CFEP DRAFTING GROUP ECONOMIC DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW TRADE OF THE EUROPEAN SOVIET BLOC IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00084A000100030002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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CFEP DRAFTING GROUP
ECONO C DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW
Staff Study No. 2
Draft of June 27, 1955
Trade of the European Soviet Bloc in Agricultural Products
This draft of Staff Study No. 2, "Trade of the European
Soviet Bloc in Agricultural Products", is transmitted for your
use in connection with the work of the CFEP Drafting Group on
Economic Defense Policy Review.
In compliance with the request of the Chairman of the
Drafting Group, the Executive Secretary, EDAC, is providing re-
production and distribution facilities as a service to further
the work of the CFEP Drafting Group.
Irving I. Kramer
Executive Secretary
Distribution:
CFEP Drafting Group
State De &Wpfffe~%-krBFA 6Rb'O4MY&100030002-1
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jpRges. ' No. of,
GFEP DRAFTING GROUP copies, Series .
EC C N R IOLIC!
Staff Study )to. 2
(Draft of 3une 9.7, 19-557
{prepared by State/OIR)
Trade of the European Soviet Bloc in Agricultural Products
The Soviet Bloc Agricultural Situation and East-West Trade
Agricultural output has not kept pace with the rapidly rising require-
ments of expanding economies either in the USSR or the European satellites.
This has been due to limitations imposed by sail and climate, particularly in
the USSR, and also to agrarian policies, which have entailed inadequate
alloeatiaf of resources to agriculture and deadening of initiative through
collectivization and inadequate remuneration for peasants. This situation is
of long standing in the USSR, dating from the outset of the collectivization
in the early 1930's, bat is more recent In the satellites, which began to
collectivize only in 1949 and still have about 70 percent of their arable
land in private ownership.
Current Attempts to Improve AMiculturalPerformance
Since mid-1953, both the USSR and the satellites have taken ate
improve agricultural performance a Measures were adopted' to increase economic
incentives through reduced taxation, lowering of obligatory delivery norms,
raising of prices paid by the government, etc., and also increased allocations
of resources were made to agriculture. In the satellites, considerable
numbers of peasants were even allowed to withdraw from collectives, particu-
larly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and pressure for extension of collecti-
vization was temporarily relaxed without abaadonment'of the eventual goal of
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socialization. In the USSR the government embarked on thpe ":rash' programs-.
1) the taking under plow of vast areas of virgin and idle lan the East.-
2) a large expansion of acreage under cormad 3) decentrali~ agri-
cultural planning, to provide more initiative at the lower level,, The
satellites followed suit to some extent in the decentralization of planning,,
These programs have not as yet had any success. For the most part they
are measures with longterm, rather than short-term prospects. For various
reasons, peasants, particularly in the satellites., have not responded to the
limited incentive measures. Furthermore the weather in 1951+ was unfavorable.
} Soviet agriculture enjoyed good yields in that year from the now lands in but suffered drought in important parts of the European areas, so
that over-all agricultural production was only about 3 percent above the
unsatisfactory level of 1953. The satellites suffered from severe winter
weather, a late spring, and heavy rains and floods at harvest times, so that
1954 crops were definitely subnormal.
Immediate Prosrects
In the USSR the 1955 outlook is for a considerable 'mass, in ari ul
tural production, based on the reported significant expansion in acreages
(practically all in grain) and the assumption of average growing conditions?
In the spring, cold spells and acreage a sioa resulted in a sizeable part
of the crop being sown latery oi,I moisture appears to be adeqto in
regions. Bich will depend on weather during the critical stages of plant
growth, as well as the ability to cope with the vastly increased workload
during the harvesting and storing period.
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In the satellites the outlook is somewhat less favorable. Mans fcw
acreage extension -m necessarily far lase ambitious than in the USSR have
not been met. The weather was favorable for fall.-son breadgrains during the
fall and winter., but has been less favorable in the spring,, with cold spells
delaying planting and cultivation as mach as 3 to 4 weeks, Breadgrain crops
in the Balkans should be about normal, but the outlook in the area from
Hungary north is more questionable, 0
and root cry could recover from
late planting if growing conditions are favorable from now oa, In general,
crops should be somewhat better than in 19549 but it is doubtful that they
will bemuchh,, if any, above normal.
Longer Term Outlook
The leadership change in the USSR in early 1955, and the reiteration
around that time of the importance of heavy industry# do not appear to have
vitiated to any significant degree the programs for expansion of agricultural
output adopted since mid?1953. Investment allooaticns to agriculture continue
to increase throughout the Eluropean Soviet bloc, and, the limited ce ac ussi
m a d e to e n h a n c e peasant, i n o e n t i v e & r e m a i n f c in all the countries except
Hungary, There the change of leadartt ip in Bch 1955 has been follaimd by
various declarations pending the ietura of fcwced colleeti isation and,, in
general, the adoption of a harshar approach to the peasantry,, butu there has
not as get been any modification in plans to i
agriculture.
sae the eca .sic eats into
The Soviet g rnma nt 2a goal is to double agricultural output 1960,
a clearly unattainable fig um, However., certain increases can be expect d
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within the coming years,, Fresent .estimates vis it an increase of
30-35 percent for the period 1954,60. How much, of this in. ase will be due
to the "new" programs, it is difficult to say. `die diversion of resources,,
including skilled labor, to these new programs Is bound to slow down the
otherwise possible increases in other areas. The incased work ll., caused
particularly by the corn program, is bound to make for poorer agricultural
practices and affect yields considerably.
