CCH - LEGAL PERIODICAL DIGEST TOPICAL LAW REPORTS PP 3544 (P. 3554) MILITARY LAW FROM PEARL HARBOR TO KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00631R000300110017-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2002/06/25: CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
44 (p
~,. 3554)
s: TO RY LAW FROM PEARL
V 74M TO VOREA
.,cold F. McNiece, Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Doi.
and John V. Thornton, Instructor in Law, New York University School of ',a.a.
22 Fordham Law Review, June, 1953, pp. 155-182
"...While the general picture is tinged with shadows which make analvsi:,
difficult, it seems that the Supreme Court is taking a narrow view of
its habeas corpus jurisdiction where servicemen are concerned. (see,
for example, Humphrey v. :.;math, 336 U. S. 695 Q949).) This Is in contraht
t.Tith the broad view it takes in civilian cases. The lower federal.
courts, on the other hand, are applying the broad "due process" approach
of the Supreme Court civilian decisions to military cases. (SFe, for
example, Schita v. King, 133 F. (2d) 283 (CCA-8, 1943); Romero v.
iquier, 133 F. (2d) 528 (CCA-9, 1943), certiorari denied, 318 U. s.
785 (1943); Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F..(2d) 664 (CCA-3, 1944); and Hiatt
v. Brown, 175 F. (2d) 273 (CA-5, 1949), reversed, 339 U. S. 103 (1950).)
The attitude of the lower federal courts seems preferable. Especially
in an era such as this, when lame standing armies will be with us for
many years to come, the constitutional protections of the serviceman
should not be watered d ,*n by ,a niggarr'ly application of habeas corpus
jurisdiction. u
The Supreme Court has also tended to limit sharply the review of
judgments of military commissions (see, for example, Ex Parte Quinn,
i117 U. S. 1 (1942); and In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 (1946)), and has
refused entirely to review the actions of such bodies where the tribunal i.-
international in character or -There the accused persons are aliens *,tho
have never come within American territory. (Hirota v. MacArthur et al.,
"38 U. S. 197 (1948); and Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763 (1950).) Ttis
.;gems unfortun'te. American political-military control seems destined
to continue for a number of years in many areas of the globe, and at least
the basic notions of American justice should follow the flag.. ghen
Americans, whether military men or civilian,, administer justice abroat,
civil courts of the United States should assert the power to see to it
+;hat this justice is in accordance with our country's ideals and traditions.
fair system of lay is one great mark of our democrarv, and it should not
be labeled "for domestic use only.""
Approved For Release 2002/06/25: CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
WINTHROP'S MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS
"1. UNDER ART. 63. This Article, which is the most important and
comprehensive of the statutes indicated, provides as follows:--'All
retainers to the camp, and all persons serving with the armies of the
United States in the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to be
subject to orders, according to the rules and discipline of war.' This
provision, which, with some slight modifications, has come down from our
original code of 1775, which derived it from a corresponding British
article, has always been interpreted as subjecting the descriptions of
persons specified, not only to the orders made for the government and
discipline of the command to which they may be attached, but also to
trial by court-martial for violations of the military code. Protected
as they are by the military arm, they owe to it the correlative obliga-
tion of obedience; and a due consideration for the morale and discipline
of the troops, and for the security of the government against the conse-
quences of unauthorized dealing and communication with the enemy, requires
that these persons shall be governed much as are those with whom they
are commorant. Owing indeed to the policy of our laws relating to the
army, which has aimed to impress, in general, a distinctive military
character--as officers and enlisted men--upon the persons employed in the
military service proper, the classes of attaches mentioned in the Article
have been less varied and numerous in our armies than in those of foreign
nations. In our late war, however, they were necessarily more considerable
than at any previous period.
"'Retainers to the camp.' This term may be deemed to include: -1.
