(SANITIZED) REPORT ON SOVIET VULNERABILITIES: DRS COMMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000300100050-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: January 21, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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DRS-SP-51
January 21, 1953
REPORT ON SOVIET VULATERABILITIES: DRS COMMENTS
I. Introduction
The five volumes of report entitled The Vulnerability of the a,ss~
Soviet Union and Its European Satellites to Political Warfare 1952, SECRET,
seta out to deal with the "Soviet problem" as a whole. The report seeks to
single out the forces which have shaped the present day Soviet Union, to
indicate the most probable lines of future development, and to suggest possi-
ble US policy courses vis-a-vis the Soviet realm which will forward US natio-
nal interests.
Following a summary devoted to recommendations, the first volume of the
report presents general papers on past and prospective Soviet society and on
Soviet-satellite vulnerabilities. These are supplemented by more specialized
papers centering on US policy on Stalin's death ("Cancellation"), US broad-
casting policy re the USSR and Eastern Europe, US policy on non Russian peoples
of the USSR, and US interests in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The second vol-
ume consists of an analysis entitled The amics of Soviet.Society . This is
supplemented by a series of papers in the ttri depicts
representative Soviet types of personalities; analyzes the reac--
hevik leadership to deviant behavior, especially in agriculture;
summarizes early Russian crises over succession, particularly
when strong rulers died, (the "time of troubles" following the death of Ivan
Grozny, the palace revolution in the $ 2 Century following Peter's death,
and the Decembrist Revolt in ]$25); discusses frustration in
the totalitarian state; and offers some theories of Soviet
society.
In the fo discusses the problem of succession
in the US a na tonalities problem. The last volume,
edited by con a.ns papers on the European satellites.
These five large volumes couple analyses of past, present, and prospec-
ast., preof actual or possible US policies. The
tive developments with of p
present notes consider the analysis without regard to the discussion
and recommendations regarding policy.
However, it is perhaps not straying too far into the field of policy
recommendations for DRS to call attention to one 0 recommendation (Vol. I,
Part r, p. 5), namely: That the US intelligence effort be concentrated on two
priority topics, (1) interplay within the Politburo, and (2) the outlook and
aspirations of higher bureaucrats, especially in the armed forces. These are
important topics, and intelligence circles have always treated them as such.
That the US "intelligence effort" should be concentrated on these topics seems
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to be an overstatement of the case, in vi f a unlikelihood that this would
produce reliable data and estimates. The report itself offers fair war-
ning of the difficulties involved, because the sections treating these topics
are among the most controversial in the Report. Students of Soviet develop-
ments inside and outside intelligence agencies have secured their best results
not by attempting to dissolve the greatest secrets but by expanding the field
of knowledge in areas where stores of knowledge can be assembled from nuggets
of information.
II. Strength andWeakness of the Report
The papers collected int a report are of varying value. Some are
rather fact as the paper on ear ier succession crises, others more
analytic;, paper on post-collectivization Party strategy in counter-
ing agricul ura deviations is an interesting essay,) Many of the papers are
largely ristorical, including that on the nationality problem (which concent-
rates on the Ukrainians, Georgians, and Armenians.) These are good summaries,
generally factual and only occasionally marred by errors and misconceptions.
In a sense it is a virtue of the "study that it sets itself so
broad an objective as to bring within a narrow compass the Soviet system as a
whole. Nevertheless, the papers generally seem less successful when the
authors strive for the broadest scope, or attempt to develop analyses in areas
where the "facts" are subject to various interpretations. Good examples of
the latter are the two papers centering on the Soviet succession problem:
"Cancellation" in Volume One and "The Problem of Succession" ih Volume Four,
Neither is a distinctly original contribution to analysis of the post-Stalin
possibilities in the Soviet Union, and both suffer from a certain amount of
faulty theorizing as-well as uncritical use of data.
The most ambitious single paper in the collection is that of
(comprising Volume Two) on The Dynamics of Soviet Society,. Although this
wor is well grounded, it does not seem to do complete justice to its subject.
