STAGE II - PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000700120004-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 105
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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Stage II - Planning
Objectives
What do we wish to accomplish?
A. What are the attitudes of the government and people of India towards
the East-West conflict?
India's attitude toward the East- West conflict is fundamental to its
general foreign policy. The continuance of this policy appears to be based
on two main considerations. First, there is the basic desire that India,
having achieved independence should never allow itself to come under the
influence of another power. he government is accordingly determined to re-
sist being influenced by either the United States or the U.S.S.R. and to
steer as independent a course as possible in international affairs. Secondly,
India's policy of nonalignment is fostered by the general fear of involvement
in a third world war and the recognition of the country's exposed position
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Thus the policy of nonalignment is in part based
on the belief that India can not rely upon the West to defend South Asia
against direct Soviet attack and on the recognition that India's limited re-
sources and industrial strength preclude a defense establishment of the size
necessary to defeat such an attack. Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet
Union has not directly intervened in South Asian affairs has apparently en-
couraged the hope that, in t1 event of a third world war, Soviet action would
be directed westward towards Europe and the U.S. and eastward towards China,
Korea, and Japan, leaving India on the periphery of the struggle. The result
is that there is a i .rl common tendency in the government and among, educated
Indians in general, to believe that it would be folly to avow or publicly
encourage anti-Soviet sentiments which might provoke their powerful neighbor.
There are other subsidiary motivations in India's policy of nonentangle-
ment, Prime Minister Nehru apparently believes that a neutral India in con-,
junction with other Asian and Near Eastern countries can exert a greater
influence in world affairs and contribute to world peace by acting as a mediating
influence rather than joining one of the "power blocs." Finally, there is the
possible consideration that India's influence is greater as a politically neutral
nation than as another member of a coalition.
Indian leaders insist that India's policy is a positive and internationalist
one and not one of passive neutrality and point out that in contrast to the
failure of the United States to join the league of Nations, India has participated
in almost every phase of international organization since 1945. Furthermore,
they stress that the policy of nonentanglement does not mean that India con-
siders each bloc or nation as equally responsible for world tensions. In
September 1951 Madame Pandit, former Ambassador to the United States and sister
of Prime Minister Nehru, expressed India's appreciation for the U.S. wheat loan
and stated that India is pro-United Nations and pro-free nations. She added
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that in the fifth General Assembly of the UN, India voted with the United
States 38 times, abstaining on 11 occasions and voted against the United
States only twice.
The form of India's political institutions, its international trade,
the possible sources of investment capital and technical aid, and the train-
ing and inclination of many of its leaders dispose India more to the Western
nations than to the Soviet Union. Since 1951 a developing fear of Soviet
aggressive designs and of Soviet-inspired subversion, an increased concern over
the intentions of Communist China, and a subsidence in some of India's fears
of the United States have tended to make India noticeably more sympathetic with
the West. But in the Indian Government's view the basic considerations which
determine India's policy have not changed usufficiently to make an open re-
orientation of policy necessary or desirable. Barring a major change in the
balance of power or in the present defense position of the subcontinent India
can be expected to continue to try to maintain its middle course between the
two power blocs. (55-26,27). This position on East-West tensions causes the
Indians often to express disappointment in the UN which they feel has become
little more than a forum to air East-West differences. (42-23)
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A-l. How do they view the present global East-West tension?
The fervent nationalism aroused during the course of the struggle
to gain independence together with a certain amount of anti-Western and
anti white sentiment has resulted in a widespread conviction among
politically conscious elements that India as one of the leading nations
of Asia and the Near East, should chart the most independent course possi-
ble in the field of internatbnal affairs (55-1).
With some exception Indians are opposed to joining either side in the
conflict between Western powers and the Soviet bloc. They want to be free
and independent and choose own role as crises arise. (142-23)
There is no probability that within the foreseeable future India will
abandon its policy of non-alignment in the East-West conflict. Nor does
any alteration in any of India's basic foreign policies appear likely with
the possible exception of its China policy which might be abandoned should
action by Red China convince the Indians of the hopelessness of trying to
wean China away from the Soviet bloc.
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Stage II
A_l-a. Do they see it resulting from a conflict of principle, a desire
for power, aggressive tendencies, fear of aggression, or from
other forces?
The edudated, sophisticated Indians tend to view East-West tensions
as primarily a power politics struggle between the power blocs for world
domination.
Indians doubt that US efforts to unite the free world under its leader-
ship are motivated solely by a desire to help the nations resist Communist
aggression. Rather Indians see in them an attempt to extend US power and
influence and to acquire allies against a powerful rival and potential enemy
with whom the US is engaged in a struggle for first place among the nations
of the world. Indians hold. that the US shares responsibility with the USSR
for present cold war tensions and believe that the US approach to the present
world situation is excessively "military" and belligerent and that US policies
in the main tend to heighten rather than relax them, thereby increasing the
danger of a world war.
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Stage II
A-1-b. What possible developments of the situation do they fear and what
do they think the actual course of developments are likely to be?
They fear that war will break out and result in their involvement and
result in their involvement and bring to an end their plan for economic
betterment and the strengthening of internal political unity. (42--23)
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Stage II
A-1-c. Where do they think their own interests lie in the situation?
They think their own interests lie in remaining neutral and in seeking
to avoid war and always to be independent and choose their own solutions
to crises as they arise. They also seek to attain a leadership role in
South and Southeast Asia and to a lesser extent in the Near and Middle East
and Africa\ n drawing together and influencing a bloc of third power or
neutral nations to offset the balance of military power developing between
the free nations and the USSR.
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Stage II
A-2. Do Indians understand the threat of communism?
Statements of Indian leaders indicate an increasing awareness of the
threat from the north. (81-15) Efforts are being made to strengthen the
northern frontier defenses.
Indian strategists recognize that the Himalayas cannot provide an
impenetrable defense against a determined invasion from the north and that
the sizeable manpower resources which enabled the country (exclusive of
that portion which is now Pakistan) to mobilize an army of about 1.5 million
men during World War II are more than offset by the serious lack in up-to-
date weapons and equipment, in mechanized forces and air power and in the
substantial industrial development required by modern war. (55-1) Despite
its policy of friendship with Communist China, India since the invasion
of Tibet, has become increasingly sensitive to, and apprehensive of, the
growing danger of Comman:ht infiltration across its northern border and in
the adjoining states of Nepal.. Sikkim and Bhutan with whom India has special
relations. As a result, the Nehru Government has made efforts to strengthen
the country's northern border defenses and bolster up its weaker northern
neighbors.
While India's top political leaders are ".....sympathetic with socialist
objectives, and show no consternation at communist ideology per se, they have
all demonstrated their opposition to the Communist Party, both for its
violence and for its subservience to the party's foreign ties .....From 1948
to 1951, when mass violence was the policy of the Communist Party of India,
thousands of Communists were Jailed." (59-1)
While the Government of India and the Congress Party may somewhat
underestimate the threat of Communists within the country, they are not un-
aware of it. The CPI is kept under surveillance and the government is pre-
pared to take prompt and vigorous action against subversive, illegal or
violent Communist activities.
The Congress Party government has begun to recognize the danger of
Communist exploitation of the poverty stricken voter and that tine is likely
to play into the Communists' hands unless some other group can demonstrate
its ability to improve the general lot. To counter Communist activities the
government is continuing a policy of strict repression of all acts of sub-
version or violence, has begun to expose and denounce Communist claims and
pretensions as well as the party's foreign allegiance, and is concentrating
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its available financial resources on a development plan that is primarily
aimed at agriculture. The main weakness of the government's program is its
lack of measures especially designed to counter Communist activities among
the vulnerable student and discontented middle-class groups, or to bridge
the wide gap existing between the largely urbanized intellectuals, who
provide the political leadership of the country and the mass of the general
population. (55,5)
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Stage II
A-2-a. Do Indians think the Communists intend to take over their country?
Coupled with the recognition of the weaknesses in India's military position
is the rather general belief that Soviet aggression is primarily directed against
the West and against northeast Asia, i.e., against China, Korea and Japan. The
result is that there is considerable feeling in India that it would be folly to
antagonize close and powerful neighbors andprovoke an attack which might otherwise
be avoided. Reinforcing these strategic considerations are important ~)psyc oolog cc
attitudes developed during the long struggle for independence.
they do not believe the Communists plan to take over the country by massive
aggression but rather by internal subversion and a Dibbling away at the weak
border states.
The capabilities of Soviet Bloc countries for influencin the Government
of India are extremely limited. The presence of two powerful Con nuni_st states
for all practical purposes on India's border is, of course, a fact that India
cannot and does not ignore, and is one o f the various factors which lead
India to follow a policy of non-alignment in the East.-West struggle. But if
it is favorable to the Sovis t Bloc to heiextenth as that iitttends tooireinforce
Indian neutralism it is also unfavorable
India's fear ofComunist aggression and hence to take counter measures against
it. Any definite attempt at intimidation along India's northern border, short
of preparations for a large-scale invasion, mould result not in~a move toward
accommodation on the part of India but in a stiffening of India's attitude
toward the Soviet Bloc. Indians in general, however, not only feel that they
are remote from the USSR but also are prone to regard the Himalayas as consti-
tuting an effective barrier against any potential invasion.
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Stage II
A-2-b. What confidence have the Indians that they can resist Communism?
The program eons-stage" socialist revolution through violenc 7 launched
by the Indian Communists ushered in an era of armed communist insurrection,
sabotage, and terrorism from 1948 to 1950 ......
extensive destruction, the effect on the CPI itself 1washdisassttrous. Govvern-
ment action was prompt and vigorous. Hundreds of party members were killed
in armed clashes with the government forces, thousands were arrested, others
were kept under close government surveillance, and the party was banned in
lever to st~Ws30;000,,; membership had fallen from an estimated 90,000 in
this violence has given Indiaimthehconfidence the scaness ve sutphpe dosing
mestic
Communists from over-throwing the government by violentPrevolution.tic
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Stage II
A-2-o. Do Indians think that Communism threatens their ideals,
aspirations and way of life?
While India's top political leaders are "......sympathetic with
socialist objectives, and show no consternation at Communist ideology
Per se they have all desmonstrated their opposition to the Communist
garb both for its violence and for its subservience to the party's
foreign ties ....." (59-1) Thus the international character of
Communism runs counter to nationalist sentiments and the ready resort
to violence to achieve their ends is repugnant to the passiveness of the
Gandhi influenced Indians. It is not Communism per se which they fear
as they have a strong faith in the validity of at-re-BM of their own
cultural and religious traditions. It is rather the fear that the Com-
munists will be able to acquire dangerous mass strength in India by ex-
ploiting economic and social dissatisfactions before the present Goverment
is able to effect an improvement in living conditions through its own pro-
grams.
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Stage II
A-2-d. To what extent do Indians see through communist professions, such
as being "for the people", and communist misrepresentation of the
West?
Actually there is little first-hand knowledge of the U.S,S,R, or of
Russians by Indians, and only a handful of Indians have ever visited Russia.
(142-21)
The general ignorance of the USSR, coupled with Soviet indirect methods
of subversion through Asian national and the prevalent suspicion of Western
colonial and ex-colonial powers leads to the tendency of many Indians to
accept Soviet propaganda claims that the Western nations are imperialistic
and that the U.S,S. , is anti-imperialistic and interested only in promoting
the aspirations for freedom and a better life of the comon people everywhere,
(l42-22) There has been evidence in recent years that many literate Indians
are becoming more suspicious of the claims of the U.S.S.R. to being the great
"working class democracy, However, the greater sympathy of most Indians
for Communist China as a fellow Asian nation, makes them more susceptible
to Chinese Communist professions and sympathetic to the anti-Western mis-
representations of the Peiping regime.
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Stage II
A-2-e. Is the Indian view of communism distorted by expectations that
it might be potentially beneficial to them, as offering speedy
solution for social and economic problems and enabling India
to develop into a strong and powerful nation?
Many Indians accept Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda at face value.
They are interested and impressed by the claims of economic progress and in-
dustrialization in both countries. Faced by similar problems of industrializa-
tion and improvement of agriculture Indians are curious to find the key to the
USSR seeming success and China's apparent progress. (1i2-21,,22) Wain they have
little interest in or use for the power-seeking and control tactics of the
Communist parties and governments and look on Marxism as an outmoded philosophy,
they embrace state socialism as the quickest method to improve the national
welfare.
Partially as a result of their Asian consciousness, Indians have tended
to be more receptive to Chinese Communist than to Russian propaganda in this
field. Non-Communist Indian visitors to the USSR tend to compare the Russian
standard of living and industrial accomplishments with those of other Western
countries, to the disadvantage of the Soviets. Communist China's accomplish-
ments, however, are generally compared to India's achievements. Since Indian
visitors to China are, of course, shown the most dramatic examples of the
"New China's" progress the comparison is generally favorable to the Communist
regime. Furthermore the Chinese Communists have systematically promoted the
idea that India and dhina, the two under-developed giants of Asia,, are facing
many similar problems and have offered India the benefit of their experience
in tackling some of these problems. Chinese Communist propaganda in India
stress the progress made under the Communist regime in development industrializa-
tion and social welfare leaving the impression with many Indians that China
is making far greater strides in tackling its problems than is democratic India.
The Appeal of Certain Communist Ideas and Ideals
In contrast to the suspicions and fears aroused by industrial capitalism
in South Asia, Communist ideas and ideals have considerable appeal since there
is no experience with communism. in action. Communism's emphasis on the problems
of the peasant and the worker and ifs advocacy of production for the common good
are particularly suited to a region where the preponderance of the population
depends on agriculture, where standards of living are pitifully low, and where
the peasant and the worker-have long been the forgotten men of society. The
subordination of the individual to the community, which is resented in the more
individualistic societies of the West, conforms to existing social traditions
in India; furthermore, the dangers of government interference in village life
are generally concealed by emphasis on such popular slogans as "Land to the
Tiller" and No Rent" campaigns. At the same time, the communist idea of a
planned economy also has a considerable attraction for many conservative leaders
who are seriously concerned over the backwardness of their countries and who
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tend to feel that the best hope of achieving any spbstantial or rapid
development lies in some type of Five Year Plan adapted from the Soviet
model. Finally.. Communist ideals of a classless society, of comradeship
without regard to color, and of the abolition of imperialistic exploita-
tion have a particular appeal to nationalists and would be reformers, who
in the course of the recent political struggle for independence have al-
ready discovered the handicaps to political unity and economic progress
resulting from divisions of class or caste, have become particularly
sensitive to racial discrimination, and have no faith in the type of Western
business imperialism made familiar during the period of British-rule, Although
Soviet action in Eastern Europe has convinced many South Asian leaders of
the expansionist tendencies of the USSR, and although the subversive tactics
of the local Communist parties have forced repressive action in India and
Pakistan, nevertheless much of the literate opinion in the area still views
Marxian analysis with considerable respect and regards many of the alleged
objectives of Communism as distinct from the power ambitions of the Soviet
Union and the actual practice of local communist parties. Prime Minister
Nehru of India has also pointed out that although his government could not
tolerate the violent and subversive tactics of the local Communist Party,
he is favorably impressed by many of the ideas and ideals of Communism, while
India's ambassador to Yugoslavia has confidentially indicated to US repre-
sentatives that he believes India could learn much from that country now that
its ties with Moscow have been cut.
At the time of India's independence there was a great deal of Indian
interest in Soviet achievements, The speed with which the Soviet Union in-
dustrialized a backward and predominantly agricultural economy to convert
itself into a first class world power in less than 30 years had aroused
considerable interest among educated Indian circles in the USSR and Communism.
It was felt that the problems confronting India of a peasant and illiterate
population living under a strongly traditionalistic social system were very
similar to those tackled by the Soviet Union at the end of World War I. Prior
to independence Indian interest in Soviet achievements had acquired a strong
nationalist tinge as a result of the restrictions placed by the British Govern-
ment of India on Indian contacts with the USSR. In Indian eyes a visit to the
Soviet Union tended to take on the aspect of a patriotic gesture of defiance
of British authority. educated Indians resented what they considered to
be officious British efforts to control what Indians should see or think,
adopting the view that the people of every nation have the right to make their
own investigation of any problem that is of concern to them and to come to
their own decisions. Both the restricting and the consequent difficulties of
first-hand observations produced a marked tendency to note only the positive
achievements of the USSR 'and to give the Soviets the benefit of every doubt.
This tendency was reinforced by the USSR's public championing of the nationalist
movements in Asia in the 1920's and 1930's.
Since independence, however, India has been able to get a better look and
many of her expectations over what was to be learned from the Soviet experiment
have been giving way to growing disillusionment. Some visiting Indians have
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been taken in by the "red carpet" treatment accorded them in the USSR but
a few of the more discerning have noticed the Soviet limitations placed on
efforts to make first-hand observations, or to get information on Soviet
discoveries and techniques. Indian leaders are still trying to gather in-
formation on Soviet achievements and experience that might be of use to
India. However, they repeatedly note the great human cost of the Soviet
gains, clearly indicating that India does not consider such methods acceptable.
Indian leaders, having decided in favor of institutions of representative and
responsible government, are openly critical of the authoritarian nature of the
Soviet system.
Growing Indian awareness of the limitations and costs of Soviet achieve-
ments has been accompanied by an increasing suspicion of Soviet political
objectives. There is still widespread Indian belief that the USSR has serious
reasons for wanting to avoid a world war. The wartime losses of the Soviet
Unioh are thought to have left that country with a determination to delay in-
volvement in a third world war so that it might devote itself to consolidating
its position in Eastern Europe and to strengthening its outer defenses. The
fact that the USSR has not attempted the direct military conquest of any weak
countries on its southern border and refrained from sending Soviet troops into
Korea appears to encourage the Indian belief that the Soviet Union is not
prepared to risk a third world war. However, a number of Indian leaders are
becoming increasingly aware of theexpansionist nature of Soviet aims and the
USSR's effort to extend its power and ideology. Prime Minister Nehru has
confidentially indic ated that he has grave apprehensions concerning Soviet in-
tentions. Distrust of Soviet intentions has also been growing among educated
Indians as the propagandistic nature of the Soviet "Peace" campaign and the
"behind-the-scene" role of the USSR have become more obvious. Indian leaders
have not relished the strong and bitter attacks by Radio Moscow in the past
calling them the "tools of US and UK imperialism." The increased suspicion
of the USSR has also been aggravated by the disruptive role played by the
Communist Party in Indian politics, especially from the end of 1947 up through
early 1951. Many Indians have been alienated by the Party's method of operation
and its past program of violence, and the Indian Government has become in-
creasingly aware of the international character of the party and its threat
of subversion. In contrast to the formally correct attitude of the Government
of India toward the Soviet Union, is the determination with which it has put
down all attempts at subversion and disruption by the Communist Party of India.
Indians have if anything shown more interest in the Chinese revolution
than in the Russian revolution. Despite the personal friendship existing
between Nehru and Chiang Kai Shek and Nationalist China's support of India's
freedom struggle, Indians regarded the Nationalist Government as a corrupt
and inefficient government under foreign domination and enjoying little or
no popular support, They looked upon the revolution as a fight between a
revolutionary force based on popular support and discredited foreign dominated
government completely isolated from the people. The Indian attitude toward
the Chinese Communists was influenced far more by their sympathy with them as
a popularly supported and anti-colonial nationalist group than by the fact that
they were Communists. Indians are by no means of one mind regarding Communism
but
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but even among those opposed to Comnunism there are probably few whose dis-
like for it is as strong and deeply rooted as their hatred of colonialism.
The Government of India has expressed the belief that the genuinely
nationalistic component of the Communist Chinese revolution is as important
as the Communist element so that even if the new government retains a
Conn,unist ideology its nationalistic element probably will ultimately oppose
subservience to the USSR. It is believed that if the Mao government were
ssured of non-Communist aid and support it would be encouraged to resist
Soviet pressure and domination and eventually to follow an independent policy.
