TEXT OF MCNAMARA'S STATEMENT ON THE B-70 BOMBERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000100100003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 16, 1962
• Content Type: NSPR

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Texff McNa?uara's
tatewent on the
' INGTOI ,March 15 -
a i is the text of ,Seere-
tart' of Defense Robert S. Mc-
Namara's statement today on
the controversial RS-70 pro-
gram:
Because of the great Con-
gressional and public interest
in the B-70 bomber and RS-70
reconnaissance - strike pro-
grams, I have within the last
week furnished to interested
members of the Congress
our latest analyses of these
two aircraft. In line with our
policy to keep our citizens
informed on major defense is-
sues, I believe as much of
this information as security
considerations permit should
also be made available to the
general public.
The B-70, in its long-range
bomber configuration, has
been a matter of intense con-
troversy for a number of
years. In reviewing the his-
tory of this project, I was
impressed by the fact that
the B-70 never enjoyed the
full support of the President
and his Scientific Advisory
Committee, the Secretary of
Defense and his principal
civilian advisers, or the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as a corpr-
rate body. In fact, the only
consistent supporter of this
program was the Air Force it-
self. The secretaries and
chiefs of the other services,
whether under this Adinis-
tration or the previous Ad-
ministration, never supported
the B-70 for full weapon-
system development or pro-
curement and, indeed, many
vigorously opposed it. So it
is a matter of record that the
B-70 has long been con
sidered a very doubtful
proposition, with the weight
of competent scientific, tech-
nical and military opinion
against it for many years.
Nevertheless, I approached
the B-70 problem with a com-
pletely open mind and with-
out any preconceptions one
way or the other. I carefully
studied not only all the argu-
ments pro and con but also
the specific facts and figures
upon which these arguments
were based. I was particular-
ly concerned, for example,
with the cost and effective-
ness of other vZays of doing
the job proposed for the B-70.
I wgpld "like to empha
at this point ghat, i?
letting a weapon. system to
accomplish a particular mili-
taiy Task; we are dealing
not with absolutes but with
r,~,mparatives. We must al-
ways take into account not
only the planned capabilities
of the proposed weapon sys-
tem but also its full cost in
comparison to the cost and
effectiveness of other weapon
systems which can do the
same job, perhaps in some-
what different ways. I be-
lieve, we can all agree that
the common objective of both
the legislative and the execu-
tive branches of our Govern-
ment is to provide ail of the
forces we need for our se-
curity at the lowest possible
over-all cost.
Only a Manned Missile
A careful study of the
earlier B-70 proposal led to
the conclusion that it was
really no more than a manned
missile, Indeed, a book about
it was published under just
such a title. The old B-70
system offered none of the
advantages of flexibility gen-
erally attributed to manned
bombers. It could not look
for new targets nor find and
attack mobile targets or tar-
gets of uncertain location. It
offered no option but pre-
planned attack against pre-
viously known targets - a
mission that can be effective-
ly performed by missiles.
Moreover, the B-70 had im-
portant disadvantages when
compared with ballistic mis-
siles. It would have been vul-
nerable on the ground to sur-
prise missile attack. It would
not have been hardened and
dispersed like Minuteman,
or continuously mobile and
concealed like Polaris.
Rather, it would have had to
depend on warning and
grounfalert response - a
method of production far
less reliable, in an era where
large, numbers of missiles
exist, than hardening and
dispersals or continuous peace-
r
a ached unde
Ti n- - I
`response
o?~wa ng; ra er isthat
they have to be launched un-
der positive control in re-
sponse to warning; rather it
is that they have to be
launched on the basis of
warning because they are
vulnerable and cannot ride
out an attack, We don't
care whether or not.Polaris
missiles, for example, can be
launched subject to positive
control because we are un-
der no great compulsion to
launch them until we are
ready to make the final de-
cision to destroy their tar-
gets.
Further, the B-70 is far
less suitable than the B-52
for air-borne alert measures.
