INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000300050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET CO Oil ICIALS ONLY
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND INTELLIGENCE
SECRET CONTROL CIALS ONLY
It.
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Ci r, f- 0 ri' T T' .^!Af'9PS ti t I n
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND INTELLIGENCE
I, INTRODUCTION
The Evaluation of a Revolutionary Situation? The Communist Parties
of the entire world are shock brigades of the world revolution--the inter-
national revolution announced by Lenin when .he stated: "We are starting
a world revolution which alone can consolidate our own, and assure the
transition to a socialist regime, " The precipitation of this revolution,
however, cannot be left to chance or to local outbreaks; the timing of an
'operation" is determined strictly by a combination of political, econon is
and social factors favorable to the launching of a revolution Any pre-
mature action is as harmful as the failure to take advantage of a favorable
"revolutionary situation"
To 4eterxnine whether or not a revolutionary situation exists in any
given area, it is necessary for international Communist leaders to have
at hand at all times for each geographic area, information concerning all
the contributing factors. Maintaining a picture of political. economic and
social tensions susceptible of creating a revolutionary situation is one of
the permanent tasks of the Communist hierarchy--the national Communist
Parties and their liaison organs, the international mass organizations and
their witional affiliates., Each element of this hierarchy contributes to-
ward filling in a part of the picutre,
Studies ma.de by the international Communist apparatus are developed
into analyses of the "relation of forces" and the evolution oi this relation.,
These analyses review the potentialities of the two camps--Communist and
anti -Communist --and the probabilities which may evolve from these, The
analytical work concerns not only the activity of the "enemy" (the state and
the classes) but also anything concerning the tievelopm nt of Communism
anywhere in the world, its difficulties and its failures as well as its
progress, The Communist authors of these analyses are thus partly at
least, simultaneously actors as well as writers, a fact constituting a
source of weakness and possible error.,
The Importance and Political Significance of Intelligence, Of the great
amount of 'intelligence collected by Communists some of it is without
visible interest, Collection of information, however, is in itself a virtue,
an act of political significance, since it serves as a means of keeping
cadres and militants on the alert during periods of relative inactivity,.
A ("1 .LJV V1N L L
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I rorn a Communist?s point of view, every capitalist r& ginme is un-
lawful. therefore? it is his duty to fight against it by every m ar_s
Eventual clandestinity is the logical result of the non-acceptance of a
capitalist government. This ethic necessarily in;.luences the methods
and atmosphere of activities of the Communist organization--particularly
the work of collecting information. There is a constant interplay between
the "special" or illegal activities, the overt political action, and the
normal organizational work.
The term "political significance" must be understood, Collection and
the utilizationof information are closely allied to political' action; the
former conditions the latter and vice versa. This interaction has been
defined in the following formula: "The idea that one has of the relation of
forces is a chief element of this gelation. of forces," In other wor:la, the
.detailed picture of the activity of the Communist world and of the action
of its adversaries, place.i in the hands of the Communist leaders, is ex-
ploited for political, organizational or agitation-propaganda purposes, in
order to recruit new adherents to the movement or to provoke reaction
from the "enemy". The result is a continuous evolution of the "relation
of forces" which constantly modifies the picture prepared by the Communists-
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Il, Guide for information Procurement
Information Procurement
is Related to Aiz4t-ic,
4. rapaizar-da ?I'herruesc
Comrriunist collection of information is related more or less -di.ry to
the three topics of agitation propaganda defined at the November 1949
meeting of the Corninform-,'
struggle for peace and against warmongers
elimination of Titoist spies
unity of action for the working class.
According to Leninist -doctrine, "in assimilating this or that element of
agitation, the masses spontaneously translate these into the language of
action"; this formula is equally valuable as it pertains to the collection
of information, the necessary prelude of action,
This theory involves an important corollary.-, wide dissemination of
agit.pt?op themes creates a favorable climate for the collection of infor-
mation and furnishes for this collection an i.ndiopens a'l le s cholK- ical
support . Therefore directives of the Central Committees of the swestern
Communist parties have requested the cadres of these parties to inculcate
the masses with a true "defense reflex" which will influence thern
spontaneously to denounce preparations for wax. Collection o#' information
for the Party thus becomes a direct and important contribution, to the
defense of peace,
Contributixg to a "climate" favorable to the collection of information is
the fact that some of the .Peoples' Democracies have provisions in their
constitutions granting asylum to foreigners persecuted in their own
countries for having fought for the "defense of peace" or for "^scientific
activity".. Collecting information for the Party constitutes a direct
contribution to the defense of peace; thus it is fitting to reassure the
supporters of those who, because., of this activity, ri.ske*d coming under
"repressive" legislation of the, non-Communist countries,
S ecific directives Request the Collection of Information.. The three
main topics of agitation-propaganda also serve as a direct guide for the
initiated Party activists who can read between the lines and act accordixgly"
This guidance, however? is not considered sufficient,, and therefore Party
and mass organization directives formally prescribe the collection of
information. The following are quotations from directives of this nature:
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In a circular of October 1950, Khalid Baghdash, Secretary- Gen.::r ai oz
the Syrian-Lebanese Party stated-
"Every Communist must report through the Party Merarchy all
information that he happens to learn, whether it is a question
of exact facts.- doubtful or rumored stories concerning the general
situation, persona in contact with.the party, the machinations of
foreign powers"
In 1951 the Uruguayan Communist Party distributed tracts in the
industrial centers and in the country requsting the recipients to send
to the Party.the maximum amount of information about most divers6
subjects,, even about facts appearing to be without importance, It w ra
stated that the limits of intelligence work are "good will,, political scree
and the patriotic ardor of each one".
In October 1951 the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT)
requested Communist trade unions of the African colonies to furnish
regularly as detailed information as possible on the economic situation
of the country,, as well 'as on the nature and importance of civil and
military works being undertaken by the French and the Americans?
