(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00309A000200060015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 7, 1960
• Content Type: NOTES

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Director of Training Document No. r, a g 7 April 1960
NO CHANGE in Class.
rl D cLAS!'IFIED
Cla l. C1,"11-!!171:) TO: T3 S
"' ?:.,;:0 4 Apr 77
Auto:. _ r 7711763
Date : ! .?~ By:
presents the question: Is there a need for->dw
a psapa&sd CM career
`8 .Itbree phases--
program w i a
p
taM'Q 'I"raining, ~!- training, and
Senior, ai ng? Any discussion of a training program must take
place within the context of the probable future role of the organlza-
tion and personnel that are to receive the training. Will CIA remain
static, shrink, or continue to grow in the future? OTR believes
that, in the long run, the latter Is the case and submits the follow-
ing reasons why CIA will continue to grow:
a. Ttrst, it will grow because as more and mare nations
become increasingly nationalistic in the world, the demands
for intelligence and covert action operations pertaining to
those nations will, continue to increase. Simultaneously, the
more the United States follows overt internationalistic policies,
the more demands there will be for intelligence and for those
culiar and privy activities of our Government that are the
primary responsibility of CIA.
b. Secondly, it will grow because of the growth of the
national intelligence concept Itself, the fncreazing recog-
nitic n that the key factor in most valid national policy
decisions pertaining to foreign affairs is factual intelligence;
Le. , it can be speculated that the recent "missile controversy"
that took up so much of our Director's time would not have
occurred if cold facts had been available on what the Russians
have and what they are producing.
c. Thirdly, our own progress has and will continue to
create more need for our services. We are caught in the
cycle of already producing intelligence that creates ever
increasing demands for more intelligence.
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tituion In our failure to spoll. out the usvchic. nh1le-Reinhi
lone can lead to working at cross purposes and honest
'n0e5 of opinion Prohibiting wholehearted enthusiastic coopers.
. Anytime two sincere members of our organization fail to see eye
eye are we quick to explain this with the organiaatio'n man cliche
"
cos ct
Without t niung such differences of opinion
as well as the letter our mission? Would the attempt to
out what the Agency is for and believes in by a group of our
Up the rest of us to support them more fully? It
a set out this philosophy without freezing it into
evert dater rather than maintain progress. Is it
tion of the Agency to set aside a portion of its supergrade
.A '-
o vidu a location and setting in which. they might
_.r
ves to this sort of question? OTR thinks there is
suggest it is time the Agency established ,"a
"
training program fcc its senior executives.
and see what, if anything, a senior
lght do toward maintaining the present progress
even accelerating it,
4, W hen a ui re-training for our present supergrades ? When
cientious though somewhat confused ~lyat--looks
td long-range picture, we too have a nagging concern.
I that the successes of CIA over the past 13 years,
,.._ _
septions, have been a bit on the superficial
or instance, in the excitement of playing .with a
rselves to lag behind in developing fundamental
a sets of the sort which will permit those who follow
to develop more rapidly in usefulness to the nation?
stically rapid growth to a position of leadership among the
nce s+ s of the western world confronts us with great
.,
tiesi In our eagerness to. "make like" a grown-up
ice service quickly, have we perhaps been forced to run
-y learnedt how to crawl and got our conceptual fc unciations
d in the process? Have we, as a result
sometimes
t
,
go
nd fancy a bit mixed rip so that some of our theoretical struct
ures
seed on assumptions of sand {i, e. , evaluating a man's judgment
" 44
Hari report when in many instances we mean his prudence)
:`"
of water (i. e. , what we want to believe) ? In our efforts
e gaps in the intelligence coverage of other departments of
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our Government and not be scooped by them, have we possibly
distorted end even lost sight of the need for a well constructed
&sc$pline of our own, designed to free us to do what we should
be d ;wMch is helping to increase the efficiency of the
n ti al intelligence process and meeting the highest clandestine
gallon and covert action needs of our Government, no matter
how difficult they may be? Here we use "discipline" in its
aio or scientific method" sense of the well-informed
and master of his subject to the point where the disciple
yet to be learned in his field and is capable of
iginal oontributiof to his chosen profession.
