THE KURDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00314R000200180010-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 1, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

DP63 -00314R000200 80010-2
The Kurds as an armed :ores do not pose a threat to the present
Fovertrents of Iran and Iraq. The Kurds are poorly equipped, poorly'
organised, and in the broad picture possess only harassment potential.
In the event of the collapse of the rovernments in Teheran and i4fhded
the Kurds have the potential to take control of their respective areas.
3141arly? if the Iranian and Iraqi armies are erwe-ed in non-Kurdish
areas to the point of withdrawin7 substantial numLers of troops from
northern garrisons, the liurds would encounter little opposition to
separatist activities. The Mahabad Republic W83 formed with joviet
Jupport at a time when Iran found itself unable to direet
political activities. 41ou1d circumstances permit, the Soviet union
is probably ready once er4fin to extend active support to a Kurdish
independence movement. The danger lies .not in a purely Kurdish effort,
but in a Nurdieh nationalist movement supported by the Soviet Union.
Iran, like Turkey, is probably more concerned with Kurdish
nationalism than it is willing to admit. Iran 'a dis.VOK organization
closely observinr Kurdish vxtivities to detect and snuff out
indepenience activities. Kurdish leaders fleeing from Iraq have been
welcomed in ;ran with the aim of collectin7 prominent Kurds, isolating
them, and thus putting to an end Kurdish nationalistic agitation for
an independent Kurdistan. A more lenient Kurdish policy in Iraq hes
slowed the flight of refugees into Iron and many of the refurees have
returned, although a number of leaders remain in Iran. Iran is,
however, reluctant to permit the overt migretion of the well Organiied
Iraqi section of the herki tribe into traditional !--rsiging' grounds
northwest of_Rezaieh. Parti Demokrst Kuri switetors frog Iraq are
said to te active in border ares of iranian Kurdistan, and sore move-
ment of lranian Kurds into Iraq is permitted with_ the hope of securing
, - -
in1orm0q04,06 activity aglow- Iraqi Kurds.; Althourh there is no
indication.that iron is stirring up trouble in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iranian
Eurds are capable of creatinrr disturbancesin Iraq if urred to do so
by their government.
lbel: 140,C 4 commom leadership is a stumblin, block to an
- _
effe0.4YIPOr2ti3t state. tio Kurdish leader has ever had the stature
to 00;0444.A.USiversa3. following across Kurdistan. Meetings of Kurdish
leader save been reported and it is evident that the Soviets are active
in Kurdistan, but a firm picture of alil?tments As not available. The
Kurds of 4,17an .dislike the central governheht but many recall the
performaPee of the Soviet Union durins,,thejeys of the Mahabad Republic;
, ECRfi
e 1#99/0941ei-dA-RDP63-00314R000200180010-2
moot Kurdish lesdire in Iraq do not senpert the saim aovernment mai
at the same time diatrust the doviet Union. A number of Kurdish
leaders mi kit join .and initially cooperate with a SovieteeupOorted
independence movement if tangible evidence of .4eviet rood faith were
forthcomina. How lone independent leaders would continue to back a
centrally controlled effort is a matter of epeculation. soviet support
and direction could be a unifyine factor amone the Kurds, but this
same outside direction could create conditions intolerable to Xurdieh
leaders who joined an independence movement to escape non-urdish,
authority.
Mulls Mustafe brzri, althourh not well liked personally, is
apparently active in Kurdish affair's at the present time. "e is
reportedly in contact with many Kurdish leaders and his nave has bean
linked with clandestine free Kurdiatan movements tn Iran and Turkey.
His loyalty to COUSOS other than his awn political navancement is
doubtful. He has apparently had differences with the aommuniet Party
of Iraq, hut has probebly maintained his contact with the 3ov1et Union.
His uneasy relationship with the aovernment of Iraq would probobly
disinteprate if Arab nationalist pressures on Kurdish areas are
increased. It is reported that ahould 43SiM fall, Barsani will break
with the aovernment of Iraq. His relationship with othetaKurds is
similarly Uneasy -- even a portion of the Bersani tribe is anti Mulls
Mustafa -- and to stay politically alive he will proWaly continue to
espouee Kurdish independence and to avail hiMself of the oraanisational
advantaves of a close relationship with the Soviet Union. iteports
of air delivery of 3aviet arms to Iraqi Kurdistan and of the dietribu-
tion of 3aviet arms to Kurdish tribesmen may indicate that .11-11a Muetafa
is being used to inject 3oviet influence into andl independence movement.