Sen Floor Debate (Cong Record)

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000400070003-2
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• Publication Date: January 1, 1962
• Content Type: OPEN

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1962 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
Missouri," by Henry C. Hart, University of
Wisconsin Press; "Toward Responsible Gov-
ernment," by Edward F. Renhaw, Idyia
Press, Chicago; publications of Resources for
the Future, Inc., and the Conservation Foun-
dation; proceedings of the western resources
conference, published by the University of
Colorado Press.
UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this
year we celebrate the 44th anniversary
of the historic independence day of the
great Ukrainian people. It is a sad fact
of history that the liberty-loving people
of the Ukraine experienced freedom and
self-government for only 2 years, from
1918 to 1920. This brief period. of inde-
pendence was the culmination of a strug-
gle for self-determination which began
in the 17th century, and endured for
more than 300 years. The people of this
nation struggled against great odds to
establish their homeland as a free, inde-
pendent state. Repeatedly their efforts
were blocked by their neighboring states.
When they finally succeeded, in 1918, it
was to be for a heart-breakingly short
-period. Yet the people of this nation-
continue to believe in and yearn for
freedom and independence.
Americans of Ukrainian descent, in
Wisconsin and elsewhere in our Nation,
look back through these 44 years to the
time when their country was independ-
ent. All, of us today know and admire
their marvelous cultural attainments,
their personal self-reliance and strength,
and their devotion to freedom and inde-
pendence. These are treasured Ameri-
can traits, as well. We are all the better
for having them added to our national
character.
The great Ukrainian poet, Taras
Schevchenko, by his life and by his writ-
ings, reminds us all of the greatness and
the unfulfilled hopes of his people. On
this anniversary of Ukrainian independ-
ence, I salute his memory, and the mem-
ory of a nation, which though briefly in-
dependent, has left its mark on history.
EXECUTIVE SESSION
The Senate resumed the consideration
of executive business.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President,
I move that the Senate proceed to the
consideration of the nomination of John
A. McCone, of California, to be Director
of Central Intelligence.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs.
NEUBERGER in the chair). The question
is on agreeing to the motion of the Sen-
ator from Montana.
The motion was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is, Will the Senate advise and
consent to this nomination?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President,
what is the pending nomination?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
nomination of John A. McCone, of Cali-
fornia, to be Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll. -
The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCARTHY. Madam President,
in introducing this nomination to the
Armed Services Committee, the chair-
man of the committee, the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELLI, said with refer-
ence to the Office of Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency:
This office is perhaps second only to the
Presidency in its importance.
Certainly it is.
This is one of the most important con-
firmations which the Senate is called
upon to make. In my opinion, it ranks
in importance ahead of most Cabinet
confirmations for several reasons: the
importance of the work of the CIA, the
relative freedom of action given the head
of the CIA and to his subordinates, and
the lack-a very serious lack-under ex-
isting practice, of any continuing direc-
tion or of effective review of,CIA activi-
ties by the Congress.
I have in the past supported and ad-
vocated establishment of a joint commit-
tee of the Congress to exercise continu-
ing supervision over the activities of the
CIA, somewhat in the same manner that
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
operates. If such a committee existed,
the choice of the head of the CIA. and
Senate confirmation would not be so
critical as it is.
There is no regular or normal pro-
cedure in existence or in use today by
which committees of the Congress are
consulted or informed of CIA activities.
During a discussion of a proposed Joint
Committee on Central Intelligence on
the floor of the Senate on April 9, 1956,
the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANS-
FIELD] asked:
Now many times does CIA request a ineet-
ing with the particular subcommittees of
the Appropriations Committee and the
Armed Services Committee.
The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr.
SALTONSTALLI, a member of both com-
mittees, replied:
At least twice a year that happens in the
Armed Services Committeeand at least once
a year it happens in the Appropriations
Committee. I speak from my knowledge
during the last year or so.
Obviously there is no regular proce-
dure. Certainly there is no indication of
any kind of current and continuous
supervision and consultation.
Intelligence activities raise special
problems and need special attention. I
would like to quote significant passages
from an article by Harry Howe Ransom
in the New York Times magazine, May
21, 1961:
- Central Intelligence today has three prin-
cipal functions: intelligence collection, its
analysis and communication to policy-
makers, and clandestine foreign political
operations. The increasing necessity of
these activities is attributable to three
major reasons.
From earliest times, an intelligence appara-
tus has been an indispensable part of the 1
paraphernalia of a great world power. The
worldwide responsibilities of the United
States today require both a system for keep-
ing the complex details of world politics
under constant surveillance and an instru-
ment for secret foreign political action.
A second reason is that national policy
decisions are based, increasingly, upon pre-
dictions of foreign political, economic, and
military. developments 5 to 10 years hence.
This fact is a consequence of the long lead-
time in developing weapons systems and of
the need to make economical use of finite
resources to implement long-range foreign
policy objectives.
Consequently, an intelligence system today
is asked an incredibly wide range of urgent
questions, answers to which can be obtained
sometimes only by devious methods. When
will Communist China test an atomic device?
What future has the economic integration of
Europe? How stable is the Government of
South Vietnam? What course will Sino-
Soviet relations take?
These are among the questions to
which Mr Ransom has pointed as ex-
amples of the kinds of things Central
Intelligence is expected to be concerned
about and on which it is expected to
make some judgments and some recom-
mendations.
A third reason derives from modern mili-
tary-technological developments. Intelli-
gence, it often is said, has become the first
line of defense. Accurate and rapidly trans-
mitted information is an absolute require-
ment for an effective strategy of deterrence.
Strategic striking forces must have an ac-
curate dossier of potential enemy targets.
And essential elements of information al-
ways must be available to thwart an enemy's
possible surprise knockout blow.
He continues with these words:
Short of declared war, however, secret op-
erations are widely regarded as a dirty busi-
ness, unfitting America's open, demo-
cratic-and formerly isolationist-society.
Events of recent years have, nonetheless, re-
vealed to the public at least the top of the
iceberg of a' Vast secret intelligence program.
Distasteful or not, secret operations have
become a major underground front of the
cold war. The accelerating pace of cold war-
fare in Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, the
Congo, Latin America, and elsewhere in-
creases the pressure for greater American in-
volvement in the secret "black arts."
One's attitude toward these activities will
depend, finally, upon one's assessment of
contemporary international politics and of
the requirements for the common defense.
President Kennedy recently declared that
the cold war has reached such a stage that
"no war ever posed a greater threat to our
security." If they take that as a valid as-
sessment, most Americans will assume, al-
though doubtless with misgivings, a wartime
attitude toward secret operations.
Whatever one's view, the existence of a
secret bureaucracy poses special problems
in the American system of government.
Knowledge is power. Secret knowledge is
secret power. A secret apparatus, claiming
superior knowledge and operating outside
the normal checkreins of American democ-
racy is asource of invisible government.
I suggest that this is a most significant
statement in the article by Harry Ran-
som.
He continues:
How then can the controls of a democratic
system be imposed upon the intelligence sys-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29
tem. While maintaining the secrecy required
for its successful operation:?. Secret opera-
tions must remain immune from some of the
normal checks, especially publicity.. Heavy
dependence must be placed upon politically
responsible officials to exercise control.
In a parliamentary democracy, such as
Great Britain; the problem is less acute.
The problem is less acute in Great
Britain than it is under our system of
government.
He continues:
Parliamentary government unifies execu-
tive and legislative responsibility under
majority-party leadership. When Ministers
are also Members of Parliament, responsi-
bility for management of secret functions is
reinforced.
British intelligence services, too, are so
organized that secret political operations
overseas are entirely separate from political
and military intelligence functions. An
agency for secret operations is supervised by
a special Cabinet subcommittee. The point
is that all are under firm political authority.
This essay describes the situation in
British intelligence activities. The con-
trol of the actvity and the direction of
it is quite different from that which
exists in the United States today.
Charles Wilson, as Secretary of De-
fense, described this danger at a press
conference in 1957 with these words:
Yo,x see, what I get for my purpose is an
agreed-on intelligence estimate. I have to
take that, or I would have to bore through
an enormous amount of detail myself to try
to say that they were wrong or right. I ac-
cept what they say.
The statement or comment by Charles
Wilson indicates one of the fundamental
problems, namely, that original intelli-
gence estimates or decisions which are
made at a relatively low level begin to
move through channels and to pick up
momentum as they move along until, at
the point of final decision, it is extremely
difficult to change the direction or to
bring a movement or an action to a
halt..
Hanson Baldwin, as military commen-
tator for the New York Times, wrote in
his column of January 15, 1956:
if war is too important to be left to the
generals, it should be clear that intelligence
is too important to be left to the unsuper-
vised..
Walter Lippmann, looking at the same
problem from a slightly different point
of view, wrote soon after the recent
change of personnel In the State Depart-
ment that reform of the CIA should seem
easier and more necessary.
For--
He said-
the CIA should cease to be what it has. been
much too much, an original source of Amer-
ican foreign policy. That is what has gotten
it into trouble, and that is what needs to
be cured.
Mr. Allen Dulles once said:
In intelligence you have to take some
things on faith.
I acknowledge the truth of this, but
also acknowledge and insist that faith
is no excuse for lack of knowledge or for
failure to seek out facts; nor should it be
accepted as a convenient device for shun-
ning responsibility.
If Walter Lippmann, Harry Ransom,
Charles Wilson, and Hanson Baldwin
are right,' Congress must be concerned
since it, along with the President, has
responsibility for determining foreign
policy.
In any case, the head of the Central
Intelligence Agency will take on great
responsibilities and acquire great powers
which, at least insofar as Congress is
concerned, he can exercise with little or
no supervision. Under the law, he can
withhold titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the Agency. He
can approve the entry into the United
States of certain aliens and of their fam-
ilies, subject to concurrence of the Attor-
ney General and the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization. He
will have authority to expend funds
without regard to the provision of law
and regulations relating to the expendi-
ture of Government funds on vouchers
certified by him alone.
These are unusual powers, and powers
which Congress traditionally has not
yielded easily. But they are, I think
necessarily granted in this case.
A part of the CIA's work is the prepa-
ration of the national intelligence esti-
mates which are used as important
guides in the formulation of foreign and
defense policy. The CIA is an evaluator
as well as a collector of facts. This
agency should find and present the facts
as they are and interpret them with full
objectivity.
The Director of the CIA is Chairman of
the U.S. Intelligence Board. Other
members represent the Defense Depart-
ment; the intelligence components of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force; the National
Security Agency, the Atomic Energy
Commission, the FBI, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the State Department.
The head of the CIA briefs the Na-
tional Security Council at each of its
meetings and is always asked to remain
for the ensuing discussion.
Customarily, at least, he is asked to
remain for the ensuing discussion.
Although the head of the CIA is not a
member of the NSC, he does remain and
participates in the discussions.
What is the statutory or legal basis for
the operation of Central Intelligence?
Quoting again from the Harry Ransom
article:
The CIA's functions are specified, broadly,
by Federal statutes, defining the Agency as
an instrument of the Presidency. The CIA's
operational guidelines are some two dozen
codified National Security Council intel-
ligence directives, approved by the President.
Actions such as the U-2 flights and the
Cuban expedition must be approved specifi-
cally by the President. In the past he has
had the advice on such matters of a special
NCS subcommittee on clandestine operations.
A second potential check has been the
President's eight-man Board of Consultants
on Foreign Intelligence Activities. This was
established early in 1956, after a Hoover
Commission study expressed concern about
the possibility of the growth of license and
abuses of power where disclosures of costs,
organization, personnel, and functions are
precluded by law.
The first chairman of this group, com-
posed largely of distinguished industrialists
and former armed services officers, was James
R. Killian, Jr., then president of the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology. Presi-
dent Kennedy recently reappointed Dr. Kil-
lian to the chairmanship of a reconstituted
board after a 2-year interval in which Gen-
John E. Hull. retired Army officer, presided.
Central Intelligence is subject today to
three major criticisms. They involve ques-
tions of control by responsible authority, the
efficiency of existing organizations, and the
problem of secrecy.
We attempt to determine how much
should be kept secret, how much in-
formation should be made available to
the public, and how much should be
made available to Congress itself. It is
true that the Central Intelligence Agency
officially operates under Presidential di-
rectives and is supervised in a general
way or checked upon by interdepart-
mental groups from the National Se-
curity Council. They participate in both
interpreting intelligence data and in au-
thorizing covert operations. But the
principal intelligence adviser and the
highest authority remains the Director of
Central Intelligence, who is armed with
extraordinary secrecy inside the Govern-
ment and with a secret budget.
I think we must acknowledge that ours
is a government of laws and not of men,
in one sense, but we must acknowledge,
too, that this is a government of men
as well as of laws, and in the important
positions of policy determination, and in
originating ideas in the field of foreign
policy, there is certainly a flow of author-
ity from the President down and there
is also a flow from those appointed by
him or who are put in important posi-
tions of trust and decision upward
through the channels to the President
himself.
Quoting further from Mr. Ransom:
In a complex world of fast-moving events
and in a Washington intelligence commu-
nity where CIA professionals are increas-
ingly influential, too few sources of counter-
vailing power exist. This particularly is a
problem with covert operations in which the
Presidency is largely dependent upon the
CIA for information on what is being done
or what needs doing. The danger of self
serving by the Agency is great. CIA may,
without careful policy guidance, write its
own ticket.
That is true of all Government agen-
cies, and I see no reason to believe that
it would not also be true of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. DOUGLAS. I ask the Senator
from Minnesota if he knows of any in-
stances in which the Central Intelligence
Agency has carried out in the field a
policy directly contrary to the policy of
the State Department.
Mr. McCARTHY. There have been a
number of reported cases in which the
Central Intelligence Agency activities
were reported to be counter to what the
State Department advocated. In other
cases the ' Agency carried on a policy
without any direction or knowledge on
the part of the State Department.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Does the Senator
from Minnesota remember the speech
which Colonel Nasser delivered at Alex-
andria, Egypt, in July 1956, I believe?
Mr. McCARTHY. Yes; I do.
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1962 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 927
Mr. DOUGLAS. Is it not true that in
that speech Colonel Nasser said that a
high representative of the U.S. Govern-
ment had come to him and said that
the State Department was sending out
Mr. George E.' Allen, who later became
Ambassador to Greece, to make a protest
to him about some of his actions in con-
nection with the Suez Canal, and that
this high official of the American Gov-
ernment then told him to pay no atten-
tion to Mr. Allen and to disregard what
he said? I do not believe I have the clip-
ping with me concerning the incident,
but I am certain that Nasser followed
out that advice, and at one time said
he was tempted to kick Mr. Allen down-
stairs.
In November 1956, when I was in
Cairo, I thought the man in question
was probably the former Ambassador to
Egypt, Mr. Byroade, who was transferred
from Egypt to the Union of South Africa.
But I found upon inquiry-nand I believe
this information has since been con-
firmed-that it was not Mr. Byroade at
all but a regional representative of the
CIA who bears the name of a famous
American family.
Does the Senator from Minnesota
know anything about that incident?
Mr. McCARTHY. I am familiar with
the story. So far as I know, there has
been-and perhaps this is in keeping
with the operation of the Agency-no
attempt to repudiate or to deny essen-
tially the story that the Senator has re-
lated, which has been about for a long
time.
Mr. DOUGLAS. I checked very care-
fully with the Embassy in Cairo. Rep-
resentatives of the Embassy were united
in saying that it had not been Mr.
Byroade-but it had been the regional
representative of the CIA. Whether that
action was taken without the knowledge
of the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, which I suppose may well
have been the case, is it not in all prob-
ability an illustration of the CIA and
the State Department moving exactly
at cross purposes in a very crucial
situation?
Mr. McCARTHY. It would certainly
be an example of what the Senator sug-
gested. Since the Senate has a particu-
lar responsibility in the determination
of the policies to be carried out by the
State Department, we need to be par-
ticularly concerned to be sure that Cen-
tral Intelligence is not carrying out a
contrary policy. I am sure the Presi-
dent and the State Department, too,
representing the executive branch of the
Government, also need to be concerned.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Is it not true that in
that case the advice which was sup-
posedly given by the CIA made Colonel
Nasser much more intransigent than he
would otherwise have been which helped
to aggravate the crisis over Suez?
Mr. McCARTHY. That was certainly
the interpretation which was placed
upon the reported incident.
Mr..SYMINGTON. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. It is true, is it
not, that the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of
State both report to the President of the
United States?
Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The distinguished
Senator from Minnesota would not wish
to saddle on any new incumbent to the
position of Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency any possible mistakes
of the past, as of dined by the Senator
from Illinois, would he?
Mr. McCARTHY. I do not think the
remarks of the Senator from Illinois
could be interpreted as putting any bur-
den of guilt upon the newly named head
of the Central Intelligence Agency, or
even on the former head of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Madam President,
may I pursue my inquiry further?
Mr. McCARTHY. If I may finish, the
remarks of the Senator from Illinois
were addressed to the question of cer-
tain procedural relationships, and were
by way of illustration of a possible sit-
uation in which. both the President and
the State Department, as well as Con-
gress, would have been called upon to
face an action which neither had really
approved.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If President Ken-
nedy believes, as apparently both my dis-
tinguished friends from Minnesota, and
my friend from Illinc} s believe, that some
things have not gone well in Central In-
telligence, there would be no criticism
of the President for attempting to im-
prove the management of the Central In-
telligence Agency through change in the
management, would there?
Mr. McCARTHY. No, on my part, I
am sure there would be no such criticism,
and I think in this case I could likewise
speak freely for the Senator from Illinois
[Mr. DOUGLAS].
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen-
ator.
Mr. JACKSON. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. JACKSON. I wish to clarify one
point. There seemed to be some impli-
cation that there is a lack of constitu-
tional control over the head of the! CIA.
Did I correctly understand the Senator?
Did I understand correctly that the
Senator meant to say that?
Mr. McCARTHY. I have been trying
to say that for 2 weeks.
Mr. JACKSON. Wherein is there a
lack of constitutional control? It may
not be what it should be, but wherein
is there a lack of constitutional control?
Mr. McCARTHY. I raised four or five
areas in which I thought serious ques-
tion could be raised as to whether there
was constitutional justification or treaty
justification or justification under any
action taken by Congress or concurred
in by Congress. I made reference to
action in Iran against Mossadegh.
Mr. JACKSON. I do not wish to talk
about individual instances. I do not
believe we should, frankly, in public dis-
cuss some of these matters, whether
they are true or false.
The Senator referred to the British
system. I must say that under the
British system only the Prime Minister
knows who is the head of intelligence.
They do not discuss these matters in the
House of Commons. Insofar as we dis-
cuss this subject I believe we ought to
follow the ancient rule of intelligence
that silence is golden.
When we criticize specific intelligence
operations in open session, we are our-
selves guilty of a lack of understanding
of the problem. Certainly these details
should not be discussed on the floor of
the Senate. Of course we can talk about
constitutional control. As I say, there
may be an opportunity to improve the
operations of intelligence, but details
with respect to intelligence should not
be discussed on the floor of the Senate.
The head of Central Intelligence re-
ports to the President. Congress does
supervise the Agency. There is a ques-
tion whether Congress has done the
kind of job of exercising control at times
that it should have done in that connec-
tion. Perhaps this control can be
improved.
