PLANS FOR AQUATONE/OILSTONE AFTER PRESENT OPERATIONAL SEASON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200040036-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: May 8, 1957
• Content Type: MF

Approved lZQl; Release 2002/11/19: CIA-RDP62BOO 4R000200040036-0
TOP
DRAFT - 8 May 57
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Nathan F. Twining
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Washington 25, D. C.
SUBJECT : Plans for AQUATONE/OILSTONE After Present
Operational Season
1. It is highly desirable to start planning at this time either for
the winding up of AQUATONE/OILSTONE after the present photographic
season car -for its continuation, probably in somewhat modified form thereafter.
At the 6 May meeting on this. Project we received some guidance on this
matter in the form of two statements which were substantially as follows:
First, that when there is evidence that the Soviets have developed
a capability successfully to intercept the U-2 aircraft,which will presumably
not be before the end of the current photographic season, this Agency should
turn over the equipment currently employed in this Project to the Air Force
to be added to the military U-2 capability being developed by SAC.
Second, that so long as the U-2 is used for overflight purposes
in peacetime, these activities should be organized as non-military operations.
2. If I have currently interpreted this guidance, it raises two
questions which I believe we can resolve without further reference at this
time to higher authority. First, can we reasonably anticipate that the
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equipment we are now using wilt retain its substantial immunity to hostile
action through another season? Second, if so, should a nonmilitary overflight
capability employing this equipment be kept in being for another season?
3. As to the first of these questions, it is our tentative view that
the U-2 will probably retain a high degree of safety from interception through
the 1958 season, especially if the RAINBOW development turns out to be
reasonably effective.
4. The answer to the second question depends not only on an estimate
of Soviet interception capability but also on a judgment as to the probable
willingness of our political authorities to allow overflights to be made under
cold war conditions. It is my own view that if limited operations can be conducted
this summer without serious diplomatic repercussions, and more especially
if the effectiveness of the RAINBOW program is demonstrated, there is a
good chance that at least limited operations will be permitted next year.
Even if this view is optimistic, there is always the possibility that one of
several things may happen to render overflights politically acceptable: The
political climate may change in such a way as to reduce the risk inherent in
such operations; a situation may arise in which there is an urgent need for
intelligence on the USSR; or local situations may require reconnaissance of
areas such as the Middle East where risk of detection and political action
are less. For these reasons I believe the likelihood that U-2 overflights
will be required and permitted is sufficiently
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great so that we should at this time plan to maintain it through 1958. In
the light of the above-quoted guidance, I assume it should be maintained
as a non-military operation as at present.
5. This general conclusion leads me to make the following
specific proposals:
a. That for planning purposes a provisional decision be
made at this time to maintain the AQUA TONE /OILS TONE capability
through 1958 but if possible on a somewhat reduced scale.
b. That this decision be reviewed no later than September
1957 on the basis of: The pvogress of RAINBOW, experience with operations
during the summer, and any new evidence available concerning Soviet
interception capabilities.
c. That AQUKONE/OILSTONE be conducted in such a way
as to require an absolute minimum of interference with the SAC U-2 program.
d. That the political authorities be advised of plans for the
maintenance of a U-2 capability in non-military hands and that this
matter be discussed on the occasion of the next meeting to which authority
is sought to undertake additional operations.
rinrT
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