COORDINATED INTELLIGENCE ASSUMPTIONS FOR NESC EXERCISE, 1958-1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: REPORT

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ATTACH NT B
TS #141842-b
FOR NESC EXEUCISE 19 i~-19 ~
w~rrr~..-rrrr r ry-.~r ~s ~+.s-~
To provide, for the special-purpose use of the Net Evaluation Sub..
committee, coordinated intelligence assumptions with respect to certain
Soviet military capabilities and US warning capabilities in mid-1962,
as set forth by the NESC in an "Outline of Specific Coordinated Intelli-
gence Required for NESC Exercise, 1953-1959."
1. In preparing these coordinated assumptions, it has been recognized
that for its purposes the NESC requires quite specific numerical pro-
jections for the mid-1962 period. The views cf individual agencies
have in some cases been compromised in an effort to meet this require-
ment. Likewise, numerical projections have been made in some areas
where the present state of our knowledge might not justify their inclusion
as estimates in an NIE for general distribution.
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2. In instances where this has occurred, every effort has been made
to provide assumptions which are as realistic as possible. For example,
Soviet requirements for Cuided missiles of various categories were derived
in accordance with estimated Soviet military thinking and strategy (as
outline in NIE ll..L..57), and in the light of available studies of US
and Allied targets, data on weapon effects, estimated availability of other
Soviet weapon systems, and other pertinent factors. Production of missiles
and associated equipment was then scheduled and the schedules were chocked
and adjusted in the light of known or estimated Soviet capabilities and
programs in the guided missile and other military fields. The final
assumptions for mid-1962 were measured against estimated Soviet economic
capaliilitics and estimated availability of nuclear materials for warheads,
and found to be feasible. *
The representative of the Director of Naval Intelligence calls
attention to his dissent to the majority estimate of the availability
of nuclear materials in the USSit, as registered in NIE 11'2?.53. Jel
A
ac ordance with this dissent he eliov that ass d n era
of~we ns)Mc curac a p 1 ds or .pion w d uir
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3 This procedure has been undertaken under the broad assumptions
-- there will be no international ac;rcomont on the limitation
of control of armaments durin_t; this period;
-- the USSR. is not and will not urin; the period of this
estimate, ae preparink for eneral war to befLin at any particular date
in the future (i.e., that the date 1962 has no special siunificance
in Soviet plannin?) ;
-- Soviet requirements for weapon s wu,,a:zs will in 1v,eneral be
related to the missions to be performed and targets to be attacked and
defended in the event of general war;
.~. Soviet proz'rams for production aril operational deployment of
weapon systems will be affected. by considorations of maximum utilization
of proven military hardware, optimum effectiveness vs. cost, minimum
loss or wa ta;e due to obsolescence factors, and maximum efficiency in
the utilization of available resources.
4. Isum, we believe that the Coordinated Intelligence Assumptions
contained in the following; pat,;cs are feasible and reasonable, but it
is emphasized that they must be treated as assumptions rather than as
estimates of S viet strent -ths in rfdo..-3- 62.
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TIM ASSUMPTIONS
A. SOVIET NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES IN MID-1962
1. Numbers of Delivery Vehicles inOoviet
ATTACHMENT B
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erational Units
Heavy Borabers/Tankers
Nur~ber: 200-300
Composition by type: BISONs, HERS, new heavy bombers
(see SNIE 11-7-56).
Medium Bombers Tankers
Piston: None
Jet: 1,350
Composition by role and type:
. (a)
Long Range Aviation - 725 BADGERS
175 Supersonic "dash" tdium
bombers
(b) Naval Aviation - 250 DADGERs
(c) Tactical Aviation - 200 l3ADGERs
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Jet Light Dotbers
Number: 2, 350
Composition by role and type:
(a)
Tactical Aviation - 1,300 BEAGLES
750 Supersonic tactical boribers
(b) Naval Aviation - 100 DEA,GLEs
200 Supersonic tactical bombers
Air-to-surface Missiles
AS-l, 55 n.m. missiles:
AS-2, 100 u.n. missiles:
ICBMs
Number:
Deployment:
450
350
(a) 50 percent static sites hardened to withstand averar;e
of 25-50 psi overpressure; 50 percent rail-transpi:artable
system with rainiriuz: of two launching, points per missile.