But the head of CIA is under the
President, and responsible to him, and
he does report to the National Security
Council. Therefore, I do not understand
the contention that there is no constitu-
tional control.
Also, there is congressional control.
Whether that control is what it should
be is another question. However, I do
wish to emphasize that we should be
careful when we discuss in public any
specific activities of CIA. Such discus-
sion may be unwittingly giving aid and
comfort to the enemy, in a sense.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. JACKSON. In the sense, I mean,
when we speak of specific examples of
intelligence activities. These are things
that can be used against us.
Mr. DOUGLAS. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. DOUGLAS. I merely called to
mind a speech which Colonel Nasser
made at Alexandria, and which was
blazoned to the world. There was no
secret about this. The statements in
that speech have never, so far as I know,
been denied in the slightest degree.
They tended to reflect badly upon the
diplomatic service. Upon investigation,
however, the evidence became clear that
it was not the diplomatic service which
was at fault, but the local, regional
representative of the CIA. Therefore, I
was not betraying any secrets with re-
spect to any matters which were not al-
ready known, but indicating where the
responsibility lay.
Mr. JACKSON. I have the utmost
confidence in the junior Senator from
Minnesota. I merely say that if we get
into any of these illustrations, like the
situation in Egypt, we give authoritative
affirmation or, denial by someone in Gov-
ernment, and that is later used in cer-
tain places against our Government.
This is what we must be careful about.
That is my only observation. -
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928 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
There is plenty of room for a proper
discussion of the organizational struc-
ture of CIA. However, I believe we
should be careful about dealing with
particular activities..
This is my opinion. I have the utmost
respect and confidence in the Senators
who have raised this issue.
Mr. McCARTHY. I appreciate the
admonition.
Mr. JACKSON. I do not know of any-
one who has been more conscientious
and sincere in trying to bring about
proper control over the activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency than the
junior Senator from Minnesota. I know
that the Senator from Illinois likewise
is taking a keen interest not only in this
matter but in all matters affecting na-
tional security. I wanted to make these
observations for our own good. I know
that my comments will be taken in that
spirit.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Madam Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I agree with the
main precept of the distinguished Sena-
tor from Washington. I am a member
of two of the three committees to which
the Central Intelligence Agency reports
in the Senate, and have heard some-
thing of this story with different inter-
pretations. I do not know which is true.
I do submit for the Senator's consid-
eration the fact that whether or not it
is true the Central Intelligence Agency,
because of its character and type as in-
dicated by the Senator from Washing-
torn, will not have a chance to give its
side of the story from the standpoint of
what happened in 1953, I believe it
was--
Mr. DOUGLAS. Nineteen hundred
and fifty-six.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I was in Cairo the
latter part of October or first part of
November of this year. I thought that
the Agency's operation, from what I
heard, was satisfactory at that time. In
any case, Mr. Dulles, the former head
of CIA-and this is true of any other
member of CIA-will not have a chance
to affirm or deny whether statements
made this afternoon on the floor of the
Senate are correct or not correct.
Mr. JACKSON. Madam President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
hir. JACKSON. The Senator from
Missouri has raised a pertinent point.
In order to have an authoritative denial
or statement from the Agency, the
Agency would have to enter public dis-
cu;sion, which would itself be an im-
proper operation of the Agency. That
Is my point.
The Senator very properly raises some
questions which are obviously of proper
concern of Congress. His interest in
making sure that there is appropriate
constitutional control, and more effec-
tive and adequate control, and reporting
by the appropriate committees 9f Con-
gress, is a very worthy subject for Con-
gress to consider, and I commend him
for what he has done in this connection,
not; only for what he has done today,
but what he has been doing for several
years now.
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Sen-
ator from Washington and the Senator
from Missouri for their observations and
comments, and for the questions they
have raised. For myself, I would say I
have not been particularly critical of
the Central Intelligence Agency for its
operation in the way of its intelligence
gathering. I think that perhaps they
have been unjustly criticized by some
Members of Congress and perhaps in the
public judgment that has been pro-
nounced upon them. I do believe; how-
ever, there is involved here a funda-
mental juridical question. The Consti-
tution establishes the responsibility of
Congress with respect to the determina-
tion of foreign policy, at least major
foreign policy, and with respect to that
determination there was a time that we
in Congress could do this by ratifying
treaties. We no longer can operate ef-
fectively by the treaty route. We still
have the responsibility with regard to
the declaration of war, but we no longer
declare war. We fight police actions
and we carry on what are called cold
wars.
Does this mean that because of a
changed mode of political conflict Con-
gress has lost any responsibility under
the Constitution? Is that the situation,
Madam President, or does it, rather, re-
quire that we give some thought to pro-
cedures? After all, we have a repre-
sentative democracy, and in major
decisions, whether domestic or interna-
tional, some concurrence and some par-
ticipation on the part of Congress has
clearly been involved from the very
beginning.
It,was in connection with these points
that I cited the practice in the British
parliamentary system. I do not mean
to say that every Member of Parliament
was consulted. In the British system
the Members of Parliament picked a
cabinet on intelligence.
It may be said that this involves a
very complex procedure. However, I do
not believe it is so complex that we could
not work out some procedures through
which we could be satisfied that Con-
gress had been consulted, or at least
men picked by Congress had been con-
sulted, and through them Congress had
participated in some degree in these
basic decisions. Even if we picked only
men who had presented themselves for
the Presidency, we could make up a full
committee out of the Senate alone. The
same kind of committee probably could
be made up even of vice presidential
candidates. We would have more on
the committee than we needed, if we
limited the committee to the usual
choice of those who felt that they them-
selves could be entrusted with these im-
portant decisions.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Madam Presi-
dent, will the Senator from Minnesota
yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. As one who has
been a member of two of the committees
which have had to do with the Central
Intelligence Agency for the last half
dozen years, at least, I have felt that no
information that we asked for was con-
cealed from us. Whenever a suggestion
January 29
was made as to whether there was any-
thing more we should be told, or any
information which we might need, we
always received it. As one member of
the committee, I have felt that we should
give our very best possible advice and
Judgment to the Central Intelligence
Agency if we felt it was not being prop-
erly administered or that the procedures
were not being properly carried out.
This subject was argued several years
ago, when Senator Barkley was a Mem-
ber of the Senate and took a very active
part in the discussion. I think that if
the question comes up at the present
time, as it has been raised by the dis-
tinguished junior Senator from Minne-
sota, we can discuss the question of pro-
cedure again, and we should. Certain-
ly, as a member of the Committee on
Armed Services and as a member of the
Committee on Appropriations, I would
welcome the appearance of the Senator
from Minnesota before those commit-
tees in executive session to give us the
detailed suggestions that he might have.
As the Senator from Washington CMr.
JAcxsoN] and the Senator from Mis-
souri [Mr. SYMINGTON] have said today,
the question, as I see it, is whether the
gentleman who has been named for this
position is qualified to hold it. That is
the primary question before the Senate
today. When a new man takes office,
we can then consider the question of
improving the management of the
agency. I think the record will show that
we discussed that question when the
Senator from Minnesota was before the
Committee on Armed Services.
Certainly we ought to make every ef-
fort possible to improve the Central In-
telligence Agency in these very difficult
times. However, I think the primary
objective today is to determine whether
the man who has been nominated Is
qualified, and to decide the question af-
firmatively or negatively. Then we can
take up the question of procedure and
determine whether the agency is ful-
filling its duties. These questions can
be considered by the committee in exec-
utive session, so that the intelligence can
and will be kept on a level which will not
result in the giving away of information,
either through procedural discussions or
in other discussions.
I appreciate what the Senator from
Minnesota is seeking to do and wishes
to do. As one Senator from the other
side of the aisle, I certainly would be
very glad to be helpful Li trying to solve
this problem, because I have heard the
subject discussed for the last 6 or 8
years, at least, if not more.
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Sen-
ator from Massachusetts. The question
of whether the nomination should be
approved by the Senate depends, in my
judgment at least, to a large extent on
the nature of the role the nominee will
fill. It depends on the nature of the
authority he will exercise over the activ-
ities of the agency. For this reason, I
think it is not exposure, exactly, because
most of the procedures are quite well
known; but at least a review of the way
in which the Central Intelligence Agency
is directed or is not directed. It is a
question of whether or not there is a
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1962 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 929
kind of failure under the Constitution-
as I think there is-in that Congress is
not fully enough involved in preliminary
decisions of major consequence, such as
going into Iran or Cuba, or some of the
other areas in which the CIA is sup-
posed to have been very active. These
facts, these questions, have a bearing
upon whether or not the nomination
should be confirmed. If the Director's
role is very limited and is carefully su-
pervised, then we should not impose the
same standards of judgment upon him.
However, if he is to be given a great deal
of supervisory authority, then I think
the qualifications of character, and such
things as that, takes on additional im-
portance. It is for that reason I had
hoped to establish a kind of general pat-
tern upon which the membership of the
Senate might make a solid judgment
with regard to the nominee.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Madam President,
will the Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Would not the
distinguished Senator from Minnesota
agree that the amount of authority and
responsibility which the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency ought to
have, and would have, would be the de-
cision of the President of the United
States?
Mr. McCARTHY. It would depend in
large measure upon the President of the
United States; yes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator has
mentioned character. Would he not
agree that the question of character,
as well as the question of ability, would
both be one, which the President of the
United States would want to consider
very thoroughly before he submitted a
nomination of this importance to the
Senate for approval.
Mr. McCARTHY. I am sure that is
so; and I am certain the President has
made a, careful examination, according
to his lights, of the qualifications of the
nominee. At the same time, there is a
clear obligation imposed on the Senate
to pass an independent judgment. The
Constitution provides that this shall be
done. So I do not think we can feel
that we are in any way offending the
President or the office of the Presidency
in taking a thorough, careful look at
any nomination which the President
sends to the Senate for confirmation.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Is it not true that
nominations of Mr. McCone have been
before this body twice in the past, once
under y Republican President, and once
under 06 Democratic President; that the
nominee was examined carefully with
respect to his holdings, his character,
and his ability; and that both times his
nomination was confirmed unanimously
by the Senate for public office?
Mr. McCARTHY. So far as I know,
that. is, true.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen-
ator.
-Mr. McCARTHY. But we are now be-
ing asked to confirm his nomination to
another office, one which the chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services has
described as second in inmportance to
the presidency. If that is the case-
and I think it is very close to being the
case-again we need to make a more
careful examination of the nominee
than we would if he were being ap-
pointed to some other position. We
might have a man who is a fine drum-
mer, but that would not qualify him to
play first violin. I think there is it little
of this kind of sensitivity or complexity
involved in the performance of the di-
rectorship of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The question of supervision and direc-
tion, and of the effectiveness of them,
on the part of the executive branch of
the Government has been raised. by a
number of special committees and a
number of special inquiries.
Harry Ransom, in the article to which
I referred earlier, said:
In its 6 years' of existence, the President's
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities, recently renamed the Foreign In-
telligence Advisory Board, has functioned
more as a polite alumni visiting committee
than as a vigorous watchdog. With one
professional staff assistant and a single sec-
retary, the board has been able only
sporadically to oversee the 15,000-man CIA.
Congressional surveillance has been much
the same.
Theoretically, the President-with oc-
casional help from consultants-controls
this powerful, huge, and expensive Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. But the Presi-
dent is the nominal head of hundreds of
agencies; he cannot be kept fully in-
formed at all times of the activities of
the CIA. Consequently, very great
powers are vested in the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. How these powers have
been used and how they are likely to be
used are most important questions. Has
the CIA in the past carried out actions
without constitutional justification,
without the authority of statute or of
resolution or of treaty commitments?
Whether these activities or operations
turned out well or badly, whether in the
long run or in the short run they ad-
vanced or improved the position of the
United States is secondary to the basic
question of legality or constitutionality
of procedure.
We in the Senate need to be concerned
about the propriety of the procedure.
The Central Intelligence Agency was
credited with having helped oust Mos-
sedegh from the premiership of Iran in
1953. History has not yet demonstrated
that that was the wisest policy, and
probably never will.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Madam Presi-
dent, will the Senator from Minnesota
yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able
Senator from Minnesota.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on
the Middle East and Southeast Asia, I
spent considerable time in Iran last fall.
I agree with the Senator from Washing-
ton [Mr. JACKSON]-and believe this was
mentioned when the Senator from Min-
nesota was before the committee--
namely, that it would have been a mis-
take if Mossadegh had continued in that
position.
I have been following the reports, in-
cluding classified reports with respect
to Iran; and developments there with
respect to the new Prime Minister. I
cannot see how this discussion can be of
service to the United States.
I also mentioned, when the Senator
was before the committee, that I doubted
the CIA took credit for the overthrow of
Dr. Arbenz as President of Guatemala,
because our Ambassador to Guatemala at
that time told me personally he felt he
had had the most to do with it.
Mr. McCARTHY. I do not question
really whether the CIA did it or whether
the ambassador did it. The question of
the justification for the action in terms
of some juridical basis remains open to
question, in either case. I am not say-
ing that the CIA in either of these cases
was operating independently or without
approval by the State Department. But
this basic question would run to it, re-
gardless of whether the action was car-
ried out or participated in by the CIA
or without its participation. The funda-
mental juridical question of control
would exist even though the Central
Intelligence Agency was not involved in
those activities, in which there was some
involvement on the part of our Govern-
ment itself.
Similar questions have been raised
with regard to Vietnam, and also of
course more recently in regard to our
support of the invasion of Cuba, last
year. The basic question of the justifi-
cation remains-regardless of whether
we have success or whether we have
failure-in regard to some of these oper-
ations and some of these activities.
Madam President, I think the Con-
stitution quite clearly provides that Con-
gress shall have a part in declaring war.
However, as I have already said, in the
modern world, war is seldom declared,
instead, there are defensive actions and
police actions. Nevertheless, the Con-
stitution still provides, in my opinion,
that the Congress has a definite respon-
sibility in connection with such actions
or actions to continue or to overthrow
the governments of other nations.
Congress has acted to give the Presi-
dent authority through the United Na-
tions. It has granted him wide author-
ity under the NATO treaty, and some-
what less clearly under the SEATO
treaty. The Congress approved the Mid-
dle East resolution in anticipation of the
Lebanon action.
I believe there is a constitutional need
for consultation with Congress by the
President or by his agents and, beyond
that, for some expression of concurrence
or some manifestation of concurrence
by Congress or by men chosen by the
Congress to speak for it, somewhat more
Clearly and more positively than is pro-
vided for under existing law or under
existing practice. A joint committee may
not be the best means. Perhaps some
other device could be developed. Per-
haps we could fix greater responsibility
on the Armed Services Committee, and
could say to it, "You are to speak for us
and to represent us, and we expect that
you will be consulted and that there will
be conferences and consultations with
you." Or we could say that this shall
be taken care of by the Foreign Relations
Committee and the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee, which have been chosen by Con-
gress, and we could specify such respon-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE January 29
sibility for them, and could give formal
approval to their participation and con-
currence. But that has not been done.
Mr. GRUENING. Madam President,
will the Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. GRUENING. Has it occurred to
the Senator that possibly the nomination
should be referred to the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee? As Mr. McCone has
testified, his task as he sees it is merely
to receive reports from all over the
world and to evaluate them. In that
case-if he is prophesying correctly-
then his task ceases to be a cloak-and-
dagger operation as it has in part been,
and becomes merely a source of informa-
tion and guide to our foreign policy-
makers. Therefore, would not it be
more appropriate for the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, rather than the Armed
Services Committee, to pass on this
nomination?
Mr. McCARTHY. I think one could
male.:e a strong case for that.
The activities of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency are more in the realm of
areas in which the Foreign Relations
Committee exercises jurisdiction. Of
course it is true that the CIA was estab-
lished by legislation which was handled
by the Armed Services Committee, and
that in fact the Central Intelligence
Agency more or less continues Intelli-
gence activities which were developed in
various branches of the armed services,
for the most part during the war. So
there is that legislative background and
there is that tradition. Therefore, I
suppose one could argue "either way-
thai there is this tradition and there is
this precedent which would justify re-
ferring the nomination to the Armed
Services Committee, and that there are
also the activities of the CIA, in its opera-
tional aspects, which I think relate to
matters which are carried on more in
the field of foreign policy, rather than
in the field of military operations. So
the question is a mixed one.
Mr. JACKSON. Madam President,
will the Senator from Minnesota yield
again to me?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. JACKSON. I wish to add to what
the Senator from Minnesota said in re-
sponse to the question asked by the Sena-
tor from Alaska, namely, that the other
intelligence undertakings by the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, and the Depart-
ment of Defense, make up the intelli-
gence community, and the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency is chair-
man of the Intelligence Board and is the
coordinator of all of these. So there is
a heavy military overtone which by tra-
dition and custom has always been a
part of the responsibility of the Armed
Services Committee, and, prior to its
creation, part of the responsibility of the
Military Affairs Committee.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Minnesota yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
LorrG of Missouri in the chair). Does
the Senator from Minnesota yield to the
Senator from Massachusetts?
Mr: McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to
say to the Senator from Alaska [Mr.
GRUENIN01 if I may, that the CIA was set
up as a follow-on of the OSS, which con-
ducted our intelligence activities during
the war.
As the Senator from Washington [Mr.
JACKSON] has stated, the CIA is a civilian
agency which collaborates and cooper-
ates with the three military services,
and-in addition to what the Senator
from Washington has said-with the
State Department, in working out the in-
telligence information from various
countries and giving it to the Chief Ex-
ecutive of our country-the President of
the United States.
I was present and helped to draft the
present CIA Act; and that was done, as
I have said, to set up this agency to
collaborate with the inteligence agencies,
particularly of the military, in time of
peace, because we felt that at that time
the OSS-which I think was never
established by law, but was established
by Executive order-had ceased to func-
tion, because the fighting part of the war
was over. I think I am correct in that
statement. I know we drafted the CIA
act with a great deal of care and with the
intention of there being cooperation with
the agencies which are strictly military
agencies.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Sena-
tor from Alaska.
Mr. GRUENING. In commenting on
the remarks of the Senator from Massa-
chusetts, it should be noted, as the Sena-
tor from Massachusetts has pointed out,
that the CIA is the successor of the OSS,
which operated in time of war, and was,
therefore, a cloak-and-dagger type of
agency. Now, while it is true that there
is now a state of undeclared war, a cold
war of sorts, it seems to me that we cer-
tainly should look into the question of
whether the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee should not have as much jurisdiction
over CIA as has the Armed Services
Committee.
Let us assume that that had been the
case, so that during the last year the CIA
had been reporting, to the extent it does
report at all, to the Foreign Relations
Committee instead of to the Armed
Services Committee. I see present on the
floor the distinguished chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FUL-
BRIGHT], who had the wisdom to oppose
the attempt to invade Cuba. Possibly,
if the CIA had consulted him and had
obtained his views, we might not have
participated in that tragic error.
