PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE GROUP INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00658A000100010007-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REQ

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*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
of
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
]NTELLIGENCE DIVISION
CONFIDENTIAL
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IlVTELLIGENCE DIVISION
W. D. G. S:
DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE
Safeguards military
.information and preserves
secrecy of military plane
and operations.
EXECUTIVE STAFF
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
Performs research,
interpretation and
dissemination of War
Department intelligence.
ARMY SECURITY
AGENCY
COMBAT INT &
TRAINING GROUP
Dixects and supervises
intelligence training
and acts for D. of I.
re Combat Intelligence
matters.
COLLECTION
GROUP
Collects information.
CONFII7ENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS
of
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
The United States entered World War II with:
a. No intelligence on enemy air or ground order of battle.
b. No detailed reference material on enemy armed forces
such as weapons, insignia, fortifications, and documents.
c. No detailed topographic intelligence for landing operations.
d. Insufficient facts -- but plenty of opinion -- on which to
base strategic estimates.
g. No trained personnel for either strategic or combat
intelligence.
Fortunately our allies were able to provide us with some
alread~r ,prepared intelligence on which we initially had to depend
for our current intelligence requirements. Even so, it was not
until late 1944 that a reasonably effective intelligence machine
had been developed.
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There are three requisites which logically must be accepted
as the basis. for a required peacetime intelligence organization:
a. It should produce strategic estimates which figuratively
speaking, are "better than 90 percent correct."
b. In our smaller world, global coverage is essential.
c. The intelligence service must be on an M-day basis.
The size of an army has no effect on the problems of peace-
time intelligence production. In peacetime, the scope of intelligence
is wider because we do not know who will be our future enemies,
and we must amass. the factual information. on areas which we can-
not enter during hostilities. Also peacetime diplomatic considerations
frequently present barriers to the' collection of information. This
brings us to the point where we must outline:
a. What should be the minimum products of a global intelligence
service for the army.
b. The present status of production.
c. Improvements required.
d. The number and quality of personnel needed. ,~
The minimum products of a global. intelligence service should
consist of the following:
a. Complete and up-to-date compilations of pertinent factual
information. on all countries, provided by:
~l)
A compilation of factual intelligence on all factors
in the war potential of a given country -- in the
shop this is referred to as Strategic Intelligence
Digests. They are maintained in loose-leaf form
at research desk levels, and form the primary
basis for the production of all intelligence. Plan-
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_ning for the digests is completed; implementation
is in its initial stages. -
(2) Detailed descriptions of all military organizations,
weapons, tactics, etc., of the major powers referred
to as Military Handbooks. Only the U.S.S.R. Hand-
book is in production and is nearing completion.
(3) Special Studies on national, regional, and global
subjects of strategic importance, such as weapons,
transportation, key materials, and armament in-
dustries. An initial program of 40 studies has been
established by the War Department Intelligence Plan,
of which 2 have been produced.
(4) Analytical topographic surveys of critical areas of
the world -- referred to as JANIS (Joint Army Navy
Intelligence Study). They present all the necessary
detailed topographic intelligence upon which may be
based a plan for military operations in the subject
area. Only 24 of a possible 200 have been produced.
(5) The compilations of factual intelligence pertinent
to strategic targets throughout the world are
referred to as Bombing Encyclopedias. The In-
telligence Division must procure the information for
Army Afr Forces to produce the encyclopedias. Flans
are now being formulated for the production of this
vital intelligence. The Intelligence Division has
available in usable form less than five percent of the
information required for a bombing encyclopedia
on the U. S. S. R.
b. The final step in the production of intelligence is a Strategic
Intelligence Estimate. It fs the most authoritative interpretation of
the capabilities of a given foreign nation to prosecute war. Str~ ategic
Estimates at the present time are inadequate in that they are not based
u~on a comprehensive compilation of authoritative factual rote igence.
Zhis rovill be made available only after Strategic Intelligence Digests are
produced.
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An intelligence production machine to a large measure is helpless
without an information collecting service. The efforts of such an
agency must be directed by a War Department Intelligence Plan and
must utilize all sources of information -- official, published, private,
and secret.
Official sources of information are military attaches, missions,
observers, and other government agencies.
Specific measures required to exploit official sources of
information are:
a. A prescribed course of research training in the Intelligence
Division for all outgoing field personnel.
' b. Assignment of civilian research analysts to tours of duty
at field stations.
c. Close and constant guidance of field effort through the War
Department Intelligence Plan and other directives.
d. Extension of Military Attache functions to include analysis of
world opinion and attitudes.
e. Improved coordination of collection effort with other govern- l
ment agencies through the Central Intelligence Group.
f. Cooperative effort with other government agencies in
Washington in the production of intelligence.
The exploitation of published sources of information requires
fuller collection, faster transmission, and specialized language per-
sonnel for analysis.
