PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND STUDY OF INDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000700120003-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: STUDY

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PSYCHOLOO CAL BACKGROUND STUDY
OF INDIA
State Department review completed
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Stage I
STRATEGY
Why pick this country?
In order to attain U.S. foreign policy objectives in Asia it is
vitally necessary that India not fall under Commanis t military or political
control whether through attack from without or subversion from within. As
there is at present more likelihood of the latter than of the former develop-
ment,, the task of maintaining friendly relations between India and the U.S.
and the free world and giving strength to those forces within India which
serve to keep India a non-Communist country becomes a foremost _ political and
psychological objective of U.S. foreign policy. An analysis of forces at
present working within and from without to influence or determine India's
domestic developments and foreign relations will be set forth below to estimate
the degree to which India is capable of resisting Communist subversion, to
disclose attitudes held by leaders and influential groups toward the East-West
conflict and how attitudes adverse to the U.S, and the free world might be
effectively altered.
India's strategic position geographically in event of war and psychologi-
cally in the "cold war" is of first importance. While India leaders generally
consider that the USSR and China have major targets possibly requiring
aggressive action by their own forces elsewhere, nevertheless Indian leaders
are alert to the growing threat to the northern border states of Chinese
Communist penetration into border areas from Tibet and Burma and the opportunity
which this position on the frontiers give them to lend direct support to dissi.
dent elements within the border states. They have reacted to this threat by
strengthening these areas including Nepal and Assam in recent years and by con-
ducting military surveys, improving communications and dispatching additional
troop units. (81-15).
As India has the best strategic location of any nation in south Asia and
Indian ocean area it is logical to assume that it is a prima objective of the
USSR and China to at least neutralize India in event of war and prevent the
utilization of the sub-continent as a staging and supply base by enemy forces.
From the point of view of the free world should an enemy force succeed in
cutting communications between India and the West, the denial of Indian-produced
strategic materials would re ire substantial readjustments in the economy
of Western countries. (60-19) Moreover from bases in India, military opera..
tions could be supported or conducted in east Africa, southwest Asia south-
central U.S.S.R. and southeast Asia. India is close to the oil fields of the
Middle East and the industrial areas of Soviet Central. Asia. (81-114.) Con-
sequently Indian Government leaders and most politically conscious elements
among the Indian public believe that while the U.S.S.R. is not prepared to risk
a world war to conquer India and is relying instead on extending its influence
and ideology by working through the Indian Communist Party. (5540)
Fromthe point of view of U.S. policy objectives India would be a valuable
ally in event of war. India's major assets as an ally are 1) its reserve of
strategic materials; 2) its potential, as a base of operations, which arises
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out its strategic location? 33) its important reserves of manpower
and the political and psychological value of the support of a leang
nation with an im ortant reputation in both Asian and non-Asian eyes.
(60-19s 81-,4 and 93-1)
In time of peace India's support of free-world policies is particularly
valuable not only because it is a major count
eat s due to its size and its
gr population but also due to the potential leadership role which Indian
leaders, especially Nehru,.play in Southern and Southeast Asia and the psy-
chological support which an anti-Comnurds t India can give the smaller Asian
countries from falling to Communist subversion.
Since August 15, 1947s when India received its independence from the
British and became a wholly self-governing dominion in the Commonwealth
of Nations, it has by degrees come to exercise an increasing in world affairs. It is clear, despite the disclaimers Prime Minister
Nehru, that India aspires to a position of leadership, not only in Asia
and Africa, but in the world. India is constantly seeking opportunities to
play the role of mediator between the Communist Bloc countries and the
Western democracies and to relax tensions that threaten world peace. To
this end India seeks to obtain the adoption of a policy of non-all
as many nations (especially Asian and African ones) as possible and therebby
thereby by
a third area of peace." India has sought to make itself the leader
and spokesman of non-Communist. Asia and its influence is
siderable on the countries of this region. India has tightened itshold on
t
Bhutan and Sikkim and greatly strengthened its influence in Neal. India
exerts considerable influence in Burma and Indonesia and despite the fact
that India is regarded with some apprehension by Ceylonese, Indian influence
in Ceylon is by no means negligible. India also exerts some influence in
the Near Eastern countries where Nehru'e policies are not without appeals
India has taken a strong interest and prominent role in the UN. It is
a, if not the leading nation of the Afro-Asian (otherwise known as the
Arab-Asian T 00-in the UN a group of 15 Arab, Asian and African nations
who generaallly present a urted front on racial and colonial issues. India's
role in theregotiations leading to the armistice agreement in Korea was a
crucial one and its chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com-
mission placed it in a position of great responsibility. The responsibilities
that India has. assumed in connection with Indochina are even more crucial.
Hence the loss of India to Comnurds t control, although this is not now imminentwould be a serious psychological and political defeat for the West. Fortunately-,-
at present Indian political, economic, and cultural ties with the West are
actually much stronger than those with the Soviet bloc,
Indian leaders have to the present demonstrated their effective capa-
bilities to meet and suppress Communist subversive tactics involving
violence in the past and to handle Communist inspired border uprisings. How-
ever, India does not alone have the capability of resisting a large scale
Sovj t or Chinese Communist attack from without.
ie Z~oreover~ the Communist
Party of India (CPI) although not an
of the Government of India ~),occupiesdat present a stronger tacticalstability
position than at any time in its history* The Party's
irjg in the general elections of 1 portu sties good show-
action. In the Central Parliament and Z in four enhanced its i fivepof the slat for political
assemblies Party members have a platform which enables them to obtain widdative
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blicity for Communist propaganda and for attacks on the government. The
gactical line adopted b the Party in 1951 and reemphasized at the Third
Congress in December 193, which calls for cooperation with other parties
and groups in the formation of united fronts, and increased concentration
on peasant and labor organizations together with the emphasis on legal
methods to achieve its current as, a1s, has proved advantageous to the
Communists. One of the greatest assets of the Communists is the marked
absence, among a ma ority of Indians, of strong anti-Comtuunist sentiments.
Despite these advantages the CFI seems not to have made as much m
since the election as initially appeared possible and in some a easgitsap-
pears even to have suffered .reverses. On the other hand, if the CFI can
overcome its factionalism and consistently follow a non-violent "united
front" policy, it can become a serious internal subversive threat.
The economic and social, conditions revailing in India have long con-
tributed to the develop tent of subversive- activity and the modern leader-
ship of India will have to struggle vigorously for years to come out
victorious over subversion by the Communist left. Harsh economic conditions
and degrading social pressures to which all but a small segment of the popu-
lation are subject have created a situation ripe for exploitation by an
astute political manipulator. In the past the bulk of India's population
scattered in more than 500,000 villages has tended passively to accept
meager standards of living, high land ng ym~i
to the money lender as mans inevitable lots andd thee rigid rstr nts
strati icat
of society into castes as a divinely on
longing to the lower castes are destined dot perform life's menialtdutiese-
and to defer to member of the p per castes.
been enco~..rr ed both 1 by the fact that most Tof tpe population o acceptance has
no other life because is knowle a heahas the
world has been limited and remote and 2) conditions rrel parts of the
which stress the deliberate abandonment ofy tmaricmforts in comforts of
the spiritual life and which attribute a mania lowly station and hardships
in this life to sins committed in earlier existences,
The srakeningg political consciousness among India curing the past fear decades, however, has already s vast rural population
rolls with a favorable climate in which to whip begun to Pdiidsover?