Officers' servants; 2. Camp-followers attending the army but not in the
public service. Of the former, there have been but few trials by court-
martial../their breaches of discipline having been in general summarily
punish by expulsion from the station or beyond the lines. Of followers
of the camp--sutlers, sutlers' employees, newspaper correspondents,
telegraph operators, and some others, were from time to time during the
late war brought to trial by court-martial, or otherwise summarily
disciplined. The post-traders who succeeded sutlers would, in time of war,
have been of the class of camp-followers if their posts had been within
the theatre of the war. Camp-followers are generally restricted to the
least number, on the eve of an important movement by the army to which
they are attached.
"'Persons serving with the armies in the field.' While this might
perhaps be viewed as a general designation including all persons serving
in the field with the army in any capacity whether public or private, yet
inasmuch as the terms 'service' and 'serving', as used in the Articles of
war, have reference to public service--the service of soldiers and the
like--it is preferred to treat these words as intended to describe civilians
in the employment and service of the government. This class, during the
late war, was considerably more numberous than that of the camp-followers
or private retainers. It consisted mostly of civilian clerks, teamsters,
Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
laborers and other employees of the different staff departments, hospital
officials and attendants, veterinaries, interpreters, guides, scouts and
spies, and men employed on transports and military railroads and as
telegraph operators, etc. Of these persons those who appear from the
General Orders to have been most frequently subjected to trial b Wt4ourt
martial were--Inspectors, Teamsters, and other employees of the Quar-
termaster's Department; Officials and employees of the Provost Marshal
General's Department, Contract surgeons and nurses, Paymasters' clerks,
Officials of boards of enrollment, Officers and men employed on steam
transports, Military telegraph operators, etc.
"The Article to be strictly construed. This Article, in creating an
exceptional jurisdiction over civilians, is to be strictly construed and
confined to the classes specified. A civil offender who is not certainly
within its terms cannot be subjected under it to a military trial in
time of war with any more legality than he could be subjected to such a
trial in time of peace. As held by the Judge Advocate General, the mere
fact of employment by the Government within the theatre of war does not
bring the person within the application of the Article. In several cases
of public employees brought to trial by court-martial during the late war
the convictions were disapproved on the ground that it did not appear
that at the time of their offences they were 'serving with the army' in
the sense of this Article. "(page 96) /
"CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTES. These laws, however, remain on
the statute book, and under Sec. 1361 discharged soldiers have not un-
frequently been brought to trial, while under Art. 60 discharged officers
and soldiers are always liable to be tried. It is proper therefore to
consider the question of the constitutionality of such laws, and that they
are constitutional cannot, in the opinion of the author, be maintained
upon sound legal principles. They are certainly not so as being forms of
exercise of the power to 'govern and regulate the land forces,' because the
term 'land forces' does not embrace discharged officers and soldiers or
any other civilians. They must be so therefore under and by virtue of a
combination of the two powers, to 'raise armies' and 'govern the land
forces.' That is to say, they must be regarded as placing or retaining
these persons, notwithstanding that they have become civilians, in the
army for a temporary or special purpose, and, by the same pot, providing
for their government while so placed or retained, so that their offences
shall be punishable as 'cases arising in the land forces.' But does
the power to 'raise armies' extend to the inclusion of such civilians in
the land forces? What are 'armies' in the sense in which this term is
used in the Constitution? Its interpretation is to be found in the series
of statutes dating from the period of the adoption of that instrument, and
of which the constitutionality has not been questioned, by which the
constituents of our armies or Army have been repeatedly defined. These
constituents are a certain number of officers commissioned or appointed,
and of soldiers enlisted, into the military service as such, bound to
obey military orders and to perform military duty in peace or war,
entitled to military pay, and remaining under military discipline and
government till discharged in due form, or otherwise legally separated
from the military state. Such are the 'armies' or 'land forces' which
the Constitution auth02002186F 7 eRb'P' 8631 I% 'I'fv' , ern. Can
Approved For Release
-2-
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
this authority be held to include the raising or constituting, and the
governing nolens volens, in time of peace, as a part of the army, of a
class of persons who are under no contract for military service, but
on the contrary have been formally discharged from all such contract, who
render no military service, perform no military duty, receive no military
pay, but are and remain civilians in every sense and for every capacity
except the special one for which the statutes under consideration propose
to reserve them? Can the authority to govern be extended to the disciplining
of soldiers after they have been legally separated from the army? In
the opinion of the author, such a range of control is certainly beyond
the power of Congress under the provisions of the Constitution referred to.
