A REVIEW OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170015-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 19, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN

A7456
Approve &RI9 ki,/OAl 4p _RQEW R00020017Oc pOember 20
U.N. Brutality in Katanga
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. JOHN H. ROUSSELOT
OF CALIFORNIA
rV THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
e
Tuesday, September 19, 1961 had asked Big. Singappa Raja,
United Nations commander, to remove all
Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, we machineguns from the hospital.
all know about the current war in Katan- "He was told strategic would post. It would The
ga between the Katangans and the hospital was a not
United Nations. I wonder if we are all be abandoned.
observers are appalled at the
foreign
aware of the brutal savage-like efforts of "All
e
the U.N. to subdue Katanga and make unrelenting severity of the United Natit
assault. I am sorry to say that I have per-
her part of the Congo. sonally seen Indian troops act with the
I read in the September 15, 1961, issue brutal savagery which is quite indefensible."
of the Chicago Daily Tribune a news item
which reports actions of the U.N. in
Katanga which are utterly shocking. In
aspect of an article. These are integrity,
scholarship, and courage.
Because Mr. Murphy's finding about
Cuba deserve the closest study by legis-
lators and editors, I submit this article
for the RECORD:
CUBA: THE RECORD SET STRAIGHT
(By Charles J. V. Murphy)
Not long ago, at President Kennedy's daily
staff meeting, the special assistant for na-
tional security affairs, McGeorge Bundy,
opened the proceedings by noting, "Sir, we
have four matters up for discussion this
morning." The President was not in a zest-
ful mood. "Are these problems which I
inherited?" he asked. "Or are they prob-
lems of our own making?" "A little of
both," was Bundy's tactful answer.
vin
d
g
sa
The exchange revealed a new an
humility. Some days after this incident,
Kennedy addressed the Nation on the sub-
ject of Berlin. The ebullience, the air of
self-assurance that marked his first months
in office had gone. He spoke earnestly to
his countrymen but his words were also
aimed at Premier Khrushchev, who up to
this point had appeared not to be listening.
This time Kennedy did get through to Mos-
cow; and any lingering doubt about the
American determination to defend Berlin
was dispelled by the response of the Amer-
ican people. The President's will to stand
firm was clear, and the Nation was with him.
Nevertheless, in any full review of John
Kennedy's first months in office, there must
be reported a failure in administration that
will continue to inhibit and trouble Amer-
ican foreign policy until it is corrected.
Ths failure raises a fair question: whether
Kennedy has yet mastered the governmental
machinery, whether he is well and effec-
tively served by some of his close advisers,
and whether they understand the use of
power in world politics. The matter is of
vital importance; in the crises that will
inevitably arise around the world-in the
Middle East, in Africa, in the Far East,
in central Europe-the U.S. Government
must be in top form, and possibly even, as
Kennedy himself suggested, act alone.
Administrative confusions came to light
most vividly in the Cuban disaster. That
story is told here for the first time in explicit
detail. It is told against the background of
the U.S. revcgsal in Laos, which in Itself
should not be underestimated: Laos, once
in the way of becoming a buffer for its non-
Communist neighbors, is all but finished;
now, in South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, a
stout friend of the United States, is under
murderous attack by Communist guerrillas;
the U.S. loss of face is being felt from the
Philippines to Pakistan, and in the long run
the damage may prove to be even more costly
than that caused by Cuba.
Let us turn back then to the train of
events, beginning with Laos, that culmi-
nated in the disaster in the Bay of Pigs.
Fortune is publishing the account for one
purpose-to set the record straight for con-
cerned Americans.
Kennedy, from the day he took office, was
loath to act in Laos. He was confident that
he understood the place and use of power
in the transactions of the Nation, but he
was baffled by this community of elephants,
parasols, and pagodas. Then, too, he brought
to office a general surmise that our long-
range prospects of holding the new and weak
nations of southeast Asia in the Western
A Review of Cuba
this report, Richard Williams, a corre- '~
spondent of the British Broadcasting
Corp., tells of an instance where U.N. EXTENSION OF REMARKS
forces fired point blank at a Red Cross OF
ambulance, wounding the attendants in
the ambulance. The U.N. is supposed HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS
to be an organization of peace-loving OF MISSOURI
nations whose goal is to achieve peace IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and tolerance among nations. The Tuesday, September 19, 1961
actions of the U.N. in Katanga cause one
to wonder if the U.N., in fact, is further- Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. Mr. Speak-
ing man's inhumanity to man. er, in the September 1961 issue of For-
In my opinion, every Member of Con- tune magazine there is a very thorough
gress should have an opportunity to read report about what happened during the
the news item to which I refer. I, there- recent Cuban affair. The journalist
fore, wish to have it printed in the who researched the material for this
Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: article for many weeks and who wrote
U.N. GUILTY OF SAVAGERY, BRITON SAYS this comprehensive study is Charles J.
LONDON, September 14: A British news- V. Murphy, the senior editor of Fortune
man covering the United Nations takeover magazine in Washington. The editors
in Katanga tonight accused U.N. forces of of Fortune have stated that they are
brutal savagery. publishing this account "Cuba: The Rec-
Richard Williams, correspondent for the ord Set Straight," for one purpose-to
British Broadcasting Corp., said in a re- set the record straight for concerned
port from Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia,
that the U.N. action was a terrible miscal- Americans. In this spirit we should
culation. carefully study the many facts nd anec-
Williams, wounded in the foot yesterday dotes which Mr. Murphy has so thor-
during the fighting in Elisabethville, said oughly pulled together.
de-
the U.N. miscalculation had in effect de- Regretfully, President Kennedy has
veloped into a national war. said about this article:
POST OFFICE A FORT This is the most inaccurate of all the ar-
Williams said that U.N. troops "have titles that have appeared on Cuba (August
turned the Elisabethville post office into a 30 press conference).
fortress, partly surrounded by the Katangan
army." It is unfortunate that the Kennedy
"United Nations machineguns on the ter- administration attacks the integrity of
race and balconies of the Red Cross hospital the author instead of dealing factually
morn-
60 yards away were firing heavily all morn- with the matter in hand. I believe that
ing," he added. issues and studies are more important
ournal than name-calling and play on personal-
ists "This approached morning, the when a hospital, group of journal-
they were e
greeted by a long burst of machinegun fire ities. I would like to say about Mr.
from armored cars manned by Irish troops," Murphy that he is one of the most ex-
Williams said. perienced, thoughtful, careful senior
STREETS DESERTED journalists writing in Washington to-
"The streets are deserted. Anything that day. For 20 years his articles, reports,
moves is shot at. Armored cars stand men- and books have been most highly valued
acingly at street corners. by thoughtful individuals. He is an ac-
"Few people slept here last night. Heavy knowledged expert in the fields of mili-
machinegun fire spat at the hidden enemy. tary strategy, economic policy, and for-
Mortar bombs burst around us and bazookas eign affairs. He has traveled all over
tore into offices and private houses when the world obtaining material for his
s tried to retake the post
t
roop
Katangan
office. writings. His firsthand experiences in- respect, he was leaning toward the Lipp-
Williams said that this morning a white elude accompanying Adm. Richard Byrd mann-Stevenson-Fulbright view of strategy.
painted, clearly marked Red Cross ambu- On some of his Antarctic expeditions. This school holds that U.S. power is over-
lance stalled in the middle of the main He has been decorated by the U.S. Gov- committed in southeast Asia, and that the
square of the capital. The driver and ernment. Three words have always proper aim for U.S. diplomacy there should
stretcherbearer got out. characterized Mr. Murphy's career as a be to reduce local frictions by molding the
"Indian troops in the post office immedi- new states as true neutrals.
ately opened fire at almost point blank journalist, regardless of whether one The U.S. position in Laos had become
range," he said, "They [the ambulance agreed or disagreed with one particular acute while Dwight Eisenhower was still in
wounded.