And attempts to maintain it
on the ground in a widely dis-
persed posture and at a very
high level of alert would have
entailed all kinds of difficult
and costly operating prob-
lems, problems that have ef-
fectively prevented the Air
Force from. operating any
other of its bombers in this .
way.
Called Poorly Designed
Moreover, the B-70 was
poorly designed from the
point of view of penetration
of enemy defenses. The B-70
would present a very large
radar cross-section and the
higher it flew the earlier it
could be picked up by radar.
Furthermore, the B-70 had
not been designed for the use
ofair-to-surface missiles such
as Hound Dog or Skybolt,
tive control on the basin of
"ambiguous -warning-a prop-
arty not possessed by mis-
siles. But the important
Tiere is riot that -bomb-
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Approved
Ind thereipre could ;dot, at--
:aqk while ,stand n off sev-
eral hundred miles, but would
actually have had to fly into
the target area to drop Its
bombs. Fkally, the B-70
would have been an extreme-
ly expensive aircraft, partic-
ularly so in relation to its
capability in the straight
bomber version.
So, it is not surprising that
previous Secretaries of De-
ense and the previous Presi-
dent have had very grave
doubts as to the desirability
of this particular weapon sys-
tem. Even ' the Air Force is
now no longer proposing the
B-70 in a bomber configura-
tion, implicitly admitting the
correctness of many of these
reasons.
What the Air Force ` is cur-
ently proposing, and` has pre-
sented to the Congressional
committees, is a new and
quite different version of the
B-70; namely, a reconnais-
sance=strike aircraft involv-
ing novel components and
equipment. While this RS-70,
,if feasible, would be of con-
siderably greater value to our,
over-all strategic power than
the B-70, it would still suffer
from some of the same short-
comings, including very high
costs; and, in addition, would
introduce entirely new prob-
lems which we have yet to
explore fully.
The B-70, as it was for-
merly envisaged, was already
a more technically complex
vehicle than any of the
ICBM's we are now develop-
ing. Because of 'its great
speed, it required a mass of
electronic components for
bombing-navigation, for com-
munications and for controll-
ing the environment within
the aircraft. In contrast to
an ICBM, these subsystems
must operate with very high
levels of reliability for peri-
ods of hours rather than
minutes.
System Is Complicated
The RS-70 would introduce,
in addition, another new set
of subsystems, including re-
connaissance sensors, proc-
essing systems, display sys-
tems, communication sys-
tems, all requiring human in-
terpretation . and decision
within very short times, and
air-to-surface missiles. Many
of these new subsystems, it
,should be recognized, have
yet to be developed. Indeed,
our technical review of this
proposal, to date, indicates
!t#?, pC eS- .1
The most attractive aspect
of the RS-70 is its proposed
reconnaissance - strike capa-
bility in a post-attack en-
vironment. This capability
would require, first, the de-
velopment of an extremely
high resolution radar system
-a system which,, ink, com-
bination with an . operator,_',
could . "recognize" targets
from an altitude of 70,000
feet and out to a considerable
distance. To appreciate what
this involves, consider the
fact that to separate visually
two poinst in an area as large
as this radar is supposed to
observe would require .a
screen 15 feet by 15 feet to
present a television-quality
picture. This example is given
only to illustrate the prob-
lem of display and is not,
of course, a solution which
anyone would consider.
At the present time we do
not know how to, specify a
system which can gather, pro-
cess and display the data at
the rates and with the reso-
lution necessary for the RS-
70 mission, which involves
firing a missile from an air-
craft flying at thirty miles a
minute before it moves out of
missile range. To achieve the
capability which would be
required to "recognize" or to
analyze damage on some im-
portant types of targets is
beyond any known 'technique.
