SOVIET INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

Appr ... ' - 00400090001-8
SOVIET INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNICATIONS
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
September 1952
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Page
INTRODUCTION ................................... i
Headquarters Communications Procedures..... 1
Diplomatic Couriers ......................... 6
Secret Section Facilities Abroad ............... 8
Operation of the Secret Cipher Section......... 10
Secret Section Personnel ..................... 14
Cipher Pads and Code Books. . ................ 15
Microphotography ........................... 17
Clandestine Communications in the
United States ........................... 21
Sorge Network .............................. 24
Communications in Western Europe,
World War II ...........32
Radio Operations in Sweden (1939-42).......... 43
Postwar Developments in Clandestine
Communications ........................ 46
Current Clandestine Operating Techniques..... 49
Automatic Transmitters ..................... 56
Microdots .................................. 56
Secret Inks and Open Code ................... 57
CONCLUSION .................................... 59
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Introduction
An ideal counterintelligence operation is the pene-
tration of an adversary's communications between the service head-
quarters and the operating networks. It is this source which offers
the most complete and most authentic account of the activities being
conducted. It is necessary, therefore, that his communications pro-
cedures be understood, and it is with this purpose in mind that the
present study of Soviet intelligence communications is undertaken.
It is being divided into two parts: (1) the open and
ostensibly legal channels, as now available in the United States,
through official Soviet missions; (2) the clandestine channels which
would be necessary were the official delegations to be withdrawn from
the United States. Internal communications within the various net-
works, always clandestine in nature, are not within the scope of this
paper.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
The term "open channels," as used herein, refers to:
(1) enciphe red cable and radio traffic transmitted through commercial
facilities by Soviet trade and diplomatic establishments; (2) the Soviet
diplomatic couriers. The first is used for brief and urgent messages;
the latter for the main burden of intelligence traffic.
Although, properly, a distinction could be made, com-
mercial cablegrams and radiograms will be considered as one me-
dium and will be generally referred to as "cable" traffic.
Headquarters Communications Procedures
The procedures for handling secret communications
at the Moscow headquarters of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU),
although somewhat dated, have been described by two reliable sources .
Comparable information is not available concerning the handling of
communications at the headquarters of the Foreign Directorate of
the Ministry of State Security (MGB). However, the procedures
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
would seem to be generally the same, being governed by prescribed
rules for handling secret communications, which are in effect through-
out the Soviet State apparatus. It might be noted, in this connection,
that "secret sections" are established in all Soviet enterprises for
the handling of secret papers and are said to function under regula-
tions promulgated by the MGB. The secret section personnel, how-
ever, is recruited from the most trusted Party or l< omsomol members
in the particular enterprise and is not necessarily MUB personnel
With respect to incoming and outgoing cable traffic,
Ismail Akhmedov, formerly chief of an operating section in GR.U
headquarters in Moscow, has given the following account of the pro-
cedure in effect there during his tenure, 1940 and 1941:
All outgoing communications prepared by him or his
subordinates were drafted personally and by hand and were passed
by hand to the chief of the code section. This latter section was in a
walled-off portion of the headquarters building, accessible only
through a locked and guarded fireproof door, admission to which was
restricted to the chief of GRU or his immediate assistant and code sec
tion personnel. After being enciphered, the messages were trans-
mitted from thereto the cable facilities. A more complete supplement,
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
in many instances, was then prepared and. transmitted by the diplo-
matic pouch.
Similarly, incoming messages were received in the
code section, were deciphered, and distributed by the chief of the
code section to the various chiefs of the operating sections. All
messages sent to and received from a resident abroad were filed in
that resident's dossier,
Igor Gouzenko served for a year as a cipher clerk in
the secret cipher section at GRU headquarters inMoscow prior to his
assignment in June, 1943, as cipher clerk for a Military Intelligence
network in Ottawa. He stated there were about 150 cipher clerks in
the cipher section at that time, with each clerk handling up to 3000
groups (i. e . , groups of five figures) per day. Gouzenko estimated
the messages averagedfrom 150 to 200 groups each, indicating about
3000 messages incoming and outgoing daily at that communications
center. The serial numbers appearing on messages from the "Centre"
to the chief of the network in Ottawa, as set forth in the Report of the
Royal Commission, ranged from Number 10,458 on July 30, 1945, to
Number 11, 955 on August 22, 1945. This would indicate about 1500
cable dispatches emanating from GRU headquarters to operations
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
abroad in less than a month and is probably a more accurate figure
than the former estimate.
The numbers in sequence on messages from the net-
work in Ottawa to the "Centre,, ranged from 209 on July 12, 1945, to
275 on August 30, 1945, or 65 cable dispatches to Moscow in the
intervening 50 days.
These figures give a glimpse of the extent to which
Soviet intelligence operations abroad rely upon enciphered cable
transmissions.
It might be noted here that Soviet establishments in
the Far East and in several of the European countries instead of using
commercial facilities have made use of their own radiotelegraphy
hookup with Moscow. This practice, which seems to have been dic-
tated by geographical considerations and cost factors, has not been
the rule in Soviet operations in the United States. Although the former
Soviet consulates in New York and San Francisco were equipped with
radio stations, their known use for intelligence purposes was limited
to one series of clandestine communications. This will be described
in a subsequent portion of this study.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
With respect to mail to be transmitted via the diplo-
matic pouch, Akhmedov gave the following account:
Such mail was sent under a triple cover. The inner-
roost cover bore the name of the resident (i. e. , a GRU officer) for
whom the message was intended. The second cover bore a code
name indicating the mission official responsible for passing the com-
munication. (It will be seen in the following pages that this is prob-
ably the chief of the mission's secret cipher section. ) The third
and outer cover ma.s addressed to the open head of the mission; in an
embassy this would be the ambassador. The envelopes were sealed
in five places, one seal in the middle and one at each corner.
The message was then taken by the officer responsible
for it inperson to the dispatch room. There it was handed to a courier
responsible for taking it to the Foreign Office (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs). The courier, according to Akhmedov, was invariably a
"GPU man. it Elsewhere, this source has stated that diplomatic
couriers were selected from both GPU (later NKVD and currently
MGB) personnel and Soviet Military Intelligence (now GRU) personnel,
although preponderantly from the former.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
The question arises as to whether all mail sent by the
diplomatic pouch is enciphered. In this connection, Gouzenko has
stated that only that portion which identifies agents, places of meet-
ings, addresses, telephone numbers, and other compromising detail
is enciphered, but he did not indicate whether a light or heavy cipher
was used.
Diplomatic Couriers
As noted in the foregoing, Akhmedov commented that
the diplomatic couriers are selected from GPU (now MGB) and GRU
personnel. He said these selections were made with the approval of
Georgi Malenkov of the Politburo. When they are assigned as
couriers, they are under the supervision of the Foreign Office.
Akhmedovand other sources have stated that couriers
usually travel in pairs when accompanying mail. Sources familiar
with the habits and movements of Soviet couriers in the United States
have corroborated this. While traveling, they eat and sleep in shifts
and, wherever possible, obtain closed compartments. Several
sources have stated that Soviet couriers are armed while accompany-
ing mail.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
It might also be noted that a Soviet courier assignment
is regarded as most desirable duty, and many have strong personal
connections with high Soviet officials.
Soviet couriers entering and leaving the United States
since the end of World War II have traveled mainly by air. Only when
accompanying very bulky mail would other passage be likely. They
are met at the airport by a car from the local Soviet mission and by
one or more representatives of the mission. Logically, the latter
would be connected with the secret cipher section, which will be de-
scribed in the following pages. On their departure, the couriers are
accompanied to the airport in a Soviet car.