That instrument, in a further provision also,--the Vth Amendment,--
clearly distinguishes the military from the civil class as separate
communities. It recognizes no third class which is part civil and part
military--military for a particular purpose or in a particular situation,
and civil for all other purposes and in all other situations--and it
cannot be perceived how Congress can create such a class, without a
disregard of the letter and spirit of the organic law.
"In 1866, the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of
Kentucky passed upon the constitutionality of the section of the Act of
Congress (no longer in force,) of July, 1862, which, in subjecting
contractors for supplies for the army and navy to trial by court-martial
for certain misconduct, provided in express terms that they should be
'deemed and taken to be a part of the land forces or naval forces for
which they contracted to furnish the supplies.' This statute the court,
in an elaborate opinion, pronounced unconstitutional, holding that Congress
could not 'by its mere declaration' place or include civilians in the army,
and that the provision cited was 'idle and nugatory;' and it was well
observed that if Congress could so dispose of one class of civilians, it
could of another, or of all classes, and thus establish a 'military
despotism.'
"As to the particular existing statutes under consideration, however,
the present weight of authority is in favor of their constitutionality.
In the U.S. Circuit Court for the Dist. of California, the concluding
clause of Art. 63 has been viewed as constitutional, and a similar view
has been taken o Sec. 1361, Rev. Sta., as including prisoners who have
.lo(a been discharges soldiers, by the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of
Kansas and by the Attorney General. Such opinions, whether or not
satisfactory to the military student, are to be deferred to till over-
ruled by subsequent or higher authority. The opinion of the author--
that this class of statutes, which in terms or inferentially subject
persons formerly in the army, but become finally and legally separated
from it, to trial by court-martial, are all necessarily and alike un-
constitutional--remains unmodified. In his judgment, a statute cannot
be framed by which a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to the
tQ'1 military jurisdiction in time of peace." (page
"V. PRISONERS OF WAR. Modern sentiment and usage have induced in
the practice of war few changes so marked as that which affects the status
of prisoners of war. The time has long passed when 'no quarter' was the
rule on the battlefield or when a prisoner could be put to death by
Q,/ W @Jpafigs2Q Q c -F?' R 109 a . D0 pa-7LOaptivity is
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,' but 'merely a temporary
detention which is devoid of all penal character.' Or, as Lieber states
it,--'A prisoner of war is no convict; his imprisonment is a simple war
V19% measure.' As it is concisely expresse /ln the Appel of 1877--'Le but
de leur capitivite ne dolt pas etre de les punir, mail de les garder.'
"In regard to the custody and disposition of such prisoners the
following principles and rules may be said to be established.
"l. Persons entitled to rights of prisoners of war. The class of
persons entitled upon capture to the privileges of prisoners ers of war
comprises members of the enemy's armies, embracing both combatants and
non-combatants, and the wounded and sick taken on the field and in
hospital. It should comprise also civil persons engaged in military duty
or in immediate connection with an army, such as clerks, telegraphists,
aeronauts, teamsters, laborers, messengers, guides, scouts, and men
employed on transports and military railways--the class indeed of civilians
in the employment and service of the government such as are specified in
our 63d Article of War as 'Persons serving with the armies in the field.'
Camp-followers, including members of soldiers' families, sutlers,
contractors, newspaper correspondents, and other allowed with the army
but not in the public employment, should, when taken, be treated
similarly as prisoners of war, but should be held only so long as may be
necessary. In the words of the Institute,--'Persons who follow an army,
without forming part of it, can only be detained for so long a time as
may be required by military necessity.' Of the non-combatants of an army,
those composing the staff of the hospitals and ambulances--viz. medical
officers, hospital stewards and attendants, employed in the care and
transport of the wounded and sick, with chaplains or priests, are considered,
under the Geneva Convention, as entitled to the benefit of neutrality,
while in the exercise of their functions. For so long, therefore, they
are not toe disposed of as are the mass of prisoners of war, but are to
be left for the time to the performance of these duties. In our late
civil war neither medical officers nor chaplains were held as prisoners
of war, but on capture were forthwith 'unconditionally' discharged."