Let me try to illustrate the
severity of this problem. Pic-
ture the RS-70 flying at 70,=
000 feet and moving at 2,000
miles per hour. The proposed
mission would require the
gathering of radar reconnais-
sance data on the presence of
new targets-or known tar-
gets which may not have.
been destroyed or neutralized.
and the prompt processing
and analysis of these data in
flight. The proposed 'radar,
moving with the aircraft at
2,000 miles per hour, would
be seeing new area at the
rate of. 100,000 square miles
per hour or 750 million square
feet per second. We cannot
state today with any assur-
ance that satisfactory equip-
ment to perform this proces-
sing and display function in
an RS-70 can be made doper-
ational by 1970, -let alone by
1967, on the basis of any
known tec gytor whether
required of the operator can
ever be done.
Thus, it is clear, that there
are many very difficullt tech-
nical problems yet to be solved
-and, indeed, yet to be fully
understood-before we can
have any reasonable expec-
tation that the reconnaissance
capability required by the RS-
70 can actually be developed
and produced within the 1967-
70 time period. We have
started work on these prob-
lems and over $50,000,000 has
been separately provided for
this purpose in the 1963
budget, but we are two or
more years away from even a
flight test of the reconnais-
sance subsystems in a form
from. which operational spec-
ifications can be drawn, let
alone blueprints for the pro-
duction of hardware.
The RS-70, as proposed by
the Air Force, is also to have
the capability of transmitting
to home base, processed radar
data on important target
areas. This capability, if ob-
tainable, woulld be useful in
retargeting follow-up strikes
by other manned bombers or
by ICBM's. However, the as-
sured rate of transmission
OAL 1 .?, ~. -,
over eFcQnt iiental -ranges
in A. wartime environment
would be only a minute frac-
tion of the rate at which the
data. are being acquired and
processed by the RS-70 radar-
The Air Force proposal
would also require the devel-
opment of new air-launched
strike missiles. For use
againsthard targets, these
missiles, because of their lim-
ited size and warehead yields,
would have to be far more
accurate than any strategic
air-launched missile now in
production or development.
This requirement would entail
yet another set of problems..
Finally, the deployment of
the RS-70 will involve oper-
ating problems far more dif-
ficult than that of the. B-52.
9 Although the Air Force has
nott yet stated the ultimate
size of the RS-70 force, a force
of about 200 B-70's was pro-
posed at one time. Consider-
ing the capabilities the Air
Force',specifies for this air-
craft, we can assume that a
smaller number, say 150,
would suffice. The Air Force
estimates that the first wing
of forty-five RS-70 aircraft
would cost $5,000,000,000: A
force of about 150 would prob-
ably cos inexc-ess of $10,000,-.
OOO 000-excluding the cost of
the tankers and the annual
operating costs.
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tern development. The new
subsystems which could pro-
vide the RS-70 with its, dam-
age assessment capability
have been started in develop-
ment, but we are not sure now
that we know how to develop
successfully the extremely
high data rate, sharp resolu-
tion radar system required.
Our best estimates now are
that *e could not have such
a system early enough to pro-
duce an operational RS-70
force capable of useful recon-
naissance strike before 1970.
2. The RS-70, without these
subsystems, would be nothing
more than a B-70, the produc-
tion of which it is now agreed
would not be warranted.
L ritilwe know much
its mlTitary efrectrvenesg and
its cost-we have no rational
basis for. committing this air-
craft to weapon-system devel-
opment or production.
But regardless of whether
or not the RS-70 will be ready
for production or can be pro-
duced substantially as the Air
Force describes it, the ques-
tion -still remains: would the
program be worth its cost ?
This question can be answered
only in terms of the total job
to be done and the various al-
ternative ways of doing it in
relation to their respective
costs.
The 1963 and prior year
budgets provide for over 1,000
Atlas, Titan and Minuteman
intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, plus forty-one subma-
rines with over 650 Polaris
missiles, plus more than 700
B-52 and B-58 bombers: By
1967 the alert portion'
ortion of the
force alone will have three
times the destruction capabil-
ity of the alert force we had
last June.
Destruction Capability
Now, how large a part of~
the enemy target system could 1
this force be expected to de-
stroy after absorbing an en-
emy surprise attack ? As I
pointed out in my statements
to the Congress in January,
this calculation involves a
number of factors of which
the following are the most im-
portant:
1. The number' of warhead
that each type of vehicle can
deliver.