In the satellites, while the outlook is less fa rabla than in the ' ,
some slow improvement may be expected fr
ased meohanizatio and greater
attention to supplies of agricultural inpatsfl agr iq's, a , peasautsU
incentives. Possible limiting factors are-. the possibility of a return to
more coercive peasant ,.policies in other countries than Hungary; mcooperati e
peasant attitudes, which have as yet not been greatly imprmd by limited
concessions; lag of manufactured goods supply a M distribution behind deferred
demand in the countryside, which weakens the incentive tffeots of in, ased
peasant incones.
East-West Trade in Agricultural Produ s
In recent years the European Soviet bloc has shifted from a net e ev
of agricultural products to the free world to a net i,mp r,,1/ 1952, net
exports of these products were $78 milllonp whereas net imps is of $20 m i ionn
were shown in 1953 and liminary' data for 1954:4 suggest en i rase in the
net import position. This develcg^nt has been p :imari;d:.y- the result of a drop
1. Agricultural products as used here include all foodetuffs, tobaccco,
hides and skins, oilseeds, textile fibers, fate and oils, crude
rubber, but, exclude forest products and dressed fins,,
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,,& food prod, (g~r'~noipa St ,g i )9 ate: ham been
in net expw+
what offset by a dean ease in the net impaare of no f coae CAitiee,
prinoipal 1. sotto. , WOO- 19 and natur 1 rubber . (A detailed an is of this
trade will be presented be1c. )
A l t h o u g h t h e S o v i e t 'bloc's priucip , : ' S sip in East-West trade
an - has been des, ing t ro ghout t period 1951m .49 the expo is stilamounted, to aro id 1.6 mMim to:s ir. i95.x;: 0MAtmeat"s fW 195+ totalled
1..3 million tens (see TAUS 1). Commitz ewwa in the latter 7"Or j obabaT WOM
not met because of adverse crop cs iitAors in the g` '4pean atell,ite , s
of whom (maims Hungary a ad Poland) even c - a.?ted to i ,wt tresidgrains frau
the free world during the 1att a2 part, of t year.
The most striking de 1o nt 3.n %wiet blo, fob' impurts frm the West
was the large 1n as?la m t, a f?, and b t; t ? ; a in 1953 ani in the
commitments f or 1954. Tess we-a euncent t d :U. the 1,a tter half of 1953 and
in early 1954. In the tam of b=utter a large prop io of JL iupor wee
for re-export to satellite p ImUpf1y >tasseL-n Gar . F e1i r 7 indi-
cations are that the Solt L-A st in meM, i ",e h ? ti d. ii 1955,
but t h a t imports of b u t t w r w a d ' ' b y ob di
Developazts in East-Weet tracts lr food Xadaie~ -s do not as yt 1rdiaec
ai significant xeg?a of clependen if tl2e St'Ut oo on fob, s frm
the West. Reducti.m o gw_s enoor% au T,uaee La 1 i3 and 195,, as well as
the satellite imps n late 1954, appear to ham b o? oted with (1) a
decisloa to u a grain d=-ist1e.1y ircr reed in 1953 and (2) sate11it
crop failures due to iw' rrmaable weather i s 1954. W ';b better weather and
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gradual improvement in agricultural production, the decline could be halted
or even reversed somewhat in future years.
The striking increases in imports of high-quality food in late 1953 and
early 1954 appear to have been dictated by politically motivated desires to
improve consumption standards for special classes of consumers in specific
areas perhaps only temporarily. There is net enough evidence to conclude
that they portend a permanent change in the. trading pattern. As yet their
impact, in terms of domestio supplies has remained minors as is shown by
comparison of imparts with estimated domestic production (Table 2), The
figures indicate that only in the case of fish imports by Eastern Germany and
Poland do the imports exceed domestic supply, a situation which was true even
before the increased imports of 1953 and 1954.1/ In the USSR., fish imports
increased about 250 percent in i954 as compared to 1952, but remained only
10 percent of domestic production,, In the case of meat, although total bloc
imports rose almost 8 time between 1952 and 1954, they remained less than 2
percent of estimated meat production for the area as a whole and only a little
over 2 percent in the case of the largest meat importer -- the USSR. Putter
imports into the USSR rose to 12 percent of domestic creamery production
in 1953 and 10 percent in 1954 but most of these were re-exported to Eastern
Germeiny, For the area as a whole, batter imports from the free world were
about 2.5 percent of domestic creamery production in 1952 and a little less
than 7 percent in 1954.
The importance of imports of fish is probably understated in Table 2
because of the comparison of domestic production ip terms of landed
fish with imports in terms of cleaned and processed fish.
This would, of coarse, be a considerably lesser percent of total
domestic production, including butter produced directly on the farm,
rather than in state-owned creameries.
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The significant Soviet meat import commitments in. 1954 (85 'hind
tons) would, if ocnpletely carried out and none re-exported, have provided
about.0 4 kg. rr capita additional meat in that year, if distributed among
the entire Soviet population; in the more likely event of distribution to
selected elements in the urban population (for instance, one-fifth of the
total population), the additional per capita consumption of such elements
would be about 2 kg., probably sufficient to provide a little more than one
meal per month. It is such a rough calculation that suggests the above
mentioned conclusion regarding the motivation of the 1953 and 1954 purchases.
It remains to be seen whether increasing the satisfactions of an "upper
crust" in Soviet and satellite society will continue to be an important
concern of the regimes,
Simultaneously with the increased imports of meat, and fish some Soviet
bloc countries continued exporting the same commodities to the free world.