~7g~1 (page 48&)
"* * * It was further stipulated that 'if citizens held by either
party, on charges, are exchanged, it shall only be for citizens,' adding--
'captured sutlers teamsters, and all civilians in the actual service of
~-y + either party, to be exchanged for persons in similar positions.'" (page)
"MAGNITUDE OF THE POWER--ITS LIMITATION. The power of military govern-
ment thus vested in the President or his military subordinates is a large
and extraordinary one, being subject only to such conditions and restric-
tions as the law of war, in defining the particulars to which it may extend,
imposes upon the scope of its exercise. As it is expressed by the Supreme
Court, the governing authority 'may do anything necessary to strengthen
itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit to the powers that may be
exerted in such cases save those which are found in the laws and usages
of war. * * * In such cases the laws of war take the place of the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States as applied In time pe ace". The
Approved For Release 2002/06/25 :J IA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
nature and ent of these powers will be illustrated in considering the
ga details of their exercise." (page 801)
"ITS LIMITATIONS. The employment of martial law has been likened
to the exercise of the right of self-defence by an individual. Its
occasion and justification thus is necessity. But though in general
without other limit than the discretion of the commander upon whom its
execution is devolved, it is not an absolute power, but one to be exer-
cised with such stringency only as circumstances may require. The often-
quoted remark that martial law is simply 'the will of the general who
commands the army' is a description much less apposite in practice to
martial law proper, or domestic martial law, than to that military
government of enemies heretofore considered, and with reference to which in
fact the observation was originally employed by Wellington. Martial
law is indeed resorted to as much for the protection of the lives and
property of peaceable individuals as for the repression of hostile or
violent elements. It may become requisite that it supersede for the
time the existing civil institutions, but, in general, except in so far
as relates to persons violating military orders or regulations, or other-
wise interfering with the exercise of military authority, martial law
does not in effect suspend the local law or urisdiction or materially
restrict the liberty of the citizen: it Mall upon him to perform special
*service or labor for the public defence, but otherwise usually leaves his
to his ordinary avocations.
"It is a principle of the exercise of martial law that even when requir-
ed to be executed with exceptional stringency and for a protracted period,
it shall not be permitted to serve as a pretext for license or disorder
on the part of the military; and acts of undue violence and
oppression
committed in its name will by the laws of war be visited with extreme
punishment.
"It is a further principle that, while martial law is not to be
inaugurated precipitately or inconsiderately, so it is to be continued only
so long as the public exigency on account of which it was declared shall
prevail. It is not indeed essential to the discontinuance of such state
that the original declaration of the same be formally revoked: when the
emergency has ceased, or within a reasonable interval thereafter, the
status may be deemed to have lapsed, and cannot lawfully be further
$ t continued or enforced." (page -bee) I
"Thus, as a general principle of law, it may be deemed to be settled
by the rulings of the courts and weight of legal authority, as well as by
the action of Congress and practice of the Executive, that the President
is not empowered of his own authority to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and that a declaration of martial law made by him or a
military commander, in a district not within the theatre of war, will not
justify such suspension in the absence of the sanction of Congress. The
result must be that martial law proper will in the future rarely be initiated
in the United States where Congress has omitted to provide the means for
rendering its exercise effectual. But, in the event of a practical exercise
of the same in an adequate emergency, and of the consequent arrest and
f r b ~~ t~ ~* to be the L_OPR V un ou pu a enemies effies or other
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
criminals, in temporary disregard of judicial process sued out for their
release, it can scarcely be questioned that Congress, if it does not
expressly ratify the act, will at least protect or indemnify the officers
and soldiers concerned, by legislation corresponding to that enacted for
a similar purpose at the close of active hostilities in the late civil
war, while--as then--authorizing the removal to a court of the United
States of actions for damages commenced against such persons in State
courts." (page 830._1
"VI. TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT OF OFFENCES UNDER THE LAW OF WAR--THE
MILITARY COMMISSION.
