AQUATONE AND THE SOVIET NOTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200200034-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: July 17, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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17 July 1956
AQUATONE AND THE SOVIET NOTE
1. Decisions must be made within the next few days (a) on the
future of AQUATONE and (b) on the answer to be made to the Soviet
protest of 10 July (Soviet Note No. 23). The two matters are
obviously related since a reply to the Soviet note must take account
of future operations under AQUATONE unless they are to be indefinitely
suspended and should be designed to place the United States in the
most favorable position in the face of possible future Soviet moves.
2. The main risk to which the continuation of AQUATONE will
expose the United States, which has to be weighed against the
intelligence this project will yield, is the political cost that would
result from the convincing attribution of the overflight activities to the
U. S. Government in the eyes of the world. The immediate threat is
that such convincing attribution will result from further political moves
by the USSR, such as the ventilation of Soviet allegations in the Security
Council. In order to assess this risk and to reduce it to a minimum,
it is necessary (a) to inquire what the Soviet reaction to continued opera-
tions may be and (b) to devise measures which will discourage and counter
a damaging Soviet political offensive.
3. The following comments are offered on the probable Soviet
reaction to continued operations:
a. It is certain that the Soviets will continue their efforts at
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interception. Such evidence as can be drawn from the experience of
operations from date supports the belief that, for a time at least, a
U-2 aircraft is safe so long as there is no major malfunction of equip-
ment. The ultimate contingency of the loss of an aircraft over enemy
territory is discussed below.
b. Unless and until an aircraft is lost over unfriendly
territory, there is absolutely no evidence the Soviets can produce
either in published statement or in such a forum as the Security Council
in support of their charges. They derive information of overflights
through radar tracking and no record of radar tracks can be used to
prove anything about either the identity or the location of an aircraft
observed on a radar scope. It can only be alleged, not proved, that
certain blips were seen at particular times and places and that these
represented hostile rather than friendly aircraft.
c. There are other considerations which may make repeated
diplomatic protests a less appealing maneuver than might at first
appear. They would amount to an admission of inability to intercept
the alleged invaders, since no one will believe that the Russians would
not intercept intruder aircraft if they could. If the Soviet authorities
allege that deep penetrations are being made and their principal cities
are being overflown, they will be conceding that the U.S. has the power
to deliver atomic bombs over much of their territory with impunity.
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Their desire to avoid such an admission of weakness to third countries
and to their own people may cause them to charge the United States
with only shallow penetrations of their territory. Even this will be
embarrassing to us but it also will tend to limit the seriousness of the
issue that is raised.
d. The considerations reviewed above certainly do not support
any clear forecast of Soviet reaction, although they do suggest that,
provided no loss of an aircraft occurs, any protest will be (a) embarras-
sing in certain respects to the Soviets themselves and (b) nothing more
than a governmental assertion supportable by no hard evidence. Under
these circumstances it may be suggested that the Soviet reaction to
continued operations will depend very heavily on the U.S. reaction to
their July 10th note, the manner in which the U.S. appears to be handling
this whole issue before world opinion, and, of course, the degree of
provocation.
4. In the situation here outlined, it is believed that this Government
can and should pursue certain courses of action in order to reduce the
risks that further political moves will be undertaken by the Soviet Govern-
ment and that they will have a seriously damaging effect upon the U. S.
position.
a. To begin with, the Soviets should not be encouraged to
believe that their July 10th protest was completely and immediately
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effective. It so happens that operations under AQUA TONE ceased
within hours of the receipt of the Soviet note in Washington. If this
suspension is permanent, one of its consequences will be to confirm to
the Soviets that these activities were indeed sponsored by the U. S.
Government and to indicate that they were under very tight govern-
mental control. Soviet tracking of AQUA TONE missions has been
confused and it is by no means certain Soviet authorities have completely
ruled out the possibility these activities are being conducted by the
British or perhaps by some semi-autonomous group with U. S. backing
but without close governmental control. It is well worthwhile to
maintain this uncertainty. Moreover, if the Soviet diplomatic protest
accomplishes the desired result within hours, there is every reason to
repeat the maneuver. There is therefore a strong case, regardless of
the basic policy decision concerning the future of AQUATQNE, for at a
minimum one more shallow penetration overflight of Soviet territory.
b. Both in the reply to the Soviet note and through other
supporting actions, the United States should build up a conception of
overflight activity as a technique of spying employed occasionally by
both sides and comparable in every way to more conventional, old-
fashioned techniques. From its inception AQUATONE has been organized
as a covert, non-legal, intelligence collection project of the Clandestine
Service. It is no more illegal, to no greater degree a hostile act, and
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involves no more violation of sovereignty than the digging of the tunnel
under the border of West Berlin and many other clandestine activities.
