PROJECT CORONA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000600110002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 11, 1958
• Content Type: REQ

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PROJECT CORONA
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14 00051153D
11 April 1958
1. Purpose: Project CORONA contemplates the covert development
and subsequent operational use of a short lived reconnaissance satellite
from which, at the completion of its mission, a recoverable capsule contain-
ing exposed film is separated for return and pick up in a preselected ocean
area. Prior to the initiation of this project, the development of such a system
had been started by the Air Force as a part of Weapons System 117L but was
officially cancelled early in March. Thus, CORONA involves the picking lip
and carrying through covertly of a program already undertaken together with
technical modifications therein as indicated below.
Z. Configuration: Taking advantage of arrangements already made by
the Air Force, the basic vehicle for project CORONA will be a two-stage
rocket consisting of the same second stage that is being built by Lockheed
for WS-117L with a Thor booster as the first stage (in place of the Atlas
booster which will be the first stage of the 117L vehicle). The payload will
be a pod containing a twenty-four inch focal length camera and a recoverable
capsule into which the exposed film feeds as the camera operates. Either
the whole second stage.of the vehicle, or possibly only the pod containing
the payload, will be stabilized after it is in orbit and will serve as a plat-
form from which the camera continuously looks downward to the earth
and takes pictures by scanning at right angles to the path. This configura-
tion is expected to yield a resolution of about twenty feet on the ground
which should be sufficient to permit structures to be distinguished from
one another and to allow the detection and identification of such major
reconnaissance targets as missile sites under construction, previously
unobserved communities, or other major installations in the areas hitherto
inaccessible to reconnaissance such as the Soviet far north.
3, Program: It is proposed that twelve to fifteen vehicles in the
above configuration be produced. Although it has not yet been possible to
establish a firm schedule of delivery dates, it appears likely that the first
firing can be in June of 1959. It is tentatively planned to schedule firings
at the rate of one a month for four to six months beginning in June 1959 and
to achieve a rate of two a month as soon as possible. On this basis,
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fifteen firings could be completed before June 1960. It is estimated that
only about sixty percent of these will be successfully orbited, operate
without malfunction and be recovered.
4. Modification of Earlier Plans: The configuration briefly described
above differs from that contemplated in the program originally launched by
the Air Force. The earlier plan called for spin stabilizati~o of the pod
containing the payload, a six inch focal length camera with Th age motion k
compensation, and a very short exposure time. Such a configuration could
be available at least six months sooner and would involve somewhat less
technological risk (because of its reliance on a proven method of stabilization)
than the one presently proposed. On the other hand, the configuration
originally proposed would have required the use of fast film which yields
grainy photography and would have yielded a resolution of only sixty feet
on the ground. To carry through the development of the original configura-
tion and at the same time to undertake the development of the modified
configuration in parallel would have obvious advantages but would add
to the total cost of the program and would complicate
the problem of maintaining cover. On balance, it is believed, (a) that the
eL)
more sophisticated modified configuration aeeuld be developed with top
priority and (b) that the six month earlier availability date of the original
configuration does not justify its cost in terms of funds and effort.
5. Administration: CORONA is being carried out under the authority
of the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Central Intelligence
Agency with the support and participation of the U.S. Air Force. ARPA
has authorized and will exercise general technical supervision over the
development of the vehicle. Detailed supervision of vehicle development
is being performed by the Ballistic Missile Division USAF acting as agent
for ARPA. The Ballistic Missile Division has also assumed the responsi-
bility for the provision of necessary ground facilities. CIA participates in
supervision of the technical development, especially as applied to the actual
reconnaissance equipment, is undertaking all procurement that must be
handled covertly, and has general responsibility for cover and for the
maintenance of security. In the operational phase actual missile launchings
will be carried out at Camp Cook by technical staffs of the companies that
are building this reconnaissance system. Tracking will be carried out
from stations being established by the Ballistic Missile Division. Recovery
will be accomplished by a Navy task force. The line of command for these
field activities of launching, tracking and recovery will be through the
Ballistic Missile Division. Subject to approval by the appropriate political
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authorities, the general schedule of launchings will be determined by
the availability of vehicles and launching facilities. Specific timing within
this schedule will be determined so far as possible on the basis of weather
prevailing over target areas. For both cover and control purposes,
weather will be reported through an already existing CIA channel and
specific firing dates will be selected by the Central Intelligence Agency.
6. Cover and Security As noted above the initial step taken to place
this undertaking on a truly covert basis was the cancellation of the program
already started by the Air Force as a part of its WS-117L development.
The cover and security arrangements already made or contemplated are as
follows:
a. Subsequent to the ostensible cancellation, extremely limited
numbers of individuals in the participating companies were cleared
for and advised of procedures to be employed in CORONA. Compart-
rnentation of this project from other activities has been established
in a satisfactory manner in all of the companies and an internal
cover story has been worked out for use in each company to explain
to unwitting company personnel the nature of the compartmented
and highly classified work which will be going forward. Generally
speaking the personnel actually employed in the design and production
of the classified reconnaissance equipment must be witting of its
true purpose.
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TOP SECRET
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d. The strictest security control is being maintained over all
aspects of CORONA. All communications which reflect the existence
of this project are handled within Top Secret procedures. A list of
all individuals who are witting of the project is maintained.
Individuals are cleared for and made knowledgeable of the project
only on a strict need-to-know basis. Additional clearances may
be granted only with prior approval from the CIA project office
and this authority will not be delegated to any other organization
concerned with the project.
7. Procurement: Of the total procurement required for CORONA,
as large a proportion as possible will be handled relatively overtly as a part
of the WS-117L and other programs. In accordance with this general plan,
both the Thor booster, which is produced by Douglas for a number of military
applications and the Lockheed second stage vehicle which (as noted above) is
being developed for WS-117L will simply be allocated from the production
schedules already in effect for these items and will be procured by the Air
Force. Only the pods containing reconnaissance equipment and the recoverable
film cassettes will be procured covertly by the Central Intelligence Agency.
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Production of only the covert items will be compartmented in the several
companies. The responsibility for final assembly will rest with Lockheed
and arrangements are being made which will permit Lockheed's production,
testing, and the bulk of its check-out activities to be compartmented and
securely carried out up to the moment when the reconnaissance pod is
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8. Financing: The total cost of the program herein outlined, assum-
I that it will be limited to 12 vehicles, is estimated at approximately
a. Of this amount, covert procurement of the payload would
account for approximately I las follows:
Recoverable Capsules
Cameras
Payload Pod and assembly costs
TOTAL
It is proposed that these costs would be financed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, subject to obtaining the funds from the Agency's
Reserve.
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b. The largest part of the total represents 25X1
the cost of the Thor boosters and the Lockheed second stage vehicles.
A rather arbitrary allowance of per completed 25X1
vehicle has been included for these items which therefore account for
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c. In addition to the foregoing cost for development and procure-
ment of hardward, there will be significant operational costs. No
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precise estimate of these is yet available and an estimate o
has been included in the above total of F
d. No allowance has been made for the cost of facilities,
including especially two new launching pads at Camp Cook and
certain tracking facilities in the Pacific, which are being built
so as to be available to support this program. The reason for
this omission is that these facilities would soon be required in
any event for military programs and the effect of CORONA has
merely been to advance the timing of their construction. Any
increment of cost to be incurred will be small.
TOP SECRET
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