"Authority and Occasion for the Military Commission.
"The Constitution confers upon Congress the power 'to define and punish
offences against the law of nations,' and in the instances of the legislation
of Congress during the late war by which it was enacted that spies and
guerillas should be punishable by sentence of military commission, such
commission may be regarded as deriving its authority from this constitutional
power. But,in general, it is those provisions of the Constitution which
empower Congress to 'declare war' and 'raise armies,' and which, in
authorizing the initiation of war, authorize the employment of all necessary
and proper agencies for its due prosecution, from which this tribunal de-
rives its original sanction. Its authority is thus the same as the authority
for the making and waging of war and for the exercise of military govern-
ment and martial law. The commission is simply an instrumentality for the
more efficient execution of the war powers vested in Congress and the power
vested in the President as Commander-in-chief in war. In some instances,
as will presently be noted, Congress has specifically recognized the military
commission as the proper war-court, and in terms provided for the trial there-
by of certain offences. In general, however, it has left it to the President,
and the military commanders representing him, to employ the commission, as
occasion may require, for the investigation and punishment of violations of
the laws of war and other offences not cognizable by court-martial.
"The occasion for the military commission arises principally from the
fact that the jurisdiction of the court-martial proper, in our law, is
restricted by statute almost exclusively to members of the military force
and to certain specific offences defined in a written code. It does not
extend to many criminal acts, especially of civilians, peculiar to time of
war; and for the trial of these a different tribunal is required. A commander
indeed, where authorized to constitute a purely war-court, may designate it
by any convenient name; he may style it a 'court-martial,' and, though not
a court-martial proper, it will still be a legal body under the laws of war.
But to employ the same name for the two kinds of court could scarcely but
result in confusion and in questions as to jurisdiction and power of punish-
ment. Hence, in our military law, the distinctive name of military commission
has been adopted for the exclusively war-court, which also, as will hereafter
be illustrated, is essentially a distinct tribunal from the court-martial
of the Articles of war.
-6-
Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
"Abroad, the court-martial is employed for the cognizance of offences
not only of the officers and soldiers of the army, but also of non-military
persons subjected to military authority in time of war or rebellion. A
late English writer, in approving the distinction established in this
country between the court-martial and the military commission, observes:
--'In England both descriptions of courts are called courts-martial, and
the general public are consequently not able to discriminate between the two."'
/
jpage 831)
Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
-7-
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY - UNIVt)RM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
Paragraph (10) is taken from AW 2(d). The phrase "in the field"
has been construed to refer to any place, whether on land or water,
apart from permanent cantonments or fortifications, where military
operations are being conducted. (See in re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252, 255
(S. D. Ohio 1944).)
Paragraphs (11) and (12) are adapted from 34 U.S.C., section 1201,
but areapplicable in time of peace as well as war. Both paragraphs,
however, have been made subject to the provisions of any treaty or
agreement to which the United States is a party or to an accepted rule
of international law. Paragraph (il) is somewhat broader in scope than
AW 2 (d) in that the code is made applicable to persons employed by or
accompanying the armed forces as well as those serving with or accom-
panying the armed forces, and the territorial limitations during peacetime
have been reduced to include territories where a civil court system is not
readily available.
Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
US Military Jurisdiction over Civilians
Constitution
Uniform Code of Military Justice - 50 USC 551 et. seq.