(b) launchin;; facilities sufficient to salvo 25C-300 missiles
Other Ground-launched ballistic Missiles
SS-47700 n.r.m. misoiles: 250-350
SS-5, 1100 n.r.i. missiles: 250-350
Deploinent: road and rail mobile, with four missiles per launcher.
Join Sand Air-- orce represe;~tatives reserve their poAitions. Th
eliey s tie assut:zed ~ur l~cr off !, D houlc -.mob with .re nce
Apprc' 4 s4 1O81~ PA- I 0 549ROGO.200 _4 45-stnn ;e,
some o w i c woul. be erjuip ped with nuclear warheads, were excluded
upon consultation with NESC Staff representative.
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ATTACEMEJT B
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Guided Missile Submarines 7k
Number equipped with cruise-type missiles: 47
(a) Current long-range classes., principally "Z" class, converted
for topside missile stowage - 20
Missile capacity-- 2 each
(b) New design., conventional powered$ constructed for internal
missile stowage - 20
Missile capacity " 4 each
(c) New design., nuclear powered constructed for internal
missile stowage - 7
Missile capacity - 4 each
Number equipped with ballistic missiles: 1 or 2
New design., nuclear powered., missile capacity 4-3 each
Submarine-launched Guided Missiles
SS-7., 200 n.m. cruise-type missiles: 300
SS-81 1000 n.m. ballistic missiles: 10-20
2. Performance Data, Dobbs, and Warheads for Above Vehicles
Aircraft characteristics: See SNIE 11-58 and SEC coordinated
contribution to NIE 11-4-58
Dodos and warheads: See NIE 11-2-58 and Annex C of NIE 11-5-58.
Missile characteristics: See NIE 11-5-58
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Missile reliability:
The following assumptions regarding Soviet missile reli-
abilities under operational conditions in mid-1962 are proposed
for use by the NESC. Bo cause of limited information available
on the operational aspects of either the Soviet or US missile
programs, there is considerable question as to the validity of
these figures.
In the table below:
Column 1 is the missile designation.
Column 2 is the percentage of missiles organic to
operational units that will appear "good enough to try"
to launch at any given time, i.e., serviceability rate.
Column 3 is the percentage of those missiles con-
sidered "serviceable" (column 2) that will actually get
off the launcher when fired.
Column 4 is the percentage of those missiles that
get off the launcher (column 3) that will actually reach
the vicinity of the target.
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ATTACIINENT B
to TS #141842-b
ASSUMED RELIAI3ILITIE$ OF SOVIET MISSILES. MID-1g2
COLUMN 1
COLUMN 2
COLUMN 3
COLUMN 4
AS-1
80
g0
80
AS-2
70
75
6o
ICBM
75
85
65
SS-4
85
90
80
SS-5
80
90
75
SS-33
85
60
75
SA-1
00
9o
90
SA-2
80
90
SA
4
L
o
8
235
80
-
0
75
75
SA-6
65
85
85
SA-7
85
80
Co
AA-2
85
85
00
AA-3
35
Co
Co
70
Co
70
NOTES:
1. Out-of-service missiles of sub-launched,, air-to-surface,
and air-to-air types would not be landed into submarines or aircraft.
2. The assumptions made for air-to-surface and air-to-air
missiles do nQt include losses due to aircraft aborts which are
caused by non-missile related items.
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B. SOVIET ALERT PROCEDURES IN MID-1962
Soviet Bomber Force
a. Assuming the continuation of present trends under normal
conditions, by mid-1962 some 30-40 percent of LRA medium and heavy
bomber and tanker aircraft will be engaged in flight training
activities each day except on weekends and at holiday periods, and
an additional 30-35 percent of LRA aircraft will be grounded for
maintenance purposes each day. The remaining bombers and tankers,
some 30 percent of the force, could be constituted as a continuing
alert force should Soviet planners so desire. Such a force could be
ready at any time to become airborne for its own protection or to
take off on assigned missions. During periods of international
tension, the size of such a continuing alert force could be increased
by reducing the number of aircraft engaged in daily training flights
and by intensifying maintenance activity. There is no present
indication that the Soviets are concerned with the development of an
alert force of this type.
