THE GROWING MISSILE GAP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00357R000300180006-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 8, 1959
• Content Type: NSPR

THE REPORTER
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The Growing Missile Gap
Is the time coming soon when the Soviet Union
could launch an attack without fearing retaliation ?
THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, Brigadier General, U.S.A. (Ret.)
"Tow IT SUFFICES to press but one
"Now
and not only airfields
and means of communication of
various headquarters but whole cit-
ies will be blown sky-high, whole
countries can be destroyed," Soviet
Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev told
the graduates of the military acad-
emies at a reception in Moscow on
November 14. On another occasion
recently, he declared that he had
only to press one button and Tur-
key would be destroyed in a day.
Khrushchev was speaking of the
capabilities of the thousands of bal-
listic missiles that the Soviet Union
now has emplaced around its perim-
eter, mostly on its western fron-
tiers.
These statements, and many oth-
ers of similar tone, were made for
internal consumption and not for
foreign propaganda. From long ex-
perience our intelligence agencies
take them seriously and confirm
the basis for them. Some of Khru-
shchev's confidence comes from his
having personally witnessed last
year the firing of a super intercon-
tinental missile-probably the one
he told Senator Hubert M. Hum-
phrey had a range of 14,000 kilo-
meters (8,699 miles) . On another
occasion he saw the firing of missile
salvos of half a dozen each at fire
ranges of from two hundred to
twelve hundred miles.
In Washington, many officials be-
lieve that the Soviet move to drive
the Allies out of Berlin, the most
critical event since the Second. World
War in its implications for the West,
is a result of Khrushchev's convic-
tion of Soviet military superiority,
achieved after years of the most in-
tense and frantic effort. Khriashchev
believes that his missiles can now
destroy a major portion of the West's
retaliatory bombing force, and that
any bombers that might survive it
missile attack are rapidly being made
obsolete by such Soviet air defense
as interceptors twice the speed of
sound and guided air-defense rock-
ets with a range of a hundred miles
and armed with nuclear warheads.
This is what constitutes the "mis-
sile gap," a period during which the
Soviet Union has the means to blunt
much of the power of the West's re-
taliatory bomber force, and during
which it has operational missiles in
great numbers that we cannot de-
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VOLUME 20, NO. 1
JANUARY 8, 1959
Thonzair R. Phillips 10
THE GROWING MISSILE GAP . . ? . . .
David Dem.drest Lloyd 16
THE SHAM BATTLE OVER `SPENDING' . . . . .
At Home & Abroad
THE FILIBUSTER DEBATE
Lindsay Rogers: 21
1. BARRIER AGAINST STEAMROLLERS ? '
Senator Jacob K. Javits 1'23
2. 'THE PUBLIC BUSINESS MUST Go FORWARD'
THE BERLINERS MAKE THEIR CHOICE
TITO BUILDS A CHURCH IN MACEDONIA
? George Bailey 25`
? . . Gordon Shepherd 28
Views & Reviews
'SOMEBODY,, ANYBODY ,." ? ' Thomas P. Coffey 31
. Norman Podhoretz 32
EDMUND WILSON, THE LAST PATRICIAN-II
Movies: MR. LEYINr$ FESTIVAL . Herbert Feinstein 35
Theater: THE FLY IN THE OINTMENT . Marya Mannes 36
Books:
Alfred Kazin 38
THE GERMAN AND THE NOVELIST ? '
STEEL MILLS AND SAC]ti:D COWS ? ? William Letwin 40
Daniel Schorr 42
MARKING TIME IN,~WARSAW .
THE BURDEN OF IEISTJRE Nathan Glazer 43
Records: A G}`PSYr3 GUITAR . Nat Hentoff 44
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fend ourselves against. In contrast
to the Soviet Union, with operation-
al missiles of all possible useful
ranges, the United States has no op-
erational ballistic missile with a
range of more than two hundred
miles-the range of the Army's Red-
stone.
THERE ARE credible reports based
on intelligence sources that the
Soviet Union has manufactured
about 20,000 ballistic missiles with
ranges from 150 miles to 6,000 miles
and has tested and fired more than
a thousand of them. The majority
of these are in the short, medium,
and intermediate ranges. Missiles
with ranges up to 800 or 1,000 miles
have been in battle positions in the
hands of troops for three years. The
1,800-mile intermediate-range missile
has been operational for two years,
and the intercontinental missile was
operational in small numbers a year
"go.
Joseph Alsop published figures
last July based on U.S. intelligence
estimates that we would have no
ICBMs in 1959 while the Russians
would have 100; 30 versus 500 in
1960; 70 versus 1,000 in 1961; 130
versus 1,500 in 1962; and 130 versus
2,000 in 1963. These were described
by Pentagon sources as optimistic
for the Soviet Union. There is, how-
ever, every reason to believe that the
Russians will meet this estimate of
their capability. Khrushchev, in his
thesis for the Twenty-first Party
Congress, stated on November 14:
"The production of intercontinental
ballistic missiles has been success-
fully organized." Robert Hotz, ed-
itor of Aviation Week, whose sources
of information are usually reliable,
states that the Soviet Union is now
manufacturing more than fifteen in-
tercontinental missiles monthly. It is
also reported by a reliable source
that the Soviet Union has already
manufactured five hundred intercon-
tinental-missile frames.