"This is the second time in 24 hours I
have seen United Nations troops fire on a
Red Cross vehicle.
"OBSERVERS APPALLED
"All the rules of war have gone by the
board in this campaign. This morning the
Belgian head of the Red Cross told me he
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 1961 Approved For R~I~iC.~R~4B0~JIfflM0170015-0
where they were placed. In Dallas, Tex.,
trolley cars were fitted out with gum and
candy venders, operated with apparent suc-
cess until a per-machine tax drove them out
of business.
A real case study of how vending machines
could open new markets and create demand
for a specific product came in 1921 through
the British Wrigley Co. and its managing di-
rector, S. L. Munson. iWrigley had two ob-
stacles to overcome in England: The British
were not addicted to gum chewing and Brit-
ish wholesalers and retailers were unwilling
to undertake to educate the public. Murison
set out to distribute some 500 penny gum
vending machines among key British retail-
ers. The retailers were simply to see to it
that the machines were kept filled. Wrig-
ley's vending program not only opened a new
market for that company, it converted the
British to gum chewing as well.
About this time, inventors of vending ma-
chines began to think seriously of selling cig-
arettes through automatic machines. In
1925, three machines were developed which
were to have a profound effect on the growth
of the U.S. vending industry. All three of
the machines were built to sell cigarettes:
One by National of St. Louis, another by
William Rowe in Los Angeles, and a third
by Smoketeria in Detroit. The cigarette
vender was the first serious attempt to sell
quantities of products at prices in excess of
a nickel. At the outset, few people took the
cigarette vender seriously and a good many
shrewd merchandisers were sure it would fail.
Hymen Goldman once recalled the day
Gordon Macke walked into Goldman's to-
bacco and candy wholesale company in
Washington, D.C. Macke had met William
Rowe on the west coast, became enthusiastic
about Rowe's cigarette machine, and was
setting out to establish a cigarette operating
business in Washington. Macke came to
Goldman as a logical and convenient source
of supply for the cigarettes he proposed to
vend.
"He told me," Goldman recalled, "that he
was going to sell cigarettes through his ma-
chines for 15 cents. At that time our retail
customers were selling cigarettes for 11 and
12 cents, and I thought he was crazy. No
one would pay that much more. But he said
they would because the machines were more
convenient. I was surehe was wrong and we
refused to sell him cigarettes."
Macke, not easily discouraged, arranged to
buy cigarettes from some of the wagon job-
bers, subwholesalers, whose source of supply
was Goldman's wholesale house. Some years
later, when Macke had proved his point by
installing more than 100 cigarette machines,
Goldman purchased the Macke operation and
thus started what is now the Macke Vend-
ing Co.
In 1926, the first Sodamats, forerunners
of the modern soft drink cup machines, ap-
peared in New York and New Jersey amuse-
ment parks. These machines were not self-
contained devices because they did not con-
tain in a single unit the coin mechanism,
cup dispenser, refrigeration system, carbon-
ator and sirup tank. Instead the Sodamats
were installed in batteries built into a wall.
-The units in the battery were fed by one
compressor, one carbonator and one pump
at the rear, the attendants worked behind
the scenes keeping everything in working
order. Batteries of Sodamats were installed
In Cony Island, Asbury Park, Atlantic City,
and New York where they continued to pump
out soft drinks long after World War II.
As the 1920's drew to a close there was
another wave of mergers and consolidations
within the industry. The Autosales Corp.,
which had been reorganized at the end of
World War I, acquired additional subsidiary
companies; manufacturing interests were
combining their resources, and a new hold-
ing company-Consolidated Automatic Mer-
chandising Corp-appeared - on the scene.
CAMCO was the first attempt to establish a
truly diversified national operating organiza-
tion. It was the brainchild of Joseph J.
Schermack, who is generally credited with
building the first practical postage stamp
vending machine.
Schermack left school to begin work as a
mechanic in Freeport, Ill., when he was 13
years old. In 1900 he started his own busi-
ness as a manufacturer of mailing machines,
the first of which was placed in Marshall
Field & Co., in Chicago. In 1910, Schermack
brought out his first profit-sharing stamp
vender, a machine which sold either four pen-
ny stamps or two 2-penny stamps for a nickel.
Until this time, postage stamps had been
vended at face value, the idea being that
the retailers who owned the machines were
'providing a service for their customers.
At first, Schermack sold his stamp vend-
ers outright to the stores in which they
were placed. Schermack formed the Sani-
tary Postage Service Corp. In September
1926 to install and operate stamp venders.
By 1928, Sanitary had some 20,000 of the
machines in operation, and a year later
claimed to have 30,000. The machines were
placed in such well-known establishments
as United Cigar, Schulte, Liggett, and other
chainstores, as well as in thousands of
independent outlets.
In August 1928, with considerable fanfare
in the public press, Sanitary became a divi-
sion of the newly formed CAMCO. Scher-
mack was named president, while Financier
A. J. Sack became chairman. The board of
directors of CAMCO, which immediately an-
nounced plans to distribute its stock to the
public, included such famous names as the
late Franklin Delano Roosevelt. CAMCO an-
nounced that it was entering complete vend-
ing service. In addition to Sanitary Postage,
CAMCO controlled the General Vending
Corp. of Virginia, Automatic Merchandising
Corp. of America, Schermack Corp. of
America, and Remington Service Machines,
Inc. CAMCO management announced it was
operating 36,000 penny weighing scales, 30,-
000 stamp vending machines, and 25,000 nut
venders and that it was moving quickly into
candy and cigarette vending. Within 5
years, the company's prospectus told poten-
tial investors, CAMCO would have 1,500,000
machines and would be making fantastic
profits.
The best known of CAMCO's installations
was a battery of 15 cigarette machines, with
3 changemakers, installed in the United
Cigar Store at 33d and Broadway in New
York. Later the machines were fitted out
with phonograph devices which repeated
"Thank you" after customers had inserted
their coins.