Satellite meat exports actually increased from 55 thousand tons in 1952 to
90 thousand tons in 1953 (largely from Poland, but also from Hungary),
considerably exceeding total Soviet bloc imports from the free world in both
years. Soviet fish exports to the free world declined from 8 thousand tons
in 1952 to 4 thousand in 1953. Butter exports, on the other hand, which had
been 6 thousand tons in 1952 (entirely from satellites) ceased in 1953.
Qualitative considerations, which have not as yet been sufficiently
investigated, were undoubtedly decisive in the cross transactions in meat
and fish.
So far in 1955 Soviet and satellite trade negotiations show continued
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interest in food imports, but few striking developments. The USSR is
contracting for sizeable amounts of Cuban sugar, as the result of a Soviet
sugarbeet crop failure last year. Interest has been shown in Swedish and
Danish meat, but Netherlands traders fear a decline under 1954 Soviet
foodstuffs purchases, and the trade agreement has not yet been renewed.
the rest, Soviet interest in negotiations appears still to be heavily
concentrated on machinery and metals, with.the food demand unsystematic
except for some typical commodities (e.g. cocoa, citrus fruits). As regards
the satellites, the most striking development is Poland's negotiations for
taeadgrain imports from new sources (Uruguay, French Morocco), thereby
extending the range of free world sources over last year. Food purchases
also are of considerable interest to Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia
(mainly fats and oils but also meat), but major satellite interest appears
to be concentrated in raw materials, both, non-agricultural (iron ore, coke)
and agricultural (fibers, hides).
In sum, it is too early to conclude either that the Soviet bloc has
become permanently a net importer of food from the free world or that there
is or will shortly be any great urgency to acquire basic foodstuffs from the
free world through normal trade channels. In addition to the items discussed
above, the sharp increase in imports in the past two years was. concentrated
also in fruits and vegetables and possibly in dairy products other than
butter. It is true. that the northern satellites (East Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and, to a lesser extent, Hungary). have recently found their
domestic food requirements increasing more rapidly than output can be
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expanded., primarily as a result of their post-Stalin economic programs, but
these conditions apply with lesser force to the USSR and even less to the
Balkan satellites. .,Furthermore, while food shortages -- especially in meat
and dairy products -- have persisted in spite of "new course" attempts at
amelioration (partly through increased imports), they do not appear to be
any worse than those that have prevailed for the past five or six years and
probably do not constitute a major problem which could divert the regimes
from, their traditional concentration on imports of non-agricultural products.
The net effect of the increased agricultural imports of the past few years
has been to raise imports of food, beverages, and tobacco, as a proportion of
total Soviet bloc imports from the free world from 5 percent in 1951 to 18
percent in 1953, but this movement was mainly at the expense of raw materials,
since the proportion of machineryp transport equipmrent, and other manufactured
goods remained steady at about 45 percent in each of these years.
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ECC*t iC DEFENSE POLICY Ri
Begin UNCLASSIFIED
I Introduction
Agricultural products represented almost half of total exports from
the European Soviet bloc to the free world in 1952 and about one-third in
-1953, and such products constituted 40 percent of European bloc imports from
the free world in 1952 and 1953. Their share in trade within the bloc cannot
be known with any precision, bat it is probable that agricultural goods are
an important part of this trade which is known to be about three or four
time the level of East-West trade.
AS used in this report, agricultural products include all foodstuffs,
tobacco, hides and skins (undressed), oilseeds, textile fibers, fats and oils
of animal or vegetable origin, crude rubber, and other animal or vegetable
crude materials. This definition excludes forest products and dressed furs.
The data presented here include some synthetic textile fibers and synthetic
or reclaimed rubber in cases where these could not be isolated in trade
statistics, but the values involved are not thought to exceed $1 million.
The European bloc was a net exporter to the free world of agricultural
products to the extent of $78 million in 1952, but in 1953 a net import of .
020 million is shown. Preliminary data for 1954 indicate an increase in these
net imports.
The shift from 1952 to 1953 was principally a result of trends in the
trrdpep over 8r 91ea 1 F13f- R 3s6- 4Vd
R0 6d' o1 ned
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sharply from about $500 to $350 million, while imports of food increased from
$110 to $185 million. Thus net exports of food dropped from $386 to $174
million.
This change was somewhat offset by a decrease in the net import of
agricultural products other than food, mainly resulting from a $100 million
drop in the import of rubber. There was a $19 million decrease in the net
imports of textile fibers; other shifts were minor. Because of the marked
differences between trends in the trade of foodstuffs and those in the trade
of other agricultural products, these two groups will be discussed separately.
Separate discussion will also be ;given to the trade of the USSR, not
only because it is considerably larger than that of individual East European
countries but because shifts in the former were greater and accounted for a
large share of the major movements in total European bloc trade with the free
world. In general the shifts in satellite trade were similar to those in
Soviet trade, but the magnitudes and in some-cases'the direction was
different.
In connection with all the East-Rest trade figures presented, it should
be remembered that these are derived from official free world sources as
compiled by the US Department of Commerce, Consequently Soviet bloc exports
are valued c.i.f. free world ports, and bloeimports are f.o.b. free world
ports. No attempt was made to adjust these values to a Soviet bloc base; use
of the conventional 5 and 10 percent adjustment (5 percent for trade with
Eirope, 10 percent for overseas trade) would not be justified her., since
agricultural products have a generally higher ratio of transport cost than
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t}e average on which such percentages are based. This means that bloc export
balances are overstated and not imports are understated throughout, End
UNCLA SIFTED
Begin SECRET. It is not possible to obtain official figures on arr
thing beyond total trade levels in intra-b].oc trade9 except for a few
scattered statements relating to particular produsta in particular years. It
is known that Soviet trade with bloc csoeiatries is large and constitutes 80
percent or more of Soviet world trade in the last few years, but its compo-
sition can only be roughly estimated.