The same concern is found on the level of the international mass
organizations; the report of Mr, Henri Jourdainy Sec? of the Trade
Union International of Metalwcark.ers and Mechanics of the WFTU presented
at the Conference of Metallurgical workers of the' countries of Europe
(Vienna, February 1952) contained the following passage-
"Our trade group will not be able to face its international obligations
unless, in each country, affiliated or not, a group of comrades
takes upon itself the responsibility of informing our International
Union of the metallurgists and mechanics in its country,
In July 1951, the Secretariat of the World Peace Council at Praguel.
wrote 'to some of the affiliated national organizations,
"In view of the interest which the Secretariat has in the situation
in your country, and in view of the response which the World
Peace Movement has there? we are interested in receiving as
regularly as possible information about the struggle for peace,,"
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In the resolution of the Administrative Committee of the Trade
Union International of Seamen and Dockers reached at the meeting of
December 1950 in Warsaw, one can read;
"The organizations affiliated with the International Union must
keep regular, close contact with the Secretariat, and by at
least three monthly reports, they must keep the Secretariat
informed about current events, about the work accomplished
and the results obtained;, These reports must be received in
time to permit the International Union to take the necessary
measures"
Radio broadcasts in the French language from eastern Europe also
direct collection of intelligence; thus, a broadcast of Radio Prague of
21 July 1952 stated
91If you wish to send us information about the occupation of
France by the Americans, write to Andre Carrel and Frat-cis
Cremieux,, in care of Radio-Libert.ea 6 Bid Poiseonniere?l Paris,,"
A leitmotiv figures in many directives the information must
include the maximum number of concrete examples, photographs.' names,,
facts, detailed statistics, etc, This question is more important on the
national level than putting the material in good order; thus in July 1951,
the WFDY told its national affiliates that if they met with difficulties
in the presentation of material collected,. they could send it "in bulk"
to the Secretariat.
Special Directives Issued in Form of Questionnaires,, Agitation-
propaganda having created the raeccosary psychological conditions and
general directives having underlined the permanent nature of inforrna.taan
collection, special directives then specify in detail the points which
should be amplified in Communist reporting at any given moment,, for any
given area,
Special directives are generally transmitted as questionnaires
appearing in circulars widely disseminated, The questionnaires are
presented either in unedited form (forme brute), or more often accompanied
by an explanation of the reason why the information is requested, It as
interesting to mote that each international meeti1 g is generally precc C-,i by
a detailed inquiry, A few examples of special -iirr.;ctic-,n :riv.--n here
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Unedited clue stionnaire a
The Austrian Communist Party transmitted to Communist xren'lbers
of the councils of enterprise living in the French Zone questiom.aires of
Fora given locality
--military construction
-use of these 'constructions
-kinds of unite, total s t'rengtha.
--if a motorized unite state type of vehicles
'munition depots, position, importance, kind of aynrxunition stored
--militarywork carried out near bridges, routes, railroad crossings,
tunreleA etc, mine shafts; who carried out these activities,,
For a given enterprise
-nature of production; quantities produced;
--number of workers, hours of work .
--how long has the factory operated? Details concerning its owner
=
ship.
-for whom is it working? Where are the orders delivered?
-stocks of supplies
In July 1952 the Communist Party of West Germany transmitted through
its "Agricultural Sections" District Party directives requesting informatics
about requisition of land for military purposes. The questionnaires Nvere
worded as follows:
How many hectares were requisitioned in the district ? The kird
of land,; Locationof requisitioned land,, Requisition plans?
Registered protests Organizations which objected, Position
taken by local authoritieae Do deputies of the Landtag and the
$undestag live near these territories? Do Party members o.
sympathizers live near these areas? Are there other people who
could be influenced to collaborate in prote sting against the se'
military projects ? Addre a se s of these people ?
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The Association of Liberation of the Chinese, a mass organization
seeking to group under the Communist banner the Chinese of Indo-China,
requested its basic organizations to procure the following information;
--evolution of the strength of the Chinese colony, movements of
population, causes of displacement
--attitude of the Chinese emigres concerning the Vietnam government,,
the Communist Party of Vietnam the USSR, and the popular
democracies, Chinese-Vietnam relations, the reactionary Chinese.
French and American imperialists the puppets of Bao Dai,
--plots of the enemies of the Chinese, etc;
agricultural activity of the emigrants, their difficulties, their attitudes..'
about the distribution of land, the influence of this policy, etc.
--attitude of Chinese emigrants toward Vietnam currency
--have the Chinese emigrants understood the "new economic policy"
of the government
--the attitude of the Chinese emigrants toward the economic oppression
of the enemy
-cultural questions: number of "-iliiterate Chinese emigrants"new
schools, sabotage of cultural activities by the enemy
military questions; precautions taken against traitors, Chinese
participation in the militia, in sabotage, in resistance activities:
material and financial support of the struggle; iijuries suffered
by Chinese emigrants
Questions Preceding an.J ernational Conference
r r++rrse rw
Among the recent examples, intelligence work was required:
on the occasion of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the
International Federation of Democratic Women, dune 1951: careful
study of the military budgets of each nation
--before the meeting of the Council of the World Federation of
Democratic South, August 1951: research on the consequences of
"la politique de guerre" and of armament on the life of youth
on the occasion of the International Assembly of Metallurgical
Workers opposing the Schuman plan (June 1952): investigation
of working conditions, questions of labor supply, arrangements made
or planned to oppose the Schuman Plan.
-in view of the World Congress of Teachers, organized in 1953 by the
Trade Union International of Teachers, survey of teaching
personnel, its political composition,, its methods of organization,,
its demands, its relations with the political power in each country,,
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Three questionnaires are quoted in full length here, The first was
issued by the Trade Union International of Agricultural and Forestry
Workers while that organization was preparing any indictment of the colonial
system in Africa. which was to be sent by the World Federation of Trade
Unions (WFTU) to the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations,
The second questionnaire originated with the Trade Union International
of Mechanics and Metal Workers of the WFTU in the summer of 1952 and had
as its purpose the collection of data for an international union of representatives
of naval construction workers. The third questionnaire was issued prior to
the Moscow Economic Conference of April 1952,
1. Anti-Colonial questionnaire about Africa
m the actual statue of the mass of farmers
-possibilities of agricultural development of the land-
-influence of the colonial system (which, far from being an element
of progress and civilization, constitutes pillage of the African
resources and an obstacle to the economic and social development
of the territories)
--the query included detailed questions about:
--colonial law making (or its absence)
-economic situation of the farmers
.paid agricultural workers and their situation
repression
-demographic and sanitary situation; status of education
=colonial organizations and pillage
-possibilities of the development of agricultural rf~ sour.ccs
-claims which have been drawn up
2. Questionnaire about Naval Construction
a) how many workers are employed in this industry (by shipyard or
by dry dock)
b) what are the working conditions
-hours of work
- rate of construction
-security and hygiene
c) what systems of remuneration are used and what are the wages
d) what are the work plans: - -
-threat' of dismissals and unemployment-
sources of raw materials
-non-military construction
trade with eastern countries
e) what claim.: are made and what are the e6~
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f) how and on what basis is unity of action being prepared and
realized in the shipyards and what are the difficulties met in
these efforts?