The idea for CAMCO sounds amazingly
modern since the organizers intended to at-
tract other large vending companies to merge
and intended likewise to integrate manufac-
turing of equipment and operating.
Mr. A. Granat, vice president of United
Cigar and one of the organizers of CAMCO,
said in an interview in 1929: "After we got
the company started, we began to discuss
the probability of consolidating the different
aspects of our business, namely, the manu-
facturing, the servicing, and the selling.
Therefore, we formed the general organiza-
tion we now have, which overshadows all of
the companies which heretofore have been
engaged In the business of vending mer-
chandise by machines."
After the corporation was formed, as Mr.
Schermack later told a reporter, "It was then
our good fortune to meet Mr. F. J. Lisman,
of F. J. Lisman & Co., a banker who had been
a member of the New York Stock Exchange
for over 30 years and who, together with ex-
cellent maturity of judgment, preserves a
wonderful, youthful attitude - toward new
ideas." With Lisman's help and guidance,
CAMCO prepared a 4-page prospectus, pro-
jecting a rosy picture of sales and profits
A7455
into the millions of dollars. In the dark de-
pression days of 1933, CAMCO went into
bankruptcy. Some of its holdings were sold
off, others were simply liquidated.
In Chicago, in 1929, a 44-year-old auto-
motive parts manufacturer named Nathan-
iel Leverone got on a penny weighing scale
while waiting for the elevated train at Wil-
son Avenue. Leverone, who prided himself
on his trim appearance, blanched at the
reading on the scale: 200 pounds. He took
out another penny, walked to the end of the
platform and got on a second scale. The
reading: 70 pounds. Many years later, Lever-
one said this experience prompted him to get
into the vending business. "Why in the
devil, I thought, haven't some honest men
seen the opportunity in these things?" That
same year, Leverone and 11 associates put
up $5,000 each to start Canteen Co. Later,
they put in another $5,000 each.
A Letter to Look Magazine
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JAMES B. UTT
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, September 19, 1961
Mr. UTT. Mr. Speaker, under unani-
mous consent to revise and extend my
remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD,
I wish to enclose a letter which I wrote
to Look magazine:
SEPTEMBER 18, 1961.
Mr. CHESTER MORRISON,
Look Senior Editor,
Look Magazine,
New York, N.Y.
DEAR SIR: This letter is with reference to
your article on the John Birch Society pub-
lished in the September 26 issue of Look.
This is to advise you that I am not now nor
have I ever been a member of the John
Birch Society. It would have been perfectly
simple for you to have determined this by
a telephone call to me. However, you ap-
pear to be so dedicated to carrying out the
anti-anti-Communist program of Gus Hall,
chairman of the Communist Party of the
United States of America, that true facts are
of little consequence to you.
In August 1960, I wrote a letter to Mr.
Robert Welch telling him that some of his
intemperate statements would open the
John Birch Society to a massive attack.
I fully support the patriotic goals of the
John Birch Society but I do not agree with
the statements made by Mr. Welch in the
Politician.
At the last convention of all of the Com-
munist Parties held in Moscow on December
10, 1960, formal recognition was taken of the
damage which the anti-Communist organ-
izations were inflicting on the international
Communist conspiracy and that the pro-
gram for 1961 was to be the total destruc-
tion of these anti-Communist organizations.
Gus Hall, chairman of the Communist Party
of the United States of America, was to im-
plement this program in the United States
and he found many willing transmission
lines through the public media to do this.
Because of some of Mr. Welch's state-
ments, the John Birch Society was vulner-
able and became the first target of attack,
and I am not too surprised to find Look to
be a willing helper in this program.
I herewith demand a retraction of that
part of the article which named me as a
member of that society.
Yours very truly,
JAMES B. UTT,
Member of Congress.
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office. Eisenhower must therefore bear a Thompson at Moscow-were agreed that spoke up in favor of intervention. Moreover,
considerable part of the blame for the U.S. Khrushchev personally had too much re- when Kennedy pressed the military chiefs
failure; he let a situation go from bad to spect for U.S. power to stir it into action, for specific recommendations, he got divided
worse, and indeed he apologized to Kennedy as Stalin had carelessly done in Korea. Yet, answers. Gen. Thomas White, then Air
for leaving "a mess," and that it might take while Khrushchev was plainly indulging his Force Chief of' Staff, and Adm. Arleigh
the intervention of U.S. troops to redeem preference for "salami" tactics it was im- Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations, were
it. There had been a moment when the possible to judge how big a slice he was con- both confident that the Communist pene-
struggle in Laos had turned in favor of templating, or whether he was being pushed tration could be defeated and Laos saved.
the pro-U.S. forces under General Phoumi by Mao Tee-tung. The only reading avail- They said that since the Communists would
Nosavan, the former Defense Minister. In able to Kennedy was, in a word, ambiguous. throw far more manpower into the battle,
a series of small but decisive engagements, Maybe Khrushchev was moving into a the U.S. war plan would have to include the
more by maneuver than by shooting, Phoumi vacuum in Laos just to keep out Mao. If so, possible use of tactical nuclear weapons on
eventually took the capital, Vientiane, early then the least chancy response for the a limited scale. They maintained, however,
in December, but at this point the Russians United States was to assume that Khru- that a clear U.S. resolution to employ nu-
intervened openly on the side of the Com- shchev would be satisfied with a thin slice clear weapons, if there was a need, might in
munist faction, the Pathet Lao. In con- in Laos, and to maneuver him toward a itself discourage further Communist pene-
cert with a large-scale push by well-trained compromise---a neutral government in tration. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the
George the Joint Chiefs of Chief Staff, and
troops from North Vietnam, they introduced which, say, the Pathet Lao would have some Chairman
a substantial airlift into northern. Laos (an minor representation. Gen. H. Decker, Arm of
operation that still is continuing). This course was urged by Secretary of Staff, had much less confidence in the U.S.
The collapse of the Royal Lao Army State Dean Rusk and also was being pressed ability to stop the Communists. Lemnitzer
then became inevitable unless the United by Prime Minister Macmillan in London. expressed the apprehension that U.S. mili-
States came in with at least equal weight It came to be known as track 2. It was in- tary action in Laos might be matched by
on Phoumi's side. One obvious measure was tended to lead to ease- re fol oweds of R dhehinr is d Russia in sua ch fast reopening
to put the airlift out of business. The job negotiation. Oppositely,
under
U.S. t divisions, more than the Army had
coul have been done by volunteer pilots Staff dthe challenge would at least have estab- hower, tstill the military challenge demand d 20calculation,
a
lished, at not too high an initial risk for a military showdown: action by the South- in its entire order of battle, as well as gen-
the United States, how far the Russians were east Asia Treaty Organization, under which eral mobilization to support them.