The couriers, baggage frequently consists of several
pieces: suitcases, brief cases, boxes tied with rope, and canvas
pouches. The most secret mail, it appears, is carriedin thepouches,
which are reported to contain special compartments for the intelli-
gence services, 35 mm. film. The descriptions of the Soviet pouches
Have varied. One reliable source states that many are 10 to 12
by 18 to 20 inches, bearing wax seals and metal fasteners, and fre-
quently are tied with cord. Others have described them as up to 28
inches in length and leather-reinforced.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
From several sources there is information that Soviet
diplomatic pouches, during the 1930's at least, were equipped with
incendiary devices which could be set off instantly by the courier in
an emergency. In one account the source said the pouch was built
with a shallow compartment across the bottom which was filled with
a highly combustible chemical. A cord extended from this compart-
ment up the inside of the pouch and out the top where it could be
reached without opening the pouch. This connected with a detonating
device for igniting the chemical and thus destroying the pouch and
contents.
One section of each Soviet consulate, embassy, or
commercial establishment abroad is set aside for the processing
of secret communications and the maintenance of secret files. In-
coming messages are received there, and outgoing messages to be
transmitted by cable or pouch are handled in that section, which is
referred to as the "secret section" or "secret division. " The fol-
lowing is a composite description of such facilities received from
a number of reliable sources:
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
This suite of rooms, described by some sources as
vault type, is separated from the rest of the establishment by steel
doors which lock from within. One or more members of the secret
section staff are in constant attendance. To gain entrance it is nec-
essary to summon an attendant by pressing a bell or buzzer. The
suite is subdivided into an outer and an inner section, in some in-
stances, by steel doors. The outer rooms are reading rooms where
authorized personnel may review secret communications directed
to their attention. The inner rooms are reserved for cipher clerks
and their organizational superiors. The windows in this section are
equipped with iron bars and steel shutters. Each secret section is
provided with an incinerator for burning secret papers, and the suite
is partially fireproofed with sheet metal facings on the inner sides
of nonfireproof doors.
Sources also agree that firearms are maintained with-
in the secret section for use in an emergency.
Akhmedov, referred to in the foregoing, was assigned
to the Soviet Embassy in Berlin on June 22, 1941, when Germany
invaded the Soviet Union. He states he personally assisted in burn-
ing secret papers in the secret section of the embassy, even while
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
the German police were attempting to gain entrance. He. said these
papers were burned on the floor of the secret section. Benzine and
other inflammable material, maintained for that purpose in the secret
section, were used to hasten the burning.,
Operation of the Secret Cipher Section
The best available information concerning the secret
cipher sections in Soviet establishments abroad seems to be that fur-
nished by Igor Gouzenko on the unit in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.
This can be augmented somewhat by other sources, generally in
agreement.
The secret cipher section in Ottawa was located in one
wing of the building, isolated from the remainder of the offices by
s?.eel doors, and was accessible to cipher personnel and to the rank-
ing service officials in the Embassy. It consisted of eight rooms,
seven of which were assigned to the various cipher clerks. The eighth
served as a central message center and secret file room. Only the
chief of the secret section was permitted regular access to the latter
room.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Five separate services were represented on the cipher
staff. Each service worked independently of other services within
the unit and under the direction of his service superior. Thus, the
Foreign Office clerks worked under the Ambassador, the Ministry
of Foreign Trade clerks worked under the Commercial Secretary,
a clerk was designated to handle the communications of the Commu-
nist Party representative in the Embassy, and cipher clerks were
assigned to the then NKVD resident chief and the Military Intelligence
resident chief. This latter position was the one held by Gouzenko,
working under the Military Attache.
Each service was furnished its own code and cipher
system, and access to it was limited to the clerks and their service
chiefs,
The chief of the secret section was responsible for
security within the unit, for coordinating the incoming and outgoing
communications, and for maintaining the secret files and papers.
While it is indicated that the chief of the secret section in Ottawa had
no cryptographic duties, sources familiar with other Soviet installa-
tions indicate that one of the cryptographic employees is designated
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
as the chief, which duties are supplementary to his regular work.
It would also seem that this key post would be one sought after by the
MGB representation in keeping with its security responsibilities in a
mission abroad. 4
The incoming secret communications, received by
cable and pouch, were delivered to the chief of the secret section
(another source stated that all mail is delivered to the chief of the
secret section); it was his responsibility to sort the communications
and deliver themto the proper officials. The chief collected the out-
going communications, both cable and pouch messages, and was re-
sponsible for their dispatch. In this way outgoing cable dispatches
emanated from the same person and bore no readily distinguishable
characteristics, whether they were regular Foreign Office or intelli-
gence traffic.
Similarly, the chief made up the outgoing pouches and
turned them over to the couriers.
The chief of the secret section in Ottawa was respon-
sible for maintaining the central safe and secret file room. A clerk
It has been asserted that the secret sections are operated
under the supervision of MGB. This is not taken as nec-
essarily correct, although it is probably true that some
chiefs of secret section have MGB connections.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
was required to place his code books, cipher pads, and clear text
messages in a pouch which he sealed with his own wax impression
when they were not in use. The pouch was then turned over to the
chief, who placed it in the central safe.
A similar arrangement was in effect in the Soviet Em-
?bassy in Berlin, according to Ismail Akhmedov, in June, 1941. He
said the secret section included an inner room which was accessible
only to the ambassador, the chief resident of NKVD, the cipher men,
and the wireless operators. Some of the cipher menwere sometimes
excluded from the inner room. This room contained a single safe.
The chiefs of the intelligence services maintained pouch-type bags
in which were placed the working materials, which were sealed and
delivered to the cipher man having custody of the safe. Such pouches
were duly registered and placed in the safe.
In Ottawa Gouzenko maintained a safe in his own cipher
room for the Military Attache, in which he was permitted to retain
reports on agent networks, notes on contacts with agents, the Mili-
tary Attac he I s diary, and other ope rational and administrative papers.
Clear text copies of enciphered or deciphered communications between
Ottawa and Moscow were, as we have noted in the foregoing, placed
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
in the pouch and deposited in the central safe. These were filed in
numerical sequence, with a new series beginningthe first dayof each
year.
Although Gouzenko was the only cipher clerk assigned
to the Military Attache in Ottawa, it might be of interest to note that
he learned from one of his associates that the Soviet Military Attache
in Washington, during the same period, had five cipher clerks as-
signed to handle intelligence traffic.
Several Soviet defector sources have referred to the
restrictions imposed upon the secret section staff in their social ac-
tivity. They are ordinarily not permitted to have any contact with
persons outside the Soviet staff, and fraternization with nonsecret
section Soviet personnel is not encouraged. Living accommodations
frequently are provided for the secret section personnel an embassy
or consulate premises. Sources familiar with the habits of secret
section workers in Soviet establishments in the United States agree
that their outside contacts are severely restricted. One such em-
ployee has indicatedhe is notpermitted onthe streets after 10:00p. m.
- 14 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Cipher Pads and Code Books
The Soviet intelligence communications transmitted
via commercial facilities are, of course, tightly enciphered. The
conversion of the original Russian words of a message into the final
cipher text of numerals in groups of five digits is a process which
is outside the scope of this study. It may be described briefly, how-
ever, as a two-step operation. In the first stage, Ri.ssian plain-text
words are converted into five-digit groups by reference to a code
book. This code book consists of a list of alphabetically arranged
words and phrases together with five-digit equivalents for each word
and phrase. The second stage, or final step, involves the use of a
sheet of random five-digit numbers which are added to the numbers
obtained from the code book. These sheets of additive keys are re-
moved from a pad and are used one time only. Thus there are two
instruments necessary for effecting a coded message, a code book
and a cipher pad.
