FRANCE-ALGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000500080029-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: May 22, 1961
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000500080029-2
S E C R E T
DCI BRIEFING 22 May 1961
FRANCE-ALGERIA
I. 20 May opening of French-Algerian negotiations at Evian is brightest
streak on De Gaulle's horizon, darkened by 22-25 April military
revolt which in the long run has probably damaged his power position
domestically as well as internationally.
A. Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) representatives in general
seemed favorably ;impressed by opening session, but they reacted
negatively to French announcement of a unilateral cease-fire; rebel
terrorist activity continues in Algeria.
1. PAG has received private assurances that De Gaulle recognizes
them as principal element in deciding future of Algeria.
2. PAG also impressed by De Gaulle's smashing of "fascist"
generals' revolt, and feel he is only Frenchman both
willing and able to negotiate (as he has publicly promised)
an independent Algeria.
B. Nevertheless, ultimate prospects not necessarily bright; long
and difficult bargaining in prospect.
1. Issues of control of Sahara and its resources, guarantees
for European settlers, and French desire to retain military
bases will be particularly thorny.
II. De Gaulle's internal position was severely shaken by military re-
volt which caught him by surprise and revealed numerous cases of
weak or divided loyalty in armed services and civilian administration.
S E C R E T
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A. Extensive purges of armed forces and civil service now under
way, but already seem less draconian in scope than when
first announced.
In If he overdoes purges, he risks bitter resentment of army
and air force officer corps for destroying their pride
and morale, as well as civilian resentment against too
drastic punishment for respected officers like Challe.
2. Otherwise, he risks not getting at bottom of apparently
deep-laid plots to sabotage his Algerian policy and, if
necessary, overthrow him to attain this,
B. Potential for serious trouble still great, particularly in
Algeria but also in France itself.
1. In Algeria, two of four generals who led revolt still
at large, and security forces seem unable to root out
secret settler organization--believed very well armed--
threatening disorders and reprisals. Moslems also
increasingly restless,
2. In France, plastic bomb attacks continue and threats
against leading Gaullists multiplying.
3. Rightist extremists now probably sufficiently desperate
to consider assassination of De Gaulle as only "sure"
way to block his Algerian policy.
C. Public support which rallied to De Gaulle at height of
April crisis has again slacked off to business-as-usual
and apathy.
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000500080029-2
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S E C R E T 16 May 1961
1. Extraordinary powers he assumed to crush revolt and clean
up afterwards are generally unpopular,
2. He has alienated rightists completely, but hasp-not yet
overtly bid for non-Communist leftrand center support as
his power base to carry through entire Gaullist program--
both Algerian settlement and major reforms in France?
IHO Internationally, De Gaulle preparing to welcome President Kennedy
31 May - 2 June
A. He41l push hard during visit to get more tripartite western
(US-UK-French) global policy and strategy coordination,
B. He shows no signs of backing down on creation of French
nuclear striking force, or of being more amenable on inte-
gration of French forces under NATO.
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 2005/01/27 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000500080029-2