This may be explained in part by the lack of exhaustive research for such an
ambitious project:
1, There has not been hammered out the kind of theoretic structure
which is necessary to explain adequately the changing contours of Soviet society
(Daniels' short paper in Volume 3 is only a beginning).
2. The various topics discussed in the "Dynamics" paper hw.e4Adt4ie-
ceived, for the most part, definitive monographic treatment by students of the
Soviet scene.
Because the author is unable to ground his analysis on previous works,
he has to skim lightly over topics deserving more careful treatment. To take
one example, in the section on "The Bureaucratization of Social and Cultural
Life" he has to cover literature, the arts, history writing, law, education?
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social mores, religion and sodial stratification in less than 30 pages.
In the "Dynamics" paper the entire section on economic developments
consists of nine pages? The author disclaims any intention of examining in
detail the Soviet economy and states that he wishes "merely to suggest the
interaction between oertain key economic problems and decisions and the poli-
cies, economic or otherwise, pursued by the Soviet regime." The economy is
of more importance, however, as a "dynamic" of Soviet society than the treat-
ment allows it to appear.
III. Question of Interpretation
Scattered throughout thel (report are certain basic ideas which 50X1
invite critical examination:
A. Primacy of "power" over "ideology."
"...All available evidence points to the domination
of Stalints mind and that of his colleagues by
an ideology derived from their own experience
in the pursuit and maintenance of power. Its
effective touchstones of good and bad are the
consequence of any given act for their own
power. If other elements enter into the ratio-
nale for their action, they are on the whole
now likely to be based on ss an nationalism
rather than on Marxism." Vol. 1, Part 50X1
II As p. 19.
This passage seems to say that there is a Stalinist ideology of power not only
separate from the Marxist-Leninist ideology but closer to Russian nationalism
than to Marxism. Much of the report seems to be based upon the idea that
"power" has triumphed over "ideology" in the USSR. Unfortunately, this idea
is assumed rather than argued in the works At times the authors suggest that
they mean merely that Stalin has revised, explicitly or implicitly, much of
the ideology as developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. At other times the
authors suggest that "power" considerations, completely separated from the
current official ideology, are dominant in Bolshevik behaviour. Regarding the
first interpretation it can be said that despite all the tactical shifts there
is a remarkable continuity in Marxist-Soviet ideology, even under Stalin. Re-
garding the second, it is difficult to imagine the kind of power considerations,
including those implied in the F--Ireport, which cannot be handled by means 50X1
of Marxist categories,
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The failure to arrive at a clear understanding of the nature of Soviet
power in turn leads to dubious conclusions regarding the actions and intentions
of Soviet leaders. An example of thinking which results from the rejection of
Marxist ideology as a determining factor in shaping the decisions of Soviet
leaders may be seen on page 7 of "Cancellation," which maintains:
...One can see at least the possibility of a group
~;ithin top Soviet leadership who, because of
their worker origins, their personal awareness
of the unsatisfied economic wants of the people,
their special technical knowledge, and their posi-
tions in industry, might, with Stalin dead,. vigo-
rously oppose a continuation of the present Soviet
position vis-a-vis the West and, therefore,
oppose the bid for power of any individual or
group committed to an aggressive anti-West policy,
This great difficulty in the work probably arises from the practice of
looking upon devices of expediency and the abandonment of unworkable experi-
ments in the USSR as an abrogation of ideological principles, While extensive
changes have taken place since 1920 in such institutions as the family, law
and in social relationships, these do not in any way invalidate ubstan-
tial body of dogma which is the basis of official doctrine, The study 50X1
tends to treat the latter as one of the less essential features o t e Soviet
system. For instance, on page 106 of Vol. II it is stated in a discussion on
increasing rigidity in the social structure:
...On balance these changes have made for a pattern
of policy more conservative,, more nearly linked
with the Russi4n national tradition, than might
have been envisaged in the early days of the Re-
volution, although this reversion in substance
has been accomplished while maintaining a resi-
due of those elements in Marxist-Leninist doc..
trine, either in their original form of modi-
fied, which are judged useful to the regime for
other purposes. opo
Again, on page 133 of the same volume, the authors maintain in speaking of dis-
cipline in Soviet society:
...In turn, the development and cultivation of a
privileged stratum of qualified and reliable
bureaucrats was judged necessary to the main~
tenance of such a society. Insofar as it lay
within the regime's power, ideological and
other obstacles were set asides ...
