SITUATION IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 23, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8
23 March 1959
SUBJECT: Situation in Cuba
1, Current Status: After approximately three months in office,
Cuba's revolutionary government has assumed the appearance of an
emerging dictatorship under Prime Minister Fidel Castro, although it
does provide a greater potential for democracy than did the Batista
regime in its later phases. Signs of disillusionment are beginning to
appear, particularly among some business, commercial and political
groups.
2. Castro's lack of administrative experience and his preoccu.
patiorc with social and agrarian reform, have hindered government
action to solve the many problems the revolution was intended to
correct, Two years of revolution and a long history of corrupt admin-
istration have adversely affected all phases of Cuba's economy and
have reduced its financial reserves. The country, however, has ample
assets ~o carry on government functions. Negotiations are in progress.
with the International Monetary Fund for a $25, 000, 000 loan to offset
a shortage of foreign exchange reserves, and the government has
instituted a program of austerity in it* expenditures. Castro has also
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8
SECRET
inaugurated a campaign against adthinist native con uption which ee6
ingly is- having aurae sixidebseij, Ceir sin mores by the new government,
sUbh a.a lowering rents and cutting utility rates, have been designed
to appeal to the lower classes without regard for the effect on the
economic structure. Some of Castro's public statements, such as a
17 March speech in which he called for a one-class society, have caused
further apprehension. Nevertheless, he probably retains much of his
great popularity with the lower classes,
3. The "war crime trials" have created criticism at home as
well as abroad. Castro's intervention in the trial of several air force
personnel, causing them to be retried and sentenced to long prison
terms after they were acquitted of charges of genocide, and his decision
to extend the death penalty to persons guilty of peculation have caused
increased speculation that he is more interested in revenge than in
justice.
4. The freedom of activity granted to Communists has permitted
them to gain a foothold in the organized labor movement--although they
have been removed from positions of leadership--and in the armed
forces, and there is evidence that they now exert influence in other
sectors of public life, including the press. The Popular Socialist
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8
Nose
41 %W.001
(Communist) party operates openly and legally and is apparently taking
steps to regain the prestige and influence which it enjoyed during the
late. 1940's. The actions of Ernesto "Cho" Guevara, the controversial
leftist Argentine rebel leader, have facilitated Communist activities.
So far there has been no serious attempt to proscribe Communist acti-
vities, although some Catholic groups, including those active in
organized labor, are working to limit. Communist influence.
5. Castro's "campaign against dictator ti lp" has made Cuba a
meeting ground for revolutionary exile groups which are engaged in
plotting, propaganda campaigns, and probably some recruitment and
training of invasion forces. So far, however, they have been held back
by failure to achieve unity. Primary targets are the Dominican Republic,
Haiti and Nicaragua. Castro's tendency to deal with Comm*nist-influ-
enced groups --particularly Dominican and Nicaraguan--has prevented
an alliance with such antidictator liberals as Venezuelan President
Betancourt and former Costa Rican President rigueres.
6. Prospects: The chances of Cuba achieving either political
stability or a democratic government have been limited by the develop-
meat of "one man rule" under Fidel Castro. Blinded by his own
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8
SECRET
fanaticism and lack of experience, Castro has allazated several
influential groups and created a basis for the development of serious
opposition to his regime. For the present, however, the still over-
whelming support of the lower classes precludes any open move against
the government.
7. From a long range viewpoint, Cuba's economic situation is
good. Barring serious labor trouble, this year's sugar crop is not
expected to fall far short of the established quota, although income may
suffer from low prices on the world market. Nevertheless, a good crop
and strict economy in government expenditures should do much to
alleviate the financial difficulties inherited from the Batista regime.
8. The government is not now Communist dominated or con-
trolled, although the potential for Communist penetration exists. Castro
has indicated that he will not allow the Communists to "steal the revo-
lution" from him, an attitude v''aktltr. ib likely to provide a greater hindrance
to Communist aspirations than any anticommunist beliefs the Prime
Minister may profess to hold.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00549R000200020040-8