OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND COORDINATION WITH HEADQUARTERS USAF AND SAC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200080025-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: April 25, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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25 April 1958
ME140RANDUM FOR: Director of Operations
SUBJECT: Operational Procedures and Coordination with
Headquarters USAF and SAC
1. Reference our conversation on 15 April 1958 concerning operational
procedures. Operational procedures used in the planning of AQUATONE flights
have been reviewed. In addition, the procedures for coordinating AQUATONE
mission planning with Headquarters USAF and SAC have been reviewed. The
following represents the results of the review.
a. Launchin two aircraft simultaneousl to insure completion
of a mission should primary aircraft a ort, or to serve as a eooy.
(1) It is often considered good operational procedure to
have a second aircraft follow or fly with the primary mission
aircraft to serve as backup in case of an abort. However, the U-2
has an outstanding record of reliability. This reliability is much
greater than that of operational and/or combat type aircraft. In
two years of operations, involving approximately twenty-five actual
overflight missions, there has been only one abort. This abort was
experienced on the latter part of the mission to Baku and resulted
in a relatively small loss of coverage. The cause of this abort
was an inverter malfunction. Camera malfunctions have occurred during
the course of operational missions. However, to minimize the possi-
bility of a pilot continuing on a mission with inoperative or faulty
camera equipment, a series of indicator lights is incorporated in
the system to indicate proper operation of the camera 'film trans-
port and shutter; two of the paramount sources of potential trouble
in any aerial camera system. In addition, detailed check lists
which cover all aspects of camera operation are completed during
pre-flight. The in-flight indicator system, comprehensive pre-
flight check lists and high experience level of camera maintenance
personnel account for the high equipment reliability rates realized
to date. Camera reliability is estimated at approximately ninety
percent successful on past operational missions. In conjunction
with a consideration of reliability of equipment, it should be
noted that the quality of AQUATONE reconnaissance photography greatly
surpasses that obtained on previous operational reconnaissance pro-
grams. Processing of AQUATONE products is accomplished under optimum
laboratory conditions, consequently, the high quality obtained in
the original negative is retained, which increases the intelligence
exploitation potential of this photography.
USAF review(s) completed.
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b. Background, malfunctions, and results of Mission 6011.
(1) Mission 6011 was originally planned as a canned mission
to cover the primary target of Ukrainia. This mission as originally
proposed was routed from Atsugi to the southeast tip of Korea, into
China, southwest of Dairen, thence north through China, making pene-
tration into the USSR in the vicinity of Ukrainia. Penetration
overflight time was approximately 45 minutes with exit from USSR,
back into China and return to Atsugi on approximately the same route
as entry.
(2) Based on additional requirements,, the proposed mission
was altered to return through North Korea on generally a north-
south heading from the Yalu River to the northern tip of South
Korea.
(3) Later on, the mission plan was changed to exclude entry
or exit through either North Korea or China as it was not desired
to involve a third country. This was based on the protest which
resulted from the first eight missions in the summer of 1956. The
decision was made to enter and exit in the Sea of Japan outside the
presumed enemy radar on headings which would indicate the aircraft
was operating from South Korea, thus disguising the actual operation
base in Japan. This is thought to have been successful, since the
protest notes do not state or imply that the violating aircraft was
operating from Japan.
(4) The mission was planned to obtain maximum photographic
coverage consistent with the weather forecast and film available.
This explains one reason why the mission was flown over the coast
line from a point approximately one hundred miles north of Vladi-
vostok to a point east of Komsomoisk rather than staying off shore
a considerable distance. In addition, it was felt that the U-2
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would have provided more radar reflection flying off shore 40
or 50 miles than it would be by flying over the coastline.
Mission results indicate that the results would have been the
same as regards the Russians, ability to pick us up. In addi-
tion, the aircraft would have been under surveillance by both
the radar stations on the mainland, as well as those on the
'Sakhalin peninsula.
