VALIDITY STUDY OF NIE 65-56: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA, PUBLISHED 7 AUGUST 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000300020003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 13, 1957
• Content Type: STUDY

Sanitized - Approved For ~EeFA~7'CIA-RDP61-00549ROO0300020003-8
IAC-D-100/48
13 September 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 65-56:
Probable Developments in Indonesia,
published 7 August 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 65-56, "Probable Develop-
ments in Indonesia, It published 7 August 1956, was noted by the
IAC on 27 August 1957 (IAC-M-304, item 5 c).
25X1A
Secretary
Sanitized - Approved F~o`~`wase : CIA-RDP61-00549R000300020003-8
 Sanitized - Approved Foj 7 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000300020003-8
IAC -D-100/48
13 September 1957
Validity Study of NIE 65-56:
Probable Developments in Indonesia,
published 7 August 1956
1. NIE 65-56 failed to anticipate several important developments
of the past year and underrated the chances of others. While we did'
foresee continuing instability and unresolved problems, we estimated
that there would be slow economic progress and moderately favorable
prospects for slow advance toward a modern democratic state. In fact,
Indonesia has undergone a series of adverse developments during the
past year.
2. The estimate underplayed the force of regionalism and
did not anticipate recent moves toward provincial autonomy. Although
it pointed out the army's lack of cohesion and lack of responsiveness
to civilian authority, it did not warn that these regional movements
would be led by army elements.
3. NIE 65-56 estimates that "the Ali government will probably
remain in office for at least the next year. " The All government
remained in office considerably less than a year, and during at least
the last three months of its tenure it was largely ineffective. The
estimate did not anticipate Sukarno's attempt to reorganize the
Indonesian political system.
4. The analysis of PKI prospects and strategy has proven
generally valid, although it did not anticipate the sequence of events
which have enabled the PKI to increase considerably its influence and
strength by posing as the supporter and champion of Sukarno's plans
and programs.
SECRET
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP61-005498000300020003-8