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Although increasing stratification of Soviet society is an undisputed fact, it
might be more accurate to say that it is really a result of the regime's desire
to perpetuate its ideology. This becomes the more obvious when one considers
that complete ideological reliability is essential to vertical mobility in the
USSR. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the prime considera-
tion for social advancement is not academic education, as claimed on page 132
of Vol, II, but ideological reliability,
Thus the issue of power and ideology is cogently presented in some notes
which George Morgan of PSB wrote after reading the paper entitled "The Dynamics
of Soviet Society," DRS agrees with the points made in this paper. Rather than
repeating these, it is sufficient to attach a copy of the paper as an expres-
sion of the DRS viewpoint.
B. Russian Nationalism and Russian National Interest,
At various points in the report the authors allude to the Soviet leaders
adopting "Russian nationalism," In other contexts they refer to "Russian na-
tional interests" as though these were readily definable and non,-contentious,
a kind of substratum underlying all regimes in the area. It is not always
clear whether the word "Russian" in these contexts refers specifically to the
Great Russians as distinct from the other Slavic and non-Slavic peoples, or
whether Russian is used as shorthand for the people of the Russian Empire.
This difficulty is minor compared to the difficulty of giving any precise con-
tent to these terms. The Russian territory has varied and Russian conceptions
of national interest have varied (not to speak of other peoples' conceptions
of Russian national interest). Furthermore, despite reintegration into the
Soviet ideology of many elements derived from pre-Bolshevik days, it is impos-
sible to establish any easy identification of Soviet foreign and internal pol-
icy with Tsarist foreign and domestic policy, which itself changed vastly
over time,
The authors may have had in mind, when they remark on the "progressively
increased reliance on Great Russian nationalism as the ideological basis for
the ovie7 regime's rule" (Vol. I, Part II A, p. 15), the official ideology
on the relations between Russians and minority peoples, or between "Great
Russian" and the non-Russian peripheral areas. No one would deny that Stalin
has gone a long way in changing what was approved Communist dogma on this sub-
ject in the pre-Revolutionary or early Soviet period. This has been, of course,
in the direction of viewing more favorably and placing more importance on in,
dividual Russians and the Russian people, as well as the Russian state. This
does not mean, however, that the Soviet position today on the subject faith-
fully reproduces some mythical position supposedly constant throughout the
entire Tsarist period. Even today the Soviet method of governing non Russian
peoples is rather different from any employed by the Tsars,
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Conflicts of Interest Within the Soviet Regime.
The authors assume too readily that there is a fundamental conflict of
approach within the ruling circles of the USSR, although such a conflict may
exist or occur in the future, They seem to be on weak ground in suggesting
the nature of implied conflict? They attribute views to present Politburo mem-
bers which are to a large extent unverifiable and somewhat implausible. Miko-
yan and Kaganovich are said to be men who, if Stalin were not present, "would
put practical considerations ahead of any theory of Bolshevik world movement
that requires subordinating normal internal Soviet development to a war eco-
nomy" (Vol. IV, Appendix B, p? 18); the careers of Kosygin and Shvernik "sug-
gest at least a real awareness on their part of the needs of the people and,
possibly, an interest, identified with their own careers, in a popular rather
than a Stalin view of the national economy." (Vol. IV, Appendix B, p. 19) It
is claimed that the ascendancy of these men, and of Suslov (with his "special
interest in the working class,") and of Shkiryatov (a former tailor)"indicate
a continuing tendency to promote to high positions men of worker and factory
experience who broaden the base of popular 'feeling1 in the Politburo" (Vol.