One method of making a rough estimate is to assemble the products
named as planned exports or imports when trade agreements betvaen bloc
countries are announced. (No quantities or values are mentioned in such
announcements.) It is not known to what extent the products so named are
representative of the major products in actual trade, but these named products
do show a certain consistency as between announcements in different years and
between a given country and its trade paztners, and also some correspondence
with what is known about the composition of domestic ?utput. Table 2 consists
of a summary of agricultural products mentioned in this way in 1954.
II, The Soviet Won
a. Feod s Trade with the Free Wild
In 1952 the USSR was a heaver net exporter of food products,
principally as a result of grain exports. The total net export of food was
$242.8 million, and the wtue of grain exports was $246.4 million. Thus the
food imports of that year - $48.8 millio, distributed among various types
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were roughly equal to exports of foods other then grain.
In 19539 ha a erg grain expoe.s dToppsd to less then half of the value
of 1952 ($11705 million), wile food imports nearly doubled and totaled $86
million0 Consequently the net export of all feeds dropped to $7103 m'ill.lon0
Increased imports were most, marked in butter9 and secondarily in fish
and meat0 Increased imports of all three products had occurred in 1952 as
compared with 19519 but the 1953 in ease in butter imports gap the most out
of line; this butter, according to data submitted by the USSR to ECK 9 was
largely re-exported to satellite county ies0
Grain exports had been relatively large in 19529 but the decrease in
1953 was to a level below that of 1951 wIch had not been a very good year0
To a mall degree this ;vaulted from pries decreases (unit value of all grain
exports dropped about 12 percent from 1952 to 1953) 9 beat mainly it was a
result of declining volume (tonnage de: aced ii 47 percent), There was a
marked divergence between bread grains wad coarse grabs z. exports of barley
and corn fell to about one-quarter of the 1952 ievel,s, while exports of wheat
declined only moderately and those of rye nearly douh2t d0
Data on USSR commitments (consi,s?tirig of trade agreement qrzotas and
reported contracts) for deli?e .n 1954 iva ate that 1953 trends were
continued0 Grain expori:,s, acowding to Ude measuzre, were to decline further
(roughly by 30 percent in vola ) with bead gains holding up better than
coarse gra us0 Imports of maat9 fish., a;ad cheese were scheduled to increase
sharply,, while butter i is were to be about the saw as in 19530 B-eli
inary trade data for 1954 co 'im these find3nge as_ to trend,, though preci
figures are not yet aala e 0 It is p?sibLj that the USSR bey a net
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importer of food products in 1954,? certainly-the net export figure was greatly
reduced.
b. Agricultural Products Other Than Food. Trade with the Free World
The USSR is a net importer of most non-food agricultural products,
and a large net importer for the group as a whole, Net imports amounted to
$159.7 million in 1952 and $71.8 million in 1953.
Three products account for the largest values in such trade4 cotton,
wool, and rubber. Natural rubber is not produced to any extent in the Soviet
bloc; imports by the USSR from the free world were $100.9 million in 1952 and
$17.3 million in 1953. (See discussion of antra-bloc trade,) This decline
explains the decrease in the overall net imports of non-foods., since no other
changes of comparable size occurred in other groupings.
Both wool and cotton are produced in and exported from the Soviet
Union., but imports are usually larger than exports (though these imports are
highly erratic). In 1952 there was a large net impart of cotton and a
smaller net import of wool.. and in 1953 the position of the two products was
reversed. On a smaller scale, the USSR is a net importer of jute and a minor
net exporter of silk and of vegetable fibers other than cotton or jute. The
overall balance for textile fibers shows a net import of $51.8 million in
1952 and $46.2 million in 1953.
With respect to the remaining agricultural items, the USSR is an
importer of animal and vegetable fats and oils, a net importer of tobacco,
and an exporter of inedible animal ode materials. Trade in other products
is minor.
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Preliminary data on 1954 trade indicate that Soviet imports of rubber
did not revive, that imports of wool remained high though perhaps less than
In 1953, and that cotton imports may have increased.
c. Trade Within the Soviet Bloc
In its trade with other members of the Soviet bloc, the USSR
appears to be both an importer and an exporter of agricultural products on a
significant scale.
The USSR apparently exports such staples as grain, cotton, and flax to
its satellites. In 1953 and 1954 exports of butter are mentioned. Imports
include sugar, fruits and vegetables, tobacco, silk, and peanuts. For many
categories of product the Soviet Union appeax?s as an exporter to some bloc
countries and an importer from others.
or particular interest is the import of rubber from Communist China;
during 1953 the bloc import of rubber from the free world shifted from Soviet
imports (from the UK and Malaya) to Chinese imports (from Ceylon), the latter
being on a larger scale than could be processed in China. Consequently China
has re-exported rubber to the USSR. mother case of re-export is that of
butter imported from the free world by the USSR and then shipped to Eastern
Europe. End SECBRET
Begin UNCL&SSIFIED
III. The European Satellites
a, Food: Trade with the Free World
The European satellites as a group were net exporters of food to
the amount of $142,7 million in 1952 and $102.5 million in 1953. Exports were
about $200 million in both ye e Imports of food increased from around $60
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million in 1952 to $100 million in 1953, thus bringing down the net export
figure.
Three types of product are prominent as satellite food exports:
grains, meat, and sugar. Grain represents the largest export, and net export,
of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria and one of the largest for Czechoslovakia
and Poland. at exports originate largely in Poland. About half of the
.sugar exports come from Czechoslovakia and the rest from Poland, Hungary, and
East Germany.