prepared to go. Another measure would a mixed allied force, including Americans, "In effect," Kennedy demanded, "you're
have been to bring SEATO forces into the would move into Laos and take over the telling me that I cant do anything-wlthaut
battle, as the SEATO treaty provided. defense of the important cities, thereby free- starting a nuclear war?" This, he swore,
In the end, Eisenhower decided to sheer ing the Royal Lao Army to move into the field he'd never do, which by itself was a startling
away from both measures. The State De- without risk of being sapped by subversion in reversal of a fundamental premise of the
partment was opposed to stirring up India the rear. This option was labeled "track 1," Eisenhower strategy: that U.S. forces would
and the other Asian neutrals. Secretary of and it was favored as well by Defense Secre- have recourse to nuclear tactical weapons on
State Christian Herter agreed in principle tary Robert S. McNamara and his Deputy whatever scale e the pursuit of whilobjenceds
that the independence of Laos had to be Roswell Gilpatric. q
maintained, yet he was unable to bring to While Kennedy favored track 2 and sup- ing to the Communists the option of un-
heel his own desk officers and the policy ported a conciliatory note that Macmillian inhibited escalation, would not tolerate even ide planners, who were apprehensive that even sent to Moscow, he decided he also had to a limited escalation on the huclear sin Laos
a limited military action would wreck the make a show of starting down track 1, in our own forces. Any.mil y m
possibility of some kind of political accom- case the political gamble failed. He per- therefore seemed hopeless.
modation with Moscow. The policy shapers, mitted himself a dramatic gesture. At his The fear of the nuclear escalation factor
especially in State, hung back from any se- televised press conference on March 23, he became the sanction for the policy that was
the
quence of actions that might have com- addressed himself somberly to a map of pursued thereafter. In addressing light of t is, the
mitted U.S. policy on the central issue: Laos-a country "far away" but in a world scene Kennedy I g himself
that Laos was worth fighting for. Even the that is "small." Its independence, he went map of Laos, in his first public appearance
modest additional support that the Defense on, "runs with the safety of us all," and in as Commander in Chief, is now memorable
Department tried to extend to Phoumi's language that all but told Khrushchev that for its fleeting revelation of a spirited man
U.S.-equipped battalions in the field during he was in for a fight, he implied that the who was eager to present himself as a strong
the last weeks of the Eisenhower adminis- United States was preparing to go to its President, hbut who all is principal too quickly ly turned
tration was diluted by reason of the con- defense. There was, meanwhile a tremen- unsure t resource of power.
filet between Defense and State. Under dous deployment of U.S. forces in the Far The Chiefs, ugh they situation, reoek different
were
Secretary of Defense James Douglas was East, involving the 7th Fleet and Marine views views o of i the risks oo although
the Laos s central w re
later to say, "By the time a message to the combat units on Okinawa. The Army's fundamentally agreed o United States had t point.
field had been composed I. Washington, it strategic-strike units in the United States And that was that the employ tactical nuclear weap-
had ceased to be an operational order and were made ready. A belated effort was made b prepared to and t his civilian strate-
s. But Kennedy
vexed become a philosophical essay." And a to buck up Phoumi's forces with an increased be be
vexed Phoumi was to exclaim that the rea- flow of fighting gear. U.S. military "ad- gists, moving away from the nuclear base
coning of the American Ambassador, Win- visers" went into the field with his battal- of the Eisenhower strategy, read into their
throp Brown, was beyond his simple ions. Against this background, on March 26, professional differences a bankruptcy of
oriental mind. "His Excellency insists that Kennedy went to Key West and met Mac- means and doctrine. The low esteem in
my troops be rationed to a few rounds of millan, who was on a visit to the West Indies. which Kennedy began to hold the military
ammunition per man. He tells me that I The Prime Minister made it clear that leaders whom he inherited from the Eisen-
must not start a world war. But the enemy Britain considered Laos hardly worth a war, hower administration has not been con-
is at'my throat." and wanted no part in a SEATO action. ceased:
After the responsibility passed to Kennedy (De Gaulle, in a separate exchange, had told Secretary of Defense McNamara is re-
in January, Phoumi's position was still not Kennedy flatly that France would not fight writing the Eisenhower strategic doctrine,
in collaboration with the political scientists
completely hopeless, if he had been able to in Laos.)
get t adequate help. But early in March a From that point on, the idea of a military at the White House and State. The backing
in stLaos, Is rategy, nwhich ow being in
sudden Communist descent drove him off a showdown in Laos looked less and less at- away from retreat nuclear
position commanding the principal highway tractive to the President. He did issue one the U.S. g
in northern Laos. That unfortunate action warning to the Russians that might have malized by McNamara. (His prescription
was the turning point in his part of the been construed as having a military tone. will call for a conventional base for NATO
war. For the relative ease with which it Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko strategy in the defense of Berlin.)
was done raised in Washington the question called at the White House and Kennedy took So there was, by early April, even as Laos
of whether Phoumi's troops had the will him into the rose garden, beyond earshot was slipping farther and farther below Ken-
to fight. of his staff, and said, "The United States does nedy's horizon, a breakdown of communica-
By then Kennedy was committed to the not intend to stand idly by while you take tion between the political and the military
the ft, ando this would
Cuba operation. He therefore now had to over Laos." But that was the last run along sides of contribute the ides Go vernmen
reckon with the very real possibility, were track 1. to Kennedy's
U.S. forces to become involved in Laos, of By then, Rusk was in Bangkok for a meet- next venture.
having to back off from Cuba. ing of the SEATO powers, still hoping to ex- The Cuban affair has been called the Amer-
At this juncture Kennedy's foremost need tract from the meeting at least a strong ican Suez. In the sense that Suez, too, was
was a clear reading of Soviet intentions. statement that would condemn the Soviet an utter fiasco, the bracketing Is wryly ac-
For this he turned to his "demonologists," intervention in Laos and reassert the deter- curate. There is, however, a clear difference
the New Frontier's affectionate term for its mination of the SEATO powers to defend between the two operations. Ill-managed
Soviet experts. The most influential among the new nations of southeast Asia%* In this as it was, the Suez invasion would have suc-
them-Charles E. Bohlen, State's senior So- mission Rusk failed. None of the ranking ceeded had not Eisenhower used the influence
vietologist, and Ambassador Llewellyn Democratic Congressmen, or Republicans of the United States to bring three allies-
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 A745%pproved For Release RM~lI -Z[ &48%I1346R~~ p15-0 September 20
Britain, France, and Israel-to a humiliating During the summer and fall of 1960, Eisen- of the United States." He discussed Cuba,
halt. (It should be recorded that neither hewer from time to time personally reviewed along with Laos, at length in both of his pre-
Britain, France, nor Israel made any critical the scheme. In late November, the last time inaugural talks with Eisenhower, and by his
comment on the U.S. excursion in Cuba.) it came up for hiscomprehensive review, an stipulation. Ike was inclined to rank Cuba
In Cuba the defeat was wholly self-inflicted. operational plan had not yet crystallized; no uelow Laos in terms of urgency, but Cuba
Even as the expedition was creeping into the timetable for action had been set. Across clearly worried him. In their second con-
Bay of Pigs, just before midnight of April the Potomac at the Pentagon, Under Secre- version Ike said: "It's already a bad situa-he political
oversee
rs
back In
shing-
or
f
Defense
n
16, t
s
th o
f W
who was charged tion. You may have to send troops in."