As I stated before, it seems to me, in
view of the fact that Mr. McCone has
declared that his function, as he sees it,
will be merely that of collecting infor-
mation all over the world and evaluating
it, which is distinctly a matter of foreign
relations more than it is anything else,
certainly the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee should have as much jurisdiction
over CIA's activity rather than Armed
Services, notwithstanding that the ju-
risdiction was originally placed in the
Armed Services Committee. Or perhaps
even better there should be joint ju-
risdiction of both those committees.
I hope that before the consideration of
this question is concluded, Congress will
have the wisdom to create an oversight
committee, by which the Foreign Rela-
tions and Armed Services Committees
may monitor and control this now com-
pletely uncontrolled agency which is now
responsible to no committee of Congress
and is unique in that respect, wielding a
responsibility and power which is abso-
lutely unrivaled iii our democracy, a
power which is vested in a man who as
head of CIA, according to the chairman
of the Armed Services Committee, the
distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr.
RUSSELL], is second only in importance
to the President in the power he wields.
To allow such power to go unrestricted
and without any reference to the com-
mittees of Congress which have supervi-
sion over foreign relations, when, in
effect, CIA will be reporting on foreign
affairs in many countries all over the
world, both inside and outside the Iron
Curtain, seems to me to be wrong.
I hope, before we conclude. some action
will be taken by Congress so that it may
have some supervision over the agency,
with whatever restrictions are necessary
to protect the national security.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I may most re-
spectfully say to the Senator from
Alaska that today the CIA is responsible
to the Committee on Armed Services and
it is responsible to the Commitee on Ap-
propriations. Certainly the past Direc-
tor of that Agency reported at least two
or three times each year to those various
commitees. Therefore, those commit-
tees, or certain members of their sub-
committees, have entire knowledge of
the activities of the Agency, the extent
of the organization, and the cost of the
organization.
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. BARTLETT. Am I correct in my
assumption that the Senator from Min-
nesota, notwithstanding that which has
been said most recently by the Senator
from Massachusetts, believes that there
ought to be closer supervision by the
Congress over the activities of the CIA?
Mr. McCARTHY. Yes, that is the
opinion of the Senator from Minnesota.
If I may respond to the Senator from
Massachusetts, I think the basic legisla-
tion which was enacted and which was
developed in the Armed Services Com-
mittee was sound legislation in terms of
the concept of the Central Intelligence
Agency at the time that law was drafted.
One of the points I raised is that the
Central Intelligence Agency, in its oper-
ations at least, is carrying on activities
which are far beyond what was contem-
plated in that legisaltion when it was
drawn. It is not a question, really, of
only CIA, but a question of whether or
not CIA performs functions which are,
in a sense, uncovenanted. That ques-
tion runs to the functions of the State
Department. The CIA seems to be the
principal agent in these more or less un-
justified, at least juridically unsustained,
actions. So at a time when we are con-
sidering confirmation of the employment
of the head of the Central Intelligence
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 1962 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE
Agency, I think we should consider this Mr. McCARTHY. I would not say
question
. necessarily that it should be by seniority.
Mr. BARTLETT. Acknowledging that Mr. BARTLETT. No. I say that is
there might, and probably would, be 99 the way it is done now.
other opinions as to what ought to be Mr. McCARTHY. Seniority has some
done, is,it the Senator's conclusion that bearing on it; I really do not know about
this closer supervision might best be that. However, evidently the determi-
obtainer by the establishment of a joint nation of who should be given this in-
committee? formation is not a determination made
Mr. McCARTHY, I said earlier in my by Congress except in rather vague
remarks- language of the act which established
Mr. BARTLETT. I am sorry I was the CIA, but it is primarily a kind of
not here at the time. selective determination by the executive
Mr. McCARTHY. I shall be glad to branch of the Government itself.
repeat the statement, with some addi- Mr. BARTLETT. In summation, then,
tional remarks. I am not satisfied that I might remove myself from this col-
a joint committee is best to accomplish loquy by stating that the Senator enter-
the purpose I have referred to. First, tains the belief that if some Members of
however, I do not know of any better Congress can be trusted with the awe-
method that has been proposed. Sec- some secrets relating to atomic energy so
Energy. I am sure the Senator will re-
call that, when that committee was
established, charges were made that
Members of Congress could not be trusted
with this kind of information, that there
would be leaks, and that Congress
could not exercise continuing supervision
over activities as involved and as tech-
nical as those in the atomic energy field.
Yet I think the record bears out the
statement this Joint Committee has
worked out reasonably well. I think it
would perhaps not be out of turn to say
that it could be tested in other areas
and other jurisdictions.
Mr. BARTLETT, If the Senator will
permit me one further observation, and
perhaps a question, the Senator has men-
tioned that there has been an implica-
tion that the whole Congress cannot be
trusted with secrets relating to the CIA
and the Atomic Energy Commission. I
wonder how far down, in the Senator's
opinion, this information could be safely
disseminated. We live in a strange
world. In days gone by, I suppose every
Member of Congress could ascertain
everything about every Government
agency. Whether it should be done or
not, it is not being done now.
I wonder if the Senator has any idea
as to where the cutoff point might prop-
erly come,
might other Members of Congress, con-
stituting a joint committee, be entrusted
with the secrets having to do with the
CIA.
Mr. McCARTHY. I think the Con-
gress is deserving of a test in several
other areas.
Mr. BARTLETT. We should give the
Congress a try?
Mr. MCCARTHY. Yes. I do not like
to repeat my good lines, but I suggested
earlier if we had doubts we could limit
the appointees to this committee and
select them only from men named as
possible presidential candidates.
Mr. BARTLETT. That is a line worth
repeating.
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Senator
from Alaska. He generally appreciates
my good lines. I thought I might risk
stating that once again.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me so that I may
ask the senior Senator from Massachu-
setts a question?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. GRUENING. My good friend., the
senior Senator from Massachusetts, the
ranking minority member of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, said a few
minutes ago that the Committee on
Armed Services more or less supervised
the CIA, and that the CIA reported to
the committee. What is the extent of
the report? Do the committee members
Mr. McCARTHY. As the Senator go into any details, or are they merely
knows, we are held responsible for every- given a brief summary of expenses, the
thing done within the Government, even number of people employed, and so on?
though oftentimes we do not have much Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
authority over what is done. It is con- will the Senator yield?
sidered ill-advised to admit that we do Mr. MCCARTHY. I yield.
not have as much responsibility as we Mr. SALTONSTALL. I say on the
seem to have. But it is my opinion that floor of the Senate that we spend several
we could to some extent bridge the gap hours and go into many details of opera-
between responsibility and real power or tions, of expenses, of administration, and
effective access of power related to our so on. I would not wish to say more on
responsibilities if we, the Congress, could the fiooi of the Senate.
determine that these particular persons I say as one member of the commit-
could be trusted, in the same way as in tee-I speak onl
for
lf
b
y
myse
,
ut I think
England the statute.
members {~nembers of Parliament pick I can speak for the others also-we have Mr. FULBRIGHT, I ask the Senator
or the cabinet out of their own never been refused any information of whether he is going to discuss, a little
parliamen ary body, and those persons any character for which we have asked,
t l later
the
dire
arti
t i
l
li
,
p
c
n
cu
e
ar experience of the
gence activities. Mr. McCARTHY. If I may have the present nominee for this particular posi-
Mr. BARTLETT. As it is now, those attention of the Senator from Massa- tion, or whether that will be the sub-
secrets would be reposed in those be- chusetts, I should like to ask a question. ject of his talk?
longing to a certain committee or com- The Senator would not say, however, Mr. McCARTHY. Yes. I intend to
mittees and from the vantage point of would he, that the committee exercises make some comments with respect to
seniority. Is that a correct evaluation a kind` of continuing supervision in any his qualifications and preparation for
of how it is? way comparable, let us say, to what the the position.
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931
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy ex-
ercises in its field of jurisdiction?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would say
that we could do more than we ' have
done if we felt it were necessary to do
it. There has never been any limit of
supervision, so to speak, placed upon
our efforts by the past Director of the
CIA, and I am sure none would be placed
on us by the future Director of the CIA.
I have never heard of any limitation
that was put upon us.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Alaska.
Mr. GRUENING. Does the Senator
from Massachusetts realize that in cer-
tain countries the CIA operates with
complete independence of the Chief of
Mission, and that our diplomatic rep-
resentatives are not even informed of
what the CIA agents are doing in the
country?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield,
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would deny
that. I would deny that, but I would
prefer not to say anything more on the
floor of the Senate. I should be glad to
discuss it with the Senator from Alaska
in conversation, as to what I do know.
Mr. GRUENING. Well, I have been so
informed by a responsible member of
the diplomatic service in a country
where this particular situation exists.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Arkansas, the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
Mr, FULBRIGHT. I have not studied
this as much as has the distinguished
Senator from Minnesota. Does the ex-
isting law specifically require the CIA
to report to the Committee on Armed
Services? -
Mr. McCARTHY. I think it does. At
least, it is implied that they should be
in some way responsible. At least, the
practice has been for the CIA to report
to the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not ask the
Senator for the practice.
Mr. McCARTHY. We shall have to
ask the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am asking for
information as to what the law itself
does require by way of reporting to any
committee. I am not informed as to
that.
Mr. MCCARTHY. We should have to
ask the Senator from Massachusetts
,
who is a member of the committee and
helped to draft the law. My opinion is
that the CIA really is required to report
only to the President. We can check
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932 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29
The man selected to head the CIA of intelligence collection, its analysis and pertinent to the problem which the Sen-
underground foreign political action. ate is considering today.
should, I believe, understand and ap- Those who would organize and carry out a Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
preciate the great powers which are giv- proposed secret operation should be separated will the Senator yield further?
en to him and be aware that, at least in the decisional process from those who Mr. McCARTHY. I yield. .
in the past, either on its own decision supply and interpret information to justify Mr. SYMINGTON. Has Mr. Ransom
or with executive approval, the,CIA has the plan. ? *
carried on activities which were of ques- Planners and operational commanders ever had any experience in any of the lan tionable constitutionality or legal justifi- notorie1usly come to view the acv cps Bt ate States telligence apparatus of the United
prepared rIri my opinion he should be in of mind that is receptive only to intelligence Mr. McCARTHY. So far as I know, he
discuss these things in the data that justify the plan's practicability. has not, but I may be mistaken. He may
proper surroundings. A distorted view of reality often results. * * * have had some intelligence experience.
He should realize, too, that in the fu- No greater challenge confronts American Mr. SYMINGTO I thank the Sen-
ture he may be called upon or challenged society than responding to the question of
or tempted to conduct similar operations. how the united states can engage success- ator.
The director of the CIA should be sensi- fully in protracted cold warfare without Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
tive to the danger of such proceedings. sacrificing the principles defended. the Senator yield?
A man selected to be the head of the As an open democratic society, the United Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
CIA should, if possible, be experienced in states has to recognize its handicaps in Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I understand,
some form of competition with the closed the point the Senator from Minnesota
Intelligence work. He should be a good societies of totalitarian regimes. It would is making relates to a division within
administrator. He should have an ade- be unwise to attempt to match the profi-
quate understanding and awareness of ciency of communist regimes in subversion the so-called intelligence community be-
the problems of foreign policy, of the as the avenue to the attainment of national tween the gathering of the information and operation be concerned-if cand l should objectives. byeimit ting itice's an Md cCARTHY. The Senator is cor-
be we we could d have e an ideal fighting rect.
man--as to the ethics of the methods That point brings me to the serious
and means by which he, his agents, and problem which faces the Senate, not Mr. FULBRIGHT. That subject has
operators seek their goals, either in the only in this case, but in many other been widely discussed in the press by
gathering of information or in carrying cases. many writers. I do not happen to know
on what have come to be called "opera- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, Mr. Ransom personally.
tions." will the Senator yield? I wish to ask the Senator a question
I shall not attempt a judgment or rec- Mr. MCCARTHY. I yield. on another subject.
ominendation with regard to the ques- Mr. SYMINGTON. The able Senator Does the Senator from Minnesota
tion of experience in intelligence of the from Minnesota has read at length from know whether or not, it is true, for ex-
nominee, as there are no clear standards an article, as I understand it, written by ample, in a country such as Great Brit-
which can. be applied. Mr. Harry Ransom, and published the ain, that the two functions I have stated
The nominee has the reputation of 21st of May 1961. I have asked the are separated?
being a good administrator. I am not chairman of the Committee on Foreign far as I am fa-
prepared to challenge that. Nearly Relations, the Senator from Arkansas Mr. McCARTH. Y So
miliar with the Y Sonathere, r as they fa-
everyone whose nomination is sent to us [Mr. FTLmUGHT], if he knows who Mr. parawit
has a reputation of being a good admin- Raves asked the ranking member of the Mr. FULBRIGHT. That has been the does not. I istratar.
McCARTHY. Yes; in Great
The question of knowledge of foreign committee on the other side of the aisle, traditional method. is one which can be passed only in very general terms and upon who is on two of
very involved with the three
Central Intelligence Britain.
subjective standards. I would feel more Agency, if he knows who Mr. Ransom Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I mentioned a
confident in passing on this appointment is, and he, too, says he does not. I con- moment ago, the Senator is really dis-
if there were a more extensive record of fess to my able friend from Minnesota cussing the operation of the CIA itself,
the views of the nominee. He is, accord- that I do not know who Mr. Ransom is and whether or not it is properly consti-
ing to one columnist, hard boiled; ac- either, and inasmuch as he is being tuted, a question in which I am very
cording to the Economist, a man of tem- quoted at such great length as an au- interested. Will the Senator discuss
per, according to Newsweek, a tough thority in this field, I would ask two ques- the particular experience and qual-
man; according to the Wall Street Jour- tions. ifications of the appointment being con-
nal,, hard driving. First, who is Mr. Ransom? sidered by the Senate? As I understand,
These are not undesirable qualities in Second, has Mr. Ransom had any the question before the Senate is not
the head of the CIA. They are not the extended or practical experience in the whether the CIA is properly constituted,
only good qualities possessed by the field of intelligence? I do not ask these but whether the appointee is qualified to
nominee, but they are the qualities which questions to be in any way critical of head the Agency. Is that not correct?
have been especially stressed in newspa- Mr. Ransom. I merely ask them for Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator is
per comment. Taken by themselves, the information of the Senate. quite correct. As I indicated, the role
they are not enough to qualify a person Mr. McCARTHY. I am not quoting which the CIA now plays has a bearing
for this difficult and sensitive office. Mr. Ransom particularly because he is upon whether or not the nominee is
The Director of the CIA should be an authority but rather because I qualified to carry out this kind of com-
more interested in finding evidence and thought what he had to say was to the plicated and difficult directorship.
Passing objective judgment on it than in point and had bearing upon the discus- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I made that state-
a ce-
support to polarize opinions or to sion. I think he is currently on the nlt because at one time I that
support a. set position. staff of Vanderbilt University. He has sponsor of a measure avery symco-
Mr. President, I quote again from the written what I believe is perhaps the thetic-and r of still measure and the idea of a
committee
Henry Howe Ransom article: most thorough book inquiring into the joint committee am-to Secret intelligence must never be more or whole question of the organization and which legally would some other idea have responsibility
less than an instrument of national policy. the operation of the Central Intelligence for the gaily wor supervision of the CIA. However,
Its control should remain primarily a re- Agency. for fearful that the bow not will
body d upon that
sponsibility of the Presidency, but Congress But I would not ask any Senator to hI ave an opportunity i pass
also must assume a more carefully defined accept what Mr. Ransom has said be- question.
are si active surveillancelufAnd mtusust D be
and
e cause he said it, or even because perhaps Mr. McCARTHY. I agree with the
agr
i n
aggressive weighing gain gain from success, my quoting him would be any kind of Senator. of him,
but r
ther against cost of failure, in every proposed ont horsemen e bas stof whether oranot his st te- Mr. FULBRIGHT. So the only ques-
r.aos secret operation.
A
A second major criticism is that the CIA ments, the questions which he raises, tion is on the qualifications of the ap-
places under one roof the separate functions and the proposals which he makes, are pointee for the job.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 933
Mr. McCARTHY. To exercise super-
vision over the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was very curious
about the Senator's views on that subject.
Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator is cor-
rect. The "question is whether or not we
think the appointee is qualified to direct
the CIA as it is now constituted, as it
now operates, and as it is likely to op-
erate in the immediate future. I say
that it would be impossible to find a
man who had all the necessary qualifi-
cations. I should like to cite two or three
considerations which I think Senators'
who are called upon to act upon the
nomination need to consider.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I share the view,
and perhaps the apprehension, of the
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT1.
It is quite possible that the appointee
of the President-in fact, the President
himself-is not entirely satisfied with
the past operation of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. If what I have said is
true, I am sure that the able Senator
from Minnesota does not wish to hang
around the neck of Mr. McCone, whose
appointment is the question before the
Senate for discussion, any of the past
possible sins or transgressions of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, I am sure he
would be the first to agree that Mr. Mc-
Cone has had no'connection with them
whatever,
Mr. MGCARTHY. The Senator from
Missouri has stated my position on that
question correctly.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sena-
tor.
Mr. MGCARTHY. To return to the
point I was making, relating to the at-
tempt to establish some general stand-
ards, I said that the man selected to
head the Central Intelligence Agency
should be aware of the great powers
which are given to him. Since he may
be called upon-and will certainly be
called upon-to operate in an area in
which the question of constitutionality
and the question of right or wrong will
sometimes be very difficult to determine,
he should, if possible,' be experienced in
intelligence work. As I said, he should
be a good administrator. He should be
concerned with the methods and means
by which he, his agents, and operators
are seeking their goals in gathering in-
formation and in carrying out what has
some to Pe called operations.
It is against those four or five general
standards that we must, make our de-
cision with regard to the nominee. As I
have indicated, I 'would not attempt to
pass judgment with regard to the ques-
tion of his experience in intelligence.
In testimony before the committee it was
indicated that Mr. McCone had little or
no experience in that field. As I have
said, there really are no clear standards
to be applied by which he might be
judged. We cannot say, "Here is a man
who has been highly successful," as could
have been said about Allen Dulles. In
my judgment he should be a man who
has taken a stand or at least who has
views on some of the broad and com- He went on to say that- he intended
plicated policy questions that have been to carry out to the best of his abilities all
known, the duties assigned to him.
For my part, I would feel much more No full or pertinent answer, it seems
confident in passing on the appointment to me, was made to the question of con-
if there were a more extensive record stitutionality. It may be that we should
of his views on these complicated ques- not expect the head of CIA to give such
tions. He has spoken very little, so on an answer, and perhaps it is an unrea-
that point I could not make any, recom- sonable demand or an unreasonable sug-
mendation. I would have to say that gestion. However, it seems to me that
this factor is unknown. he should have given some thought to
So far as concerns the question of the
constitutionality of some of the actions,
either participated .'n by CIA, attributed
to CIA, or perhaps only. carried on by
the State Department, I raised this ques-
tion before the committee. I suggested
that they might wish to ask certain
questions of the nominee, and the ques-
tions were asked. I quote from a letter
which Mr. McCone himself sent to the
chairman of the committee in answer
to a number of questions which I had
raised and which in turn had been asked
of him by the committee:
Senator McCASTHY's third question asks
for my views as to the authority for some
of the actions attributed to the Central In-
telligence Agency in the field of foreign
affairs within recent years. Many events
have been attributed to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency over the years, and it would
be impossible for me to have the facts on
these matters, but I certainly do not accept
that because they are attributed to. the
Central Inelligence Agency the Agency is
responsible for them.