Igeld economic and social, inequalities. whip P popular discontent over
sciousness dates back to the independence movement amend t epefforts ofon-
nationalist political leaders, notably Mohandas K. Gin rural areas through a n " Gandhi* to arouse support
grass-roots campaign which began slowly during
the first and second decades of the present century r
tum
tum during the world d ression of the 1950's. The and which y gained momen-
the independence movements had asits?n objective e$yin rrural
areas the arousing of villagers to the possibility of bettering economic conditions through inn their de-ial.
po"is"es there was a Political action. At the advent of ine
general expectation that a nationalist
usher in a new era. When no appreciable ch r gOVnn would
lot of the people as a whole developed, the rural population o the social and n to sink
back into general apathy. Considerable disillusionmenttaandodis discontent ensued
which the communists and other subversive
some success. The communists now groups have begun to exploit with ~
omens es as the om pose as the champions of the peasants,
only genuine advocates of social and economic betterment.
A second feature which tends to render India susceptible to the overtures
of subversive elements is the wide gap existing between the rural populacsan
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the government. Once in pourer, the Congress Party lost mue of its former
contact with the general village population. The Congress Party leadership
has become largely absorbed in tackling some of the more immediate problems
with which it has been confronted and in handling the day-to-day business
of govermnent. Furthermore, a certain post freedom complacency has replaced
some of the old pre independence drive and there are a number of office
holders,, particularly in the state governments, Who have yielded to the tempta-
tion to use public office for personal gain. In any case, the Congress Party
has shown a certain loss of interest in, and lack of attention to, the country's
rural areas, which has left a political vacuum for opposition parties to ex-
ploit. Moreover, as a consequence of the long-standing popular identification
of governmental authority with foreign rule, there has persisted in India a
general tendency to blame government for every ill and to find fault. with it
on every conceivable occasion, both for what it does and for what it fails to
do* In addition the Congress Party has had to bear the brunt not only of well-
founded criticism but also of the characteristic rural distrust of all supra-
village authority with which villagers feel only remotely connected. This
traditional distrust of higher authority has been reinforced by certain govern-
mental police actions which have seemed to many Indiana unwarrantably.high-
handed and reminiscent of the worst features of British rule. Both left- and
right-wing subversive elements have shown themselves alert to these potentiali-
ties in the rural scene. They have also been quite successful in making a bid
for public sympathy when indiscriminate police action directed against com-
munists or militant communalists has fallen upon the innocent as well as the
guilty.
Another very important asset to subversive elements, particularly to the
communists, is the opportunity to exploit an interrelated group of commonly
held Indian attitudes. The Communist Party of India has had some success
in identifying its own aspirations and beliefss 1) with the general Indian
concern for world peace; 2) with India's natural pride of independence; and 3)
with Indian fears and suspicions of the West and resentment over racial dis-
crimination, which are the heritage of long years of colonial rule. The com-
munists have played upon these themes and have at tempted to direct the public
sentiment thus aroused against the Congress government, charging it with being
the naive or willing dupe of Western capitalist imperialism. When the com-
munists make such charges or attempt to make dramatic capital of their cham-
pionship of Indian sensitivities, there is a large audience emotionally pre-
disposed to believe them.
Still another feature that has lent itself to exploitation by subversive
groups has been the very complexity and heterogeneity of Indian society with
its numerous languages, its important regional groupings and its strong tra-
fiftions of local particularism. The importance of these group division lies
not only in their inherent challenge to Indian national unity but also in the
opportunity afforded subversive elements to exploit regional loyalties and
group rivalries as a means of gaining political strength.
An acute internal problem arising out of this heterogeneity stems from
the demands for the formation of linguistic states and the readjustment of
existing state boundaries along linguistic lines. This problem is India-wide.
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-It has long been the policy of the Indian National Congress to redefine
State boundaries to correspond with major linguistic groupings, but the
Government of India has taken the position until 1952 that this should
not be attempted at present in view of the desirability of devoting all
energies to constructive activities particularly in the economic field.
Readjustment of boundaries on a scale sufficiently wide to meet all de-
mands would seriously disrupt the existing administrative structure. In
certain areas it might also weaken the local Congress Party organizations
and enable opposition governments to come to power., and so result in
friction between the GQt and the State concerned. Nevertheless, by post-
poning the formation of linguistic states., and refusing to yield to the
increasingly urgent demands of local political leaders, the government has
come to realize that it has been playing into the hands of agitators
prominent among whom are the Communists, who make use of this issue to
criticize the central government and to build up their strength.
Consequently on December 19s 1952 the government formally announced
its decision to create the new state of Andhra. The new state, composed
of the Telegu-speaking half of Madras State, was formally established
in October 1953. In December 1953 the government appointed a commission
to examine the whole problem and make recommendations by June 30, 1955.
The future of India as a national state hinges on the wisdom with which
the government handles this fundamental linguistic issue which agitators
can so easily play upon to gain their subversive ends.
Apart frestllhese broad conditions which favor the development of sub-
versive activity on a nation-wide scale there are certain special features
which particularly favor communist inroads. The Indian mind, traditionally
attracted to abstruse and metaphysical thinking, is peculiarly apt to be
drawn to the intricate subtleties of Marxism. Added to this is the predis-
position of the Indian populace to admire selfless devotion to a cause, a
type of devotion. that the CPI demands of its party members and -which was
once associated with many members of the Congress Party in the days before
independence.
Finally, there is the disillusion and disappointment of large segments
of the white collar classes and intelligentsia who provide most of the lead-
ership and drive to the subversive organizations in the country. These are
the groups who are disgruntled or embittered by the limited opportunities
available to them to realize their capabilities or to use their scholastic
training. In present day Indian although there are some important employ-
ment opportunities afforded in public service and in fields requiring
technical skills, the British founded, classical educational system continues
to turn out a disproportionate number of graduates in the liberal arts and
in a few professions, notably the law. Thus the groups who had earlier nur-
tured high hopes of progress under independence, not only have been dis-
illusioned by the fact that there has been little economic or social improve-
ment, but also often face gloomy employment prospects, and have begun to chafe
under the slow pace of the Congress promised reforms. These groups therefore
are particularly vulnerable to the communistst positive assurances of accel-
erated social and economic betterment.
Subversive
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Subversive elements in India today are attempting to exploit not
only the patriotic sentiment but also the techniques of popular organiza-
tion which were associated with the nationalist movement in pre independence
days. During the period of British rule subversive activity against the
Government of India, as in other colonial areas, was closely identified with
nationalism, It was carried on by a number of political organizations, many
of ,h ich are still in existence. Daring the struggle for self rule and in-
dependence, the Indian National Congress, the present ruling party, was itself
declared illegal and its leaders thrown in jail. As far back as 1917 Mahatma
Gandhi promoted civil disobedience, proposing that Indians undermine their
government by peaceful defiance of its authority. During the following two
decades people from all social and economic levels joined in Gandhi campaigns
of civil disobedience that were considered subversive by the Government of
British India, and which met with severe suppression. Thousands of persons,
including Gandhi and Nehru, proudly went to jail. No stigma was attached to
defiance of the government or the consequent punishment, and jail sentences
came to be regarded as evidences of patAotism. Similarly, Subhas Chandra
Bose and his followers, who joined the Japanese when they occupied Southeast
Asia, set up a puppet government and put an army known as the Indian National
Army (INA) into the field against the Allied forces, were and still are ac-
claimed as heroes of the nationalist movement. Common phenomena of these
nationalist days were student demonstrations, illegal strikes, boycotts and
even some organied rural rent campaigns,
The COM M his t Party of India (CPI) is the strongest and most dangerous
subversive organization in the country today. In India as in other non-
communist countries, the party works within the law as well as outside it.