were in the
ton proc
ess
of knocks e
out
uast
miliary
T
TT
l
o
a oral culu war
y o
needed for victor """ g
On takin
oftice, Kennedy y. activities, was keeping a watchful eye on the g at once called
If the U.S. military are without a peer in project, and releasing such military talent for a detailedbriefing on the condition and
any one technique of warfare, it is in putting and gear as the CIA requisitioned. Neither prospects of the U.S.-fostered operation.
forces ashore across a hostile beach. For he nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff (whose con- This information was supplied by Allen W.
the Bay of Pigs, all the necessary means nection with the project remained informal Dulles, the Director of the CIA, and by Bis-
the at Kennedy's hand. It was, by the at this stage) believed that much good would sell. After Kennedy had heard them out he
standards of Gen. David M. Shoup's Ma- flow from an attack made by Cubans alone, decided that he had to have from the Joint
rines, an elementary amphibious operation For one thing, the resources then available Chiefs of Staff a technical opinion of the
in less than battalion strength. And, in- permitted the training of only 300 men or feasibility of the project. It is at this point
deed, as a tactical exercise, it was well de- so, and the air unit had but a dozen planes. that the locus of responsibility begins to be
vised and daringly and successfully led. But This was hardly enough to bring down a uncertain.
after the strategists at the White House and tough, well-armed regime, and Douglas re- The operation was not a Department of
State had finished plucking it apart, it be- peatedly counseled more realism in the plan- Defense responsibility. Only once before, e-
came an operation that would have dis- ning. Indeed, it was taken for granted by early January, had the chiefs formally re-
graced even the Albanians, When Kennedy Douglas and the others directly concerned viewed the plan, at Eisenhower's invitation.
looked around for the blundered, he found that a landing in force could not possibly be Now they were asked only for an apprecia-
him everywhere and nowhere. Practically brought off unless the expedition was shep- tion of its validity. The enterprise, more-
everybody in his inner group of policy mov- herded to the beach by the U.S. Navy (either over, had expanded considerably in scope
ers and shakers had been in on the plan- openly or in disguise), and covered by air and aim in the past few months. With more
ning. Only after the disaster was upon power in whatever amount might be neces- than 100,000 Cuban refugees in the United
them did he and his men realize that a ven- sary. Eisenhower, the commander of Nor- States, recruiting had stepped up, and the
ture which was essentially a military one mandy, understood this well enough. organizers were at this point aiming at a
had been fatally compromised in order to YOU MAY HAVE TO SEND TROOPS IN landing force of about 1,000 men. An op-
satisfy political considerations. One not erational plan for a landing on the south
unfriendly official who also served under It became obvious toward the end of 1960 coast of Cuba, near the town of Trinidad,
Eisenhower was later to observe: "Cuba was that Ike would be out of office well before was finally beginning to jell. There the
a terrific jolt to this new crowd because it an effective force would be ready, So the country was open, with good roads leading
exposed the fact that the hadn't reall decision as to how big the show should be, into the Escambray Mountains and the
begun to understand the meaning and con-
y y and how conspicuous should be the U.S. needed link-up with the indigenous guer-
sequences understand the use misuse of share, and in what role, was no longer his rillas. Also cranked into the plan were
power, es other words. They had blamed of to make. Given the relaxed attitude at the ingenious schemes-a barrage of radiobroad-
apparent Inaction w ds. They indecision and White House, the military chiefs also relaxed; casts from nearby islands and showers of
Iow ks laziness. Cuba taught them that and military concern for the enterprise sank to pamphlets from airplanes-intended to gal-
plain he ac- the "Indians"-from the four-star level to vanize the anti-Castro Cubans in the cities
tion, any ny kind of serious ghtn, is t amateurs." and the colonels on the Joint Staff who had and villages into demonstrations as the in-
the invasion for action,
tThi ly yea for safe
had amat too" been advising the CIA in such matters as vaders struck. It was never explicitly
during Idea early sof had taken then, training and tactics. Bissell was encouraged, claimed by the CIA that a general uprising
during th a 1960. By Cuba on the one hand, to go forward with prep- was immediately in the cards; the intention
thousands defectors summer mm from Castro's in the deUnited States. Many of them arations for an invasion, but he was cau- was to sow enough choas during the first
were professional oldiate. The job of em tioned to be ready to fall back to the more hours to prevent Castro from smashing the
were pr and training them was given of the modest objective of simply generating a sup- invasion on the beach. Once the beach-
ganizing Intelligence them as the eh ply of reinforcements for the anti-Castro head was consolidated, however, and if fight-
ent' pnclige ce Agency, mechanism for e Govern- forces in the mountains. ing gear went forward steadily to the guer-
m covert operations of this sort. It mounting Before Eisenhower was fully rid of his re- rillas elsewhere in Cuba, the planners were
orto the end the specific ressme sponsibility, however, a number of disquiet- confident that a mass revolt could be
and remained e one of the CIA's top deputies, developments combined to impart to the stimulated.
sibility Richard a of onee a the CIA's top dewhois enterprise an air of emergency. It was es- Finally, the plan still assumed that U.S.
also a highly practical executive. Among tablished that Castro was to start receiving, military help would be on call during the
as other first-pia c accomplishments, execu iv Bis- early in 1961, substantial deliveries of Soviet landing. Castro's air force consisted of not
sell had masterminded the operation, is- jet fighters, and that pilots to man them quite two-score planes-a dozen or so ob-
sell h was, until r finally missed, as one day From all indications, these would provide ber of obsolete British Sea Furies, also slow,
it de t, the mot economical espionage and
In modern him, by early summer, with an air force propeller-driven airplanes. But in addi-
hensive would be more than enough to extin- tion there were 7 or 8 T-33 jet trainers, the
times. the last of a succe of U.S.