IV, Appendix B, p. 19),
The report also implies that the Soviet "bureaucrats" have motivations
different from the regime, and that they are kept in line only by "surveillance
and compulsion." (Vol, I, Part II BY p. 20) It is said that the higher of-
ficers of the armed forces are the most vulnerable and important to US politi-
cal warfare., This point is developed elsewhere in particular relationship to
the Army as a kind of military force uncontrolled by Stalinist ideology but
imbued 'rathert with the ideology of Russian nationalism:, The tendency on
page 12 of "Cancellation" to regard the military forces as a "potential reser-
voir of political unreliability" ignores the positive effects of Party control
and indoctrination in the armed forces.
Anti-Stalinist currents may erupt in various forms even in highly-placed
groups, given situations when choices are available at various levels of autho-
rity. The authors are not, however, discussing a war situation, in which many
individuals may suddenly acquire the power to make dramatic choices for and
against the regime. It is more difficult to visualize this occurring in a
non-war situation, even on the death of the leader.
D. T portance of the Communist Party and Police.
The Report seems committed to the proposition that the Communist Party
has suffered a loss of statue. "No element in the Soviet structure appears
to have been more weakened by the purges than the Communist Party apparatus,
which lost authority to the other chains of bureaucratic command, and, notably,
to the Secret Police," (Vol. I, Part II,.A, p. 14) In another context the
authors discuss the Party`s "relative weakness, as compared to the position
after Lenin's death," as a limitation on the Party's ability to replace Stalin
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by a single successor. The factual evidence underlying this assumption is not
clearly evident.
There has been change, of course, in the relationship of Party and
government, involving greater fusion of the two at key points. In the purge
period, however, the Stalin group, operating essentially from Party positions
of control (at the time Stalin held no high government position), caused a
thorough. purge not only of the Party ranks, but also of the police and other
government agencies. Two successive Secret police chiefs lost their heads,
as did various government agency chiefs, top Army officers, and Party officials,
In both the prewar and postwar periods the Party leadership has displayed its
determinative role in the operations of Soviet society. If the survivors to
Stalin in the decisive Party body (Politburo or Presidium) are unable to work
out an orderly succession this will not necessarily mean that the Party has
lost status in comparison to other Soviet agencies. The likelihood at the
moment is that they will manage orderly succession which will continue the
the Party's dominance.
The tendency to overestimate the power of the police in the Soviet state
may arise partly from a lack of exhaustive research as well as an uncritical
acceptance of certain popular conceptions on this subject, particularly in the
field of forced labor. Much more adequate data are available on the present
functions of the I4VD and MGB than that presented on page 72 of Volume II. Cer-
tain statements on the historical development of the Soviet police are erro-
neous. Contrary to the assertion on page 71 of Volume II, the OGPU was not
transformed into the NKVD in 1934, but was absortedc The nucleus of the power
of the old OGPU was retained in a new Main Administration of State Security
(GUGB) under the NKVD. It is also not accurate to say, as stated on the fol-
lowing page, that the corrective labor camps of early years were transformed
into political concentration camps. In the early period of Soviet rule, the
two existed side by side, and were only gradually fused to form one type of
camp in which both political and criminal prisoners were incarcerated.
In discussing the economic and political significance of forced labor,
the authors err in basing their conclusions on information which is not valid
in describing the present situation. It cannot be asserted, for example, that
the population of the forced labor camps is now from 3.5 to 10 million (page
73, Vol. II). These estimates are based on data for 1941 and before, and
therefore provide only slight critera for judging the size of the present camp
population. There is in fact no possible way of reliablyr, estimating the
magnitude of the forced labor system at present. Contrary to the assertion
on page 10 of "Cancellation" the whole postwar economic program is not inter.
