SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR DECEPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000400050018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 28, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 100-2-57
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR DECEPTION
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and
the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 28 May 1957. Concurring were the Special Assistant, In-
telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval
Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assist-
ant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained,
the subject being outside of his Jurisdiction.
MORI
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department of
State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or
Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
ment with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be
requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
SECRET
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR DECEPTION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc for deception in a manner or
on a scale which would threaten US national security, and to assess the ability of US
intelligence to cope with such deception.
SCOPE
This estimate, which differs radically from the normal national intelligence es-
timate, owes its origin to a recommendation made by the Technological Capabilities
Panel, chaired by Dr. Killian, and to NSC Action 1430. Specific recommendation
C.4 of the Killian Report reads as follows :
"We need to examine intelligence data more broadly, or to invent some new
technique, for the discovery of hoaxes. As a first step, we recommend a National In-
telligence Estimate, with adequate safeguards, of our success in keeping secret our
most useful techniques of intelligence. This estimate would suggest the extent to
which an enemy might be manipulating the information obtained through these
sources."
CONCLUSIONS
1. The capability of Communist govern-
ments for undertaking operations of de-
ception is greater than that of most other
governments because (a) they exert a
higher degree of control over the informa-
tion respecting their countries which be-
comes available to the outside world; and
(b) they need not refrain from deception
because of concern that their own general
public may be puzzled or misled by opera-
tions primarily intended to deceive for-
eigners.
2. The US has no intelligence method or
technique which is completely unknown
to the Bloc, and therefore none which is
invariably proof against deception. It is
true that a great deal of the evidence
which we possess concerning the Bloc is
of such a nature that it could not have
been falsified or distorted. However, such
evidence is generally insufficient for the
more important intelligence estimates,
especially those which deal with Bloc in-
tentions and those which attempt to
arrive at an exact statement of Bloc
strengths, whether political, economic,
military, or other. Concerning these
matters it is generally necessary to con-
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cede that deception is possible, and to in-
quire whether it is feasible, and if so
whether it is likely.
3. Since every intelligence estimate rests
on its own particular structure of sup-
porting data, which is often very elabo-
rate, no statement of the degree of sus-
ceptibility to deception will apply equally
to all. Each estimate must be separately
considered, and the evidence on which
it is based (including collateral and con-
firmatory evidence) examined with the
problem of deception in mind. We have
carried out such an examination for US
estimates on five matters of great impor-
tance: (a) Soviet heavy bomber strength;
(b) Soviet nuclear weapons; (c) three
aspects of Soviet air defense; (d) Soviet
guided missiles; and (e) Soviet capability
to attack the US without warning. The
conclusions of this examination are pre-
sented in the body of this paper. (Paras.
48-70)
4. The chief defenses against deception
lie first in the constant and laborious ac-
cumulation of information, from inde-
pendent and widely varied sources, upon
every aspect of Bloc affairs. Such an ac-
cumulation makes it possible to test new
data for reliability against the greatest
possible body of knowledge. Ancillary
to this is the provision of experts and an-
alysts having a wide variety of skills and
perceptions to bring to bear on this data,
so that individual preconceptions or
shortcomings may cancel out. A second
defense consists in the continual search
for, and application of, new intelligence
techniques. Even though these may be
known to the Bloc in principle, they may
when first applied, or when first used in
a new area of intelligence interest, yield
information which can be accepted with
reasonable assurance that it is free from
deception.
5. Even when such defenses have been de-
veloped as far as possible, there will still
be circumstances in which deception may
be effective. This is most likely in a peri-
od of intense international crisis, when
sufficient time may not be available prop-
erly to collate and evaluate new informa-
tion, and when the urgency of the situa-
tion may not permit reservation of judg-
ment or postponement of decision. It is
during such a period that the feasibility
of deception, and its potential danger to
US security, is at its greatest.
DISCUSSION
Definitions and Distinctions
6. Deception, or hoax, as used in this paper,
is defined as the act of misleading through
deliberate manipulation, distortion or falsifi-
cation of evidence, in order to induce an ad-
versary to act in a manner prejudicial to his
interests. Generally speaking, the methods
are as follows: (a) by planting false infor-
mation; (b) by coloring or distorting other-
wise authentic information so as to make it
convey a false impression; (c) by selectively
releasing some correct information on a sub-
ject while withholding essential parts of the
total picture; and (d) by releasing plentiful
data, whether true or false, with the ob-
ject of overshadowing and obscuring certain
particular items of paramount importance.
These various methods may be pursued in
combination or singly.
7. For the purposes of this paper, deception
must be distinguished from - concealment.
The latter aims by withholding information
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to prevent the victim from arriving at a cor-
rect conclusion; the former aims by manipu-
lating information to make him arrive at a
false conclusion. Concealment is intended to
foster ignorance, and deception to produce
error, and it is with deception that this paper
is primarily concerned.
8. The distinction between concealment and
deception is theoretically valid, but in prac-
tice it is often impossible to separate the two.
Deception generally - though not always -
depends for success upon an accompanying
suppression of truth. Concealment in turn
is often made more certain by an accompany-
ing deception intended to divert attention
from the truth. In this paper, however, we
are examining not the extent of our ignorance
of Soviet affairs, nor the capabilities of So-
viet security agencies to withhold informa-
tion, but rather the extent to which the evi-
dence we possess concerning Soviet affairs
may be the product of deliberate Soviet decep-
tion. Accordingly, we shall as far as possible
exclude the element of concealment from
the discussion, while recognizing nevertheless
that it is usually an essential component of
successful deception.
Objectives of Soviet Deception
9. Broadly speaking, Soviet deceptions under-
taken against US and allied intelligence would
have one of three aims:
a. To lead us to an underestimate of So-
viet or Bloc strength, capability, or determina-
tion, either in some particular respect (e.g.,
heavy bomber strength; Soviet disposition to
support Communist China), or generally.