This charge was not made. This was
not in the question I had suggested to the
committee.
Mr. McCone continues :
The Senator's question appears to go to
the,basic juridical or constitutional authori-
ties of the executive branch, and this in-
volves profound legal questions which, since
I am not a lawyer, I do not feel competent
to debate. It is my understanding, however,
that the President has wide powers in the
field of foreign relations and within the
framework of the Constitution is empowered
to do what he deems to be necessary to pro-
tect and promote the national interest. At
the present time, in my opinion, the national
interest is best served by taking steps to
deter the encroachment of communism.
Does this mean that he would justify
any step or any action, constitutional or
extra-constitutional or unconstitutional
in deterring communism?
I would not say that this is his posi-
tion, but it is the statement that he :made
in answer to the letter:
At the present time, in my opinion, the
national interest is best served by taking
steps to deter the encroachment of commu-
nism.
This is a fine, general statement of
policy, but what is needed is some re-
finement and somewhat more specific
statement with relation to the involve-
ment of the Central Intelligence Agency,
as has been charged in the press and in
other places:
As provided by law the Central Intelligence
it, or that when he is being considered
for appointment we might properly ask
of him this question as to what his opin-
ion is with respect to the juridical basis
for some of these actions. In this case
his answer does not cover what I hoped
he would cover in answer to this question.
My fourth question was:
What is the nominee's judgment as to
methods which can be justifiably used by
the Central Intelligence Agency?
Mr. McCone replied:
The very nature of the question is such
that I believe I cannot respond to it, par-
ticularly in the light of the responsibility
imposed upon me by law to assure the pro-
tection of intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure.
I can see that there would be need
for secrecy. I did not have in mind that
he should express an opinion on a spe-
cific situation. I had hoped that there
might be some discussion of a theoreti-
cal situation, as to what methods he
thought might be justifiable. We could
raise a theoretical question with refer-
ence to stirring up a revolution behind
the Iron Curtain when it had no oppor-
tunity of succeeding, even though the
suppression of the revolution by the Rus-
sians would give us propaganda value in
some other part of the world.
This is a rather gray area, I know, and
one in which I did not expect him to
answer specifically or give a specific
moral judgment or make a fine ethical
distinction. However, this is an area in
which a decision must be made, without
attempting to apply a theoretical situa-
tion to a particular case. It may be that
Mr. McCone would be willing to carry
on such a discussion in private, but judg-
ing from what he said I cannot be sure
of that.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. As I understand
the question asked of the appointee by
the able Senator from Minnesota, it was
as to what were his views as to the au-
thority for some of the actions attributed
to the Central Intelligence Agency in the
field of foreign affairs within recent
years. If I were asked the question, I
would not know how to answer it.
The Central Intelligence Agency has
been identified, as almost entirely re-
sponsible for the Cuban situation. Based
on the record to which I listened care-
fully, and which, as the Senator knows,
some members discussed on the floor, I
Agency operates under the direction of the can not agree.
National Security Council which is advisory This is a very delicate field. I ap-
to the President and of which he is Chair-
man ch it with caution, even in com-
and, therefore, it is but one of the arms proach
in that much.
in the complex of establishments which are g
involved in the President's conduct of for- The next question the Senator asked
eign policy. / of the nominee was as to the methods
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934
which can be Justifiably used by the
Central Intelligence Agency.
I do not see how the head of what is
known to be a covert, as well as an overt
agenoq, and which has been set up on
that basis to protect the freedom of this
country, could possibly answer that
question.
As the Senator from Minnesota knows,
I have great respect for his opinion.
However, let me read that question
again.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
what was that question?
Mr. SYMINGTON. It is question
No. 4.
This would involve such matters as
whether a member of a foreign service
could be influenced in any way. I can
think of many other matters, and so can
you other Senators. I just do not under-
stand how a man could answer that
question?
He knows the nature of the oath he
takes when he takes the office, as he has
twice. in the past. I ask the Senator
from Minnesota to give consideration, if
he were nominated for this position, to
what his answer would have been to this
question:
What is the nominee's judgment as to
methods which can be justifiably used by
the Central Intelligence Agency?
The Senator, realizing, of course, that
this nominee would report to the Presi-
dent of the United States.
Mr. McCARTHY. Well, I did not ex-
pect the nominee to give an answer in
terms of every specific and possible ac-
tion that might be taken. However, some
time ago Mr. C. D. Jackson made a
speech in which he said, as I recall the
quotation, that we should proceed as
fanatics, with no holds barred and no
questions asked.
If this had been the nominee's answer
I would have had to say that here is a
person who is insensitive to the question
of methods. We must be very careful
not to attempt to justify the use of any
methods or any means because we feel
our objective is good in the matter of
communism or fascism. I would expect
him to make a statement in which he
would make a distinction between right
and wrong, even in this difficult area in
which the Agency must operate. I did
not expect him to make a particular, fine
judgment. However, it was not unrea-
sonable to expect a man to indicate at
least the framework of principle or pat-
tern of principle within which he would
attempt to make this hard and difficult
judgment or recommendation.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I believe Mr. C. D.
Jackson, to whom the able Senator has
referred, is the publisher of a well-
known magazine, and has been out of
the Government for years.
Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Has that any-
thing to do with Mr. McCone?
Mr. McCARTHY. The Senator from
Missouri asked me to give an example of
the kind of answer that I would make in
the circumstances. I said that this is
the kind of answer, if it had been given
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29
to us, would, in my opinion, have been
completely unsatisfactory. The Senator
asked me what kind of answer I might
have given to that question. I cited all
this as an example. I do not say it is
Mr. McCone's approach. It is not my
approach. I do net believe even that it
is really the approach of Mr. C. D.
Jackson.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator did
not read the last sentence in the fifth
paragraph of the statement of Mr. Mc-
Cone, incident to that question. Was
there any reason for not doing so?
Mr. McCARTHY. I do not think so.
I thought I had read it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If I am incorrect,
I apologize.
Mr. McCARTHY. I think I made ref-
erence to it. I may not have completed
reading it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. May I read it?-
Mr. McCARTHY. Yes. I do not think
it is really pertinent. I have no ques-
tion that Mr. McCone would not know-
ingly violate his oath of office. The
statement really does not relate to my
question, because I do not expect that
he would even have had to say this in
answer to me. However, I should like
to have the statement complete in the
RECORD. As a matter of fact, if I may
have unanimous consent to do so, I
should like to have the entire letter
printed at this point in the RECORD.
Mr. SYMINGTON: I thank the Sena-
tor. I was about to make the same
request.
There being. no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., January 19, 1962.
Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: I am happy to re-
spond at the Armed Services Committee's
request to the statement Senator EUGENE J.
MCCARTHY made on January 18, 1962, at the
opening of the committee's hearings on my
nomination to the position of Director of
Central Intelligence. I shall respond directly
to the specific questions posed by Senator
MCCARTHY at the end of his statement, but
as other portions of the statement were con-
sidered during the hearings I shall also set
forth my position in regard to them.
The first question asked if the. Central In-
telligence Agency is to be reorganized and if
so in what respects. I have been and I am
studying the organization of the Agency very
intently. The present pattern of organiza-
tion of the Agency Is the result of years of
study by competent people, both within the
Government and outside consultants, and in
my opinion it is not a bad pattern of or-
ganization. However, I believe that in all
departments of the Government there Is an
evolution in management procedures and op-
portunity for improvement, so I think that
some changes will be indicated in the Agency
organization. I would propose to discuss any
Important changes with our congressional
subcommittees.
During the hearings before your committee
I read into the record a letter from the Presi-
dent concerning the scope of the responsibil-
ities he has asked me to assume, and the
President stated therein that he would expect
me to delegate to a principal deputy as I
may deem necessary so much of the direction
of the detailed operation of the Agency as
may be required to permit me to carry out
the primary task of the Director of Central
Intelligence. This, of course, I intend to do,
and while I will have overall responsibility
for the Agency, I am studying what delega-
tions of authority should be made to the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
Senator MoCtiamy's second question asked
what bearing such changes would have upon
the duties of the head of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and upon the operation of the
Agency. Any efbaRges made in Agency or-
ganization will have no bearing on the duties
of the Director of Central Intelligence, the
scope of whose responsibilities is set forth
in the Presidential letter mentioned above.
The authority of the Director has been
neither enhanced nor diluted, and I believe
the purpose of the President's directive is
to make clear that the Director of Central
Intelligence is his principal intelligence offi-
cer to exercise the dual role set forth In the
law, to be responsible for the direction of the
Central Intelligence Agency Itself, and to as-
sure the coordination of the intelligence
community as a whole. The one change that
has been made is in connection with the
coordination function. The Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence Is Chairman of the U.S. In-
telligence Board, which is composed of the
heads of all the intelligence components of
the Government, and I have placed the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on
that Board to represent the views of the.
Central Intelligence Agency in connection
with any matters considered by the Board.
It appeared to me that if I served as Chair-
man and as such as the President's repre-
sentative and the Deputy as the Agency's
representative was the advocate of the
Agency's viewpoints, I would be In a position
to take a more objective point of view. This
new arrangement was approved by the Presi-
dent in the letter referred to above.
Senator McCARTHY's third question asks
for my views as to the authority for some
of the actions attributed to the Central In-
telligence Agency in the field of foreign af-
fairs within recent years. Many events have
been attributed to the Central Intelligence
Agency over the years, and it would be Im-
possible or me to have the facts on these
matters, but I certainly do not accept that
because they are attributed to the Central
Intelligence Agency the Agency is responsi-
ble for them. The Senator's question ap-
pears to go to the basic juridical or constitu-
tional authorities of the executive branch,
and this involves profound legal questions
which, since I am not a lawyer, I do not feel
competent to debate.
It is my understanding, however, that the
President has wide powers in the field of
foreign relations and within the framework
.of the Constitution is empowered to do what
he deems to be necessary to protect and pro-
mote the national interest At the present
time, in my opinion, the national interest is
best served by taking steps to deter the en-
croachment of communism. As provided by
law the Central Intelligence Agency operates
under the direction of the National Security
Council which Is advisory to the President
and of which he is Chairman and, therefore,
it is but one of the arms In the complex of
establishments which are involved in the
President's conduct of foreign policy. I in-
tend to carry out to the best of my ability
all duties assigned, and I must assume that
no such assignment would cause me to vio-
late my oath of office to support and defend
the Constitution.
Senator MCCARTHY'S fourth question con-
cerns my judgment as to methods which can
be justifiably used by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The very nature of the ques-
tion is such that I believe I cannot respond
to it, particularly in the light of the respon-
sibility imposed upon me by law to assure
the protection of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Senator McCARTHY's fifth question was to
the extent of my involvement, if any, in what
had been described or reported as "leaks"
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
from the Atomic Energy Commission with
reference to the moratorium on nuclear test-
ing. I know of no instance where I person-
ally or any of the Commissioners were
charged by anyone with leaking anything
either on this subject or any other subject
of a classified nature. There were leaks in
this area, but there were none that were
attributed to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Senator MCCARTHY'S sixth question in-
quired as to the facts with regard to the
charge that I attempted to have scientists
fired at the California Institute of Tech-
nology. Ten scientists at" Cal Tech signed
a statement concerning suspension of nu-
clear testing. I differed strongly with their
position and felt that the manner in which
the statement came out tended to imply that
it was an official Cal Tech position. I wrote
my letter stating my strong disagreement to
1 of the 19 scientists directly, Dr. Thomas
Lauritsen. To the best of my recollection I
did not send copies of this letter to the uni-
versity or officials thereof, and the file carbon
which I retained does not indicate any dis-
tribution, I would be less than candid if
I did not say that my views concerning this
matter were known to many people. How-
ever, I did not officially or unofficially re-
quest the dismissal of any or all of the
scientists by the Institute, and none were
dismissed as a result of any action by me.
The general thrust of Senator MCCARTHY'S
statement was the need for greater congres-
sional supervision of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and early in his statement he said
there is no regular or normal procedure in
existence or in use today by which commit-
tees of the Congress are consulted or In-
formed of the Central Intelligence Agency's
activities. There are, of course, subcommit-
tees of the Armed Services Committees of
both the Senate and the House, constituted
as CIA subcommittees, and there are sub-
committees of the Appropriations Commit-
tees of both the Senate and the House,
constituted to consider the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's appropriations matters.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been at
all times responsive to the calls of these sub-
committees and in addition has brought to
their attention matters the agency felt
should properly be considered by them. I
will continue this policy and this relation-
ship with these subcommittees.
Senator MCCARTHY'S statement quoted a
comment by Hanson Baldwin that intel-
ligence is too important to be left to the un-
supervised. In addition to the relationship
with the subcommittees of the Congress set
forth above, the Agency reports to the Na-
tional Security Council and is subject to di-
rection by the National Security Council.
There are precise interdepartmental arrange-
ments for consideration of certain of the
Agency's activities so that the President and
the Secretaries of State and Defense can ap-
ply policy guidance and be adequately in-
formed.
Senator 7,dCCARTHY also sets forth a quota-
tion from Walter Lippmann stating that the
Central Intelligence Agency has been much
too often an original source of American
foreign policy. I do not consider that the
Director of Central Intelligence is a policy-
making position. The chief function of the
Agency I. to obtain all possible facts from aN
sources and after proper evaluation dissemi-
nate them to the President and other ap-
propriate polieymakers. I might be asked my
personal views, and if so I would feel free to
give them, but do not conceive that it is
proper for the Director of Central Intelligence
to volunteer in regard to questions concern-
ing the national policy. Within the Intel-
ligence structure there are, of course, from
time to time, policy questions concerning or-
ganization or methods, but these are not re-
lated and therefore must be clearly differen-
tiated from matters of nat16nal policy and
are settled internally through the mechanism
of the U.S. Intelligence Board.
I trust the foregoing will serve the needs of
the committee.
Yours very truly,
JOHN A. MCCou ,
Director.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator
from Minnesota has raised the question
of the constitutionality of actions, and so
forth. I have been looking up the :law.
I believe that chapter 343 of the Acts of
the 80th Congress, section 102(a), be-
ginning on page 497, is still the present
law regarding the Central Intelligence
Agency. I wish to call attention to sub-
paragraph (d) of section 102, which de-
fines its duties. If the Senator from
Minnesota will permit me to do so, I
should like to read the five duties.
Mr. McCARTHY. I should be glad to
have the Senator from Massachusetts do
so.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I read as fol-
lows:
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the
intelligence activities of the several Govern-
ment departments and agencies in the in-
terest of national security, it shall be the
duty of the Agency, under the direction of
the National Security Council-
(1) to advise the National Security Coun-
cil in matters concerning such intelligence
activities of the Government departments
and agencies as relate to national security;
(2) to make recommendations to the Na-
tional Security Council for the coordination
of such intelligence activities of the depart-
ments and agencies of the Government as re-
late to the national security;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such in-
telligence within the Government using
where appropriate existing agencies and fa-
cilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have
no police, subpena, law-enforcement powers,
or internal-security functions: Provided fur-
ther, That the departments and other agen-
cies of the Government shall continue to
collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate
departmental Intelligence: And provided fur-
ther, That the Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall be responsible for protecting; in-
telligence sources and methods from unau-
thorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the ex-
isting intelligence agencies, such additional
services of cpmmon concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more ef-
ficiently accomplished centrally;
(5) to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct.
I call especial attention to subpara-
graph (5) :
(5) to perform such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct.
That would put the CIA directly under
the National Security Council, to per-
form whatever actions the National Se-
curity Council asked the CIA to do, as
I interpret that sentence.
Mr. McCARTHY. Of course, the
question of constitutionality would arise
so as to determine whether the CIA per-
formed duties which the National Se-
curity Council had not directed, and
also whether the National Security
Council may have directed things which
were extra-constitutional, and in which
the proper participation of Congress it-
self was not provided for. So it is a
basic question of the involvment of Con-
gress and its participation in decisions,
some of which I think, under the Con-
stitution, were not intended that Con-
gress be involved, and that this ques-.
tion would still run through the State
Department, the National Security
Council, and the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Secretary
of State himself is a member of the
National Security Council. Certainly
we would hope the President would not
authorize, through the National Security
Council, anything to be done that was
not constitutional.
Mr. McCARTHY. Perhaps we should
ask for representation from Congress on
the National Security Council. This
might be an alternative to a joint com-
mittee on intelligence.
Mr: SALTONSTALL. I think that
matter has been discussed in the past
and decided in the negative.
Mr. McCARTHY. Conditions change.
I think it was Edmund Burke who said
that for every political decision or situa-
tion, the number of factors involved is
infinite; therefore, the number of de-
cisions that might be right is also
infinite.
Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. BARTLETI'. First, I desire to
congratulate the Senator from Minne-
sota for his discussion this. afternoon.
I think the issues he has raised and the
questions he has propounded ought to
have been raised and propounded.
While it is true that he-and, for that
matter, all the rest of us-must, be-
cause of the very nature of the Agency
which is the subject of the discussion,
proceed, as it were, through the dark,
darkly, yet he has brought out here
points which I think will, in the long
run, result in an improved functioning
of the CIA. For that reason, if for no
other, the country is indebted to the
junior Senator from Minnesota.
I was very favorably impressed by the
statement Mr. McCone made before the
Committee on Armed Services, not
once, but two or more times, in response
to questions; namely, that he does not
believe it to be the duty of the CIA to
formulate policy. His description of the
purpose of that organization is, as I re-
call his thinking about it, to collect in-
telligence and data. That seems to me
to be vitally important. If rumors are
to be believed, that has not always been
true in the past.
My understanding of the situation is
that foreign policy is to be conducted
by the President, with advice and guid-
ance coming principally from the De-
partment of State, and that the contri-
butions of the Central Intelligence
Agency are to be made in the supplying
of intelligence information upon which
those decisions can, as we hope, be
properly made. But if there are two or
sometimes, as is rumored, more organi-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---- SENATE January 29
zations; especially in areas abroad,
where we seek to influence people and
governments, setting out different poli-
cies and guidelines, only confusion and
sometimes chaos will result.
That is why I was especially pleased
to hear Mr. McCone define the chief
purpose, as is revealed in the printed
hearings on his nomination, of the CIA
as being a gatherer of facts.
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Sena-
tor from Alaska for his comments.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. It is somewhat
academic, but I think there is merit in
the suggestion of the Senator from Min-
nesota for congressional representation
on the National Security Council. At
one time a distinguished former Mem-
be.- of this body, the Honorable James W.
Wadsworth, introduced a bill to that
effect. It had to do with making the
Vice President a statutory member of
the National Security Council. The
proposal was opposed by the administra-
tion at that time, because it was consid-
ered that the Vice President was a
member of the legislative branch, not
the executive branch.
But I think there is merit in the idea,
and I hope that at sometime the able
Senator from Minnesota will develop any
further thoughts he may have on that.
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Sena-
tor from Missouri.