The Party has tried to bring about internal revolution in India since in-
dependence first by attempting to foment a general strike of industrial
workers as a preparatory stop for country-wide insurrection and, when this
approach failed, by trying to stir the peasantry to revolt in the more remote
areas of Assam, where government control was not well established and loyalties
to a central or provincial government were either negligible or nonexistent.
Much of the party's workhas also been concentrated on infiltrating and captur-
ing the leadership of popular organizations, such as the All-India Trade
Union Congress, the All-India Kisan Sabha, and the All India Students' Federa.
tion. Although communist capture resulted in disaffection and the formation
of rival organizations, the original bodies are now "front organizations"
whose subversive roles promise to become increasingly important as the party
continues to form a coalition of anti-Congress groups by legal meant A few
instances of conist infiltration in the police and armed forces as well as
in the emphasize "United Front" tactics and attempts to civil service have
been reported from.time to time. However, information on this subject is so
fragmentary that the extent of such infiltration cannot be properly assessdd..
There is no evidence of any attempt on the part of the communists to infiltrate
the Congress Party, Their efforts are confined mainly to the left opposition
pparties. Policies of the Congress Party which seem to play into communist
hands are apparently arrived at
communist propaganda, which seeks to play independently uon Indian nationalism desires
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for peace may possibly have influenced to some extent the thinking of
Congress leaders and government officials either directly or indirectly.
With regard to subversive activity carried on against the Government
of India by foreign governments, there is very little information. Avail-
able data indicate that the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Trade Agency, and
TASS, possibly engaged in subversive activity to the extent of providing
financial aid to further communist acti
it
v
and pp
provide a courier service for the transmission torthe U.S S.R . of disensitive
information gathered by local communists.
India's new Constitution makes no specific reference to subversive
activity. Nevertheless it gives the government wide authority to deal with
any situation which threatens national security, The Constitution provides
that if the security either of India or of a part of it is threatened by
internal disturbance, the President of the Union may, by proclamation,
suspend the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights enumerated in the Constitu-
tion (including the rights to freedom of speech and expression to assemble
ceabland without arms, and to form associations or unions 5. Furthermore
M Constitution stipulates that none of its fundamental rights clauses shal.f
affect the operation of any existing law "in so far as it roses, or pre-
vents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the security
of the State or of public order, reasonable restrictions on the rights con-
ferred." The Constitution also empowers the government to enact legislation
on preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of India or the
individual states. In the latter case the Union legislates concurrently with
the states. The states are empowered to legislate on the subject of public order
but not on the use of the armed forces of the union to aid civil forces in the '
maintenance of such order.
The Union and the states all have ]aws relating to preventive detention and
the maintenance of public order generally. Many of these were enacted during
the British rule and were directed to limiting the activities of nationalists
who were fighting for political inde endence. Since independence, however these
same laws have been utilized by the Congress Party government against both the
extreme left and right, The enforcement of these laws resulted in the banning
of the CPI in many states, the short-term imprisonment of
and considerable disruption of the party itself. Nevertheless thhecos tsrs'
have had some success in a loitin gg
back to re independence des. Cogmmur st ronttaivil libe ty om ittees aannd
leagued have been organized in different parts of the country to fight for the
abolition or drastic reform of these laws and to su
sons arrested under them. Furthermore the CFAs 1 legal
aid abandon don its
open policy of violence and to participate in the 195152ie1 ction campaign
~o t
enabled the party to recover much of its organizational strength dto explo
not only the inevitable political opposition sentiment but a host of local as-t
pirations and grievances as well. With the gains made by the communists i) the
legislative branch of the central and southern state
general elections, it will. be increasin sor Congres in the len 8,
both at the National and state levels ~ ~~fficu.lt for Congress governments,
the Communist Party of India, ''Y out repressive measures against
While the repressive measures adopted by the
in keeping subversive activity within, controllablegovernment havtee su
Proportions', the m mo ost effective
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counter measures in the long run will be thos
t
k
t
e
a
en
o mitigate the causes
of unrest, dissatisfaction, and frustration among the people which often find.
their outlet in subversive activity. The Congress Party government has begun
to take a few positive measures in this direction. Land reform legislation,
irrigation and hydroelectric schemes, multi-purpose rural development projects
and the revival of village panchayats (councils) at the local government level,
are all designed to enlist active cooperation and support from the rural popula-
tion and give positive evidence of government concern in rural welfare. In
urban areas a few much more halting steps are being taken to improve the employ-
ment opportunities and enlist the idealism and support of the rising school
generation and of the middle classes in general. These are the groups who are
currently the source of all political leadership as well as of all vocal political
opinion in the country. Some effort is being made to revive the student move-
ment on constructive lines, to strengthen the scientific and practical side of
education, to open the recruitment to public service on the widest possible basis,
and to encourage industrialization with its expanding opportunities for training
and employment. As of spring 1952, however, most of these programs were still
only in the initial stages and relatively little substantive progress had been
made. Accordingly the present prospects are that subversive activity will con-
tinue to be on the increase in India, capitalizing on frustrated and restive
elements in both rural and urban areas.
The Communist Party of India (CPI) is the strongest and most dangerous
subversive organization in India today, Stronger now than at any tame since
independence, the party has made a rapid recovery from the spring of 1950, when
it was riven by internal conflict and isolated from all other political groups
by its policy of exclusiveness and its use of terroristic tactics. An impor-
tant element of the present strength of the CPI is perhaps to be found in its
own shrewd estimate of the situation which it is attempting to exploit in India,
namely that the Congress Party government is faced with a grave crisis but is
not yet sufficiently discredited and isolated from the
The success of the CPI in organizing n people to be ousted,
united front" parties, whose candidates
made good showings in India's 195142 elections, is a good measure of the
general soundness of the party's political estimate and of its new influence.
The CPI is an orthodox Stalinist party and as such looks to Moscow, the
Cominform, and to certain brother parties, especially the Communist Party of
the United Kingdom for guidance and direction. There is evidence that, so far
as basic policy and tactics are concerned, the CEE to the best of its ability
adopts its line in accordance with the dictates of Moscow and the Cominform.
In view of the importance of India to the Communist world both the USSR
and China are devoting considerable effort and money in seeking t
ful employment of all the arts of diplomacy and propaganda to keep the counttrly
and its leaders at least "neutral" in the "cold ware,
slick magazines glorifying the USSR can be..bought cheaply in "people's book
the Cominform, of working through Asiantnationals, and itsrwillingness to aa through
and train Asians has done much to obscure its aggressive
is many educated Indians accept Soviet propaganda at fac designs. The result
Indians are interested and impressed by the claims off economic pee .,
rogress an
industrialization in the Soviet Union. Faced by similar problems of in-
dustrialization and improvement in agriculture Indians are curious to find the
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key to USSR's seeming success in these lines. (L2-21,22)
China as 'well. as the USSR rely heavily upon the exchange of cultural
missions, exhibits, fairs, dramas 'and plays to influence Indian public
opinion. Cultural missions between Communist China and India begin to be
exchanged in 1951 followed by the establishment of Chinese Indian "friendship"
associations. Only England and France among the non-Communist nations had more
delegations going to and from the USSR in 1954 than did India. Moreover, of the
40 delegations between the two countries in that year 32 of them went from India
to the USSR. The increased use of films for propaganda purposes shows that
this medium has a high priority. Soviet film festivals have been held in a
number of large Indian cities while the Soviet Embassy sponsors the showing of
documentaries. There are a considerable number of Communists and fellow-travelers
in all sectors of the Indian motion picture indust
the industry is such as to allow easy Comnunis t exploitation* SovietzandoChins se
exhibits dominated the Bombay International Industries Fair in 1952 in which the
U.S. and the UI did not participate. Though it was an industrial fair, the
Communists used the occasion fQr extensive cultural campaigns. A "multimillion
dollar" modern art collection opened in Delhi in March 1952. Composed of 80
paintings, 20 sculptures and 50 other items, the exhibit was the first Soviet
art display ever held outside the USSR. In all of these ways and many others
both the USSR and Communist China reveal at one and the same time the high
priority they give to the "conquest" of India through the diplomacy of cultural
and artistic propaganda and their skills by adroitly linking them up with the
major Communist theme of "peace", "anti-imperialism",, and "anti-capitalism.n
India's will and capacity to resist Communist attack by force or subversion
varies from time to time, from one part of the country to another and the nature
and subtlety of the campaign. In general since 1951 for
an apparent increasing a example there has been
consciousness of the threat of Conanunist attack as Com-
munist China approached the borders of India along the northern frontier ac-
companied by a more critical view of the USSR and skepticism as to its peaceful
protestations and promises.