locked with the forced labor system., It is also not a new penetration of the
state structure by the police, since it existed before World War II in pro-
bably much greater measure than it does today.. It cannot be claimed that the
desire to mobilize quickly large pools of cheap labor for special tasks of
capital construction is a motive to sustain the institution of forced labor
(p. 253, Vol. II). On the contrary, with very few exceptions it seems that
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the Soviet forced labor system is designed to make use of the large number of
prisoners who have been incarcerated as punishment for deviant behavior,
E. Sub ective Elements in Interpretation.
There is a noticeable tendency to introduce value of judgments into the
study which are irrelevant to the problem under consideration, The authors
assert, for example, that "the Russian revolutionary conspirators ..u never
accepted, or they abandoned, the lessons of some two thousand years of Western
thought which regarded the handling of state power in relation to the indivi-
dual as a distinct problem in all forms of society." (Vol. I. Part II A, p. 7)
Subsequently the authors voice their doubts that the Soviet leaders "under-
stand the ethical and even religious foundations of Western Societies, or the
conception of politics as the arena for the settlement of differences among
individuals and groups, such a settlement being made within rules designed to
protect the individual as well as the community, to protect the minority as
well as to permit the majority to govern.." These statements reflect a strong
ethnocentrism, because they are based on the assumption that there exists a
system of thought which is, or should be, held by all peoples at all times.
Marxism deziie the propositions which the authors assert, so that there is no
question of the Soviet leaders "abandoning" or not "understanding" propositions
which are part of a different philosophy.
IV. The Paper on the Soviet European Satellites
Appendix D to Volume 5 of the study in question, dealing with the Soviet
satellite countries of Eastern Europe, is of extremely uneven quality, con-
taining a number of first-rate sections - for example, some of the passages
dealing with Czechoslovakia -- as well as others (particularly the introduc-
tory chapter) much less sound of substance and less well written. On the
whole, the study amounts to a routine duplication of the kind of estimates of
Soviet satellite strengths and vulnerabilities made by the intelligence agen,-
Dies of the US Government during the past several years. Occasionally it
shows unusual and penetrating insights on particular matters, but its main con-
clusions do not alter the generally accepted picture of the orbit. On the
debit side, a number of the assumptions and generalizations made on particular
topics appear to be of doubtful validity and occasionally are mutually contra-
dictory. As a result, the study as a whole makes the effect on the reader of
being loosely reasoned, despite the validity of many of its parts.
This defect is perhaps best exemplified in those parts of the outline
attempting to discbver "Underlying Forces Tending to Bind the Satellites to
the Soviet Union." It is a blunder of methodology, for example, and a most
misleading one at that, to argue at length, as this paper does, that the satel-
lite countries tend to be bound to the USSR by their current economic depend-
ence on the Soviet Union. The economic dependence is an artificial one created
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by the USSR and binds no one but the satellite Communist regimes themselves;
it would evaporate like dew in the morning sun if the Communist hold were
broken, To call these politically-imposed economic ties an underlying factor,
and then to leave the additional impression that this factor tends to bind the
satellite peoples (not only their rulers) politically to the USSR, is to put
the cart before the horse and to compound confusion.
Equally questionable is the emphasis given in the introduction to fear
of Germany as an underlying factor binding the satellite peoples to Russia.
The fear exists in Poland and Czechoslovakia and probably does -- within
limits -- redound in those two countries to the Soviet advantage. That it
exists and plays an important role in Hungary or Yugoslavia is much more de-
batable; and in the cases of Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania it is much easier
to argue that the people pay little if any attention to the German question --
they may even thihk vaguely of Germany as one of the powers that may help
liberate them eventually from Soviet rule. Even in Poland and Czechoslovakia,
popular attitudes on Germany are more complex and irrational than this study
depicts them; for example, fear of German revival often appears alongside of
hope in US power and in a liberating war from the West, in the same Polish or
Czech individuals; that is to say, they lean on the US, not on the USSR, for
emotional support in their disquietude on th'e.subject of Germany. On the
whole it is hazardous to imply, as this study seems to imply, that the Com-
munists have convinced a majority of even the Czechs and Poles (let alone the
people of the more remote satellite states) that Russia - the same Russia
which betrayed Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1939 -_ is their defender against
future German attack. This misleading implication, it is true, is watered
down and qualified further on in the text; but the initial generalization, as
it stands in the middle of page 2, appears far too broad.