The next group of products in importance is that of dairy products,
eggs, and homey, of which the largest export was from Poland, presumably of
eggs. This group also accounted for substantial imports, especially in 1953;
the largest went to East Germany and probably consisted of batter. Next in
size of exports was the category fruits and vegetables, originating in
Czechoslovakia.. Bulgaria, and elsewhere. Imports of fruits and vegetables
were also substantial, and again East Germany was the largest buyer.
Products which were largely imparted include fish, of which East
Germany was by far the largest buyer, and coffee, tea, cocoa, and spices,
purchased by Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. In addition to the
products mentioned, there was a substantial East German import of meat.
The above statements are intended to cover both 1952 and 1953. The
differences between the two years center around the increase in food imports,
an increase which is found in almost all these commodity groups but which is
largest for fruits and vegetables and for dairy products, eggs, and honey.
There is a slight decrease in imports of fish. Among the exports, an increase
in meat exports was offset by decreases in the export of sugar and of dairy
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products, eggs., and honey. Total grain exports were about the same, but there
were shifts in the share of different countries: deliveries by Rumania and
Bulgaria increased while those of Poland.. Hungary, and Czechoslovakia
declined.
Preliminary indications of 1954 trends point to a decrease in grain
exports and an increase in imports of grain from the.free world (the latter
may not appear in full until 1955 data are available). At the same time
imports of other foodstuffs were scheduled to increase, though less abruptly
than in the case of the USSR. Thus net exports of food to the free world
almost certainly decreased, but it is less likely than in the case of the
USSR that the satellites as a group became net importers though individual
countries did so.
During 1952 and 1953 all of the satellites except East Germany and
Albania were net exporters of food to the free world. Poland had the largest
exports and net exports in both years, and showed an increase in both figures
in 1953. In 1952 Czechoslovakia and Hungary were next in order, but in 1953
their net exports declined and were surpassed by those of Ri1ni nia and Bulgaria
(in the net but not the absolute value of exports). The latter two countries
showed a decided increase in grain exports in 1953, but the level of their
trade was lower.
Albania's only trade in food with the West was a small import of sugar
in 1953. East Germany was a net importer of most kinds of food in both years,
with overall net values of 432 million in 1952 and 447 million in 1953.
Its only appreciable food export was sugar.
It is thought that the above trends in the net positions of northern
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 Approved For Release 2000/05/B lA-RDP63-00084AO00100030002-1
and southern countries were probably continued in 1954. The principal reason
was the effect of Knew courses" which increased domestic food requirements of
the more industrial satellites more rapidly than output could be expanded.
b. Non-food Agricultural Products: Trade with the Free World
The satellites as a group are net importers from the free world
of agricultural products other than food, and on a scale which somewhat
exceeds net exports of food, leaving overall agricu,7.tnral deficits. In 1952
and 1953 the net imports of non-food products were $146.5 million and $121.9
million respectively., and the import surplus for all agricultural products
was $3.8 million in 1952 and $19.4 million in 1953.
By far the largest items were textile fibers, which accounted for net
imports of roughly $100 million in both years. Of these fibers, cotton
accounted for imports of $64 million in 1952 and $40 million in 1953, while
imports of wool amounted to $32 million and $!4 million in these years;
exports were negligible. Poland and Czechoslovakia were the largest importers
of these fibers on about the same scale and Hungarian imports, largely of
cotton, were third in importance. Imports of both fibers by East Germany,
mania, and Bulgaria were steady but on a lover level. As regards other
textile fibers, there are small exports of silk from Bulgaria and Czechoslo-
vakia, more sizeable imports of jute by Poland and Czechoslovakia, and
imports of other vegetable fibers by Czechoslovakia, Hungary., Poland,, and
East Germany (in that order),
Tobago is imported by the northern satellites and exported by Bulgaria
on a small scale. Hides are imported, primarily by Czechoslovakia and
secondarily by Hungary and Poland. Oilseeds., on the other hand, are an export
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 Approved For Release 2000/05fff : GIA-RDP63-00084AO00100030002-1
product, mainly from Hungary and Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia is both an importer
and an exporter of oilseeds. Fats and oils (excluding butter., which appears
under dairy products) move in both directions but with sagas not imports in
both years; Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland are the importers and
Hungary the only large exporter. htimal aside materials (inedible) is :
fairly large net export of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania.
Rubber is a substantial import of Poland and Czechoslovakia,
c. tzrirn. Mural. Products s Intra.-BLoo Trade
The three most industrialized satellites -- Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, and Poland are importers of all the agricultural products
mentioned in trade agreement announoements, except for sugar, which each of
them exports. Imparts (or exports) of item fraau all the agricultural
categories except live animals are specifically mentioned in the case of
Czechoslovakia, a few are missing in East German ann unoements, and a few
more - mostly food items - for Poland. All three are said to be importers
of grain, tobaccos, hides, cotton, and wool from other bloc countries.
Hungary is in an intermediate position as between industrial and
agricultural products in trade, and is an exporter of grains, meat, and
live animals but an importer of most other agricultural products.
The Balkan countries are principally agricultural exporters within the
bloc. Rumania is an exporter of meat, fishs, grain, and some miscellaneous
products but imports oilseeds, cottons, and fruits and vegetables, Bulgaria
is an exporter of most agricultural geods, but imports cotton, coffee, tea,
and spices, and is mentioned as both importer and exporter for several
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 Approved For Release 2000/05/28 A-RDP63-00084AO00100030002-1
categories. Ilba4a imparts all the foods ssntioned in trade agreement
anno ceaenta othe' than fruits and vegetables, but exports all the man-food
items aenticaed .eh include oottan, x?al, tobacco, hides, and oilseeds.