In this hope, India has followed the policy of extending such aid and support
to Communist Chinese Government. Being of the opinion that the Chinese
Nationalist Government was clearly repudiated by the Chinese people, and that
the present Communist regime is based on popular support, India was one of
the first nations to recognize the Communist Government of China. India also
recognizes Communist China's sovereignty over Formosa. India has also been a
prominent supporter of Communist Chinese demands for UN membership, arguing
that it not only has a right to be there but that in any discussion of Asian
and particularly Far Eastern problems a nation of the size and strength of
China cannot properly be ignored. India was delighted to see Communist Chinese
participation in the Geneva Conference.
While India has made an effort to see a favorable side of Communist China,
certain things have made this difficult and at the same time embarrassed India.
India can rationalize some of the Chinese expansion which has brought China into
conflict with non Asian powers. China's military occupation of Tibet has strain-
ed India's determination to see the favorable side of China. India recognized
China's suzerainty over Tibet but expressed the hope that Tibetan autonomy
would be respected. Communist China, however, brushed aside India's sentiments
in a brusque manner and with an air of superiority. While continuing to make
a supreme effort to understand China's position and motives and to express con-
fidence in her India takes steps to protect her own interests. The present
Indian regime Ls been displeased by the "peace" campaign in which China joins
with the USSR and which deals in terms of abuse and conflict which Indians be-
lieve decrease the chances of peace rather than increasing them. Indians have
also disliked the Chinese effort to exploit cultural exchanges between India
and China for political ends.
There has been a tendency to believe that China has made rapid progress
toward agricultural reform and industrialization under the new regime, some
Indians even being under the impression that the progress in China has been
greater than in India. However, the Government op India has taken strong
exception to the idea that China is making greater strides than India. More-
over, there is a growing popular awareness of the limited nature of many of
the apparent gains in China and the costs in personal freedom and regimentation
at which they have been made.
Di at sfaction with Qotiditiops of life in India is an important factor
favorable to the spread of Communism in India. Such dissatisfaction
already marked under the British, was aggravated after independence ;Is
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in 19b7 by the failure of the new government to make easily per-
ceptible progress toward solving the basic problems of mass poverty and
the particular economic hardships of the middle classes.
Although the poverty of the Indian agricultural and urban laboring
groups provides a basis for Communist propaganda activities political
consciousness (and hence more or less clearly articulated attitudes
toward the USSR and China) is limited mainly to the urban middle groups.
Within this element of the population, the group most attracted to
Communism consists of those educated for white collar obs who have been
unable to find appropriate work, and of students training for white collar
jobs, which are far from readily attainable. In addition to being
economically frustrated, this group tends to be cut off from the age-old
cultural and religious patterns of the country which have been undermined
by the Western concepts long taught under the tritish and subsequently in
the Indian universities and schools. However, these Western concepts --
e.g., individualism and the "rational" rather than traditionalistic de-
termination of courses of action -- have not been fully absorbed and made
the basis for a new way of life. Thus the "Western" educated in India
often tend to be in a sense "cultureless" seekers a4ter a satisfying
ideology. Communism for some is the answer. It is not intellectually
demanding as it purports to answer every question, but is demanding of
coil itment, service, sacrifice, and secrecy, and hence appeals to those
who are flounde g in a social and moral vacuum: Some of these join the
Party; In infinitteely greater number stop short of active participation but
are influenced by t same factors to a generally favorable and uncritical
attitude toward the Communist Party in India, and perhaps more so toward
Communism abroad,
While many Indians are drawn toward Communism, or sympathy for it,
largely in reaction to their own social maladjustment d malaise, a large
number (perhaps a majority of the politically conscious) are sympathetic
toward it or tend to discount criticism of it because of more general
factors. Widespread ignorance of the actual situations in the USSR and
Red China make it easier to believe the representations of the Soviet and
Chinese propagandists and their local Communist counterparts. But the Soviet
Union and Red China also enjoy certain more tangible advantages over the
West. The USSR is considered closer to Asia in its problems and policies.
It is known to include Asian peoples, and in the 1920's and 1930's publicly
championed nationalist movements in Asia. By aid to the Communists to China
and other Asian insurgents in the 19L0's and early 1950's it weakened
Western control (or influence) in Asia. That this aid might manifest a new
imperialism was obscured for many Indians by their tendency to identify
"imperialism" almost exclusively with that of the Western powers. Also tend-
ing to obscure the nature of Soviet imperialism is the fact that it operates
largely through Asian nationals. Many Indians tend to accept Soviet propa-
ganda claims that while the Western nations are imperialistic the USSR is
anti-imperialistic and interested only in promoting the aspirations for free-
dom and a better life of the common people everywhere.
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Stage II
A-2 -f . Do they think, or tend to think, of Communism as the wane
of the future or inevitable?
They do not as yet look upon Comaninism as the wave of the future
or as inevitable.
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A-2-g,
Stage II
What knowledge and understanding have Indiana of Communist
history, with special regard to the treatment of satellites?
Such views as the educated Indians have with respect to the role of
the satellites in the Soviet "Empire" is submerged beneath their over-
whelming consciousness of imperialislp being essentially a Western European
historical force born of the rise of capitalism. Hence, their inability
to detect imperialist expansionist forces in socialist economies which re-
sult in a degree of naivete or purblindness which precludes an objective
appraisal of Soviet and Chinese Communist goals and zig-zagging tactics
to achieve those goals.
However since 1950 there has been a growing suspicion of Soviet
intentions indicated by a perceptible tendenoy of the
critical of the political objectives and tactics of worlds communism and
of the Soviet Union. This hasbeen in part stimulated by the appearance
of informed accounts of Soviet tactics in Eastern Europe, Objective in-
formation on Soviet tactics of subversion and control in East Europe and
elsewhere are in demand on the part of editors, members of parliament and
other public leaders.
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Stage II
A-3, What do the Indians think of the West?
India's top political leaders have a hyper-sensitive aversion to
anything associated with colonialism coupled with a distinct fear of the
capitalism and materialism of the West. (59-1) Nevertheless since 1950
there has been a growing awareness of Soviet and Communist objectives
and tactics coupled with a growing demand for economic aid which has led
the Indians to be less critical of the West and to adopt more "plague-
on-both-your-houses" attitudes accompanied by a realistic policy of seeking
material aid from both sides and by playing one off against the other to
strengthen their "neutral" role in world affairs?
Criticisms of Western democracy in action are directed to its economic
rather than its political aspects. The introduction of industrial capitalist
enterprise and western concepts of private ownership of land have altered
the old village economy, displaced handicraft workers and encouraged the
growth of city slums. Because private British commercial interests in South
Asia resulted in colonial domination Indians have long regarded private
capitalism as closely linked with imperialist exploitation. Capitalism's
emphasis on competition, and on the production and acquisition of material
goods are in conflict with some of the most fundamental ideals of Buddhism
and Hinduism.
India's concern over colonialism is well illustrated by Prime Minister
Nehru's many policy statements asserting nationalism to be the single most
important force in Asia today, that most of the strength of Communism lies
in its ability to exploit these nationalist sentiments and that if the West
wants the cooperation of Asia it cannot afford either to ignore the
awakening of the people or to buttress reactionary political
Korea, French Indochina, Formosa) which no lonr command popular support+.,
Resentment of the West also finds its roots in the feeling that the white
races discriminate against the colored peoples of the world. m,_ press
comment oi.Marshall Aid for Europe emphasized the large amount US was prepared
to spend on Europe in contrast to the negligible amounts made available for
Asia. Use of atomic bombs in Japan and later talk of its use in Korea caused
the editor of a Bombay publication to state: "Asian lives do not seem to be
as sacred as the European ones. Think of all the indignation that the mere
mention of poison gas aroused in the world (European) wars and the feeble ....
protest which the Truman threat of infecting untold millions of innocent
dumb Asians with radioactive poison has aroused .....,"
Indians fear to let Western capital come in lest they lose control of
their economy, yet they need the economic help of the West,
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Stage II
A-3-a. How do Indians assess Western objectives, intentions and
capabilities towards the Communist bloc countries?
India interprets efforts to organize the free world for defensive
purposes as attempts by the US and the UK to win non-Soviet Bloc
countries as allies in their power struggle with the USSR, and holds
the view that such a course endangers world peace.
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Stage II
A-3-b. YIhat do Indians think of collective security measures involving
association with the West?
They hold that efforts of the US and UK to organize the free world
as attempts to secure allies in support of a power struggle which is a
danger to world peace.
The concept of collective security appears to the Indian as essentially
mistaken one and they would prefer to substitute the concept of "collective
peace." Particularly unacceptable to the Indians are regional defense
organizations involving Asian countries (e.g., MEDO, the more recent northern
tier, and the Manila Pact) since these directly challenge the Indian hope
of creating a "third area of peace" -- i.e. a group of Asian nations under
Indian leadership not committed to either side in the cold war,
The role of India in the UN
An important cornerstone of India's foreign policy is the promotion of
its aims through the United Nations. India views the UN as a forum for the
exchange of widely divergent national views and as an instrument for the
amelioration of conflicts and their settlement by peaceful means. India has
been one of the most active states in the UN, and has been active in many of
its agencies.
India served on the Security Council in 1950-51 and on the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) from 190 through 1951. It belongs to all the exist-
ing agencies, though it never joined the former International
Re ugee Organization.
India is represented on the following bodies:
Committee for Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories
Korean Reconstruction Agency
Headquarters Ad deory Committee
International Law Commission
General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee on Administrative Unions
(of trust and non-self-governing territories)
In addition, India was a member of both the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Commission for Conventional Armaments during its tenure on the Security
Council. It also served on the United Nations Coundssion on Korea (UNCOK),
and ECOSOC's Commission on the Status of Women and the former Economic.. Em-
ployment and Development Commission. Finally, as of June 1952s Sir Bengal
N. Rau was serving as a judge on the International Court of Justices
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East West Conflict in the UN
India has consistently favored a conciliatory role for the UN in
dealing with international disputes and has opposed stress on military
aspects. Reversing a stand it took in 1947, India has for several years
favored admission of all applicants for UN membership. India has sup-
ported the West on a number of?important issues, and has voted with the
Soviet Union only infrequently, but where there has been a direct power
conflict between the two blocs., particularly if the use of force has been
involved, India has generally abstained from voting.
At the Fifth General Assembly in 1950 India abstained on the overall
Uniting for Peace Resolution which authorized the measures by which the
General Assembly could resist aggression if the Security Council was pre-
vented from acting because of a veto. In support of its abstention India
observed that "in the present international situation the creation of a
United Nations force would emphasize the compulsive rather than the media-
tory function of the United Nations and would, therefore, not help in the
creation of a proper psychological atmosphere for the preservation of peace."
Similarlyy, although India abstained on the section of the resolution creat-
ing a Collective Measures Committee (CMC) to study methods which might be
used to strengthen international peace and security it also abstained on
Soviet motions to delete this provision. India, however, was prepared to
support the section which established a Peace Observation Commission which
has functions of investigation and fact finding, and also, to accept mem-
bership on the Commission, Again, in the Sixth General Assemb India
abstained on the resolution upholding the report of the CMG on tie grounds
that it might increase East-West tension. It abstained in committee on
every paragraph but also abstained on a Soviet move to abolish the Collective
Measures Committee,
In 1949, India supported the Fourth General Assembly's resolution
"Essentials of Peace," which called on all members to support the work of
the UN, settle their di utes peacefully, cooperate toward regulation of
armaments, and exercise their national sovereignty jointly to the extent
necessary for the international control of atomic energy. Although India
had previously supported the UN plan for the effective control of atomic
weapons it now favors only those resolutions or parts of resolutions on
which tie Great Powers have agreed. Thus, at the Sixth General Assembly
India abstained on the western resolution for the regulation, limitation,
and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, while favoring
the creation of a new single Disarmament Commission, India also abstained
on the Soviet allegations that the United gtates was intervening in Soviet
internal affairs under the terms of the U. . Mutual Security Act of 1951
which authorized the use of funds to facilitate service in NATO forces by
refugees from beyond the Iron Curtain. India recorded another abstention
on the Western move to appoint a commission to investigate the possibility
of holding free elections in all of Germany as a necessary step to the re-
unification of that country. Though not objecting to the goal of unity per
so., India, in line with its attitudes favoring Great Power reconciliation,
has taken the view that the commision proposals in the f ace of Soviet op-
position, would not advance a solution of the German question.
India
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India has often joined in efforts to replace the Chinese Nationalist
delegation to UN bodies. It believes the UN's failure to seat the Communist
Chinese regime is a major factor contributing to existing world tensions.
The high mark of these efforts was in the Fifth General Assembly when India
introduced a resolution favoring admission of the Chinese Communist regime
to UN membership. Sixteen nations supported the resolution, 33 opposed it and
there were 10 abstentions. India then headed a Special Committee to study the
question of Chinese representation which was unable to come up with an
acceptable proposal.
On the issue of Korea India favored the initial establishment of a UN
Temporary Commission when this question arose in 1917, voted for its con-
tinuance in 1948, and its extension and enlarged authority in 1919 when India
became a member. India's presence on this body helped ensure the acceptability
of the commision's report clearly exposing North Korean aggression in June
1950. As a Security-Council member India supported the finding of aggression
and also upheld the resolution calling for assistance in repelling the in-
vaders.
India made no military contribution to the Korean war but it did send a
medical detachment. It strongly opposed the UN decision to cross the 38th
parallel and abstained on the General Assembly resolution for the unification
of Korea which implicitly authorized this step. Following Communist China's
intervention India rapidly assumed the role of eacemaker between the belliger-
ents. On In .ils initiative 13 Asian and Arab states proposed a three-man
cease-fire group which the General Assembly accepted. The Indian co-sponsored
proposal for a Far Eastern conference for peaceful settlement of "existing
issues" was not adopted. However, India's UN delegation chief, B.N. Rau,
served on the cease-fire group which drafted a statement of principles for a
Korean settlement, but this effort was dropped following Peiping's criticism
of the proposals in the press and over the radio*
Consistent with its efforts to win over the Peiping re to a position
of neutrality, India opposed the February 1, 1951, General Assembly resolution
condemning Communist China as an aggressor. It subsequently abstained on the
Ma 18, 1951 vote when the Assembly recommended an embar ? on strategic
materials to Communist China and North Korea. In reporting to the UN following
the adoption of the embargo however, the Indian Government pointed out that
the resolution would not affect India as there was no trade with China in
strategic items, and that India already had prohibited the re-export of these
items on the basis of its own domestic needs. India, however was agreeable
at the Sixth General Assembly to postponing consideration of the Korean question
pending a truce or other developments and supported a resolution to that effect.
Leader of Arab Asian Bloc
India has emerged as the leader of a group of Asian and Arab states which.,
in addition to the Arab States, generally includes Afghanistan, Burma, Indo-
nesia, and Pakistan. The members of this group share a broadly common outlook,
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vote together on a number of international issues, and have cooperated to
work out certain policies or lines of action in the UN. The members, to
varying degrees, have adopted a policy of noninvolvement in the East-West
conflict, tend to envisage conciliating and nonmilitant functions for the
UN, oppose "colonialism" and "imperialism", and seek economic assistance
for their nations) development.
Position on Colonial Issues
In line with its strong views on colonialism India has taken an active
interest in colonial questions before the UN, generally supporting the
principle of self-determination as recommended by the Sixth General Assembly
for inclusion in any Covenant of Human Rights. In January 1949 it sponsored
the Asian Conference at New Delhi which urged the UN to take steps to ensure
Indonesian independence. The vigorous stand taken at New Delhi contributed
in no small measure to the ultimate independence of Indonesia,
India has served as a prominent member of the Committee for Information
on Non Self-Governing Territories and has sponsored resolutions in several
sessions of the General Assembly looking to the political, economic, social,
or educational betterment of dependent peoples. It has steadily sought to
extend the authority of the UN in this field, one example being its unsuc-
cessful effort at the Second Assembly in 1941 to seek the conclusion of
trusteeship agreements for all colonial territories. It was one of the leaders
of the Arab Asian bloc which pressed for discussion of the Moroccan situation
at the Sixth General Assembly and of the Tunisian question by the Security
Council in April 1952. When these endeavors were rebuffed Prime Minister
Nehru gave public notice of the importance he attached to the UN assurance
of at least the opportunity to discuss colonial issues.
The disposition of Italy's former African colonies greatly interested
India and it took an active role in the UN discussions. In the spring of
1919 it opposed the Bevin-Sforza plan for the division of Libya which was
eventually rejected. It then supported the Fourth General Assembly's de-
cision to establish an independent Libya by 1952 and subsequently favored
the other arrangements for the colonies. These included a 10 year Italian
trusteeship in Italian Somaliland and an Eritrean-Ethiopian federation,
scheduled to be effective in September 1952.
Position on Human Rights
India's deep-rooted opposition to various forms of racial and other
discrimination is strikingly illustrated by the question of the treatment
of Indians and other groups in the Union of South Africa. India has annually
attacked in the UN what it considers to be blatant racialism practiced by the
government of the Union of South Africa, and has pressed the Union government
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to delay implementation of its discriminatory Group Areas Acts but to no
avail. In taking a generally restrained and responsible approach,howeverj,
it has supported recurrent efforts to arrange for a round table conference
of India and Pakistan with South Africa. The conference has not yet
materialized, and the Sixth General Assembly recommended that a three-member
commission be established to facilitate negotiations and called on the Union
of South Africa to suspend enforcement of the Groups Areas Act. India was
a co-sponsor of this resolution.
India's concern over the racial discrimination practices of the Union
of South Africa has been a fundamental motivation in the Indian efforts to
have it made accountable to the UN for the administration of South-West
Africa, India considers that this former mandate should become a trustee-
ship under the UN.
In line with its advocacy of nondiscrimination, India has been actively
represented on the Commission on Human Rights.
Position on Economic Development
As a country anxious to emphasize its independence but which is in
great need of foreign technical and financial aids India is among those
favoring greater assistance through the UN., rather than through bilateral
channels. This was demonstrated most vividly at the Sixth General Assembly
when India supported the U.5.-opposed proposal that the Economic and Social
Council submit plans for establishing a special fund for grants-in-aid and
long-term loans to underdeveloped countries. India had long favored such a
development fund and has twice proposed that moneys saved by disarmament
be applied to economic development. It is an active participant in the UN's.
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and recently increased its own con-
tribution to that program for 1952.
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Stage II
A-3-c. Does concern over political and economic imperialism color
Indians' attitudes toward the West?
India's top political leaders have a h er-sensitive aversion to
anything associated with colonialism (59-1
This aspect has been set forth above under question A -3p p.20.
In brief this concern lends color to all Indian thinking and conse-
quent attitudes toward the West.
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Stage II
A-4. What do the Indians think of the United States?
There is a definite ambivalence in attitude toward the United States.
Educated Indians know that the U. S. Government on a number of occasions
showed interest in seeing the U.K. make concessions to the Indian nationalists.
President Roosevelt personally pressed Prime Minister Churchill on this sub-
ject. The shipment of wheat .... to India, the Point IV aid and the Ford
Foundation activities in India can also be expected to have a beneficial effect
on the relations of the two countries. On the other hand many Indians tend
to be suspicious of U.S. intentions and to believe that the United States is
taking on the role and international policies formerly associated with the
U.K. They suspect an indirect policy of economic penetration and control.