Such an underestimate could be profitable to
the Bloc by causing the US and its allies to
cut down on the development of countervail-
ing strength, and then to find themselves con-
fronted by superior Bloc power at a time of
crisis. At worst it might lead to defeat of
the US and its allies in war, because of in-
adequate preparation.
b. To lead us to an overestimate of Soviet
or Bloc strength, capability, or determination,
either in some particular respect, or generally.
Such an overestimate could be profitable to
the Bloc by creating unnecessary economic
and political strains as the US and its allies
strove to build up countervailing power. It
could also cause the US and its allies to con-
duct their affairs with excessive caution, in-
ducing them to accept reverses, or to fail to
press advantages and achieve successes, when
the true power situation made such courses
unnecessary.
c. To cover (i.e., to assist in the concealment
of) some particular Bloc activity, or some
aspect of Bloc policy, by directing the atten-
tion of US and allied intelligence to other
matters. This may include deceptions de-
signed to mislead as to the time at which some
otherwise predictable action is to occur.
10. Any Soviet deception must logically be
directed towards one or another of these goals.
In practice, however, more modest aims might
in certain circumstances be all that the So-
viet leaders needed or wanted to achieve.
Suppose, for example, a period of intense inter-
national crisis, with war an imminent possibil-
ity. The problems and uncertainties facing
intelligence officers would be very great, and
large amounts of contradictory data would be
flowing in even in the absence of deliberate de-
ception. At such a time hoaxes which fell
short of being wholly convincing would never-
theless serve to puzzle and distract the activ-
ities of intelligence. Such hoaxes might ac-
complish their purpose if they prevented esti-
mates from being timely and firm, even
though they did not succeed in causing them
to be incorrect. Thus, although the logical
aim of deception will always be to induce a
false estimate, the practical aim may be
simply to hinder and delay the production of
a correct estimate, and to cause it to be at-
tended with doubts and reservations.
Soviet Capabilities for Deception
11. Soviet capabilities for deception depend
in great part upon the degree to which various
US intelligence methods are susceptible to
hoax; this problem is discussed at length in
paragraphs 24-42 of this paper. Here it is
only necessary to point out that since the So-
viet state is totalitarian, its rulers can exert
an unusually high degree of control over the
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information respecting their country which
becomes available to the outside world. Pub-
lications, speeches, broadcasts, and the like,
can be directly controlled. Statistics and
other descriptions of Soviet life and achieve-
ment can, within limits, be systematically
falsified. Observers can be shown what the
Soviet government wishes them to see, and
excluded from what the government wishes
them not to see. Moreover, although Soviet
rulers must take into account administrative
and operational requirements for reasonably
accurate information, they are not answer-
able to their own public for what they do in
this connection. They can decree any prac-
ticable operations of deception they wish, and
they need not refrain from such operations
because of concern that their own general
public may be puzzled or misled by hoaxes
primarily intended to deceive foreigners. Thus
the basic capabilities of the Soviet and other
Communist governments for deception are
greater than those of any other important
governments in the modern world.
12. It is worth noting, however, that the capa-
bilities of the Soviets for deception may fre-
quently depend upon their ability to gain
rapid and correct knowledge of the impact
of their efforts. In the first place, the Soviets
must be reasonably certain that false data
they prepare actually reach the proper US (or
other foreign) authority. Again, any given
phase of a deception operation may be de-
pendent upon the results of preceding phases,
and perhaps cannot usefully be undertaken
until those results are known. The impor-
tance of such factors in the success of a decep-
tion operation will vary widely with the na-
ture and aims of the operation. Thus, we
cannot usefully estimate in general terms the
degree to which present Soviet knowledge of
our intelligence activities extends Soviet ca-
pabilities for deception, nor can we define the
limits which Soviet ignorance of those ac-
tivities may place upon their capabilities.
Even if the Soviets were largely ignorant, a
single successful penetration might give them
opportunity for a profitable hoax. The only
generalization that seems admissible, there-
fore, is that Soviet capabilities for deception
will be diminished by good security measures
protecting the US and allied intelligence sys-
tems, and will be increased by breaches of
this security.
Defenses against Deception
13. Intelligence officers are aware of the pos-
sibility that they may be the recipients of
information intended to deceive. Each piece
of data concerning the Sino-Soviet Bloc is
examined with a particularly critical and
skeptical eye by US and allied intelligence
personnel, to ascertain, if possible, whether
it is so intended. In the more technical
branches of intelligence research, investiga-
tion is constantly in progress to discover the
possibilities of deception, to devise methods
for defeating them, and to invent new meth-
ods of intelligence collecting which may, for
a time at least, be relatively immune from
hoax. It is clear that the best defense against
deception would be to acquire information
respecting the Soviet Bloc by methods which
the Soviets did not know about, and which
consequently they could not use to introduce
deceptive data. Generally speaking, however,
this defense is not available.
14. The US has no method of intelligence
collection or analysis which is completely un-
known to the Bloc, nor any method which is
entirely invulnerable to hoax. This is not
to say that all our evidence concerning the
Bloc is equally suspect for this reason; in
some circumstances photographs, for example,
or the direct observation of competent wit-
nesses, may furnish information which is
for all practical purposes incontrovertible.
Neither is it true that the Bloc is always
aware of the extent to which the US employs
various intelligence methods, or of their ap-
plication to particular problems, or of the suc-
cess with which they are used, or of the degree
of advancement which a particular technique
has reached. When a technique is very new,
or is newly applied in some particular area
of intelligence interest, there may for a time be
good reason to believe that its use is unknown
to the Bloc, and the data which it produces
may be received with substantial confidence
that they have not been distorted by decep-
tion. As a general rule, however, we consider
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it impossible to find assurance against decep-
tion through intelligence methods unknown
to the Bloc.
15. While no method of intelligence collec-
tion can be proved to be invariably free from
susceptibility to hoax, nearly all methods will
from time to time produce particular data
which can be demonstrated to be hoax-free.
