EVALUATION OF PRESENT SATELLITE PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000600170060-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: August 22, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED
.ORANDUly, Y
Acting Chief. DPD
1961
ECT: Evaluation of Present Satellite P *gran.*
L. Attached is a paper entitled "Evaluation of present Reconnais-
sance Satellite Program." It is the livid of a series of articles planned
on this subject. These articles will be submitted whenever an urgent
need exists or at an interval of approximately every six months.
2. This series of papers, I believe is needed to examine the
progress the program has made to date and to enable us to extend our
thinking beyond our present perimeters. In addition, they should act
to solidify our aims and goats for the future.
3. Tie ideas for future operations expressed in these articles
are written purely from an operational concept. Many of their, when
examined by engineers sad technicians, may have to be discarded for
one reason or another. kiowever, the mere tact that they were
exan,ined and discussed may produce ideas which will greatly improve
our present capability. If this goal is achieved then the purpose which
motivated these articles has also been achieved.
SIGNED
Chief, Special Projects Branch, DPD
Attschirent - I
As noted above
PD/SPB, (22 August 1961)
Distribution:
#1 Addee (w/att)
12 DPD/SPB (w/att)
,A1.3 - DPD/RI (w/att)
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UATION 0
RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE le_
INTRODUCTION:
rim present reconnaissance satel fte program tarries the
code word CORONA. U is a program of high risk and rather high costs.
Through 21 July 1961 the DISCOVERER program has supported sixteen
CORONA missions. Eleven failed to launch, orbit, or rs-enter with
recovery. Four were recovered with useable photography. One was
recovered with a film transport malfunction.
With each success proper evaluation e revisits enables as
e our procedures aimed at giving as more useable film in the
Interest. This evaluation also points out the shortcomings and
Ions built into the present program. The need for a follow-on
program and modifications to the existing program also becomes
apparent. The desire to improve our techniques and planning a. well
as to extend our thinking and eiterili11,0 our future needs are the motiva-
ting factors behind the writing of thie article.
IL PRESENT METHOD OF OPERATIONS AND LDAITA ?
To place into orbit whenever vehicle allocations permit.
r co sauce satellfte with the primary objective of obtaining
photographic intelligence of the Soviet Union is the present method of
operations for the CORONA program.
This program is limited to the ephemeris progranirced for
from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Another limitation is the
ito combination of the C prime camera. The use of the C
tripple prime camera is now programmed and if this instrument lives
up to its expectations photography of a much more desirable resolution
will be produced. However, la this connection the CORONA program
is experteacing growing pains in its ability to provide minimum sun
angles for each type of film exposed under certain conditions. Much
additional work is needed in this field before mission planners can
increase the &mown of useable product obtained during each mission.
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Limitations of obtaining desired orbital periods is saother
area that is weak in the operational phase of the mission. Once better
accelerometer controls are available this wealmeas will be erased sad
as a result photography of more desirable scale will be obtained.
At present the intelligence input for each mission is limited
of interest within the USSR. This concept can very well over
rea of interest and provide the intelligence community with
? than they can property evaluate. A more realistic approach
assigning priorities to areas of interest with additional
priorities assigned to individual targets within each area. If this
proposal were adopted the over programming capability could be lased
to a greater extent through the use of the pass selection capability.
The present pass selection capability provides us with the
moans of determining camera on.off decision atter the commander
takes into consideration the recommendations of weather sad
intelligence officers. For example, if there vas just enough film
available to use on one pass, which would be selected? On Pass A
there are three targets. They are assigned target numbers of 3, 47.
and 44. On Pass 3 this targets are assigned numbers of II. 12. end
52. Here you can se. why more detailed study of the targets must
be taken into account rather than Jest assigning them numbers. But
I will admit that assigning them numbers is better than using the
present system of limiting targeting to outliniag areas of Interest.
As soonest the computer spitem , presently being installed
Air Force Base for use by Weather Central, is completed it is
d that more accurate and longer rugs forecasts will be
avaUsbie. At preload long range forecasts are limited to a two day
Even under the present method of operations this is
d inadequate. As the state-of-the-art advances the used
age forecasts will become more critical.
