VALIDITY STUDY OF NIE 65-55: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA THROUGH 1955, PUBLISHED 1 MARCH 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000300010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 9, 1956
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 2000/00IICRf-lK-RDP61-00549R000300010001-1
IAC-D-100/20
9 August 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 65-55:
Probable Developments in Indonesia Through 1955,
published 1 March 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 65-55, "Probable Developments
in Indonesia Through 1955, " published 1 March 1955, was noted by the
IAC on 7 August 1956 (IAC-M-251, item 15 c).
25X1A
Secretary
Approved For Release 2000/04,C147RDP61-00549R000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2000/041f*t',[ PI-RDP61-00549R000300010001-1
IAC-D-100/20
9 August 1956
Validity Study of NIE 65-55:
Probable Developments in Indonesia Through 1955,
published 1 March 1955
1. One of the major conclusions of NIE 65-55, "that a government
dominated by:the Masjumi will probably emerge following the elections"
has been proven invalid by events. This conclusion was based on the
estimate that the election would be a three-cornered race between the
Masjumi, the PNI, and the PKI, and that the Masjumi would win the most
seats in the Parliament. We believed it would be able to form a coalition
government either with one or more of the smaller parties or by drawing
away the right wing of the PNI. In fact, however, the Masjumi received
a somewhat smaller popular vote than the PNI and the same number of
seats. Moreover, instead of there being but three major parties, the
election resulted in four: PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PKI. In this situa-
tion it was the PNI rather than the Masjumi that played the leading role
in organizing a cabinet. The major factor in this incorrect estimate of
the outcome of the elections was a failure to appreciate the strength of
NU, which was able to gain a sufficiently large share of the Moslem votes
to reduce Masjumi strength substantially and to become the third largest
party.
2. The other major conclusion, that Communist popular strength
was increasing and that the Communists would not resort to force during
the period of the estimate has proven valid.
Approved For Release 2000/04MCICJWRDP61-00549R000300010001-1