Asia is back of India's alarm over the retention of U.S. bases and U.S.
military expansion in the Pacific. (42-22)
They believe U. S. is aiding France (December 19-q) in retaining colonies
in North Africa and is complacent about colonialism in order to maintain allies
in Europe to counter the USSR. The difference between U.S. economic and
military aid to Europe and that made available to Asia is also resented. They
are sensitive on race issue, Indian newspapersfeature epidodes involving rase
friction in the U.S. and they have the idea that all Negroes are grossly mis-
treated everywhere in the U.S. The advanced character of U.S. economic and
technological progress causes Indians to feel U.S. is not the country to look
to for clues to the solution of her difficulties. They are inclined to be-
lieve.that the U.S. is completely materialistic in outlook and is accordingly
lacking in artistic achievement and cultural interests. (42-23)
Policy toward the United States
India's policy toward the United States has been conditioned by the same
general factors which have determined the policy of nonalignment
cer-
tain Indian concepts of the United States. The immense power of the United
Stages together with the fear that the United States has certain imperialistic
policy objectives, particularly in Asia, are perhaps the two most important
factors responsible for Indian suspicions and fears of the United States, The
development of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union
together with the conflicting interpretations of U. S. policy objectives ap-
pearing in the U.S, press have made Indians apprehensive that the United States
might fail to show restraint in using its newly won power, causing a general
conflagration that India believes can be avoided. This basic suspicion may be
attributed partly also to the fact that the rise of U.S. power during World
War I l paralleled the decline in British power with the result that much of
the anti-Western and anti-imperialist feeling which developed during the period
of British rule has now been shifted to the United States.
been fearful that the United States, as the successor of the MU.KK.I daFrancee
to a position of world prominence, would become the defender of the status
quo in Asia and would prevent the full expression of Asian nationalism. Suspi-
cion was reinforced when the Indians interpreted certain U.S. actions in Asia
as evidence of indifference towards nationalist movements, namely, an apparent
initial
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initial delay in backing the Indonesians against the Dutch in 1949 con-
tinued recognition of the Chinese Nationalist government after what most
Indians believe to have been a clear shift in popular Chinese support to
the Communist regime, and in Indochina, the support of Bao Dais whom the
Indians consider an obvious French puppet. They have also resented what
they believe to be inadequate U.S, support of efforts by African and Near
Eastern nations to end colonial rule. Closely related to this as a cause
of anti-U. . sentiment is India's strong emotional concern over racial
discrii na o u The common Indian belief that racial discrimination is wide-
r reaa in the united States has led man Indian to think that the United
States desiring to continue "white mans rule is refusing to give any
but token support to Asian and Near Eastern na.ionalist movements.
Many Indians have also tended to believe that the United States has
considered affairs in Asia and Africa of secondary importance to Europe
where relatively larger sum :have been spent in economic and military aid.
Another cause of misunderstanding has been India's fear of U.S, economic
domination. Indians have been deeply concerned that a more subtle economic
imperialism might replace the imperialism just ended. Indians commonly
identify American capitalism with Indian capitalism which has generally been
less responsible more exploitative and similar to nineteenth century capitalism
in the Weest. Socialist and doctrinaire Marxist criticisms of capitalism are
faasit ve to educated Indian circles where there is general ignorance of the
si i achievements of American capitalism. Accordingly, many educated
Indians favor some form of socialist approach to economic problems. They tend
to fear that a capitalistic United States may not only be unsympatheticto
this view but might prefer that Asia be exploited by being forced to remain
a producer of raw materials and a market for Western surplus manufactured
goods.
In some res ects since the first years of independence there has been
an increase in Indian understanding of US motives and actions and some Indian
fears and suspicions have been reduced. Government and business alike now
generally recognize that U.S. capital is not clamoring to invest in the county,
and, in addition, are beginning to realize that if India is to make any signi-
ficant economic progress it will require outside investment. Indian govern-
mental statements that nationalization is not now contemplated were in part
designed to encourage American investment and by the spring of 1952 several
contracts with U.S. firms had bee siigned. S me Indian
are be ixning to feel that the U Go aosincere I ere
. vernmen~ may have a sincere in~eres~
in aiding Indians welfare and evelopment. This change in attitude can be
primarily attributed to thel60,000,000 U.S. loan for the purchase of grain
in 1951 during the acute grain shortage in India and the evident concern of
both U.S. officials and ordinary citizens to be of help. Other factors in-
fluencing this chance has been the implementation of the Point IV program
and a sympathetic and enthusiastic interest shown by U.S. Ambassador Bowles
in the Indian government's efforts to tacket the difficult economic problems
confronting the country.
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In general, however, US Indian relations have deteriorated during
1953 and 195. and probably the Indian attitude toward the US is now more
unfavorable U an it has been at any time since India became an independent
country. The growing Indian criticism of the US during the past two years
appears to reflect the fact that increased US activity in Asia has done
violence to some basic Indian attitudes towards foreign affairs., including:
(1) the traditional Indian anti-colonial attitude which arouses immediate
suspicion towards evidence of greater Western involvement in Asia; and
(2) Nehru's cherished concept of an Asian "no-war area"., independent of
either power bloc and presumably under his leadership.
The most prominent cause of Indian criticism of the US has been the
US Pakistan military aid agreement. Both the Indian press and officials
reacted violently to this development on the ground that such an arrange-
ment brought the cold war and possibly a hot war closer to India's door-
step. Less openly expressed but also of great importance was the Indian
anxiety that Pakistan would be strengthened vis-a-vis India in the dispute
over Kashmir. The US H-bomb tests in the Pacific during the spring of 1954
occurred at a time when the climate of opinion in India was already high
l
critical of US foreign policy as a result of the US Pakistan military ai d
agreement. Genuine horror of this US-sponsored explosion, combined with
widespread fear that racial prejudice entered into the selection of Asian
waters as a laboratory for nuclear tests tended to aggravate anti-American
sentiment. US refusal to associate itself with the results of the Geneva
conference also invoked a negative reaction in India., especially since India
conceived of itself as having played a significant part in the attainment
of a settlement. Finally US sponsorship of the Manila pact has been
vigorously condemned in India. In this case resentment at what was inter-
preted as a challenge to India's leadership of a neutral Asia seemed to loom
larger in Indian criticism than even anti-colonial sentiment. Moreover,
Indians appeared to view Dulles' collective security proposal as an attempt
by the Western powers to shape Asia's destiny to suit the strategy of the
cold war with no reference to the desires of free Asian countries. j%MLttt1x
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Stage II
A-t.. What do the Indians think of the West?
India offers a considerable number of factors which are either them-
selves directly favorable to the US or which provide opportunities for
exerting a favorable influence. Among these is the fact that India is
a free and independent nation whose government and people are strongly
desirous of preserving that independence. Also favorable is the fact that
India is a republic with a constitution strongly reflecting the liberal
democratic tradition of Great Britain and the Western democracies. These
traditions are, moreover, the dominant political ideology not only in
government circles, and the Congress Party, but among educated Indians
generally. Closely connected with the foregoing is the British influence
on Indian education and the fact that many educated Indians have studied
in Great Britain and the United States. Nehru's student Years at Harrow
and Cambridge left him with a deep-rooted respect for England's humanist
tradition, history, and. legal and political institutions. The cultural
transfusion effected by Western education is a highly significant point
of contact between India and the West and is undoubtedly one of the factors
accounting for the close and friendly relations that now exist between
India and the UK. The extensive use of ,English among educated Indians
which has been fostered by British educational influence is another important
bond between India and the UK as are also India's membership in the Common-
wealth of Nations and the strong economic ties between the two countries.
The common cultural heritage from Great Britain shared by India and America
forms an important basis upon which to build Indo American friendship,
India's membership in the UN and the strong support given the UN con-
cept by Nehru and the present Government of India are further factors
favorable to the US despite the fact that there is some criticism of the
US role in the UN. Indians sometimes accuse the US of trying to dominate
the UN and of ruling to make it an implement of American foreign policy,
The present Government of India, although it refuses to align India
with the West and follows a foreign policy which in important respects
clashes with that of the US, is nevertheless in several other respects
favorable to US interests. It is reasonably strong and stable. It has a
forward looking program of social and economic reform. It is strongly
anti-Communist at least so far as domestic Communism is concerned and al-
though tending to discount the threat of aggression from Communist China
and the USSR it is not unaware of their expansionist tendencies. It de-
sires to remain on good terms with the US as with all foreign powers and
while urging the development of self-reliance on the Indian people has
nevertheless thankfully accepted US economic and technical assistance. It
is probably from the point of view of US.interests the best government at
present possible in India.
The fact that Nehru so completely dominates the Government of India
and is virtually the sole author of Indian foreign policy though hardly
to be claimed as a favorable factor in view of his antipathy by and large
to America.-: and Americans,his misgivings regarding American aims and motives,
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and his intense opposition to US cold war strategy and tactics, provides
an unusual opportunity for influencing Indian foreign policy in a direction
favorable to our interest. To effect a change in Indian foreign policy, it
is necessary and sufficient to convince Nehru that such a change is desirable.
The adroit cultivation of Nehru by a skillful American diplomat could probably
do much to improve Indo-American relations and increase American influence on
the Government of India. Another factor favorable to the US is its long
record of humanitarianism. Indians are appreciative of our capacity to respond
generously to appeals for aid made in behalf of people in disaster-stricken
areas at home and abroad, as for example, the relier extended ti India during
its great famines near the turn of the century, the vital relief aid to the
USSR Ukraine in 1921-22, and the long-term low interest wheat loan to India
in 1951. While Indians tend to find many deficiencies in the American character,
they look approvingly upon our warmheartedness, generosity, and ability to get
things done.
In the economic sphere there are a number of factors favorable to the
achievements of US objectives in India. India's need for economic development
is both widely recognized and strongly desired. The Government of India has
laid great emphasis on economic developments and has given wide publicity to
its economic development programs -- the First and Second Five Year Plans --
with a view to arousing popular enthusiasm and support. These efforts have
had considerable success. The First Five Year Plan which is now three years
along was well conceived and although it got off to a slow start is now making
satisfactory progress. Indians recognize their need of improved agricultural
and industrial techniques and know-how and in the main look to the US and the
West to supply them. Similarly, it is to the West that Indians look for the
capital goods and equipment needed for their country's economic development.
Further, despite the strong Indian conviction that they ought not to accept
foreign economic assistance if any political "strings" are attached the
Government of India has accepted technical and economic assistance from the
US and publicly defended itself for doing so in the face of adverse criticism
from the Parliamentary opposition.
Another economic factor favorable to the US is that India's trade is
primarily with the West, Approximately 45 percent of India's total trade is
with the US and UK and less than 3 percent with the Communist Bloc countries.
The activity of US business in India can also influence that country
favorably toward the US -- as well as unfavorably. The success of Standard
Vacuum Company in maintaining and staffing oil refineries near Bombay on
a basis satisfactory to both them and to India has increased good will be-
tween Government of India and the American investor general ly. Conversely,
the inflexibility of General Motors before Goverment of India's insistence
on arrangements allowing the gradual creation of an automotive industry
engaged in the manufacture (and not merely the assembly) of parts resulted
in mutual recrimination and less of faith.
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Factors or conditions -which tend to influence India unfavorably toward
the US and the free world.
Foremost among the Indian factors which operate unfavorably to the
interests of the US is the Indian policy of non-alignment in the cold war.
Although Indian sympathies are more with the Western democracies than with
the Communist Bloc countries the Government of India steadfastly and. on
principle refuses to align itself with the West or accept US leadership in
world affairs. on the contrary it makes a point of pursuing an independent
course of action determined by its conception of India's own national
interest with the result that Indian foreign policy often clashes with that
of the US. The Indian policy of non-alignment has a number of.roots. First,
there is the desire not to compromise India's newly won independence.
Second, there is the desire to prevent, or at least to stay out of, a third
world war as they believe that a period of peace is necessary for carrying
out the economic development and social reforms required to consolidate
India's position as an independent nation. Third, there is their relatively
alight fear of Communist aggression and their grave concern regarding the
possibility of a third world war. Fourth, there are their misgivings regard-
ing US motives, their dislike of US cold war strategy and tactics, and Indian
analysis of the present world situation which differs fundamentally from that
which prevails in the US. Lastly there is a certain amount of distaste for
American culture and character which renders the idea of close ties with the
US unattractive,
India is keenly sensitive to any infringement of its status as a free
sovereign nation and shows deep concern regarding any outside interest in
its protectorates.. Sikkim and Bhutan, and its northern neighbor Nepal,
which although nominally independent is under strong Indian influence.
Indian nationalism constitutes one of the bases of India's foreign_ policy
of non-involvement and is an importance contributory factor in Inia s
refusal to accept foreign aid if political strings are attached. India is
determined to eliminate all foreign ownership of Indian territory, and mach
of the nationalist drive which characterized its suceessful campaign to
remove British rule has since independence been directedegainst the French
and Portuguese to relinguish control of their tiny possessions in India.
While France has transferred control of its Indian possessions to the Govern-
ment of India, Portugal has indicated it intends to retain possession of its
Indian pockets as long as possible. India's resentment of Portuguese in.
transigence in this matter tends to affect adversely its relations with
Portugal's fellow members in NATO. Indian nationalism also manifests itself
in the suspicious attitude toward US and other missionaries, particularly
those resident in the border areas.
TheAmarican effort to unite the nations of the free world in common
opposition to Communist aggression appears to Indians neither necessary
nor desirable. They believe that Americans overestimate the Comnunist
threat and misunderstand its real nature which in their view lies less in
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the danger of military aggression by Communist countries than in the
possibilities for Communist subversive activities in countries made
vulnerable to such activities by social,, political and economic ills.
India's intense anti-colonialism tends in the main to influence
India unfavorably to the US. Its influence is not however, wholly
negative, the fact that the US was also once a British colony that
achieved its independence only with a struggle and the fact of American
support for Indian independence constitutes a bond -- though not a very
strong one -- between the two countries. Indians are aware of the ex-
cellence of the US record with regard to its own colonial possessions,
especially the Philippines, but our past record is overshadowed by more
recent events. US support for metropolitan powers and colonial regimes
-- particularly the French in Indochina and North Africa --- has caused
the Indians to comment unfavorably on the disparity between US professions
of anti-colonialism and actual practice. While Indians generally recognize
that this practice has been dictated not by the desire to support colonialism
but because of what the US regarded as overriding considerations, they never-
theless feel that a policy that is constantly being overridden and which
therefore seldom or never determines action has ceased to have much reality.
Closely related to Indian disapproval of American support for colonial
regimes is Indian disapprobation of US support to regimes which the Indians
regard as discredited, reactionary or not genuinely representative of, cr
responsible to, the people of their country as, for exanle the
of Chiang , governments
Kai Shek Bao Dal., Castilla Armas, Franco, Rhee. The support of
these regimes the fndians regard as not only morally indefensible but in the
long run politically inexpedient. Indians hold that regimes which lack a
strong democratic base and remain in power through how anti-Communist they may i be are liable in the l outside osopbe bpero, nth overthrown
rowner
o t
by Communist regimes who ride to power on the tide ofngpopuln
ruar discontent,
Moreover the hold that the US exerts on these
amounts to a new form of colonialism. These regimes know tat htheyda esde-sort,
pendent on US support for their continued existence and that therefore they
must in the last analysis comply with US wishes or perish.
A set of factors very unfavorable to the US are the various disputes
between India and Pakistan of which the more important are the Kashmir issue
and the canal waters dispute, The question of whetl r Kashmir would accede
to Pakistan or India led to hostilities between the two countries which were
terminated by a UN cease-fire in January 1949, Both India and Pakistan have
since maintained armed forces in those parts of Kashmir which they hold while
attempts in the UN to arrange for Kashmir's demilitarization and the holding
of 'a plebiscite have failed as have also bilateral discussions between the
two countries. The canal waters dispute, which dates back to the partition
of the province of Punjab in 1947, centers on Pakistan's claim to water sup-
plies for certain of its cabals from headworks which now lie in India, The
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been in consultation
with Indian and Pakistani representatives since 1952 in an attempt to work out
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a mutually acceptable plan for the utilization and development of these
water resources. These two major controversies together with a variety
of other lesser disputes have so embittered Indo-Pakistan relations as
to make them a continuous problem to the US. They complicate and make
more difficult our relations with both countries and divert the energies
and resources of the countries into unproductive channels to the detriment
of economic development and political stability. US efforts through the
medium of the UN to obtain a settlement of the Kashmir dispute have not
only been unsuccessful but have exposed the US to considerable Indian
criticism, earlier on the ground that the US favored Pakistan in the dis-
pute and more recently on the ground that Americans had been carrying on
anti Indian intrigue in Kashmir,
In view of the strained relations that exist between India and Pakistan,
the Indian reaction to the American decision to extend military aid to
Pa star was strongly adverse, India felt probably quite correctl1y that
P istan's chief interest in obtaining milit ry aid was to strengthe!i Its
frontier vis-a-vis India and was perturbed at the prospect of any increase
in the military strength of its potential enemy. It was also resented as
a direct blow to India's aspiration for the creation of a "third area of
peace" in Asia. In consequence of the US decision to extend military aid
to Pakistan, Indo-Pakistan and US-Indian relations have deteriorated.
The extreme sensitivity of all Indians on matters of racial discrimina-
tion and color prejudice is a factor unfavorable to the US. Indians, in
general, believe that racial discrimination in the US is much greater and
more serious than it is and that Americans are much more influenced by color
prejudice than they are, Thus, for example, Indians believe it significant
that the A-bomb was not used against the "white" Germans but was employed
against the Japanese and that the US has conducted its nuclear weapon tests
in oriental waters, They are particularly sensitive about the treatment
accorded Indian emigrants and their descendants in areas under white domina-
tion e,g., South Africa British East Africa British West Indies where
Indians have been and MIT are subjected to humiliating disabilities These
include segregation of residence and public places, denial or restriction o
franchise, and limitations upon ownership of property and rights of trading.
Especially repungant is the apartheid (race segregation) policy of the Union
of South Africa. In former years Indians were greatly irritated by the dis-
criminatory laws prohibiting Indians from inmiigrating into, and acquiring
citizenshi ,in,the US, but their adverse criticism of US immigration and
naturalization policies had largely subsided since the exclusion laws were
repealed in 194.
The Hindu doctrine of ahimsa (non-violence) occupies a prominent place
in India moralizing. Its a ep ance tends to increase Indian susceptibility
to Communist peace propaganda.
Indian horror of weapons of mass destruction is a factor that works
against the US. Indians are aware that the USSR also has such weapons, but
the greater publicity given US tests of nuclear weapons and the fact that
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these tests have been held in Asian waters rather than at home as in the
case of the USSR have served to focus Indian disapprobation on the US
whom they regard as more reckless and menacing with regard to such weapons
than the Russians.
The Marxian interpretation of capitalist economics has an attraction
for Indian intellectuals, and they are inclined to be more critical of
US than of British capitalism. They tend to believe that propperity is
possible under the US system only as it keeps its industrial machine geared
to war requirements, and that the system exploits not only its own workers
but demands that US policies in Asia be exploitative.
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Stage II
A-Li-a. What identities and differences of interest do they see
between themselves and the U.S.?
Discussed in part under A-4 above.
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Stage II
A-4-b. What view do they have of U.S. leadership in the Free World?
There ist~atidM egt some ggrowing recognition that the United States
is making serious efforts for world peace and has no aggressive intentions,
although India does not always agree with U.S. policy in specific cases.
India opposed the U.S.-sponsored UN military move beyond the 38th parallel
in Korea in 1950 as an act provocative to Communist China but U.S. policy
during the peace negotiations has convinced many Indians that the United
States sincerely desired to end the war. During this same period Indian
suspicion of the Soviet Union has tended to increase.