:ogees who share OTR1s feeling
sac has not been as great as it might have
!t not as great as we would like it to have been,
to may be the need for refresher training of our senior
if for no other reason than to get them together, free
y duties, in seminars and discussion groups to share
to of their experience with the rest of the Agency. What
importance do we know today about the basics of national
ce and the control of overseas clandestine operations that
r substantially, if not in full. detail, of the time the
O was liquidated? Do newcomers keep repeating the errcts of
the past in mounting new p rogr
mouse of necessary compartmentation, 0TR rtai,nly+"
nearly as much about it as we'd like to. But we lust
nd a real case for many important WLg intelligence
being developed subsequent to 1945. There have been
a need many more? In any event, let us assume
some lack of progress'---or at least an opportunity
ess in the Agency-and briefly discuss some of the
that progress which training seminars for
ra at this time might help solve. First, let us
the emblem of communication. Coming from all
and many walks of We as we do, have we established
essional vocabulary which is equally meaningful to all
"
problem
ny of us "solution minded" as opposed to being
;tided"? The former being the temptation to instinctively
that have worked before to what appears to be a
thout complete examination of the facts peculiar
at hand; "problem solving minded" being more con-
a clear definition of the problem that will convey exactly
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9 to aall minds concerned with the problem, the belief
definition will then eenabble people with vatrious back~-
d e at a common solution t o r-made to the
jht say the solution minded individual is he
cerned wwih operations and the problem sabring
concerned with repo rting car getting the intellt-
Needless to say the g execut,ve may
r either one. a both of these Opposite approaches
ajor d~sions on a proper melding of the two that
objective regardless of the techniques involved.
;e the Agency, could this explain a failure to
, because of human communications difficulties, between two
quly sins and able Ff and Covert Action Officers even a
D and DD executive. Could serer re-training to effect utter
human communic=ations help redirect our emphasis and stimulaatee more
willing coopeaation within the Agency?
y, Ne, let us take thee emblem of better utilization of Agency
en a lot of talk about early retirement,
out and s ~ on, but what about betted' usage of what we
wards for better utilization of our personnel are great.
g of advanced and seni r level personnel is one of thee most
off ive ways to create an officer corps that will eli=minate such
4. Loss of potentially useful output due to time spent in
activities beneath an officer's ability, miss?ons, projects, or
puma that never come off, staff studies that take up our
time a and fill our files but newer lead to any action.
ants of little or no value usually traceable to
`amp anad planning and esh solutions
use of a lack of vision and imagination.
c. Waste of tine spent on urassigneed activities, personal
ts, and the following of different lines of pursuit because
disagrees with the assigned procedure car may not be
+ re efficient way of performi~tg the same task that
rag on in the next cider of the Agency.
l utpllcation of efforts and organizational weaknesses
eemming from rerlipping spheres of responsibility leading to
aloustes and animosities a and competitive restrictions resulting
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now robe until a little child pointed out that the Zmperor wasn't
as at all. Could it be that the great play on
Mng we did was largely hocus pocus because
really any worthwhile trade secrets to reveal,
as many as we would have liked to have others
ius as far as the exchange and even publication of
kndings and techniques within the Agency and the
to i.nt?lligence community is concerned, it seems possible
ty need not necessarily be as serious a problem as it is
sometimes made out. On the other hand, have we become so
bwmaucratio in some areas that those things which must be kept
se fret are difficult to keep privy to those who need to know?
is completely undocumented remarks lead us to a
area that senior seminar groups might like to resolve,
put this in the f'crm of a few related aluestionsi
a. is trial and ft= eschewed in some areas of the Agency?
b, Have we tended to cut off constructive experimentation
In clandestine operations by making the standards for the
proval and security of such developmental activities too
amorous?
aIst that. each new proposal be
any direction? Do we sometimes con-
tasurring less important things within a proposal
because we can measure minutia more accurately?
tendency to reject a ignore proposals i the findings
own established patterns orreriginate in our shop?
1)o we find ourselves unwilling to build hypotheses on
principles developed from a number of operations,
which is conclusive in Itself? In fact, have we found
s away from the day-to-day preoccupation with individual
ob ems to cleirly identify the principles underlying our
rvidual operational successes, and equally important,
errors and consolidate these into doctrine to guide the
atfons of others? For example, what do we know about
the psychological manipulation of groups now that we have
been in the PP business for over 9 years?