2.. The proportion of each
weapon system expected to
survive the initial all-out nu-
clear attack - the survival
rate.
3. The degree of reliability
veriEory -that we can
of vehicle to penetrate the
enemy's defenses-the pene-
tration rate.
,5 The warhead yield and
`6egree of accuracy that can be
expected of each weapon sys-
tem.
Utilizing these factors and
pplying to them values
whf'eh on the whole, are
thought to` lie quite conser4a-
tive, we calculate that the
strategic retaliatory forces
prograr med through' 1967
could achieve practically com-
plete destruction of the enemy
target system---even after ii}.
sorbing an initial nuclear at-
tack. The addition of a force
of either 200 B-70's, which
was proposed last year by the
Air Force, or the 150 RS-70's
now being considered, either
of which would cost about
$10,000,000,000, would not ap-
preciably change this result.
While calculations of this
sort are useful for estimating
the adequacy of our:program-
med forces under extreme con-
ditions, it should be pointed
out that these forces may not
necessarily be used in this
manner. Indeed, we are im-
plementing command and con-
trol processes at all levels of
authority to insure that our
response can be graded by de-
gree, by geographical and po-
litical area and by target type
as would be appropriate to the
type and extent of an enemy
attack.
With regard to the wartime
reconnaissance capabilities of
the RS-70, we have other
means of performing that
function and with any ade-
quate high - processing -rate
radar system which may be
developed, the B-52's and'
B'58's could have a consider-
able reconnaissance and bomb
damage assessment capabil-
ity incident to their principal
missioh. We think that the
B-52's and B.-58's, arriving
after our missiles have sup-
pressed, the enemy's air de-
fense, could penetrate as well
or almost as well, as the RS-
70.
A decision by the Soviet
! Union to produce and deploy
an anti ICBM system could
not significantly change this
over-all picture, and in any
event would be no less effect-
ive against the RS-70 and Its
missiles. To ensure that our
missiles can reach their tar-
gets even then, we have in-
cluded a substantial sum in
the 1963 budget for a "pene-
tration aids program." We also
have the option of increasing
th_g Minuteman program for
t hfeh e ra T1-7Muctton capa-
ci 'has already been pro-
vided.
It is, clear, therefore, that
the RS-70 program, as we see
it now, would not add signifi-
cantly to our` strategic retali-
atory capability in the period
after 1967. Interestingly
enough, at the very time the
Air Force is urging: the pro-
duction of anothe aircraft sys-
tem on the grounds that nu-
clear-armed missiles are not
dependable, one theatre com-
mand is requesting the pro-
duction of a new nuclear-
armed missile to replace his
aircraft which he says are too
vulnerable in a nuclear war
environment. And, while the
Air Force, in pressing its case
for a new bomber, has ques-
tioned the dependability of nu-
clear-armed missiles, it is at
the same time urging an air-
craft (the RS-70) which itself
depends for its strike capa-
bility on highly sophisticated,
nuclear-armed missiles.
While I am fully convinced
that it is entirely premature
to make.any kind, of com-
mitment to weapon-system
development or production of '
the RS-70 in fiscal year 1963, '
I am not prepared to preclude
such a commitment at a later
date. By continuing our XB-
70 program of three proto-
type aircraft at the cost of
$1,300,000,000 and by pro-
ceeding with the exploratory
development of the key sub-
systems of the proposed RS-
70 for which funds have been
included in the 1963 budget,
we will have open to us the
option of producing and de-
ploying an RS-70 system at
a later time if the need for
such a system should become
apparent. Since, the key sub-
systems have yet to be devel-
veloped, delaying the decision
for one year would not post-
pone the real operational
readiness of the first wing
at all.
I have just recently re-,~
viewed this entire problem
with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and again, except for(
the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force, they all support the!
B-70 development program
by President
..Kennedy.
time ~lie,r",g?Tiabi33 `-yVV-~~~
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