As the text is examined for specific statements, a number of other opi-
nions of questionable validity are found. Among them are the following:
P.3.-....'BAs the exploitation of the satellite areas
has increased, self-sufficiency has de-
creased, and the feeling of dependence and
security based on Soviet domination has
become stronger.ff...
If this is true, it can be true only of the Communist leaders; there is
no evidence that the present economic system fosters such a feeling among the
people at large. Moreover; the reference to decreased self-sufficiency is
rather meaningless in this context; the only real loss of self-sufficiency in
these countries has been in the political sphere, and the economic dependence,
as remarked earlier, has followed as an artificial -- not an underlying
result of political vassalage.
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P.36-..."Soviet policy in the western part of the
satellite area has been marked by over-
industrialization in terms of the real
needs of the people of those areas."...
This would be vigorously disputed by many non-Communists in those areas,
and by many political exiles from the countries in question. In Czechoslova-
kia it may be true that some distortion of the industrial apparatus, from the
viewpoint of local needs and interests, has been imposed by Soviet policy; but
to state that there is too much industrialization in Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Hungary and Eastern Germany is tantamount to saying that this general region
most of which has suffered in the past from rural overpopulation and indust-
rial under-development -- ought to remain economically stationary. This tacit
conclusion is contradicted, however, in the very next sentence at the top of
page 4, which admits that the industrialization "has been of some advantage"
to the satellite countriesn
P.4.-..."The prospect of supplying the vast markets
of the Soviet Empire is a factor of certain
importance throughout the satellite area --
strongest, perhaps, for Germany."...
Here again a generalization is made which attributes to the overworked
satellite peoples ideas and sentiments that are scarcely likely to enter into
their political thinking, It is doubtful that anyone save the Communist bu-
reaucrat thinks in these terms,
p.6,-,,,"In Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia (as
well as in East Germany) nationalism is
linked with specific territorial griev-
ances."...
It is a major omission not to mention Hungary in this connection.
P,7,-..."The attempt to identify communism with na-
tionalism, which was made, or appeared to
be made, in the first years after the war,
has failed?".,,
This is an important subject and one that merits careful analysis. The
generalization on it, quoted above, is probably too unqualified, There is
evidence,. for example, that the Polish Communists have-succeeded to some ex-
tent in identifying their regime with the patriotic claims to the territories
annexed from Germany at the end of the war.
P.7,-..,"The various churches provide a visible and
active force tending to pull the satellites
away from Soviet domination."...
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Again the generalization is broad to the point of being misleading,
though it is somewhat watered-down further on in the paragraph. It comes
closest to being true, perhaps, in the case of the Roman Catholic Church in
P land; but even there it is inexact to use such words as "tending to pull
Ploland away from Soviet domination," since, presumably, nothing short of
war can do that at present. When it comes to the Orthodox Church and lesser
churches, the generalization contains hardly any truth at all, so far as can
be seen from the data filtering out of the Balkans.
P.9.-.,,11More dangerous from the Soviet point of view
are the growing armies of the satellite
nations,"...
If so dangerous, why is the Kremlin rushing to enlarge them and to equip
them with heavy modern arms? The conclusion is inescapable that they are not
in the least dangerous to the USSR, though their fighting quality is another
matter. It is a fair guess that only in the losing phase of a general Soviet
war might the satellite armed forces become a Soviet political vulnerability..
P. 12. This section sounds forced; it is hard to accept the view that
Poland's current dependence economically on the USSR is based on any natural
or necessary underlying factor. The expansion of the Polish steel industry is
impossible without Soviet assistance only because Poland is politically the
captive of the USSR.