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,overt action eftts are we too often in an "ail
ash operation frame of mind rather than willing to
sh ourselves a bit at a time and thereby build up Agency
for the future and for our successors?
ques has the Agency developed for accurately
performance of its components and its officer
tin be uniformly applied throughout all of its
Until we test such a training program It would be premature
r any conclusion about this "quick and easy" solution to
possibly accelerating the progress of the Agency toward its national
goals. However, it would seem possible that from it some of our
top managers would learn at least a little more than they knew before
about the human communications and motivational problems of the
Agency. What is proposed here is simplicity in itself--so simple
in fact that everybody seems to have overlooked it in recent years.
there even a reluctance in some quarters to pull together and look
record of what CIA training our supergrade executives have
e record is not one that can stand examination then it
weight to the need for such training. Nor are we proposing
braining for training's sake, Trankly we want a closer and more
gad association with those executives whose experience is
training has nothing to offer to them--they are the ones
ie most to offer to OTR that we can pass on to their
does have one area of self-Interest to thisproposal.
t may generate brilliant policies, strategies, and
Agency, based upon the soundest kind of thinking,
y are not transmitted down the liner by the DTR and his
he Agency's training programs, both top management and
. left operating in a vacuum. Frankly there is a gap in
'a training efforts. Maximum results can only be achieved
tt training at all levels. The type senior training we
ould be herd-working group seminars charged with
.g solutions to specific problems of the Agency and dty-
bout the real Agency objectives and to develop improved methods
run irg of those major planning and programing exercises which are
the unite responsibility of CIA top management. Time and oppor-
tunity would be provided for deliberate philosophical reflection
rARt xr .
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y : a'a 5r.
Se goals.
t believes U wiii get the opportunity to train the GO-14's who may
need this type Of instruction but feels there probably we Ere some super'
grades who need it too.
Ve have raised some interesting and controversial subjects
you might find being discussed in any of the halls of the A
en
cy,
g
Even if they a unvasltdeted and completely imaginary, training situa-
ions involving eliminating them from the minds of subordinates or
solving those that may be real would better prepare oft`icers for the
highest positions of responsibility in policy determination and execu-
tive coordination, planning, and administration of the Agency here
and at overseas posts and in interdepartmental and international
reation&hips. Thus we would create a senior block of instruction
to provide stimulation to the planning mind and the environmental
fr$mework for a free and vigorous spirit of inquiry into the curt-
lexities of controlling a national intelligence organization at home
and abroad. This we must do as world circumstances are ever and
rapidly changing. Consequently organization, administration,
strategy, doctrine, and tactics must change also. The senior
official needs some time away from his day-to-day chores if he is
to make his maximum contribution to assisting CIA to meet the future.
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13. Lot us summarize what we have been trying to eaayx
a. Things could hardly look better for the long-range
anpower than ever.
CIA is going to need better trained and probably
f the Agency. Certainly in quality and probably in
b. It. may be appropriate, however, to question how much
u1y basic pro gresss has been made in the "science" of lntelli-
inhibited to a degree at least, by the very stringent
operations of all types.
If progress has been a bit disappointing, perhaps it
equirements which seemingly have to be met before we take
any action not conforming to established patterns.
d. Some of our better operators seem to go ignorantly on
`aay happily ignoring these requirements--th Hugh perhaps
nsating by paying greater attention to the accomplishment
isions of the Agency. Hence the question arises &&.to
whether such requirements unnecessarily discourage experimental
tivities and the reporting of the results thereof.
ncy seems a bit divided between those who .
Ly on attainment of objectives and those who would
d up a professional intelligence discipline based
borrow heavily from other professions and think primarily In
terms of technique s .
while obviously confused by it all, finds itself
by what can be learned by getting those
kgrounds and different opinions together
academic en*4ronment and studying those problems which
many feel exist but no one in authority ever seems to finally
dismiss or resolve.
q. A senior re-training program might accelerate the
dress of the Agency in many of its fields of responsibility.
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