Indians are broadly tolerant of Communism's
reflecting the eclecticism of Hinduism and Idin politiccaalnandce onnoomi.c think-stem
ing favors nationalization of segments of the economy
as a form of imperialist expansion and colonization. (x-an-23) T critiThei r her n nawitalism
nationalism still being in ew
g , politically-
c
conscious Indians tend to ac pt Sooviet pr?pa Western claimse booutsthe USSR as
being "anti-imperialistic" and "interested only in
freedom and a better life-of the common people eve promoting Indians have greatly interested and impressed by claims of economic pro Ind and have been
Lion in the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent in Communist and Many Indians
also admire the USSR as a count is mist China. Indians
has publicly championed nationalist moovvemen scin Asia, inthheles as one which and aid to Communist China and the Asian insurgents weakened Western control of Asia.
Many Indians have been impressed by Co
it is widely felt that India would be foolish to antagonize uunnneecessarily a
potentially dangerousreighbor. (42-22)
The
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The government maintains a sizeable modern military force capable
of meeting any threat except a determined attack by USSR or Communist
forces. Despite certain well-known attitudes in favour of pacifism,
India thus far has had no trouble maintaining a sufficiently large army
on a volunteer basis, In a country with a huge population, abject want,
and underemployment, the ranks of the army can be filled by men who are
seeking any employment that will give them food and clothing. The armed
forces can draw upon a number of castes and communities with a tradition
for military life such as the Sikhs and Kshatriyas of India and the Gurkhas
of Nepal, In spite of the pacifist tendencies inherent in Hinduism and
consciously encouraged by Gthe government has received considerable
support for its defense of Kashmt r, and Prime Minister Nehru's assurance
that India would resist any encroachments from the north by force, if
necessary, met with general approval. (42-24)
Civilian morale in India in World War II was not high as the Indians
were much more concerned with the political struggle for independence than
they were with the military struggle which they considered largely the
affair of others. A better test of their morale is the fighting in Kashmir
since the end of the war, Popular support in India for the defense of Kashmir
has never wavered, There has been little complaint against military expendi.
tures, although they absorb half of the national budget, thus preventing
much-needed developments of non-military programs. (12-24)
Against a really determined all-out attack by the Soviet Union and/or
Communist China India's forces would be defeated and forced to resort to
guerrilla warfare. Against anything less than such an attack,, the Indian
Alned Forces are capable of maintaining internal security and defending
successfully India. However, a sharp decline in the popularity of the
Government in New Delhi would greatly increase the external military danger,
(80-1)
India is still one of the lesser naval powers of the world, although
compared with other Asian and Australasian naval forces the Indian Navy ranks
second in number of ships and strength of personnel to Australia.
considered capable of carrying The Navy is
out its mission against 4the naval forces of its
mmieneighbors, but not against a major naval. power, (80-2)
a aircraft i sngth of the Air Force, level of trainsnngg, sand high m o alleprender
significant military factor in South Asia. India has considerable mili-
tary industrial capacity pa rticularlyr in regard to basic infant weapons*
Government arsenals and f actortes can produce all the small arms and small-
arms ammunition required for an arm{ir of 500,ooo, In addition, ordnance fac-
tories produce Bran guns, shells, mortar projectiles, artillery explosives.,
and other items. Indian textile molls produce all the fabric items requirefor military use, (00-2)
Without external assistance the capacity of the Indian Communists to
carry on guerrilla or paramilitary activities is at present
While it is virtually impossible for them to endanger seriously theestability
of the government without such external assistance, they might for a time
seriously embarrass one or two state governments. While some external aid
could be infiltrated, apart from an external attack by the Communists on
India local Cots could not overthrow the government, Given a year or
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so of maximum feasible assistance from the USSR and Communist China in the
preparation for guerrilla activity the Indian Communists might be able to
give substantial guerrilla assistance to invading Communist forces.
The police have shown themselves to be acutely aware of the Communist
menace and are prepared to take drastic measures against aryr indication of
. Commuunis t violence. They have also developed a rather extensive network of
agents and informers to keep the Communist Party and its numerous front
organizations under surveillance. By and large the police are loyal, dependable,
and continue to keep away from politics. (S14)
A serious problem confronting the new independent post war government was
the jubversive campaign directed against it by the Communist Party of India
CP.t . During the political, strut' a leading up to independence the Congress
Party welcomed the cooperation of the communists in line with its policy of
accepting cooperation from all groups -- whether as members or simply in affil-
iation -- so long as such groups were prepared to accept the Congress Party's
basic policies and to recognize the directives of its duly constituted au-
thorities. The CPI had been bitterly critical of the Congress Party, including
its socialist wing, up until 193b when the CPI adopted a "United Front" policy.
The Urztted Front policy was regarded in Congress Party circles as a genuine
recognition by the CFI of its past errors and its offer of " ooperation"` was
accepted. This "cooperation" was reasonably smooth until 19h2 with the
exception of a brief internal struggle within the Congress Party in 1930-I0
between communist-su ported radical elements under the leadership of the
Bengali patriot, S. t, Bose, and the old-line leadership of the party under
Gandhi. The Bose group was eventually forced out of the Congress Party. Between
mid-l9 ti). and the spring of 19112 the CPI and the Congress Party were on good
terms as both groups appeared to expect Soviet support of Indian nationalist
demans for British guarantees of postwar independence, The failure of the
U.S.S.R. to support these demands, coupled in the spring of 1942 with the CPI's
uncotional support for World War II and its bitter attack on the Congress
Party, was viewed as a betrayal of the Indian nationalist cause and as evidence
of the CPT-s subservience to the Soviet Union. This CPI betrayal was further
aggravated, in the Congress Party's view, by the communists' decision to cooperate
with the Muslim League and by the. CPI's sympathetic attitude towards the league's
demand for Pakistan. The arrest of virtually all of the Congress Party's leader-
ship by the British government authorities in India in August 1942 prevented
the Congress Party from taking any action at the time, but one of its first acts
following the release of its leadership at the and of the war was to expel all
known Communists from the Congress Party. During the immediate postwar years,
while major nationalist attention was focused on the negotiations for independence,
the conflict between the CPI and the Congress Party became steadily more intense,
A sharp rivalry developed for control of Indian labor, peasant, and student
organizations, Furthermore the CFI's advocacy of revolution and its efforts to
organize violence and counry'-wide uprisings brought it into open conflict with
Congress Party authorities who were sharing responsibility in the interim Domin-
ion government at the center and were in control of most of the interim state
governments as well.
