POST-MORTEM ON NIE 11-3-57: PROBABLE INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF SOVIET ATTACK ON THE US THROUGH MID-1960, DATED 18 JUNE 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000100160042-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 1999
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: July 26, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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Approved For Release : CIA-RDP61-00549R000100160042-2
IAC-D-.57/69
26 July 1957
Post-Mortem on NIE 11-3-57:
Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack
on the US Through Mid-1960,
dated 18 June 1957
I. F inks
1. In preparing NIE 11-3-57 a somewhat different approach
was undertaken from that which had been used for the precedessor
estimate, NIE 11-6-55 of 1 July 1955.* Instead of relating the
warning problem largely to various forms and scales of initial attack
open to the USSR, the new NIE sought to explore much more fully
certain variable and imponderable factors which might be present in
any future warning situation.
2. Pursuant to IAC -D - 57 / 14, the National Indications Center
and the National Security Agency participated in the production of
NIE 11-3-57, the former also having prepared an extensive written
contribution. These agencies should again participate formally in
future warning estimates.
3. The accumulated experience with papers on warning has
served to underline certain inherent difficulties in estimating on
this subject:
a. Warning would always be the product of an
extremely complex situation involving factors which
cannot be anticipated in advance. While intelligence
can gear itself to obtain many kinds of indications, and
to evaluate their relative significance if and when they
appeared, it cannot be certain in advance of the precise
weight which would be attached to them in reaching a
warning judgment in any real situation.
*In view of the hypothetical character of the problem examined
in NIE 11-6-55, a validity study in the ordinary sense is not
.appropriate.
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP61-00549R000100160042-2
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 SECRET
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP61-00549R000100160042-2
IAC-D-57/69
26 July 1957
b. Inasmuch as many of our estimates of Soviet
capabilities and current levels of military readiness
have a tentative and imprecise character, an essential
element is lacking for making precise estimates of the
warning intelligence may be able to give.
c. An estimate of the warning that intelligence
could provide is in the nature of the case a net estimate,
and therefore requires a more complete picture of
present and future US intelligence capabilities for ob-
taining warning indications than has been available.
4. The problems referred to in 3 a cannot be overcome and
would always be inherent in any estimate of probable warning. With
respect to 3 b, we believe that the next warning estimate should be
based on assumptions concerning Soviet alternative courses of
action based on estimated Soviet capabilities. At the same time it
will doubtless be useful from time to time to reexamine the more
general and theoretical aspects of warning such as are discussed in
Sections I and II of NIE 11-3-57.
5. The problem referred to in 3 c is already being given
attention. IAC-M-289, item 3, set up the Warning Systems Survey
Committee, which is designed to provide a current appraisal of
present and prospective capabilities of intelligence in the warning
field.
The Board of National Estimates and the IAC representatives
are requested to take account of the above considerations when next
the IAC schedules an estimate on warning of attack.
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