'Everything's Just Dandy'
Meanwhile, administration officials
have been busy denying the U.S. lag.
The United States has no opera-
tional missiles of intermediate and in-
tercontinental range and no ballistic
missiles at all for distances between
200 miles and the intermediate range
of about 1,500 miles. And yet Under
Secretary of Defense Donald A.
Quarles, in an address to the Armed
Forces Staff College on January 24,
declared: "In the important area of
long-range ballistic missiles we are
in a `nip and tuck' race in which
neither side could, with assurance,
be said to be ahead.". Defense De-
partment Director of Guided Mis-
siles William M. Holaday declared
last April 28: "It is my personal view
that the status of the over-all Soviet
missile development is no better than
our own at the present time."
But at about the same time Lieu-
tenant General James M. Gavin was
writing in his book, War and Peace
O
in the Space Age: "Now that the So-
viets have an inventory of ICBMs,
these will constitute their long-
range striking force." In an inter
view in the Reader's Digest for
April, 1958, General Curtis LeMay
said: "I do not believe they [the Rus-
sians] have operational ICBMs in
any quantity," implying that they
did have them in small numbers.
Senator Henry M. Jackson (D.,
Washington), who, like others I
have quoted, has access to intelli-
gence information, stated last Janu-
ary 30: "By either this year or next
year, our entire system of overseas
bases will be exposed to Russian
IRBM attack. Next year, or the year
thereafter, the strategic airbases in
our own country will become ex-
posed to Soviet ICBM assault.
Meanwhile,. vital bases here at home
are now open to enemy missiles from
the sea."
Writing in the Space Journal for
December, Donald C. Wakeford of
the Huntsville Arsenal says that So-
viet launching sites for interconti-
nental and intermediate-range mis-
siles "have been pinpointed and
ballistic flights of their major weap-
ons have apparently been tracked by
radar from Turkey. They also have
two intercontinental missiles-the
T-3 and the T-3a-which are in oper-
ation and which can carry hydrogen
warheads."
The fact is that the United States
has located at least seven Soviet
ICBM launching sites in western
Russia, and knows where the nuclear
warheads are stored. The Japanese
have reported the location of five
launching sites in the Far East.
There are hundreds of operational
launching sites for medium- and in-
termediate-range missiles in the So-
viet Union, East Germany, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Albania.
The Built-in Satellite
According to German sources, the
Russians were working on a rocket
motor of 500,000 pounds of thrust in
1950. It was reported to be opera-
tional in 1954 and to comprise the
first-stage rocket of the Soviet T3a
intercontinental missile. Sputnik III,
weighing a ton and a half, was put
into orbit by a single-stage rocket,
whose thrust is calculated by U.S.
experts to be about 825,000 pounds.
This probably is the first stage of the
super-rocket which Khrushchev says
can reach anywhere in the world,
and which is undoubtedly the same
rocket he told Senator Humphrey
about. The U.S. National Aeronau-
tics and Space Agency has just let a
contract for the development of a
rocket with a million pounds of
thrust, but it will not be operational
for several years.
The second Atlas successfully
launched by the Air Force was aimed
skyward and went into orbit. In the
final-stage rocket of this missile were
a few scientific instruments. The press
and radio made false comparisons be-
tween the weight of Sputnik III and
the orbiting Atlas missile. The fact
that the latter was heavier than
Sputnik III means little. Most of its
weight is accounted for by the final-
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stage rocket, which is an integral
part of the "satellite." The important
thing is the payload launched into
orbit. In this case, the Atlas was
able to carry about 150 pounds of
payload into orbit, while the last
Soviet Sputnik, still orbiting, has a
payload of 2,919 pounds-or about
twenty times as great as the Atlas
payload.
WHY DO ALL THE administration
spokesmen pretend that we are
in a "nip and. tuck" race with the
Soviets? One reason was given by
Holaday in the address previously
quoted. He admitted that there was
some conflict between the obligation
to keep our people informed of the
dangers the country faces and the
obligation to maintain the West's
confidence in our leadership and
strength. Former Secretary of De-
fense Charles E. Wilson justified
keeping the situation from the pub-
lic by asking, "Why scare the people
to death?" It seems probable that an-
other reason is that the administra-
tion wants to hold down the demand
for more military expenditure that
would be forthcoming if the public
were aroused.