For a short period just before independence the CFI, under the leadership
of P. C. Joshi, adopted a conciliatory policy towards Gandhi Nehru and the
socialist elements in the Congress Party, apparently in an attempt to pave the
way for closer relations between an independent India and the Soviet bloc.
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During this period the CPI temporarily stopped its promotion of urban
strikes and peasant uprising . The communists, however were unable to
achieve any rapprochement with the Congress Party. Instead the rivalry
over the control of popular organizations increased and was even further
intensified by the development of rivalry for the control of the popular
movements for responsible government in the princely states. When the
Congress Party came to power, one of the new government's first moves was
to forbid publication of any material on communal or princely state af-
fairs by the CFI newspaper People's Age.
In the spring of 1948 the CPI gave up all pretense of "cooperation",
asserted that India had achieved independence only in name and was still
being exploited by the "Anglo-Americans" accused Nehru of compromising
with "Western imperialists", and launched a campaign of ruthless violence
and terror. However, the government moved promptly to deal with the new
tactics. The success of the Congress Party Government's policy in dealing
with the CPI was assested by the crudity and violence of communist tactics
ch all nated many people and largely isolated the CPI even f m urban
a or. The attempts by the communists to capture labor, ppeeasannt, and
student organizations precipitated the disintegration of these groups, en-
abling the Congress Party to make a strong bid for reorganization, leaving
the CPI with only a segment of the original body while most of the balance
of the members were reorganized under Congress Party leadership.
The open violence of the communists was met with strict repression
by the state governments, which have the major responsibility for police
action under the Indian constitution. Following a raid of the CFI's head-
quarters in Bombay, the CPI was declared illegal in a number of states
where it was most active, including Madras, Travancore.-Cochin, Hyderabad,
and Bengal.. Preventive detention ordinances, formerly used by the British
against nationalist elements, were now used by the Con ress Party against
the Communists. Indian Army units in Hyderabad carried on a small-scale
war against Communist rebels who first posing as popular champions against
the Razakars, began in mid-1948 to occupy and terrorize a large part of the
Telengana area in the eastern part of the state. The central government also
8ent military aid to north Madras and Assam to help these states suppress
ommunist violence in the Andhra area bordering on Hyderabad and among the
Tribals along India's border. Nehru defended the government's action before
the central legislature on February 2i, 1949. He stated that the government
had a mass of evidence indicating that the CPI was making organized attempts
to sabotage the Indian railway system and such other vital installations as
telephone telegraph, and power stations. He declared that while his govern-
ment was LIdetermined to maintain the well-established rights of labor " it
could not-"submit to threats of violence and incitement to active revolt from
any quarter, " and that consequently it had arrested a number of CPI members
and taken other necessary precautionary measures, and had advised provincial
governments to do likewise. Nehru has frequently reiterated this policy of
distinguishing between the CPIts alleged social and economic objectives,
of which he is prepared to admit are humanitarian; its resort to violence
subversion, which he is firmly determined to resist; and its subservience to
Moscow which he denounces,
In September 1949 the Indian Home Ministry issued a counterpropganda
booklet entitled "Commuunist violence in India, which exposed the underlying
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purposes and practices of communism for the Indian reading public. The
pamphlet contained much detailed documentation and was well argued, but
its appeal was essentially to the sophisticated intellectual and could
hardly compare with the sensationalist pamphleteering of communist publica-
tions and the yellow journalism of such "fellow travelers" as the Bombay
weekly, Blitz. Furthermore, India began to face the same problem confronting
many governments in the West, namely., that under a democratic constitution
it did not have the authority to deal with agitators of the communist type
as firmly as it would like.. Most of the arrests made by the states had been
made with special powers under State Emergency Acts which had been held over
from World War II days, or under Section 144 of the Indian Criminal Procedure
Code which continues to be regarded by many Indians as a piece of authoritarian
British legislation. With the adoption of the constitution., however these
legal sanctions soon proved ineffective. Indian courts began to declare sev-
eral of the state ordinances and actions unconstitutional since they contra-
vened guarantees of basic individual liberties. Except where convictions for
specific crimes had been obtained, therefore the states were unable to keep
communists in jail and had to release most olt them. The ban on the CPI was
lifted in one state after another for similar reasons. In order to provide
itself with the authority to apply the drastic measures felt necessary to
deal with the communist threat., the government introduced a bill amending the
Fundamental Rights' section of the constitution so as to enable both the Union
and state governments, to deal summarily with individuals or groups endangering
the domestic peace or India's friendly relations with other powers. This amend-
ment was passed in November 1951 against considerable opposition from both the
left and the right. Anyone arrested under the new provisions, however, has the
right of appeal to the courts, so that there is some protection against the
arbitrary use of the executive power.
The Congress Party Government '8 firm policy toward the communists has un-
doubtedly made an important contribution to India's internal stability, con-
tributing to the decline of the CPI between 19148 and 1950, a period during
which the party was also being torn by inner conflicts on policy and leadership.
The Indian public, somewhat alienated by CPI violence, has tended to support
the government's action. Furthermore, the governments exposure of communist
tactics and methods has also helped to disillusion some groups both within and
outside the Congress Party.
The subsequent forced relaxation of government controls, however, followed
by the CPI's widely publicized abandonment of its policy of open violence in
1951, helped the party to regain some of its influence and prestige as self-
advertised "champions of the underdog." By the clever use of the United Front
policy during the 1951.152 elections and the successful exploitation of growing
criticism of the Congress Party, the CPI won a number of seats both in the state
and central assemblies. The CPtts nomination of a number of candidates who were
still in jail virtually forced the government to speed up its review of most of
the cases against communists who had been rounded up -without specific char as
and who were being detained indefinitely. Although e process of trial aril.
release for CP1 members was thus greatly accelerated., preventive detention
orders continue to be invoked. The growing dissatisfaction with the Congress
Party and the desire to organize an effective political opposition has disposed
a few groups of both the right and the left to cooperate with
tactical reasons. the CPI for
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Despite certain successes of the government's anticommunist policy
the record of the 195142 elections indicate that the communists will
probably continue to gain in strength as their "legal"tactics make it
difficult for the government to move against them on legal grounds, and
as they continue to cultivate non-Congress Party groups or whatever
political hue i4 their efforts to oust the Congress Party government.
The communists have also had some success in exploiting popular sympathy
through charges of government oppression and appeals for the defense of
civil rights. The government, however, is now even more alert, to the
communist danger and apparently intends to make full use of preventive
detention ordinances and its new constitutional powers.
National Defense Policies
Many of the same considerations that underlie Indian foreign policy
have determined India's defense policies. Prime Minister Nehru has been
primarily responsible for the policies, with only a minor role in their
formulation played by the armed services and former Defense Minister Baldev
Singh. In line with the decision to pursue an independent foreign policy,
India has avoided all military alliances or commitments and has even kept
aloof from formal military agreements and conferences within the Comaonweealth.
Following the London Commonwealth Conference in 1951, Nehru stated in reply
to questioning in Parliament that India had in no way participated in the
round table discussions on defense. There is, however on a confidential
basis a wide exchange of information which covers mil.hary matters as well as
mutual political and economic interests.