Sources familiar with Soviet intelligence procedures
are in agreement that the code books are changed perhaps at six-
month to one -year intervals. The code books used by Igor Gouzenko
in Ottawa were bound in a blue cover and were about six by nine inches
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
in size. The outer cover bore the Russian equivalent of "Secret" in
the upper right-hand corner, and the equivalent of ""Copy Number-"
in the same location. In the center of the cover appeared the equiva-
lent of "Code', followed by letter and number. (Thus: "Code A-22"")
Two pages of the code books contained instructions on its use.
The cipherpads are furnished to the intelligence serv-
ices abroad at much more frequent intervals. One source estimated
that new pads would arrive about every two weeks. Each sheet of the
pad is used once and then destroyed, hence the term "one-time pad. ""
The pads used by Gouzenko bore the seal of the People"s Commissariat
of Defense, then the body to which the Soviet Army, and thus the
Military Attache, was ultimately responsible. Gouzenko described
the pads as follows :
Each branch of the service had its own seal
and all were different. The pad is bound in celluloid,
with the binding lace going through brass eyelets in
the celluloid. The top celluloid binding is a strip
around the pad. .. The bottom celluloid binding is
solid and bears the word "Inflammable" printed
thereon.
The ends of the binding lace are brought to
the top cover and the seal is placed over the ends (of
the lace). Underneath the top cover are two sheets
of black paper which must be removed before using
the pad. The numbers are arranged in horizontal
rows of 5 in each row, with 10 rows to the page.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Gouzenko diagramed a cipher pad on a scale of 3 1/2
by 4 1/2 inches. This may or may not be its true size, since he did
not indicate thereon. However, another Soviet defector, referring
to the tone -time cipher packs" in use by the Soviets in 1940, said they
were contained in grey or white sealed envelopes, about four by five
inches, which bore five seals stamped in red sealing wax. This
source said the envelope contained a number or .eery thin slips of
paper separatedby blackpaper. Each slip contained i,.- cipher num-
bers to be used on a particular date.
Mic rophotography
A study of Soviet intelligence communications would
be incomplete without comment on the use of microphotography,
Thirty-five mm, undeveloped film is almost universally used in
Soviet operations to convey documentary intelligence to the "Centre. tt
It has been noted in the foregoing that material qualifying as to brevity
and urgency may be dispatched by cable. However, in certain lines
of operation, for example in the field of technical and scientific de-
velopment, it is necessary for the intelligence services to obtain
complete documents for the accomplishment of their missiors. There
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
is an obvious advantage in submitting a complete document rather
than an intelligence agent, s uninformed version of its contents. Copy-
ing such documents on 35 mm. film is practical from the standpoint
of security and space. Therefore, we can look for this process at
one stage or another in an operation.
In some instances the source-agent with access to
sought-after documents is trained and equipped for this work. For
example, and it is only one of many which might be selected, Andrei
Schevchenko, a Soviet official on the Amtorg staff in New York City,
in 1945, attempted to penetrate the secret library of an American
airc raft manufacturer. After the build -up process, in which Schevchenko
felt he had gotten a measure of control over the source, he produced
a ZeissIkon camera, giving it to the source together with instructions
in document photography. He later tried to get the camera backwhen
the source failed to produce the desired results. For a time, how-
ever, the source, under FBI control, turned over to him information
cleared for the purpose on rolls of film. At one point the source told
Schevchenko he would like to learn to develop the film himself, but
the latter insisted he wanted only undeveloped film. This, of course,
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
is a security precaution. If the container were opened other than in
a darkroom, the film would be ruined and evidence destroyed.
Another security note, in this connection, is in the
fact that Schevchenko excused himself immediately after the delivery
of film was made to him on the pretext that he had to meet another
person. Later he returned to the source, giving him further lengthy
instructions on the use of the camera. Presumably he wanted to get
rid of the film as quickly as possible, undeveloped or not.
Any open Soviet establishment will, of course, be
equipped for document photography; and, in the interest of security
and space, bulky material can be copied upon reaching there and
transmitted as undeveloped film by courier.
The photography also might be handled on an inter-
mediate level, between the source and the Soviet establishment.
There are numerous instances available from Soviet operations in
the United States of this practice. For example, the Ovakimian net-
work, during the mid-1930's, maintained cover apartments in New
York for this purpose. Of more recent date the Julius Rosenberg
group maintained cover apartments equipped with photographic labo-
ratories. A complete laboratory was maintained by Nathan Gregory
- 19 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Silvermaster in the ba-sement of his own residence in Washington,
D. C. , where, according to Elizabeth Bentley, he and his associate,
Ludwig Ullman, photographed documents which they obtained tempo-
rarily. It would serve no purpose to recount the many instances in
Soviet operations in the United States in which microphotography
has been employed. It is characteristic of nearly all of them. The
Leica camera, or similar 35 mm. models, x .1 iw.sually be found in
the paraphernalia of a Soviet career agent.
The foregoing outlines the communications mediums
available to the Soviet networks operating at the present time in the
United States. Were the various Soviet missions to be withdrawn,
the networks remaining in operation would be required to employ
clandestine facilities, inferior as to security and capacity.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
II. CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS
Three mediums are usually suggestedwhen clandes-
tine intelligence communications are being considered: agent radio,
courier, and mail. The latter term includes "microdots, 10 secret
writing or open code letters directed to designated mail drops.
The present study indicates that Soviet operations,
under strictly clandestine conditions, have relied agent radio
(i. e. , wireless telegraphy) for the main link between networks and
the USSR, augmenting this main channel with courier and mail traf-
fic. However, it should be noted that courier and mail links are
less likely to connect a network with the USSR than with an open
Soviet establishment in the same or a nearby country.
Clandestine Communications in the United States
The early Soviet intelligence operations in the United
States were sustained largely by clandestine courier communica-
tions. During the late 1920's and the very early 1930s, seamen,
particularly on ships between Hamburg, Germany, and New York,
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
were used as couriers by the networks headed by Alfred Tiltin,
Moische Stern, and others. Funds for the networks were supplied
through this medium and the intelligence production, much of it on
35 mm. film, was transmitted through this channel. Whittaker
Chambers, Robert Gordon Switz, Nicholas Dozenberg, and others
connected with these early Soviet networks have described the seamen-
courier system.
The late Walter Krivitsky, a Soviet intelligence offi-
cial until his defection in 1937, stated that the Soviet Military Intelli-
gence service began organizing a courier system among seamen in
1926, with Hamburg the center of this activity. About 200 seamen
on ships between German and American ports were enlisted. The
system was still functioning in 1937, but Krivitsky felt it was being
used only to test its efficiency in the event war interrupted other
channels .
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the United States and the USSR in 1933, the need for such
channels became less urgent; and in this country in recent years
clandestine mediums have been relatively unknown in Soviet commu-
nications--excepting, of course, internal communications within
- 22 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
networks. However, several operations in Latin America, during
the late 193W s and early 1940's, were linked with open Soviet chan-
nels in the United States and were directed by Soviet officials in this
country. Clandestine couriers and a system of mail drops for en-
ciphered secret writing messages were employed.