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Private sources of information are one of the richest and
relatively unexplored sources. They include:
a. Universities and research foundations.
b. Expert consultants in specialized fields such as petroleum,
metals ethnology, nuclear physics, and transportation systems.
c. Domestic firms with overseas agencies.
d. Private individuals traveling abroad, particularly experts
in scientific and other fields.
e. Domestic newspaper morgues.
Action has been initiated to form a committee representative of
.learned societies and research foundations to exploit civilian research
facilities.
A major criticism of G-2 has been a failure to disseminate its
intelligence. This was reflected in combat units where the fl wo of
information upward was better generally than downward. Media
for dissemination of intelligence include:
a. Oral presentation to higher authority.
b. Responses to requests by staff divisions and other govern-
ment agencies.
c. Special Studies and Handbooks.
d. Periodic publications:
Mllitary Summaries (monthly)
Scientific Intelligence Review (monthly)
Intelligence Review (weekly)
Soviet Military Roundup (weekly)
Intelligence Bulietin (monthly)
e. Special dissemination.5~
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CC~NF'IDENTIAL
The preparation of information for dissemination is
9~e of the mast important "iellin~rocesses in the pro
duction of intelli ence. It forces research analysts and
specialists to marshal the facts and to arrive at generally
logical conclusions.
Human beings are, as a whole, mentally lazy. In most
instances, they can only be forced into the process of turning
out information in files into intelligence through objective
production assignments.
With minor additions, the staff of the Intelligence
Group of the Intelligence Division as authorized by the
1 January 1946 T/O is adequate, once personnel is trained,
to meet the intelligence needs outlined. ,
However, it will be 1 e tember 1947 before this
machine is operating to a reasonably satisfactory degree;
and 5 ears will be re wired to reach the desired standard.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Chief - D~Chief
Intelligence Group
J
Special
In?ormation
Center
Executive for
Administration
Operations Room
Cartographic
Chief
Chief
Chief
Chief
Chief
Chief
Chief
Domestic
Pan Am.
Br. Empire
W. FnZropean
Eurasian
Far Eastern
Service
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Branch
Mil. Br.
Who's
Who Br.
Pol. 80
Ec. Br.
Topo Br,
Cap. Doc. Br.
I+ibrary Br.
~s N. CIV.
Ourrently Aubhorized
224
0 839
Proposed Increase:
Domestic Branch
8
0 16
An~yais of Foreign Ptiblie Opiniots
1
0 6
(}uidance o#' Iiesearcl~ in Civi~,iari Inttrtilctions
1
0 4
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CONFIDENT L
The Intelligence Group is the intelligence producing agency in
the Intelligence Division. The T/O of 1 January 1946 for the Intelligence
Group (shown on opposite page) authorized 224 officers and 539 civilians..
In addition, there are now in the Military District of Washington 1
people formerly stationed at Camp Ritchie, Md., employed in the ex-
ploitation of captured German and Japanese documents. It is estimated
the latter will be required only until 1 July 1947.
The minor additional staff requirements referred to are designed
to meet recently increased responsibilities -- 34 for duty in Washington
and 125 for duty outside the United States. The latter are to be
assigned to the collection group. Of the former? 23 are needed to
operate the newly activated Domestic Branch and its supporting desks
within the Functional Branches -Military Branch, Who's Who Branch,
Political and Economic Branch; 6 for Analysis of Foreign Public
Opinion; and, 5 for Guiding Research in Civilian Institutions. Of those
for duty outside the United States 124 are for Research Analysis with
Field Offices overseas and 1 for duty with Canadian Intelligence.
During the war the peak staff of 1 115 in the Intelli ence Group
worked a total of approximately 55,000 man-hours per week. The
Intelligence Group was also directly assisted by the efforts of auxiliary
groups numbering almost 500 persons involved in captured document
exploitation and other activities. The intelligence effort during hostil-
ities was directed almost entirely against the 2 major enemies and
their satellites.
At present the staff of approximately 700 works about 29,000
man-hours per week. Reduce the staff by 50 percent and apply the law
of geometrical progression to account for overhead and processing, and
.the actual intelligence production -hours would be reduced to approxi-
mately 7,000 per week to cover the entire world -- this as compared
with the 55,000 hours when we were working almost exclusively on
only 2 nations and their satellites.
Reduction in personnel may be effected intelligently only by
elimination of functions. Production of intelligence on the U. S. S. R.
and "satellite countries" must continue. If a 50 percent cut were
ordered, the following measures would have to be taken:
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(1) The United States_
(2) The British Empire.
(3) Western Europe.
(4) The Far East-
(5) South America,
Cessation of publication of the following:
(1)
(2) Intelligence Bulletin
b.
a. Cessation of production of intelligence and maintenance
of an information library on the following areas:
Special Studies
(3 )
(4) Military Handbooks.