Although refusing to make military or diplomatic commnitments, India has
demonstrated its determination to maintain as strong a military to defend itself against attack. Far the past few 45 arm as possible
India's budget has been marked for defense purposes. Ina view So of t Inddiatsf
stringent economic position this percentage constitutes a far heavier burden
than for an industrially developed nation. In absolute terms, however, the
amount of defense is relatively small -- Rs. 916 000,000 (US$192 000,000)
for 1952/53. Thus India has been unable to develop a large air force or sub-
stantial mechanized forces and still relies principally on infantry units.
The Indian Army has approximately 400,000 man. The government realizes that it
is in no position to resist a concerted Soviet attack. Indian leaders, how-
ever, do not feel that the U.S.S.R. intends a-direct attack and appears to be
nursing the hope that in case of war the Soviet Union will disburse its forces
in Europe and Northeast Asia, Consequently India is stressing preparedness
against attacks from nearer and more likely quarters, such as Pakistan and
Communist China, and against internal subversion.
Defense policy vis-a-vis Pakistan
The dispute over the accession of Kashmir which started in October 1947
has resulted in India's defense policies since independence being largely
focused on Pakistan. From November 1947 until the cease-fire in Janua11x9
Indian troops-ere engaged in fighting Northwest Frontier tribesmen, Pakistani
irregulars, and eventually Pakistani troops. Although this campaign
popular hostility between the two nations., it aggravated
a appears to have resulted in mutual
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respect for each other's military capabilities and to have made important
contributions to the training of both armies. Since the beginning of 1949
there has been no major fighting but the generally tense situation has
kept both sides alert and forced them to maintain their military strength.
India has made it clear that it will resist aggression from Pakistan
but has made it a ually clear that India does not want war with Pakistan.
In the fall of 1951 when there appeared to be some danger that Pakistan
might attempt to press its demands on Kashmir by some precipitate action,
India's conspicuous movement of troops to the East and West Pakistan borders
was clearly intended to discourage such action and to disabuse Pakistan of
any belief that a war could be limited to the state of Jammu and Kashmir
alone. During the course of the protracted negotiations both sides have
made a few concessions. Presently there is every indication that India will
continue to defend the Abdullah government and will resist any renewed at-
tempt by Pakistan to get a solution by force. In an attempt to improve
relations between the two nations, however, Pii me Minister Nehru urged
Pakistan in 1950 and again in 1951 to sign a mutual " no war declaration"
and to agree that all disputes would be peacefully settled. Pakistan re-
jected these overtures as pointless unless accompanied by specific proposals
for the settlement of all outstanding disputes. At the same time, however,,
most Pakistani leaders, appear to be well aware of the heavy cost of war
and the doubtful success of the effort in view of India's larger forces.
The disputes and rivalry between India dnd Pakistan have prevented full
cooperation on mutual defense problems, particularly along the Tibetan-Jammu
and Kashmir border and in the Assam-Burma area. The constant negotiations,
between the two countries, however,, have provided a system of cooperation
and a medium for exhbasge of information which has proved helpful against
subversive and communist elements in the northeast border area and which
would enable similar inconspicuous cooperation against foreign infiltration.
in the event of a direct attack that threatened both countries there is little
doubt that they vould cooperate in resistance. But while the disputes smolder
between the two and each finds it necessary to deploy a large part of its
forces against the other, there is not likely to be any combined defense
efforts against Communist China or the U.S.S.R.
Defense policy vis-a-vis China
The military occupation of Tibet by Communist Chinese has aroused
Indian concern over the defense of the long Indian-Nepalese-Tibetan border.
Although India has continued a formal policy of friendship for China there
are many indications that India is concerned over the threat posed by
Chinese forces to the north. Most of India's northern borders lie in difficult,
mountainous terrain and have never been officially demarcated.
Indian apprehension has been increased by recently revealed Chinese maps
which claim as Chinese territory large tracts in Assam, all of Bhutan and
parts of the state of Jammu and Kashadr, thus laying the groundwork for future
controversy. CosmnurAs t China has not officially pressed these claims. However,
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Prime Minister Nehru has indicated that India recognizes the McMahon line
(the boundary drawn by the British for northeast India but never formally
recognized by the Chinese) and that India's forces will resist any hostile
attack fagainst the country. In the spring of 1952 Prime Minister Nehru
toured the northeastern border regions which comriand the main passes leading
from Tibet and stressed the need for constant vigilance.
The Indian government has taken several steps to strengthen the defense
of Assam which borders southeastern Tibet and western Sikang. Indian troops
and police have struck hard against the Bengali terrorists revolutionary
Communist Party of India which was fomenting antigovernment activities among
the Tribals of the state, most of whom are in the border areas. Partially
in order to counteract subversive propaganda among the Tribalsa Prime Minister
Nehru has arranged to convene a conference of Tribal representatives and
other interested groups during June 1952 to evolve a plan for improving the
welfare of India's Tribal peoples -- of whom some 800,,000 live in Assam. In
addition the Indian Army in Assam has been strengthened, the air force has
aerially mapped the Assam region, and a systemative survey of the border has
been undertaken.
India has assumed the position formerly held by the British Government
with respect to the three northern border areas of Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal.
Since independence India has negotiated new treaties with all three states.
Bhutan, a small Buddhist state ruled by an autonomous Maharajah, is a full
protectorate. In 191j.9 it concluded a treaty with India under Mich India con-
trols Bhutan's foreign relations and defense. Bhutan is an isolated region
and natural barriers largely separate it from adjoining Indian areas but
Bhutanese officials are in a position to report on developments in Tibet.
Bhutanese scouts have been organized by the Indian police to reconnoiter
the Tibetan border. Sikkim, which commands the main communication routes
from India is under even closer Indian control. It is the only princely
state which has not been fully integrated into the Union continuing to occupy
the same position of close dependence on the Delhi government formerly occupied
under the British. India handles not only Sikkim's defense and foreign re-
lations but its transport and communications as well and, in addition, an
Indian official has been in complete control of Sikkim's internal administra-
tion since August 19149.
India also maintains special relations with Nepal, for although Nepal
controls its own foreign affairs it shares its defense responsibilities
with India. India's defense interests in Nepal center on Nepal's long border
with Tibet and its proximity to major population centers in northern India.
India's defense objectives in Nepal are threefold: establishment of an
adequate defense of the mountain passes, maintenance of internal stability
to prevent subversion from within or any weakening of the state that might
handicap its defense, and continuance of a government not unfriendly to India.
Within the past two years India has pursued these objectives with heightened
urgency. The Government of India inherited its responsibility for the defense
of Nepal from its British predecessor under a treaty of 1923. In 1950 Nepal
and India signed treaties of friendship and commerce shortly after which the
Prime Minister of India made a speech stating that any attack on Nepal would
be considered to be an attack on India and that the Himalayas were India's
northern defense border. In the autumn of 1951 a joint Nepalese Indian military
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team surveyed the northern border and in January 1952 Nepal's Prime
Minister requested, and received, an Indian -military mission to train
and reorganize Nepal's armed forces. Finally, India has offered to build
a highway from Katmandu, Nepal's capital, to northern India,, and to im-
prove the existing airstrip in Katmandu,
The transfer of government in Nepal from the hereditary autocratic
rule of the Rana family to a more representative popular government has
not come without friction between the Rana family and the other contending
groups. Since February 1951 Nehru has on several occasions mediated Nepalese
disputes and in July at Nepal's request Indian troops aided in the capture
of the Nepalese rebel leader, K. I. Singh. To further aid Nepalese stability
India has proposed a development program which India will largely finance on
a long-term basis,
The biggest threat to clcs a an effective Indian-Nepalese cooperation
are the sharp personal rivalries within the Nepalese Government which
threaten its stability and handicap efforts to strengthen it. The Nepalese
Congress Party which has led the movement for popular government in Nepal
is anxious to keep dependence on India at a minimum but it is both conscious
to the threat along the northern border and of the considerable aid and sup-
port it has received and still needs from India. For its part, India appears
anxious to avoid excessive interference in Nepalese affairs, recognizing
the odium it may incur, and hopes to achieve its aim through the cooperation
of a moderate government, in the event of the breakdown of government or
the coming to power of a hostile group, however$ India can be expected to react
strongly and to occupy Nepal if necessary.
in the northern Indian border states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal
Pradesh which lie west of Nepal, the frontier guards were sizeably strengthened
in mid-1951 when Chinese Communist troops appeared for the first time along
the border. In addition, the Indian Army in Kashmir has been in a particularly
good position since 198 to check on infiltration and continually sends patrols
out from the town of Leh to cover eastern Kashmir,
The northern border of India has extremely difficult terrain which pro-
vides some advantage lb the defender. In addition India has shorter and better
lines of communication than China. These advantages may be offset if there
is a significant build-up of air power to the north, since India is particularly
weak in air defense.