Moreover, the figures showing Polish trade dependence on the USSR ap-
pear to be wrong; the proportion is more nearly 35% than 50%.
P. 1314. It would be interesting to learn the basis of this high estimate
of Rokossovsky's role as a channel of Soviet political, as opposed to purely
military, control of Poland. Though he is a member of the Polish Politburo,
this fact by itself proves little as to his importance in the political pic-
ture. Actually, there is very little evidence to suggest that he was sent to
Poland on any broader assignment than a strictly military one. Moreover, if
Sobolev was sent to Warsaw to supervise Rokossovsky (as the last sentence on
page 13 suggests), it becomes even more misleading to state that Rokossovsky
"runs the whole show" (page X)., Since so little is known about the merchanics
of Soviet tutelage over the satellite regimes, it would be better to eschew
flat generalizations on the subject ----- particularly in the case of Rokossovsky,
whose blemished political record in the USSR justifies serious doubt as to the
scope of the role assigned to him in Warsaw by the Kremlin.
P.160-...Mixed industrial enterprises and joint con-
struction projects have been set ups"...
The first part of this statement gives the misleading impression that
joint Soviet-Polish companies exist in Poland.
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P.43-44. Does this analysis of the recent purges in Czechoslovakia really
present all of the possible interpretations? It emphasizes personal rivalries,
and speculates on national-deviationism, but says very little about the Krem--
lin's tremendous pressure on the Czechoslovak regime for. economic results,
which is a leading factor, if not the basic factor, affecting the current poli-
tics of the regime. Certainly this Soviet pressure for results would be suffi-
cient,to--cause political jostling and power shake-ups within the group of men
obligated to produce the results, without its being necessary to. suppose any
of these men less fervently Stalinist or less loyal to Moscow than the others.
The discussion on pages 42-43 fails to bring out this fundamental aspect of
the subject, and gives the impression, at the same time, of emphasizingenation-
alism among Communist leaders to an unrealistic degree.. If the
going to mention the. marginal and sensational possibilities allinhherenmoret
theory, such as Gottwald vs. Stalin (page 43), then is
gated to preface them with a more sober and comprehensive can asof the more
commonplace factors in the situation, such asthose suggested the above. If
Ifnthie
is done, it may no longer seem so "surprising'.' (page 42)
Communists have. made the "party" Communists take a back seat, if we suppose
that.this simplification of control had as one of its aims the securing of
greater,effieiency to meet Soviet demands.
P. 47 (top). Is Dimitrov meant, instead of Kostov? Kostov was never con-
nected with the Comintern,
P. 48. In 1945 the Bulgarian army was not yet staffed with officers of
Russian antecedents.
P. 49, This account of the Communist Party purge in Bulgaria lays perhaps
too much emphasis on Kostov's alleged "intransigeance" in economic dealings
with the USSR, and fails to bring out with sufficient clarity the political
fact that this purge was a direct consequence of the Tito_Comin?orm schism --
i.e., was a preventive step on the part of Moscow vis-a-vis Bulgaria.
V. Recommendations
Research and writing on the USSR and its European satellites by groups
outside the US Government have proved most useefu to agencies
where these groups have produced long-range,
distinguished by imagination and systematic theory. Long-range studies are
next to impossible for government agencies, which must necessarily focus on
the more immediate problems, particularly those involving intelligence support
for policy-making officials. Some of the RAND studies in the field of Soviet
economics or psychological
groups signally able contributions in
Various academic
a variety of fields..
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Although the work ~ is of unquestionable value, it creates the
impression that the authors have been unduly attracted by an understandable
desire to solve quickly the inner mysteries of Soviet and satellite affairs.
The success of such an undertaking would seem to be in direct proportion to
the amount of research preparation involved. While there is no intention to
deprecate the efforts of those who contributed to these volumes, it is felt
that results of greater value to the Department's intelligence operation can
be obtained by more detailed studies of the individual facets of Soviet and
satellite society.
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