MEETING WITH SENATOR RICHARD B. RUSSELL - 29 NOVEMBER 1962

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP64B00346R000100120001-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 5, 2004
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 29, 1962
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP64B00346R000100120001-1.pdf372.17 KB
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Approved For Release 2004/02/03 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000100120001-1 25X1. Copy * - of 4 on-bet 196 UM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Meeting with Senator Richard B. Russell - Z9 November 1962 t with Senator Richard B. Russell, with for approximately an hour. Senator Russ mentioned his visit to some of the F-- I and the Air Force monitoring station which ; described as most modern. 25X1 25X1 3. Senator Russell than discussed his trip to Luxor which at one point was cancelled but then was reinstituted in about an hour. There was supposed to be an Egyptian fighter unit there but when they arrived none them were on the airfield. However, he mentioned the damaged Badger Approved For Release 2004/02/03 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000100120001-1 Approved For Release 2004/02/ PCI DP64B00346R000100120001-1 aircraft which looked like our 3-47. He said this was shrouded in canvas and there were n=y mechanics working on it. He stated clearly it was damaged and he indicated a high degree of security was golz~g in the area with signs saying .'no ca noras,." He mentioned the crew chief of the American military attaches plant who bad been left there with the DC-3 which was forced to land due to loss of an engine. Russell described the difficulties in getting this crew chief out of the area back to Cairo. Later in Cairo, Russell stated the military attaches indicated they had picked up a run.-.or based no evidence that the 3a4g.r aircraft had been shot down by mist sce by 7 gyptian fighters. The Director said he would look into this. (An Initial check with f CI indicates that they had not heard of this situation.) 4. The Senator asked the Director about the Cuban sit The erector gave a rather detailed picture indicating we had counted 4g missiles coming out by aerial photography and visual obse from ads. Originally. based on the capabilities of the ships wi large Weiss. it was .stimated there might be as many as 48 mis in Cuba but our reconnaissance had only picked up 33. it was pointed out that the ships which turned back at the time of the quarantine were estimated to contain 35 missiles. As to whether or not there regain any missiles in Cuba, the Director commented on the difficulty of proving they negative. The Director mentioned the 42 IL-Z8s with apparent dismantling and only four left with wings and the cement of crates. He mentioned the l2 KOMAR PT-typsr-boats, the four coastal defense _ ,too with six missiles each. He mentioned the 39 G-216 equipped with T4een..typo missiles a n4 piloted by Soviet pilots. While not having the altitude capability of a U-g, if they were in a goad position possibly they cad zoom A ad hit a tT-2 with a missile. The Director mentioned the 24 SAM sites which are complete with the NU comnaunicatious not and radar. This is also nuumod by Soviets although on occasion Cubans have been on the net, S. Russell asked if we know how the t7-g was brought down. The a SA-2 missile apparently during a test y of, Major in the body entered on the basis 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/02/03 CIA-Rd 00346R000100120001-1 snn Approved For Release 2004/0 : CIW-RDF64B00346R000100120001-1 The Director indicated the FROG units were roughly equivalent to our Honest Johns. He described the four organized mobile armored units in battalion size. He stated he was very ed about these and as to why they are there. Photo evidence reveals construction of permanent installations such as barracks, etc. The Director stated he could earlier rationalize the SAMS as a shield but why leave them there now. Also it was difficult for him to srmti isa permanent installation, for the armored units. He speculated possibly that they are there against the contingency a take over after Castro had drunk some "bad coffee. ?' Thee l rector indicated there were some who believe the Soviets will lot the situation in Cuba gradually drift downward but that he believes that Cuba is an extremely valuable piece of real estate and in fact more valuable to the Soviets than any one of the satellites as being a bastion for the Soviets in this hemisphere. Russell indicated his complete agreement with this view. 7. The Director stated that a massive intelligence effort being conducted against Cuba with two U-Z flights per day scheduled. McCono commented an the press items charging poor once in the Cuban crisis and Senator Russell Indicated he did not I. Mr. McCone stated that he personally had 4 his concern about missiles in Cuba s nco last August. He mentioned that the President had commented to him today (29 Noveembor) that "no one would believe you or take you seriously.,, However, Mr. Me Cone added that while possibly we could have learned about them earlier. we would have had no positive proof any earlier. Russell d that certainly it took more than two weeks to build these McCone agreed that the photography of 5 September uchs in one area and to retrospect this was the beginning at sn.e construction of one of the sites. Consequently, it took y six weeks. 9. Mr.. McCono commented on the insistence of the Soviets that the President come forward with his pledge against invasion. The DCI speculated that this would be extremely useful to the Soviets in the event of a take over and a threat by the U. S. to counter this which the Soviets Approved For Release 2004/02/03 CIAfDP64B00346R000100120001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/02/03 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000100120001-1 could take to the UN and possibly win their point. Russell expressed his view that we should have gone into Cuba and cleaned it up once and for all but that maybe this is the best way. The Director advised that the deal for the Cuban prisoners that the money placed on deposit and letters of credit had been withdrawn. Mr. Cone stated he would advise in the jutur, such arrangements, pointing out, however, that the Attorney Secretary Rusk Just today have again raised the question of open. Russell reiterated his very strong view out but if it had to go the American people should d the full story. He acknowledged. of course, the special iblllty of the U. S. for those prisoners and that the other 60, 000 n Cuba got there on their own. He was pleased that these arrangements were off. He pointed out that no other new Agency that he knew of after throe years failed to get into trouble in connection with its appropriations. In the case of CIA, it continued to receive the money hich it needed and was able to keep from public view the essential things which it required to do its job. If the prisoner deal were to go forward, he stated his belief this could cause the Agency serious trouble the Congress on its appropria