Defense policy vis-a-vis Burma
While Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia would be deeply
resented in India$ would lead to a cog3 ,.g of Indian-Chinese relations, and
would cause India to further strengthen its armed forces, India does not at
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this time appear likely to bolster resistance to communist aggression in
any Southeast Asian country with the possible exception of Burma. It is
reported that the Indian Army considers aid to Burma necessary in such an
eventuality, but the government has carefully refrained from any public
statements comparable to those made in reference to Nepal, Privately, also,,
the government has refrained from committing itself to a definite course
of action in the event that Burma is attacked. Confidentially, government
officials have stated that a threat to Burma's territorial integrity would
be viewed as a threat to India and that some action would be taken but that
formal representation might be the extent of it. Present indications are
that in case of a direct attack India would elect to husband its military
resources in its own defense. Diplomatically and in the UN, however, India
would probably support Burma. On the other hand, in the event of obvious
Chinese infiltration and greatly increased internal subversion, India might
be expected to encourage and support Burmese resistance and furnish Burma
such arms and other military equipment as it could spare. India, however,
is not likely to allow its forces to become directly involved except in
the defense of the India-Burma border.
Certainly India considers Burma within its sphere of interest, and the
officials of the two countries have had several confidential consultations
on defense matters. But, India's present policy with respect to Burma is
dictated by India's relatively small armed forces, the need to be prepared
for war with Pakistan, and fear of a direct attack from Tibet by Chinese
Communist forces. In addition India, apparently on the basis of its con-
sultations with the Burmese, does not believe that the Communists are currently
preparing for any military thrust into Burma.
Military-civilian relationship
Independent India inherited a British-trained and organized army which
had been deliberately kept isolated from politics. The present government
has been anxious to maintain the sharp distinction between the military and
civilian branches of government. The cabinet, led by Prime Minister Nehru,
has assumed full initiative and responsibility for defense policy and the
armed services have operated within this framework. The services have been
encouraged to maintain a nonpolitical professional status and attitude,
and generally they have adhered rigidly to this principle.
The Government of India has been generally alert to the welfare and morale
needs of the Arty. Loyalty, discipline, and morale of the services is reasonably
good. During British rule there was little provision for Indian officers in
the upper grades to get the necessary training and experience. This weakness
has been corrected to some bxtent through Commonwealth training facilities
and by actual experience in the Hyderabad and Kashmir campaigns. Indian offi-
cers are reported to be improving in the caliber of their leadership. The main
weaknesses of the-Indian forces are not political but strictly military - such
as lack of training facilities, equipment and fire power needed by a modern
army.
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Strengthening India's Resistance to Communism
Both India's will and capacity to resist Communist attack from without
or within can be strengthened in a number of feasible ways and through
programs some of which are underway. From the military point of view a settle-
ment of the. Jammu and Kashmir dispute would increase India's defense capacity.
othe
As time goes on the strength of Indian armed forces will increase as
ee
shortage of qualified Indian personnel for highs' staff command po a
occasioned by the former British practise of allowing only British officers
to hold such posts., is gradually being overcome. (80-1) The combat capa-
bilities of the Air Force are limited by its dependence upon foreign sources
of supply for combat aircraft., aircraft parts and aviation petroleum products.
(80-i) While India does have the potentiality of becoming one of the leading
naval powers of Asia (82-9) at this time (1952) the Indian navy is not capable
of defending the Indian Ocean area (82-1). A ten year expansion program in-
volving the acquisition of an additional cruiser,, seven additional destroyers.,
the establishment of a marine corps., and development of a fleet air arm will
bring India over to its goal of self-defense,
Domestic economic and social programs supported by the government are
contributing in strengthening the country from within. The organization
of popularly selected village government bodies., the development of "basic"
rural schools., the encouragement of cooperative societies., the pioneer efforts
in developing an adult education program, an agricultural extension service,
and rural community development programs., have all demonstrated the effective-
ness of such programs in countering eommunis t propaganda and arousing public
interest and support. To date, however., most of the country's limited financial
resources have had to be devoted to defense and to the maintenance of police
and essential administrative service, while only relatively small sums have
been available for economic development and improvement of the general welfare.
As a young nation confronted by serious internal problems of building
an independent state and raising the economic level of its people, India
has been trying desperately to keep from becoming involved in the cold war.
(la-23) Prime Minister Nehru has many times declared that India will seek
to avoid aligning itself with any bloc of powers and this point of view has
won widespread support. They want their country to remain free and inddpendent
in order to choose their own role as crises arise. Because of the relationship
to the U.K., they became involved in the world wars and suffered inflation
and famine and they now want to avoid involvement in third war. With some
exceptions Indians are opposed to joining either side in the cold war. (142-23)
Indiata Foreign Policy
The major tenets of Indian foreign policy formulated since independence
are: 1) a desire to maintain political neutrality in the East-West struggle;
2) a desire to prevent war by acting as a moderating force between the power
blocs and, if possible., to avoid involvement if war occurs; 3) reliance on
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collective security through peaceful measures under the United Nations;
.4) support of all nationalist independence movements, par ticularayian
Africa, the Near East and Asia, and, finally, 5) opp
basic frame-
discrimination against the colored peoples of the world. This
India's
work of foreign policy has been determined in lge $lrd colonial by 1 nation.,
position as an Asian power, 2) its long experience
3) its dangerous proximity to the U.S.S.R, and Communist China in the nacd
of the relative weakness of India's own military defenses, and I4)
to devote a maximum of attention and resources to meet the serious internal
problems confronting the country.
India's vulnerability to Soviet attack, the relatively poor equipment
of its defense forces, and the need for an extended period of international
peace to enable it to meet its difficult economic and political problems
have all contributed to the country's fear of war and the fervent desire
to avoid it. This attitude is probably further strengthened by the influence
of certain pacifist ideas stressed by the late national leader, 1ohandas K.