Bad B &83IFM
SEW T
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 ? Approved For Release 2000'7S5/i3 P -RDP63-00084AO00100030002-1
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 Approved For Release 20009v$I I-RDP63-00084A000100030002-1
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UICLASSIFIED
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 Approved For Release 2000/05/f?". IA-RDP63-00084AO00100030002-1
-27
III. Output and Trades Selected ?roots
In this section the relation of domestic output and East-Test trade
will be examined for the major products in trade. The data will all be
presented in terms of metric tons in order to establish comparability
between available production statistics and trade. This mean that some of
the trade figures will be less precise than. the dollar value figures used
in Section II, Howrever., they are pr3bably as reliable as the production
figures which consist, in many instances, of estimates. In most of the
tables production data is given to the nearest thousand or ten thousand
tons, while trade data are presented to the nearest hundred tons.
Bloc export prod==a -- grain end sugar - will be presented first.
Next will come- fats and oils -which include products grouped for discussion
because of the similarity in their signif icaince for diet, followed by meat
and fish. Lastly, textile fibers will be discussed.
Grain
Although grain is tradition ly, the largest export prod act ce the
European bl:z-y to the f': eG w~ ld leas thaws. 't : percent of the areas output
of all grains was ezp-vrt. ad in Ir View of the decline in g ra n
exports in 1953, And the de=r6w. d level. of expox t c !Itmeztz for .1954, it;
is of interest to note that dcmeetic cu`,' at did not wary in the same,
proportions,, Its 1952 exp ,?L to Gt the free w rld viers abo?at; l a7 percent of
output, while 1953 expz r s and 195. ?E ,t re? s were less than 1.2 percent
of outputa (It is urMkely thar act 1, a Z ?a tn-n. 1954 ex~ eded yam me is .)
This decrease suggests tha. a change :i. pol.i,tA;y ? the prinedpa?
MO MIT
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28_
cause, although for particular countries and products bad crops were
contributing causes. The decisions of bloc governments to retain more
grain for domestic use, especially coarse grains for livestock feeding,
were thus influential in limiting total East-West trade in 1953, although
in 1954 other exports were found which made possible a modest expansion
of this trade.
In Table 7 the figures for European bloc output and trade in all
grains show the USSR as producer of nearly three times the output of the
satellites, with exports to the;.free world in about the same proportion.
(These figures are not equivalent to those given in Section II for cereals
and cereal preparations because they exclude malt and cereal preparations.
Included are wheat, rye, corn, barley, oats, and rice.) The percentage of
output exported varied between satellite countries, with East Germany and
Albania exporting no grain to the free world while Bulgaria exported about
three percent and Rumania two to three percent of their output. The other
satellites, like the USSR, exported between one and two percent of output.,
Table 7 is divided between breadgrains and coarse grains, and also
includes a rather large number of grains which were not specified in the
trade statistics of importing countries (there are, of course, no
corresponding output figures for the latter group). Not all of these
output totals represent complete data, as is explained in the footnotes to
the table; however, the only missing crop data are for coarse grains in
1952 and 1954, and their value is estimated to be no more than seven
million tons in either year.
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- 29 -
Production of coarse grains was a little more than half that of bread
grains in these three years, with some shift in favor of the coarse grains.
The overall export of bread grains is fairly stable, while that of coarse
grains fell abruptly in 1953 and was planned to fall further in 1954.
This shift applies equally to exports of corn, barley, and other coarse
grains. With regard to the two bread grains, wheat and rye, no consistent
trend is apparent in these figures.
As between the satellites and the USSR, it appears that the latter is
responsible for the decreased export of coarse grains from the European
bloc. Satellite exports of corn were actually lower in 1952 than in the
subsequent years, a difference closely related to the poor 1952 crop,
whale exports of the other coarse grains did not vary greatly. There was
more corn in 1953 and 1954 retained for domestic use, and in this respect
the satellites were probably similar to the USSR although the lack of data
on Soviet corn crops makes this judgment tentative.
In general, it may be stated that Soviet bloc planners were placing
a greater priority on domestic use of coarse grains in 1953-54. But the
satellite planners had been putting their major effort in 1954 into an
expansion of wheat and rye production rather than corn. The corn crop
was good, but the increase in breadgrains did not materialize because of
bad weather. The Soviet interest in increased production of both corn
and wheat represents a new emphasis in planning which is expected to
continue, at least in the near future, and the possibilities for expansion
of output are greater in the USSR than in the satellite area. Satellite
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_30-
planners are also trying to increase grain output -- the emphasis on
different crops varies among the countries --- but less rapid changes
can be expected.
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-31
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- 37 -
Table 7. Grain (Excluding Flour, Malt, and Cereal Preparations) Continued
(In thousands of metric tons)
Footnotes
a. Minimum figures, because of the omission of Soviet corn production,
for which no estimate is available. Totals are probably around 95
million tons for USSR and 128 million tons for the European Soviet
bloc.
b. Minimum figures, because of omission of certain coarse grain crops
for East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the Balkan satellites, for
which no estimates are available. Total production of the missing
crops was 6.7 million tons in 1952 and 7.2 million tons in 1953,
but probably was lower in 1954 because of bad weathers Thus the
1954 totals may be estimated at around 34 million tons for the
satellites and around 120 million tons for the European Soviet bloc.
Minimum figure, since it excludes Soviet corn crop, for which no
estimate is available. Total could probably be about 43 million
tons,
d. Minimum figures, because of omission of certain crops from East
Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the Balkan satellites. Total
production of the missing crops was 6.7 million tons in 1952 and
7.2 in 1953, but probably was lower in 1954. Thus the 1954 totals
may be estimated at about 12 million tons for the satellites and
about 45 million for the European Soviet bloc.
