ITALIAN SOCIALIST REUNIFICATIONS PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200010078-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 78
• Publication Date: September 13, 1956
• Content Type: MF

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13 September 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR : Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Italian Socialist Reunification: Prospects
and Implications
1. Close collaboration as a preliminary to reunification of
the Nenni-Socialists (PSI) and the Saragat Socialists (PSDI) appears
probable as a result of a series of developments which culminated
in a meeting of Nenni and Saragat on 25 August to explore the
principles, positions, and procedures related to reunification.
Indeed, a number of observers
con-
sider eventual reunification almost a foregone conclusion.
2. Despite the present impetus toward reunification, however,
there remains a gulf between the positions of the two parties on many
specific questions in the fields of PSI relations with the Italian
Communist Party (PCI), foreign policy, and trade union organization.
Thus far, most PSDI leaders, except for Saragat and a few others,
appear anxious for reunification; on the other hand, many of the PSI
leaders appear far less enthusiastic. We believe that if the PSDI
were to be more deliberate in negotiation and exacting in demands
for guarantees, the dangers inherent in reunification would be at
least reduced, and the chances for drawing Nenni and some of his
followers lastingly away from their Communist attachments might
be increased.
3. The outlook regarding reunification will probably be greatly
influenced by judgments and decisions to be made on the question by
the Socialist International Council at its meeting in London on 20
September. A progress report on the Italian Socialist situation will
be made to this meeting by Pierre Commin, the Acting Secretary
General of the French Socialist Party who played a major role in
bringing the leaders of the two Italian parties together, and who has
been persistently optimistic that the basis for reunification exists.
We believe that Socialist International members will be disposed to
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examine Nennits bona-fides for reunification and membership in the
International more carefully than Commin, and may eventually
appoint a fact-finding commission to this end. However, the hope of
bringing the PSI back to democratic Socialism and of broadening the
democratic base in Italy so as to permit a democratic alternative to
CD-dominated government may cause them to lose sight of the
political dangers of Socialist reunification. The French Socialists
in particular are probably encouraged by Nennits statements sup-
porting the Algerian and Suez positions of the Mollet government.
They probably also believe that PSI-PSDI reunification would bolster
their own political position in France.
4. Nenni has, during 1956, given some evidence of attempting
to pursue lines at variance with the PCI or Soviet position. Notably,
he attacked the present Soviet leaders for their role in permitting
the tyranny of Stalin. He has partially backed the Western position
on the Suez question. He has said that he would not oppose Italy's
membership in NATO. He has declared that the PSI-PCI unity of
action pact of 1946 is an "historical document," and in some
localities permitted the PSI to vote for city officials opposed by the
PCI. However, these recent statements and efforts of Nennits are
far outweighed at present by his 30-year history of intimate collabora-
tion with the Communists, and the strong personal and organizational
ties created in this period, These organizational ties, in labor unions,
cooperative, veterans organizations, etc., would be difficult to break
even if Nennits intentions were sincere and even if he succeeded--as
appears unlikely--in bringing the vast majority of the PSI membership
and voters into the new party.
5. Socialist reunification will substantially change the political
and governmental alignments that have prevailed in Italy for almost
a decade, but the nature and effect of these changes cannot be firmly
estimated at present. On the one hand, reunification might result
in political benefits in Italy if the two parties were merged on a
democratic basis and adhered to the principles of the Socialist Inter-
national. Italy might then possess the basis for developing a demo-
cratic alternative on the left, for constituting a more substantial
parliamentary bloc for the advancement of much-needed economic and
social reforms, and for delivering a severe blow to Communist
strength and prestige.
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6. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the PSDI from the
present government might eventually force the Christian Democrats
either to include the reunified Socialist party in the government or
to move to the right to include the Monarchists. Such a forced choice
might cause a split in the CD with unpredictable consequences. Fur-
thermore, the fact remains that the PSDI presently has only about
half the popular strength of the PSI. Whatever Nennits professions
at the moment, the PSDI would probably find itself soon absorbed by
the PSI. Unless the PSI were able to purge itself of its pro-Communist
and Communist elements, which will be difficult to accomplish, the
reunified group might end up under the control of Communist elements.
7. Finally, it is possible that Nennits moves may be part of
a larger Communist design not only to break the CD hold on the
Italian government, but also to serve Communist purposes in Western
Europe in general. It cannot be forgotten that Nenni stuck loyally by
the PCI and Soviet line during the long period of Stalinist tyranny,
and while many of his social democratic friends in the satellites
were liquidated. It may be very significant that Nennii s movement
toward greater autonomy and democracy in the PSI coincide with
Soviet changes of line and efforts to achieve popular front govern-
ments and neutralism in Western Europe.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
/s/ SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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