Gandhi. India under Gandhi's leadership gained freedom with a minimum of . force
and with considerable reliance on "nonviolence" techniques of protest. As a
result there is some tendency in India to believe that many world problems also
could be solved by less reliance on force or threat of force and that India
has a positive obligation to counsel moderation and, where possible, to act as
mediator between the rival blocs. At the same time, the Indian Government has
clearly indicated its intention to fight any direct attack. (55-5,26)
While it would, of course, be an important gain for the US if India were
to abandon its policy of non-alignment, adcept the principle of collective
security, enter into defensive alliances with other free nations under American
aegis, the fact that there is virtually no likelihood of India's doing so under
present circumstances is not calamitous. However, the loss of.India to the
Sim-Soviet bloc, however it occurred, would be a severe political and psy-
chological blow to the West. It would most certainly result in the loss of
much of the rest of Asia and tend to create throughout the world the impression
that the ultimate triumph of Communism was inevitable. It is therefore of much
greater importance to the US that India remain non-Comunist than that it abandon
its neutral foreign policy. It is also a much more feasible objective as
opportunities exist for strengthening India's will and capacity to resist
Communism whereas opportunity for influencing India's neutralism are at present
negligible.
Indian Neutralism
Unless its own immediate interests are involved, India can be expected to
follow a policy of neutrality in the event of a third world war, regardless
of whether the Soviet bloc or the West or the West is considered to have pre-
cipitated the conflict. If its own interests are threatened, India would
probably be prepared to align itself with the West in the hope of obtaining
military assistance. Even though neutral, India would be likely to attempt to
maintain as much of its trade with the UK and the US as possible; this will, as
the war continues, tend to draw India toward the West.
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India's neutrality in the East-West struggle is fundamental to the
country's foreign policy. It is based on several important considerations;
(1) the conviction that the US and the USSR are engaged in a struggle for
world supremacy and that to sup ort either, In Nehru's view, would be both
morally wrong and imprudent; (2) the desire to avoid-any alignment which
might dero ate from the full exercise of the country's newly won inde-
pendence; (3) the fear of involvement in a third world war at a time when
India desperately needs a period of peace to build up its economy and
stabilize its political structure; (4) the persistence of anti-Western
and anti-colonial attitudes developed during the fight for independence;
(5) the belief that India cannot rely upon the West to defend South Asia
against direct Soviet or Chinese Communist attack; (6) India's ambition
for Asian leadership; and (7) the conviction that India can make its
greatest contribution to world peace by acting as a mediator between East
and West. India's neutrality is a major obstacle to US efforts to rally
and unite the free nations of Asia in the struggle against Soviet world
domination. Nevertheless, it denies to the Soviets the very substantial
political and psychological advantages they would derive from positive
Indian support.
The loss to Soviet control -- either through internal subversion
or external force -- would have a serious adverse effect on the position
of the Western democracies vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc. It would bring
into the Soviet ephere the largest and most influential non--communist
country in Asia, thereby enhancing Soviet prestige and influence. The
stability of the remaining non-oommunist regimes of Asia would be threatened,
and, without strong outside support, many of them would doubtless follow
India into the Soviet camp. The repercussions of such a development would
not be limited to Asia alone.
India's economic problems are of major significance not only in de-
termining the prospects of the present moderate government but also in
influencing the country's foreign policy. These problems are not likely
to be solved without a considerable amount of outside economic assistance.
Since the West is the only probable source of such aids economic con-
siderations tend to impel the Indian Government to expand its ties with
the West without, however, committing itself firmly and to hold back in
the development of closer bonds with the Soviet bloc.
If India should become a member of the Soviet bloc, its potential contri-
bution would depend largely on the degree of developmental assistance extended
by the Soviet Union. Since higher priorities -within the Soviet orbit would
probably prevent the USSR from providing India with the necessary machinery for
large-scale industrialization, India would remain primarily an agricultural
country with ever-growing pressure of its population on the 1 and and with little
to contribute to the economy of the Soviet sphere.
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If India's accession to world communist ranks were to result in the
loss of all South and Southeast Asia's resources to the West the advantage
of the Soviet bloc would be considerable. This advantage would, however,
consist more in the denial of important sources of strategic materials to
the West than in their acquisition by the Soviet bloc, particularly, as in
time of war, shipping difficulties would impose severe limitations on Soviet
ability to utilize supplies from this area.
Indian products have a much higher priority on the West's purchasing
list than on that of the USSR. The absorption of India into the Soviet
bloc -would place under communist control one of the West's principal sources
of jute goods, tea, manganese, mica, shellac, and kyanite. As important to
the West as India's own products are the rubber, tin, and graphite produced
in neighboring countries, the supply of which would be seriously jeopardized
if a communist regime should come to power in India.
India's economic importance to the US and the West depends on the status.
of US-USSR relations. In normal times the total trade of the US with India
is not substantial. India absorbs only 2.1 percent of US exports and supplies
but 3 percent of US imports. In the current cold war situation, however, India
contributes strategic materials in significant amounts to the economies of the
free world, and to that of the US in particular. Nevertheless, with these
commodities are important, none of them is absolutely indispensable. In a total
war, India's contribution might include not only exports of strategic materials,
but large scale production of military supplies and local support for military
forces such as was provided to British and other Allied forces during World War
II. The magnitude of that contribution can not be assessed precisely, but it
was apparently around 48,OOOfo00,O00. Since the country has not yet fully re-
covered from the effects of World War II, and is cureently restricting its
capital goods imports severely, it is doubtful that an equally large contribu-
tion could be expected under present conditions.
In a continuing cold war situation., India is most important to the West
as a major supplier of jute goods, tea, manganese, mica, shellac, and kyanite.
The loss of any one of these commodities would create difficulties and would
involve at best a shift to more costly and less satisfactory-sources of supply.
Presumably, tea could be dispensed with. In the case of jute goods, the sub-
stitution of other fiber and paper bagging is possible, but alternative
materials are also in short supply. For manganese, mica, and kyanite, alternative
sources of supply can be developed only with considerable delay and with a loss
in the quality of the raw material. India alone supplies the best quality of
shellac, but the use of shellac can be restricted. Even more important to the
West than India's own products are such commodities as natural rubber, tin
graphite, etc., produced in neighboring countries, the supply of which would be
seriously jeopardized, if not lost entirely if a communist regime should come to
power in India.
The full alignment of the Indian Government with the Western democracies
would be an important gain for the West not only because it would strengthen
the democratic camp by the addition of the largest non-communist country in
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Asia, but also because such a striking conversion to the democratic point
of view after a long period of suspended judgment would have a powerful
psychological effect and do much to confirm in their adherence to the
democratic cause a number of Asian countries that presently adopt neutral
or timid positions.
Continued Indian neutrality would deprive the USSR of the striking
political and psychological benefits that would accrue from an Indo-Soviet
alliance. But as has been indicated in the discussion of India's political
significance to the US, Indian neutrality is not without significant ad-
vantages to the USSR since such neutrality is an important obstacle in the
way of US leadership in the struggle against world communism; on occasion,
it gives support to Soviet maneuvers, as, for example, in the UN and its
specialized agencies. These positive benefits, together with the fact that
Indian neutrality denies important advantages to the West, make the con-
tinuance of Indian neutrality a worthwhile objective of Soviet foreign policy,
failing the possibility of gaining India's adhesion to the Soviet bloc.
In conclusion then the loss of India to Soviet control would have a
serious adverse effect on the position of the Western democracies vis-a-vis
the Soviet bloc. It would deprive them of an important source of a number
of strategic materials since India's adhesion to the Soviet orbit would
probably soon result in the West being denied free and unrestricted access
to all the resources of South and Southeast Asia. It would bring into the
Soviet sphere the largest and most influential non-communist country in
Asia. Its psychological effect would be tremendous and Soviet prestige
and influence would be greatly enhanced. All the non-communist regimes
of Asia would be gravely threatened and without strong outside support,
many of them would doubtless follow India into the Soviet camp. Nor would
the effects be confined to South and Southeast Asia, as there would doubt-
less be repercussions in Africa and the Near East as well.
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