JUSTIFICATION FOR PENETRATION FLIGHTS BY AQUATONE BASED ON INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000600150063-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 63
• Publication Date: February 13, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
Approved For Release 2001/D'609~DP61 S00750A0000150063-9
Copy _,,/_ of 19 25X1
13 February 1957
JUSTIFICATION FOR PENETRATION FLIGHTS BY AQUATONE
BASED ON INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
25X1
1. The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee on AQUATONE
has identified three intelligence problems of vital importance to
the defense of this country. Their solution can have vital effects
upon this nationts economy. These problems are set forth below.
In ex lorin the way in which AQUATONE, with its uni ue ability
might
contribute significantly to the solution of these three intelligence
problems, the Committee has required that each target listed could
affirmatively meet the test: "Will we learn significant new information
that will likely make a fundamental difference in our estimates of
Russian capabilities".
2. The three problems are as follows:
a. Soviet Guided Missile Capability Against the
United States,
1) The limited amount of information available
to the intelligence community indicates that the Soviet Union
has given a very high priority to the development of both
offensive and defensive guided missiles. Current estimates
give the Soviet Union a capability in the field of air-to-surface
and surface.to-surface weapons suitable for nuclear attack on
the United States and predict an ICBM capability by 1960. To
achieve this latter threat, the Soviets would have to begin
testing ICBMIs and/or components thereof not later than
1958; such testing, however, could start in 1957.
25X1
25X1
ew o this, we are, ttiorefore# see g y pioneer
25X1
NSA review completed
HANDLE
Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP6
TOP SECRET
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP61 SO075OA000600150063-9
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP61 SO075OA000600150063-9
 25X1
Approved For Release 2005
06Q (' i S00750A00960150063-9
CAN i.
6) Coverage of the foregoing targets, one or more,,
and study of the results with collateral information, should
enable us to sharpen our requirements not only for AQUATONE
but also for other sources in respect of the guided missile
problem.
b. Soviet Long Range Aircraft Capability.
1) We feel that the solution to this problem must
go hand in hand with efforts to solve the guided missile capa?
bility problem because of the interrelationships of the two
delivery systems. AQUATONE mission evealed
that eight of the nine home bases of the Soviet long range
aviation had storage sites the existence of which had previously
been unknown. If the ratio of eight out of nine should also apply
to the remaining long range aviation bases and, assuming that
the sites contain nuclear weapons, current estimates regarding
the status of long range aviation nuclear readiness as well as
nuclear production capabilities would probably require
readjustment.
2
of the highest priority long range aviation airfields would
serve both to indicate the size and the composition of the
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
HANDLE VIA
Approved For Release 2005/ 75: 9 1
 Approved For Release 20
P P09SMETP61 S00750A000600150063-9
~5 O
bomber force and the scope of the forward deployment of
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1 D
3) Coverage of the long range aircraft bases
coupled with the information obtained on the guided missile
installations will indicate which is receiving the greater
emphasis in the USSR and whether Soviet development in
these fields is surpassing that of the US.
25X2
25X1
HANDLE
Approved For Release 2ggW/(t;'--JA f DP61 S