Training camps for the exiles were set up bylCuban exiles; itcwould be bssy the a is ista an ernme t, so theacorc with
e was
in a district in western Guatemala offering most powerful air force in Latin America. not the pushover it appeared at first glace.
some privacy. The original idea was to feed Two other developments were scarcely less Armed with rockets, these jets would be
the recruits back into Cuba, to reinforce the worrisome. Castro was making progress in more than a match in a battle for the exiles'
several thousand anti-Castro guerrillas al- his systematic destruction of his enemies in B-26's. The scheme was to destroy them on
ready established in the mountains. Toward the mountains, upon whose cooperation the the ground in advance of the landing, by a
the autumn, however, a more ambitious and invasion counted, and there was no way, save series of attacks on Castro's airfields; should
riskier project came under tentative consid- by an over air supply, to get guns and am- the T-33's escape the first surprise blow,
eration. Castro was organizing large forma- munition to them. The stability of the exile there would be ample opportunity to catch
tions of militia and was obviously bent on movement itself was, moreover, coming into them later on the ground while they were
crushing the counterrevolutionary movement question. Warring political factions threat- being refueled after an action. In any
before the Cuban populace caught fire. With ened to split their ranks, and men who had event, a U.S. carrier would be close by, below
a view to saving the movement, it was pro- trained long and painstakingly were impa- the horizon, and one or two of its tactical
posed to build up an invasion force big tient over the failure of their American ad- jets could presumably supply whatever
enough to seize and to hold on the Cuban visors to set a sailing date. The feeling took quick and trifling help might be required in
shore a beachhead sufficiently deep for the hold of them and their American sponsors an emergency.
expedition to proclaim a provisional govern- that it was to be in the spring or never. It stood to reason that, considering how
ment, and so provide a rallying base for the After histi election, Kennedy had been small the landing party was, the success of
discontented. By this time, too, the rudi- briefed fairly frequently on the Cuban situa- the operation would hinge on the B-26's
ments of an anti-Castro air force were in tion, along with that in Laos. As his hour of controlling the air over the beachhead.
training nearby. The planes, however, were authority approached, the question of what And the margins that the planners accepted
all obsolete-mostly propeller-driven B-26's, to do about Cuba was increasingly on his were narrow to 'begin with. The B-26's
twin-engine bombers of World War II vintage mind. The problem had a personal angle. were to operate from a staging base in a Cen-
that had been redeemed from the Air Force's In his fourth television debate with Richard tral American country more than 500 miles
graveyard. Associated with them was a Nixon, he had sharply blamed the Eisenhower from Cuba. The round trip would take
troop-carrying squadron with which a small administration for permitting communism to better than 6 hours, and that would leave
detachment of paratroopers was training. seize a base there, "only 90 miles off the coast the planes with fuel for only 45 minutes of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX A7459
action, for bombing and air cover, over
Cuba. In contrast, Castro's air force could
be over the beachhead and the invaders'
ships in a matter of. minutes, which would
increase his relative air advantage manifold.
Hence the absolute necessity of knocking
out Castro's airpower, or at least reducing
it to impotence, by the time the ground
battle was joined.
This, in general terms, was the plan the
Chiefs reviewed for Kennedy. The assump-
tions concerning the possibilities of an
anti-Castro uprising not being in their
jurisdiction, they took these at face value.
They judged the tactical elements sound
and, indeed, they accorded the operation a
high probability of success. They were al-
lowed to appraise the training and the
equipment of the forces. A team of officers
was sent to Guatemala. On the basis of
its report, the Chiefs made several recom-
mendations, but again their assessment was
favorable.
Late in January, Kennedy authorized the
CIA to lay on the invasion plan, but he
warned that he might call the whole opera-
tion off if he had a change of mind as to its
wisdom. D-day was tentatively fixed for
March 1 but this proved impossible to meet.
For one thing, it took some time to organize
the quarrelsome exiles in New York and
Miami into a workable coalition that would
sponsor the expedition. For another, it was
decided that a battalion of about 1,400 men
was needed to secure a beachhead, and that
the force, which called itself the Cuban
Brigade, should be beefed up generally. In
consequence of these developments, the
target date kept slipping until it finally
.came firm as April 17.
It has since been reported that the Presi-
dent was inwardly skeptical of the operation
from the start but just why has never been
clear-whether he judged the force too small
to take on Castro, or because he was reluc-
tant to take on so soon a nasty job that
was bound to stir up an international
ruckus, however it came out. Some of his
closest advisers, in any case, were assailed
by sinking second thoughts. What bothered
them was the "immorality" of masked ag-
gressfon. They recoiled from having the
United States employ subterfuge in striking
down even so dangerous an adversary as
Castro, and they were almost unanimously
opposed to having the United States do the
job in the open. Even with the best of luck,
there would certainly be a flutter among the
six leading Latin American States, which,
with the exception of Venezuela, had refused
to lend themselves to any form of united
action against Castro. And the repercussion
would scarcely be less embarrassing among
the neutralists of Asia and Africa, whose
good opinion Kennedy's advisers were most
eager to cultivate. And so the emphasis at
the White House and State began to move
away from a concern with the military con-
siderations-the things needed to make the
enterprise work-and to become preoccupied
with tinkerings they hoped would soften its
political impact on the neutral nations.
THE DISMEMBERING BEGINS
The "immorality" of the intervention
found its most eloquent voice before the
President during a meeting in the State De-
partment on April 4, only 13 days before the
date set for the invasion. (Stewart Alsop
told part of the story in a recent issue of
the Saturday Evening Post.) The occasion
was Bissell's final review of the operation,
and practically everybody connected with
high strategy was on hand-Secretary of
State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara,
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon,
General Lemnitzer, CIA Chief Allen Dulles, as
well as Bundy, Paul Nitze, Kennedy's spe-
cialist on strategic planning at the Pentagon,
Thomas Mann, then Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin American Affairs, and three
of Kennedy's specialists in Latin American
matters---Adolf Berle, Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., and Richard Goodwin. There was also
one outsider, Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, who had been Kennedy's favorite
choice for Secretary of State, and whose sup-
port he wanted. After Bissel had completed
his briefing and Dulles had summed up the
risks and prospects, FutsRIGHT spoke and de-
nounced the proposition out of hand: it was
the wrong thing for the United States to get
involved in.
Kennedy chose not to meet this issue. In-
stead, he quickly noted certain practical
considerations and then, going around the
table, he asked various of his advisers
whether they thought the operation should
go forward. Without exception, the answer
was "Yes." Berle was particularly outspoken.
He declared that "a power confrontation"
with communism in the Western Hemi-
sphere was inevitable anyhow. As for this
enterprise, "Let 'er rip" was his counsel.
Mann, who previously had been on the
fence, now spoke up for the operation.
Rusk, too, said he was for it, in answer to
the President's direct question, but as would
presently be manifest, he privately had no
heart for it. Two other men among the
President's senior foreign policy advisers,
not present at the meeting, shared Fttt-
BRIGHT'S feelings: Under Secretary of State
Chester Bowles, and Adlai Stevenson, with
the United Nations in New York, who soon
came to know in a general way that some-
thing distasteful was afoot. In deference to
these views, Kennedy-either at the meeting
or soon afterward-made two separate rul-
ings that were to contribute to the fatal
dismemberment of the whole plan. First,
U.S. airpower would not be on call at any
time: the obsolescent B-26's flown by "our"
Cubans would be on their own. Second, the
B-26's could be used in only two strikes be-
fore the invasion-first on D-minus-2-days
(April 15) and again on the morning of the
landing. Although these limitations clear-
ly lengthened the risks, Lemnitzer did not
dispute them, nor did Bissell's own mili-
tary advisers; they were confident that if
the B--26's missed the T-33's on the first go,
they would surely catch them on the second.