A series of letters between New York and Buenos
Aires, and New York and Mexico City, intercepted by censorship
beginning late in 1941 and continuing into 1943, were found to contain
enciphered messages. The Mexico City letters, relating to Soviet
intelligence efforts to free Frank Jac son, Trotsky's assassin, from
prison, indicated many of the message series were not getting through
on schedule to the mail addresses. Perhaps for this reason, a New
York school teacher, Anna Vogel Colloms, in August, 1943, was
dispatched to Mexico City as a courier. A box of blank stationery
taken from her possession at a Texas border station revealed sev-
eral pages of invisible writing in cipher.
The secret writing letters between Buenos Aires 4nd
New York concerned, in part, the establishment of a radio link be-
tween the two cities.
One of the letters, postmarked in New York, February 1,
- 23 -'
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
1943, set up a schedule of call letters and broadcast times between
two clandestine radio stations, one located in the New York area and
one located in the Buenos Aires area. Beginning in the same month,
and closely conforming with the schedule given in the letter, a station
in New York, believed to have been located in the Soviet Consulate
there, made repeated attempts to contact the Buenos Aires nation.
This station used the, same cipher as the letter of February 1, 1943.
The traffic was discontinued in October, 1943, which time, or
shortly thereafter, several South American countries had received
Soviet trade or diplomatic missions. Thus, official channels may
have been made available to the network in. question.
Soviet networks in other parts of the world, however,
have found it necessary to use clandestine channels to a large degree,
and it might be useful to study some of the more important operations
from a' communications standpoint.
Sorge Network
Richard Sorge was assigned to Tokyo in 1935 on an
undercover mission for the "Fourth Department," as Soviet Military
Intelligence was then known. He was a German Communist who
- 24 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
entered the service of the Comintern during the late 1920's. Later
he transferred to the intelligence service. He had an established
reputation as a journalist, succeeded in submerging his Communist
history, represented a reputable German newspaper in Tokyo, and
gained complete acceptance in German official and social circles
there. With such cover Sorge operated as remotelyas possible from
Soviet official channels. It was not until 1940 that he was givenliaison
with the Russian delegation in Tokyo, and this was at his request.
Several times a year members of the Sorge network
were dispatchedas couriers with rolls of 35 mm. film to either Hong
Kong or Shanghai, where they met Moscow couriers. Arrangements
for such contact had been made by Sorge's radio station. In addition
to delivering the film (Sorge sometimes accumulated 25 to 30 rolls
between deliveries), the couriers returned with funds for Sorge's
ope ration.
By 1940 travel into and out of Japan had come under
more strict control, and Sorge had difficulty in safely passing his
couriers through to China. For this reason he asked Moscow for
liaison in Tokyo; and Moscow approved, although with some reluc-
tance. Periodic meetings, participated in by Sorge, or one of his
- 25 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
group, and officials of the Soviet delegation in Tokyo (unknown to
Sorge et al, but identified from photographs of Soviet personnel in
the possession of the Japanese police) then began, with character-
istic recognition signals and clandestine rendezvous. After this li-
aison was established, Sorge's microfilm reports to the "Centrefl
were passed on through this medium, and funds for the networkwere
received in the same way. Such meetings were, however, set up
through Sorge's radio communication system.
In October, 1941, Sorge, his radio operator, Max
Klausen, and the remainder of the network were arre-sted by the
Japanese police. The details of Sorge's operation, disclosed in a
Japanese police report, have subsequently been made available.
Portions of this account dealing with the radio operation are selected
here to illustrate the technique involved.
Max Klausen, also a German. Communist, was trained
as a radio technician in the Soviet Union andwas assigned to Sorge's
network in Japan in 1935. Klausen used a commercial cover. At
first he engaged in an export business, dealing in general merchan-
dise. Later he was established in a small manufacturing business.
Like Sorge, he successfully concealed from the German community
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
in Tokyo his Communist background and was completely accepted in
Klausen assembled his first transmitter and receiver
shortly after his arrival in Japan from parts which he purchased in
Tokyo, except for a telegraph key which he brought with him. He
later built other units and seems to have been pleased with the fact
that they were compact enough to fit into two suitcases, in which he
carried them to and from his various broadcasting ?ccations. More
current Soviet radio equipment is, as will be seen in a later portion
of this study, more compact in construction.
Klausen alternated between his own residence and the
residences of other members of the network for his radio operation.
These locations were selected with the following considerations in
mind: (1) an upper floor for elevation; (2) a wooden frame dwelling
to allow better transmission. and reception; and (3) a densely popu-
lated area to make direction finding more difficult.
Klausenos 100 watt equipment was estimated to have
been capable of a 1200-mile range. He believed that his control
station was in Eastern Siberia, possibly Vladivostok, Komsomolsk,
or Khacarovsk; but he had no certain knowledge of its location. The
- 27 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Japanese Communications Ministry, on the other hand, believed the
control station was in the direction of Shanghai, at least until 1940.
In this connection, it appears that the Japanese police picked up sig-
nals from Klausen's station over an extended period but were not
successful in locating the station or in deciphering the messages until
leads from other sources led them to Klausen.
Although he was aware of the effectiveness of mobile
direction finders, Klausen seems to have been confident that the
Japanese police had not developed this technique; he said he assumed
his broadcasts were monitored but felt he would not be traced closer
than a "few kilometers. " He alternated his location, avoided long
periods of transmission, altered wave lengths and call letters, and
was careful of outsiders. In his personal conduct, his rule was: "to
act cheerful before others, to look stupid, and especially to make it
knownl was interestedin amateur radio. n He hired his domestic help
for day service only. He dismantled and concealed his equipment
when it was not in use (in a wardrobe trunk), estimating that he could
assemble and be in operation in ten minutes and dismantle in five
minutes. He avoided an outside antenna, stringing twin-braided copper
wire about 25 feet long inside the room.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Klausen was not entrusted with the cipher until 1938.
The outgoing communications were enciphered by Sorge and handed
to Klausen. The incoming messages were handed to Sorge still in
their cipher. Sorge said he obtained special permission from Moscow
to teachKlausen the cipher in 1938 in order to relieve himself of the
burden, but felt that this was an exception to the rule that the cipher
"was revealed only to the head of a network. " Contrary to Sorge's
belief, however, many other Soviet operations have disclosed that
radio operators more often than not do their own cipher work.
There is no indication that Sorge and Klausen restricted
their contacts with each other. Incoming and outgoing messages
were exchanged at meetings in restaurants and other public meeting
places. On other occasions they openly visited each other's home.
The basic cipher key employed by Sorge and Klauaen,
by which one and two-digit numbers were substituted for individual
letters of the alphabet, was memorized. This constituted the first
step in the enciphering operation. A-second step, introduced to make
the cipher more secure, consisted of adding numbers to the basic
cipher key numbers. The numbers used for adding were obtained
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
from tables appearing in the "German Statistical 'yearbook," a book
which was in keeping with their cover. The message itself contained
an indicator group, giving the receiver the page and column of figure s
being used. Ordinary messages from the Soviet station were signed
"Dal" (Russian equivalent for !'Far East"), -and this was later
changed to "Organizer. " Messages signed "Director" were either
major directives, issued by the chief of Military Intelligence in
Moscow, and recognized as such by Sorge, or special congratulatory
or anniversary greetings.