On this point I think it important that
Senators give attention to the entire
matter of procedure. I think that some-
times we believe democracy is self-
operating and that we do not need to
worry very much about it or about what
the channels are and what the juridical
basis is, and we are inclined to believe
that it will take care of itself. I was not
a supporter of the famous Bricker
arnendment; but I do not think the only
question involved was isolationism, be-
cause there were also questions of the
authority of Congress and the involve-
ment of Congress in some of the deci-
sio.ns. So I think we should give atten-
tion to this problem, not only in regard
to the CIA and foreign problems, but
also in regard to matters in domestic
fields.
1vir. President, I have only one more
related set of remarks to make. These
have to do, not with this parteiular case,
but with the entire function of the Sen-
ate in its role in acting on nominations.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
at this point will the Senator from Min-
nesota yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bua-
DICK in the chair). Does the Senator
from Minnesota yield to the Senator
from Massachusetts?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator
from Minnesota has made a learned pre-
sentation in regard to the CIA and
supervision of it by the Congress, and
other related matters. Do I correctly
understand that the Senator from Min-
nesota opposes confirmation of the pend-
ing nomination; or is he raising ques-
tions now because he believes this is the
proper time to raise questions in regard
to this subject, when the question of con-
firmation of a nomination is before the
Senate?
Mr. McCARTHY. Let me say to the
Senator from Massachusetts that sev-
eral other Members have been concerned
about some other related problems, and
I should like to hear them express their
views. But it is my feeling that whereas
I would not say the nomination of Mr.
McCone should be rejected on the basis
of any one of the specific points which
have been made against confirmation
of his nomination, yet the total pattern
or configuration is such that if it were
for me to make the decision about con-
firmation of his nomination or rejec-
tion of his nomination, I, would have to
vote "No." So unless I am persuaded
otherwise in the course of time-and of
course, as Edmund Burke said, little
time remains, for we must vote on this
question the day after tomorrow,
Wednesday, and even though I do not
think many Members would base their
decision on my declaration of position,
yet I would have to say that as of now
I am not prepared to vote in favor of
confirmation of the nomination.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Minnesota yield
further?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Whereas I
agree on many subjects with the Sen-
ator from Minnesota, let me'say very
fervently and categorically that I dis-
agree with him on this one, and I shall
vote in favor of confirmation of the
nomination.
Mr. McCARTHY. In view of the
Senator's previous remarks, I assumed
that he was likely to reach that conclu-
sion.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on
this point, will the Senator from Minne-
sota yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. _FULBRIGHT. A moment ago I
thought the Senator from Minnesota
would proceed to discuss the affirmative
reasons which had been advanced in re-
gard to the question of confirmation of
this nomination. Do I correctly under-
stand that the Senator has completed
that part of his presentation?
Mr. McCARTHY. I thought that by
indirection I had made those points.
Certainly I do not dispute some of the
claims made for the nominee or about
his fine record, as pointed out by the
Senator from Missouri. I can only say
that I have in mind a different point.
As regards the administrative expe-
rience of the nominee, I am not in a
position to challenge, or at least I am
not inclined to challenge, any of those
statements.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I correctly un-
derstand that the Senator from Minne-
sota has said he has no knowledge of
the nominee's views in regard to matters
of foreign policy?
Mr. McCARTHY. I say that I am not
informed ifi regard to his position on
many matters of complicated and diffi-
cult foreign policy, and this is informa-
tion which I should like to have.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did the Senator
ask questions of the nominee himself on
this subject?
Mr. McCARTHY. I did not. I said
that I should like to have the committee
ask questions on that. But I think the
procedure in the committee is not to
have other Senators ask questions there.
Is that correct?
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Armed Serv-
ices Committee was very glad to have the
Senator from Minnesota submit ques-
tions. The Senator from Arkansas has
brought up a pertinent point, because
the chairman of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee permitted questions in
any detail the Senator from Minnesota
wanted to ask them. Some are part of
the record, beginning with page 32, listed
from 1 to 6. The answers were given
by Mr. McCone in the letter which mem-
bers of the committee received; and it
is now- part of the hearing record.
I would say, with great respect to the
Senator from Minnesota, that if there
were any specific questions for the pur-
pose of challenging the nominee's capac-
ity in this field, and his knowledge of
foreign policy-which, as the Senator
knows, is reasonably extensive, based on
positions he has held in the past--inas-
much as the Senator from Minnesota
has now declared his intention to vote
against confirmation of the nomination,
I would have hoped the questions would
have been asked of the nominee at the
committee hearing, so that before the
Senator from Minnesota took the floor
he would have had answers to any ques-
tions he cared to ask.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. McCARTHY. I shall yield in just
a moment.
First, let me say that the questions to
which the Senator from Missouri refers
were included in my statement and were
suggested to the Armed Services Com-
mittee as relating to an area about which
they might wish to ask questions.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I
wished to ask about. Did any member
of the Armed Services Committee ques-
tion the nominee in regard to this aspect
of foreign relations?
Mr. McCARTHY. So far as I know,
there were no questions there in regard
to matters which can be defined as mat-
ters of foreign policy or relating to for-
eign problems.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does not the Sen-
ator think it is rather unusual that the
committee did not ask questions about
such matters, which are of primary con-
cern to it?
Mr. McCARTHY. I had hoped they
would, because the public record is very
scanty.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from
Minnesota is not a member of that com-
mittee; is he?
Mr. McCARTHY. No, I am not a
member of the Armed Services Commit-
tee.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. So the record does
not show that any member of the Armed
Services Committee asked about these
matters; does it? I am asking the Sena-
tor that question.
Mr. McCARTHY. No; not in what I
consider a sufficient way to go into such
complicated matters.
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Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, the matter of the point of view 6.1 a Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the Foreign
will the Senator from Minnesota yield? nominee. Let us take the Secretary of Relations Committee did not ask a new
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield. State. It may .be pointed out that he Secretary of State for his ideas and
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should like to simply Is the instrument and agent of position and feelings on foreign affairs
refer the Senator from Minnesota to the the President, so why should we ask him matters, I think it would be derelict in
committee hearings at the top of page what his policies are? It could be said its duty. That would be true with re-
42. From that page I quote the follow- that this man is purely the representa- spect to the Committee on Agriculture
ing statement by Mr. McCone : tive of, the Executive. and Forestry with respect to one's agri-
As I said, from the standpoint of my com- With respect to the appointment of a cultural policies. But in this case it is
petence in office, it is my responsibility to former Secretary of Agriculture, we not, I repeat, a policymaking job; this
report facts, and, furthermore, I think I Democrats went into that question ex- is an effort to find a man who is capable
should avoid, so far as possible, being drawn tensively with respect to Ezra Taft Ben- of getting the facts, administering the
in on a personal basis into any policy dis- son. Why did we not then say that he Department, picking out good men to
cussions because that, to an extent, may have had nothing to do with policy; that he work under him, so that they can get
some effect on what people, the validity that was simply the channel, the instrument, the facts and give those facts to the
people might attach to the facts. and was pure and undefiled? We raised President, the National Security Coun-,
However, I would expect that because of
the various areas of activity that I have had the question of point of view and poli- ell, and, when asked, to the Congress.
in Government in the past, that maybe my ties in many other areas that are not as Mr. McCARTHY. The record shows
personal opinion may be asked on some sub- important as they are in the determina- that this Agency has been a policy mak-
jects. But in my role as Director of Central tion of policies of the Central Intelligence ing one and has had a great influence on
Intelligence, it would be beyond my corn- Agency. policy. If such complete neutralism
petence to deal with policy. Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, could be achieved, I think the Senator's
That was brought out at least two or will the Senator yield? case could be made. I was going to con-
three times during the discussion; and r. McCARTHY. I yield. elude with a statement which is really
certainly in the past the former Direc Mr. SALTONSTALL. I say, just as an answer to the question the Senator
tor, Mr. Dulles, said clearly that he emphatically as I can, from my knowl- raised earlier. In; this case the whole
never expressed himself on matters of edge of CIA and its activities over the somehow is greater than the sum of its
policy. He said it was his duty to obtain years, that if Mr. McCone had matte a parts, and I am inclined to oppose the
the facts and to give them to the policy- statement on policy questions and had nomination.
makers, whd are the President, the Sec- said, "I believe that this is the wrong Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
retary of State, the Secretary of Defense, policy, and this is the right policy," it will the Senator yield?
and so forth. would have affected my opinion very Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will materially as to whether he was the Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from
the Senator yield? right man for this kind of position to Minnesota had an interview with Mr.
Mr. McCARTHY. I yield. which he has been appointed. His job McCone, did he not?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Does the Senator is not to express policy positions, but to Mr. McCARTHY. Yes.
believe a nominee to be Director of the get facts on which the policymakers can Mr. SYMINGTON. At the Senator's
Central Intelligence Agency can properly act. If they do not have thef facts so request?
testify before a congressional committee, they can do a job, he should get more Mr. McCARTHY. I think it was at
in open session, his views with respect to facts or resign, or be asked to resign, be- his request.
matters relating to his programs and cause he is not doing his job of getting Mr. SYMINGTON. Did the Senator
policies, as he views them in regard to the facts. find Mr. McCone evasive?
our intelligence activities in the various I say that most respectfully to the Mr. McCARTHY. No. I think he
foreign countries? Senator from Minnesota, because in this answered essentially in the same way he
Mr. McCARTHY. I do not know that instance it is distinctly against the answered before the committee and in
It would have been necessary for him to nominee's qualifications for the position the letter which he subsequently sent to
discuss all of these in open committee for one chosen to express himself on the committee when the committee sug-
sessions. I would not have been opposed policies of the Government. That is my gested-I do not know whether it was a
to having the committee hold some ex- understanding of the situation, suggestion or not-that he answer in re-
ecutive sessions or limited sessions, if Mr. McCARTHY. I think if we could sponse to my question, which the com-
need be. But to satisfy myself, at least, be sure that he was going to be com- mittee presented to him.
I should have liked to have had a knowl- pletely neutralized from now on, it Mr. SYMINGTON. The only reason
edge of his stand on some of these issues might be the ideal. If he replied that I mention this conference is because of a
with which the Central Intelligence he had no views or has had no views on discussion before the committee. I had
Agency will have to deal. policy Problems that have been before felt the Senator from Minnesota was
I think this raises a rather serious us, it would be another matter. But I stating Mr. McCone attempted to dis-
question in regard to what is the real do not think the Senator would argue charge these professors.
role of the Senate in regard to acting that Mr. McCone is a man who has no Mr. McCARTHY. I have not raised
on the question of confirming Presi- views or has had no views, so it is a that question here today.
dential nominations-for instance matter of some significance to know Mr. SYMINGTON. I know the Sena-
whether the Senate is to take the posi- what they are or have been. We can tor has not. I am raising it.
tion that the point of view of the nomi- move from that point to determine, Mr. McCARTHY. I have made no
nee has no relationship to the question whether or not he would let those views point about evasiveness with respect to
of confirmation, and $hould not be in- affect what he might do as the head of any question.
quired into. the Central Intelligence Agency. :t say Mr. SYMINGTON. I asked the Sen-
Mr. SYMINGTON. In open ses- we would not accept a man as head of ator that question- because I wanted it
sion- ' the Rural Electrification Administra- clear in the RECORD that he had not re-
Mr. I cCARTHY. If so, that limits tion and say we did not care what his quested the discharge of these men and
the role of the Senate to checking and views are. The Senate would not re- none were discharged.
ascertaining whether the nominee is spond to that kind of appeal. I recog- Mr. McCARTHY. Insofar as I know,
honest, and whether he has FBI clear- nize that these remarks would not apply what the nominee said in answer to the
ante, and perhaps whether under cer- to the head of this Agency as they would various questions, not only in that hear-
tain conditions he has a health certifi- to the head of the REA; but, in terms ing, but before the Joint Committee on
cate. In that event it could be said there of procedure, I would be opposed to a Atomic Energy, presented a picture of
is no need for the Senate to inquire into man who had expressed certain views one in whom there was no evasion or
these other areas. on the questions of policy in a field in misrepresentation of fact.
There is no need to hold extensive which he was going to be active, be- Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Sen-
hearings, in my opinion, for important cause, in the formal sense, he would be ator.
decisions to cover these three points; but, expected to carry out the laws of Mr. McCARTHY. There may be a
traditionally, the Senate has looked into Congress. few side facts that may not have been
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29
presented, but, so far as questions went
in that field, I would not say he has not
completed the record.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I brought that
question up because the question was
asked. Are there any fields in which
the Senator believes the nominee was
evasive?
Mr. McCARTHY. At present, no. It
is not a question of evasiveness. I have
made no charge of evasiveness, but I
raised some questions which had been
raised, to which satisfactory answers
were given in the hearings, and in part
raised them here because they deserved
special consideration in reference to
facts in controversy with respect to the
head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the
Senator.
In the record the Senator from South
Dakota asked the nominee about his
position; whether he was a policymaker;
and he said "No." I am sure it was the
feeling of his predecessor that he should
not be a policymaker.
Mr. McCARTHY. I thank the Sen-
ator.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that there be printed at the
conclusion of my remarks two docu-
ments, one a letter from John A. McCone
addressed to the Honorable RICHARD B.
RUSSELL, chairman of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, dated January 19, and
an article entitled "The Secret Mission
in an Open Society," by Harry Howe
Ransom. At the time the latter article
was written Mr. Ransom was on the
faculty of Harvard, if I may correct
my earlier statement. He has since
moved from Harvard.
There being no objection, the letter
anti article were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., January 19, 1962.
ROIL. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL: I am happy to
respond at the Armed Services Committee's
request to the statement Senator EUGENE J.
MCCARTHY made on January 18, 1962, at the
opening of the committee's hearings on my
nomination to the position of Director of
Central Intelligence. I shall respond directly
to the specific questions posed by Senator
MCCARTHY at the end of his statement, but
as other portions of the statement were con-
sidered during the hearings I shall also set
forth my position in regard to them.
The first question asked if the Central In-
telligence Agency is to be reorganized and if
so in what respects. I have been and I am
studying the organization of the Agency very
intently. The present pattern of organiza-
tion of the Agency is the result of years of
study by competent people, both within the
Government and outside consultants, and in
my opinion it is not a bad pattern of organ-
ization. However, I believe that in all
departments of the Government there is an
evolution in management procedures and op-
portunity for improvement so I think that
some changes will be indicated in the agency
organization. I would propose to discuss
any Important changes with our congres-
sional subcommittees.
During the hearings before your committee
I read into the record a letter from the
President concerning the scope of the respon-
sibilities he has asked me to assiune, and
the President stated therein that he would
expect me to delegate to a principal deputy
as I may deem necessary so much of the
direction of the detailed operation of the
Agency as may be required to permit me
to carry out the primary task of the Director
of Central Intelligence. This, of course, I
intend to do and while I will have overall
responsibility for the Agency, I am studying
what delegations of authority should be
made to the Deputy Director of Central In-
telligence.
Senator MCCARTHY'S second question asked
what bearing such changes would have upon
the duties of the head of the Central In-
telligence Agency and upon the operation
of the Agency. Any changes made in Agency
organization will have no bearing on the
duties of the Director of Central Intelligence,
the scope of whose responsibilities is set
forth in the Presidential letter mentioned
above. The authority of the Director has
been neither enhanced nor diluted, and I
believe the purpose of the President's direc-
tive is to make clear that the Director of
Central Intelligence is his principal intelli-
gence officer to exercise the dual role set
forth in the law, to be responsible for the
direction of the Central Intelligence Agency
itself, and to assure the coordination of the
intelligence community as a whole. The
one change that has been made is in con-
nection with the coordination function.
The Director of Central Intelligence Is
Chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board,
which is composed of the heads of all the
intelligence components of the Government,
and I have placed the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence on that Board to repre-
sent the views of the Central Intelligence
Agency in connection with any matters con-
sidered by the Board. It appeared to me
that if I served as Chairman and as such as
the President's representative and the Depu-
ty as the Agency's representative was the
advocate of the Agency's viewpoint; I would
be in a position to take a more objective
point of view. This new arrangement was
approved by the President in the letter re-
ferred to above.
Senator MCCARTHY'S third question asks
for my views as to the authority for some of
the actions attributed to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the field of foreign affairs
within recent years. Many events have been
attributed to the Central Intelligence Agency
over the years, and it would be impossible
for me to have the facts on these matters,
but I certainly do not accept that because
they are attributed to the Central Intelli-
gence Agency the Agency is responsible for
them. The Senator's question appears to go
to the basic juridical or constitutional au-
thorities of the executive branch, and this
Involves profound legal questions which,
since I am not a lawyer, I do not feel compe-
tent to debate. It is my understanding,
however, that the President has wide powers
in the field of foreign relations and within
the framework of the Constitution is em-
powered to do what he deems to be neces-
sary to protect and promote the national in-
terest. At the present time, In my opinion,
the national interest Is best served by tak-
ing steps to deter the encroachment of com-
munism. As provided by law the Central
Intelligence Agency operates under the di-
rection of the National Security Council,
which is advisory to the President and of
which he is Chairman and, therefore, It is
but one of the arms in the complex of estab-
lishments which are involved in the Presi-
dent's conduct of foreign policy. I intend to
carry out, to the best of my ability, all duties
assigned, and I must assume that no such
assignment would cause me to violate my
oath of office to support and defend the
Constitution.
Senator MCCARTHY'S fourth question con-
cerns my judgment as to methods which
can be justifiably used by the Central In-
telligence Agency. The very nature of the
question is such that I believe I cannot
respond to it, particularly in the light of
the responsibility Imposed upon me by law
to assure the protection of intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure.
Senator MCCARTHY's fifth question was to
the extent of my involvement, if any, in
what had been described or reported as leaks
from the Atomic Energy Commission with
reference to the moratorium on nuclear
testing. I know of no instance where I per-
sonally or any of the Commissioners were
charged by anyone with leaking anything
either on this subject or any other subject
of a classified nature. There were leaks in
this area, but there were none that were
attribtued to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Senator MOCARTIIY'S sixth question in-
quired as to the facts with regard to the
charge that I attempted to have scientists
fired at the California Institute of Tech-
nology. Ten scientists at Cal Tech signed
a statement concerning suspension of
nuclear testing. I differed strongly with
their position and felt that the manner in
which the statement came out tended to
imply that it was an official Cal Tech posi-
tion. I wrote my letter stating my strong
disagreemenj: to one of the 10 scientists
directly, Dr. Thomas Lauritsen. To the best
of my recollection I did not send copies of
this letter to the university or officials
thereof, and the file carbon which I retained
does not indicate any distribution. I would
be less than candid if I did not say that my
views concerning this matter were known to
many people. However, I did not officially
or unofficially request the dismissal of any
or all of the scientists by the institute, and
none were dismissed as a result of any
action by me.
The general thrust of Senator MCCARTHY'S
statement was the need for greater congres-
sional supervision of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and early in his statement he said
there is no regular or normal procedure in
existence or in use today by which commit-
tees of the Congress are consulted or in-
formed of the Central Intelligence Agency's
activities. There are, of course, subcommit-
tees of the Armed Services Committees of
both the Senate and the House, constituted
as CIA Subcommittees, and there are sub-
committees of the Appropriations Commit-
tees of both the Senate and the House,
constituted to consider the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's appropriations matters.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been
at all times responsive to the calls of these
subcommittees and in addition has brought
to their attention matters the Agency felt
should properly be considered by them. I
will continue this policy and this relation-
ship with these subcommittees.