Questionnaire Preparatory to the Moscow Economic Conference
-=lack of currency
B. Restriction of Trade Channels
To what do you attribute this state of affairs ?
In particular, to what extent; do the following factors
pertain.
A. Scarcity of Raw Materials
--What are the reasonri for the shortages, if any?
--stockpiling of strategic materials
-arising of world market prices
`-closing down of certain markets
If possible give concrete examples and corroborating facts.
To what degree does this situation affect your standard of
living, and that of your associates and employees,
(Date of the beginning of the slackening and its importance)
PART ONE; Description of the Situation of the Business or Industry
in Which You are Engaged
Is this business or industry presently experiencing a
slowing down of activity or a reduction of profits?
a) Concerning the domestic market, has the falling
off of sales come as the result of a decrease in
buying po rp or from some other cause?
b) Is exportation to certain countries presently reduced
or even prohibited? What countries and for what
reasons?
C. Increase of Business Costs
--salaries and NW1f-a-re-e'xpens0s
-taxe s
(Proportion of these two factors in relation to
turnover and in relation to each other, I
D, Restriction of Credits Necessary for the O p e r a t i o n
of the Business
a Has th authoritative lessening of credits irnpo&E d
by the banks affected your economic sector?
b) Do you consider this olio ustified'
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PART TWO: Search for olutions
We invite you to consider whether an increase of production can be
effected in your sector, and in the general national economy, with-
out first eliminating the factors of economic depression which we
have just enumerated.
Since general productivity apparently cannot be increased except by,
longer working hours or. by consolidation of businesses (which would
have as a result the elimination of small'and middle -sized businesses)
would these solutions appear desirable to you'
Do you foresee, on the other hand, the possibility of increasing
international economic exchanges? Could this be done through the
termination of regulations prohibiting the export of certain products
to Eastern countries? Study, the po?sibiltti:s o; c:c,bang?s with
those areas.
Is not the reduction of international economic barriers, moreover,
essential to an easing of political situation?
Do you see any way to lessen the fiscal burden besides a reduction
oi rearmaments?
Can armaments be reduced without endangering the security of the
nation?
What is your opinion about the possibility of an international dis-
armament conference. and about the possibility of common action
to achieve this?
Are you willing to discuss this subject and are you willing to support
your point of view quite apart from any political obligation?
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Interpretation of the Directives and Exchange of Experiences
General directives and the special questionnaires constitute the
basis for intelligence collection,, But the Party sometimes explains
that these directives have no restrictive character, the only limita-
tions being "good will, political sense and the patriotic spirit of each
individual.." In other words, an invitation to extend information
collecting to more confidential matters is implicit in the directives,
Thus when trade unions of naval construction, workers were invited by
the Trade Union International of Mechanics and Metal Workers to
collect information on non-military construction, they assisted at the
same time in collecting information on war industry as related to naval
construction, In March 1952, the Austrian Communist Party (KPOIe )
informed its cells that surveillance of "preparations of war" implied
the communication to the Party of all detailed observations pertaining
to the construction of barracks and -munition and gasoline dumps; instal-
lation of mine chambers on bridges, highways, centers of power supply;
and military preparation of the police, gendarmerie, customs officers, etc,
It frequently happens that on the national or international levels one
organization obtains better results in its intelligence collecting than a
neighboring section does. A pooling of information therefore takes plate
to promote the total intelligence effort, Under the phrase "exchange of
information", the organizations vvorking against the same objectives
communicate to each other the. results of their efforts and discuss methods
used, difficulties met and successes obtained. Thus on the occasion of
the preparation for the meeting of the "International Conference for the
Peaceful Solution of the German Problem", organized by the World Move-
ment of the Partisans of Peace, the French and German representatives
decided at the Strasbourg meeting, December, 1951, to proceed regularly
with the exchange of military information,
PART THREE: Procurement Techniques
Mass Method of Information Collection
The "mass method" of intelligence procurement does not involve
investigation by specialists working according to traditional rules, The
idea of quantity outweighs every other consideration, Rather than keeping
a small number of agents near points of critical interest, the mass systern
utilizes large numbers o: informants placed at every level of the adminis-
trative, political, economics social and military apparatuses. The pace of
modern civilization continually increases the comphjty of these organizati^rts,
and it becomes more and more difficult to obtain an overall perspective,
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Communism takes up its observation at the base, scrutinizing especially
certain sectors which, according to the Communist viewpoint, have the
greatest importance for Marxist interpretation,
In 11Hurnanite of May 9 and 10, 1951, the following explanations were
given by Madame Simone Tery concerning the investigation, undertaken
by the FCP, of the "American occupation" of France, The survey was
made by the combined efforts of thousands of observers, who can be
divided into two groups,
(1) The 500 accredited correspondents of l'Humanite, who, "day
after day, at the cost of great effort, in addition to their daily work., sent
regularly and willingly. thousands of reports, These reports, "even when
it was not possible to publish them" informed the Party "about anyone- who
was passing through any part of France," The correspondents were thus
mobilized in all of France for the investigation of the "American occupation, "
(Z) To these 500 correspondents were added, for this investigation,
section leaders, Party members, and readers of 1'tHumanite,, all mobilized
to collect information,. It was a question of a ".fraternal complicity" of per-
sons who submitted carefully prepared documentation, reporting what they
knew, and indicating what should be investigated,
Utilization of the Communist Organization
Legal and illegal activities of every Communist organization overlap
and interpenetrate; their respective importance varies somewhat, but traces
of illegal activity are found at every level of the organization. This observa-
tion obviously applies to questions relative to the collection of intelligence
information, to the degree that such collection violates the law, and empha-
sizes an importance difference between the "mass system" and the "classi-
cal system" of information procurement) instead of creating a special,
apparat, the mass system contents 'itself with utilizing the entire Communissi
organization itself,
This principle has two
mportant resulted
(a) The observer of a determined target is the Communist militant
or sympathizer who is close to the target, He can, thereiorerz observe as
a connoisseur and report with a maximum of accuracy,,
(b) The Communist organization, through the mass organizations,
has access to the largest sectors of human activity, and is able at times to
annrnrch a. target from several different angles.
According to its inherent nature, each carnrnu.nist :or'~nizatior is
especially fir ctcd towards a certain segment of society which it is assigned
to canvas,, It is, however, possible to find two ad.iitional aspects in the mass
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(1) In the event.of'an inquiry considered particularly import -
ant, , ecveral organizations may be directed against the target
jointly with the organization normally qualified to perform the assign-
ment, Thus, survey questionnaires emanating from the Trade Union
International of Agricultural and Forestry Workers, prior to the pub-
lication of the anti-colonial indictment, were addressed not only to
its affiliated trade unions. but also to all the African trade unions
under Communist domination.