One sure defense against deception would be
for the intelligence community to use only
such data, but the result would be an ex-
tremely limited view of Bloc affairs, quite in-
adequate for the needs of policymakers. Ac-
cordingly, it is necessary to fall back on large
amounts of information which, taken bit by
bit, cannot be certified as hoax-free. This
would be a serious weakness if each piece of
data existed only in isolation from others,
but obviously such is not the case. Intelli-
gence estimates very rarely rest on isolated
bits of evidence; on the contrary, practically
all are based upon a substantial mass of data
from independent and diverse sources. The
various items tend to support one another
and to provide an elaborate structure of evi-
dence which is internally consistent and mu-
tually confirmatory.
16. If such data fit together into a consistent
whole, a presumption may thereby be es-
tablished that the data are hoax-free, even
though no single piece, taken by itself, can
be proved to be so. As observed above, how-
ever, the capabilities of the Soviet government
are such that large masses of internally con-
sistent but actually deceptive data might be
disseminated for the benefit of foreign intel-
ligence. Hence, the presumption of freedom
from hoax must be carefully considered. The
strength of this presumption will depend upon
(a) what proportion of the evidence can be
shown to belong almost certainly in the hoax-
free class; and (b) how feasible a hoax ac-
tually would be in the particular situation
and with the particular data under considera-
tion.
17. The evidence bearing on each estimative
problem is different, and hence the degree
of defense against deception is different in
every estimate. In general, however, esti-
mates relating to the more ordinary aspects
of Soviet life - the economic system, for ex-
ample, and much of the conventional military
establishment - are based upon a great deal
of data from many independent sources. Con-
firmatory evidence is plentiful, if not always
sufficient. Moreover, the feasibility of decep-
tion is at, its lowest when the false data to
be fabricated is voluminous and the correct
data to be concealed equally so; when decep-
tion would have to involve very large numbers
of Soviet officials, or might seriously mislead
those officials who were not admitted to the
secret. On the other hand, in certain spe-
cialized and highly secure aspects of Soviet
activity - the guided missile and nuclear
weapons programs, for example - informa-
tion on some of the most important points is
scanty and there is rarely much directly con-
firmatory evidence. To avoid deception in
these situations it becomes of the utmost im-
portance to secure data which is inherently
hoax-free, and which does not require con-
firmatory evidence to argue that it is so.
18. Over the general field of intelligence,
therefore, the principal defense against decep-
tion lies in continual and laborious acquisi-
tion of plentiful data from independent and
widely varied sources. By this means a new
piece of information may frequently be clearly
confirmed, and pronounced hoax-free. If
such specific confirmation is impossible, new
information may nevertheless be accepted as
substantially true if it fits reasonably well
into the context in which it belongs, and if
that context is itself fairly well established.
Painstaking research into the whole structure
and pattern of Communist society is essential
for the purpose of establishing such a context
and permitting the testing of new bits of
information as they come in. In normal cir-
cumstances intelligence would never reach
an important conclusion on the basis of in-
formation from a unique source if that in-
formation could not be guaranteed to be in-
herently hoax-free and if it were inconsistent
with the pattern which had been established
and into which it would be supposed to fit.
19. It follows normally that hoaxes, if they
are to be of any consequence, must be of large
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scale and long continuance.1 Sporadic de-
ceptions and falsifications of data will be rec-
ognized by sophisticated observers because of
their inconsistency with the main mass of
evidence. If the Bloc desires to have a given
piece of misinformation accepted by US in-
telligence (assuming that the misinformation
is on a point of real importance) it must first
fabricate considerable amounts of confirma-
tory evidence, or it must establish in the
minds of US intelligence analysts a context
or pattern into which the misinformation will
fit without undue difficulty.
Self-Deception
20. This leads us to an aspect of deception
which cannot altogether be ignored; that of
self-deception, or the misinterpretation of
evidence because of preconceptions, preju-
dices, or bias. Self-deception is a highly com-
plex matter, most of the aspects of which can
be excluded from a paper mainly concerned
with deliberate Soviet deception. However,
any successful hoax is likely to depend to a
considerable degree on the predilection of the
victim to accept certain kinds of falsehood,
and it must be assumed that the USSR, in any
extensive operations of deception, would en-
deavor to take advantage of what it estimated
to be the preconceptions and biases of US
and allied intelligence. This is apt to be par-
ticularly true in "cover plans." It is at least
theoretically possible that we may arrive at a
correct description of some Soviet activity and
on the basis of our own preconceptions judge
it to be of the greatest intrinsic importance,
although to the USSR it is important mainly
because it has diverted our attention from
some other activity. Suppose, for example,
that the Soviet heavy bomber program were
'An exception may be the bluff, which is usually
a form of hoax designed to produce a misread-
ing of intentions. A bluff can be quick and
successful, but it requires some background to
give it verisimilitude. This background may be
either true or false; if it is false, it will prob-
ably have been created by an extended opera-
tion of deception. Another important excep-
tion would be the sort of hoax described in
paragraph 10 above. See also paragraph 23
below.
now intended mainly to cover the progress
which the Soviets have made in their guided
missile program.
21. There is more than this to self-deception.
We have observed above that much data re-
specting the Sino-Soviet Bloc must be ac-
cepted as credible for no better reason than
that it fits harmoniously into a previously
established context or pattern. This context,
once we have formulated it, tends naturally
to become somewhat rigid, and the more elab-
orately it is constructed the more rigid it be-
comes. Thus, there arises a disposition to
reject new and startling information, at least
provisionally. Suppose, for example, that
there occurred a pronounced weakening of
the Soviet state, in its political, economic, or
military spheres, or in all three. It is likely
that the evidences of such weakening would
for a long time fail to be accepted by US in-
telligence. The USSR would derive advan-
tage from this failure, and might find ways to
encourage it.
22. The USSR might, by long-continued and
skillful operations, attempt to create in US
and allied intelligence organizations the pre-
conceptions that would, at the required mo-
ment, become the basis for a successful hoax.