The effect of reduction of personnel on the basic research
desks is shown by the following example:
The French Desk of Polec Branch is allotted a total, of 7
personnel (2 military, 5 civilian). It therefore produces 280
man-hours of work a week.
During an average week the French Desk receives 100 cables,
151 documents, and 118 publications, requiring the various pro-
cesses of reading, analysis, evaluation, BIDing, making extracts,
clipping, indexing, filing, etc. The time required to process fully
this incoming material averages 80 percent of the average working
week, a total of 224. man-hours.
When the 224 man-hours required for rocessing of material
are deducted from the 0 man-hours available to the Desk each
week, only 56 man-hours remain free for actual production of
intelligence; including the writing of flashes for the morning
Conferences, weekly Intelligence Review items, special studies,
.and such other jobs as the critically important work on the Stra-
tegic Intelligence Digest, the briefing of out-going Military
Attaches, and conferring with the returning Military Attaches.
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From this it may be seen that if one person were to leave
the Desk, the loss of 40 weekly man-hours would cut intelligence
production time from 5o hours to 16 hours, a reduction of o0
percent. If two persons were to leave,. representing a loss of
80 weekly man-hours, no time at all would be left for intelligence
production, and incoming material would not even be fully processed.
The New York Times. with its expert staff, can make estimates
concerning world situations which will average 90 percent in
accuracy. Reduce the staff and the accuracy of estimates will be
reduced generally according to the law of diminishing returns.
That newspaper has achieved its eminence in the newspaper world
through almost unlimited expenditure not only for current producti~~n,
but also for building up its morgue and a highly trained staff. This
has taken several generations.
However, a geometric progression is applicable to the Intel-
ligence Division, for we have built up neither the vast resources
of highly skilled reporters, researchers, and analysts, nor a
comprehensive library of essential material.
Cut the resources of the Intelligence Group by 35 percent
and its production- will be comparable to that of a small-town
aily newspaper, producing news coverage based largely on
rewrites and editorials on local pro lems. Such a newspaper will
be fortunate if it averages a 60 percent accuracy on world
situation estimates.
Cut the resources of the Intelligence Group by 50 percent
and its product will be comparable to that achieved by a small
community weekly together with a morgue of an average daily
newspaper.
The Intelligence Service with which we entered World War II
may be compared -- in skill and experience of its staff and in
world coverage of its operations -- to the news service of a
local daily newspaper.
The War Department cannot be satisfied with strategic es-
timates of between 60 and 70 ercent accuracy, nor can we predict
in what remote sect on of the world we may be suddenly called
upon a few years hence to carry out air-borne or water-borne
landing operations. Who would have predicted in 1935 that within
7 years we would be landing troops on the west coast of Africa or
on remote islands in the Pacific ?
At least the first two years of a war are fought on a basis
of in a .Bence pro uce a ore sou rea .
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Tt is highly doubtful that in the future there will be time to
create an effective intelligence organization after the outbreak of
war. To meet such an eventuality we must have an intelligence
machine geared to make possible immediate and effective Ivl-day
operations.
One of the senior officers of the Central Intelligence Group
said, "Do you realize that the Intelligence Division has the only
genuine intelligence producing organization in Washington?" And
yet, although we have this unique machine, we are now, paradoxically,
asking ourselves what a global intelligence service should be and how
intelligence should be produced.
With proper support, a machine, staffed by adequately trained
personnel and on a sound production schedule, can be operating with
reasonable efficiency by 1 September 1947. Within 5 years, with
vigorous support and direction, we can develop an intelligence service
as pre-eminent in its field as is The New York Times in the newspaper
world.
A great many are paying lip service to the idea that we must
have a highly efficient peacetime intelligence service. However,
there is only an extremely vague general concept of what constitutes
an intelligence producing machine. Few realize that the problem of
developing such a machine is comparable to that of the development
of a staff, the editorial machinery, and the sources of information for
agreat newspaper like The New York Times.
The editorial activities of The New York Times are so integrated
and so interdependent that no one would toy with the idea of decentrali-
zation. Decentralization would reduce materially the effectiveness of
the production machine. Similarly, decentralization of intelligence
operations results onl iy n duplication of effort and a loss of flexibility.
It scatters reference material among many agencies and results in an
overall increase of administrative personnel, and -- most important --
it would break up the only well-balanced intelligence organization in
the United States.
It has been shown already that a reduction in personnel must
result in reducing accuracy or in accepting partial world coverage,
which must be based on an attempt to predict where the next war is
to be fought. In either case we are ~ambling_with the future security
of the United States. This risk is unwarranted, particularly when an
efficient military intelligence service is within the means of the War
pgpartment.
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The personnel required are considerably less than the
strength of an infantry combat team. Its annual cost can be
compared with the price of o0 B-29's.
To develop an effective intelligence machine we must
supply the resources to obtain a production goal, not allot
a number of personnel to an organization and wait anxiously to
see what they can produce.
~ CONFIDENTIAL
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