Senator MCCARTHY'S statement quoted a
comment by Hanson Baldwin that intelli-
gence is too important to be left to the
unsupervised. In addition to the relation-
ship with the subcommittees of the Con-
gress set forth above, the Agency reports to
the National Security Council and is subject
to direction by the National Security Coun-
cil. There are precise interdepartmental ar-
rangements for consideration of certain of
the Agency's activities so that the Presi-
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1962 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 939
dent and the Secretaries of State and De-
fense can apply policy guidance and be ade-
quately informed.
Senator 14CCARTHY also sets forth a quota-
tion from Walter Lippmann stating that the
Central Intelligence Agency has been much
too often an original source of American
foreign policy. I do not consider that the
Director of Central Intelligence is a policy-
making position. The chief function of the
Agency is to obtain all possible facts from
all sources and after proper evaluation dis-
seminate them to the President and other
appropriate policymakers. I might be asked
my personal views, and if so I would feel
free to give them but do not conceive that
it is pro*r for the Director of Central In-
telligence to volunteer in regard to questions
concerning the national policy. Within the
intelligence structure there are, of course,
from time to time policy questions concerning
organization or methods, but these are not
related and, therefore, must be clearly dif-
ferentiated from, matters of national policy
and are settled internally through the
mechanism of the U.S. Intelligence Board.
I trust the foregoing will serve the needs
of the committee.
Yours very truly,
JOHN A. MCCONE,
Director.
SECRET MISSION IN AN OPEN SOCIETY
(By Harry Howe Ransom)
Sile,Ice is the golden word of intelligence.'
Recent events, however, have trumpeted U.S.
foreign intelligence activities at full volume
and high fidelity for all the world to hear.
What has come through is disturbing.
The Central Intelligence Agency's misfor-
tunes have engendered the publicity which
an efficient intelligence system always seeks
to avoid. The fact that disclosures have
been made ' in itself represents a failure.
The nature of the disclosures raises trouble-
some issues, but the central question in the
current White House and Capitol Hill inves-
tigations is, What is the role of the secret
intelligence apparatus in a democracy?
Few would deny the necessity of intelli-
gence activities. After the American U-2.
aircraft was downed in Russia last year,
President Eisenhower publicly confessed to
the world that the United States-pursuant
to authority granted in the National Se-
curity Act of 1947-seeks intelligence in
every feasible way. The espionage side of
this activity he described as a distasteful but
vital necessity for security against surprise
attack and or effective defense planning.
The Cuban fiasco, however, has revealed in
unprecedented detail another side of
CIA activities--clandestine political opera-
tions designed to subvert an unfriendly
government.
Central Intelligence today has three prin-
cipal functions: Intelligence collection, its
analysis and communication to policymakers,
and clandestine foreign political operations.
The increasing necessity of these activities is
attributable to three major reasons.
From earliest times, an intelligence ap-
paratus has been an indispensable part of
the paraphernalia of a great world power.
The worldwide responsibilities of the United
States today require both a system for keep-
ing the complex details of world politics un-
der cbnstant surveillance and an instrument
for secret foreign political action.
A second reason is that national policy
decisions are based, increasingly, upon pre-
dictions of foreign political, economic, and
military developments 5 to 10 years hence.
This fact is a consequence of the long lead-
time in developing weapons systems and of
the need to make economical use of finite re-
sources to implement long-range foreign
policy objectives.
Consequently, an intelligence system to-
day is asked an incredibly wide range of
urgent questions, answers to which can be
obtained sometimes only by devious meth-
ods. When will Communist China test an
atomic device? What future has the eco-
nomic integration of Europe? How stable
is the Government of South Vietnam? What
course will Sino-Soviet relations take?
A third reason derives from modern mili-
tary technological developments. Intelli-
gence, it often is said, has become the first
line of defense. Accurate and rapidly trans-
mitted information is an absoluate require-
ment for an effective strategy of deterrence.
Strategic striking forces must have an ac-
curate dossier of potential enemy targets.
And essential elements of information al-
ways must be available to thwart an enemy's
possible surprise knockout blow.
Much of such information is held in tight-
est security by the Iron Curtain countries,
requiring a systematic effort to ferret it
out. Similar information is freely available
to the Communists from our open society.
Americans have not flinched at espionage
or underground political action in wartime.
A favorite national hero is Nathan Hale, who
spied in the American Revolutionary cause.
In World War II, the Office of Strategic
Services was, deservedly or not, considered
most romantic.
Short of declared war, however, secret
operations are widely regarded as a dirty
business, unfitting America's open, demo-
cratic-and formerly isolationist-society.
Events of recent years have, nonetheless,
revealed to the public at least the top of
the iceberg of a vast secret intelligence pro-
gram.
Distasteful or not, secret operations have
become a major underground front of the
cold war. The accelerating pace of cold
warfare in Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand,
the Congo, Latin America and elsewhere in-
creases the pressure for greater American
involvement in the secret black arts.
One's attitude toward these activities will
depend, finally, upon one's assessment of
contemporary international politics and of
the requirements for the common defense.
President Kennedy recently declared that
the cold war has reached such a stage that
"no war ever posed a greater threat to our
security." If they take that as a valid as-
sessment, most Americans will assume, al-
though doubtless with misgivings, a war-
time attitude toward secret operations.
Whatever one's view, the existence of a
secret bureaucracy poses special problem:: in
the American system of government.
Knowledge is power. Secret knowledge is
secret power. A secret apparatus, claiming
superior knowledge and operating outside
the normal checkreins of American democ-
racy is a source of invisible government.
The American democratic system, how-
ever, is based upon the concept of visible,
identifiable power, subject to constitutional
checks and balances. One important check
is the citizen's right to know what his Gov-
ernment is doing. Another is the existence
of a free press to inform him.
How, then, can the controls of a demo-
cratic system be imposed upon the intel-
ligence system while maintaining the sec-
recy required for its successful operation?
Secret. operations must remain immune
from some of the normal checks, especially
publicity. Heavy dependence must be
placed upon politically responsible officials
to exercise control.
In a parliamentary democracy, such as
Great Britain, the problem is less acute.
The difference is attributable to four factors.
First, Britain has been a world power for
several centuries. Over the years a degree
of confidence in the professionalism of secret
operations has developed
Second, parliamentary government unifies
executive and legislative responsibility under
majority-party leadership. When Ministers
are also Members of Parliament, responsibil-
ity for manegement of secret functions is
reinforced.
A third mitigating factor is "the establish-
ment." That political leaders, intelligence
chiefs and lords of the press often have com-
mon social ties facilitates consensus on
necessary secrecy.
Fourth, the existence of the Official Secrets
Act inhibits the publication of secret in-
formation by imposing legal sanctions on
the press. Additionally, a special Govern-
ment press arrangement exists under which
British editors are sometimes asked upon
receipt of Government defense notices, to'
refrain voluntarily from publishing speci-
fied sensitive information.
British intelligence services, too, are so
organized that secret political operations
overseas are entirely separate from political
and military intelligence functions. An
agency for secret operations is supervised
by a special cabinet subcommittee. The
point is that all are under firm political
authority.
Totalitarian regimes, with their absolute
control of the press, suppression of opposi-
tion and centralized government, have few
of the problems of disclosure and control
experienced by open societies. The Soviet
Union is thought to possess the largest in-
telligence system in the world; its existence
is never avowed by Communist leaders.
Even in dictatorships, however, problems
exist. The interpretation of foreign intelli-
gence doubtless is often distorted by the
intelligence structure there are, of course, fr
rigid ideology. And it is also a fact of his-
tory that the secret intelligence apparatus
often has been a vehicle for internal
political conspiracy. Invisible power is
a potential threat to constituted authority
whatever the form of government.
Aware of the danger of secret power within
government, the President and Congress
have attempted to surround the CIA and
related secret apparatuses with controls.
These are designed to reconcile the conflict-
ing requirements of secrecy and of demo-
cratic control.
The first of these mechanisms derives from
the fact that the CIA's functions are spec-
ified, broadly, by Federal statute, defining
the agency as an instrument of the Presi-
dency. The CIA's operational guidelines
are some 2 dozen codified National Se-
curity Council intelligence directives, ap-
proved by the President. Action such as
the U-2 flights and the Cuban expedition
must be approved specifically by the Presi-
dent. In the past he has had the advice on
such matters of a special NSC Subcommittee
on Clandestine Operations.
A second potential check has been the
President's eight-man Board of Consultants
on Foreign Intelligence Activities. This was
established early in 1956, after a Hoover
Commisison study expressed concern about
the possibility of the growth of license and
abuses of power where disclosures of costs,
organization, personnel and functions are
precluded by law.
The first chairman of this group, composed
largely of distinguished industrialists and
former armed-services officers, was James R.
Killian Jr., then president of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology. President
Kennedy recently reappointed Dr. Killian to
the chairmanship of a reconstituted board
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29
after a 2-year interval in which Gen. John E.
Hull, retired Army officer, presided.
~Nhile the CIA's huge annual budget-
estimated at more than half a billion dol-
lars-is not subject to normal legislative
review, three Congressional standing sub-
committees on central intelligence in fact
ex st as a third potential checkrein.
The Senate and House Armed Services
Committees both have subunits assigned as
watchdogs over the CIA. The Senate sub-
committee combines senior Senators from
the Appropriations and Armed Services Com-
mittees. The House maintains a separate
Appropriations Subcommittee, some mem-
bers of which have been privy to such secrets
as the atomic bomb (Manhattan project) ap-
propriations during World War II.
The working principle of the intelligence
system in the United States was expressed
some years ago by Allen W. Dulles, Director
of Central Intelligence:
"In intelligence you have to take certain
things on faith. You have to look to the
man who is directing the organization and
the result he achieves. If you haven't got
someone who can be trusted, or who doesn't
get results, you'd better throw him out and
get someone else."
Central Intelligence is subject today to
three major criticisms. They involve ques-
tions of control by responsible authority, the
efioiency of existing organizations and the
problem of secrecy.
True, the CIA operates under Presidential
directives, and interdepartmental groups
from the National Security Council down-
ward participate both in interpreting in-
telligence data and in authorizing covert
operations. Yet the principal intelligence
adviser to the highest authority remains the
Director of Central Intelligence, armed with
etxraordinary secrecy inside the Government
and with a secret budget.
In a complex world of fast-moving events
and in a Washington intelligence commu-
nity where CIA professionals are increas-
ingly influential, too few sources of counter-
vailing power exist. This particularly is a
problem with covert operations in which the
Presidency is largely dependent upon the
CIA for information on what is being done
or what needs doing. The danger of self-
serving by the Agency is great. CIA may,
without careful policy guidance, write its
own ticket.
In its 6 years of existence, the President's
E.oard of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities, recently renamed the Foreign In-
telligence Advisory Board, has functioned
more as a polite alumni visiting committee
than as a vigorous watchdog. With one pro-
fessional staff assistant and a single secre-
tary, the Board has been able only spo-
radically to oversee the 15,000-man CIA.
Congressional surveillance has been much
the same-infrequent meetings of uncom-
raonly "timorous subcommittees. The atti-
tude of veteran legislators assigned to these
units is exemplified by one who declared:
part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, unquestionably nonpolitical. Anonymity is
it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, the only proper role.
to seek information-and knowledge on sub- Another aspect of the CIA's ambiguous
jects which I personally, as a Member of secrecy Is that major operations that fail
Congress and as a citizen, would rather not often produce, as we have seen, public con-
have." fessions from highest authority. On the
As astute politicians, Members of Con- other hand, secret missions that succeed
gress realize the possible national embarrass- often are known to the press but volun-
scent if they formally approved espionage or tarily censored.
Covert political action that fails and is dis- For example, the CIA played a dominant
closed. Yet even were Congress less in- role In the overthrow of Premier Mossadegh
lribited about monitoring secret operations In Iran in August 1953, after his abortive
effectively, none of the subcommittees has attempt, in league with the Communist
adequate staffs today for thorough surveil- Tudeh Party, to exile the pro-Western Shah.
lance. This role has never been officially admitted.
Another example is CIA's involvement in
the 1954 Guatemalan episode. In an opera-
tion resembling on a smaller scale the recent
Cuban expedition, the CIA aided the suc-
cessful counter-revolution against the re-
gime of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, which
the U.S. Government regarded as Commu-
nist-dominated. The American press re-
mained silent. Perhaps the inevitable
penalty for failure is disclosure.
Self-restraint on the part of the press and
of Congress in dealing with justifiably secret
information will come at that point when
confidence is restored in the professional
quality and unquestioned subordination to
political authority of secret operations.
It remains to be said that America's for-
eign policy headaches around the globe to-
day stem less from information or organiza-
tion deficiencies than from lack of clearly
articulated foreign policy objectives beyond
anticommunism. Many of the aforemen-
tioned problems of the intelligence system
would solve themselves, given a clearer con-
sensus about America's world purpose and
specific policy objectives.
No greater challenge confronts American
society than responding to the question of
how the United States can engage success-
fully in protracted cold warfare without sac-
rificing the principles defended.
As an open democratic society, the United
States has to recognize its handicaps in
some form of competition with the closed
societies of totalitarian regimes. It would
be unwise to attempt to match the pro-
ficiency of Communist regimes in subversion
as the main avenue to the attainment of
national objectives. There is no point in
America's fighting totalitarianism by imitat-
ing it.
It is equally as important to recognize that
any Communist competitive advantage in
cold warfare comes not alone from centrali-
zation, secrecy and rigid discipline. More
Important is the existence of a Communist
purpose, clear objectives and refined doc-
trines for implementing them.
In a world still lacking universal accept-
ance of law and order based upon govern-
ment by consent, the United States will
sometimes face compelling requirements to
engage in distasteful-indeed, illegal-secret
operations. What is crucially important in
a democracy is that plans, policies and pro-
grams for such reflect the deliberate, in-
formed and purposeful decisions of respon-
sible political authority.
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL
11 A.M. TOMORROW
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when the
Senate concludes its deliberations today
it stand in adjournment to meet at 11
o'clock tomorrow morning.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
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Secret intelligence must never be more or
less than an instrument of national policy.
Its control should remain primarily a re-
sponsibility of the Presidency, but Congress
also must assume a more carefully defined
and active surveillance role. And the De-
partment of State, particularly, must be ag-
gressive in weighing gain from success,
against cost of failure, in every proposed
major secret operation.
A second major criticism is that the CIA
places under one roof the separate func-
tions of intelligence collection, its analysis
and underground foreign political action.
Those who would organize and carry out
a proposed secret operation should be sep-
arated in the decisional process from those
who supply and interpret information to
justify the plan.
This unification appears to have been a
major defect in the Cuban misadventure. It
may explain both the prediction that Cubans
would rise to assist the exiles in overthrow-
ing Castro and the policy decision that the
venture was feasible.
Planners and operational commanders no-
toriously come to view the plan as an end in
itself. They gradually develop a state of
mind that is receptive only to intelligence
data that justify the plan's practicability.
A distorted view of reality often results.
Another example is the unexpected inter-
vention of the Chinese Communists on a
large scale in the Korean war in November
1950. Hard Intelligence was available that
the Chinese Communists were infiltrating
North Korea, with a strong possibility of
major intervention. Yet the operational plan
of General MacArthur's forces to drive north
to the Yalu went ahead disastrously in dis-
regard of available information that should
have given pause. The decisional system
should be insulated against this common
cause of self-delusion.
Persuasive reasons possibly can be ad-
vanced for not placing covert foreign politi-
cal and intelligence (informational) func-
tions under separate agencies. If so, the
dangers inherent in combining them should
be recognized and appropriate safeguards
provided.
A third and related criticism involves
secrecy. Democracy cannot work without a
free press. Expanding Government secrecy
increases the danger of official manipulation
of opinion and concealment of shortcomings
of an incumbent leadership. Secrecy also
vitiates the party and electoral system and
reduces the meaningful autonomy of Con-
gress. Yet again Intelligence activities by
definition require secrecy.
In the face of this dilemma, CIA's secrecy
today has become ambiguous. This may be
the fate of any secret apparatus within
America's open society. But only in America
have intelligence officials become famous per-
sonalities eager to mount the public rostrum.
The director, deputy director and other CIA
officials in recent years have made frequent
public speeches, some containing implicit
policy recommendations. The CIA leader-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Sooner or later a man like that was
bound to get into the Government serv-
ice. I think that high talent recom-
mends itself. It is not at all surprising
that three Presidents-President Tru-
man, President Eisenhower, and Presi-
dent Kennedy-have availed themselves
to Mr. McCone's service.
He came to the Government in an
advisory capacity,I believe in the Tru-
man administration, and showed apti-
tude and competence in the whole field
in which the Air Force operates. He did
a lot of work in the field of Air Force
procurement, and he received the Civil-
ian Service Award with high honors in
1951.
It was not surprising that in due
course President. Eisenhower should
choose him to be a member of the Atomic
Energy Commission. Certainly he ren-
dered great service there.
He went back to private life, and Pres-
ident Kennedy then discovered his com-
petence in many fields and thought he
would prove very useful in directing
the affairs of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
This subject of conflict of interest is
always a difficult problem, to say the
least, about which one can scarcely talk
without having it said that he is speak-
ing in derogation of a person. That is
the last thing I would undertake to do.
It is a subject of interest to the Congress.
I am raising the question only to excite
some additional interest in. the necessity
that the Congress modify and clarify
acts which have been on the books al-
nlost going back to the Civil War which
in their application, if they were strictly
applied, would provide some of the most
fantastic results anyone could imagine.
I noticed in the House report on one
of the acts on the books today that if a
mail carrier assisted his mother in mak-
ing out some kind of a pension applica-
tion as to which Federal funds were in-
volved he would be in violation of a Fed-
eral law and could be prosecuted, as ex-
isting law stands today.
This nomination has had attention,
and a great deal has been written about
Mr. McCone by Mr. Pearson. I think I
have read most of the articles. A lot
of the material was in quotation marks.
Some of it was arrogated to our late dis-
tinguished and lamented friend, Senator
Bridges. It was taken out of the RECORD.
I am sure that as people in the country
read these observations it disturbs them
even as it disturbs us. I came into the
Chamber one noon recently and talked
to a Member of the Senate. I said, "'Did
you see Mr. Pearson's article today?"
He said, "I did." I said, "I am terribly
disturbed and distressed about it. :I do
not quarrel with the articles as such, but
I am thinking in terms of their impact on
the thinking of people all over the coun-
try and what is our responsibility in un-
dertaking to bring about a modification
of the things which are on the statute
books at the present time."
I know the nomination before the
Senate will be approved. I say right now
that I shall vote to confirm the nomina-
tion of Mr. McCone. However, this
941
nomination directs attention to the fact
that without undue delay both the House
and the Senate now ought to direct
some really vigorous efforts to-the busi-
ness of revising the conflict-of-interest
statutes with which we are presently
dealing.
There are eight of these, and they fall
roughly into four categories. The first
would include officers and employees who
act in behalf of an outside interest in
dealings with the Government. I think
an example probably would be a mili-
tary officer who assists a private com-
pany in obtaining, let us say, a defense
contract. That is one category with
which existing law deals.