United hStates centers in cWestern policy in Asia gseveral and the whhich
India strongly opposes. India continues to advocate the seating of the
Peiping Government in the UN and the recognition of its sovereignty over
Taiwan (Formosa) on the ground of its de facto control of China. India did
not attend the San Francisco Conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty because
of its view that no settlement in Asia can last unless it is acceptable
to all Asian powers, including Communist China. India has also objected to
the special position which the U.S. has maintained in Japan and the Ryukyu
and Bonin Islands.
The other important source of friction results from India's belief that
the United States fails to recognize the de th and importance of nationalist
movements in colonial and backward areas. (95-29)
Daring 195 Indian criticism of US leadership of the Free world with
regard to Asia increased. The US Pakistan military aid pact, Secretary
.less speech on "massive retaliation" the hydrogen bomb tests in the
Pacific,, and the conclusion of the Manila pact were interpreted by many
Indians as evidence that the US was abdicating political leadership
favor of reliance on sheer military power. The Formosa crisis in 1955 has
also raised Indian apprehension regarding US leadership. While most
politically conscious Indians probably believe that the US sincerely desires
to avoid war, they are fearful that some incident will occur which, in the
extremely tense situation, will set off a major conflict,
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A-L-o. How do they react to U.S. foreign policy generally?
See A-4 -b above, this section.
Also, A-4-e, below.
India is not likely to alter her foreign policy as a result of possible
US moves. Even in the event of war, she will remain neutral so long as this
is at all possible. Her attitude towards the US, however, will be adversely
affected b any moves which India interprets as likely to lead to a spread
of the conflict in Asia, or to a world war.
With regard to US economic aid, it is probable that, while the amount
of good-will generated by economic aid is not great, withdrawal or sub-
stantial reduction of such aid would adversely affect Indian attitudes
towards the US.
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Stage II
A-Li-d. Do they admire or condemn particular aspects of U.S. culture
as they see it? e.g., liberty, "materialism."
Suspicion and Envy of the Materialism and Mechanized Culture of the U.S.
Because of the limited contacts between India and the US during the
period of British control, the literate public in the area is just be-
ginning to replace its stereotypes of a materialist, largely uncultured,
and machine-dominated country with some knowledge derived either from
actual first-hand acquaintance with the US or from some reading of its
history,, ideas, and social institutions. Most Indian opinion of the U$
however s still composed lar ly of stereotypes based on impressions
gained (l) from the movies, (2)from British text books and general
British literature (which tended before World War II to concentrate either
on classical Greece and Rome or on developments in Europe and its colonial
empires, to the general neglect of the American hemisphere outside of
Canada), and (3) from items with sufficient maws value to be carried in
the local press. The following are some of the more common stereotypes.
(3.) Society in the US revolves around sex, with a high divorce
rate and little family life.
(2) The US has virtually no culture of its own and depends on
Europe for anything of value, while such developments as
jazz, swing, be -bop., movies,, and commercial advertising
are evidence of the debasement of popular taste and the
general lack of any indigenous intellectual or spiritual
values.
(3) The history of the US has been one of exploitation of vast
natural resources with emphasis on the accumulation of wealth
and on the production of mechanical gadgets for material com-
fort. This massing of wealth and tools has made the US one of
the strongest countries in the modern world but has not pro-
duced any outstanding intellectual or moral leaders. The
exercise of this power tends to be irresponsible and erratic
and may thus be extremely dangerous.
(!4) Closely
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(Ii) Closely allied with this view of US history is the notion
that US society disregards or is ignorant of the importance
of first principles and instead venerates wealth, material
comfort and power as ends in themslev?s.
(5) US politics are dominated by personal and party rivalries
and are subject to sudden shifts in public opinions; con-
sequently, major political decisions depend upon the mood
of the moment and not on any systematic philosophy or the
considered judgment of a particular leader or group of
leaders.
(6) Because of its wealth, the US scandalously wastes resources
which other countries would husband carefully.
(7) As a result of its power, its lack of any ancient cultural
tradition, and its disregard for the cultural patterns of
less successful nations, the US would like to impose the
"American Way of Life" on the rest of the world.
(8) Finally, it is widely believed by educated opinion in India
that although Abraham Lincoln succeeded in freeing Negroes
in the US from slavery he died a martyr and Negroes are
still treated as second class citizens, generally segregated
from social contact with whites and periodically subject to
the dangers of lynching.
Many of these stereotypes are colored by the natural envy felt by
weak and relatively poor countries for the obvious power and wealth of
the US. In the main, however, these views are based on ignorance, on
the limited opportunity for checking impressions through actual contact.,
and on the misunderstandings which almost inevitably arise between the
products of widely differing types of culture. Thus, in addition to
India's need for larger and more reliable amounts of information about
the US, and the extension of opportunities for mutual contact, there is
the particularly urgent need for the interpretation of US culture and
objectives in terms which Indians can understand and appreciate.
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A-4-e. What other factors contribute to the present state of
Indo-U.S. Relations?
There is a definite ambivalence in attitudes toward the United States.
Indians know that during their struggle for independence many of their
countrymen found a political haven in the United States and that there was
considerable sympathy for the Indian cause. Educated Indians also realize
that the U.S. Government, on a number of occasions, showed interest in see-
ing the United Kingdom make anncessions to the Indian nationalists, and
that President Roosevelt personally pressed Prime Minister Winston Churchill
on this subject. The warm welcome extended to Prime Minister Nehru during
his American trip in 1949 made a profound impression in India. The shipment
of wheat from the United States to India to reduce food shortages, the Point
IV aid, and the Ford Foundation activities in India can also be expected to
have a beneficial effect on the relations of the two countries.
On the negative side is the fact that to the ordinary Indian the American
looks, speaks, and acts so much like an Englishman that he inherits the bias
against the British built up over so many years. Furthermore, many Indians
tend to be suspicious of U.S. intentions and to believe that the United States
is taking over the role and international policies formerly associated with
the United Kingdom. Part of that role was the policing of Far Eastern waters
and the regulation of Asian trade.
The Indians do not expect that the United States will attempt any direct
colonization but suspect an indirect policy of economic penetration and con
tropoInd? Prime MipnisteertNehru has voiced hi cons rn over controlismt' before
The rear of growing U.S. intervention in Asia is back
of Indians alarm or the retention of U.S. bases and U.S. military expansion
in the Pacifis. This accounts for much of the unfavorable Indian reaction
to a Japanese peace treaty leaving American forces stationed in and around
Japan indefinitely, and its desire for a settlement in Korea stipulating
a total withdrawal of all foreign troops.
Other sources of dissatisfaction with American foreign policy include
the belief that the United States is complacent about colonialism in the
Far East because of the U.S. desire for allies in Europe to counter the
U.S,S.R. Indians have criticized the US for its failure to commit itself
in the Indian-Portuguese dispute over Goa and other Portuguese enclaves in
India. According to Indian critics, the US failure to bring pressure to
bear on Portugal is due to Portuguese membership in NATO and the consequent
US ridluctance to offend it, despite the merits of the Goa case.
The difference between US economic and military aid to Europe and that
made available to Asia is also resented. Indians were chagrined because
European
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European countries receive enormous sums as direct gifts, while the cost
of the wheat sent to India to avoid famine had to be arranged on a loan
basis, and then only after lengthy debate by the U.S. Congress.
Indians feel t hat the former immigration bars raised against them by
the United States were largely based on race and color, and they believe
that they are now allowed what is nothing more than a token immigration
quota to the United States. They are sensitive, therefore, to race issues
and tales of injustice and arbitrary treatment based on race. They hear
and read about the race problem in America; Indian papers feature any
episode involving race friction in the United States. Many Indians there-
fore have the idea that all Negroes are grossly mistreated everywhere in
the United States. Few have a clear picture of the regional nature of the
worst discriminatory practices or of the amount of progress in race relations
which has occurred in recent years.
The notion that the United States is an extraordinarily wealthy,
efficient, and technologic ally advanced country, free from economic and social
problems like those prevailing in India, makes for belief! that the United
States is not the country to which India must look for clues to the solution
of her difficulties. It is not realized that many of India's current problems
of sanitation, urbanization industrialization, and the like are precisely
the issues that the United states faced in times past. At the same time
most Indians are inclined to believe that the United States is completely
materialistic in its outlook and`is accordingly lacking in artistic achieve-
ment and cultural interests. There is virtually no knowledge of the degree
to which art, music, drama, and literature flourish and enter into the lives
of a substantial sector of the American population. Nor is there much ap-
preciation of the f acct hat the U.S. drive to taise the standard of living
allows for a much wider pursuit of artistic and intellectual interests by
the general population. (1i2-22 and 23)
In the field of foreign policy, the Congress advocates the maintenance
of friendly relations with all countries, continued membership in the
Com+aonwealth, and an independent policy Which avoids alignment with any
power bloc. However, increasing suspicion of the U.S.S.R. and China, the
definite communist threat at home, and the need for capital, which the
United States can furnish has disposed a number of party leaders to favor
closer ties but not direct alignment with the United States. (53..17)
The Kashmir dispute with Pakistan is also a factor in Indo-US relations,
US military aid to Pakistan has raised many new questions in India regarding
US neutrality in the dispute. The announcement of the US-Pakistan military
assistance pact led Prime Minister Nehru to demand the withdrawal of US
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-l-
members of the UN observers team in Kashmir on the grounds that they could
no longer be considered neutral. Furthermore Indian leaders have stated
that the US Pakistan agreement has "altered tie context" of the Kashmir
dispute and have indicated that India's position might be "reconsidered."
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Stage II
A-5. What other attitudes condition their vieve of East-West
tension?
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__
Stage II
A-S-a. Do differences and disputes with other nations of the area
affect the Indian attitude toward the U.S. and the West?
(e.g., the Kashmir and canal water disputes with Pakistan.)
Relations between India and Pakistan are under present circumstances
likely to continue much as at present for an indefinite period. No solu-
tion of the Kashmir dispute datisfactory to both countries is likely to
emerge and the present de facto partition of Kashmir is likely to continue.
India is not likely to resort to arms against Pakistan, nor under present
circumstances is Pakistan likely deliberately to go to war with India.
There is however, always the possibility that irresponsible elements may
touch oil hostilities. A solution of the canal waters dispute may, perhaps,
be reached in time, although present prospects do not appear particularly
bright. Some of the other outstanding problems between the two countries
may eventually be settled but it is unlikely that all of them will be.
Indian opposition to US military aid to Pakistan has outdone in violence,
intensity and duration any previous criticism in India of the US on a
specific issue. The US has been accused of partiality in favor of Pakistan
in the Kashmir dispute, and India asked that US observers be withdrawn
from the UN teams in the disputed territory. Increased suspicion of US
motives and actions also led to charges of US intervention and spying in
Nepal, which is virtually an Indian protectorate. There has also been some
criticism in India of the Turkish-Pakistan pact and other proposed Middle
Eastern pacts which are believed to be Western-oriented, on the grounds
that they are sponsored by the US and do not contribute to any relaxation
of world tension. The fact that Indian aspirations for leadership of an
unaligned Arab-Asian bloc may be frustrated by such pacts also contributes
to Indian resentment.
The formation of the Manila pact was also deeply resented in India,
Many Indians feared this development would unnecessarily inject cold war
problems into the area and increase tensions. Furthermore, the inclusion
of Pakistan and other Asian countries in what is viewed as a US-sponsored
pact runs counter to Nehru's concept of an Asian ttno-.wart area, pre-
sumably under Indian leadership.
The tension between the US and Communist China over Formosa and the
off-shore islands also affects Indian attitudes toward the US. India's
overriding concern in this situation is the fear that tension between the
US and Communist China in the area may lead to an open conflict resulting
in a third world war. While accepting the Communist claim to Formosa as
justified, India also appears to recognize -- without strongly disapproving
-- that the US intends to protect Formosa. Within this framework, the Indians
tend to view with approval any policy, whether advanced by the US or Communist
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which they believe to be conciliatory or helpful in securing a
cease-fire or a peaceful sdttlement. The US stand on protecting the
off-shore islands is not considered a policy contributing to the lessen-
ing of tensions and thus the Indian press has not hesitated to severely
criticize the US for it. In general, unless the Chinese Communists
engage in unprovoked aggression, US actions will probably receive more
criticism than those of Peiping, since most Indians feel that Communist
China is legally entitled to both Formosa and to off-shore islands.
US policy in Indochina and Korea also affects Indian attitudes
toward the East-West conflict. As with regard to Formosa. India is
primarily concerned with reducing tension and minimizing the chance of
open conflict in these areas. Thus US actions which are interpreted as
provocative or inflexible tend to be severely criticized in India, while
indications that the US is concerned with finding peaceful solutions to
these problems are viewed with approval. The US failure to associate
itself with the Geneva Agreement on Indochina evoked strong criticism
in India, and many Indians considered the extension of Manila pact guaran-
tees to include South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to be in contravention
of the Geneva accords.
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W-.
Stage II
,A-,-b. What influence do ideological, moral or religious concepts
have on the Indian attitude toward the East-West conflict?
Indians religlo-philosophical ideas and tradition, particularly
those of Hinduism, play an important role in shaping attitudes toward
the West. Educated Indians tend to assume that the peoples of the West,
parti cular4y those of the United States, have a materialistic, mechanized
and largely irreligious culture which has resulted in the development of
aggressive but insecure personalities, the destruction of family and social
ties, and the aggravation of international rivalry to the point where world
security itself is threatened. By contrast it is felt that India through
intensive meditation and philosophic speculation has achieved certain pro-
found religious insights which the world badly needs but which the materialistic
mind of the West either does not orcannot grasp, Furthermore, because the
spread of Christianity in India during the past two centuries has been
linked in the popular mind with British in erialist rule, Western professions
of Christian principles are often viewed with cynicism or distrust. (43-4)
The pacifism of India encourages a sense of moral responsibility for
peace.
The Indian judicial system includes a tradition of mediation. The idea
is to determine not what is right and what is wrong, but to find out what
is right in the positions of each side and to work out a solution acceptable
to both sides,
Indians would support our ideas of freedom, and dignity of the individual,
but in viewing the moral case as between East and West, they would see the
West as having exploited other groups and perhaps unconsciously having im-
pulses to continue economic and other interests at the expense of other groups.
Also, there is the feeling that the US is inclined to be belligerent. While
they condemn government control and the pressure and force associated with
Coimnuuni.sm, they view its objectives and improvements in living standards
under Comnunism as morally good. They see elements of good and bad in both
sides. They view capitalism as tending to be exploitative unless controlled
by government.
India is in fact imbued with a missionary zeal in the cause of pacifism
which has its roots deep in history. "We should make all attempts at a
peaceful solution so as to give the world no cause to accuse us of not having
done everything possible to avert war. We must omit nothing, no matter how
slender our hopescf success." The words might be Mr. Nehru's. In reality
they come from the Iord Krishna in the Mahabharata, India's great religious
epic which is as basic to Hindu thought as the Bible is for the West.
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Stage II
B. What.factors contribute to shape., strengthen,, or weaken these
attitudes?
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-5a-
Stage II
B-l. What is the content of the nationalist idea and sentiment in
India?
Despite the diversity of racial stockj, religious and linguistic
differences, great variety of customs, Indian civilization has in
Hinduism a fundamental unity in widely shared religious beliefs and
social institutions. jkftk~x This common cultural unity forms the
essential basis for the modern nationalist movements and nationalism.
The threat of Western influences and of external aggression only seems
to heighten the consciousness of common culture heritage and give con-
tent and emotional drive to the modern political nationalism which has
seized the nation.
Attitudes and reactions of the people
Nationalistic attitudes
India gained her independence in 1947 after a century of struggle
a ande that Iddanseb#eigivvenam oreaconsisddtration foe offici1ald ositiozns
and some voice in the control of tYhieir own affairs. At first, the pmove
for greater recognition of Indian talent and more self-government was
generally limited to Bengal, where the first Europeanized Indian intelli-
gentsia arose. But it was not long before these ideas spread to all corners
of the land and became a mass movement. The fact that the independence move-
ment was directed against domination by a f oreign people markedly different
in appearance, language, and customs, welded Indians together, despite in-
ternal political distinctions and differences. Leaders, slogans and
organized groups arose on a national basis. Gandhi, himself a Vaisya, could
not be said to hace represented any one caste or class. Scores of millions
of people participated in the noncooperation and Swadeshi (boycott of foreign
goods) protests against British rule.
In order to justify the independence struggle and to gain and hold their
mass following, the leaders of the nationalist movement had necessarily to
point to the past glories of India, to her alleged sufferings and repression
under foreign rule' and to her potentialities if she could but gain her
freedom. Slogans, songs, poems insignia, and even articles of apparel such
as the Gandhi cap became symbols which knit the people together in the
nationalist cause.
During this period British spokesmen asserted that they were giving
the Indians as much self-rule as they were ready for, and that the United
Kingdom had an obligation to remain in India to protect the progress toward
modernization that had been made and tD guard the interests of the minorities
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who would suC for if the Europeans left India before popular institutions
were firmly rooted. This led to heated and eloquent affirmations by
Indian leaders everywhere that Indians were able to govern their own af-
fairs and that the nation would hold together and prosper without British
guidance. Thus, a fierce and uncompromising nationalism grew up in an
effort to secure independence, and. he Congress Party, which led the move-
ment, elaborated social and economic reform policies to refute any charge
that the country would not benefit by independence. Millions of Indians
became dedicated to the liberation of their country; countless thousands
gave up education and personal prospects for advancement to join the
political movement; thousands more risked physical injury and jail to agi-
tate for independence. By the time the goal was achieved a broad segment
of the political leadership of the country was associated in the popular
mind with social and economic reforms and ideals of self-sacrifice.
Since the British withdrawal and the transfer of power to the Congress
Party, popular attitudes toward its political leadership have changed con-
siderably, The Congress Party still commands a measure of popular good will
principally because of its long association with Mohandas Gandhi, its role
in gaining independence, and its sponsorship of a land reform program.
Nevertheless the fact that the independent government has been unable to
make any substantial improvement either in rural or urban welfare has re-
sulted in a growing apathy toward the central government in rural areas and
in considerable disappointment and cynicism in urban areas, particularly
among impatient reformist elements. The Congress Party, however, is still
by far the best organized and the best-known political body. Its leader,
Jawaharlal Nehru, is a national hero with a substantial following throughout
the country.
With the achievement of the primary nationalist goal, the throwing
off of the foreign yoke, provincialism and separatist tendencies have come
to the fore., Nationalism and patriotism are still important influences
and valiant attempts are being made to further integrate the country. But
the vast distances, the relatively poor transportation and communication
systems, and a highly stratified society living in small villages encourage
localism and division. When questions pertaining to a national language
or to administrative units arise there is a strong interest in seeing that
local aspirations are considered. Any decision made for the national good
is bound to run counter to some local demands. Consequently, there are both
centrifugal and centripetal forces in India today; one of the real rroblems
facing the central government is how to achieve needed unity without out-
raging this or that region or section of the population. A planning com-
mission of the central government has issued a report outlining a five-year
plan for economic and social improvement on a national scale. Yet at almost
the same time Dr. B. R,Ambedkar, the most prominent leader of the un-
touchables, left the cabinet with the charge that Muslims in India are shown
more consideration than the Scheduled Castes.
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Still, in spite of all divisions, a definite national consciousness
is in evidence. The symbols of independent India are an expression of
this national feeling and its deep roots. The national flag is a hori-
zontal tricolor with bands of deep saffron, white and dark green. In the
center of the white band is a dark blue wheel, the wheel of the law
(dharma chakra) of King Asoka, as it appears on the abacus of the Sarnath
lion capital. In India the colors convey rich symbolism, the saffron
standing for courage and sacrifice, the white for peace and truth and the
green for faith and chivalry. The wheel symbolizes justice and fellowship.
