SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000500080001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 22, 1961
• Content Type: BRIEF

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S E C R E T
DCI BRIEFING 22 May 1961
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
I. Soviet policy over the past four months has been marked by wide
fluctuations.
A. At one extreme, Khrushchev has adopted a relatively moderate
attitude toward the US, and actively sought to arrange an
early meeting with the President.
B. At the other end of the spectrum, however, he has not hesitated
to exploit aggressively situations in Laos, Congo, and Cuba.
C. His recent speeches--his first public remarks on foreign
policy for some time--contain signs that he does not intend
to prolong exploitation of Cuban situation to the point of
jeopardizing efforts to bring about negotiations on brodder
East-West issues, particularly with his meeting with Presi-
dent Kennedy upcoming.
1. In Tibilsi on 12 May, Khrushchev said that he and President
Kennedy have to "coexist on our planet and consequently we
have to find a common language on certain questions."
2. During his tour of Soviet Armenia, Khrushchev told his
audience in Yerevan on 6 May that "we are still making ef-
forts to improve our relations with the Western countries,
including the United States of America"; he described these
efforts as "most important for the settlement of vital in-
ternational problems." He also claimed that the Soviet
Union was preparing for disarmament talks with the US with
"complete seriousness."
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SECRET 22 May 1961
II. The successful Soviet space flight and the turn of events in
Laos and Cuba have probably reinforced the Soviet premier's
confidence that he can continue to take advantage of and pro-
voke situations in the "colonial" areas without permanently
damaging his relations with the West.
A. This high degree of confidence rests on Khrushchev's con-
viction that the tide of international affairs is running
irrevocably in favor of the Communist world and that the
West has no choice but to adjust to what Khrushchev sees as
a new balance of power.
(OVER)
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S E C R E T 16 May 1961
B. Nevertheless, Khrushchev's confidence is tempered by caution.
1. For: example, he has been extremely careful not to over-
commit the USSR to the defense of Castro's regime.
2. Similarly, in Laos, the Communists pushed their military
action to a point just short of that which they believed
:woul'd?. force SEATO intervention.
III. While Khrushchev will continue to exploit those situations where
Soviet interests can be advanced without extreme risks, his
main concern is with the major issues confronting the East and
West.
A. Berlin is still crucial problem for Khrushchev, and his over-
all future course will depend on the outcome of his efforts
to resolve the problem this year.
1. We feel it is likely that if negotiations do not take
place or, fail, Khrushchev will proceed with his plan to
sign a separate peace treaty and transfer control over
Allied military traffic to the East Germans.
B. Khrushchev also recently confirmed his readiness to begin
bilateral talks with the US on general disarmament next
month.
1. These talks are to take up procedural questions of the
composition and timing of a new negotiating body; the
Soviets are currently championing the right of the
neutrals to participate.:in future negotiations.
Khrushchev has indicated that the Soviets hope to take
up substantive aspects of disarmament with the US.
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S E C R E T
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S E C R E T 16 May 1961
2. We continue to feel that Khrushchev has no real interest
in a comprehensive disarmament agreement; while he may be
interested in some limited measures, he is under no
pressure to obtain an early agreement.
C.. Khrushchev's approach is well illustrated by recent Soviet
behavior at the Geneva test ban talks.
1. The Soviets have introduced two new potential roadblocks:
a. They warned that a treaty will be impossible if the
French continue to test.
b. They demanded that the administration of the control
system be placed under a three-man council, with one
Western, one Soviet, and one neutral representative
to
--which would be tantamount/giving the USSR a veto
over effective operation of the system.
2. Khrushchev may still be interested in a test ban on terms
to him,
favorable X*&?W but Chinese Communist opposition probably
is a major factor against an agreement.
3. At some point we feel that Soviets may move to have the
test ban issue merged with general disarmament talks.
IV. The Soviet demand for tripartitism at Geneva reflects the
emergence of a new concept in international affairs.
A. We believe that the tripartite division of international
executive organs has become basic Soviet policy.
1. Khrushchev summed this up when he announced that while
there were neutral countries there were no neutral men.
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S E C R E T
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S E C R E T 16 May 1961
B. In effect, the USSR has made a Soviet veto the price for co-
operation in international organizations,
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S E C R E T
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