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-38-
The European Soviet bloc as a whole is a large producer of refined
sugar, and in 1952 and 1953 exported between 7 and 8 percent, of its total
output to the free world. Sugar trade in 1954 is not known as yet. So far
in 1955 the USSR has contracted to purchase from Cuba more than 500 thousand
tons of sugar -- about four times as much sugar as the USSR exported to the
free world in 1952 and 1953. This move appears to be the result of a very
poor sugarbeet crop in the USSR in 1954, when refined sugar output dropped to
2,700,000 tons, as compared to 3,400,000 tons in 1953. This also is known
to have involved increased Soviet purchases in the satellites, thereby
reducing the satellitest surpluses for export to the.f"ree world.
Table S. Sugar
(In thousands of matrie tons)
1952
1953
Imports Experts
Imports
Exports
Production
from free' to free
world world
Production
from free
world
to free
world
USSR
3,074
0
322
3,400
0
135
East Germany
470
0
52
675
0
15
Czechoslovakia
450
0
124
550
10
86
Poland
591
negl
47
765
0
85
Hungary
177
1
38
238
22
13
Rumania
74
negl negl, 117
0
0
Bulgaria
36
0
1
58
negl
0
Albania
4
0
1
5
negl
0
Total
4,876
2
375
4,902
32
334
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- 39
Fats and Oils
There is little overall dependence on imports of fats and oils from
the free world in the European bloc as a wholes Net imports were only
0.2 percent of output in 1952, and rose to 2.1 percent in 1953 largely
because of Soviet imports of butter for re-export to East Germany. These
imparts were continued in 1954, but are expected to decline in 1955.
Inasmuch as total output of butter and of other fats and oils increased
somewhat from 1952 to 1953, the sharp increase in imports was the result of
a policy change rather than of decreased supplies,
Nearly half the tonnage of fats and oils produced in the European bloc
consists of vegetable oils, including oil from sunflower seeds, olives,
peanuts, cotton seeds, etc., some of which is made into margarine but more
of which is consumed directly. (Trade totals for this category include
imports of margarine. The trade in oilseeds was omitted from Table
because tonnages are not comparable, but it should be noted that these are
a net export by the bloc to the free world.) Slaughter fats constitute
about 30 percent of fats and oils output, and the remaining 20-25 percent
is butter. In the USSR, Hungary, and the Balkans the proportion of vege-
table oils is higher than in the northern satellites, where butter is more
prominent; the latter countries, and the USSR in 1953 also imported butter
from the free world. National consumption, in general, is similar to the
relative production of these products. Differences in living standards and
in the proportions of urban population account for these differences in
consumption patterns.
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Vegetable oils are a net export to the free world for the European
bloc, almost all of it originating in Hungary.. Poland exported some
butter in 1952 but imported in 1953, as did Czechoslovakia, while East
Germany imported butter in both years. East Germany and Hungary imported
slaughter fate in 1953; all these items are quite small, and the remainder
of satellite trade in these products is negligible.
The only large item, relative to either output or consumption, was
Soviet imports of butter in 1953. If these imports were entirely shipped
to East Germany, and if East German supplies consisted of local output plus
re-exports from the USSR, then the latter would have contributed 38 percent
of the total. Under these assumptions, total butter supplies in East
Germany in 1953 would have increased by about one-third over the 1952 level
as an indirect result of imports from the free world; and total fats and
oils would have increased by 10 percent. Thus in 1953 and 1954, but
probably not in 19559 there was one instance of significant dependence on
free world supplies. It should be emphasized., however, that this was an
unusual situation and that the facts are not clearly established.
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 Approved For Release 2000/0%12 CIA-RDP63-00084AO00100030002-1
_ 41
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 Approved For Release 2000/O TCIA-RDP63-00084AO00100030002-1
- 42 -
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!c3 -
Meat
The Soviet bloc increased its net exports of meat to the free world in
1953 as compared to 1952 in spite of an increase in imports from 13 thousand
to 22 thousand tons (see Table 10)0 Poland has been the major bloc exporter,
and Hungary has exported, relatively small amounts,,
Imports in both of these years went almost entirely to the USSR and
East Germany,, but in neither case were these very significant as additions
to domestic production. Imports from the free world amounted to less than
one percent of the output of all countries except for East Germany in 1952,
when they provided an increment slightly over one percent, Import commit-
ments for 1954 rose sharply for the USSR (up to 85 thousand tons), but.
still represented only about 2.5 percent increment to domestic production.
At the same time, East German import commitments showed a decline from 1953
actual imports, while Czechoslovakia, where imports from the free world in
previous years were negligible, contracted to import five thousand tons
frown this source. These two factors suggest the probability of a Soviet
intention to shift ea of its i.ntra~bloc meat exports (possibly re-exports
of its imports from the free world) from Czechoslovakia to t Germany.
Soviet bloc export commitments for 1954 are not known. Domestic production
in 1954 is estimated to have risen somewhat in the exporting countries
Poland and Hungary - but declined in East Germany and Czechoslovakia
sufficiently to reduce total bloc production by more than 110 thousand
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a
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-45 -
Fish
The only large domestic fish catch within the European Soviet bloc is
in the USSR., which is the area's only exporter of this product on a very
small scale 9 consisting probably mostly 4:af 1y products like caviar and
cratneat -- to the free world. The area as a whole has been consistently
a net importer of fish from the free world., with the satellites as a group
imparting in 1952 an amount equivalent to 70-75 percent of the total
domestic catch of the area.