b, Should Soviet planners elect to mount surprise air attacks
after a preparatory stand-down, they might consider that a relatively
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brief stand-down could be concealed from detection if it occured
over a weekend, at the time of a Soviet holiday., or during unfavorable
weather. About 70 percent of the LRA bomber and tanker force could
be serviceable for military operations after a 2-day stand-down,
c. Should Soviet planners elect to mount maximum-scale attacks.,
about 85 percent of the LRA bomber and tanker force could be service-
able for military operations after a 5-day stand-down*
d. The above factors apply to jet medium bombers of Tactical
and Naval Aviation as well as Long Range Aviation. They also apply
to jet light bombers, with the exception that about 00 percent of the
aire%raft of this type could be serviceable after a 2-day stand.-down.
2.. Soviet Ground Forces
a. Past Soviet reactions to civil disturbances in the Satellites
provide some indication of the minimum time needed to meet unexpected
emergency situations, In June 1953 Soviet units in East Berlin left
their barracks and moved into positions along the West Sector boundary
within three hours after receiving alert orders. Elements from out-
lying areas arrived on the scene within 13 hours. In October 1956 the
Soviet response to the Hungarian uprising was even more rapid. Units
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began arriving in Budapest from locations 50 miles distant within
three and one-half hours, and from locations 160 miles distant within
about eight hours. Although exercises have been held regularly in
recent years to test alert procedures., it is doubtful that reaction
tine could be significantly shortened,
b. Circumstances which are most conducive to rapid reaction
occur when Soviet units have completed their summer field training
and returned to winter quarters. At that time the troops are at
peak effectiveness and have access to all their equipment; they
probably could move into local assembly areas within two hours. At
other times of the year., as many as 50 percent"of Soviet units might
be split between home stations and field training areas., requiring
24+ hours or more to assemble with all their equipment.
Soviet Submarine Forces
Between now and mid-1962 the USSR will continue to improve the
readiness and operational capabilities of its naval forces. Alternative
assumptions can be made with respect to the precise state of readiness
that might exist in mid-1962 (a) that a normal peacetime pattern of
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training, upkeep? overhaul and operations is being maintained; (b) that
as a result of increased international tensions or deliberate Soviet
decision a sharply increased state of readiness is being maintained. The
latter alternative would involve the maintenance of larger numbers of ships
at sea.. with ships in port limited for the most part to those in upkeep or
overhaul status. Many of the ships in port would have a large percentage
of their crews on board and make every effort to be prepared for rapid
sortie. The following conditions could apply under each of these
alternate assumptions:
Assumption
Percentage of Naval Forces
At
Sea
Underway
in 6 bra.
Underway Towable to
in 12 brs* dispersal
area in 48
hrs.
Immovable
(a)
25
20
30 15
10
(b)
50
20
5 15
10
The above figures are generally applicable to all types of major Soviet
surface vessels and submarines,, and to all Soviet fleet areas.
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ATTACI MENT B
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C. SOVIET AIR DEFENSES IN MID-1962
1. We have reviewed those portions of NIE 11-57 which azze pertinent
to the NESC's requirements, and find them generally valid, with the ex-
ception of the following points:
2. Fighter Aircraft. For revised performance data on Soviet inter-
ceptors, see SEC coordinated contribution to M 11-4-53. With respect to
numbers of interceptors, we hold estimated Soviet operational strength con-
stant at about 10,000 fighters through mid-1960, at which time a gradual
decrease will probably begin. Soviet fighter strength in mid-1962 will
probably be about 9,300 aircraft, of which over half nay be all-weather
types. The assumed breakdown of Bloc fighter strength by type and area
is as follows:
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Jet Fighter Aircraft O rationaal Units (mid-1962)
Area
Day
All-weather
Total
Regiments
Northwestern USSR
670
720
1390
43
Western USSR
985
1070
2055
63
West Central USSR
600
900
1500
45
Caucasus
555
575
1130
35
East Central USSR
305
315
620
19
Far Eastern USSR
650
020
1670
51
Total Within USSR
3395
4400
5
256
Soviet Forces East Europe
445
490
935
29
(Total Soviet)
(4410)
(4890)
(9300)
(285)
East European Satellites
2360
740
3600
113
Total Within
East Europe
3305
1230
4535
142
Communist China and
North Korea
1900
690
2590
76
TOTAL BLOC
9,170
6,320
15,490
474
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3. Guided Missiles. For revised data on Soviet missile types
and performance, see NIE 11-5-58. With respect to numbers of missiles,
we assume that by mid-1962 the USSR will have produced sufficient mis-
siles and associated equipment to accomplish an operational, program of
the following general order of magnitude:
Arbitrary
Designation
Number of
Missiles
Operational
Units*
Deployment
SA -1
13,500
56
Moscow sites
SA-2
23,000
175
Static and
mobile
SA -3
15,000
100
Static and
mobile
SA-4
13,500
100
Static
SA -6
500
2 cruisers
-----------
4 destroyers
-----------
SA-7
1,300
4 cruisers
12 destroyers
AA-1
Fully replaced by improved missiles
AA-2
3,000
Day and all-
weather fighters
AA-3 and AA-4
35,000
All-weather fii titers
* M-21 SA-3, and SA-4 units are assumed to be battalions with three or
four firing units each.