During the few remaining days, Kennedy
drew his circle of advisers more tightly
around him. Apart from Bundy and Ros-
tow, the only White House advisers who re-
mained privy to the development of the
operation were the Latin-American ex-
perts-Adolf Berle and Schlesinger. Lem-
nitzer and, of course, Allen Dulles were in
and out of Kennedy's office. But the doubts
of Rusk and FULBRIGHT and of others were
all the while imperceptibly converging on
the President and, bit by bit, an operation
that was marginal to begin with was so trun-
cated as to guarantee its failure.
The embarkation of the expedition was
scheduled to start on April 10. This was,
in itself, quite a job. Some half-dozen
small steamers were collected for the first
movement, together with a number of tac-
tical landing craft. The takeoff point was
a port on the Caribbean, several hundred
miles from the training area in Guatemala,
and the transfer of the Cuban brigade was
done by air and at night, through 4 nights,
in the interest of secrecy. The gear aboard
the ships was enough to supply the landing
force through 10 days of battle, and also to
equip the thousands of guerrillas expected
to be recruited after the beachhead was
gained.
Only a week before the embarkation, and
indeed only a day or so before the last go-
around at the State Department, another
serious change was made in the invasion
plan. At the Insistence of the State Depart-
ment, Trinidad was eliminated as the target
landing area. State's reasons were complex.
Rusk decided that the entire operation had
to be kept unspectacular and minimize the
overtness of the U.S. role as much as pos-
sible. That required shifting the attack to
a less populated and less accessible area,
where Castro's reaction might be slower and
less effective. Rusk and his own advisers
were also anxious to be rid at all possible
speed of the incubus of responsibility for
mounting the operation in Central America,
anxious that the B-26's should be based as
rapidly as possible on Cuba. The only vul-
nerable airfield capable of taking the planes
was one in poor condition near the Bay of
Pigs, on the Zapata Peninsula, about 100
miles to the west of Trinidad. Here the
countryside was quite deserted and, to suc-
ceed at all, the invaders had to seize and
hold two narrow causeways leading across a
swamp that was impassable on either side.
These actions did not end the last-minute
curtailments directed by the White House.
Even the arrangements for arousing the
Cuban populace and trying to stampede
Castro's militia with leaflet raids and radio-
broadcasts were struck from the plan, and
again because State was afraid that they
would be too obvious a showing of the U.S.
hand. On April 12, while the convoy was
heading north, Kennedy was impelled to an-
nounce at a press conference that the United
States would not intervene with force in
Cuba. Rusk made sure the idea got home
by repeating the same guarantee on the
morning of the invasion. The effect of this
was to serve notice on the Cubans in Cuba,
who were known to be waiting for an en-
couraging signal from the United States
that whatever they might be tempted to
try would be at their own risk,
THE POLITICIANS TAKE COMMAND
Clear to the end, Kennedy retained tight
control of the enterprise. As each new se-
quence of action came up for his final ap-
proval-the go signal for the embarkation,
then for the preinvasion air strike on the
morning of April 15, he came to his decisions
quickly and firmly. All the way, however,
he reserved the option to stop the landing
short of the beach. He kept asking how late
the enterprise might be reversed without
making it look as if Castro had called an
American bluff. He was told: noon on Sun-
day, April 16, when the invasion force would
be 11 hours of steaming from the Bay of
Pigs. The Sunday deadline found Kennedy
in the Virginia countryside, at Glen Ora;
only then did he raise his finger from the
hold button. As he did so, he noted with
relief that no other unfavorable factors had
materialized. He was mistaken. At dawn
of the day before, by the timetable, the
B-26's, having flown undetected through the
night from their Central American staging
base, appeared over Cuba and bombed the
three fields on which Castro's ready air was
deployed. (The attack was, on the whole,
highly successful. Half of Castro's B-26's
and Sea Furies, and four of his T-33 jets
were blown up or damaged and so removed
from the imminent battle.) The story was
put out that pastro's own pilots, in the act
of defecting, had attacked their own airfields.
This was a gloss, to say the least; the at-
tackers were indeed defectors from Castro,
but they had defected long before. Later
that afternoon, at the United Nations, after
the Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, had
charged that the attack was "a prologue" to
a U.S, invasion, Adlai Stevenson arose and
swore that the planes were Castro's.
From this hapless moment on, Stevenson's
role becomes unclear. There was a subse-
quent published report that he intervened
to block the second strike. Stevenson has
flatly denied, and continues to deny, that
he even knew about the second strike, let
alone that he demanded that it be called off.
But there was little doubt about his un-
happiness over the course of events in the
Caribbean and he conveyed these feelings
to Washington. Before Sunday was over
Bundy was to fly to New York, to see Steven-
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A7460 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX September 20
son (Bundy said) and still wearing in' his
haste to be off, sneakers and sports clothes.
This sudden errand followed a shattering
order that went out to Bissell.
It was Sunday evening, only some 8
hours after Kennedy had given "the go-
ahead." In the first dark, the expedition
was even then creeping toward the Cuban
shore. In Bissell's office there was a call on
the White House line. it was Bundy, being
even crisper than usual: the B-26's were to
stand down, there was to be no air strike in
the morning, this was a Presidential order.
Secretary of State Rusk was now acting
for the President in the situation. If Bissell
wished to make a "reclama" (federalese for
appeal), it could be done through Rusk.
Bissel was stunned. In Allen Dulles' ab-
sence (he was in Puerto Rico), he put
his problem up to CIA Deputy Director
Charles Cabell, an experienced airman. To-
gether they went to the State Department
to urge Rusk to reconsider a decision that,
in their judgment, would put the enterprise
in irretrievable peril. Cabell was greatly
worried about the vulnerability to air at-
tack first of the ships and then of the troops
on the beach. Rusk was not impressed.
The ships, he suggested, could unload and
retire to the open sea before daylight; as
for the troops ashore being unduly incon-
venienced by Castro's air, it had been his
experience as a colonel in the Burma the-
ater, he told the visitors, that air attack
could be more of a nuisance than a danger.
One fact he made absolutely clear: mili-
tary considerations had overruled the po-
litical when the D-minus-2 strike had been
laid on; now political considerations were
taking over. While they were talking, Rusk
telephoned the President at Glen Ora to say
that Cabell and Bissell were at his side, and
that they were worried about the cancella-
tion of the strike. Rusk, at one point, put
his hand over the mouthpiece, and asked
Cabell whether he wished to speak to the
President. Cabell shook his head. Perhaps
that was his mistake; it was certainly his
last chance to appeal to a lamentable deci-
sion. But Bundy had made it clear that
Rusk was acting for the President, and Ca-
bell is a professional military man, trained
to take orders after the facts had been ar-
gued with the man in command.