In other words, the USSR might contribute
to the construction by US intelligence of false
patterns of some aspects of Soviet society by
which to test new data for consistency. If
they could accomplish this, the Soviet leaders
might then, at a crucial moment, be able to
perpetrate a successful deception without
actually falsifying the particular evidence in-
volved, but simply by having previously as-
sured that it would be misinterpreted. The
interaction of self-deception with Soviet hoax
would be complete. In the general field of
intelligence, this form of deception is almost
certainly the most difficult to guard against.
The Element of Time
23. Even after everything has been done that
can be done to erect defenses against decep-
tion, it is clear that in some circumstances
time will be the deciding factor. Time is
needed to collate and evaluate new informa-
tion, to see how far it can be confirmed, and
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to decide how far it may be accepted as hoax-
free. During a period of intense international
crisis sufficient time may not be available,
and the urgency of the situation may not per-
mit reservation of judgment or postpone-
ment of decision. Single bits of dubious and
unconfirmable data will probably have to be
given a weight which in normal times they
would not have. The entire intelligence pic-
ture will almost certainly be confused with in-
consistent and contradictory reports even if
none of them is the product of deliberate So-
viet deception. It is at such a time that the
feasibility of deception, and its potential dan-
ger to the security of the US, is at its greatest.
SUSCEPTIBILITY OF VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE
METHODS TO HOAXING
Overt Intelligence'
24. By far the greatest volume of intelligence
data is procured by overt and commonplace
means, from ordinary and easily accessible
sources. The materials thus collected come
from books, newspapers, magazines, scientific
and learned journals, radio broadcasts, of-
ficial declarations and published documents,
speeches, photographs, reports of travellers,
and so on. We may stretch this category to
include the conversations of US diplomatists
and other officials with those of the Bloc, and
the interrogation of defectors, returnees, and
prisoners of war. The mass of such materials
is enormous. It is reduced to shape and
significance not only by the labor of intelli-
gence analysts but also by scholars, publicists,
and others who have no official connection
with intelligence work.
25. The sheer volume of these materials, to-
gether with the widely varied skills of the
numerous analysts who work on them, would
require that any important deception be a
The various headings under which intelligence
methods are considered in this section are
adopted for convenience and for the particular
purposes of this paper; they do not constitute
a logical or scientific classification of intelligence
processes, nor even a complete list of methods,
and are not intended to do so.
large-scale operation. Occasional falsified doc-
uments or statistics (assuming that they were
falsified sufficiently to make a really signifi-
cant difference in their meaning) would al-
most certainly be detected as such because of
their inconsistency with other available ma-
terials. Moreover, any substantial falsifica-
tion of figures, reports, directives, etc., which
deceived US intelligence might also deceive
Communist functionaries who needed to know
the truth, and thus produce confusion within
the Communist bureaucracy.
26. It is possible, however, for overt intelli-
gence materials to become the vehicle for
hoaxes on a grand scale. The history of the
USSR is full of examples of massive distor-
tions of fact by Soviet leaders. Judging with
the benefit of hindsight, for example, it seems
that Stalin succeeded in creating the impres-
sion abroad in the years immediately before
and after 1950 that the Soviet state was both
more ready and more willing to undertake
general war than was in fact the case. This
impression was based largely on evidence re-
ceived through overt channels. There is good
evidence that the Soviets devote considerable
effort to attempts to mislead the mass com-
munication media of the free world.
Espionage and Counter-Espionage
27. In the conduct of espionage it is always
assumed that the enemy has the ability to dis-
cover the operations and to use them for the
purpose of passing deception information.
This assumption is valid also in the case of
counter-espionage operations, which are de-
signed to effect contact with an enemy's secret
intelligence and security services; if discovered
by the enemy, such contact furnishes a prime
channel for deception. Controlled foreign
agents indeed constitute the classical method
for planting deceptive material in a nation's
intelligence structure.
28. The ability of an enemy to use espionage
and counter-espionage channels for passing
deception material is considerably affected by
the character and level of the agent selected
for such a purpose. Thus, for example, an
agent who has no plausible means of acquir-
ing information of national importance can-
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not be used for deception purposes. On the
other hand, it is a regular technique to build
an agent up to the point where the recipient
of information is led to believe that the agent
has in fact such access. This is done by slowly
improving the quality of information supplied
to the agent, by giving the agent plausible
stories concerning his ability to acquire such
information, and finally, step by step, leading
the agent to the point where intelligence
would be willing to accept a false report bear-
ing on a matter of national significance.
29. It is, of course, highly unlikely that in nor-
mal times decisions of crucial importance to
US security would be based upon the reports
of one agent, or even of several agents. A
successful hoax through clandestine agents
would normally require not merely one or
two pieces of deceptive information but also
a substantial amount of supporting data. In
time of major crisis or difficulty, however,
the danger would probably be considerably
greater. A single agent's report conceivably
might provide the last straw of evidence to
determine the US decision; time might not be
available to test the credibility of the report
in adequate fashion. Or, deception might de-
lay a valid intelligence judgment, or render
it so tentative as to be of little use. For such
a purpose, in time of crisis, deception through
clandestine agents would almost certainly be
particularly effective.
Liaison with Friendly Governments
30. Liaison with friendly governments, as ap-
plied to the US intelligence collection effort,
is normally a formal or informal contact with
the intelligence or security instruments of
those governments. The liaison relationship
may thus be viewed as an extension of US
capability to collect intelligence or counter-
intelligence information on the enemy, and it
is as vulnerable to deception as our own in-
dependent intelligence effort. An additional
hazard is presented by the fact that the friend-
ly government could, if it desired, use the re-
lationship for deceptive purposes of its own,
as well as unwittingly at enemy instigation.
31. The Communist powers have the ability
to use these US liaison relationships to their
profit principally through penetrations of the
friendly service, with resulting control of in-
dividuals or whole units of the service, as well
as through counter-espionage operations di-
rected against the collection efforts of the
service. The Bloc also may be able to intro-
duce deception into an established and repu-
table US line of information by means of cov-
ert political pressures directed against a gov-
ernment with whose intelligence service US in-
telligence maintains liaison. In such an event
the intelligence service's liaison with US in-
telligence might itself be used to conceal the
government's intentions or the government's
covert relationship with the Bloc. The type
and magnitude of misleading information
which can be passed by the liaison channel
includes the entire range of intelligence and
counter-intelligence information exchanged.