(2) Certain organizations appear to have been founded pur-
posely as a means of approach to a selected target; this was the case,
for example, in the 'Committees against the Construction of Airfields"
set up in West Germany in localities where such work was in progress,
The Networks of Correspondents
One of the masterpieces of the Communist system of procurement of
information is the network of correspondents organized in imitation of the
"rabkor" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This institution,
which was for a long time a practice of Communist-Parties, is presently
being extended to the national and international mass organizations, The
WFTU in particular advocates the organization of such systems on a pro-
fessional basis. This was, done in 1950 in the seamen's and dockers' union,
and in 1952 in the Metal Workers' Union,
The existence of these networks of correspondents must not be consid-
ered as a technical (or professional) specialization, In fact, the corres-
pondents are not paid party workers; their activity is explained only by the
necessity of the Communist organizations to free themselves from bourgeois
sources of information.
The networks of correspondents are generally connected with the cen-
tral organs of the Communist press. Each correspondent, a confirmed
Communist, is chosen upon the suggestion of the local leaders of the Party,
He must have special aptitude for observation, and must keep himself
informed about problems which evolve from the Party's political policy,
He signs his reports with a number; the reports are generally checked by
the local Party leaders, In certain countries, there are confidential bul-
letins for correspondents in which-they exchange, experiences, The
correspondents are not paid, but expenses they incur in their work are
reimbursed by the Party. The information collection program of these
workers is very wide in scope, as illustrated by the two following projects,
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In ;o11and, the correspondents are instructed to report on demands
for salary increases, working conditions, job accidents and their causes
(especially those which are not reported in the "bourgeois press", gene; al
operations of factories, benefits, influence of non-Communists; and
the prospects for a united front, They must likewise report activities of
the municipal assemblies; interest themselves in the general demands of
the people, in rural problems, in the problems of the middle classes, and
in education and housing.
In the western zoncoof Austria, correspondents are requested to follow
public opinion closely; provide statistics on industry, business and aa;ricul-
ture; report incidents in which occupation troops are involved; maltreat-
ment of Austrians by Allied police; measures taken by the Austrian or Allies
against the peace movement; preparations for war; construction of barracks
and airfields; military manoeuvres; and to observe everything which concerns
the Foreign Legion and displaced persons.
Two remarks will terminate this brief expose on the subject of corres-
pondents:
(1) One network of correspondents often works for the benefit of
several recipients; either a Party and a mass organization, or, as in West
Germany, for the benefit of the Communist Party of West Germany and that
of the Eastern Zone, In other words, the collection of information is unified;.
but there is a difference in the manner of exploitation by the various recipi-
ents.
(2) In West Germany, the correspondents have received instructions
to avoid any action which would violate counter-espionage laws; the essential
task for them is to continue their activity without exposing themselves to sup-
pressive measures, One of them however, a municipal councilor of
Fribourg,, was convicted of espionage in the summer of 1951.
.
Within the purview of a study of. the intelligence activities of Communist
parties, special mention should be made of the units within these parties
responsible for agitation-propaganda, Observations made in Austria make
it possible to describe in detail the activities of an agit-prop section,
i
The Agit-Prop. Section of the Central Committee of the Austrian Corn-
munist Party (KPOi?) in Vienna receives, from the agit-prop sections of the
provincial offices of the Party, periodic reports on various questions of
possible interest to Party headquarters,
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Information .Exploited bar Alit-Prop Sections
Among subjects treated are industrial, economic and social prublerns;
technical progress in metallurgy, the laying-ofi of workers, trade union.
conferences, social agitation. Political questions are also treated: rnuni-
cipal activities, local activity of government personalities. A great many
of the reports deal with military questions concerning the Allies and the
Austrian police, such as:
1. Incidents with occupation troops.,
2. Military construction, with emphasis on details about the con-
tractors and those authorizing this construction,
3. Photographs of police equipment and details about Allied Ofii -
cers responsible for liaison with the police.
4. Details of training given to new occupation troops,
5. Supplies of ammunition.
6,, Movement of armored vehicles,
7. Progress of airfield comotruction, etc.
8, Details of security measures taken when important officials
travel., especially security precautions taken in railway stations_
9. Reports on military transport by rail.
10, Movements abroad of suspected persons (without doubt in order
that these persons can be watched by another Communist Party),
11. Lists of unemployed workers (so that each one can be contacted
,personally by a Party member,
Mechanics of Reporting
Certain observations and conclusions can be made concerning the
mechanics of reporting-
ay the reports transmitted generally -.3rry a coded indication of the
source, or a statement such as, "a confidential contact in the factory
rnn,'ric th*t , c+ts
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b) Frequently, questions considered. Of most interest are explored
further and supplementary, detailed reports are requested,
c) Agit-prop sections sometimes query Party headquarters to learn
if the information they have collected has been confirmed.
d) They report difficulties encountered in their intelligence work
(arrest of militants caught in illegal acts) and ask what attitude they
should adopts
e) Agitrprop sections sometimes request permission to. publish in
the local Communist press information which they have collected,
f) The Austrian Communist Party believes that it is well informed
on the activities of the police, as it has two informants in that organiza-
tion, one in the communications section and the other in the research
section, '
g) The Agit-prop sections of the Austrian Communist Party, in
accordance with instructions from the Central Committee, refuse offers
of intelligence information from certain types of persons, (employees of
brothels, for example), even though they may be well placed to obtain
details of military activity.
Technical Aids
Communist organizations tend increasingly to employ modern techni-
ques in intelligence activity. The following- examples have been noted:
1) In Austria, the use of telescopic lenses for photographing mili-
tary installations;
2) Inltady, attempted installation of telephone taps,
Members of Austrian factory cells were advised that some component
parts, believed at first to have no possible military use, could be used in
the assembly of armored vehicles or artillery pieces, and were requested
to purloin samples of such parts. They were instructed to send these to
Vienna, where the Party leadership would have them examined by experts
in order to determine if they were to be used for the rearmament of the
Western powers,
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PART FOUR-. Methods o1 Transmitting in Formation
Declassification of Secret Material
The Communist apparatus :s less interested in the confidential nature
of an information report than in the possibilities of exploitation that it fur-
nishes., pNevertheless, in the mass of information collected, there are
con.z.?. .lt. a r: ,.nrtr- 1 . 'qa.? th L r
a i" Y:~..Y: oi- the F~t2.~"c?l:~.~ re~~olutii
ists included a clause demanding the disclosure 0:, secret treaVi es an4 docu.-
ments. International communism has remained faithful to this tradition,.