Another category would incude the
officials and employees acting for the
Government in any kind of a transaction
or deal in which they have a personal in-
terest. We have had some examples of
that over the years. I would not wish
to specify particularly, and to let it ap-
pear that I was invidious about it, be-
cause I think if anybody wishes to go to
the history books he can easily find
those cases,
There is a third class, which includes
those persons who were once upon a time
officers and employees of the Govern-
ment and who have left the Govern-
ment, who represent some private con-
cern, and who probably have made rep-
resentations in behalf of a contract or
an undertaking prior to the lapse of the
2-year period which is required. In
some cases it could be an inadvertence.
In some cases it might be deliberate. But
in any event there is law that is directed
against a violation on that score.
Finally we have another category:
Officers or employees who take pay from
a private source for Government work,
as in the case of an attorney, being
paid by the Government and serving the
Government, but also accepting pay
from an outside source for work done
for the Government.
Those are the statutes in general that
we have today, and they are obfuscating,
prolix, and difficult to determine. Cer-
tainly it is difficult for a layman, or his
counsel back home, to determine pre-
cisely what he has to do in order to
cleanse himself in the eyes of the stat-
utes now on the books if he were to serve
his Government.
The weakness in this entire setup is
apparent. Look at the cases in which
Government could well use the part-
time services of people who are admit-
tedly expert in their fields. Why should
they, for part-time service, under exist-
ing law, agree to divest themselves of
their interests, make a full disclosure of
their holdings, and be interrogated and
cross-examined on every holding that
they have? Then they would always be
subject to have raised the possibility
that they forgot something, and might
become guilty of perjury. Such talents
as they have are denied to the Govern-
ment if a man refuses under those cir-
cumstances to march before a committee
of Congress and say, "I am sorry. I have
lived my life pretty well. I have become
an acknowledged expert in the field in
NOMINATION OF JOHN A. McCONE
TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the nomination of John A. McCone, of
California, to be Director of Central
Intelligence.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, the
question of conflict of interest continues
to beset Congress session after session,
and it does develop some rather awkward
and embarrassing situations not only for
Members but also for those who are
appointed to come into the Government
service because they have extraordinary
talent and competence to render service
to the Government.
In the instant case we are considering
a very distinguished citizen. I do not
believe there can be any doubt about the
fact that he is a distinguished citizen.
He was first nominated by the Presi-
dent in September of 1961. 1 believe the
oath was administered at the White
House by Chief Justice Warren in the
latter part of November.
At the time the designation was made
by the President of the United States,
there was certainly a glowing statement
with respect to John A. McCone and
the confidence of the President in his
capacity to discharge his responsibility
as Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
I took a little look at this problem,
and I puzzled over it, largely because I
am a member of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate, which commit-
tee has held some hearings and heard
some testimony with respect to certain
conflict-of-interest bills; one sponsored
by the administration, one sponsored by
the two distinguished Senators from New
York [Mr. JAVITS and Mr. KEATING], and
one which was reported by the House
Committee on the Judiciary, and which
has. been languishing on the House cal-
endar I believe since July of last year.
I wish to use this nomination as a
backdrop for what I say on the matter.
Mr. McCone, as I recall, is 60 years of
age. I have talked with him on occasion
and discovered that he is a mild-man-
nered man, a man of mild speech but of
great competence. He was. graduated
from the University of California I be-
lieve in 1922.
The character of the man is evidenced
pretty well by the fact that notwith-
standing an engineering degree he be-
came a riveter in an iron works. When
a fellow is 'willing to start at the very bot-
tom notwithstanding the great amount
of engineering data and knowledge he
has absorbed in college, I think it is
pretty good testimony to his character
and to his willingness to start at the
bottom and to come up the ladder. By
rapid stages he did come up the ladder,
finally to help set up, in partnership
with others, a business of his own.
For a long time Mr. McCone has de-
voted his talents, together with those of
his associates, to the business of build-
ing troopships, of building refineries,
of building all manner of facilities which
are produced of steel.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29
which I operate. I am willing to serve
my Government. I am willing to come
for a month, 3 months, or 6 months.
But I am not willing to come and lay
everything on the board because I do not
have to, because I have made my mark in
industry and business, and I do not care
to go through that ordeal."
Then, of course, still another weakness
is that under existing law public officials
can retain many private interests that
are probably incompatible with their
duty. That subject has not been ex-
plored too deeply, but certainly ought to
be clarified so the average citizen could
himself, without the benefit of counsel,
look at a lawbook and say, "This I could
do This I cannot do. This kind of
position I could accept without getting
into difficulty."
Finally there is the unwillingness of
men of stature who would be glad to
serve their Government but were not,
and perhaps could not, in justice to
themselves and their families, always
divest themselves of all their holdings.
That is no easy undertaking, and yet
what a burden it is upon the conscience
of a man to whom the country has been
good, who would like to serve his Gov-
ernment, but who simply must say, "I
am sorry. What Government demands
by way of questioning, cross-examina-
tion, and divestiture of interest and all
the other things that I see recited on
the front page is too much for me. So
I shall not subject my family to what-
ever that interrogation may disclose. I
would prefer to sit back and pursue my
vocation as I have done before."
We have statutes on this subject that
go back to 1873. I trust the Committee
on the Judiciary, on which I serve, will
now find inspiration for accelerated ac-
tion out of the very confirmation that is
before us, and hasten the proposed modi-
fications of existing law so that it will
be much easier for patriotic and stead-
fr".ct citizens who wish to serve their
Government to come into Government
service.
I yield the floor.
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, my
sole purpose in rising today is that my
al;tention has been directed to a portion
of the testimony before the Committee
on Armed Services in the case of Mr.
McCone, in which a Senator present at
the hearing said that in his opinion the
inquiry which the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy had held in 1958 with
reference to some action in connection
with the teachers in California was per-
haps not as thorough as it might have
been, or at least the published reports
of the inquiry were somewhat short of
satisfactory.
I only wish to say that the one who
raised that question is one of our fine
Senators, my close personal friend, and
I find it extremely difficult to comment
on the subject. I only hope that what
I say can be dissociated from the other
remarks which he made.
I do wish to say that the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy--certainly the
Senate section of the committee-in my
opinion has not been notorious in fail-
ing to investigate individuals. We have
had many witnesses before the commit-
tee. I think the members of the com-
mittee have been careful in asking im-
portant questions.
On the particular subject to which I
refer, while the published record does
not show all the questions which were
asked, I can assure Senators that a great
many questions were asked, carefully
probed, and not all that appeared ever
reached the surface.
For example, the President of the
United States nominated a man from
Iowa to be a member of the Atomic En-
ergy Commission. The investigation by
the FBI was not as recent as it might
have been. It was reasonably complete,
and that investigation did not reveal
anything with reference to the nominee
which should have caused him any
trouble.
At the same time, the then Chairman
of the Joint Committee on Atomic En-
ergy received a great many letters with
reference to the nominee, and when it
was impossible to get any further in-
formation on him, the then chairman,
at his own expense, sent an investigator
out to see if some additional informa-
tion might be developed.
We had the assistance of a great Iowa
newspaper, which I believe had been
friendly to the nominee, but that news-
paper also was anxious to find the facts.
We studied them as carefully as we
could. Subsequently we hired a special
investigator as a member of the com-
mittee staff.
I wish to point out that though the
nomination was sent up by a Republican
President, every Republican member of
the committee voted to employ the spe-
cial investigator, because every member
of the committee wanted the investiga-
tion to be complete. When the special
investigator had finished his work it
developed that the nominee desired to
have his name withdrawn, and it was
withdrawn. He had been involved in a
banking transaction which was not
frightful, but which had developed a
little difficulty that he recognized might
have been embarrassing to him at some
subsequent time.
The point I wish to make is that the
Joint Committee never published any re-
port on all the investigations we went
through. It never tried to show how
many hours of work the committee put
in on this problem. If one would look
at the evidence turned in by the Joint
Committee, he might say that the com-
mittee did nothing because the nomina-
tion was presented to it and subse-
quently withdrawn.
Now let me turn to another nomina-
tion, the nomination of Sumner Pike,
made by a Democratic President. The
first nomination was sent up on Octo-
ber 28, 1946, a recess appointment. The
nominee took the oath of office. Then
the full nomination was sent to the
Senate. The nomination was sent to the
Senate section of the Joint Commitee.
The committee reported favorably upon
him, and the nominee was confirmed.
But he came up for another term of
office, and that particular time there
was some objection to some of the things
he had done. The Joint Committee had
long open hearings, and then in execu-
tive session voted five to four to report
the nomination adversely. Such action
was taken. The Senate reversed the ac-
tion of the Joint Committee and voted
to confirm the individual.
I only point out that the Joint Com-
mittee did not merely take its work as a
matter of course and go on their way.
They made a careful study of the ques-
tion.
There has been reference to a good
deal of material that developed about
Mr. McCone. It happens that in the
files of the Joint Committee one, would
not find all the material that was gath-
ered on Mr. McCone in the first days
of the study.
I have a file before me which shows
the name of a very distinguished former
Member of the Senate, the late lamented
Senator from New Hampshire, Mr.
Bridges. I went to him because of the
investigation that he had caused to be
conducted by his committee. He did
what people expected Senator Bridges
to do, namely, he turned over to me such
information as he had. I went through
every piece of this information carefully
and thoroughly. I asked the other mem-
bers of the Joint Committee to sit with
me in questioning Mr. McCone. Al-
though the printed record of the hear-
ings may not reveal in great detail the
testimony that was taken, I can assure
all Members of the Senate that a very
careful check was made on all matters
to which we had reference in connection
with the matters that have been under
discussion.
Another matter that I did not make
public was the financial statement of
Mr. McCone.
In meeting with Mr. McCone in the
office of the then majority leader, Sena-
tor Knowland of California, I asked him
for a complete financial report of every-
thing he owned. He submitted it to me.
He said he believed he did not need to
do so, because he had already submitted
one to the White House, which had been
checked fully, and there had been no
difficulty in connection with it. I still
asked him for a complete financial re-
port. He submitted it.
We went over that report very care-
fully. Mr. McCone and I went over it
very carefully and other members of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
joined us. It is a hard thing to review
a man's financial resources and not rush
out and publish everything about it. It
is interesting to find an individual who
owns a great many stocks but who lives
modestly and plainly and does not dis-
play the fact that he is a man of sub-
stantial wealth.
We looked at the report very carefully.
We made up a list as to which we said
that those were stock that he ought to
sell. I told him we thought he should
sell those stocks. Of course I was not
sitting in judgment. I had no authority
to say that he ought to sell them. How-
ever, it bothered my conscience to have
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confirmed any man owning stocks in
companies which may have contracts
with the Atomic Energy Commission. I
told him:
You are likely to have some business deal-
ings with these firms when you are on the
Atomic Energy Commission.
He was surprised that I should say
that with respect to one of these com-
panies. He thought that that company
never had had any business transactions
with the Atomic Energy Commission,
but it had. When he looked at the list,
he said:
I do not object to these; I will sell these
stocks.
He did sell them. Then we came to
another group of stocks. I said':
These are not in a black and white class.
This is a particularly difficult ground we
are now on with respect to these stocks.
However, If I were you, I would dispose of
these stocks also. I agree'that they are not
in any way in conflict, but I think I would
dispose of them also. I think you will feel
better if you did so.
There was no argument about it. He,
put a check mark next to every one of
them. He said:
I will dispose of these also.
Then we came to stocks that we
thought he could safely hold, in which
his interest was not such as to conflict
with his responsibility on the Atomic
Energy Commission.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. ANDERSON. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator will
allow me to interpose at this point I
should like to say that the nominee feels
the same way about it at this time.
Reading from the RECORD at the point
where Senator SALTarrsTALL was inter-
rogating the nominee and where the
Senator from Massachusetts had asked
a question about the nominee's holdings.
The nominee says:
In 1958, I turned the management of the
shipping company over to others, and dis-
associated myself entirely. I then at that
time placed the stock of those companies in
trust in a bank, which was an irrevocable
trust, revoka' le only when I left the Gov-
ernment.
Now, I have not placed that stock back in
trust. I am perfectly willing to do so.
The witness said this on January 18,
1962.
Then,.later in the testimony, with re-
spect to this trust he said:
I have no objection to the establishing of
an irrevocable trust if there is reason to do
so. I felt the peculiar wording and restric-
tions of the Atomic Energy Act made it ad-
visable to establish that trust at that time.
Mr. ANDERSON. I only say to the
Senator from Missouri that this is not
the class of stocks to which I refer. I
shall come to them in a moment. There
was a certain class of stocks that he could
own openly or-I believe lawyers use the
expression-notoriouply. So there was
not any possible conflict with respect to
those stocks.
Then we came to a fourth group of
stock, and I said:
I think on these, Mr. McCone, you ought
to make a trust arrangement, so that you
will not have any custody of them. The
reason for it 19 that the Atomic Energy Act
is peculiar. It does not permit a member of
the Atomic Energy Commission to have any
other business.
This was a 100 percent wholly owned
company. While he was not going to de-
vote any time to its management, I
nevertheless said to him:
You do not want the charge to be made
that as president and sole owner of the stock
you had to be engaged in another business.
Therefore, he moved this stock into a
trust arrangement.
Not only did he put them in a trust,
but he submitted the trust agreement not
only to the lawyers, but also to any mem-
ber of the Joint Committee old Atomic
Energy who wanted to look at it, to see
if it was sufficient. I commended him for
it, and I commend him now.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. ANDERSON. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. My only point in
bringing it up was that the nominee was
completely willing to do whatever the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
thought should be done with respect to
these holdings, which, as we both know,
is not the case with all potential nomi-
nees. He did exactly what the chair-
man of the Joint Committee thought
was right, and he also expressed the
same thought before the Armed Services
Committee, namely, that if the chair-
man and the committee thought it was
,the right thing to do, he was entirely
willing to do it.
Mr. ANDERSON. I thank the Sena-
tor. I only say to him that this was not
the action of the Joint Committee. It
was merely the suggestion of the chair-
man of the Joint Committee. I said that
I thought he would feel better if he made
this disposition. He did exactly what
was suggested. I made that suggestion,
and he complied with it. That was typi-
cal of our entire dealings with him.
While it is true that not everything
that took place appears in the record,
there were many things that do not
appear in the record that we did do.
I should like to give another case that
came before the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee. At one time a very fine
scientist was suggested for membership
on the Atomic Energy Commission. He
was appointed by President Eisenhower,
so we were not under any obligations to
be extremely careful.
Some Members of Congress know that
the Senator from New Mexico has not
always been extremely careful in his re-
lationship with people who get appoint-
ed. Here was a man who was named: to
membership on the Commission. I was
tremendously interested because I had
known of the man's work at Los Alamos.
He telephoned me while I was in New
Mexico and asked me if he could come to
talk to me before his, name was sub-
mitted. Of course, I was happy to have
him do so. Dr. Von Neumann came to see
me and read a long list of things that he
had done which some people regarded as
being foolish and which he felt would
cause some people to classify him as be-
ing an extreme liberal, and he wanted
to know if I thought that was bad. I
assured him that I did not so regard it.
I said to him:
If your name comes before the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, you will have to
speak on every one of these subjects and
discuss every one of them.
At a later date he did come before the
joint commitee in executive session and
discussed every one of these things to
which some people might have taken
exception.
The things that he had done were
based upon the fact that he had come
into substantial amounts of money be-
cause of his inventive mind. If a friend
was in need and came to him, he tried
to help him.
We therefore examined Dr. Von Neu-
mann in secret at first. Then In order
that no one would be able to say that
we did not cover the subject completely
we held an open hearing, at which the
able junior Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
GORE] carefully phrased the questions
and put them to the witness, so that the
subject could be completely covered but
without drawing other people into it.
We frequently do not put into the
record everything that happens and
everything that takes place. However,
I wish to assure everyone that every-
thing was carefully done. It is all
very much like the case of an iceberg;
not all of it is above the surface. Ques-
tion after question was put to the witness
carefully and thoughtfully, so that he
might have a chance to testify as to what
his relations had been and what had
happened.
As many persons know, Mr. McCone
was well liked by the members of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I
was in a strange situation, because peo-
ple had worried that we might not get
along together. I thought we got along
splendidly. Other members of the coin-
mittee thought the same.
So, as Mr. McCone was finishing his
term of service in 1961, and Dr. Seaborg
was coming in to succeed him, the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy had a spe-
cial meeting in an afternoon. At that
meeting, Mr. McCone gave his final
report. At the very outset of it, I an-
nounced to the members of the commit-
tee that I hoped we might treat the ses-
sion in two sections, one which would
relate_ to Mr. McCone's final report, the
other which would deal with our own ex-
pressions of feeling toward him. I
wanted to make.it possible to declassify
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE January 29
the minutes of the executive meeting Division of Military Application; Howard C. highly the service you have rendered ever
and let them go into the record. Brown, special assistant to the Chairman; since you came on the Commission in 1958.
ter of February 13, 1961, I and Richard X. Donovan, special assistant I- have never worked with a man whom I
In my letter
McCone, who was then in for congressional relations. thought was more dedicated or applied him-
wrote to Mr. Chairman ANDERSON. The meeting will self more industriously and energetically to a
Los Angeles, having left the Govern- come to order. position in the executive branch of the Gov-
ment: Today we meet with Mr. McCone for the ernment. I think you have rendered a great
DEAR JOHN: As we both know so well, pub- last time prior to his leaving the chairman- service. I appreciate the personal associa-
lie life, and service has both rewards and ship of the Commission on Friday. The tion I have had with you and the frankness
penalties, pleasure, and regret. purpose of our meeting is to permit Mr. Mc- and candor with which you have answered
It is my pleasure to send you a transcript Cone to give us his views on the status of our questions and responded. to our requests
of the words of praise and friendship ex- the atomic energy program and the ques- for information.
tended to you by the members of the Joint tions and problems which we face. As you leave your place in the executive
Coranrittee on Atomic Energy in our meet- I would like to suggest that we withhold branch, I am confident that you do so with
ing on January 18. It is my regret that we accolades as to Mr. McCone's abilities and the high regard of all of our Members. I
will, not be facing each other across the con- accomplishments until the end of our session want to take this opportunity also to say
Terence table again. today in order to permit him to proceed in that Mr. PRICE, who had to return to his
There is little I can add to what was said an orderly manner with his presentation. I office because of constituents, asked me to in-
that last Wednesday except to stress the will say, however, at this point that the elude him in my remarks and in those other
sincerity and unanimity In our appreciation relationship between Mr. McCone and me laudatory remarks he knew would be made
of the contribution you have made to the personally and, I believe, the other Members today. He shares in the high regard we all
cocntry. and the staff of the Joint Committee has have for you.
been most cordial and constructive through- Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, it
]: then submitted to him a copy of the out the 21/2 years he has been with the is a little difficult for each member of the
minutes of the meeting of the Joint Commission. committee to say the same thing in a dif-
Coillmittee on Atomic Energy. I understand you have a prepared state- ferent way, yet we all want to join in what
1vLr. President, I ask unanimous con- ment, Mr. McCone, which you will file with has been said.
the committee, but that you will talk to us From a personal standpoint I want to say
sent to have printed at this point in the in a more summarized way from notes. to you-and for the record-that you have
RECORD the text of my letter of February We have with us here today, also, General brought as high a degree of capability and
13, 1961, and the portion of the minutes Starbird, who will be leaving the Commission understanding to this job as an individual
of the executive session which was in a week or so as Director of the Division could bring. You are not a physicist, but
informal of Military Application. We are going to you are an engineer of ability and you have
There being no objection, the letter miss his great participation and we are also a practical fundamental grasp of the subject
and minutes were ordered to be printed going to miss his important contributions matter and a capacity to get into these sci-
to the program. entific matters from the standpoint of your
in the RECORD, as follows: Following our session we expect to have background and training.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, some refreshments and I hope that everyone You have brought to the Commission the
Jo:INT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, will stay for a brief social gathering with Mr. highest degree of business judgment-prac-
February 13, 1961. McCone, the other Commissioners, General tical business judgment. I think that has
Hon. JOHN A. McCONE, Starbird, and the staff of the Atomic Energy been very important. After all is said and
Los Angeles, Calif. Commission. done, in my view the Atomic Energy Com-
DEAR JOHN: As we both know so well, pub- Mr. McCone, will you please proceed? mission is not a scientific agency purely. It
lie life, and service has both rewards and Chairman McCoNE. Thank you very much, is an industrial- production agency. It re-
penalties, pleasure, and regret. Mr. Chairman. quires a combination of a high ability to
It is my pleasure to send you a transcript I would like to reserve for the end of my grasp the scientific phases of the matter and
of the words of praise and friendship ex- statement my comments as to the very warm a high degree of practical business, admin-
tended to you by the members of the Joint and sincere feeling I have toward this com- Istrative and production knowledge. You
Committee on Atomic Energy in our meet- mittee and all of the members and the man- not only have this combination of abilities, d it ing on January 18. It is my regret that we ner in which they have treated and co- but you have one w o hasloucually aw el .
will not be facing each other across the con- operated with me. There faience table again. (There followed a discussion of the various tion on the Commission who has enjoyed
There is little I can add to what was said atomic energy programs which appears in a greater confidence Or trust than you have.
separate, classified transcript.) That is a matter of common agreement on
that last Wednesday except to stress the sin-
cerity and unanimity in our appreciation of I would like to close by thanking you, Mr. - this committee.
the contribution you have made to the Chairman, and you, Mr. HOLIFIELD, and every You have been extremely forward looking
member of this committee for the wonderful in your attitude and your devotion to this
countrS' cooperation, friendship, and support you have program. I met Dr. Seaborg outside just a
Sincerely, given me. It has been a very gratifying and few minutes ago and we recalled some of
CLINTON P. ANDERSON, the early days in the committee, the whole
Chairman. pleasing experience.