Its effectiveness is limited only by the US
evaluation of the liaison relationship, includ-
ing the reliability, competence, security, and
effectiveness of the services and the degree
of success of the enemy's penetration or con-
trol.
32. An additional significant factor which en-
hances the ability of the Bloc to use the liai-
son channel for deception purposes is that it
is difficult and often impossible for US intel-
ligence to trace intelligence information sup-
plied by a liaison service to its ultimate source.
Accordingly, under such circumstances, US
intelligence customarily knows no more about
the source than the liaison service is willing
or able to disclose.
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Photographs (other than aerial photo-
graphs)
38. Photographs and motion picture films
are procured by intelligence agencies from a
great many sources: commercial photogra-
phers, foreign travellers, industries and organ-
izations with foreign contracts, liaison with
friendly governments, foreign language docu-
ments and publications, and official govern-
ment releases. Some 30,000 photographs are
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received and inspected each month by US in-
telligence agencies. When such materials
have been acquired under reasonably con-
trolled conditions - as for instance when
photographs have been taken by a trust-
worthy Western individual - they are a most
reliable and concise source for intelligence
data of many kinds. In such circumstances
the object photographed may of course be
camouflaged, simulated, or otherwise manipu-
lated for purposes of deception; the photo-
graph itself, however, is not a hoax.
39. Photographs emanating from Bloc sources
are also highly valuable for the intelligence
they yield, but must be used with more cau-
tion. Instances are known of deliberate mis-
representation in such photographs, usually
accomplished through retouching, or by at-
taching a false caption. The purpose has been
to withhold or disguise military information,
to magnify progress in programs of industrial
expansion, or simply to confuse by adding to
or subtracting from the picture. Skilled anal-
ysis will usually show whether a photograph
has been tampered with; nevertheless it is
possible to alter a photograph in such a way
that the change cannot be detected. Such
alterations might be used to achieve a signi-
ficant deception. The change of a caption
cannot be detected by analysis of the photo-
graph itself, and the chances of successful de-
ception by this means will depend on the
amount of other evidence (including other
photographs) which may be available to con-
firm or deny the reliability of the picture
under consideration.
Aerial Photography
40. The methods of deception used against
aerial observation usually consist either of
(a) hiding objects or installations by means
of camouflage or concealment, or (b) simu-
lating objects, installations, or activities by
means of decoys and dummies. These are
chiefly effective against visual observation as
opposed to photo interpretation. Ample evi-
dence exists indicating the capability of the
Bloc to make effective use of camouflage ma-
terials, new paints, coatings, underground
and underwater constructions, infra-red
shielding, smoke defenses, techniques for
protective use of light and shadow, techniques
for concealment of debris, natural features,
and use of underground spaces, ephemeral
bridges, and dummy military equipment and
installations. It generally appears that the
major applications of Soviet deception are di-
rected toward tactical situations and the
camouflage or concealment of men and com-
bat material. There is little indication of
strategic applications to large installations,
urban areas, port complexes, etc. Some re-
search and production installations are known
to be underground while others have been
widely dispersed.
41. Although Bloc control over deception
measures is complete, there are still difficult
problems to be solved. The USSR might find
it (a) physically or economically impossible
to camouflage or place underground all im-
portant installations, and (b) from a security
viewpoint unwise to confine its methods of
camouflage or concealment to the most im-
portant installations. Moreover, during
World War II nearly all the important instal-
lations camouflaged or concealed were located
by photo interpreters. It is usually impos-
sible to build any important installations
without an adequate connecting communi-
cations system which is relatively easy to find
and almost impossible to conceal, even on
photography of small scale.
42. We believe that the present ability of US
photo interpreters to cope with deception
methods is generally good. The problem,
however, is almost certainly becoming more
difficult. Even with the best aerial photog-
raphy it is possible that US forces could miss
the comparatively small ICBM sites, if they
were protected by a concealment effort of su-
perior quality. It is probable that overflight
aerial photography would require substantial
technical improvement and supplementation
with other kinds of instrumentation in the
air, plus the highest quality of photo inter-
pretation employing other sources and evi-
dences from ground reconnaissance, if the
ability of US intelligence to cope with decep-
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11
tion techniques in the future were to be fully
insured.3
THE LIKELIHOOD OF DECEPTION
43. The foregoing sections of this paper have
shown that much of the evidence which we
possess concerning the Sino-Soviet Bloc can-
not be guaranteed to be free from deliberate
distortions or falsifications. It has also been
pointed out that, in the interpretation of this
evidence, we cannot always be sure that we
are free from self-deception to which the So-
viets may have contributed. It follows that
most intelligence estimates concerning the
Bloc, based as they are on a complex of evi-
dence, cannot be guaranteed to be free from
the influence of deception. It does not fol-
low that, because the influence of deception
cannot be proved to be absent, it must be
presumed to be present. By definition, intel-
ligence agencies would not know if they were
being hoaxed. Nevertheless, US intelligence
agencies are confident that most of their esti-
mates are not likely to be significantly viti-
ated by hoax, even in those instances where
the evidence is insufficient to permit a very
firm judgment. The reasons for this confi-
dence will be illustrated in the paragraphs
which follow.
44. As a preliminary, it will be well to recog-
nize that many things of the greatest impor-
tance concerning the Bloc can be established
as true beyond any serious possibility of hoax.
Some of these are specific facts - e.g., that the
USSR has detonated nuclear devices; that it
has certain types of aircraft in certain mini-
mum numbers; that it has certain types of
other weapons, the description and capabil-
ities of which are known by examination.