The Indian National anthem, Jana Gana Mana composed by the great poet,
Rabindranath Tagore, is most appropriate for purpose of promoting unity,
for it was written largely with this aim in mind, as the opening lines
illustrate:
Thou art the ruler of the minds of all people,.
Thou Dispenser of India's destiny,
Thy name rouses the hearts of the Punjab, Sind,
Gujerat and Maratha, of Dravid, Orissa and Bengal,
It echoes in the hills of the Vindhyas and Himalayas,
Mingles in the music of Jumna and Ganges,
And is chanted by the waves of the Indian Sea.
With independence and the emergence of heroes and martyrs of the lib era-
movement movement a new set of holidays has come into force. August 15 the
date of transfer of power from the United Kingdom to India, is cele~irated
as Independence Day. January 26, the date the constitution became effective,
is celebrated both in India and by India's missions abroad as Republic Day.
The anniversaries of the birth and death of Mohandas Gandhi haver=also become
important occasions,.
Since modern independent India is so young a country and as the groups
which will guide tier destiny are still in the process of formation, there
has been little expression of popular aspirations concerning the future of
the country, as distinct from party policies. Newspaper opinion reflects
party points of view. Followers of Pandit Nehru want a secular state in which
Muslims will feel as unhampered religiously as Hindus; sweeping agricultural
reforms; much more extensive industrialization; state ownership and control
of most industries relating to transportation, communication, and defense;
a settlement on honorable terms with Pakistan; the termination of all Western
coloniali in sia; and the avoidance of any involvements with an ma or Dower
or ow r 9 c w chmight lead to in the near future Followers of Gandhi
support most of these same aspirat ions but differ in thaf they would emphasize
large-scale industry less and cottage industries and agriculture more.
Followers of right-wing Congress Party leaders, such as P. Tandon, former
President of the party, want less dependence on the West, a greater reliance
on old Indian pattern& of thought and action, a much firmer stand against
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Pakistan., and special concessions to Sikh and Hindu refugees from Pakistan,
Supporters of right-wing organizations, such as the Hindu Mahasabha would
like to see Pakistan reunited to India., by force if necdssary. Socialist
sympathizers and politically conscious peasant and labor groups want the
prompt redistribution of land, grants of land to the landless, and socializa-
tion of most industry. Communist supporters, who are still only about 5%
of the population, want a total rearrangement of social and economic life
under a communist dictatorship and a foreign policy closely following that
of the Soviet Union and China, Most Indians would like to see the country
become self-sufficient in food and grow strong enough to follow an inde-
pendent policy in international of i2s and to exert an influence commensurate
with the size of its population.
The establishment of a government responsible to the people and the
extension of political rights to all Indians have given opportunity for
the political expression of a number of tensions., divisions., and conflicts
which were formerly minimized by the prima objective of independence.
Although the prospect as of April 1952 was that the cohesive forces of
nationalism would remain dominant., numerous divisive tendencies had become
manifest -- many with considerable force. On the other hand the common
fight for independence has itself made an important contribution to the sense
of national community in India. This is reinforced by the common stakes in
the present extensive structure of government, the common system of education
and the common fund of ideas of the middle and upper classes who will continue
to be the main source of political leadership for some time to come, and the
all-pervasive Hindu social system which is still the most important cohesive
force at the village level. (53,5)
Whereas religion profoundly influences life throughout the country.,
education., press, and radio reach only a small. minority, principally in
urban areas. Education is still largely the privilege of the few with only
about 15% of thepopulation in 1951 estimated to be literate, The proportion
of government expenditures on education to total expenditures compares
favorably with modern states in the West. Because of the poverty of the
general population and the limited resources., however, actual expenditure
per pupil amounts only to a fraction of that spent in the West. In the past
the educational system has been geared primarily to preparing students for
a Western type of classical education and government service, India is
currently engaged in revising and reorganizing this sytem with three major
objectives: 1) the provision of a practical education on a universally com-
pulsory basis for all children between the age of 6 and llij 2) an emphasis
on scientific and technical subjects ...,..; and 3) a gradual replacement
of English with Hindi., the new national language, as a medium of instruction
.?....
All media of public information and opinion in the country are geared
primarily to serve the ......60 million inhabitants of urban areas where
most literacy is centered .....,.English is still the most widely used
medium....,.The guarantees of freedom of the press and speech in the
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constitution of India are broadly drawn." While there is an opposition
press which functions relatively freely, papers can be suppressed in the
interests of national security. The government exercises a monopoly on
radio. (43-2)
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--5--
Stage II
B-1-a. How strong is the Indian sense of national unity? What
factors tend to promote or hinder the growth of Indian
national consciousness?
The almost continental size of India., the diversity of the racial
stocks, the religious and linguistic differences dividing the people.,
and the great variety of customs have led to the common belief that the
country lacks a community of culture and interests. On the contrary.,
however,, Indian civilization from very early times has b een characterized
by a fundamental unity based upon common sympathies derived from widely
shared religious beliefs and social institutions?
Only a small section of the population remains outside the pervading
influence of Hinduism which by 300 B.C. became firmly established as an
integrated religious., social., and economic system., and spread throughout
the sub-continent.
Islamic invasions of the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries have
modified some aspects of the cultural and social scene., without., however.,
altering its essentials.
Modern technological., ideological and political institutions have
begun to show signs of penetrating more deeply into Indian society., to
affect the basic social structure and the prevailing view of life. For
the first time since the earliest days Indians basic cultural structure
is being undermined; change is increasingly involving the more funda-
mental aspects of the civilization. (4OA-l)
Factionalism along religious and caste lines continues to wo rk within
the new nationalism. As regards the outside world, however, Indians tend
to be highly and emotionally sensitive to real or presumed slights of their
country, and there is a corresponding idealization of the Indian past and
of all things India in the present. Western ways are simultaneously em-
braced and condemned for their destructive effect upon the indigenous
civilization. This cultural schizophrenia is psychologically distressing
to those caught in it, but its existence suggests that Indian civilization
will not become a carbon copy of that of the West., but will represent rather
a new synthesis of traditional Indian and characteristically Western patterns.
(40-6)
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In India, as in all of South Asia, internal conflicts created by
the evolution of new social patterns are a serious disuniting factor.
These conflicts were created by the impact of Western ideas, religious
beliefs, moral values, and productivity upon the folkways and mores of
a society in which the masses and plodding, illiterate, sub-marginal
farmers. All classes have been shaped by a way of life which strati-
fied society according to caste and legalized oppression of the lowest.
Western values acquired a special meaning because they were supported by
strong military force and by advanced technologies and sciences. Western
experience also infused a new element into the historic Hindu-Moslem
conflict which had torn the sub-continent for centuries -- that of
nationalism. Many Indians have accepted Western values and discarded
those of their fathers. Others have attempted to select desirable
elements from both. Some have reverted fanatically to their traditional
beliefs. Great numbers have relinquished their old beliefs and rejected
the Western ones, and drift aimlessly 000oa or fall prey to, the
false leadership of the Communists. The old ways of life are giving way,
or being modified; the strictures of caste and custom are being broken;
and the resulting conflict is a serious source of weakness to India.
Nevertheless, there were a number of important divisive factors.
Some of them have their roots deep in India history or in the social
structure while others are of more recent origin. Several minor parties
which support particular communal., local or regional interests have been
formed and have in some special instances succewsfully challenged the
national parties. Regional and local interests, strongly reinforced by
language differences, motivate the demands for autonomy or regional re-
organization by the Gurkha League in the eastern Himalayas and north Bengal,
by the numerous tribal parties in Assam and Bihar, and by such major
regional groups as the Punjabis and Bengalis in the north, the Gujaratis
and M.arathas, in the west, and the Telugus and Malayalis of Andhra and Kerala
in the south. Both rightist and communist elements have had considerable
success in exploiting regional sentiments the former in the Punjab and
Rajasthan, the latter in Andhra and Kerala. Religious differences have
been another divisive factor. Although the suspicion and distrust aroused
between Hindus and Muslims during the fight for partition is subsiding
and a number of Muslims, including several Muslim Leaguers, participated
in the 1951-52 elections, it will. take time and continued official effort
to assure whole-hearted political cooperation in many areas. In addition
to Hindu Muslim tension, considerable tension has developed between Sikhs
and Hindus in northwest India, as Sikhs have tended to blame the Hindus
for acquiescing in the partition of the Punjab and for the fact that the
central government has been unable to compensate the Sikh refugees for all
they have lost in Pakistan. There has also been considerable rivalry over
political jobs and influence between the sizable Christian population and
the Hindus in the United State of Travancore-Cochin in south India. (53-4)
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Nationalist sentiments, which are of recent growth in India, have
succeeded to a certain extent in weakening centrifugal forces and over-
riding sectional loyalties. Important elements in these sentiments are
pride in India's past, attachment to the motherland as a territorial
entity, and a growing national self-respect. Their strength is seen in
the reaction of all Indians regardless of caste, religion, locality or
language to the racial discrimination against Indian nationals as
practiced in South Africa.
Nationalism also evinces itself in a concern for India's dignity and
prestige in the desire for a place in the international sphere commensurate
with India's size and ancient position as a fountainhead of Asian culture,
and in the belief that India has a contribution to make in solving the
world's problems. Nationalism may thus prove to be a stimulus to India's
efforts to advance towards the social and economic goals set up during the
struggle for independence and emphasized by the present government.
At the present time, however, it is doubtful that nationalism has taken
strong enough root in the population as a whole to make an important con-
tribution towards a stable sociopolitical system.
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Stage II
B-1-b. Have Indians a pride in their nation, its history and
achievements? To which features of these do they point
with pride?
Like other peoples the Indians have a deep pride in their own
cultural and religious traditions. They point with especial pride to
the beauties of their art and architecture, their forms of dance and
music, the broad toleration and the philosophic profoundities of
Hinduism and the ancient origin of these attributes of their life
antedating most of Western civilization and that of the rest of Far
Eastern Asia to which they contributed so much including Buddhism it-
self,, the religion of milll= of Chinese,Japanese and the majority of
the peoples of Southeast Asia. It is this consciousness which causes
the leaders of India to feel that they have an inherent right to a
role of leadership in Far Eastern Asia, and more particularly in
Southern Asia.
Most of the arts existing in India today have a long tradition and
much pride and sentiment attached to them. Architecture, sculpture,
and even casting in bronze were highly developed in the Indus valley
cultures of 5,000 years ago, One of the bronze figures of this early
period is that of a dancing girl, suggesting that the dance, too, is one
of the country's most ancient arts. Students of art are familiar with
the stately pillars with their carved capitals and noble inscriptions
erected by King Asoka at various places in the country well before the
Christian era. At least eight of these pillars remain in good condition
today. To this same early period belong outstanding carvings of both
real life and inanimate subjects. To the first and second centuries before
Christ also belong the great Buddhist shrines of Bharhut, Sanchiy and Bodh
Gaya, with the rounded mounds (stupas) for the relics of the Buddha and
the carvings in relief on the railings depicting the story of his life.
The cave shrines and monasteries of Ajanta and Ellora with their
frescoes and figured sculptures date fromthe fifth and sixth centuries
after Christ. Through the years a number of styles of temple construction
developed. In modern temple construction, such as that of the Birla
Temple in Delhi, there is an attempt to reconcile and utilize the features
of a number of these forms.
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Artists everywhere pay tribute to South Indian bronzes, which have
been skillfully made from the tenth century to the present day. Some of
the representations in bronze of the god Shiva as Nataraja (the lord of
the dance) are considered especially noteworthy for grace, power, and
symbolic portrayal.
Indian literature goes back to 1500 B.C. whem some of the hymns of
the sacred Vedas must have been composed. From that point there is a
chain of important literary expression. The great Indian epics' the
R a*ana and the Mahabharata, which were probably compiled and reworked
for hundreds of years before they reached their present form, have provided
the aspiration for much of the painting, drawing, writing, and sculpturing
down to the present day.
One of the first great Indian authors about whom we know something
definite is Kalidasa, who lived in the fourth and fifth centuries after
Christ. His poem Cloud Messenger and his play Shakuntala are still widely
read today. mother import figure in India's lit re ary history is the
Hindu poet, Tulsi Das (1532-1623). His version of the Rmayana has been
both a literary and a religious force in northern India, In addition to historical and legendary episodes, a favorite theme
for nationalistic novelists and poets during the long struggle for in-
dependence was attacks on Western imperialism and criticism of British-
imposed Western ideas and mores. Socialist and communist attacks on
Western imperialism attracted a number of able and well-known writers.
such as Mulk Raj Anand, Bankim Mukerji, and Harindranath Chattopadhya.
These writers, although now closely associated with the Indian Comttmanist
Party's propaganda activities, have achieved a reputation both for their
writing ability and for the nationalistic tone of their work, and continue
to exert considerable influence,
In India. the dance is a highly developed art form with a long tra-
dition and an involved technique. An intricate language of hand gesture
(mudra) has grown up which is so precise and detailed that anyone who
knows the key can follow the episodes and story _
alist movement encouraged intellectuals to take an activeyinterestain the
dance as an important part of the nation's cultural heritage. Several
schools were started, the best known being those of Rukmini Devi and one of
her pupils, TJday Shankar. These schools concentrate on traditional dance
forms, but are also developing new dances for traditional themes as well as
new themes,
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Indian classical music is highly developed technically. Indians
tradition of painting is almost as old as its other arts. The paintings
in the rock-cut temples of Ajanta and Ellora and the fresco paintings
of Bagh in Gwalior were on a grand scale and have been acclaimed by ex-
perts as unsurpassed up to the time of the greatest of the Italian masters.
Indian artists showed a talent for miniatures as well, as shown in the
illuminated manuscripts of the Pala school of Bengal (ninth to twelfth
centuries after Christ) and the Gujarati school (eleventh to fifteenth
centuries after Christ).
Indians are proud of their successful struggle for independence and
of their achievements since 1947 in attaining national unity, in formulat-
ing a democratic constitution and in carrying out their economic develop-
ment programs.
Indians also take pride in their country's increasing prominence in
world affairs and believe that India,under Nehru's guidance, can continue
to make, a significant contribution to world peace. Indians tend, however,
to be very sensitive to any indications that Indians position of nonalignment
and what they conceive to be its role in bridging the gulf between East and
West is misunderstood or not appreciated by either side.
Indians were proud of the role they were called upon to play in Korea
and believe that the Indian representatives on the Repatriathn Commission
brought credit to India. Most Indians also felt that, while India was not
officially a participating member of the Geneva Conference, it played a
significant and commendable role in representing "independent Asian views''
to the conferees and in bringing about a cease-fire in Indochina. The
selection of India as chairman of the supervisory commission in Indochina
has been a source of pride to many Indians, who feel that it is another in-
dication of the usefulness of India's position in the cold war and of the
confidence both sides have in India's impartiality.
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Stage II
How do Indians look ppon themselves and their culture in
comparison with the people and culture of other countries?
Indians take great pride in their ancient culture (as shown else-
where in this paper). At the same time they are aware that they have
been left behind in the technical field, are anxious to catch up, and
are afraid they may not. They consider their religion as superior
and all-embracing.
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Stage II
B-1-d. How do Indians regard other countries and their nationals,
especially the USSR and China, Europe and the U.S.?
'Policy toward the Soviet Union
India's relations with the Soviet Union have been formally correct,
but with little evidence of positive friendliness. These relations
reflect the government's keen awareness of India's vulnerability to
Soviet attack and the desire to demonstrate the genuineness of India's
policy of nonalignment with either the eastern or western power blocs.
The Indian Government has generally refrained from criticizing the Soviet
Government and has endeavored to remove or prevent frictions between the
two countries. These efforts to minimize criticism of the U.S.S.R. are
sometimes interpreted by non Indians as favoring the U.S.S.R. particu&
larly when viewed in conjunction with the strong Indian criticism of the
United States on some issues. India, however, has shown no interest in
developing close relations with the Soviet Union. The contrast between
India's attitude toward the Soviet Union and its attitude toward the
United States appears to stem from four major considerations. First there
is India's profound fear of provoking its more imne diate neighbor. Second
is the apparent feeling that because of the retention of the Commonwealth
tie and of Western-inspired political institutions, India must take special
measures to convince Asia and the Near East as well as the Soviet Union
of its own complete independence and its policy of nonalignment. Third is
Indians belief that the only hope of surviving as an effective mediator
between the two power blocs is to maintain a meticulously correct attitude
of diplomatic courtesy towards the rigidly controlled government of the
Soviet Union; whereas relations with the United States, another democratic
nation, may be put on a free give-and-take basis, including frank exchanges
of criticism and conflicting ideas. Finally, there is the Indian conviction
that the wartime losses of the Soviet Union left that country with a de-
termination to delay involvement in a third world war so that it might de-
vote itself to consolidating its position in eastern Europe and to strenghen-
ing its outer defenses. By contrast it is felt that the wartime successes
of the United States and U.S. superiority in atomic weapons might tempt it
to precipitate a general conflagration either through some hasty action or
as the result of a deliberate policy of a preventive war.
The USSR's rebuff of India's conciliatory efforts in mid-1950 has
dampened India's more optimistic expectations of helping achieve an early
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negotiated
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negotiated settlement between the two power blocs. Nevertheless, India
continues to believe that neither power bloc can eliminate the other and
that India eventually might have the opportunity of contributing to world
peace by bringing the two blocs together in negotiating a mutually acceptable
agreement. Many Indian leaders are growing increasingly suspicious of
Soviet objectives while beginning to develop a better understanding of U.S.
policies and points of view. Nevertheless, there is still widespread Indian
belief that the U.S.S.R. has serious reasons for wanting to avoid a world
war and there is considerable Indian fear that U.S. public opinion is suf-
ficiently unpredictable that some unforeseen incident might suddenly convert
the cold war into a hot one. First the Indian press and then even govern-
ment officials have become more openly critical of Soviet tactics and achieve-
ments since the first three years of independence, However., the four basic
considerations which determine Indies policy of nonalignment, though somewhat
modified in the light of experience have not substantially altered.
Apart from political and strategic considerations there.was at the
time of independence a great deal of Indian curiosity about Soviet eco-
nomic achievements. The speed with which the Soviet Union industrialized
a backward and predominantly agricultural economy to convert itself into
a dominant world power in less than thirty years had aroused considerable
interest and respect among educated circles in India. It was felt that the
problems confronting India of a peasant and illiterate population living
under a strongly traditionalistic social system were very similar to those
tackled by the Soviet Union at the end of World War I. Prior to independence
Indian curiosity in Soviet achievements had acquired a strong nationalist
tinge as a result of the restrictions placed by the British Government of
India on Indian contacts with the U.S.S.R. In Indian eyes a visit to the
Soviet Union tended to take on the aspect of a patriotic gesture of defiance
of British authority. Many educated Indians resented vh at they considered
to be officious British efforts to control what Indians should see or think.,
adopting the view that the people of every nation have the right to male
their own investigation of any problem that is of concern to them and to
come to their own decisions. To Indian curiosity in the Soviet experiment
was added considerable interest among socialist circles for some of the
philosophy of consminism, and since British restrictions made first-hand ob-
servations difficult., a marked tendency to note only the positive achieve-
ments of the U.S.S.R. and to give the Soviets the benefit of every doubt.
Since independence, however, many of India's glowing expectations over
what was to be learned from the Soviet experiment have been giving why to
growing disillusionment. A number of Indian leaders are becoming increasing-
ly aware of the aggressive and expansionist nature of Soviet aims. Prime
Minister Nehru has confidentially indicated that he has grave apprehensions
concerning
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concerning Soviet intentions. Distrust of Soviet intentions has also been
growing among educated Indians as the propagandistic nature of the Soviet
"Peace" campaign and the "behind-the-scenes" role of the U.S.S.R. have
become more obvious. Some visiting Indians have been taken in by the os-
tentatious treatment accorded them in the U.S.S.R. but a few of the more
discerning have noticed Soviet limitations on efforts to make first-hand
observations, or to get information on Soviet discoveries and techniques.