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Past history indicates that as ions as covert intelligence
y le taken from reconnaissance satellites this Agency wtU
Wain operational control of the vehicle. The advantage,
pioneer coverage through the CORONA program are very
y area of the world can be brought under the tense
feed exists, without the great amount of coordination
required to obtain political approvai for piloted aircraft flights. The
philosophy of 'take say pictures you can sad be greatfal for any
pictures you receive should be phasing out as the CORONA program
moves from the development into the operational stage. la addition.
the pioneer coverage can be used for producing flight plass whenever
the more detailed photography of manned vehicle is desired. With
these ideas in mind the following ideas are advanced:
Establish a Need:
This does not refer to the normal missions scheduled
to et the availability of There and Agee**. Instead commit-
meats be made to review at regular intervals selected
areas throughout the world, and more important is the ides of
maiutainies pre-cut mission tapes ea the shelf to be used whoa
ever the requirement exists. This requirement is La reality an
established need.
To put this plan in operation the latsUlgonc. camnuuIty
view the inter oval situation and predict areas of the
are moat Likely to develop Into trouble areas. Areas
country could benefit greatly from obtaining timely
ic intelligence. These areas could then be forwarded
rations Branch in time form of specific requirements.
After the Operations Branch receives the specifics.
pr areas and dates, detailed flight plans could be produced.
These plans would We the midtime for computing sun angles and
recommending launch limits in agreement with established
policies governing recovery operations and thermal limits.
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The west coast Deach Co-anander would be
the plan through the use of as operations order sad
paring standby directives; to provide the best launch,
e most desirable orbital characteristics for the
Chace the tapes are ctIli and the equipment trade
such should be effective within a six to eight day
the mission approval is obtained.
flcbIlltLIat1en Angls
To obtain some of this sew techniques sad .qdpme
bably have to be developed. U we are to meet these
meats action must begin now because of the great
atriount of lead time required.
As the defense csisbflLty of the USSR. improves or
plaids of importance shifts from the Soviet Union to
be to our advantage to launch our vehicles on as Inclination
45.50 degrees. U this requirement is a valid one then
launching from Cape Caaaveral rather than Vandenberg Air recce
Sas. will be necessary. Rang* safety problems created by
Launching towards heavily populated areas will not allow au east-
ward bunch from Vandenberg Air Force Boo.. Throat lircitattoas
required to overcome the forces of the earth's rotation prevent a
westward launch. 3ne solution would be to launch from a Florida
site. Launching from this location will require a lot of planning
sad coordiaatiou and it should begin at *ace. In addition. this
effort, whatever is required. will be worthwhile because many of
the troubled areas in the world are loaded within the latitude
bead of 45 North to 45 South. It will also provide a launch capability
throughout the year when sun angles. snow, and ice are a problem
in the northern regions. The problem of location and composition
of suitable recovery force* must be *aimed.
La e
The primary reason for delay would be the weather factors
in the problem. As mentioned before the computer program should
enable WECEI4 to supply as with better long range forecasts. U
may also be necessary to delay launchings because of the presence
of a solar flare. N-uch progress bay been made in forecasting these
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phenomenon. Very accurate predictions should enable es to
insure the recovery of payloads which previously would have
been lost. However, detailed plans should be made with the
other agencies to guarafttee the availability of launch facilities
to support priority satellite reconnaissance missions.
4. La 1..ense-Film Combinations:
To be an operational vehicle with worW-wide capibilitle.
remeet for greater latitudes he sun angles, cloud
hams, industrial smoke, and camouflage mast be met.
vestigation into the advisability of employing color inn*
a-red photography should be given immediate attention.
Irarious type of film for es* over different areas of
may provide the a1l$W417 to part of this problem. Again
d for the development at a computer for use during an
tion, that will help obtain better photography through the
better sue angles And environmental conditions, should be
given high priority. The need also exists to maintain in the
inventory several different types of cameras and film which can
be selected to provide the best photography at the least cost to
Lit the intelligence requirement.
? it I...42mr_atts_l_c_ana ntrol:
tiny operational more positive control of the
camera must be made available to the commander. It is
mandatory that an additional control station be completed in
order that each pass can be individually controlled. In addition,
it would be very advantageous to have in the system the option
of selecting various portions of a pass rather than the pass is its
entirety.
6.
program moves towards a completely operational
capability subject of satellite emergency war plan participation
tut be given more consideration. Here we have a means.
perhaps the only means at this time, of obtaining photographic
record of any international conflict which may engulf the world.
this thod will be denied us due to
&ere. but if this were the
case, other reconnaissancevehicles will be similarly affected.
This subject opens 4111117 avenues to the large problem of supporting
and operating this program during periods of tension or during
armed conflict.
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DPD/SPB) (23 Aug 61)
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