Japanese police officials commented that the code
system employed by the Sorge network was ideal from the standpoint
of security. The cipher was difficult to read because of the rare
recurrence of the same symbols due to the use of the "German
Statistical Yearbook. " It was stated that normally, when an additive
ta'.i1e is employed, its length is limited, but this book offered an
almost infinite variety of figures. " The code key was easily memo-
rizable by the average person; and, "as long as the user took care
to remove coded messages from his person and to burn all evidence
immediately after transmission," the Japanese authorities felt that
a house search would have been unproductive.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Until the "Chinese .Incident" (1937) when the volume
of traffic was relatively small, all radio contact was initiated by the
control station. In each incoming message the time and date for the
next contact would be stated. During this period contact was had at
least once a week. Beginning in August, 1938, Sorge was notified
that the Soviet station would stand by for calls from him during the
first fifteen minutes of every hour. Klausen found that daybreak and
sunset hours were best for transmission, but he most frequently
operated during the 4:00 p. m. to 7:00 p. m. period. Notwithstanding
the earlier comment made by Klausen that he did not stay on the air
for a long period, he elsewhere stated he often worked in a four -hour
stretch.
Klausen went on the air 60 times during 1939, dispatching
about 23, 000 words. About the same volume was handled in 1940.
During the nine months the station operated in 1941, he broadcast
about 20 times and dispatched about 13, 000 words. Thus, in spite
of liaison arrangements which Sorge was given in 1940, he continued
to rely heavily on his agent radio.
After the outbreak of the Russo-German. War, Sorge
stated, he cut down on long reports and bulky documents and
- 31 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
concentrated on reporting essential facts by radio.
Communications in. Western Europe, World War .t1
A volume of material i.s available for the study of Soviet
intelligence communications under strictly clandestine conditions in
Western Europe during and in the period just prior to World War II.
After June 21, 1941, when the German invasion of r' us F is was launched,
the Soviet networks in Germany and Western Europe became heavily
reliant upon secret agent radio. Much of the information concern-
ing Soviet operations. during the period comes from German counter-
intelligence records, which are in some instances fairly complete
and in others only fragmentary. Recognizing that all the facts are
not available, it seems to be correct to say that a number of very
effective Soviet networks capable of developing intelligence of high
value to the Soviet Union were, by 1943, either eliminated or cut off
by communications breakdowns. These breakdowns can be traced to
German successes in locating agent transmitters, to effective house
searches which produced information on the network structures and
ciphers, and to German successes in eliciting cooperation from net-
work members when taken into custody.
- 32 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
The Soviet intelligence services were not completely
unprepared for the eventuality confronting them on June 21, 1941.
Ismail Akhmedov, identified in the foregoing, said each resident of
Military Intelligence abroad was equipped with his own wireless.
These were 100 watt portable units for emergency use, in anticipa-
tion of wartime conditions.
A German intelligence report, dated just prior to the
opening of hostilities between Russia and Germany, described Soviet
efforts to establish "a chain of secret radio stations in Berlin, and
other important cities of the Greater Reich, " as "almost provoca-
tive. " These efforts were reported to have been headed by one
Kobulov, the Soviet Embassy Counsellor, described as a "GPU"
official. The same report also described the roundup of 60 persons
in Czechoslovakia and the confiscation of a dozen secret radio stations
during the same period.
In spite of the presence of Soviet official representa-
tion in Germany up to the date of the invasion of the Soviet Union,
much of the Soviet intelligence activity against Germany after the
Nazis suppressed the German Communist Party was directed from
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
the neighboring Low Countries and France. The resident directors
of those operations relied upon the official Soviet channels until June,
1940, when they were disrupted by the German occupation.
A network headed by Leopold Trepper, established
in. Brussels under a commercial cover in 1938, rriaintained corru-nuni-
cations through the Soviet Trade Delegation in Brussels, until it was
withdrawn in June, 1940. Trepper then moved to Paris and estab-
lished contact with the Soviet Military Mission at Vichy, which, in
turn, was withdrawn in. June, 1941.
A branch of Trepper's organization, meanwhile, con-
tinued to function in Holland and 'Belgium. Dutch, Belgian, and
exiled German Communists, together with several Soviet nationals
(documented as Latin Americans, Finns, etc. ), made up this group.
An export-import company, with affiliated branches in Brussels and
Paris, served as a cover for funds and communications and enabled
the organization to continue and to expand contacts inside Germany.
After the German invasion of Russia the Trepper or-
ganization and the other Soviet networks in Western Europe were
completely reliant upon agent radio for contact with the "Centre. "
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
In those areas in which the German radio control organization could
function such stations were rapidly silenced.
The first major break for the Germans was the un-
covering of a station operated by the Trepper organization in. Brussels
in December, 1941. Several of the group were arrested, a complete
photographic laboratory was seized, a quantity of counterfeit
identity cards and a volume of plain-text and ciphered traffic con-
fiscated. One of the principal agents, one Ma::~karov, a trained
Soviet radio technician., walked into the arms of the German police
on the morning following the raid, when he appeared at the house,
unaware of what had taken place, with a set of messages for trans-
mission.
The remainder of Trepper"?s organization was then
integrated with a group headed by l onstantine Jeffremov, a Soviet
national who arrived in Brussels in 1939 undercover as a student of
chemistry. Jeffremov was documented as a Finnish subject. He
had taken over a group of German and Dutch Communists, and late
in 1941 his group put an agent radio into operation. This station
took over the Trepper communications with the "Centre," up to
June, 1942, when it was located and confiscated by the German radio
control organization..
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Documents seized in. this raid, together with the
earlier seizure, enabled the Germans to fill out their knowledge of
these Soviet operations to a large degree. Johann Wenzel, a German
Communist long sought by the German police, was captured in this
raid and under interrogation appears to have given away the cipher.
This enabled the Germans to decipher a quantity of back traffic and
to uncover important network links inside Germany.
One of the groups exposed was headed by Harro
Schulze-Boysen, a Luftwaffe officer assigned to staff work in the
German Air Ministry, Schulze-Boysen had liaison with an official
of the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin until the mission was with-
drawn in June, 1941. The Soviet official turned an agent radio over
to him at that time, but technical difficulties prevented him from
establishing contact with the "Centre." Late in 1941 one of the agents
in the Trepper organizationwas dispatched from Brussels to contact
Schulze-Boysen in Germany to assist in overcoming the technical
difficulties, and to aid the group in getting into direct contact. This
connection was exposed by the Brussels back traffic.
Another group, headed by Arvid Harnack, an employee
of the German Ministry of Economics also was uncovered. Harnack
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
had been controlled by the same official of the Soviet Trade Delega-
tion and also had been furnished an agent radio for direct contact
with the "Centre." Liaison was arranged between the Schulze-Boysen
and Harnack groups to provide each with an auxiliary communications
channel. Meanwhile, neither group succeeded in making radio con-
tact, and a courier link between Schulze-Boysen and Brussels and
between Harnack and the Soviet Trade Delegation in Stockholm was
maintained until late in the Summer of 1942 when both groups were
eliminated. All together, 80 persons were arrested, an indication that
this was a major blow to Soviet intelligence.
Ramifications of these Brussels seizures led to
Holland, where several agent radios were silenced, only to be suc-
ceeded by others which had been held in reserve. When the reserve
equipment was seized by the Germans, attempts were made to para-
chute agents and equipment into Holland. The same pattern was fol-
lowed in Germany. In general, it might be said that the operations
of the agent radios, if successful in making contact with the "Centre, "
were short-lived.
Meanwhile, Trepper and his organization in France
made several attempts to establish radio communication with the
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
"Centre. " Agent radios operated by the underground French Com-
munist Party were placed at his disposal from time to time. All
this activity came to an end late in 1942 when the German counter-
intelligence organization traced him through his business affiliation
with the Brussels group, and uncovered his associates in Marseilles
and Lyons.