Indian leaders are still trying to gather information on Soviet achieve-
ments and experience that might be of use to India. However, they repeat-
edly note the great human cost of the Soviet gains, clearly indicating that
India does not consider such methods acceptable. Indian leaders, having
decided in favor of institutions of representative and responsible govern-
ment, are openly critical of the authoritarian nature of the Soviet system.
During 1954 the USSR and satellites increased their efforts to expand
their trade with India. The Soviet Union also made several dramatic offers
of technical and economic assistance to India, thus challenging for the
first time Western preeminence in this field and attempting to exploit the
propaganda potential inherent in such programs. The most noteworthy develop-
ment was the signing of an agreement between India and the USSR in February
1955, providing for extensive USSR credit and technical aid in the construc-
tion of a 1,000,000 ton steel mill in central India. If construction to
modern standards proceeds with reasonable dispatch, this project will im-
press many Indians as tangible evidence of Soviet willingness and ability
to promote their development goals. Indian officials, on the other hand,
are aware of Soviet motives. In accepting technical assistance, the Indian
government will doubtless take measures to limit political activities on
the part of Soviet personnel and to prevent the use of rupees obtained by
the USSR for subversive activities in India.
The increased suspicion of the U.S.S.R, has been aggravated by the
emergence in the 1951-52 elections of the Communist Party as a relatively
small but well-organized and potentially significant force in Indian
politics. The Indian Government is becoming increasingly aware of the
international character of the party and its threat of subversion. In con-
trast to the formally correct attitude of the Government of India toward
the Soviet Union, is the determination with vhich it has put down all
attempts at subversion and public disruption by the Communist Party of India.
Although growing suspicion of the U.S.S.R. has begun to make an important
change in Indian attitudes toward the U.S.S.R, since independence any major
formal shift in Indian policy toward the U.S.S.R. in the near future is unlikely.
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Both Indian Government leaders and most politically conscious
elements among the Indian public apparently believe that the U.S.S.R.
is not prepared to risk a world war and is relying instead on extend-
ing its power and ideology by working through local Communist parties.
The fact that the Soviet Union has not attempted the direct military
conquest of any of the weak countries on its southern border and has
refrained from sending Soviet troops into Korea appears to have en-
couraged this belief. The Indian Government takes the view that if
the noncommunist world could refrain from all acts of provocation,
generally suppress comment hostile to the Soviet bloc, and concentrate
its efforts on localizing and settling all points of conflict between
the communist and noncommunist world in peripheral areas, a third world
war could be prevented. At the same time the government believes that
each nation should take firm measures against internal communist groups
and that all free nations should work together to alleviate conditions
of poverty, and political unrest which foster the growth of communism.
Policy toward China
Since the consolidation of the Communist regime in China, India's
conciliatory policy toward the Peiping regime has been motivated by
several factors: (1) India's overall desire to maintain good relations
with all countries, while remaining aloof from the cold war conflict;
(2) a desire to reduce world tensions by acting as a mediator between
Communist China and the West; (3) the hope of facilitating a weakening
of the ties between China and the USSR; (4) the need to avoid antagoniz-
ing Communist China, a superior military power; and (5) the hope that
friendly and conciliatory treatment will beget a like response. Despite
its policy of friendship, however, India has been increasingly sensitive
to, and apprehensive of, the growing danger of Communist infiltration
across its northern border, and the potential challenge posed by Communist
China to India's aspirations of leadership in southern Asia. As a result,
the Nehru government has made efforts to develop India's economy and to
strengthen the country's northern border defenses. In addition, probably
with an eye to recent events in Southeast Asia, India has pursued a policy
described by one of Nehru's senior officials as "moral containment,"
This policy consists of publicly welcoming Communist China's peace propa-
ganda, advertising it as widely as possible and attempting to extract more
and more specific assurances of peaceful intent from the Peiping regime,
on the theory that putting the spotlight on its peaceful professions will
make it more difficult for Communist China to indulge in more expansionist
activities. The great emphasis Nehru has given in his public speeches to
the "five principles" enunciated by Nehru and Chou En-lai in June 1951, is
part of this technique.
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Policy toward Asia and the Near East
As the largest and most power.nation in South Asia, Indian inter-
pretations of world events have considerable influence with other nations
in this area from Afghanistan to Indonesia. India influence is particu-
larly strong with Burma and Indonesia, countries which have also recently
emerged from colonial status. India has indicated that the territorial
integrity of Burma is a matter of special concern and that India could
not be disinterested in any violation of it. The close personal under-
standing between Burmese Premier Thak_i.n Nu and Indian Prime Minister Nehru
further strengthens the bond between the two nations. In January 1949 India
also took the initiative of sponsoring' a conference in New Delhi in behalf
of Indonesian independence. At this conference 19 nations adopted a resolu-
tion calling upon the Security Council to take firm and definite steps to
reestablish the Indonesian Republic, end Dutch aggression, and free Indo-
nesian leaders. Since that time relations between the two nations have been
very friendly.
Indian relations with Ceylon have been somewhat strained as a result
of Ceylon's virtual disenfranchisement of Indian minorities in Ceylon, The
economic and political rights of the Indians, mostly Tamils who work on the
tea and rubber plantations, are still under negotiation between the two
governments. Like other nations of South Asia Pakistan's foreign policies
are determined by much the same considerations and points of view as guide
India. Pakistan, however, is so anxious to emphasize its independence of
India that Pakistan generally takes pains to avoid the semblance of pollow-
ing India's lead.
India consistently has taken an active interest in all efforts toward
regional cooperation, When India became independent in 1947 it appeared
,anxious to participate in and to lead an Asian regional organization com-
posed of all the major Asian states. At the end of World War II the Indian
expectation apparently was that nationalism in Asia would be the cohesive
force necessary to bring the nations together and that this would have suf-
ficient strength to outweigh the factors tending to pull some of the nations
into the orbit of the two major power blocs. India apparently hoped that
a grouping of Asian nations might act as a "third force" between the power
blocs and as a mediatory influence upon them. Other motivating factors
were the increased prestige that would be India's as a leader of this third
bloc and the natural Indian desire to see Asian nations play a more prominent
and influential role in world affairs.,
With the unofficial support of the government, the Indian Council of
World Affairs in the spring of 1947 convened a 10-day conference in Delhi
of representatives of international relations study groups from Asian
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countries and observers from U.S., U.K., and Australian organizations
to discuss world affairs, with particular reference to Asia. The Inter-
Asian Conference set up a small permanent secretariat at Delhi to carry
on a program of research and publication. A second conference was
scheduled to be held in China in 1949 but the Chinese Civil War inter-
vened.
The New Delhi Conference on Indonesia in January 19149 was the in-
dependent government's first official effort to bring Asian nations to-
gether to discuss a mutual problem. Attendance, however, was limited to
nations of South and Southeast Asia. Considerable discussion in closed
sessions was devoted to the question of whether the conference should
recommend creation of a permanent regional organization, but by this time
India was hesitant about the idea and, upon Nehruts insistence that the
time was inopportune for creating such an organization, the question was
dropped. However, the conference passed two resolutions which recommended
that the nations keep in close touch with each other through normal diplo-
matic channels, instruct their UN representatives to consult among them-
selves, and explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery for
the purpose of promoting consultation within the framework of the UN.
By January 1949 the position of the Chine se National Government was
very tenuous and the possibility of a change of government in China intro-
duced a new factor into the picture of an Asian regional organization. To
India= a regional organization without China was unthinkable, but a
Communist China undermined the basic concept of nonalignment, and differences
of view with respect to the merits of the new government were likely to
prevent effective cooperation among all Asian nations.
In 1950 when the Philippine Government called the next conference of
Asian nations at Baguio, it was evident that the Asian nations -- exclusive
of the uninvited Communist Chinese and North Korean governments -- were
divided in intent and that not,only were the Indian and Philippine govern-
ments vying for Asian leadership but that they representedtwo conflicting
views on the purpose of an Asian regional organization. The Philippines
favored a strong anti-Communist stand whereas India still advocated a
regional grouping more in line with India's own policy of nonalignment.
Common interests and points of view have also led the nations of the
Near East into increasingly close cooperation with Asian countries in the
UN. Although there have been some unofficial expressions of sympathy and
support for -Muslim Pakistan the nations of the Near East generally have
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been careful to refrain from involvement in the disputes and rivalry be-
tween India and Pakistan. India has generally sympathized with nationalist
demands in the Near East and these nations in turn have looked to India
for support of such demands.
Many of the Near Eastern nations have-problems similar to those of
some nations in Asia; all are underdeveloped and need a long period of
international peace and extensive capital and expenditure; all occupy
fairly exposed positions along the Soviet border; and most of them have
at one time or another experienced colonial rule. These factors have dis-
posed virtually all of these nations to favor in varying degrees a policy
of noninvolvement in the East-West conflict and to take similar views on
many other international issues, (55^.29 to 33)
India is not interested in the formation of an Asian Bloc in the
sense of a military alliance, but is in favor of bringing together as
many countries as possible who wish to take an independent stand in tk
East-West conflict and act as a neutral force. The countries of South-
east Asia and the Arab Bloc are of particular importance in this respect.
Partly with a view to winning their support, India ehampions the nationalist
cause wherever this comes into conflict with colonialism,
India's attitude towards the Commonwealth, of which she is a member,
is in brief that it provides a forum for joint consultation on problems of
common interest and imposes no restrictions on India's domestic or foreign
policies. Although India has frequently taken an independent stand, and
her relations with two of the Commonwealth countries, Pakistan and South
Africa, are strained, her ties with the UK are close and friendly and she
is probably more susceptible to influence exerted by the UK than by any
other country.
Indiats attitude towards other Asian Powers is influenced by its
position in the East-West conflict as well as by its desire to assume
a position of leadership in Asia. Because most of the ccuntries of South
Asia face with India a common threat from the USSR and Communist China
and as most of them have also been involved at one time or another in the
struggle against Western colonialism, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indo-
nesia, and even Pakistan tend to be influenced by India's evaluation of
international affairs and foreign policy. This has been particularly
evident in the comment and reaction of these countries to developments in
Asia, Although the mutual suspicions dividing India from Pakistan and
Ceylon have in any case made the formation of a regional political bloc
impossible, India itself has hitherto opposed any regional political
alliance that might appear to be directed against the Soviet bloc, How-
ever, India's recent efforts to organize an Arab-Asian bloc in the UN to
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a neutral settlement of the Korean issue may be a precursor of similar
attempt.: in the future. While India has opposed the formation of a
regional political alliance, it has not been cpposed to cooperating with
the Commonwealth in a regional. organization for the economic development
of South and Southeast Asia. Thus India cooperated in the recent draft-
ing of the Colombo Plan and is expected to play a leading role in its
implementation.
Indians accuse the U.S. of favoring Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute
and Pakistan's participation in a military aid pact with the US, the
Manila Pact and Turkish-Pakistan pact, interpreted as a quid pro quo
for US support, Under present circumstances, offers of similar treatment
on arms supply would probably not be accepted. Attempts to reassure India
with regard to possible Pakistani aggression or other guarantees by the
Western powers will not go far towards lessening these adverse affects.
In general, India's foreign policy, as stated above, is independent
of action by other Commonwealth countries, or "colonial" powers. Action
taken by the UK, however, and to a certain extent by other Commonwealth
powers, such as Canada or Australia, is likely to have some effect on
Indian policy.
Intensification of the USSR's peace propaganda with or without offers
of trade opportunities are not likely to draw India closer to the USSR.
Effects of the peace propaganda can be discounted, and while India would
doubtless avail herself of any advantageous opportunities to increase her
trade in non-strategic commodities with either China or Russia, such trade
probably would not effect her policy.
In spite of this desire for neutrality India dislikes and fears the
policies of the USSR more than she does those of the western powers and
realizes that should she have to abandon her neutrality, she would probably
side with the west. India believes that the threat to world peace can
best he met at the present time by weakening the USSR to the extent that
she will no longer be in a position to pursue her aims by military means,
To detach China from the Soviet orbit and thereby to reduce the USSR's
strength is one of the immediate goals of India's foreign policy, She
believes that there is a possibility of doing this, and that a necessary
first step is to secure the recognition of the Chinese Communist govern-
ment, and the admission of its representatives to the UN, India's friendly
relations with Communist China are maintained partly with a view tow:aken_
ing this country's ties with the Soviet Union, There is little evidence
that to date India has made much progress in this direction, A feeling of
"Pan-Arianism" and a strong desire to work out somehow a modus vivendi
with a powerful neighbor also influence Indian attitudes towardshe`Chinese
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Should India become convinced that her China policy had no hope
of success, she would abandon this approach. It can be expected,
however, that she will not substantially modify her general position
of non-alignment in the East-West struggle, unless and until she feels
that her own vital interests are at stake,
Increased support of subversive elements in India by the USSR or
China would probably have an adverse effect on Indian attitudes toward
these countries, but would. probably not have any,practical effect on
relations between the countries concerned unless it should reach such
proportions as to endanger governmental stability. Within her own borders
India apparently feels capable of dealing with subversive activities
on the part of Indian-Comnunists. Should Soviet or Chinese support of
subversion within the principalities along India's border, particularly
in Nepal, be materially increased, India would. probably be forced to build
up her defense program.
Further diplomatic rebuffs from China may have, cumulatively, the
effect of discouraging India in her efforts to detach China from the
Soviet orbit, but she is not likely to desist altogether from her attempts,
nor to abandon hope of eventual success until aggressive action on China's
part in some area vital to Indiats security makes friendly relations with
China impossible.
India will react most unfavorably to Communist military intervention
in Southeast Asia, particularly in Burma, but less so in Iran or Afghanistan.
There is evidence that India is already apprehensive of China's intentions
with regard to South and Southeast Asia, and such action would increase her
fears for her own safety, and would lead her to intensify her defense program.
It is probable, also, that India would contribute troops, at least in token
numbers, to any UN force which might be formed to defend Burma in a case of
Communist aggression against this country. In a similar case affecting Iran,
Afghanistan, or any of the Southeast Asia countries more remote than Burma
from her own borders, Indiats participation is doubtful, and would probably
depend on the circumstances and the general international situation,
Attitudes towards the UK and the Commonwealth
The decision of the labor Government to make a full and prompt trans-
fer of power in virtually all of Britain's colonies in Asia at the end of
the war, the general decline in Britain's position as a world power, and the
Socialist policies of the UK have combined to dissipate most Indian hostility
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towards the UK and to replace it with considerable sympathy and even
admiration. Most Indian leaders are now convinced that the UK has
neither the desire nor the strength to control political events in
Asia. The general support for India's decision to stay in the Common-
wealth is primarily the result of the marked improvement in the at-
mosphere of Indo-British relations, the desire to retain valuable
military aid as well as important trade and business relations, and the
desire to obtain the full repayment of the UK's sterling debt to India.
Undoubtedly the strengthening of Indo-British. ties has also been in-
fluenced by UK attitudes toward India: the anxiety to make concessions
and to adjust the Commonwealth formula in order to retain India as a
member, the consultation and exchange of information on major issues
of policy, particularly in the field of Asian affairs, and finally the
readiness to provide the initiative and considerable financial aid for
a program of economic development for South Asia. Although India's
policy of neutrality and the nationalistic pride of a newly-independent
country has led the government to play down its relations with the UK,
the British are making an important if unpublicized contribution in
helping dispose the leaders of Indian public opinion towards Western,
though not alwayss.. US, points of view.
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Stage II
B-1-e. Do Indiana cherish deeply certain elements of their national
life?
(1) Would these include democracy, independence, religion,
property and way of life?
(2) Others?
Indian Art
Educated Indians are proud of their ancient traditions of art and
intellectual life and are inclined to take the view that their country's
industrial and technical deficiencies when compared with the West are
more than compensated by Indiana past intellectual and artistic accom-
plishments. Indian art is a rallying point today for patriotism,
nationalism, and self-esteem. The great art creations of the past have
become national symbols. The official state insigne is the likeness of
the capital of the Anoka pillar at Sarnath and the stamps of the country
are representations of the country's great architecturall, monuments and
temples. The latter have replaced the picture of the British monarch.
(42-19)
Indian Religion
Religion plays a major role in India, Nepal and the French and
Portuguese colonies of the subcontineat in shaping the general outlook
of the population. Religion has dominated the philosophic thought of
the region, and basic philosophic concepts permeate popular thought and
attitudes even though the philosophies themselves are beyond the grasp
of the ordinary man. This pervasive role of religion in the life of an
Indian is in marked contrast to the highly pragmatic and humanistic
cultures of both China And the West. Religious values tend to be viewed
as the only ones having any real or permanent significance, while social
and economic values tend to be discounted as temporary and illusory;
men who devote themselves to religion command popula respect and often
excite widespread reverence and devotion; many customs and objects, such
as the cow, in Kiadsism have acquired sacred significance; religious
pilgrimages are a common feature of the social scene; and offenses to
religious sentiment can provoke fanatical retaliation. (43-1)
Right of the Individual to Participate in Government
From the most ancient timmes, self-contained and self-sufficient village
republics handled life in India. Everything was taken care of by the village,
which was governed by its elders, the panchayat; economics, justice, home
and foreign affairs. Relations with a provincial goverment or a ruler were
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confined to tributes and taxes .....After the advent of the British,
centralization set in and the responsibility and portent of village
government receded.. the feeling of civic responsibility died out.
Caste and clan responsibilities remained.
As to the right of individuals to participate in government,
Hinduism proper knows of nothing else. The four castes had a say in
everything, and in the villages representatives of the outcastes were
members of the panchayats, thus participating in village government
.....The first all-Indian election of 1952, the first ever to have taken
place in the country, proved a revelation to the rest of the world ....
The staggering participation in the first election also exploded the old
adage that participation in elections is linked to literacy. The great
majority fo- the voters was illiterate. Yet they had...?understood the
issue of voting and fulrfilled their electoral duty.....The principle of
adult franchise had been thoroughly understood; not because it was a
pleasing importation from the West, but because participation in their
own government lies in the tradition of India, for many thousand years.
For the nonr-Westernized Indian, freedom means that an individual
is free to do what he wants to do under certain social laws and in
conformity with social and moral codes. These codes have been established
by certain historical or mythological persons; they have been added to,
amplified, commented upon.....The small minority of Westernized Indiana
hold, according to the completeness of their westernization in greater or
lesser degree, the same views as we do.....Couched in Western terminology,
the Constitution of India ....expresses the concept of freedom in polities
to be practiced in the middle of the twentieth century and thereafter.
Pro2erty
The joint household system has often been called the backbone of
Indian economy. In a joint household, parents live in the same house
or, at least, the same compound with their sons, their daughters-in-laws
their grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Their own parents, widowed,
old or inform live with them, toop, as often do their own younger brothers
with their families. At the marriage of each son or grandson a room or a
house is added to the family abode.
All the earnings of each individual go to the cas!?non exchequer. What-
ever property and money there is, belong to the family as a whole, not
to an individual. The eldest son, as before him his father, bears the
chief responsibility for looking after the familyns affairs and the wel-
fare of each of its members .....,A.s each male member of the family shares
in the family property to which he joins his individual earnings, --
women are taken care of by their husbands, fathers or brothers -- there
is
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is no need for social security or old age pensions.
Money, .....means a great deal in India. It is carefully hoarded
and sparingly spent by those -rho own it. The bulk of moneyed Indians
do not, as yet, go in for banking. They take care of their surplus
in their own way: land, jewels, gold or silver bars, grain speculations
and so on. But however much money might mean, the "vanaprasta" and
"sanryasi" who relinquished it earns more respect and reverence than he
who owns it.