It is totally harmless to the persons and activities about whom the
intelligence is gathered. If it is said that an overflying airplane could
deliver an atomic bomb without warning, the same is true of any
Communist vessel in a Western seaport. It is believed that this concept
can be powerfully supported by including in the reply to the Soviet note
not only a denial that any U.S. military aircraft crossed the Soviet
border on the dates alleged in the protest but also a counter attack in
the form of well supported allegations of Soviet clandestine activities
so described as to emphasize their parallelism with those of which the
U. S. has been accused. These activities might include both Soviet
overflights of Northern Canada a year ago, more recent flights over
West Germany, and more conventional spying activities which involve
a violation of sovereignty.
c. In order to strengthen the U.S. position in the face of
further Soviet allegations, it might well be desirable to fly a mission
with a regular military aircraft up to the Baltic Coast of the USSR and
then promptly advise the Soviet Government with an appropriate apology
that this aircraft may inadvertently have crossed the Soviet border for
a brief period. Such an apology, taken with a parallel one delivered
some weeks ago, would render far more plausible the U.S. denial of
deep penetration overflights in the face of the unsupported Soviet allegations.
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d. A number of other steps which would reduce the credi-
bility of the Soviet allegations and thus discourage further diplomatic
moves on their part may prove feasible. One of the most dramatic
would be the interception of a Soviet military aircraft over West Germany.
This may be possible since several illegal penetrations of up to 40 miles
have recently been made. In the field of propaganda and argument,
the Soviet accusations might be represented as an effort to discredit
the President's proposal for legal air inspection.
5. Assuming that the Soviet allegations can be somewhat deflated
by the steps suggested above, it may be desirable also to minimize
further provocation of the Soviet Government to the extent consistent
with continued collection of the highest priority intelligence. A proposal
for accomplishing this result is as follows:
a. Taking account of what has already been accomplished,
there are some six groups of targets of the utmost importance in
European Russia located as follows:
(1) The Moscow area, largely covered by clouds on the
occasion of an earlier mission;
(2) Three or four scattered targets in the Ukraine which
could be covered in one mission with suitable weather;
(3) A number of targets on or near the north coast of the
Black Sea;
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(4) A series of critically important targets on the Volga
from Gorkii down to Stalingrad including the Kapustin Yar
missile test site;
(5) A group of targets including atomic energy installa-
tions and major industrial centers in the Central Urals;
(6) The area of the Kola Peninsula and the coast of the
Barents Sea, which includes non-strategic bomber bases and
may include other important installations.
b. Clearly the Moscow area is a target of the utmost political
sensitivity and any further missions in that area might well be deferred.
On the other hand, the coastal areas both north and south can be over-
flown with shallow penetrations and minimum risk of loss of an aircraft
and might well be regarded therefore as having lower sensitivity. The
other groups of targets here listed probably fall between these extremes.
c. It is proposed that the general policy should be to authorize
(1) overflights of the coastal and near coastal areas, including the lower
Volga and Southern Ukraine, and the European Satellites as opportunity
offers, and (2) a limited and specified number of missions over other
regions well away from Moscow and Leningrad. The specific authoriza-
tions might include two missions over the Northern Ukraine, two along
the Volga, and two or three in the Urals.
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6. A final question about these proposals which must be considered
with care is how to deal with the ultimate contingency of the loss of an
aircraft over friendly territory. It is believed that the general principle
should be to handle this contingency in the same way as the conclusive
compromise of any other illegal clandestine activity. Some explanation
of the presence of the aircraft over Soviet territory should be offered.
This might be one of the ones provided for in our present emergency
procedure such as faulty navigation or it might be possible to have the
actual overflights appear to be the work of a refugee group with covert
U. S. support. In any event, it should be made clear that the aircraft
was not a military aircraft and that its pilot was not a member of the
Armed Services. Although this would not constitute an open admission
of deliberate U. S. violation of the Soviet border, it would leave the
impression that the overflight probably was the deliberate work of the
clandestine service, just as the handling of the Berlin tunnel disclosure
has undoubtedly left a similar impression in many quarters. This explana-
tion should be developed in such a way as to make clear that neither the
responsible Chiefs of the Armed Services nor the senior civilian officials
of the Government had specifically authorized the activity in question.
Admittedly, this method of dealing with the contingency we most fear would
result in newspaper editorials about the irresponsibility of the Central
Intelligence Agency. It is submitted, however, that the result of this kind
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of embarrassment is inherent in any and every clandestine operation.
There is always some risk that the operation will be compromised.
When any such operation is compromised and made the subject of a
public protest so convincing that denial is not very plausible then the
only remaining choice is whether to allow the Chief of State to be
suspected of authorizing the activity or deliberately to direct suspicion
to the clandestine service. Surely the latter is the proper course.
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