In declassifying documents, Communist organizations function as "trans-
formers" of secret information into overt information which can be freely
transmitted,
Communist opposition to secret government activity is seen in the
following types of incidents;
1) Party orders to militant Communists working in armament fac-
tories to refuse to sign oaths of secrecy concerning military secrets,
2) During various Communist espionage trials,. Communist newws-
papers have published the text of the information which the defendants Were
1e~ s}Seri of having procured,
Y211,ersee of Mass Organizations in Opposing Secrecy
The role play"ei by a speci.a.lize-a mass organization. such as the Work!
Federation of Scientific Workers, should be taken into account, At every
opportunity, this federation and its affiliates declare themselves in favor of
extensive international exchange of scientists and technicians an: of the
communication of discoveries and working methods "for reasons of inter-
national peace., " Such organizations regularly take a stand against the main-.
tenance of secrecy concerning nuclear and bacteriological .research..
Mechanics of Transmittal of Information
Once documents have been declassitied and publicity has been given t
confidential infornnationH the methods of transmittal of information no longer
presents any special problem., Thus the survey on the Americzm occupation
of France, which appeared in 11Humanite in the spring of 1951, .was transmitted
to Budapest, Warsaw and Moscow as a "review of the reuse,
to analyze further the mechanics o transmittal, it is well to begin at the+base-
that is, at the collection point of the "raw." information, Generally speaking,
no information report reaches the highest levels of the mass organizations
or the Soviets in its original form, At each intermediary stage,, there is a
screening, sifting and partial exploitation of the infor ma `
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Within a country, all methods of transmittal are used: direct contacts,
telephone, postal courier, etc. When the mails or the telephone are used.,
a slight degree of security is obtained by the use of numbers to protect the
anonymity of the informants.
We have noted in Germany and Austria, the use of communication chan-
nels composed of Communist railway employees when the information is of
confidential nature (troop movements, transport of materiel, etc. ). In
Germany, the East-West frontier presents problems of transmittal which;
have been solved mostly in the following manner: the work is coordinated
in West Germany at Bonn by the chief correspondent of the Information
Agency of the Soviet Zone (A. Do N. ); the information is sent under cover to
a certain number of trusted individuals, then sent on via several secure Chan-
nels into East Germany. The chief correspondent regularly crosses the
frontier, receives the documents forwarded and carries them to East Berlin,
taking care to'avoid the western sectors of the city.
Information passed from a national mass organization to an international
one generally has been transmitted via the postal system. Certain organiza-
tions affiliated with the WETLY have noticed inexplicable delays in the trans-
mittal of reports by mail. and since the fall of 1951, the WFTU has been
'searching for a courier system providing greater security.
Travel of militant Communists to the Soviet Union and to the peoples
?e .ncracies has been used as a means of transmitting reports. It is well
known that such travel is extremely frequent, and is occasioned by inter-
national meetings, organized trips, "peace vacations," etc. A report on the
Belgian Congo, for instance, drawn up by the Colonial Committee of the
Belgian Communist Party--a document indirutably of intelligence interest
which contained first-hand information on mining questions and on capital
investments--was taken to Moscow in April 1950 by one of the leaders of
the Belgian Communist Party. In July 1952, the Swiss police arrested
Professor Bonnard, of the University of Lausanne, President of the Swiss
movement of the Partisans of Peace, when he was about to leave for Prague
and Berlin. He was carrying a report on the International Committee of the
Red Cross and its directors which was destined for the World Peace Council.
Professor Bonnard had collected this material at the specific request of
Professor Joliot-Curie. President of the World Peace Council, who had
had personal contact with him in May 1952. The Swiss authorities considered
this an act of espionage carried out in behalf of a foreign power.
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Soviet Access to Information in the Possession of International Mass.
Organizations
It is known that the Soviets are represented widely at the head of inter-
national mass organizations. Thus they are in a position to keep themselves
informed about reports addressed to the Secretariats of these associations,
For example, it is known that Serguei Rostovsky, (formerly) Assistant
Secretary General of the WFTU, and a Soviet citizen, sent registered pack-
ages every three days from Vienna, to the International Department of the
Central Council of Trade Unions of the Soviet.Union in Moscow. It is pre-
sumed that a synthesis of reports received by the WFTU reach the Soviets
in this way. This hypothesis is strengthened by the very nature of the
International Department, which is responsible for liaison with foreign
trade unions and which maintains contact with foreign trade union delegates
who have visited the Soviet Union, If one admits that the manipulation of
the international mass organizations is achieved by the spokesman of the
corresponding Soviet mass organization, one can easily understand the
unity of the entire system and its ultimate centralization for the benefit of
the Soviets,
Some Exceptions to the Usual Channels of Transmittal
There have been some exceptions to the channels of transmittal which
merit attention:
a) ROSTOVSKY, as Assistant Secretary General of the WFTU,
requested the Secretary of the Confederated Trade Unions of Cameroun
to inform the WFTU directly about the meeting of the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions held at Duala in March 1951.
b) In October, the Central Committee of the Soviet Trade Unions of
Maritime Transport Workers, with headquarters in Moscow, initiated
contact with a dockers' trade union of a large port of French North
`Africa, The trade union in question then made use of its channel to
Moscow to inform the Soviet trade unions of its strength. its problems,
the victories gained in the struggle for peace and national liberation,
etc.. and kept its correspondents informed of everything which might
be of interest.
In these two cases the procedure was the same, In Cameroun, direct
passing of information to the WFTU eliminated the Union des Syndicats
d'Outre-Mer and the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT),. In the case
of the North African port, the CGT and the WFTU found themselves elimi-
nated in favor of the Soviets. These exceptions can be explained in the first
case by the need for urgency, in the second, by the strategic and political
importance of the North African port,
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c) Liaison between the various interested organizations does I
not always seem to function perfectly. It is known, for example, that
the Belgian Communist Party sent to Moscow an important report on
the Belgian Congo; some months later the WFTU complained that it
was priorly informed about this region, and, not having the report in
its possession, was obliged to write to the authors of the report. In
this particular case, the absence of a central trade union under Com-
munist domination in Belgium accounts for this direct contact between
the WFTU and a national Communist Party,
PART FIVE: Exploitation of Intelligence Information
The collection of intelligence brings into the possession of national
and international Communist organizations a considerable mass of hetero-
geneous information, a large part of which may quickly become outdated.