Democracy
Democracy is not new to India. Through their panchayats, the people
of India enjoyed the rights and duties or responsible self-goverment
many thousand years ago.
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Stage II
B-1 f. Are the Indians working towards goals of economic and social
development?
(1) How much have they done and planned on their own?
The goverment is keenly aware of the difficult economic problems
confronting the country and is attempting to work out some solution
through a combination of different measures. It has invited birth con-
trol and population experts to examine the problems of population con-
trol and some tentative measures have begun to be explored but the
greatest handicap to this approach has been the lack of a sufficiently
cheap and simple contraceptive the use of which could be widely adopted
in rural areas. However, the three major policies on which the govern-
ment is relying to combat the challenge of population pressure are:
1) the control of basic commodities, 2) land reform, and 3) the initia-
tion of a countrywide development program.
The government's commodity control measures vary in pattern and alter
from time to time, but, taken together, constitute essentially a holding
operation designed to assure the population of its minimum grain and cloth-
ing requirements. Through these measures the government has prevented one
major and several minor threatened famines; has helped India's two major
industries, cotton and jute textiles, obtain their raw material needs and
has assisted in the maintenance of a continuous and more equitable dis-
tribution of certain basic consumer goods with the result that food .nd
cloth riots have been nipped in the bud and the severe inflationary pressures
in the economy have been kept under fairly effective control. These gains,
however, have been achieved at the cost of some increase in the country's
dependence on foreign grain and cotton imports.and of arousing popular
discontent, particularly in the food-deficit areas of south India where the
cultivators have resented the government's compulsory grain procurement
program and the rationed population havebeen critical of the size and quality
of the ration.
The government's second line of attack in meeting the problem of low
production has been to bring pressure on most of the larger states to enact
land reform legislation since under the Indian constitution land reform is
under the jurisdiction of the states. There are wide variations in the sys-
tem of landholding in different parts of the country and there is considerable
variation in the land reform measures adopted. In the main, however, the
legislation either enables the transfer of land from the landlords to the
tenant cultivators or strengthens the legal rights of the cultivators. The
major objective of the land reform pro gran has been to give the cultivator
an incentive to increase his production by satisfying his urge for ownership,
or
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or at least by giving him the right to retain some of the benefits of
any production increase he may achieve. Although most of the major
states have enacted the necessary legislation, only a small number of
land transfers have actually been effected. The rates of compensation
are relatively modest but only the most well-to-do tenant cultivators
have been able to afford the necessary paymentw which amount to several
times the annual rental of the land. The result has been a growing tide
of criticism among the rural population over the ineffectiveness of the
legislation. (55-3)
After a great deal of detailed survey work and quite a bit of actual
project experience the goverment drafted, revised, and finally, in mid-
1951, initiated "The First Five-Year Plane The major objective of this
plan was to mobilize government and private resources behind a multi-
purpose development progran with the aim of stepping up the tempo of agri-
cultural production. The government hopes that if it succeeds in this
objective later plans can build upon the first to achieve a steadily
expanding and sound economy.
because the variability in the monsoon rainfall leaves agriculture
in two-thirds of the country particularly dependent on irrigation an
important part of the plan is devoted to hydroelectric development and
irrigation. The other major features of the plan include: 1) agriculture
and rural development through the production of fertilizer, improved seed
and equipment, and the widescale expansion of agricultural extension
services; 2) some expansion of railway and road transport to facilitate
marketing and distribution; 3) some expansion of both regular and village
industries to produce incentive goods and a few of the basic commodities
required in other parts of the program.; and 4) some extension of public
health and education.
The plan has involved a great deal of study and all of the measures
proposed have been designed to meet long recognized needs. There is also
little doubt that if the full'plan could be implemented by the scheduled
date of 1956 most of the goals of increased production could be achieved.
A good start was made during the first year. However, it seems doubtful
that the government will be able to find sufficient funds or technically
qualified personnel for the full implementation of the rest of the program.
The government recognizes that it will need foreign assistance to do the
job but it feels that it is humiliating to ask for aid and that politically
it cannot afford to appear to be in any way dependent on outside help.
Accordingly, it has announced that it will welcome all proffers of foreign
assistance, but that it intends to try to implement the program whether
foreign aid is forthcoming or not.
Industrial Policy
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Industrial Policy
Before independence the Indian National Congress Party supported
a policy of controlled development of industry. This policy was never
spelled out in detail, but the more socialist wing of the party under
Nehru'a leadership made it clear that in their view the major objec-
tives of this policy were: 1) the rapid industrialization of the
country, 2) the prevention of any unfair exploitation of labor by
capital, and 3) the prevention of any foreign exploitation of India's
resources in disregard to the people's own interests and needs. When
the new government came to power in 1947s however, it found that the
immediate need was to arrest the postwar decline in industrial pro-
duction and replace important new material supplies lost to Pakistan
with partition. The government soon began to recognize that there was
little possibility of introducing imnediatei-major changes into the
existing industrial structure. The primary need for increased production
made the government hesitate to take any step that might interfere with
the output of an operating industry, even temporarily. Furthermore, the
growing demands on the government's limited amount of financial resources
and trained personnel underlined the hazards of undertaking greater
responsibilities. Added to these considerations was the pressure exerted
by business interests in the party against any general extension of govern-
ment ownership.
Nevertheless, some of the party's top-ranking leadership, and parti-
cularly Nehru, were anxious to steer the economy along socialist lines.
This leadership., with the support of large segments of educated Indian
opinion, inclines to the view that socialist solutions are often more
suited to Indian conditions than capitalist ones. Several factors con-
tribute to this point of view. First, most Indian businessmen have a very
poor public reputation because of their business methods which are generally
geared toward a quick, lucrative return with a mini aum of long term in-
vestment and with little interest in the upkeep of plant or equipment or
in the development of good labor or public relations. Furthermore, Indian
society is still permeated with the idea that devoting one's time and
energies to the making of money is a mercenary and degrading occupation.
Secondly, Indian businessmen themselves recognize their lack of experience
and continue to look to government or to foreign capital to develop any
new fields of investment. Thirdly, capitalism in Indian eyes tends to be
closely identified with imperialisms because it had been a British trading
and business company (the East Indian Trading Company) which had undertaken
the military conquest of the country; and because the British government,
when it later assumed direct control, declared as its avowed objectives the
assistance and protection of British industrial and trading interests.
Finally, the opinion of educated Indians has been considerably influenced
by the ideas and ideals of British socialists, including such personalities
as G. B. H. Cole, the Webbs, Cripps and Attlee, whom they regard as being
of high intellectual caliber and moral character. The fact that these British
socialists
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socialists gave positive support for Indian nationalist aspiration
prior to independence, and have criticized capitalism on moral and
social grounds strongly appealed to Indian sentiment. Accordingly,
the Nehru government, in its formulation of industrial policy, has
attempted to work out a compromise between capitalism and socialism
by assigning certain fields of industry to government control and
leaving others to private development.
The government is first Industrial Policy statement on April 6,
1918 envisaged government control in different degrees for three
spheres of economic activity. In the first sphere the central govern-
ment claimed exclusive monopoly and full control; this was the sphere
which the former British Government of India had controlled and in-
cluded the manufacture of arms and ammunition, the production and con-
trol of atomic energy, and the ownership and operation of the railways,
posts, telegraph, telephone and radio. An.important additional proviso
was that the government could take over any industry in a national
emergency. The second sphere, in which all new enterprises were to be
the responsibility of the government, comprised the following six in-
dustries: coal; mineral oils; iron and steel; aircraft manufacture;
shipbuilding; and the manufacture of telephone, telegraph, and wireless
apparatus exclusive of radio sets. The third sphere, comprising the rest
of the industrial field, was to be left to private capital, with the ex-
pectation that the state might participate jointly in new enterprises.
In addition certain industries were to be subject to central government
regulation and control, including principally, salt, automobiles and
tractors, electrical engineering, fertilizers, pharmaceutical products
and drugs, nonferrous metals, machine tools, and cement. Foreign capital
and technical skill were acknowledged as valuable, but their employment
was to be carefully regulated in the national interest.
Government policies to increase agricultural production also have had
some success but their scope has been to limited to assure any measurable
improvement in the standard of living of more than a small fraction of
the total population. During World War II the British predecessor govern-
ment launched a Grow More Food" campaign which was continued and sub-
stantially expanded by the independent government of India with the ob-
jective of making the country virtually self-sufficient in food-grains
by 1951. The program combines the production and increased distribution
of fertilizer, improved seeds, and farm implements with the repair and
expansion of wells and canals, the provision of contour plowing and other
similar conservation services, tractor reclamation of weed-infested land,
and the installation of tube wells. As a result it is estimated that
agricultural production has increased by the equivalent of about 1,000,000
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=79W
tons of. foodgrains in the first five years of India's independence.
Unfortunately, these increases were more than offset by the combination
of floods followed by partial failure of the monsoon rains in 1950 and
1951. Furthermore, although the increases have meant better diets for
the producing areas concerned, since virtually none of the increases
has been available for distribution to other areas, the country's
general food problem still remains unsolved.
The government has also started four large-scale irrigation
projects (Bhakra-Nangal, Hirakud, Damodar, and Tungabadra) which will
rank among some of the largest in the world and. which are designed to
increase India's grain production by 2,272,000 tons. These still re-
quire another 7 to 10 years to complete and at least another 3 to 5
years of work before a preliminary production increase of more than
500,000 tons can be expected. Finally, in addition to the "Grow More
Food" campaign and the large-scale irrigation projects, the Indian
Government has launched a few community development projects. These
projects have differed widely, but where agricultural production has
been increased in conjunction with multi-purpose development (the com-
bined development of local industries, cooperative societies, improved
housing, health, and educational facilities) the increases achieved
in income, production, and in general living conditions has been much
more marked than in areas aided only by the "Grow More Food" campaign.
The government hopes to use the experience gained in these projects as
a guide in working out the more comprehensive community development
program inaugurated in the spring of 1952 with U.S. Point IV assistance.
Under this program some projects are to be started in every major region
of the country to reach more than 16,000 villages and about 12,0000000
people,
Some progress has also been made towards achieving the Congress government's social objectives. A system of free and compulsorbasic" Party
education for children up to 1L years of age is being extended in several
of the states and a program combining literacy and social education for
adults has been started. Employment exchanges
benefits to workers in organized induct 'unemployment and sickness
facilities have also been extended and some study and be medical and health
of nutrition, gun on the problems
Major hopes of the Congress Party gov'ermmmnt, however, are pinned
on the initiation of a nationwide development program. The
recognizes that its commodity controls are only ameliorative m asest
and that a solution of India's food problem requires a substantial and
fairly rapid increase in the country's actual grain production to offset
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the expanding population coupled with an adequate supply of incentive
goods or special benefits to the cultivator which will induce him to
sella maxi~ua of his production for distribution to the rest of the
population. Similarly, the government recognizes that any land reform
program can provide only a partial answer to the landholi.ng problems
since there are already far too many agricultural laborers for the land
available. Indian agricultural economists have begun to point out that
alternative employment must be found for a substantial proportion of the
20 million landless agricultural laborers as well as for several million
of the tenants with only partial land occupancy rights, who are currently
cultivating uneconomic sized holdings.
In mid-1951 the Government of India initiated a Five Year plan of
economic development-which is being revised in the light of initial
project experience and detailed consultations with the individual states.
As the plan is primarily designed to lay the foundations for a continuing
economic development program for India study and revision of the program
will probably also be a continuing process. The first tentative Five-
Year Plan is scheduled to extend from fiscal 1951-52 to fiscal 195556
and its primary emphasis is on agricultural production. In view of India's
major dependence on the vagaries of the monsoon, an important part of the
plan is devoted to expansion of irrigations supplemented by a number of
other program for increasing agricultural production including extension
services, and the expansion of power, transport and fertilizer production
facilities. In addition some provision is made for the increase of machine
and cottage industry production which might sdrve to increase supplies
of incentive goods and relieve the pressure on agriculture by providing
new employment opportunities. The
initiating a practical working development program thanvwith the achieve-
ment of specific production goals. However, there is little doubt that
if the plan were fully implemented by the target date of 1956 the estimated
increases of more than 7 million tons in griin achieved. Furthermore, the political benefits thatucouilld beuexpectedbto
accompany such notable increases in agricultural production would be a
major asset in countering Communist activities in rural areas and in
assisting the Congress Party Government to contest the next elections which
must normally be scheduled for not later than 1956, implementation of the development 956. A full and effective
a substantial amount of elop program by 1956, however, would require
equipment, technical training foreign aid to supply much of the specialized
cure the necessary incentive ,and personnel, and to help produce or pro-
count goods which are currently lacking in the
ry. As of June 1952, however, there is no definite prospect that more
than a relatively small fraction of the foreign forthcoming. Althoug a number of projects have already been startedland
the government has announced its intention of pushing forward on its own
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whether
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whether or not more foreign assistance becomes available, it is doubtful
whether India's unaided efforts can achieve more than one-third of its
goals. Domestic capital is inexperienced, and in the past either govern-
ment or foreign initiative and capital have had to assume the major burden
of developing now fields of production before domestic capital has become
available in any quantity.
The Congress Party Government has begun to make some progress towards
increasing the country's agricultural and industrial production under its
economic development program and with the aid of US technical assistance.
As of May 1954, however, the two major challenges confronting the country
were: 1) whether the employment opportunities for the growing middle
classes could be substantially expanded and improved or whether these groups,
who have been the main source of Cozmmunist recruitment in the past, would
increasingly turn to Communist panaceas of full employment and rapid economic
development, and 2) whether with the growth of political consciousness the
rural population,, who hitherto have been largely passive spectators of the
political scene, will continue to support parties working for gradual economic
improvemment, or will be won over by Communist propaganda of "land for the
tiller " "reduction of agricultural debt," and concern for peasant welfare.
(5o-28)
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Stage II
B-1-f (2) Do cultural factors affect Indian attitudes towards
developments?
Because Hinduism, the most prevalent religion, is a religio-socio-
economic system, it sets the pattern not only f or religious attitudes
and philosophic thought, but also for social relationships and economic
organization. Hindus comprise approximately three-fourths of the popula-
tion in India and the French settlements, about two-thirds of the popula-
tion of Goa and the Portuguese settlements. As a religion, Hinduism is
tolerant and catholic, embracing widely divergent types of worship and
belief, from simple forms of primitive animism to the most highly developed
forms of mysticism and metaphysics. Although social and economic reforms
per se are not considered spiritual objectives, the goal of complete self-
lessness, revered by all religions of the country, has led to the develop-
ment of the idea of selfless service to society, as illustrated by the
work of Mohandas Gandhi and of the Servants of India Society. At the same
time the strong emphasis on pure spirit and the common belief that life
itself is essentially the product of illusion has resulted in a tendency
to neglect or even to disregard the value of the individual. Finally, the
Hindu caste system has resulted in a fairly rigid stratification of society
under which the upper castes enjoy marls,d social and economic privileges,
while large low-caste and outcaste groups suffer serious social and
economic disabilities, although all can share in the general traditions
and larger life of the community. (L3-1)
Capitalism's emphasis on competition, on "getting ahead", and on the
production and acquisition of material goods are in direct conflict with
some of the most fundamental ideals of Buddhism and Hinduism which hold
that man must detach himself from desire and free himself' from dependence
on material things. Although Islam is not an anti materialist religion,
the social organization and ideals of Muslims in South Asia are closely
allied to those of their Buddhist and Hindu neighbors; emphasis is placed
on cooperation rather than competition and on the importance of the social
unit -- the family or the village community --- rather than of the in-
dividual. Finally, the displacement of handicraft workers and the slum
living conditions of many factory workers has encouraged a feeling that the
use of machines is immoral and degrading. This attitude has been given
particular emphasis in the last few decades through the teachings of Gandhi
which have had a widespread influence throughout South Asia.
To make economic progress the country will require a substantial in-
crease in the training of technically qualified personnel. This increase
can be realized only if academic emphasis isieoriented....Even so, technical
instruction confronts major problems in India today. First, there is the
prejudice based on the Hindu belief that a man is born into his occupation,
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which he must follow even though unskillfully rather than undertake
another's occupation, no matter how well qualified for it he might be.
This attitude, together with the fact that most handwork occupations
are assigned to the Sudra or lowest group of castes, has made students
in the upper three caste groups reluctant to take up technical education.
Secondly, most Indian industries have been unwilling to recruit high
school or technical school graduates and to let them develop experience
on the job. Instead industries t end to employ persons who, because of
their experience in a particular caste occupation, already possess some
knowledge and technical skill.
During World War II many young men and women joined the technical
services and were trained as skilled or semi-skilled workers. Age-old
prejudices began to break down and a beginning was made toward develop-
ing technical education on practical and up-to-date lines. (43-23)
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Stage II
B-1-f (3) How strongly do the masses desire improvement of material
conditions?
In the past the bulk of the population has tended to passively
accept meager standards of living. The awakening political conscious-
ness among India's vast rural population during the past few decades.,
however, has already begun to provide subversive groups with a favorable
climate in which to whip up popular discontent over age-old economic
and social inequalities. (57-1)
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B-l-g. Have the Indiana a vigorous tradition of political consciousness
and activity?
Similarly., the rise in political consciousness and the steady ex-
pansion in educational facilities has broken the Brahman monopoly on social
and intellectual leadership. Brahmans still continue to exercise mach of
their traditional leadership in village life and the emphasis of the
Brahman caste on intellectual attainment enables its members to play a
dominant role in the fields of politics, law., and education. (43-2)
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Stage II
B-1-g (1). Is the government apparatus now or potentially
capable of controlling communist pressure?
The police have shown themselves to be acutely aware of the
Communist menace and are prepared to take drastic measures against
any indication of Communist violence. (S4-1)
Despite certain successes of the government's anti-communist
policy the record of the 1951-52 elections indicate that the com-
munists will probably continue to gain in strength as their "legal"
tactics make it difficult for the government to move against,them on
legal grounds,.....The Communists have also had some success in
exploiting popular sympathy through charges of government oppression
and appeals for the defense of civil rights. The government, however,
is now even more alert to the communist danger and apparently intends
to make full use of preventive detention ordinances and its new con-
stitutional powers. (55-16)
Both the military and police forces of India are loyal to the
Congress Party government and have played an important role in main-
taining law and order and in quelling threats of violence from both
the right and the left. (50-8)
This section might also include reference to several other tech-
niques used by the Indian Government to control the Communists.
1. The Preventive Detention Act, passed at the behest of the
Congress Government, enables the Gw ernment to hold sus-
pected subversives without trial for 12 months. This act
has probably been most frequently used against the
Communists,
2. Government restrictionsep'ent; Communist propaganda activity
among the Indian armed forces. The Government has also re-
stricted the sale of Commxni.st literature in railway stations,
since they are Government property.
3. Passports and visas have been denied both domestic and foreign
Communists on several occasions. In 1952, for example, eight
Indians were refused passports for the Moscow Economic Conference,
since the Indian Government did not think "the grant of pass-
ports to them would be in the public interest." At least one
Communist member of Parliament was among the eight. (However, 36
passports
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passports were granted to Indians who wished to attend). In
1954, the Indian Government reportedly refused visas to
several foreign Comfnunists, including an Indonesian, German
and Australian, all of whom wished to come to India as
"fraternal delegates" to the Third Congress of the Communist
Party of India at Madura.
Congress Party leaders in the Indian states have been warned
not to participate in Cost-sponsored rallies and other
"front" activities, so they would not lend prestige and
respectability to Communist causes,,
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Stage II
B-l-g (2). What circumstances do or might arouse in the Indian people
intense feeling on political questions?