The number of AA-3 and AA-4 missiles within this total is flexible,
but
df r.F ejopse 20 0IG8126 CI - PSII'l$ 49ROrO0 (3 5-lee
Approv
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ATTACIDENT B
to TS 3#141342-b
4. Early Warning and Intercept Control. For revised performance
data on Soviet aearly warning and GCI radars, see SEC coordinated contri-
bution to NIE 11-4-58. At the present time radar coverage extends over
the entire Soviet Bloc except for certain inland portions of central and
eastern Siberia. This radar coverage is achieved with two general cate-
gories of radars, i.e., heavy or prime radars and light auxiliary sets.
At the present time some 1700 radar sites are active. Some 1200 - 1500
prime radars and some 3000 of the light radars are used in various com-
binations in the Soviet Bloc system. By mid-1962 radar coverage will
probably be complete over the Soviet Bloc. New radars of much higher
quality are already beginning to appear, and b mid-1962 will be widely
deployed.
5. There is evidence that, in addition to the employment of indi-
vidual Soviet cruisers and destroyers 25X1 D
Soviet minesweepers are now being adapted for use as radar picket ships for
for continental early warning.
6. Command and coordination. The limitation imposed by current
air-ground communications equipment is probably being overcome by use of
on air-ground data-link system for GCI vectoring of interceptors. We
believe such equipment is in widespread use in western USSR and will be
in use throughout the Bloc by Ali 162.
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7. For several years the Soviets have been developing computers and
other components suitable for data handling use. The use of such equip-
ment will have a marked effect in increasing traffic-handling capabilities,
reducing system reaction time, and improving coordination within the Soviet
air defense system. For example, it is expected that data'-handling equip-
ment will increase the traffic capacity of each Soviet radar reporting site
to at least 20 simultaneous raids. We believe that an air defense system
with some semi-automatic features is being widely deployed in western USSR
in association with early warning and GCI sites. This system, which is
believed to be similar in concept to the US SAGE system, will be in use
throughout the Bloc by mid-1962. The Soviets are introducing a new IFF
system; such a system will probably be fully operational by 1960.
8. Electronic Warfare. Shipborne, land-based, and airborne equip-
ments, suitable for jamming at frequencies in the X-Dand and below, are
now in operational use. A trend towards frequency diversification has been
noted in Soviet radio and. radar equipment, in contrast to the earlier con-
centration of frequencies. This trend includes the addition of L-Band
frequencies and probably th6 use of rapidly changeable frequencies in some
radars.
9? Air Facilities. It is assumed that, as a minimum, the current-
ly-existing airfields with long, permanent-surface runways will remain
available for operational employment. They are as follows:
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General Area
Minimum Runway Len;;ths t (ft)
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
USSR
20
62
30
239
51
European Satellites
7
47
38
52
0
Communist China and
North Korea
1
11
27
72
31
22'
1217
95
363
92-
About 300 of these fields are currently being used for air defense
operations. In addition, there are about 400 Bloc airfields with run-
ways over 4,000 feet in length which could be utilized for fighter oper-
ations under reduced safety margins.
D. U.S. WARNING CAPABILITIES IN MID-1962
(Submitted through special channels under separate cover.)
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