In June, 1943, Tepper escaped from German custody,
but he appears to have given the Germans a degree of f- oope ration and
to have compromised several of his important associates before
doing so.
German counterintelligence made a concerted effort
to play back the agent radios uncovered in France and the Low
Countries, setting up a special organization to coordinate and control
the counteroperations. In some instances the original operators
were at least partly cooperative. No great successes have been
claimed for these attempts.
In neutral Switzerland, however, three agent radio
stations, best known by the German code name "Rote Drei, 11 served
an important Soviet operation in a most effective way until late 1943.
AGerman official has given the following account of the damage done
to the German cause by this Soviet group:
-38-
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
". . . in the most critical period on the easternfront,
at the time of the battles around Stalingrad and in
the Caucasus, and then later in the spring, summer
and autumn of 1943, in those decisive days when
the German armies in the southern and central sec-
tors of the eastern front were sweeping back, in those
days when one expected that s-omewhere, perhaps
on the Dneiper they would be able to make a stand,
check the onrushing tide of the Russian armies, and
build a new firm front, precisely in those days,
weeks, and months the most secret information
regarding the troop units, strength, assembly areas,
intentions, etc. was passing currently through
Switzerland to Moscow. These were exclusively
matters which must have come from the highest
level of German military command. "
The German monitoring service first intercepted the
traffic between the "Rote Drei" stations in Switzerland and the con-
trol station in the USSR in June, 1941, and placed their position
generally in the Lake Geneva region. They were quickly recognized
as agent stations and henceforth were closely monitored. Not until
1944 was the cipher broken and the traffic read.
The principal figure in the "Rote Drei'" group was
Alexander Rado, an immigrant Hungarian cartographer. Prior to
June, 1940, he maintained communication with Moscow via Paris,
with microfilm couriers passing between his headquarters in Switzerland
and Soviet official channels in France. The occupation of France
by German troops suddenly cut this link, and it was necessaryto in-
tegrate his network with another group operating in Switzerland
- 39 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
which had already succeeded in establishing radio communication with
the "Centre. " One of the stations made available to Rado was the one
operated by Alexander Foote, who was recruited into Soviet intelli-
gence when he returned to England in 1938 from service in the
Loyalist Army in Spain. He was first assigned to establish himself
as a resident in Munich, reporting out to a network superior in
Geneva. Before this operation had progressed ;? far, Germany
and Great Britain were at war, and Foote, using British documents,
was hastily withdrawn from Germany.
Foote then took an apartment in Lausanne, Switzerland,
passing himself off as a "leisured emigre Englishman." He was given
elementary instruction in radio operation and at length installed a
transmitter in his apartment. Foote's superior, a woman, also
operated a unit in her residence near Geneva, This was later moved
into Geneva and was operated by the proprietor of a radio repair
shop. A third unit, operated by a Swiss woman Communist, who was
trained by Foote, completed Rado's radio communications system.
Foote, who has written an account of his operations
in Handbook for Spies, states that Rado's network consisted of some
- 40 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
60 sources, and after June, 1941, the three stations were fully oc-
cupied in carrying his traffic. The urgency of the situation made it
sometimes necessary to broadcast for hours at a time, in violation
of security rules. In an enemy country, he felt, this would have led
to early discovery, but in Switzerland appears not to have created
much interest until later.
Foote established contact with the Soviet control station
through a fixed call signal on a fixed wave length. When the "Centre"
replied to his signal, Foote then switched to his "working wave length:'
After establishing the initial contact, the "Centre" did the same.
Foote felt this practice cut to a minimum the possibility of radio
monitoring.
All messages were enciphered in five-digit groups.
The first stage in the process was based on a memorized key for
converting the letters of the alphabet into numerals. In the second
stage-Foote calls it "closing the cipher"-a passage taken from a
text employed as a code book was also reduced to numbers, and the
latter product added to the product of the first stage. It is of interest
to note, as in the Sorge operation, Foote used a book dealing with
statistics for the second process. * Recognition groups inserted into
Statistical Handbook of Foreign Trade, 1938, and
Swiss Handbook of Trade Statistics, 1939
- 41 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
the ciphered text identified the page and passage used.
In 1943 the Swiss authorities became interested in
the "Rote Drei" network. Foote was not immediately located, but
his companion stations were identified and raided. In one of the
raids copies of the plain-text messages, in some instances with an
enciphered version attached, were found. This station was using
Rado's personal cipher, thus compromising it. Foote, however,
had his own cipher, and thus could continue to function; during the
ensuing weeks his was the only link between the Rado organization
and the "Centre. " The urgency of the situation seems to have com-
pelled the use of Footers station in spite of the obvious danger.
Afewweeks after the companion stations were raided,
the Swiss police located Foote's transmitter. He had time to burn a
few documents, and to put his set out of commission, before the police
were able to break into his apartment. Subsequently, the Swiss
attempted a play-back with this station, which failed, according to
Foote, because Rado's cipher was used on the Foote unit. The
Soviet station confirmed its suspicions by putting some "control
questions" to the operators, who were unable to make the proper
responses.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
The surviving operations in Switzerland were thus cut
off. These included the most valuable of all Soviet sources in war-
time Germany, a source which has never been completely identified.
The material, conceded to have come directly from the highest
German military circles, was referred to as the "Lucy" source, and
was funneled through Rachel Duebendorfer to Rado. In November,
1943, Duebendorfer wrote an open code letter to an acquaintance in
Montreal, Hermina Rabinowitch, the contents of which are revealed
in the Report of the Royal Commission, with instructions to pass it
along to the Soviet Embassy at Ottawa. Through this means,
Duebendorfer attempted to re-establish contact with the "Centre."
It must be concluded that her situation was desperate to justify so
evident a security breach.
Radio Operations in Sweden (1939-42)
The Swedish Radio Control Section, operating in con-
junction with the counterintelligence police, located a number of
clandestine agent radios being operated by Soviet intelligence during
the 1939-1942 period. The networks for which the radio stations
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
were being operated were headed by Soviet officials on the staffs of
the Soviet Legation, the Soviet Trade Commission, and the Soviet
Travel Agency in Stockholm. One of these officials, Stefan Artemiev
of the Soviet Legation, took the trouble to explain to one of his radio
technicians that "the international situation might result in the with-
drawal of official Soviet representatives in Sweden andmake necessary
the use of radio transmittal in sending data to the Soviet Union. _'
These cases seem to have been directed mainly toward
information concerning German military movements in the Scandinavian
peninsula and the Swedish military defenses. Some of the stations
already were in contact with a control station located near Moscow,
while others were in the process of establishing contact. The stations
were located in private dwellings, many of them enlisting aid from
Communist Party members and sympathizers.
One of the cases in this group, involving a youthful
refugee named Lennart Katz, is of interest since it is an instance in
which a radio operation was isolated from the remainder of network
activities. Katz put a station into operation in June, 1942; it was
located almost immediately and Katz was apprehended in the act of
transmitting.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
Katz, acting solelyas a technician, neitherenciphered
nor deciphered. He received outgoing messages in cipher and deliv-
ered incoming ciphered messages at a cache in the remote country-
side. His instructions were to check the cache on odd weekdays
between 1:00 and 2:30 P.m. He never saw nor identified the courier
who visited this drop. On even weekdays Katz was under instructions
to pass a designated street corner at the same hour of the day in
order that the network could have him observed and be assured that
he was not under arrest.