These and a multitude of lesser particulars,
concerning which there can be no possibility
of deception, can be combined to establish
various general ideas concerning the Bloc
which again, as long as they are cautiously
formulated and kept sufficiently general, may
be considered immune from hoax. Thus, the
For discussion of certain other methods of in-
telligence collection in relation to the problem
of deception, see Annexes B and E (limited
distribution).
rough order of magnitude of the Soviet econ-
omy and of the Soviet armed forces, and many
of the general characteristics of both, can be
known beyond serious doubt. At least the
minimum scientific, technical, and military
capabilities of the Bloc can also be established
in a general way simply by measuring the
achievements which have been shown to the
world. These things provide a base-point for
further estimates.
45. Intelligence must press beyond incontro-
vertible facts and broad generalizations, how-
ever, and therefore most estimates are in the
domain which cannot be guaranteed to be
free from hoax. The estimates of this type
fall into two broad classes: (a) virtually all
concerning Soviet or Bloc intentions; and (b)
virtually all of the more exact estimates of
Soviet and Bloc strengths, whether military,
political, economic, or otherwise. With re-
spect to these matters, it is usually necessary
to concede that hoax is possible, and to con-
sider whether it is feasible, and if so, whether
it is likely.
46. Since every estimate rests on its own par-
ticular structure of supporting data, no state-
ment of the degree of likelihood of hoax will
apply equally to all. Each estimate must be
separately considered, and the evidence on
which it is based (including collateral and
confirmatory evidence) examined with the
problem of deception in mind. We have car-
ried out such an examination for US estimates
on five matters of great importance: (a)
Soviet heavy bomber strength; (b) Soviet nu-
clear weapons; (c) Three aspects of Soviet
air defense; (d) Soviet guided missiles; and
(e) Soviet capability to attack the US with-
out advance warning. The method was as
follows: as a first step, some of the evidence
could be conclusively shown to be free from
the possibility of hoax. The remainder was
then assumed to be the product of deception,
and the difficulty and cost of such deception,
roughly assessed, was set against a judgment
of the probable advantage which the USSR
would gain from the deception. Frequently,
by this process a convincing estimate of the
likelihood of deception could be reached. If
it could not, other lines of argument could
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sometimes lead to such an estimate, though
occasionally no conclusion was possible. The
results of the investigation are very briefly
summarized in the following paragraphs. 4
47. By way of caution, it is desirable to recall
the distinction between concealment and hoax
which was made earlier in this paper, and to
emphasize again that we are dealing only
with the problem of hoax. The validity and
adequacy of an estimate depends not only on
whether the evidence on which it rests is hoax-
free, but also on whether the evidence is suf-
ficient. With the latter question we are not,
in this paper, concerned. Consequently, the
judgments which follow do not establish the
degree of validity or adequacy of the esti-
mates examined. It is true that if certain
evidence is deemed likely to be vitiated by
deception, the reliability of the estimate rest-
ing on that evidence is diminished. It is not
true that an estimate resting on evidence free
from hoax is therefore a valid and satisfactory
estimate, for the evidence may be insufficient
to make it so.
Soviet Heavy Bomber Strength
48. It can be established, beyond possibility
of hoax, that the USSR on 26 April 1956 had
a minimum of 22 BISON and 12 BEAR air-
craft; this number were seen in the air to-
gether by competent observers. The essential
performance characteristics of these aircraft
can also be established, though within certain
narrow margins of error. It can also be
proved that the USSR has the capability of
producing substantially more than this num-
ber of these aircraft. Beyond these facts,
however, the evidence on which our estimate
must be based could be deceptive. Moreover,
A somewhat more detailed account of the ex-
amination of the first four topics will be found
in Annexes A, B, C, and D (limited distribution).
It should be observed that each of these topics
is itself quite general in nature, and that the
estimates concerning them break down into a
large number of subsidiary estimates, many of
which must separately be examined for suscep-
tibility to hoax. We have conducted such an ex-
amination to the extent that appeared necessary
to establish the validity of our judgment on the
main problem. Even in the Annexes, however,
we can present only a comparatively small num-
ber of these subsidiary investigations.
the deceptions which might have been prac-
ticed are not so costly or difficult as to be
ruled out on these grounds, in view of the
intrinsic importance of the matter of heavy
bombers.
49. We have estimated that as of 1 July 1956
the USSR had produced approximately 40
BISON and 40 BEAR aircraft. r, That this
was an overestimate produced by Soviet decep-
tion may be considered unlikely, primarily be-
cause the USSR failed to use certain methods
which it could easily have employed to induce
us to make an even higher estimate. On the
contrary, the latest evidence acquired caused
us to reduce our previous figures, and much of
this evidence could without difficulty have
been withheld or altered by the USSR.
50. It may be, on the other hand, that the
USSR had substantially larger numbers of
heavy bombers than we believed, and at-
tempted to hoax us into an underestimate.
According to this hypothesis, the USSR would
have presented us with evidence sufficiently
consistent and persuasive to lead us to the
estimate we made, while successfully conceal-
ing evidence of the existence of additional
aircraft. The element of concealment would
be the essence of this operation; the hoax
would be easy of accomplishment but compar-
atively unimportant. Because a fair amount
of evidence from a variety of independent
sources yields no indication of the existence
of additional aircraft, we believe such conceal-
ment to have been unlikely.
51. Concerning future build-up, we have re-
cently estimated that in mid-1960 the USSR
will have 500 BISON and 300 BEAR aircraft,
in operational units. s In the nature of things
such an estimate must be based more on de-
NIE 11-4-56: Soviet Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action; published 2 August 1956.
SNIE 11-6-57: Soviet Gross Capabilities for At-
tack on the Continental US in Mid-1960; pub-
lished 15 January 1957. The Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, did
not concur in this estimate of future heavy
bomber strength. His non-concurrence was not
related to the problem of Soviet deception, how-
ever, and insofar as the following argument re-
lates solely to the likelihood of deception through
evidence from Soviet sources he concurs in it.
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duction and argument, and less on tangible
evidence, than an estimate of the current
situation. We have no direct knowledge of
Soviet plans for a build-up in heavy bomber
strength, and even if we had, the plans might
change. In one sense, therefore, the likeli-
hood of hoax is negligible because the di-
rect evidence from Soviet sources concerning
future strength is so slight as to exert little
influence upon our judgment.