The use of this documentation presents special problems whose solution
constitutes one of the characteristics of the "mass method". The intelli-
gence which has been collected is not merely handed over to specialists
for study, but is often extensively used for agit-prop purposes. Over an3
above this immediate exploitation, which appears to be given priority
consideration, an intensive exploitation is effected within Party informa-
tion offices. The results of this further exploitation may also be used in
the agit-prop field,
The Communist organizations are give considerable initiative in deter-
mining the use to which intelligence. information shall be' put. Any informa-
tion, the dissemination of which will constitute a weapon in the political
battle, must be given immediate publicity. Any oversight of this principle
will be reprimanded. Thus, the German Communist Part congratulated, the
Communist Party of the Saar on the quality of the information the latter lad
collected and transmitted, but reproached that Party for not having exploited
the information fr'r. local propaganda,
Channels for Immediate Exploitation:
(a) The Press: The Communist Press abounds in revelations, often
from excellent sources, and frequently presented in Vie form of photocopies
of the documents themselves? Some examples of immediate press exploita-
tion are: Sweden: The publication of a document of the Swedish Intelligence
Service concerning the use of Russian emigrants as agents. Germany:
Publication of a circ ulcer originating with the Allied intelligence services
concerning the use of former prisoners of war in the Soviet Union,
Dissemination at the international level of information os confiden-
tial nature to be reprinted in the Communist press, appears to be handled
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by the Telepress Agency, located in Prague, That Agency has dealt with
the following subjects in its communications:
- use of Japanese and Chinese Nationalist agents by the American
services
- activities of the Western intelligence services against Czechoslovakia
- secret documents of the United States Department of Defense concern-
ing the aid given to the American services by the Catholic Mission of
of Seoul
- secret British documents concerning the plans of the British Govern-
ment regarding the Sheffield Peace Congress
- report bf the Chief of the American Military Mission in Indochina to
President Truman
- F.B.I. activity in the United Nations Secretariat
- commentary on a report of Roger Wybot, Chief of the French Sur-
veillance du Territoire
Teleprese Agency maintains close relations -with the WFTU and disseminates
for it certain iniormation ani:' warnings
(b) The Radio: Exploitation by radio follows the same pattern as used.
for the press, but has an element of speed which the press does not enjoy.
The following example is cited to illustrate the rapidity with which informa-
tion can be transmitted and broadcast:
On 2 November 1950, the Communist papei LePatriote de Dijon, pub-
lished information on the interrogation of an intelligence agent by the
Surveillance du Territoire of Dijon, The Dijon press reaches Paris about
7:00 a. m, ; the report was picked up by the Paris office of the Tass Agency
and integrated in its review of the press which it transmitted to Moscow at
11 a: m. At 12:30 pu m, (French time) the news item from the Dijon paper
was broadcast practically word for word from Moscow,, The report was of
great interest to the Belgian CP, as it concerned a person whom that Pay-ty.
suspected of having participated in the assassination os one of its leaders,
Julien Lahaut.
One of the most effective Communist radio programs relating to.ri ce
and broadcast as part of their "Voice of Peace" propaganda plan, is the
program titled, "The American Period in I rancc" ("Ya Fr'anca a 1'hr.urc americaine") broadcast by Radio Pragy w It is of interest to note
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that certain efforts at immediate exploitation have been stopped because
inopportune, For example, 1?Humanite once published the numbers of
two policemen conspicuous for their anti-Communist attitude. Though
information of this sort has never reappeared, black lists nonetheless
continue to be compiled.
Intensive Exploitation, (Exploitation "en profondeur" )
In each Communist Party as in each mass organization (national and
international) there is a unit where documents are assembled, put into
order, studied and synthesized. This reports office is generally located
within the Secretariat of each organization. As an instance of "intensive
exploitation" carried out by a Partisans of Peace organization, the follow-
ing episode is related:"
In Austria, the Partisans of Peace synthesized, in the form of a
"White Book", studies made by militant Communists on war preparations,
The book gives a detailed picture of the Allied occupation And of military
installations in Western Austria. For the most part, the published details
are accurate; some of them, notably concerning the presence of Americans
in the Tyrol, brought out facts not well known to the local French com-
mander. The "White Book" is illustrated with sketches and photos, some
of them on large-scale, of military objectives in restricted zones. More-
over, this document, without including direct appeals for sabotage of
installations, discusses existing security measures and contains very use-
ful facts for eventual sabotage. For instance, the "White Book' contains
the following statement: "The new bridge of Otztaler is furnished with
mines in the interior of its first piling; the place is marked, at the third
row of stones from the base. with a brass notch the size of a coin."
Analysis of this "White Book" reveals that it was compiled by military
specialists.
Intensive exploitation seems to be most highly developed in the trade
union field. This is not surprising in view of the close link between trade
union affairs and economic problems, and in view of the following considera-
tions:
(a) Communist theoreticians anticipate victory of the proletariat after
the collapse of the economic system of the capitalist world;
(b) the study of the economic situation of the capitalist countries fur-
nishes Communists with the most useful themes for social and revolutionary
agitation, and permits them (when Moscow does not order otherwise) to
choose the best moment for action.
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The following are instances on the national and international level
where intensive exploitation has been carried out by trade union organi-
zations:
1) The "Confederal Center of Economic Studies" of the Secretas iat
of the Confederation Generale du Travail functions as a research
section dealing with French economic problems. In close liaison with
the Bureau de Documentation (Reports Office) of the CGT and the Com-
mittee of Economic Studies of the French Communist Party, it furnishes
the latter with information and supplies the necessary facts for CGT dele-
gates on the Economic Council, It is equipped to examine reports assem-
bled by the trade federations of the CGT.
Staffed with specialists on economic problems, the "Centre Confederal"
issues periodic and special studies. Some of these deal with aspects of
the economic crisis in France and have appeared in the WFTU publication,,
"World Trade Union Movement,"
Representatives of the Centre Confederal d'Etudes k conomiques some-
times attend meetings of the Departmental Trade Unions (Unions
Departernentale s des Syndicate), as for example the meeting at Annecy in
November, 1951, where a program for denouncing the manufacture of war
materiel was set U. At the end of the meetings, delegates to the Enter-
prise Committees of the factories of the department (which included an
important bearings plant) were invited to:
procure a list of the customers of the factories
establish contact with the workers of customer factories to deter-
mine if the products were used for military equipment,,
2) The Economic Section of the West German Communist Party (I'IPD)
This unit is responsible for the following tasks:
a) examination of Western newspapers and economic periodicals.
b) the exploitation of answers to questionnaires distributed by Party
headquarters to Communists belonging to Enterprise Committees
and to certain trade union officials. A questionnaire concerning
mines of the Ruhr, for instance, contained the following questions:
personnel strength (classified by age), appointments and dismissals,
salaries, detailed information about the depth of the prob-
lems of investments (self-financing, investments of foreign capital,
E', Ro P, credits), etc.
