EXCERPTS FROM WG I M-139, SEPTEMBER 24, 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00527A000100180005-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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Excerpts from 10 I M-139, September .2 4, 1957
1. COC OM Listing Criteria.
Ref. Ml I D-77; WG D-77/1; ED/EC OM 23)
A. Consideration of Chairman's Draft Memorandum - WG I D-77/l.
The State member reported that the proposed Criterion (c) set forth in the
Chairman's memorandum agreed in substance with State's interpretation of the present
Criterion. (c). If, however, this was to be formalized and set forth in precise
language as an interpretation of the present Criterion (c), then State would wish
to discuss it from the standpoint of phraseology because they felt that there were
certain minor phrases which could be clarified.
The Chairman advised that he would indicate to the Executive Committee that in
substance State, ICA, and MDAC agreed that Criterion (c) should be interpreted along
the lines proposed in his memorandum, and that Defense and Commerce did not agree
with this interpretation. He thought there was little to be gained from a prolonged
discussion of each word since it was clear from the Group's last discussion of this
subject that some members agreed in principle and others disagreed in principle.
B. Consideration of Draft Revised Language for COCOM Criteria attached to
=EC OM-23.
The Commerce member referred to the EC's directive to WG I set forth in
ED/EC OM-23, and advised that the proposed draft language for Criteria (a), (b), and
(c) attached to OM-23 represented what Commerce felt was a reflection of the inter-
pretation which the U.S. has given to the existing COC OM criteria since 1954.
The Defense member said he gathered that it was not up to this Committee to de-
termine whether or not these proposals for revised criteria were to be submitted to
COCOM or the CG. On the other hand, he was concerned if it was a firm fixed position
on the part of several agencies that the proposals for revised criteria would not in
any event be introduced in COCON or the CG, because the exercise then seemed to be
soriewhat foolish.
The State member advised that in the light of the comments made at the last meet-
ing and positions taken by other members at that time, State had reviewed its
position carefully. At the present time he was in full agreement that it was not
the function of this Group to address itself to the question of whether or not these
criteria are to be submitted to COCCM. State did feel that the important issue that
was facing all of us was to develop a position on a list so that we could be prepared
for any possible proposal that might be made by some other PC. They also felt that
it was difficult to judge the acceptability or the utility of any set of criteria
until we had some indication of how it would work in practice. If language was being
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used to reframe existing criteria since 195L., any wording which tended to or could
be considered as making a substantive change in the criteria should be annotated
and citations given to show that it did in fact reflect U.S. interpretations in the
past of the existing criteria.. He was perfectly willing to consider the proposals
submitted under the cover of ED/BC Om-23 to determine (1) whether they were responsive
to the EC instruction and (2) whether if they were responsive, they were acceptable
as a revision of the existing criteria. Since the seemed to be agreement that
it was not the Group's function to consider whether this language should or should
not be submitted to COCOM, his consideration of this paper naturally should not be
construed as constituting State concurrence to something not under consideration
nor should it be considered as a precedent for any State position which might be
adopted later. With respect to the acceptability of the proposed criteria, he
did feel that it would be difficult to determine that without some examples or an
indication of their application. In response to a question by the Defense member.,
he stated that if State were asked its evaluation of the'COCOM situation, State would
at this time advise against any proposals This did not mean that under no circum-
stances would State agree to the submission of proposals to COCOM for revision of
the criteria or that there would be no proposals for revising the criteria that
State would support. State's present evaluation and advice was that this was not the
time to do it. He reiterated though that it was not the function of the Group at
the present time to discuss that problem.
The Commerce member remarked that the State member's comments clarified the
situation and brought the Group's consideration within the concept of the EC directive
to it, which related to the technical advisability, without other considerations.
In l-iaie with this directive, he felt that the revised language attached to OM-23 was
technically advisable as a refraining of the existing criteria in order to reflect the
interpretation which this Government has given to the existing criteria since 1954,
Thee' State. member noted his earlier comment that it was difficult to look at the
criteria as revised in this proposal and to tell simply by examining them on a word
for word basis whether or not they are in fact responsive to the instruction in that
they reflect past and present U.S. interpretations of the criteria. What he would
like to see and what would make it easier for State at least to understand that had
been done would be to have these criteria applied, and then to discuss whether or
not the changes did in fact make a difference and whether they were really the same
criteria in revised form or not. A sample category of the lists could be gone over
in terms of the list review to see what would happen under these criteria -- perhq s
a category which had already been reviewed by CIA to see whether the results were
the same. Under any criteria there was a possibility of ambiguities, differing
interpretations, and if we were going to came up with that situation, he thought we
should know it before we went any further.
The Commerce member pointed out that their proposals made a point of technical
data which in the past had only been effective in our controls to the extent that
we had AP 5. Now that would be particularized. With reference to the language
proposed in criterion (a) "are expected to be used by the 5ino-Soviet bloc'", he
recalled that one.of the particular' difficulties we had had in the past had been
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the fact that PCs are inclined to weigh a particular item against its use pattern
in the West. Commerce. was saying that it had to be weighed also and most particu-
larly against the use pattern that would apply in the Sino-Soviet bloc.
The Chairman referred to the fact that the proposal said "expected"~ use and not
the actual use. The Commerce member replied that, without derogation to the
intelligence community, he thought even they would be willing to concede that in
some instances it was quite difficult to indicate precise intelligence as to the use.
It had to be a matter of expectation. The Chairman thought that in most cases the
intelligence community had been and was able to give us quite good use patterns of
materials. Even if that were not true, he wondered whether this l.ap.guage if adopted
would not lead to more subjective and differing interpretations than we now have.
He thought the deletion of the words "expected to be" would be one improvement., that
could be made in the Commerce proposal.