I want nt to thank Mr. Ramey and the staff project and some of our associations at that
time. We both agreed the picture doesn't
EXECUTIVE SESSION (INFORMAL), MEETING No, also for the cooperation they have given us. look the same today as it did 14 years ago.
87-1-1, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1961, of Chairman ANDERSON. I want to say, Mr. I don't know what it will look like in another
THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY, Chairman, I have tried to terminate your 10 years, but I do believe your forward look-
TON OF F THE THE UNITED STATES, WASHING- report wished toy do so, member ing attitude in the programs which you have
TON, D D.C.C. . sponsored will have a great effect on the pro-
met, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have an opportunity to put some words in
c m, pursuant to call, at l, p.m., SI L the the permanent trecord. gramIs wish in the you well in indefinite the future.
future. I wish you
committee ittee room, the Capitol, Hon. CLINTON ON May I ilay first all this has been a very continued success. I hope you will have the
P. ANDERSON (chairman) presiding. messing and experience for satisfaction you deserve from again serving
.
me. I have enjoyed working with you.
Present were: Senators . PA, ALBERT I am in the same situation as your Government a most vital way.
Box CORE, (presiding), JOHN O. PASTO STORSS, ALBERT Incidentally, of Senator PASTORS. . I associate myself with
GORE, HENRY M. JACKSON, BovRKE B. HICK- you leaving chairmanship of all of the statements that have been made.
EVLOOPER, HENRY DwORSHAK, and WALLACE this are. committee Iittee and will the not return to It. However, let me say this. You have be-
F. BENNETT; Representatives CHET HoLI- Therefore, I am grateful for this opportunity come, in my opinion, a model of what a
FIELD, MELVIN PRICE, WAYNE AsPINAL{,, WIL- to express in this closing year of my chair- dedicated and devoted public servant should
LIAM BATES, and JACK WESTLAND. manship the pleasure I have had in associat- be. There was a time in this Committee
Committee staff present: James T. Ram- log with you and to thank you for your many when I was rather apprehensive at the rela-
ey, executive director, John T. Conway, courtesies and constant understanding which tionship between the executive branch and
George F. Murphy, Jr., and Carey Brewer. I appreciate most sincerely. the legislative branch. I think it has been
Representatives of the Atomic Energy Mr. AsPINALL, who could not remain, left a through your strong personality and through
Commission: Hon. John A. McCone, Chair- statement which he asked be inserted in the your temperament that much of that dis-
man; Hon. John S. Graham and Hon. Loren record at the appropriate place. This will be turbed atmosphere has been cleared. This
K. Olson, Commissioners; A. R. Luedecke, done. committee has renewed confidence in the
General Manager; Dwight A. Ink, Assistant Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I executive branch, for which you should take
General Manager; A. D. Starbird, Director, would like to say this to Mr. McCone. I value a great deal of credit.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 945
I dislike to see. you go, but after all you
have your reasons. It has been a very illum-
inating and refreshing experience for me to
be associated with you. I remember our
very cordial relationship in Geneva. There
it was my privilege to meet Mrs. McCone, the
very charming and devoted lady who, I
think, may be largely responsible for what
you are. I congratulate you and I wish you
many, many years of good health, success,
and happiness.
Representative ASPINALL. Mr. Chairman, I
too wish to join in the words of commenda-
tion which are being directed to the retir-
ing Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission.
I desire to thank Chairman McCone per-
sonally for the loyal, constructive, able, and
effective service which he has once again ren-
dered to his Nation and fellow men. The
members of this committee, of the Congress,
of the administration, and of the Nation
shall be forever indebted to Chairman Mc-
Cone for his dedication to service and the
wise counsel and leadership which he has
provided for the nuclear energy program
during his encumbency of the office.
As he leaves our association, I wish for
him life's better blessings-good health and
sweet happiness. I sincerely hope that the
association we have had together shall not
be brought to an end, but, rather, that we
-shall find ourselves in his.company ofttimes
in the days and years ahead of us.
Senator GoRE. Mr. Chairman, my predom-
inant feeling today is a sense of loss both of
a personal nature and of a public nature.
Few men can bring to public service the
personality and the intellectual capacity
which Mr. McCone possesses and of which he
has given so generously.
Senator PA5T~oRE referred to the improved
relationship between the Commission and
the committee. That was much to be de-
sired. I would that I could have some of
the gentleness of manner which Mr. McCone
nearly always demonstrated. [Laughter.]
And yet I love the Irish in him. It is there.
I am glad it is there. The trouble is that-
to make an invidious comparison-it is in
me too much.
It is with genuine regret that I see you
leave public service, John McCone, and if I
have my way about it, you won't have the
luxury very long. I think this country needs
you. I shall undertake to persuade somebody
to persuade you to get back into the service
of the country.
Representative BATES. Mr. Chairman, I
will not-detain the committee with any ex-
tensive remarks. I have expressed person-
ally to John the great respect I have for
him and the'work he has done.
I came on the committee about the same
time he became Chairman of the Atomic En-
ergy Commission. I did so with some con-
sternation, having read in the newspapers of
the -bitter controversies which existed be-
tween some members of the Joint Committee
and the Atomic Energy Commission. I have
no firsthand knowledge of those circum-
stances and could not, and see no need to,
pass judgment on the situation as it ex-
isted at that time.. I do, however, wish to
state that the extraordinary administrative
qualities of John McCone brought about an
atmosphere in these relationships that was
pleasant and harmonious. He had that in-
nate quality of balance that permitted him
to be firm ;n principle, yet cooperative in
understanding alternative points of view.
He has gained our respect and our admira-
tion. He can leave his assignment with a
great deal of pride. My only regret is that
the country will lose the services of a dis-
tinguished servant and patriot. .
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Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I am
sorry I can't stay for the reception after
this meeting.
However, I do want to express my appre-
ciation to Mr. McCone for the fine job he
has done as Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission. This is not his first service to
the country. He has served in many other
capacities. I remember particularly his out-
standing work as Under Secretary of the Air
Force at the same time Mr. Lovett was Sec-
retary of Defense.
I want to say, Mr. McCone, that while we
may not agree on every aspect of the atorn-
ic-energy effort, I do believe you have
brought to the office a high degree of corn-
petence with your background as an engineer
in private life and your administrative expe-
rience. You have handled your job well un-
der what have been trying and difficult cr-
cumstances at times.
I personally wanted to come here today
and express my appreciation for the service
you have rendered the country.
Senator DwoRSnAK. Mr. Chairman, I
share the sentiments which have already
been expressed by my colleagues, and I con-
sider it a tragic loss that you are leaving the
service of the Government at this time.
It has been a real pleasure for me to have
the opportunity to work with you. You have
dispelled the feeling I had 4 years ago when
I became a member of the committee that
we were to face constant turmoil and dissen-
sion in the relations of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Joint Committee which
naturally impaired the progress which I have
strongly desired be made in this field.
I want to express also the appreciation of
the people of my State of Idaho for the very
fine understanding you have displayed and
the sympathetic cooperation you have ex-
tended in the management of the Idaho in-
stallation of the Atomic Energy Commission.
While recognizing the personal sacrifice
you have made in leaving your home and
your business in California to assume this
great responsibility, I do share the hope of
my colleagues that because of your dedica-
tion as an American patriot you will find, it
possible to assume other responsibilities in
the future and continue to help our govern-
ment solve many of the problems which so
strongly affect the security of our Republic.
Representative WESTLAND. Mr. Chairman,
after all of these'statements that have been
made, it is rather difficult to think of any-
thing further to say.
I, like Mr. BATES, have been on this com-
mittee for 2 years. I consider it a real privi-
lege to have served with this committee and
to have been associated with you. I appre-
ciate the many questions you have answered
in words of one syllable; answers that have
helped me to learn something about this in-
dustry' and the problems facing the Nation
in the atomic energy program.
There is no question in my mind, John,
but that you have brought great prestige,
nationwide to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, some of which has rubbed off on this
committee, and has helped the atomic energy
program in the United States and perhaps
throughout the world.
I have admired you particularly for -your
stability in your decisions. Once made you
have stood by them despite occasional con-
trary opinions from equally high levels in
government. Having decided what you 'be-
lieved to be the right course for this country,
you have maintained that position. To me
this is a great character building example
for, perhaps, all of us.
I have only one thing to add-I would say
that I am sure your golf game will improve
after you get away from this job. [Laugh-
ter.]
Senator BENNETT. John, you have heard
all of these encomiums and these sugges-
tions. It is my job to sum up and I will do
it with the Biblical phrase, "Well done, thou
good and faithful servant."
Chairman ANDERSON. Although this is
something which has not been done before,
I would like to ask permission to have these
statements that have been made today
transcribed in a separate record which would
then be sent to Mr. McCone.
If there is no objection, that will be done.
The meeting. is adjourned.
(Whereupon at 4:35 p.m. the meeting was
adjourned.)
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I
could place in the RECORD a great many
other things. I simply wish to say that
.I believe the committee carefully con-
sidered Mr. McCone's qualifications be-
fore he officially became the nominee.
Before his name was announced, I had
sat down and gone over a great many
things with, him in the presence of the
Senator from California, Mr. Knowland,
and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKEN-
LOOPER]. Then I had had other ex-
tended conversations with him, trying
to bring out facts which I thought were
essential. If the Joint Committee did
not do its work, then I am sorry; but I
fully believe as much care was given to
Mr. McCone's nomination as probably
any committee in Congress ordinarily
would pay to the usual nomination.
We were happy to see how the nomi-
nation worked out. We were very happy
with the work Mr. McCone displayed.
I think we tried to be extremely cooper-
ative. I believe Mr. McCone tried to
carry out the instructions of the Presi-
dent and, at the same time, deal with
the committee, which was dominated by
the opposite political party. It is a very
difficult situation to carry out the wishes
of a President who is of one political
party and to deal with a committee com-
posed of members, a majority of which
are members of another political party.
However, I think the nomination worked
out very well.
I am happy to say that I enjoyed visit-
ing with Mr. McCone and watching what
he did. I for one wish to pay tribute to
the fine way in which he operated as
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I wish
to associate myself with the remarks of
the able Senator from New Mexico [Mr.
ANDERSON].
I have served for many years on the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, both
in this body and in the House. I know
that what the Senator from Mexico has
said today regarding the thorough inves-
tigation made prior to the action taken
by the Joint Committee in approving
unanimously Mr. McCone's nomination
is true. I think it is unfortunate that
these allegations are being dredged up
all over again, after two committees,
prior to the consideration of Mr. Mc-
Cone's nomination by the Committee on
Armed Services this year, had acted
unanimously on his appointment, first, as
Under Secretary of the Air Force in, I
believe, 1948, and later, in 1958, when he
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE January 29
was appointed chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission..
Mr. President, it is not easy to get able
and qualified men to serve in the area of
national security. I have always been of
the opinion that such men should be
selected without regard to their partisan
backgrounds. I have felt that the main
criterion for consideration should be
their ability and qualifications. I took
this position before I was chairman of
the Democratic National Committee, and
I have taken the same position ever since.
As a matter of fact, I took that position
during the course of the campaign itself.
The President of the United States
stated very clearly during the course of
the campaign in 1960 that he would
select men in the area of national se-
curity without regard to party.
The President had many such prec-
edents for the service of able men. In
the Wilson administration, in the ad-
ministration of Franklin D. Roosevelt,,
and in the Truman administration men
have served who were not members of
the Democratic Party.
From personal experience on the Joint
Atomic Energy Committee I know a good
deal about Mr. McCone's ability and his
knowledge in the field of national se-
curity. I believe we are fortunate in be-
ing able to bring into the Government
a man with Mr. McCone's background
and experience.
Mention has been made earlier of some
of the offices which Mr. McCone"has held
and in which he has served his country.
I believe the distinguished Senator from
Illinois [Mr. DIRKSENI went into some
detail in that respect. Suffice it to say
that Mr. McCone served on the so-called
F:inletter Committee, the Air Policy
Commission, in 1947. He served as a
special deputy to the then Secretary of
Defense, James Forrestal; then as Under
Secretary of the Air Force; and sub-
sequently as chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission.
Some persons have said Mr. McCone
has not had experience in the field of in-
telligence. The point is that we need
a man who has the judgment, common-
sense, and administrative ability to deal
with the many problems which arise in
the position of Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. At least in my
judgment, Mr. McCone has had experi-
ence in the broad area of national se-
curity that few people in Government
have had. He is a good administrator.
I must also add that during his service
as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
inission Mr. McCone foresaw what the
Soviets would do, especially in the area
of nuclear testing. The campaign
against Mr. McCone stems, in fact, not
from concern over the unfounded allega-
tions of conflict of interest, but really
because of concern for his hard, tough
policy in relation to the Soviet Union.
I know of my own knowledge how right
Mr. McCone was concerning what the
Soviets would do in the field of nuclear
testing. He was honest and forthright
in his dealings with the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy. He gave us his point
of view. He stated his opinions candid-
ly, fairly, and objectively. He took a
position which was in disagreement with
that of some members of his own admin-
istration.
I am confident that Mr. McCone as
head of the Central Intelligence Agency
will-act from a broad, rich experience
which will make it possible for him to,
serve effectively in this area. He will be
intellectually honest in his judgments in
evaluating the information which will be
entrusted to him. We are indeed fortu-
nate to have a man of his capacity will-
ing to serve the country during this
troublesome period.
Much has been said concerning an
alleged conflict of interest. These alle-
gations have been made before, as I have
indicated, and have been unanimously
rejected by three different committees,
including the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, which heard his testimony. We
had all the information before us. Some
persons simply wish to bring out mat-
ters which have been completely refuted.
These matters are raised now as part of
the campaign against Mr. McCone-a
campaign which stems mainly from dis-
agreement with the hard policy he has
always taken with reference to difficult
decisions which must be made in the area
of national security affecting our rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.
Mr. President, I am confident that
Mr. McCone will be an able and an ef-
fective Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and that he will faith-
fully discharge his duties in the interest
of our national security. If there is an
area in Government where we need men
who are tough and hard and able ad-
ministrators, rich with good sense and
good judgment, and who will indeed
take a hard, tough position, it is in the
Central Intelligence Agency.
I am confident that Mr. McCune will
be worthy of the trust-and it is indeed
a great trust; it could be the security
of our country-that we place in his
hands when he undertakes to do this
job. I can only say that it would be a
tragedy if Mr. McCone were to embark
on his new position with a substantial
vote against him in the Senate.
Mr. President, we should give Mr. Mc-
Cone a unanimous vote. I only hope
that Senators who speak in regard to
the nomination of Mr. McCone will
weigh carefully their words and will
make sure that they do not attempt to
use arguments in the area of so-called
conflict of interest as a means of justi-
fying their opposition to him. If they
believe he is not qualified they should
state wherein he is not qualified.
But I hope and trust that the Senate
will give Mr. McCone an overwhelming
vote of confidence, so that when he em-
barks on his duties as Director of the
Central Intelligency Agency he will
know, and the country will know, that
he has the full confidence and support
of the Senate, which are so essential in
connection with the doing of a very
taxing and difficult job-one which is
most difficult under even the best cir-
cumstances.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I associate my-
self with the remarks of the able Sen-
ator from Washington, one who has had
so much experience working with the
nomineee in broad and classified mat-
ters. -
I shall speak briefly on this nomination
before the vote.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
METCALF in the chair). The clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
,out objection, It is so ordered.
THE COLLEGE ACADEMIC FACILI-
TIES AND SCHOLARSHIP ACT
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, tomor-
row in the House of Representatives,
and later this week in the Senate, there
will come before the Congress, for de-
bate, the College Academic Facilities
and Scholarship Act, which in this body
is Senate bill 1241. The chairman of
the Education Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, the distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] is un-
fortunately detained, because he is serv-
ing as a member of our delegation at
the Punta del Este Conference, in Uru-
guay. He has obtained, on a State-by-
State basis, statistical information
which in his judgment would be of as-
sistance to each of the Senators par-
ticipating in the debate, and also would
be helpful to the Members of the other
body when they initiate their debate,
tomorrow. He has asked me to have
this material placed in the RECORD at
his request, in order to help us in our
consideration of this important matter.
The information developed consists of
such Items as current and projected col-
lege enrollment, financial assistance to
students administered through the col-
leges and univerisities, data on the pub-
lic junior colleges of each State, esti-
mated expenditure of colleges and uni-
versities for student higher education,
and college age population data.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the material to which I have
alluded be printed in the RECORD at this
point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the data
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
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