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One very successful survey concerned the copper foundry of
Duisburg, and it included a list of the suppliers of raw material, a list
of customer firms, the ultimate use of semi-finished products (notably,
utilization by the radar industry of the United States), etc.
Members of the Economic Section are frequently reminded of the
permanent security regulations concerning the transportation and safe-
keeping of documents, and are warned to avoid becoming involved in a
lawsuit on charges of industrial espionage,
Completed studies of the Economic Section are sent by trusted
couriers to the "West Section'." of the Central Committee of the Socialist
Unity Party of East Germany and to the Kuczinsky Economic Institute at
Berlin,
3) The Bureau de Documentation of the WFTU, The World
Federation of Trade Unions receives from all over the world a consider-
able mass of information and reports which must be exploited whenever
possible, The Federation has consequently organized within its Secre-
tariat a "Bureau de Documentation"' which has modeled its filing system
on that used at the International Labor Office in Geneva,
The WFTU files its reports with the aid of large-sized markers
separated according to:
- classification by subject matter (basic reference)
classification by geographic area (cross reference),
The classification by subject matter includes, among others, the following
headings agriculture, armament, unemployment, colonialism, living
costs, discrimination, war economy, strikes, imperialism, inflation, raw
materials,,' etc. Each one of these subject headings has logical sub-headings,
as: Discrimination in commercial, economic, political, or racial matters,
This classification by subject matter is completed by a geographic classi-
fication (by countries or -regions). Thus the information,. "Armistice negotia-
tions in Korea are at a standstill because tungsten mines are at stake,,
Without Korea's tungsten, the U. S. would be unable to manufacture jet
planes and shells, or to supply its atomic energy projects" will be noted on
a basic reference card having the source and date of information and filed
under the headings, "raw materials--tungsten" and "imperialism," as well
as under two cross-reference cards filed under the headings, "Korea" and
"United States,,?'
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Producing Intelligence Information
The idea. of "producing" intelligence information characterizes what
is undoubtedly one of the most unique aspects of the "mass system" of
information collection. As opposed to the "classic system," which con-
notes the collection of information already available in the form of reports,
patents, etc. , the "mass system," based on first-hand observation, is in
a position to produce. new information, By accumulating fragments of
information, studying them synthetically from a pre -conceived (Communist)
point of view, the Party, through Its "mass. system," is able to achieve a
general perspective of a given problem which is sometimes quite or'ginal
and profitable to the Party. This is particularly true when the Party's
"mass system" takes on a function the government has not considered
necessary to fulfill:
1) For instance, in 1950 a foreign power interested in French fac-
tories, working for national defense, reportedly tried to recruit as an agent
an employee of that government service, competent to report on such matters,
Allegedly, he was not able to fulfill his mission because of the fact that orders
and deliveries at that time came under two separate government offices,
and there was no centralization. On the other hand, thanks to the interven-
tion of the Enterprise Committees of the armament factories, invited under
the pretext of "defense of peace" to denounce preparations for war, procure-
ment of this information was effected without difficulty by the Confederation
Generale du Travail, (CGT)o
2) In May 1952, C, G, T? trade unions of the Paris region and the
Communist Federation of the Seine undertook a study of factories working
for national defense and of the kinds of goods being produced, The Centre
Confederal d?Etudes Economiques of the C, G. T. prepared a study on the
profits which French manufacturers will realize from national defense
orders. As far as is known, no French government office is in possession
of statistics of this nature,
PART SIX.- Conclusions
The Communist Postulate
There is no coherent search for information without a postulate of
political strategy and a definition of policy which supports intelligence
procurement. For international Communism, in spite of variations in
tactics, the postulate is very clear and has been formulated many times.
It can be summarized by the following statements-.
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a. The Soviet Union wants the victory of the proletariat the world
over and works toward this end.
b, The Western powers want to prevent the victory of the proletariat
b1 means. including force.
c. The Soviet Union does not want war, but wants to be stronger
than its enemies.
d. Because of the superiority of the Communist economic system
over the capitalist system, the Soviet Union will be able to survive the
armaments race. while the West will be ruined by this new burden; the
West will receive the final blow when the last colony liberates itself;
internal disputes in the imperialist bloc and the progressive closing of
markets will be contributing factors.
e. Consequently, there is reason to believe that the world revolution
of the proletariat will be achieved without war and within a reasonably short
time. However. as the capitalist bloc will not voluntarily abandon power
but will rather risk a war, the "partisans of peace" of the capitalist county
tries must paralyze the preparations for war until Western economy col-
iaps, s.
Given these principles. there evolves a series of conclusions which
may be summarized as follows:
1) In order to penetrate every segment of society, assignments
must be distributed throughout the parties and the mass organizations.
2) Since intelligence information is not only the necessary pre-
lude to action, but is closely connected with action itself, there must be
constant interplay between procurement and exploitation of information.
3) Finally, it is reasonable to question the objectivity of the pic-
ture drawn up by the Communists and to ask if, carried away by t heir
dialectic. they may become victims of "self-intoxication",
The Distribution of Tasks
The flexibility and comploity of the Communist apparatus --parties
and mass organizations--permit excellent coverage of Western activity,
The WFTU, because of its horizontal and vertical structure, is of con-
siderable importance for intelligence procurement. Through horizontal
structure (the national trade unions), WFTU leaders have at all times an
exact picture of economic and social conditions in a given country.
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Through its vertical structure (the trade union internationals) certain
problems can be approached logically from a continental or international
level. Thus, the seamen's and dockers' unions affiliated with the Trade
Union International of Seamen and Dockers can rapidly inform the inter-
national headquarters about delivery of American arms, a subject to which
they have been directed to give priority attention. Similar statements can
be made concerning centralization by the WFTU of information on social
security, housing, education, etc. The Trade Union International of Metal
Workers and Mechanics, in collaboration with that of the Miners, follows
closely all questions relating to the Schuman Plan, A "European Workers'
Committee", grouping various trades, is studying the problems presented
by the rearmament of Germany,
The World Movement of the Partisans of Peace and its affiliates were
initially restricted in their intelligence efforts to political questions and
to problems relating to preparations for war. Its vertical hierarchy has
permitted (the Moscow Economic Conference, Committees for the Develop-
ment of International Trade), public health (Doctors' Conference for the
Study of Living Conditions, Committee of Inquiry on Bacteriological War-
fare), religious matters (Moscow Conference).