On their return to the office, Bissell flashed
orders to the 8-26 commander at the stag-
ing field, more than 500 miles from the Bay
of Pigs. The force got the changed orders
shortly before midnight, only half an hour
or so before they were scheduled to depart;
the bomb bays were already loaded and the
crews were aboard. Meanwhile the planes
carrying the paratroopers had taken off, and
the first assault barges, still unobserved,
were even then approaching the beaches.
TUESDAY, THE TURNING POINT
Past midnight, in the early watches,
Bissell and Cabell restudied the battle plan,
while signals of consternation welled up
from their men far to the south. At 4
o'clock, less than an hour before first light
on the Cuban shore, Cabell went back to
Rusk with another proposal. It was mani-
festly impossible for the brigade's small
force of B-26's (only 16 were operational)
to provide effective air cover for the ships
from their distant base against jets that
could reach the ships in minutes. Cabell
now asked whether, if the ships were to pull
back of the 3- or 12-mile limit-whichever
distance U.S. legal doctrine held to be the
beginnings of international water-the U.S.S.
Boxer, a carrier on station about 50 miles
from the Bay of Pigs, could be instructed to
provide cover for them. Rusk said no and
this time Cabell finally took advantage of
the reclama that Bundy had extended to
Bissell. The President was awakened.
Cabell registered his concern. The answer
still was no.
Shortly after that, on Monday morning,
April 17, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton, the Presi-
dent's military aide received word that the
Cuban Brigade had landed. They had little
chance. They were without the ranging fire
power that the B-26's with their bombs and
machineguns had been expected to apply
against Castro's tanks and artillery as they
wheeled up. Castro's forces came up fast.
He still had four jets left, and they were
indeed armed with powerful rockets. He
used them well against the ships in the bay.
Before the morning was done, he had sunk
two transports, aboard which was the larger
part of the reserve stocks of ammunition, and
driven off two others, with the rest of the
stock.
Now Kennedy and his strategists became
alarmed. About noon on Monday, Bissell was
told that the B-26's could attack Castro's
airfields at will. Orders went to the staging
base for a major attack next morning. But
the orders came too late. Most of the pilots
had been in the air for upwards of 18 hours
in an unavailing effort to keep Castro's planes
off the troops and the remaining ships. That
night a small force was scratched together.
It was over Cuba at dawn, only to find the
fields hidden by low, Impenetrable fog.
Nothing came of the try.
Tuesday, the second day, was the turning
point. The men ashore had fought bravely
and gained their planned objectives. They
had even seized and bulldozed the airfield.
But they were desperately short of ammuni-
tion and food, and under the pressure of
Castro's superior firepower and numbers
they were being forced back across the
beach; three B-26's trying to thelp them were
shot down.
Two small landing craft had made rendez-
vous with two remaining supply ships and
taken on ammunition and rations; but from
where they were, they could not reach the
beach until after daybreak, at which time
Castro's jets were certain to get them.
There remained still one last clear chance
to make the thing go. Boxer was still on
station. The release of a few of Its jets
simply for air cover should see the two craft
safely to the shore.
"DEFEAT IS AN ORPHAN"
That night Kennedy was caught up in a
White House reception, a white-tie affair,
for Congress and the members of his Cabi-
net. He was informed by an aide that Bis-
sell wished to see him. The President asked
Bissell to come to the White House. Calls
went out to the other principals-to Rusk,
who had been entertaining the Greek Pre-
mier at a formal dinner at the State Depart-
ment, to McNamara, General Lemnitzer,
Admiral Burke.
They gathered in the President's office
shortly after midnight. One of the partici-
pants recalls: "Two men dominated that
singular occasion-the President and Bissell.
Bissell was in the unhappy posture of having
to present the views of an establishment that
had been overtaken by disaster. He did so
with control, with dignity, and with clarity."
Bissell made it plain that the expedition was
at the point of no return; unless U.S. air-
power was brought forward, the men on the
beach were doomed. In substance, he asked
that the Boxer's planes be brought into the
battle to save the operation. Rusk still
would not have this. Several others were
also opposed, including the President's per-
sonal staffers. Burke vouched for the worth
of Bissell's proposition. The discussion with
the President lasted until 2 a.m. Its out-
come was a singular compromise. Jets from
the Boxer would provide cover next morning
for exactly 1 hour-from 6:30 to 7:30 a.m.,
just long enough for the ships to run into the
shore and start unloading, and for the re-
maining B-26's to get in a hard blow.
Next morning, through an incredible mis-
chance, the 8-26's were over Cuba half an
hour ahead of schedule. Boxer's jets were
still on the flight deck. But Casio's jets
were ready. Two of the B-26's were shot
down; others were hit and forced to abort.
That was the melancholy end. At two-thirty
that afternoon, Bissell received word from
one of his men abroad a ship in the Bay of
Pigs: remnants of the landing force were in
the water and under fire. There was a final
message from the gallant brigade com-
mander ashore to this effect, "I have nothing
left to fight with and so cannot wait. Am
headed for the swamp." Bissell went to the
White House to report the end. Kennedy
gave orders for a destroyer to move into the
bay and pick up as many men as it could.
It was no Dunkirk. Only a few men of the
1,400 were saved.
"Victory," Kennedy noted some days later,
"has a hundred fathers, and defeat is an
orphan." Yet, for all Kennedy's outward
calmness at this moment of defeat, he was
never, after it, quite the same. Speaking be-
fore the American Society of Newspaper Edi-
tors, a grave President said, "There are from
this sobering episode useful lessons for all
to learn."
Adm. DeWitt Clinton Ramsey: Naval Of-
ficer, Aviation Pioneer, Industrialist,
and Statesman
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. DANIEL J. FLOOD
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, September 19, 1961
Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, now that
more than 15 years have passed since
the end of World War II, the memory of
that momentous struggle, which is pass-
ing rapidly from the public mind, is be-
ing momentarily recalled with increasing
frequency through the obituary notices
of important war leaders.
The latest such story was that about
Adm. DeWitt Clinton Ramsey, who as
Naval Aviator No. 45, was a pioneer in
the development of the modern Navy,
and rose, after a distinguished career to
the high and responsible positions of
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 1946-
47, and commander in chief of the Pa-
cific Fleet, 1948-49. It was my privilege
to have known this eminent naval of-
ficer.
Though the obituary accounts of his
services list many of his important as-
signments, there is one highly significant
contribution to contemporary U.S. his-
tory made under his direction, which is
known only to those who have delved
deeply into interoceanic canal questions,
which I have attempted to do.
The tour of Admiral Ramsey as Vice
Chief of Naval Operations coincided with
the 1946-47 drive for a sea level canal at
Panama, which grew out of the hysteria
following the advent of the atomic bomb.
Toaid those conducting the studies for
the modernization of the Panama Canal
authorized under Public Law 280, 79th
Congress, with respect to navigational
planning, Admiral Ramsey was a leader
in setting up in the Navy Department
what is known as the Panama Canal
Liaison Organization. An experienced
navigator, who had made many transits
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