AQUATONE/OILSTONE PROJECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200040046-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: April 26, 1957
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Release ?(02141
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IA-RDP62B00844R000200040046-9
26 April 1957
AQUA TONE /OILSTONE PROJECT
a. Weather conditions are generally favorable for aerial
reconnaissance over Europe and most of Siberia from 1 April through
October and in the Far East moderately good in the summer and at their
best during the autumn.
4 b. AQMPTONE Detachments are now in place and operational
in Germany, Turkey, and Japan. They fly occasional weather missions 25X1 D
e Detachment in ur ey carries out occasiona
reconnaissance over the Middle East.
c. During the last nine months significant progress iasbeen
achieved in the development of radar camouflage. It is belies &:d that the
radar reflectivity of the U-2 aircraft can be so reduced that a majority of
overflight missions will avoid detection entirely. Nevertheless, it must
be anticipated that at least a certain proportion of them will be detected,
although their continuous tracking should be extremely difficult. It is hoped
chat this development can be operational by late June.
d. It now appears likely that with this radar camouflage the U-2
vill be relatively safe from interception at least through the 1958 reconnais-
sance season. Nevertheless, both its margin of advantage and the security
surrounding this operation are subject to continuous erosion so the AQUATONE
capability must be regarded as a wasting asset.
2. Plans for the Current Season: Additional hard intelligence of
a sort that could best be obtained through aerial reconnaissance is urgently
required, especially on Soviet guided missiles, nuclear weapons, and inter-
continental bombers. Taking account of normal weather patterns, twelve to
fifteen successful missions should be sufficient to cover some thirty-six
targets which have been selected by the Intelligence Community as having
the highest priority. It is proposed that these be undertaken, but only as
highly favorable weather develops in order to obtain maximum coverage with
a minimum number of sorties. This would imply a rate of operations of only
one to three missions per week.
TS-164224
Copy/of5,
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3. Maintenance of the Capability: The principal reason for develop-
ing the AQUATONE capability originally within the CIA framework rather
than in the Air Force was to maintain greater security, employ deeper
cover. use civilian pilots, keep the aircraft outside of military control,
and therefore make possible more plausible denial of U. S. military responsi-
bility in the face of any Soviet charges. Currently two SAC squadrons are
being equipped with this same aircraft in addition to the three AQUATONE
Detachments. If this capability is politically more useable, for the reasons
just stated, in the hands of the Clandestine Service than in those of the
regular military establishment, it is proposed that it be maintained through
1958 separate from the SAC units (subject, of course, to the immediate
transfer to SAC in the event of a war emergency). If, however, no such
political advantage can be derived by leaving this tool in the hands of the
Clandestine Service it is proposed that CIA's equipment be transferred to
the Air Force after the present photographic season.
4. Decisions AZequired: It is-becoming increasingly urgent to obtain
answers to the following questions.
a. Will limited overflights of the highest priority targets be
permitted;
I:) Over the highest priority targets in the USSR, or
(Z) Over specified peripheral areas of the USSR where
high priority targets are located, or
(3) Over China, or
(4) Over the European Satellites?
b. Is such overflights cannot be authorized at present, will
successful completion of the development of radar camouflage up
to the standard indicated in paragraph 1. c. above render these
operations acceptable?
c. Whether or not overflights are to be authorized at this
time is it desirable to maintain an overflight capability outside of
the regular military establishment?
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low
25X1 C
(4) The modification of the aircraft to permit their
operation without pilots, that is, as subsonic guided missiles
retrievable as drones.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director
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