Two satellites East Germany and Czechoslovakia - appear regularly
to have imported from the free world between two and three times the amount
of fish caught domestically. Imports of Poland were around 10 percent of
output., and net imports of the USSR were less than 5 percent. Imports of
Hungary and the Balkan countries were negl gihla. The relative importance
of fish imparts Is probably understated in the accompanying table because
domestic production figures are in terms of landed weight., while imports
almost certainly represent cleaned and proyessed fish., which are free of
waste as well as., in many casea9 dehydrated.
Soviet bloc fish imports have inc as ed stead L r in the years 195225 ..,
with total. imports for the earlier year about 161 thousand tons and import
coamnitmsnts for the later year 29 r thousand tons. The principal inreases
have occurred in the case of the USSR and Czechosl.o la. In tee of the
total supply of the area as a whols9 it w ,d not appear that fish imports
from the free world are a significant in xt9 but in the case of the
salted and smoked fish from S,oandinav1a not ntriea., they provide an Impor-
tant element of the diet., particularly of East Germany and Czechoslovak,.
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- 47
Textile Fibers
The European satellites produce relatively, little cotton or wool and
are dependent on imports for most of their domestic consumption. The USSR,
on the other hand, is a substantial producer of both fibers and is the
principal source of supply within the bloc.
Cotton and wool are important net imports by the European bloc from
the free world. In 1952 and 1953 these net imports were 5.6 and 3.6 percent
of the area's domestic output of cotton, and 19.5 and 30.5 percent of
domestic output of wool. These figures are not very precise, particularly
in the case of wool, partly because of weaknesses in the output data but
still more because wool exports are reported in a variety of ways in free
world official trade statistics.. (Some countries report tonnage of greasy
wool, others report clean wool tonnage, and still others do not specify;
scouring causes a loss of 50-55 percent in the weight of wool.)
These data indicate a rather minor dependence on free world supplies
of cotton, but a quite substantial use of free world wool by the European
bloc as a whole. If satellite countries are viewed individually, it
becomes apparent that they are extremely dependent on imports, but the
extent of dependence on the free world as opposed to supplies from within
the bloc cannot be determined in the absence of more precise estimates of
consumption than are now available. In general the position of individual
satellites is indicated by output data for their textile industries, but
these do not reveal the use of raw materials with any precision. In the
case of wool -- even more than cotton -- the relation of output to raw
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material consumption is obscured by large (over 50 percent) and variable
admixtures of other materials in the production of many types of woolen
cloth.
The cotton textile industry of the USSR is about twice as large as
those of the satellite countries combined, It appears that the USSR
does not consume all the cotton produced *itbin i s.'bord ts,, and that
substantial exports (or perhaps re-exports) of cotton flow from there to
the satellites. East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have substantial
cotton textile industries and produce'no cotton; their needs are undoubt-
edly larger than were supplied by 1952 and 1953 imports from the free
world. The same is true, on a smaller scale, for Hungary and Rumania
although some cotton is grown in those countries. Only in cases of
Bulgaria and Albania is there any possibility that domestic output could
suffice; their imports from the free world are not large and could easily
be supplied from USSR surpluses.
The distribution of woolen textile capacity is similar to that of
cotton textiles, except that the USSR output is somewhat less than total
satellite output. East Germany and Poland have the two largest woolen
industries, followed by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and
Albania in that order. It is probable that Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania
could supply their own needs, but with little to spare. The northern
satellites clearly could not do so. The position of the USSR is not clear;
the size of its imports would indicate a significant dependence on the free
world if its exports to the northern satellites were not considered, but
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such exports must have been substantial and may well have exceeded Soviet
imports from the free world.
Table 12. Textile Fibers
(In thousands of metric tons)
1952
1953
Imports
frbm free
Production world
Exports
to free
world
Imports
from free
Production world
Exports
to free
world
Cotton
USSR
1,100
33.7
12,1
1,200
16,9
13.7
Lat ',Germany
0
0.2
negl
0
1.6
0
Poland
0
1510
0
0
4.0
0.2
Czechoslovakia
0
16.0
0
0
16.0
0
Hungary
0.8
10.0
0
2.5
15.0
0
Rumania
5.5
2.0
0
5.0
1.4
0
Bulgaria
10.0
1.0
0
14.0
3.0
0
Albania
2.0
0
311
-..Q
0
Total
1,118.3
77.9
1211
1, 224,6
57.9
13 09
Wool
USSR
112?0
518
017
114.5
23.1
101
East Germany
2,0
1.0
0
2.3
0,6
0
Poland
1.8
11.9
negl
2.0
11.2
0
Czechoslovakia
0.8
7.8
negl
0*8
8.0 -
negl
Hungary
1.8
0.5
0
1,8
1.6
0
Rumania
14.4
114
negl
14.9
103
negl
Bulgaria
7.4
negi
0
7.4
n.a.
0
Albania
10
0
1.h.
0
0
Total
14105
28.4
O e7
145.1
45.8
101
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 Approved For Release 2000/F CIA-RDP63-00084A000100030002-1
Appendix
Table < ALBANIA: -W TS AND MORTS OF AGRICULTURAL CO WOD?MS
EAST-MT .TRADN 1952; 1953
(Ian thousands of dollars)
IN
1952 1953
ft~orts imports e Exparts Imports Net
SUGAR AND PREPARATIONS 0 0 -- 0 1 - 1
CEUDE VEGETABLE
MATERIALSO IBLE 0 0 -- 1 0 f 1
ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE
A 0 0 -- 0 54
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL
pwm 0- 0 0 -- 1 55 -51+
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