(5) Attached as enclosure, is a graphic summary of the
route as flown and indicates suitable weather encountered, as
well as equipment performance. The tracker malfunctioned early
in the mission. This malfunction has been traced to a new
operating procedure which was to turn the tracker on approxi-
mately thirty minutes after take off to avoid photographing the
launch base and surrounding geography. It is believed that the
delayed turn on of the tracker and the resultant lack of heat due
to equipment operation resulted in freezing of the film and may
have contributed to subsequent failure. However, since the tracker
camera is utilized primarily for orienting photography obtained
with primary cameras, and since primary cameras operated with complete
success, there was little loss of any significant intelligence in-
formation due to this malfunction.
(6) The malfunction in System III was only a partial failure
of two of the three channels and was caused by a break in the antenna
lead to channels 2 and 3 which occurred approximately one third of
the way through the mission. This is the only known failure of
System III on operational missions.
(7) Both the A-2 camera (primary mission capability) and the
System I operated 100% and obtained excellent results.
c. Coordinated Mission planner,
(1) Mission 6011 track was reviewed by at least one or more
liaison officers from the Reconnaissance Section of Headquarters
Air Force at least two or three days before it was flown. No
objection to the route was indicated.
(2) An objection was voiced by SAC. This was in regard to our
procedure fo on missions involving RAI air-
craft.
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d. Procedures for advance notification and coordination with
Headquarters USAF an :-SAC.
(1) On all penetration and peripheral missions, the
Reconnaissance :Section at Headquarters USAF is notified at
least twelve hours in advance. One of the cleared officers
from that section personally comes to our Control Room and is
briefed on each mission. They are given the route to be flown
by coordinates, which includes points of penetration and exit.
The reconnaissance Section then passes all of this information
to SAC not later than six to eight hours before the mission
takes off, usually earlier. If the Reconnaissance Section knows
of a SAO mission which may conflict with our proposed mission,
they advise SAC immediately.
(2) The reconnaissance Section reviews our proposed routes
primarily for glaring errors as they realize minor points of
routing are either dictated by requirements or are matters of
individual opinion. At no time has USAF or SAC objected to any
of our planning. It is understood that Gen. Preston and, in some
cases, Gen. Tunner or Gen. LeMay, review every mission plan in
sufficient time to voice a timely objection. A working arrangement
exists that if objection is taken by USAF, they would notify us
immediately at the working level through our established liaison
people.
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(3) At one time, Gen. Terrell, 1)CSO, SAC, thought that, AC
should have a liaison officer physically located in Project Opera-
tions to aid in planning. Subsequent discussions with the officers
of the Recon Section, Hqs, USAF, satisfied Gen. Terrell that existing
procedures for coordination between the Project, Headquarters USAF,
and SAC were adequate and, therefore, agreed, that a SAC liaison
officer was not necessary.
(1k) ;Close liaison has been maintained with SAC over the past
two years, particularly on the subject of ROB. In fact, the Project
operates on SAC ROB information which is received through Headquarters
USAF. In'the caseaf the first Klyuchi mission, and on the basis of
SAC's recommendations, we launched from Eielson rather than Atsugi.
This was done in an attempt to avoid radar detection. SOP for all
missions is to find soft spots radar defenses around the USSR.
Except for the missions from findings have not been suffi-
ciently consistent to show any soTT, spots through which an aircraft
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may probably penetrate undetected. Full benefit has been taken
of SAC experience in trying to find soft spots. With the in-
creased numbers and types of Russian radars, as well as the
obvious increase in efficiency of their operation, it is Oper-
ations' opinion that no matter how mission 6011 had been planned,
it would have been detected and tracked virtually the same as
history now shows it was.
2. Full consideration is given to all aspects of operational planning
to include taking advantage of the experience which Headquarters USAF and SAC
can provide, as well as effective and timely coordination with both Headquarters.
Further, it is felt that the reliability and performance record of our aircraft
and collection equipment is probably unequalled in the history of reconnaissance.
Therefore, no major change to operating techniques is considered necessary.
3. Although AQUATONE operations have been exceptionally successful to
date, efforts to improve reliability and effectiveness are being continued.
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Att:
1 map msn 6011
Deputy Director Operations
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