Other masf organizations fill in the gaps of the picture through the;
normal exercise of their activities; thus the World Federation of Democratic
Youth and the International Students' Union and their national affiliates
concern themselves with military affairs, colonial problems and intellectual
matters, while the Women's International Democratic Federation reports
and investigates social problems, etc.. Similar remarks can be made con-
cerning the International Organization of Journalists, (certain meirbers of
which keep an eye on colleagues considered to be warmongers), the
International Association of Democratic Lawyers, as well as various welfare
and resistance organizations. The Communist Party in each country acts
as coordinator of all information collected by the mass organizations.
Communists militants in each mass organization set the tone of the surveys
conducted. For particularly important questions, the entire apparatus of
the Communist Party is used to further the procurement effort and to exploit
the information,
The Interplay of Procurement and Exploitation
From a study of this interplay as exemplified in the activity of one mass
organization- -the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)--two facts
are brought out:
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1. the perfect coordination of action in any given field between the mass
organizations and the Communist Parties;
Z. the close liaison existing between procurement and exploitation of
information on the local and international level,
The WFDY organized in February 1953 an "International Conference for
the Defense of the Rights of Youth". In order to acquire material for debate
the WFDY requested its affiliateb to carry out an extensive survey concern-
ing:
a, conditions affecting young people in each country (social
structures, educational problems, working conditions, unemployment,
discrimination, (public health, military service, etq.4r)
b. yciuth organizations--including reactionary groups---, their
influence, their methods of action, work among unorganized youth,
cooperation with organizations not affiliated with the WFDY, partici-
pation of youth in trade union activity, etc.
The survey was organized most carefully: various questionnaires were
drawn up according to towns where the young people lived or their places:
of work or study; The WFDY requested the WFTU to procure information
which the former lacked: the different categories of young people, their
geographic location or their place of work; particularly questions concern-
ing youth in rural areas, The WFDY considered as integral parts of the
work of the survey the study on youth made in February-March 1952 by
Humanite, and that made by PAvant-Garde,
According to instructions of the WFDY the first results of the survey
were utilized at the place of collection as basic points for the development
of the claims of youth. Thus in Italy, where investigation committees were
formed, the survey established that in Turin, for exarr.ple, there were
15, 000 young unemployed, but also there was the possibility of employing:
immediately more than 10, 000 young people. Following the survey, various
measures were taken--petitions, delegations, strikes-- these had concrete
results such as the opening of various work projects, professional courses,
etc.
Another example was furnished in West Germany where the director of a
steel factory, returning from a visit to the United States, had tried to
introduce a new method of job analysis and evaluation. Preparatory to the
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conference some young workers made a detailed study of working conditions
and were able to prove that this "evaluation" brought to the owner a supple -
mentary profit of 15 (German marks) a week per worker As a result, the
workers immediately protested.
Another form of interplay is found between the information and the
action taken. At each echelon of the Communist apparatus the activity has
two aspects: (1) observation and criticism of the Western world, and (2)
propaganda advocating a Communist society, These two forms of activity
are concomitant and generally come from the same Communist organiza-
tions.
Self -Intoxication,
Communists denounce objective and complete information as a form
of "liberal;" hypocrisy. Intelligence and information for them are weapons
in the battle of the classes and not destined to reflect events objectively.
Under these conditions, one may ask whether Communists are not
prisoners of their own dialectic guided by narrow patterns of thought from
which they cannot escape without being accused of deviationism and whether,
as they observe the non-Communist world, their principal concern is to
confirm the broad lines of the picture prepared by international Communism.
It seems that the prime preoccupation of Communists is to emphasize
the contrast between this picture and the Western world, One network of
correspondents in Austria requested informants to present their reports
with a "progressive" slant, that is, to emphasize that which was unfavorable
to the Western bloc, In Germany, a Communist network furnished f0 se
and slanted information concerning the Alsatian canal, picturing it as drain-
ing the land of the area, having an unfortunate effect on the harvests irk
that region, increasing the poverty of the farmers, diminishing production
of electrical energy, etc,
In Germany also, correspondents speak of the scoop made by one ot
their colleagues who used photographs of mine chambers at the loot of the
Lorelei rock to prove the existence of a tremendous plan envisaged by the
western powers for obstructing the course of the Rhine and causing vast
floods in case of Soviet attack.
At the time of the World Peace Council meeting in Oslo (March-April
1952), members who considered the basic reports about bacteriological
warfare unconvincing were told that proof of the facts. was less important
than the immense possibilities for agitation which the affair provided,
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Political observers representing the Tass Agency deserve commentary
here. They send daily reports to Moscow, using excerpts from the
bourgeois press (in the case of France) only if they develop themes expounded
by international Communism. The larger part of these reports are drawn
from the Communist press, which is termed an "official source", The
general theme of Tass reports from France pictures the French people as
being governed by a small government clique completely dominated by
Washington and remaining in power through resort to terrorism and police
action. ' The aim of the French government, according to Tass,is to rearm
Germany so that it can start an aggressive war against the Soviet Union,
The reader of these reports gets the impression that a Communist regime
could very easily be installed in France.
As an illustration of the lack of objectivity of Tass reports .(due to
reliance on the Communist press) the following episode is related: Con-
cerning Parliamentary debates on the Schuman plan, the Paris office of
Tass had at first reported (early December 1951) that confidence would be
accorded to the government. But the Communist press seemed to modify
this first view and subsequently Tass noted a constantly growing opposition
to the plan which had been aroused by thousands of letters and petitions to
the deputies. In view of such Tass reports, M ~ scow was most disagreeably
surprised by the "incomprehensible" results of the voting. The Soviets.
could not understand why a majority of the deputies approved thy: plan while
trade unions and industrialists opposed it,
The Paris Taos office explained that votes had been purchased with
dollars? and undertook an inquiry of the matter in order to disclose the
machinations and maneuvres which caused this scandal as well as the
identity of those "who brought the Charr.;ber of Deputies to its knees" (sic).
It remains to be seen if this "conspiracy of conformity" imposed by the
necessity of agitation-propaganda leaves any possibility for objective
analysis. It is now admitted that the intervention of international Communism
in Spain at the time of the Civil War was the result of an error of judgment
in the analysis of the situation in Spain. The Nazi regime furnishes
instances where its leaders were victims of similar errors despite the
quality and accuracy of their intelligence. Basically, it is a problem of the
train of human thought when it allows itself to be dominated by national or
partisan passion.
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