The Defense member remarked that in considering the bloc as a wholes the first
priority was in connection with military priorities. Regarding Cl:i.nas they were
having an extremely difficult time in trying to build up an industrial base for the
same purpose for which the Soviets wanted it -- to build up a car machine. It was
"expected" and that was why the word "expected" was used here. When the Sino-Savict
bloc purchased an item which was considered to be of strategic importance, they
were not buying it for consumer use but were buying it for s zategic reasons, . t rt. it
appeared to him that, when looked at in that context, the word "expected" was not
out of order.
The State member inquired whether the fact that a machine which could be used
for military purposes was being purchased by the Sino-Soviet bloc was sufficient `,-do
assume that it would be used for that purpose, and whether this was the presumption
under which we had always operated. The 'hairman stated that we have not operated
under this presumption.
The Chairman thought that the inclusion of technical data and servi?;;es in the
proposed criteria was a matter which should be discussed. He thought all were
agreed that when it applied to strategic uses or materials technical data did need
to be controlled. The issue here was how and where it should be controlled, and it
erred him to be perhaps a misunderstanding of the purpose and function of the
criteria to insert technical data in the criteria themselves., because the criteria
were standards for listing items or materials on the lists. It seemed to him that
it did not serve much purpose to mention technical data in the criteria unless there
was some way of listing specific items of technical data on the lists, and even If
this were feasible, it might not be desirable.
The Commerce member reminded that so long as we labored under AP 5, which was
merely a caveat to PCs, two things happened. There was a direct relationship
primarily only to those items that were on the control lists and we did not have a
precise specified control on certain technical data as such.
The Chairman inquired whether Commerce had given any study yet to the practical
feasibility of being able to list specific items of technical production data on the
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lists in a manner that would limit the listings to the objective of strategic
controls and would not be so broad in general that it would encompass all kinds of
technical data on a particular item which would have no strategic application.
The Commerce member advised that Commerce felt that from the technical aspects,
the listing of technical data did not present a monstrous problem which could not
be overcome. Commerce felt that technically it could be done. He emphasized that
it was the prototypes and the technical data which were important.
The Chairman said he thought it was an almost insoluble problem to be able to
list technical data in such a way that it would be acceptable within the multilateral
control program or within our economic defense policy, without of necessity making
it so broad that it would go far beyond the objectives of strategic controls. Per-
haps if we had some samples of the kind of listings which might be made under these
proposed criteria,, we might be better able to judge the feasibility of making such
listings. Also he wondered how it was planned to encompass new data that had not
yet been invented.
The Commerce member advised that he had not prepared himself in such a way as to
be able to give the Chairman such information because he had not understood that
that was a part of the assignment. In addition to giving the Group Commerceo's
judgment that it was technically feasible and practical and could be done he re-
minded that the Office of Munitions Control and Commerce were exercising controls
over technicaal data, and that other countries were supposed to be doing so under
AP 5. The Chairman observed that this was being done in the U.S. on a case by case
basis under general rules which covered all data of certain types. Specific techni-
cal data which are controlled are not on any specific list. He also pointed out
that the war in which State and Commerce controlled technical data now was more
analogous to the way it was being controlled by COCOM under AP 5 than themanne:?
proposed here.
The Commerce member noted that he had given his concept of how the proposal
would work. If more definitive language was wanted with regard to certain examples,
he could go back and get them and submit them later. He noted that so far as de-
termining the scope,, variety, and extent to which such data would be listed, that
would still be in the same context required by the language in the proposals.
The Chairman asked whether the proposal was not intended as a broadening of the
base by which items could he listed. The Commerce member said that it was not be-
cause this was in the context of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Defense member said they
had interpreted "'military capabilities" to be "forees in being"' and for that reason
limited. They were proposing to broaden it to _ the extent that. it me ant support for
the war effort. The Commerce member stated that it was not a broadening of our
interpretation since 1954. Our difficulties on rolling mills and securing control
of certain vessels indicated that we had had an interpretation to cover items which
would support the war effort. "Industrial" was included because we now had the
Sino-Soviet bloc as the complete target. It would not, however, encompass the entire
basic economy. It was the industrial complex which lent support to and was in effect
an indirect military complex.
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-5-
The MDAC member remarked that "military-industrial" suggested that a whole new
area of industrial items would be covered not related to "military capabilities"
because items critical in relation to military capabilities were already covered.
The ICA member said she gathered these words were included because of the in-
clusion of the Sino bloc, and therefore it might be interpreted as a broadening for
the European Soviet bloc.
After further discussion the Chairman stated that the issue here on which we
had to report to the EC was whether these proposals reflected the interpretation
which the U.S. had given to the existing criteria since 1954 It seemed that some
questions had been raised which would indicate in the minds of some members that
these proposals would substantially broaden or at least form the basis for a sub-,
stantial broadening of the criteria and the resulting control lists. If this were
true, then we would have to conclude that the proposals did not reflect the inter-
pretation tat the U.S. had placed on the criteria since 1954. He asked the members,
'V1.ewS O'i, ??.:17,5 point.
The ICA member thought the proposals made the criteria broader than the U.S. has
used in the past.
The State member felt that the proposed revised criteria did in fact broaden the
interpretation that the U.S. had given in the past. He repeated, however,, that it
was difficult to make a judgment without seeing a specific application of these
criteria to a given list.
The 0hairman reported that he would advise the EC that,State, ICA and IDAC felt
the draft revised language for COCOM criteria, extracted from a paper submitted by
an EC member (ED/EC OM-23), did not reflect the interpretation which the U.S. had
given to existing criteria since 1954, and that Commerce and Defense felt that it
did. At the same time he would report the views -r,:.. -usly expressed by the members
on the U.S. interpretation of Criterion (c) contain d in KG I D-77/1..
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