52. Our estimate of future Soviet heavy bomb-
er strength is, however, influenced by our esti-
mate of current strength and current capabil-
ities, and by current indications of the de-
velopment and expansion of air facilities. It
is here that the possibility of deception exists.
An overestimate or underestimate of the cur-
rent situation might affect our figures for
mid-1960, but in view of the arguments on
which that estimate is based, the effect would
in fact be slight. The more significant pos-
sibility of deception is as follows : Suppose
that the Soviets have no military requirement
for a substantial heavy bomber force in 1960,
but wish us to believe that they have such
a requirement and that they will build up to
it. Instead of abandoning their current pro-
gram, therefore, they keep it in leisurely prog-
ress as a deceptive measure. They might rein-
force the deception during the next year or
two by hoaxes designed to increase our esti-
mates of current strength. The primary ob-
ject, however, would be to distort our esti-
mates of their heavy bomber strength in 1960
and the years thereabouts, and perhaps also
our view of their probable future military
strategy.
53. The hypothesis would be, then, that while
present Soviet heavy bomber strength and
production capabilities may be exactly as we
have estimated them, the entire show is es-
sentially a hoax for the purpose of misleading
us as to the future situation. We consider
this an unlikely hypothesis, but there is no
evidence available by which it can be con-
clusively disproved. Our belief in its unlike-
lihood must be based largely on arguments
from general principles: that the Soviets re-
quire a powerful intercontinental striking
force; that for a period of years the USSR
must rely primarily on the manned bomber
for this purpose; that therefore the Soviets
will build heavy bombers.
54. It is plain that a Soviet hoax leading us
to an overestimate of future Soviet build-up
in BISON and BEAR aircraft would be the
most feasible of any significant hoax con-
nected with the heavy bomber situation. It
would be the one most difficult for us to dis-
cover if in fact it were attempted. Our esti-
mate rests more upon general understanding
of Soviet methods and objectives, and of the
nature and probable development of weapons
systems, than upon the meager amount of
direct and specific evidence which is available.
Thus, in the last analysis, our judgment that
hoax is unlikely in this particular is valid
only so far as our general understanding of
the conduct, techniques, and motivations of
the Soviet leaders is valid. The possibility
of self-deception, to which the USSR may
have deliberately contributed, cannot be ruled
out.
Soviet Nuclear Weapons 7
55. We consider that the existence of an ex-
tensive Soviet nuclear energy program is es-
tablished beyond serious possibility of decep-
tion.
56. Concerning the specific types of nuclear
weapons tested by the Soviets, we conclude
that the evidence on which our estimate is
based is highly unlikely to have been signifi-
cantly influenced by deception.
57. With respect to the number of nuclear
weapons which the Soviets could have in
stockpile, the margin of possible error in our
estimate is great. Soviet concealment is ef-
fective, and in addition some of the evidence
on which the estimate is based could be af-
fected by deception. We cannot say with con-
fidence whether or not it is likely that decep-
tion has been attempted. We believe, how-
ever, that even if it has been tried and has
succeeded, the effect of deception on the esti-
mate can have been only slight.
See NIE 11-2-57: The Soviet Atomic Energy
Program; published 7 May 1957 (Restricted
Data).
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58. Our estimate of the nature and dimensions
of future Soviet nuclear weapons programs
is based upon an extrapolation of current
trends, and the likelihood of error in such
projections to the future is considerably
greater than in estimates of the current situa-
tion. The likelihood of error through decep-
tion, however, is almost certainly no greater,
and may be less, because evidence from So-
viet sources plays less part in our estimate
of the future than it does in our estimate
of the present.
Three Critical Aspects of Soviet
Air Defense 8
59. We consider that our knowledge of the
types of fighter aircraft available to the USSR
is established beyond serious possibility of
hoax. With respect to the numbers of these
aircraft, our estimate is based upon evidence
which could at least in part be the product
of deliberate falsification. Although the num-
bers involved are much larger than those of
heavy bombers, the same general propositions
concerning the likelihood of hoax apply (see
paragraphs 49-50 above). The performance
characteristics of these aircraft are known
beyond serious possibility of deception save
in one important respect: their electronic
equipment. Even in this particular, certain
of the characteristics and capabilities of the
Soviet equipment are known beyond serious
likelihood of hoax; what cannot be established
is how many fighter aircraft in fact have this
equipment. It is possible that the USSR has
deliberately led us into the belief that more
aircraft are thus equipped than is in fact the
case.
60. Concerning the Soviet aircraft control and
warning system, we consider that it would be
at least as difficult to fabricate the evidence
we possess as to construct and operate a gen-
uine system. Consequently, we consider major
deception virtually out of the question. The
evidence is not complete, however, and the
USSR could deceive us as to the extent of its
e See NIE 11-4-56: Soviet Capabilities and Prob-
able Courses of Action; also NIE 11-5-55: Air
Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. A new estimate
on this subject is under preparation.
aircraft control and warning system in the
remoter regions of its territory.
61. We estimate that the USSR now has a
ground-to-air missile capability as part of its
air defense system. The direct evidence of
this capability is such, however, that we can-
not prove that it is not a hoax. The cost of
such a deception would be great but would
not be sufficient to rule it out, in view of the
importance of the question of air defense.
We believe hoax highly unlikely, however, be-
cause (a) we know that the USSR has the
scientific and technical capability to produce
surface-to-air missiles, sooner or later; (b)
we estimate that the USSR has a military re-
quirement for such missiles; (c) it is reason-
able (though not necessary) to believe from
other evidence that the USSR would have pro-
duced a surface-to-air missile by this time;
and (d) the magnitude of the construction
operations at what we estimate to be guided
missile sites around Moscow is far greater and
more costly than would appear to be required
for mere hoax, and, where it can be examined
at all, is clearly adequate for genuine missile
operations.