Situations or developments which conflict with basic Indian attitudes
or deeply ingrained prejudices, in both the fields of foreign and domestic
affairs, do and might arouse intense feeling on political questions.
Y. !!AO lisa: Pride in linguistic and cultural group has led to
considerable agitation for realignment of state boundaries to conform with
linguistic and cultural areas. Any belief that the central government is
neglecting a particular region, is favoring one area over another, or is
frustrating regional aspirations can result in intense political feeling.
Another expression of regionalism is the controversy over the constitutional
decision to replace English as the official language with Hindi, a north
Indian language.
,2?, Caste: The problem of caste can also arouse many Indians. The
present Congress government regards caste as an anachronism hindering
political, and social progress in a modern state and the Constitution pro-
hibits any public discrimination on grounds of caste and specifically
abolishes untouchability. Such policies have aroused opposition, especially
among more conservative Hindu groups. Caste rivalries are also at the root
of much political factionalism, particularly in South India where they take
the form mainly of conflict between Brahman and non Brahman groups`
,1. Communalism vs. Secularism: The establishment of a secular state
in India has been vigorously opposed by militant Hindu and Sikh groups,
including several political parties.. These groups blame the Congress Party's
special concessions to minority groups and particularly to Muslims for the
partition of the country, all-the sufferings of non-Muslim refugees from
Pakistan, and the difficulties and periodic crises in Indo-Pakistani rela-
tions. Government-sponsored reform proposals in Hindu law and social customs
arouse intense opposition from these groups. Such issues as cow-slaughter
also arouse political feeling, with the religious conservatives generally
supporting proposed legislation to prohibit it.
????-~??~,ran8~-actnt~i~-f19113`3~~3"&~~~11~~~~ i
1. Colonialism:
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,e, Colonialism: Most Indians, as a result of their own struggle
against colonies awl yule, are very sympathetic with nationalist movements
throughout Asia and Africa, and tend to react emotionally to any sug-
gestion that colonial powers are suppressing the aspirations of colonial
peoples or are seeking to reassert their control in these areas.
/* Racialism: Indians are generally extremely sensitive on matters
of race and strongly resent any evidence of racial discrimination, es-
pecially by Western countries in their dealings with colored groups with-
in their borders or with Asian or African countries. Thus incidents in
South Africa, especially vis-a-vis the Indian minority, arouse considerable
feeling in India. Indian sensitivity on the subject of race also played
a part in the strong reaction against US hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacifis,
which many Indians considered as an indication of the fact that Americans
cared little for the life and health of Asians.
1. India's Foreign Policy: Indians tend to be sensitive to real or
ima ned.cri cism of their foreign policy, and to resent any indications
that their position in the cold war is misunderstood, especially by the
West. A combination of nationalism and anti-colonialism has disposed
politically conscious Indians to take the view that the peoples of Asia
and Africa have their own interests independent of the Western or the Soviet
power blocs and that they should determine their future development sub-
stantially free of pressures or influence from either of these blocs. Thus
criticism, especially if it is based on what Indians believe to be a mis-
understanding of their position, tends to offend their nationalist sentiments
and also their self-esteem as the largest newly-independent nation of this
area. There is also growing resentment among politically conscious Indians
who believe that the Western powers are attempting to shape the future of
Asia to suit the strategy of the cold war with little reference to the de-
sires of free Asian countries, Thus the Afro-Asian conference is considered
important as a forum for the expression of Asian and African views, and any
real or imagined effort by Western countries to interfere with the meeting
will be considered as further evidence that the West does not wish to take
"free Asia's" views into account.
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0-.
Stage II
B-1-h. Are there minority problems?
Except for the Anglo-Indian community, most minorities in India
are religious groups .....These include Muslims, Tribals, Sikhs,
Christians, Jains, and others -- some $5,000,000 people of a total
population of 361,000,000 as against 275,000,000 Hindus. (i2-25)
The major minority problem is the century old Muslim-Hindu
conflict. This conflict culminated during the struggle for inde-
pendence as.a result of the rivalry for jobs, political office and
influence in creation of the separate Muslim state of Pakistan,
This resulted in the movement of 6,000,000 Muslims from India to
Pakistan and some 4,500,000 Hindus and 3,000,000 Sikhs who entered
India from Pakistan territory. These refugees in India have been a
serious problem as not all have been satisfactorily settled and they
have become bitter and are ".....inclined to support politicians who
favor a 'toughs policy toward the Islams still in India". (42-25)
The refugee movement has been confined largely to the eastern
and western border areas. In the rest of the country Hindu-4uslim
relations appear to have returned to a generally peaceful status.
(42-25)
Because of the persecution of the Sikhs by the Muslims in the past
the Sikhs have maintained a traditional hostility toward the Muslims.
The Sikhs opposed the 1947 partition of their home territory, the Punjab,
and, as a result of the communal riots which followed, some 3,000,000
Sikhs in West Pakistan were forced to evacuate to India end virtually
all Muslims were forced out of East Punjab. Many of the Sikhs therefore
support a stronger policy against Pakistan, and against Muslims in India,
(42-26)
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B-1 h (1). Do the minorities suffer from insecurities and unsatisfied
aspirations?
The 7,500,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan have by no means
all found adequate housing or work equivalent to their employment before
partition. (42-25)
Since independence considerable Sikh energy has* .,.,,been directed
into competition with the Hindus for political position and power in East
Punjab and into agitation for the reorganization of the Punjab into a
Sikh state. (42-26)
The Jamns, although few in number, exercise considerable social and
economic influence as a result of their prominence in banking and com-
mercial circles ......,Their comparatively high economic level and their
literary rate of 38.2% (in 1931) give them a respected position in society.
(142-26)
The Christian community of 6$00,000 is more in step with the moderniza-
tion taking place in India today than most other groups, They have a higher
literary rate than the Hindus and Muslims and more of them know English.
The advantages in social and economic competition derived from Westerniza-
tion will probably more than compensate for the disadvantage of humble
social origin and identification with the somewhat unpopular West. (142-26)
There are some 28,500,000 aborigines in India, For the most part they
are in some degree of contact with Indian society, and are at one stage
or another in the process of assimilation, Until a group merges with non-
primitive Indians there is a period of maladjustment and insecurity
accompanied by a breakdown of the tribal culture. Speculators from the
civilized areas deprive the primitives of their means of subsistence and
often reduce them to the status of landless laborers. At times government
restrictions worked against them. Assimilation, the only ultimate answer,
is generally into the lower caste levels of Hindu society. A more favorable
alternative is conversion to Christianity. (142-27)
The Anglo Indians, of whom there are about 150,000 in India today,
are of combined British and Indian ancestry, At first the British approved
and later disapproved of mixed marriages. The Anglo-Indian minority sank
socially until they were a minority ostracized 'by the British and Indians,
With development of nationalism their position became more precarious, for
they were suspected of being in sympathy with the British, (142-27)
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Stage II
B-1-h (2). How does the majority look upon the minorities?
The cow-venerating Hindus look with horror upon Muslim beef-eating
and on certain occasions the sacrifice of cows. The Hindu caste system
and the Muslim seclusion of women inhibit somewhat friendly relations
between the two groups. (!42-26)
The relatively few (125,000) but highly literate Parsees, who are the
most Westernized Indians, exert a wide influence because of their wealth
and great business and industrial successses. This combination of
Westernization and favoured economic position, however, does not endear
the Parsee to other Indians; in particular, orthodox Hindus dislike having
so much control of the motion pictures in "alien" hands. (42--26)
Members of tribal communities are frequently treated on a par with
the scheduled castes because of their diet or other customs which are
considered tnclean by Hindus. (0-13)
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Stage II
B-1-h (3).
What are the official policies towards minorities?
The Government of India follows an official policy of secularism and
tolerance with respect to all minorities and does not favor one religious
minority as against another. (1s2-25)
The rights section of the constitution prohibits any public discrimina-
tion on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth, makes
the enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability an offense
punishable by law, and guarantees to all citizens the right to practice
any profession, trade or business. In addition, freedom of conscience,
and the right freely to profess, practice, and propagate religion are
specifically guaranteed. Finally the state in granting financial aid to
educational institutions, is prohibited from discriminating against re-
ligious institutions although no person and institution receiving state
aid can be required to take part in religious instruction or worship with-
out his own or his guardian's consent.
Despite the fact the country is 75% Hindu efforts are made not to dis-
criminate against minorities in government functions and positions and in
general. The government has continued the secular traditions and practices
inherited from the British and there has been no marked tendency toward
imposing essentially Hindu ideas on the general population. (1,3-12)
With respect to the Muslims the government has taken the position that
they be accorded the same treatment as other religious communities. The
central government sponsors the formal observance of major Muslim as well
as Hindu religion celebrations. Officials have been generally prompt and
firm in quelling Hindu-"Muslim riots.
Apart from the gradual decline in the feeling of antagonism between
Hindus and Muslims arising out of the partition of the sub-continent there
are two situations which continue to contribute to the insecurity of the
Muslims, namely the demand of certain Sikh refugees for the expropriation
of,Muslim property in India to compensate for their losses in Pakistan and
the discrimination exercised against Hindus in East Pakistan, The govern-
ment has flatly disregarded the Sikh demands and took action to stop attack
on Muslims in West Bengal. (1,3-13)
The Congress Party's attitude toward the Scheduled Castes and tribals
was favourable conditioned by Gandhi's interest in improving their status.
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However, as they are widely scattered in thousands of villages n......
it would take a reeducation program of major proportions to break down
the religious prejudice of centuries and to achieve any substantial
implementation of the constitutional guarantees. The best hope for
improvement is to provide better educational facilities for the depressed
classes and revive self-governing village bodies in which all elements
of the community are represented. (43-13)
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Stage II
B-1-h (14). Is the government capable of applying these policies or
of obtaining satisfactory solutions?
Despite its official policy of secularism and tolerance vis-a-vis
religious minorities the Hindu-Sikh refugee problem continue to be
exploited by Hindu politicians and will continue to be a problem for
some time. Even after the refugees have been absorbed, memories of the
days after partition will probably persist and make difficult the develop-
ment and maintenance of friendly Hindu-Muslim relations. (42-25)
The Christian community, consisting largely of converts and descend-
ants of converts from the lower strata of Hindu society and from the
aboriginal (tribal) religions, is not growing as fast as in the past,
partly because of recent ameliorations of the conditions of the Scheduled
Castes under Hinduism, but it is sufficiently well established to maintain
itself as an important group. (42-26,27)
Although some evidence of discrimination are discernible, the Congress
Party Government appears to be making a genuine effort to adhere to its
ideal of a secular state; with 75 percent of the population Hindu, it is
inevitable that Hindus dominate all ranks of government and all social and
economic activities. Under the British a fixed proportion of government
appointments were reserved for members of the leading minority communities,
Muslims, Sikhs, scheduled castes, and in certain areas, tribals. The
present government has abandoned these reservations except for the repre-
sentation of scheduled caste and tribal communities in the legislatures
since it feels that these two groups are still in need of special assistance.
In fact the nondiscriminatory clauses of the constitution were amended in
the summer of 1951 to enable the continuance of certain special assistance
to backward groups. At the same time the government has tended to be more
liberal in according recognition to substandard Hindu schools and to the
Hindu system of !r%, d(based on the Veda) medicine while strictly inter-
preting regulations n-Hindu or Western schools and for Western schools
of medicine. In some areas cow slaughter has been prohibited with some
detriment to Muslim butchers, who have been forced to concentrate on sheep
and goats. Since no statistics are available on the relative proportion
of Hindus and non-Hindus in government there is no way of checking discrimina-
tion in appointments. In the main, however, the government has continued
the secular traditions and practices inherited from the British and there
has been no marked tendene toward imposing essentially Hindu ideas on the
general population. (43-12)
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Stage II
Are there other aspects of Indian culture and society
which influence Indian attitudes towards the East-West
conflict?
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Stage II
C. Do significant segments of Indian society hold views and attitudes
which differ from those discussed above?
Political Participation
In the Indian national election during the winter of 1951-52, 60 per
cent of the eligible voters went to the polls. Among the Lucknow
respondents the voting participation was somewhat higher -- about 67 per
cent. This is in line with the expectation of a somewhat higher vote
in India in an urban area. Curiously enough, there were practically no
differences in amount of voting between the upper-educated and the lower-
educated groups. In the United States such differences are marked, and
in India we might expect this all the more in view of the poverty and
ignorance of the uneducated classes, and their small exposure to mass
communication. The explanation may lie in the strong element of personal
appeal in Indian elections.
Party Preference
A large proportion of the persons interviewed had no party preference
or were unwilling to indicate a preference. Of those who did say which
party they preferred, the Congress Party of Gandhi and Nehru had a wide
lead, especially among the lower-educated groups. The communal,, religiously
oriented parties, the Jan Sangh and Mahasabha received a small number of
votes, ranging from 3 per cent to 11 per cent, for all education and age
groups. The two left-wing parties, the Communist and the Socialist ap-
parently receive support in Lucknow largely from the young and the better-
educated. Preferences for the Communists, particularly, are closely re-
lated to age and education. Thirteen per cent of the young, college-
educated prefer the Communist Party over all others as compared with 7 per
cent of the older college-educated and virtually none of the older
respondents in the lower-educational categories.
Knowledge of Indian National Leaders
About a fourth of the uneducated persons interviewed in Lucknow were
unable to name national leaders other than Nehru, Gandhi and Patel. Among
those who can name national leaders, the names of Subhas Chandra Bose,
Pandit Pant, Rajendra Prasad, and Jaiprabash Narayan stand out. Bose, the
Indian strong man who sided with the Nazis and Japanese during World War II
was most mentioned even though he has been dead for 10 years. Pandit Pant
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and Prasad are understandably well-known due to their positions as head
of the Congress Party and President of India, respectively. Narayan is
a prominent Socialist who had embraced conuunism in his earlier years.
Reactions to a Legislative Act
As an example of the relative amount of information on national af-
fairs, it is interesting to note that practically none of the lower-
educated respondents had heard of the Preventive Detention Act, a
previously passed piece of legislation which was being warmly debated
in the government at the time of the study. This Act allowed the govern-
ment to detain persons thought to be prejudicial to India's security.
A large proportion of those who have heard of the Act are against it,
full half of the lower-educated and most of the college-educated.
general, the reactions to this and other politically-oriented questions
indicates the greater degree of conservatism among the lower-educated
and old Indians.
Views of Certain Foreign Nations
The Lucknow respondents were asked how they view Indians, and the
peoples of four other nations: the British, Americans, Russians, and
Chinese. Among a choice of twelve adjectives, here are the ones which
they felt applied most aptly to the five nations:
The BRITISH are seen as"domineering", "intelligent" and "conceited."
The AMERICANS are seen as "progressive", "intelligent" and"domineering",
also as "practical" and "conceited".
The RUSSIANS are seen as "hardworking", "brave", and "progressive."
The CHINESE are "backward", but "progressive" at the same time. They
are. also "hardworking."
The INDIAN self-image is of a people who are "backward", "generous",
. "brave" and "hardworking."
Almost all the Indians had an idea of mat Indians were like, and most
of them were able to choose adjectives for the British and Americans. Fewer
of them bad images of the Russians and Chinese. This is seen to be partly
related to the degree of contact with foreign nations. The main personal
contacts the Indians have had are naturally with the British, but the
Americans
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Americans are a close second. The Chinese are next and there has been
virtually no direct contact with Russians. Tie college-educated have
Forty-six per
had many more contacts than the laEVer-educated groups.
cent of them have known and talked with British in the last four years,
41 per cent with americans and 32 per cent with Chinese.
Word Images among Social Status Groups
There is a general tendency for the higher-status groups, the better-
edu.cated, higher-caste, higher economic class respondents to choose more
favorable images of the Russians and Chinese and less favorable images
of the Western countries. In terms of age and education, there is a
markedly greater number of favorable Communist country chrices tammoongthe
young, college-educated. Among political party groups t
pected preference for the Communist countries among the Communists and
Socialists.
ORIENTATION TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The amount of attention paid to international affairs by the people
of Iuoknow varies with their education and their exposure to the mass
media. Among the college-educated, the recent news items most remembered
were in the international field. In the lower-educated groups, those
who could remember recent news items at all were apt to remember items
about local or national affairs. The content of the news remembered was
apt to be political for the higher-educated and economic for the lower-
educated.
Knowledge about the United Nations: In order to see just how great
was this divergency between groups on knowledge of international affairs,
the Iucknow respondents were asked what they had heard about, and what
they knew about the United Nations Organization. Practically none of the
uneducated had any knowledge of the UNO at all, while practically all the
college-educated at least know what it was. Of those who knew something
of the UNO, only the college-educated had correct information as to its
Director General.
Attitudes toward the United Nations: Most of the Indians who knew
anyth g a out the United Nations had negative attitudes toward it. They
thought it was not doing a good job in trying to solve international
problems. Very prominent among the reasons given, particularly by the
college-educated, was a feeling that the UN was too much under the domina-
tion of the United States.
Iortanc_e of
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Importance of Religion in Every-day Actions
The social habits of caste are reinforced by religion, In guiding
every-day actions, how important do the Indians consider religious be-
liefs to be? "Very important", say two out of every three of the non-
educated, and one out of two of the higher-educated older respondents.
Only among the young college-educated was there widespread rejection of
religious belief as a guide in everyday activities; in this group only
one of four considers religious beliefs "very important," whereas almost
half felt that they were of little or no-importance.
The Communist Party, among the other parties shows perhaps the most
interesting pattern in respect to political preference and voting, In
the Lucknow sample, practically all those who preferred the Communist
Party over the others were in the under forty age groups. The greatest
bulk of the pro-Communists, also, were among the higher-educated, parti-
cularly the college group. It would be dangerous to generalize for India
as a whole from these findings, but one piece of corroborating evidence
might be cited here: In an unpublished study done in eleven Indian
universities at the same time that the Lucknow study was in progress, it
was found that approximately 20 percent of the sample of students
questioned indicated a preference for the Communist Party. This is, of
course, far above the national average.
In respect to India as a whole and Uttar Pradesh as a State, the
Communists polled about 4.5 per cent of the total vote for the Union
Parliament and gained approximately the same proportion of the seats,
making them the major opposition party. In Uttar Pradesh, the strong
Congress area, they did much worse, polling less than half of one per
cent of the total vote.
It is interesting to note in reference to the national vote of
the Communist Party, that the proportion of seats won was even higher
than the proportion of votes in the electorate. This is a very unusual
occurrence in any but a "proportional representation" system of elections
and may point to considerably more coordination of effort throughout
India than is evidenced by any of the other minority parties. In all the
other cases there was apparently considerably more "wasting" of votes
for losing candidates.
AwareneTs of Economic Problems
How much are the Lucknow residents aware of their economic poverty
and, more generally, of the economic problems faced by the nation? There
seems no doubt on this score. Respondents may or may not be aware- of family
or personal problems; they may or may not have felt repercussions of the
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Hindu-Muslim tension (in Lucknow, the site of the present study,, the
communal tension was not severe); but they were fully aware of economic
problems, both at the individual and national level. About three out
of four Indians at all levels of education considered the economic
problem to be the major problem faced by people who are in similar cir-
cumstances to them. Among the better-educated., a sizeable proportion
of the respondents also thought in national terms and identified economic
poverty as India's biggest problem, but for the least-educated (and
poorest) respondents, it was primarily a per issue.
The preoccupation of these respondents with economic problems was
evident not only from the answers to those questions which dealt directly
with this issue, When asked how they felt about India's newly gained
independence, the immediate spontaneous joy at being "free from foreign
bondage" was tempered for several respondents by the failure of the Indian
National government to find a solution to economic ills. "Independence
is good in the sense that the country is free but bad as the public is in
trouble", says a 33