This practice of using a cache as a liaison drop has
been widely used by the Soviets in Europe and in recent years has
been noted in connection with Russian operations in the UnitedStates.
Further reference will be made to this device in a subsequent portion
of this study.
In other cases in this Swedish group the radio techni-
cians also performed cryptographic duties. It was observed that the
key bookb used in such instances, which were popular editions of
Swedish literature, could frequently be identified in house searches
by their well-worn appearance. In one case the cryptographer cus-
tomarily had dirty hands, and his code book was well smudged with
finger impressions.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
In summing up this account of clandestine operations
in Western Europe, it can be said that the services of many valuable
sources and some entire networks were lost because they had to
rely on agent radio, and in those areas in which the monitoring serv-
ices were well developed, radio operations could not be concealed
over an extended period. The exceptional case was the group in
Switzerland, where radio control seems to have been ineffective
Postwar Developments in Clandestine Communications
There is in evidence a more thorough course of train-
ing, especially in agent radio technique, in the Soviet intelligence
services. The curriculum of an eight-month training program offered
prospective "illegal residents" of GRU in 1945 provided individual
instruction and practice at various residential locations in and around
Moscow, with no classroom work, for obvious security reasons.
Student agents were trainedin the construction, re-
pair, and operation of agent-type radio, and in Morse code, broad-
casting technique, methods of camouflaging antennas, and in the
- 46 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
theory and practice of radio direction finding (gonionaetry).
Among the suggested measures for camouflaging an-
tennas were the following: (1) stretch a third wire so it appears to be
part of any exposed wires belonging to the electrical installation of
a house; (2) simulate the installation of an electric wall plug for attach-
ing an electric iron or table lamp, but using one of the terminals for
the antenna; (3) form the antenna into a spiral and place it on the in-
side of a picture or mirror, using the end of the antenna to hang up
the picture or mirror; (4) stretch the antenna on a balcony or in a
court, so that it appears as a clothesline; and (5) install the antenna
as though it were part of the usual house-type radio equipment.
On the theory that direction-finding equipment could
not be brought into and be in operation in an agent radio's immediate
vicinity in less than one hour, these student agents were instructed
to limit their transmissions to one hour or less.
Places for concealment of equipment, when not in use,
recommended in this GRU training course are not unusual: overstuffed
furniture; false bottoms in wardrobes and other items of furniture;
and secret compartments in the walls, ceilings and floors.
In addition to the course on radio operation, the pro-
spective GRU "illegal residents" were given basic agent training ing
-
- 47
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
methods of security, forms of liaison (contacts, meets, etc. ), re-
cruiting procedure, intelligence objectives, and enemy police organi-
zations and methods..
Document and nondocument photography and laboratory
work (using the 35 mm. Russian ":Fed, " a copy of the "Leica""),
cryptography, and the use of secret inks also were part of the course.
Another Soviet innovation is the development of a more
compact agent radio. During the latter part of World War II, and
during the years since the war, a radio referred to as the "Tensor M"
model has made its appearance in widely scattered Soviet operations.
This model or variations of it were furnished behind-the-lines agents
parachuted into Germany late in the war, and have been furnished
agents in Japan, Finland, and Western Europe in more recent opera -
tions.
This equipment consists of three, and sometimes
four, units packaged separately (receivers, transmitters, and
rectifiers) in metal cases, each unit of which measures approxi-
mately 1 1/2 by 4 by 7 inches. The complete set, with accessories,
can be fitted into a medium-sized piece of luggage. Although such
units have not been identified with anything produced in the English-
speaking countries, they bear, probably for reasons of deception,
- 48 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
English printing. Their construction indicates the units are factory
produced, primarily for intelligence service use. Under good oper-
ating conditions this equipment is capable of transmitting -up to or
exceeding 1000 miles.
The "Tensor M" type equipment is more readily con-
cealed and transported than the earlier Soviet agent-type radio, many
of which were improvised and agent built.
There is also an indication that the Soviets have de-
veloped a weather-resistingprocess permitting agent radio equipment
to be buried in the ground for long periods of time. Such equipment
is reported to have been furnished agents connected with a Soviet
"stay behind,, program in the satellite countries, who wouldbe called
into service should the Soviet Union lose control of that territory.
The equipment is alleged to be buried in locations known only to the
agent and his superior and is exhumed and examined once a year for
defects. Meanwhile, the agent operators have been given cipher
systems and call schedules and are held in readiness, with no other
assignments.
Current Clandestine Operating Techniques
Two "illegal residencies" in Western Europe, one of
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
which was established in 1948 and the other at an earlier date, oper-
ating under strictly clandestine circumstances, provide some fairly
current information on Soviet methods. These operations were pro-
vided with two communications systems, agent radio and an overland
courier link, connecting with an official Soviet mission in an adjoin-
ing country. First, the radio system will be described briefly.
The radio equipment provided the agents in these op-
erations was similar to the "Tensor M" type described in the fore-
going. In one case, the agents, secretly entering the country of
operation, brought it in, in a small suitcase. In the other, the agent,
on arriving in the country safely, transmitted an open code letter
to a mail drop outside the country, and the radio was brought in by
courier and turned over to him personally. Both units were set up
and operated from private dwellings.
On their dispatch, these agents were provided with a
schedule for several months in advance covering broadcast dates,
times, and frequencies for communicating with the "Centre. " (The
control station it believed to have been located in or near Moscow. )
This schedule, too complicated to be memorized, in one instance
was photographed on silk and sewn into the lining of the agent's
- 50 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
clothing. The schedule had several provisions.
First, there was a table of bilateral contacts with the
"Centre; 11 each of which provided for two wave lengths, the first for
regular contact, to be used during the first 15 minutes of the call,
and the second, an alternate, to be used if the first did not result in
contact.
In order not to exceed the one-hour broadcast time,
there was provision for a unilateral contact, to occur on a specified
frequency at a given time on the night prior to the bilateral contact.
Acknowledgment of the receipt of the unilateral message would, thus,
be made by the receiving party during the subsequent bilateral session.
Unilateral contacts, offering greater security from direction finding,
increased in number, and the bilateral contacts decreased, as these
operations progressed,
In addition, the agent was provided with a schedule of
"control calls" (about 12 a month) in which the "Centre" went on the
air at certain times and the agent responded only if he hada message.
If he had nothing to send, it was not necessary for him to stand by
for such calls.
The call letters used by the agent for all transmissions
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
are changed with each broadcast--as are the call letters of the con-
trol station in. the regular bilateral contacts-and are based on a
formula derived from the calendar day and month.
The cipher systems used in the operations in question
conform generally to those described earlier in this paper. The plain
text is converted into numbers, the key to which is in a memorized
code word. In the second stage reference is made to a key book,
and a second set of numbers is obtained. The Iwo products are
added, and the final cipher obtained. A variation of this system was
used also in these operations, in which the numerals in the latter
stage were then transposed into letters of the alphabet, and the mes-
sage as transmitted is in letters rather than numbers.
The key books used in the operations in question were
popular editions of current fiction, and they were not changed fre-
quently. In one instance the same key book was in use for over two
years. The agent (and this appears to be typical practice) selected
the book to be used, purchased two copies, kept one for himself, and
transmitted the other to the "Centre" by courier.
Radio contact was established on an average of five or
six times a month, for brief and urgent operational traffic and admin-
istrative matters such as the receipt of funds by courier, the dispatch
- 52 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
of film by courier, and arrangements for courier meetings.