62. Even if there be no hoax as to the main
point of Soviet surface-to-air missile capabil-
ity, it remains possible that the direct evi-
dence we possess may have been fabricated
by the USSR to give an exaggerated impres-
sion of current capabilities. The sites around
Moscow may be more numerous and elaborate
than is actually justified by the missiles
presently available for use at them, even
though they may be genuine sites for guided
missile operation. We have no basis on which
to judge the likelihood of such deception.
Soviet Offensive Guided Missiles'
63. The existence of a vigorous Soviet pro-
gram of research and development in guided
missiles can be established beyond any serious
likelihood of hoax, though not, perhaps, be-
yond all possibility of it. Likewise, the fact
that Soviet scientists and technicians are ca-
See NIE 11-5-57: Soviet Capabilities and Prob-
able Programs in the Guided Missile Field; pub-
lished 12 March 1957.
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pable of developing advanced types of guided
missiles is, we believe, not subject to doubt.
64. Concerning the types and numbers of mis-
siles which the USSR may now possess, and
the precise stage of development of those
which are not yet ready for production or op-
erational use, the evidence available is ex-
ceedingly scanty. Such as it is, we consider
that it is in itself virtually immune from hoax.
It is far from sufficient, however, and we still
have to base our estimate of Soviet guided
missile capabilities, both present and future,
very largely upon the analogy of US experi-
ence. The estimate made in this way can
be checked and corrected at a few points by
the direct evidence which has recently be-
come available. The influence of hoax on our
estimate is, up to this point, negligible by com-
parison with the influence of concealment.
65. It is possible that the direct evidence which
has recently become available may, though
in itself genuine, be deliberately released to us
by the Soviets for the purpose of persuading
us either to an underestimate or to an over-
estimate of their actual missile capabilities.
This would involve an assumption that the
USSR had in part successfully concealed
either its assets or its deficiencies in the mis-
sile field, and since the evidence is extremely
scanty we cannot rule out the possibility of
such concealment. The direct evidence, how-
ever, plays only a small part in determining
our estimate, and in most respects the esti-
mate would have been the same without this
evidence, though it would have been less con-
fident. Thus, the influence of deception, if
deception has been attempted, would have
been comparatively slight. The intelligence
community, in submitting its estimate of So-
viet guided missiles, does so with many reser-
vations, most of which arise not because of
the likelihood of hoax but because of the in-
sufficiency of evidence.
Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the
Continental US Without Warning l?
66. Preceding examples have been primarily
drawn from estimates of Soviet strengths;
they have involved Soviet intentions only in
connection with plans for future build-ups.
In the present example, however, we are con-
cerned primarily with an estimate of Soviet
intentions, an area in which hoax is par-
ticularly easy. Barring some unexpected in-
telligence breakthrough, we are highly un-
likely to have direct knowledge of the plans
of Soviet leaders. Therefore, a judgment of
their intent to attack must be based upon
(a) an estimate of Soviet capabilities for such
attack, and (b) a correct interpretation
of the political, psychological, and military
moves which the Soviet leaders make leading
directly to the attack. In this discussion, we
shall assume that the USSR possesses the gen-
eral capability to attack, and confine ourselves
to the second aspect of the problem.
67. Two conditions are possible: (a) that the
Soviet leaders do not intend to attack the US,
but desire to persuade us that they do so in-
tend; and (b) that the Soviet leaders intend
to attack the US, but desire to persuade us
that they will not do so. The first would ob-
viously be the easiest of hoaxes to execute.
It might require, for example, no more than
the dispatch of a substantial formation of
heavy bombers toward the US under such con-
ditions that US intelligence would gain knowl-
edge of the movement. Such a hoax would
be extremely dangerous for the perpetrator,
and would be unlikely under presently fore-
seeable conditions, since if successful its ef-
fect would presumably be to set off a retalia-
tory attack which might not be averted in
time. Circumstances can be imagined, of
course, in which US retaliation would be in-
feasible, and in this case the deception might
be very profitable to the USSR.
68. Assuming now that the Soviet leaders
decide to attack at a given time, but desire to
persuade us that they will not do so, there
are manifold possibilities for deceptive opera-
tions. The Soviet leaders could, for example,
enter into ostensibly friendly negotiations
shortly before the attack, giving every indica-
tion that the political crisis (if there was one)
10 I.e., warning in advance of that furnished by
early-warning radar. See NIE 11-3-57: Prob-
able Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on
the US (to be published shortly).
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was about to be settled peacefully. They could
confuse US intelligence with many kinds of
specific contradictory evidences, along the
lines discussed in paragraph 10 above. They
could, with no great difficulty, even simulate
a deficiency in capabilities, perhaps such a
one as would seem to be only of temporary
nature, and therefore the more convincing.
69. The Soviets could, also, over a consider-
able time, build up their state of readiness
for attack in such a way as to make almost
impossible a determination of actual intent.
Training flights of heavy bombers could take
place, for example, time after time, until US
intelligence would have no way of determin-
ing whether or not any given flight was de-
signed for actual attack. All the various sub-
sidiary maneuvers which might be required
could be frequently executed for training pur-
poses, and to the same effect. Such moves
would not, of course, reassure US intelligence.
On the contrary, they would presumably
create a condition of more or less permanent
alarm and vigilance. Yet there might be
nothing to distinguish the ultimate attack,
in its earlier stages, from similar military
maneuvers which had been often repeated
without eventuating in attack.
70. We conclude that the likelihood of suc-
cessful hoax in connection with a Soviet at-
tack on the US is considerable. In certain
circumstances we believe that the Soviets
could make it virtually impossible for us to
gain advance knowledge of their intent to
attack, though this is not to say that we
would have been ignorant of their capability
to attack without warning. However, the gen-
eral political circumstances leading up to war
are seldom perfectly adapted to the require-
ments of hoax. Thus, although the likeli-
hood of hoax could hardly be less than high,
it cannot be measured more exactly save in
full knowledge of the context of circum-
stances which brought about the decision to
attack in this manner.
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