Opinions of the Attorney General - 6 - 506 (185+)
Opinions of the Attorney General - 28 - 590 (8 May 1893)
Ex parte Weitz - DC Mass. 256 F. 58 (1919)
Blackmer v. U.S. - 284 US 421, 76 L. ed. 375, 52 S. Ct. 252 (1932)
Coleman v. Tenn. - 97 U.S. 509, 24 L. ed. 1118 (1879)
Colepaughh v. Looney - CA Kan. 235 F. 2d 429 (1956)
In re Di Bartolo - DC NY - 50 F. Supp. 929 (1943)
Duncan v. Kahanamoku - 327 US 304, 90 L. ed 688 (1946)
Ex parte Falks - 251 Fed. 415 (1918)
U.S. v. Flores - 289 U.S. 421, 77 L. ed. 1086 (1933)
Ex parte Gerlach - NY 247 Fed. 616 (1917)
Grisham v. Ta for (District Court - Md. Pa.) (1958)
U.S. v. McElroy Guagliardo) - 158 F. Supp. 171 (DC District) (1958)
U.S. v. Hudson (and Goodwin) - 7 Cranch 29, 3 L. ed. 289 (1812)
Ex parte Jochen - Texas - 257 Fed. 200 (1919)
Ex parte Johnson - District Court, Kansas - 3 F. 2d 705 (1925)
Johnson v. Sayre - 15 S. Ct. 773, 158 US 114, 39 L. ed. 914 (1895)
Kahn v. Anderson - 255 US 1, 65 L. ed. 469, 41 S. Ct. 224 (1920)
U.S. ex rel. Roberson v. Keat- District Court, Illinois - 121 F. Supra. 477 (1.449)
Lee v. Madigan - District Court, California - 148 F. Supp. 23 (1957)
McCulloch v. Maryland - 4 L. ed. 579, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819)
McKane v. Kilpatrick - District Court, Virginia - 53 F. Supp. 80 (1943)
Government v. McGre o - 14 Mass. 499
Madsen v. Kinsella - 3 3 US 341, 96 L. ed. 988, 72 S. Ct. 699 (1952)
Ex parte Milligan - 18 L. ed. 281, 303 (1866)
Pei tein v. U.S. - 151 F 2d 167 (1945)
Perry v. Harper - (1957) Okl. Cr., 307 P. 2 168
Ex parte Guirin - 317 US 1, 43, 44 (1942)
Rines v. Mikell - 259 Fed. 28 (1919)
Re. Ross 110 US 453, 35 L. ed 581, 11 S. Ct. 897 (1891)
U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles - 350 US 11, 76 S. Ct. 1 (1955)
Ex parte Vallandigham - 1 Wall. 243, 68 US 243, 17 L. ed. 589 (1864)
Petition of Varney - District Court, California - 141 F. Supp. 190 (1956)
US ex rel. Gua liardo v. McElro (D.C. App.) 259 F. 2d 927 (12 September 1958)
US ex rel. Wilson v. Boblander (Colorado) 10 November 1958
UCLA Law Review 3:279 April 1956
University of Kansan Law Review 21:95-101 Winter 1952
De Paul Law Review 3:95-100 Autumn/Winter 1953
JAG Journal 1952:9-12 D
George Washington Law Review 21-711-37 June 1953
Notre Dame Law Review 24:490-354 Summer 1949
Georgetown Law Journal 35:303-27 March 1947
Fordham Law Review 13:122-8 March 1944 ''
American Joreal of rat do 1 RD
F62-bWrRh*A0110017-0
Virginia Later~iv~r~eecem-ber
 Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0
REID V. COVERT
Washington University Law Quarterly 1957:384 - December 1957
Michigan Law Review 56:287 December 1957
UCLA Law Review 5:132 January 1958
University of Virginia Law Review 60:86 December 1957
Vanderbilt Law Review 11:202 December 1957
University of Cincinnati Law Review 26:634 Fall 1957
Minn. Law Review. 42:490 January 1958
St. John's Law Review 32:108 December 1957
Maryland Law Review 17:335 Fall 1957
Harvard Law Review 71:712 Fall 1958
American Journal of International Law 51:783 October 1957
MCKUNE V. KILPATRICK
Columbia Law Review 44:575-8 December 1944
Texas Law Review 33:932 June 1955
South California Law Review 29:228 February 1956
Approved For Release 2002/06/25 : CIA-RDP62-00631 R000300110017-0