During the early period of the operations in question
regular courier liaison, with personal meetings, occurred about
once a month, later being reduced to three-month intervals. Such
meetings were stipulated as to time, place, and recognition signals;
and it was in this manner that funds and equipment were brought in
to the operating group and the bulkier reports and documents were
transmitted to the "Centre. " Both operations made ,_ase of 35 M.M.
film for some of their transmissions.
The chief of one of the groups, after a year in opera-
tion, was called to an adjoining country, where he was in directcon-
tact with a superior. He was instructed to prepare a detailed report
of his organizational work and full account of his operational activities
for the year. This report required about 15 days to prepare, and
on its completion he was instructed to return to his operation.
While in direct contact with his superior organization,
however, this agent was instructed on his return to operations to
prepare a series of "letter boxes" (hiding places or caches to which
we have referred in the operations in Sweden), and to submit plans
and photographs on each for approval. These, of course, were to
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
eliminate personal contact between couriers and network members.
Four such locations were selected and submitted, one a hole in a
pile of stones in a city park, and the others in remote places outside
of the city. Two were approved, including the one in the park, but it
appears that they never were used; instead, personal meetings with
couriers continued. However, in the companion operation ome"letter
box" was used. The "Centre" notified the "illegal resident" by radio
that funds would be deposited for him in a hiding place; and, although
he had three prepared and approved caches, the "Centre" chose to
establish a new one for this deposit. He was given detailed instruc-
tions for locating a brick wall in which one brick was missing. By
reaching deeply into this hole, the agent found the package. It might
be noted that U. S. currency was supplied in this instance.
The "letter box" cache is not a new development in
Soviet intelligence technique, but until recently is not known to have
been used in the United States. (Parcel lockers have been used to
make transfers, a variation of this idea.) However, in recent Soviet
operations here the practice has been discussed or employed in
three separate instances. When used it is usually accompanied by
a signal mark in chalk or pencil indicating to the other party that a
"deposit" is waiting to be picked up. When one party wishes to meet
- 54 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
with the other, this may be indicated,byplacing a mark on aparticular
page of a public telephone book or other accessible public document.
Another twist on current operating methods is noted
in the case which led to the conviction of 22 persons for espionage in
Greece during the past year. Two clandestine agent radio stations
locatedin private dwellings were uncoveredin this case bydirection-
finding equipment. Both were concealed in basement crypts or vaults,
the entrances to which were hidden. In one case a sliding concrete
block covered the entrance, and in the other a door step, which
could be bolted into place from within, covered the entrance. In the
first house the tenants led the police immediately to the crypt; but
in the other, although the station was in operation when the raid
began, it was many hours before the raiding party located the crypt
and then only with aid of mine -detecting equipment. A Greek Com-
munist leader, in the cryptwhen it was located, shot and killed him-
self before the police gained entrance. Before that, however, smoke
was observed coming from a chimney; and,realizing that the oper-
ator was burning his documents, the police poured water down on the
fire and thus salvaged some material, including key books which
subsequently were of assistance in breaking back traffic.
- 55 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
The most recent and the outstanding Soviet achieve -
ment in clandestine communications is the development of an automatic
tape transmitter, capable of sending up to 500 words a minute,
adapted for use in conjunction with the "Tensor M" type equipment.
Such equipment, which will fit readily into a piece of luggage 18 inche s
in length, has been placed in use by Soviet intelligence.
An entirely new problem is therefore presented to the
direction-finding services. The hand-keyed agent radio of the past
averaged 10 to 15 words per minute, and his broadcasts were meas-
ured in terms of an hour or less. The automatic equipment will
enable him to get on and off the air in a very few minutes.
A statement cannot be made as to the extent of the use
of this automatic equipmentinSoviet operations, nor can its technical
performance be judged at the present time. It promises, however,
to relieve the main weakness in Soviet clandestine communications
and to offer prospect for greater use of agent radio in the future.
Special emphasis has been given in this study of Soviet
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
communications to agent radio and its auxiliary, the clandestine
courier, because the operations studied have given prominence to
these mediums. This is not to discount the possibilities of the micro-
dot. Akhmedov, to whom we have referred previously, has stated
that the microdot process was known to the"Fourth Department! '(Soviet
Military Intelligence) in 1940, and related a specific instance of its
use at that time. One Volnuchin was dispatched to the United States
as a resident late in 1940, and was given a letter to deliver to the
Military Attache at Washington. The cover text was in the form of
a letter from a relative; the microdot was placed over an Ili. 11
Akhmedov recalled that Volnuchin lost the letter en route, and on
reporting the fact was recalled from Washington and dismissed from
It can be assumed that the Soviet intelligence services
have added the German know-how in this field, and that effective use
of it can now be made in their operations.
Secret Inks and Open Code
Although the technical aspects of secret ink communica-
tion are not proper to this study, it is necessary that attention be
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
directed to it as a medium. Brief reference has been made to the
enciphered messages in secret inks in the traffic between Soviet net-
works in South America and New York during the early 1940s, and
it has been noted that training in this subject was given prospective
GRU "residents" in 1945. Lacking the speed of radio and the capacity
of a courier system, secret ink communication might be looked upon
as an auxiliary or emergency medium.
Another form of written communication which must be
considered, and which cannot be fully treated herein, is open code.
This is a general term for the practice of concealing messages with-
in innocuous appearing personal correspondence or other cover texts.
This may be effected in a number of ways; cryptic words, symbols,
or letters having special markings or positions, all forms of open
code, usually are arranged privately to cover contingent situations.
Situations which have not been provided for occasion
the use, of double-meaning language, another form of open code, and
for this reason it is of particular interest. It is insecure and dan-
gerous, and its use indicates an emergency. Rachel Duebendorfer's
communications with Hermina Rabinowitch in Canada, necessitated
by the fact that she was completely cut off, illustrate the use of
- 58 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
double-meaning language and the circumstances requiring it:
We live in the former apartment and are working
as previously in the old firm. . . Relations with Lucy
are good... Sisi's (Duebendorfer) position is sad.
Please inform Gisel's parents (Soviet Embassy at
Ottawa) that they must remit 6, 700 dollars. , . .
(Report of the Royal Commission, p. 571)
A few weeks later Duebendorfer sent another appeal
... Please inform Gisel's family, that she should
advise Znamensky 19 that Sisi is alive and works
as of old with Lucy. . . For the work of Sisi Gisel's
family must transfer 10, 000 dollars....
(Ibid., p. 573)
The reference in the second letter to "Znamensky 19, It
the Moscow headquarters address of the GRU, was considered
particularly indiscreet by Soviet intelligence officials in Ottawa.
In summary, the main links between Soviet networks
and the "Centre,' are provided by the legal communications system
of Soviet missions. Since greater security, speed, and capacity are
offered, the official channels will be used as long as they are available.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
When cut off from official channels in the past, Soviet
networks have turned to agent radio; and, where it was possible to
do so, augmented the radio system by a courier link with an acces-
sible Soviet mission in a neighboring country. Under clandestine
conditions, the future prospect would seem to be for heavier reliance
upon agent radio if automatic transmitting equipment proves to be
effective. Courier systems will be necessary to sustain operations
over a long period of time, and the microdot and secret inkprocesses
may in some instances replace the 35 mm. film in the hands of the
courier. Emergency situations may call for the use of such devices
as open code on occasion. But the rigid centralization which is a
trademark of Soviet operations will require the rapid exchanges in
basic communications that only radio can provide.
This would seem to have an application to Soviet op-
erations in the United States should a break in relations occur, and
it must be assumed that plans for an agent radio system to function
under such conditions have been formulated.
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8
 56R000400090001-8
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400090001-8