`I Say It Isn't a Gap'
The President, questioned about
the missile gap during a press con-
ference on August 27, declared:
"There is still a long ways to go
before the airplane, I would say, is
made completely obsolete. So while,
if there is any gap, I am quite cer-
tain that our enormous strength in
fine long-range airplanes is-I say it
isn't a 'gap' . . . in my opinion, the
airplane takes care of that deficien-
cy." The President's statement shows
that he had not been briefed on re-
cent calculations by the Air Force,
which have modified the idea that
bombers are substitutes for missiles
as long as they can evade guided
rockets and manned interceptors.
Calculations on the effectiveness of
ballistic missiles against surface air-
base installations, which I will am-
plify later, show that ballistic mis-
siles are a greater threat to the
manned bomber than even the best
air defenses and that in case of a sur-
prise attack the majority of these
bombers will never get into the air.
The question of whether the U.S.
bomber force can fill the missile gap
in the immediate future depends
upon two questions:
? Can the Soviets with a surprise
missile attack destroy a major por-
tion of the U.S. bomber force on its
bases?
? Will the Soviet air defenses
cause such heavy losses in the retalia-
tory bomber force that it is, in effect,
neutralized? Linked to this question
is whether United States electronic
countermeasures, diversionary mis-
siles, and attacks on Soviet air de-
fenses will be able to decrease the
effectiveness of the defenses mate-
riall.y..
The first question must be divided
into two parts: What is the Soviet
threat to SAC overseas bases? What is
the Soviet missile threat to SAC bases
in the United States?
The Russians have thousands of
missiles emplaced and ready to fire
on U.S. overseas bases. Their missiles
are known to be accurate within
about two-tenths of one per cent of
their range. This is adequate for use
with a nuclear warhead at these
ranges. One scientist, with access to
U.S. intelligence in the course of his
work, told me that we might as well
throw away our overseas bases for
all the value they would have in a
full-scale war. This, however, does
not mean that they should be aban-
doned. now, since they would have
great value in anything less than
full-scale war.
Nor does it mean that the U.S.
bomber forces on the bases would be
completely wiped out. SAC keeps
from six to twenty per cent of its
bombers, depending upon the situa-
tion, in the air at all times, so these
will not be destroyed in a surprise
attack. Nor will all missile attacks
be successful. Nevertheless, Air Force
planners talk in terms of the loss of
seventy-five per cent of the aircraft
on overseas bases in a full-scale sur-
prise nuclear attack. In addition to
the SAC bases overseas, there are some
three thousand U.S. and Allied tac-
tical aircraft, more than half of
which could carry nuclear weapons
to European Russia. It cannot be
anticipated that all of them could
be destroyed on their bases, but a
great many could be.
U.S. Deterrence:
From Massive to Minimum
The calculations by which the scien-
tists and military planners reach the
conclusion that Soviet ballistic mis-
siles are such a total threat to the
U.S. strategic bomber force are com-
plex. But these calculations are re-
sulting in a whole new strategy of
war, which-together with the lag in
missile development in the United
States-is ending up in a theory
called "minimum deterrence." In
essence the theory admits that a large
portion of our present forces cannot
survive a large-scale surprise missile
attack. Our remaining retaliatory
forces would be unable to knock out
hostile offensive bases but might de-
stroy thirty or fifty cities. Our retalia-
tory threat, instead of being over-
whelming, as we have considered it
in the past, with its first target the
enemy's offensive forces, now be-
comes a threat which declares to a
potential enemy: "If you attack my
military bases, I will respond with
what I have left by attacking your
major cities." The steady improve-
ment in Soviet military posture, with
no relative improvement in our own,
has reduced us to this unenviable
position.
The following calculations, based
on public information of the effec-
tiveness and accuracy of Soviet mis-
siles, demonstrate how important
missiles have become in the latest
strategic thinking. It is assumed that
there are four hundred NATO and
U.S. airbases eight hundred to twelve
hundred miles distant from Soviet
missile installations. The announce(]
accuracy of Soviet missiles at that
. range is a probable error of two
I'iniles (meaning half of them will fall
'this close to the target), and the ex-
plosive force of the Soviet missile
warheads is five megatons (five mil-
lion tons of TNT), which is capable,
according to the Atomic Energy
Commission, of destroying all but
,the heaviest surface structures with-
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in a radius of 6.2 miles and killing 1
eighty-five per cent of the human
megaton bomb that Humphrey re-
ported was in reality the Soviet
five-megaton missile warhead.) Cal-
culation shows that an average of
two missiles would have to be fired
to obtain a ninety per cent possibili-
ty of destroying an airbase. Eight
hundred missiles would be sufficient
to wipe out the major part of Allied
airpower overseas.
W HY CANNOT the Allies wipe out
Soviet missile bases? Here comes
the awful mathematics of missiles.
The U.S. missiles have a warhead of
from one-third to one-fifth the power
of the Soviet warhead. There have
not been enough firings to determine
accuracy realistically, but at the pres-
ent time our missiles are not
more than three-quarters as accurate.
With these disadvantages, calculation
shows that it would take thirty-three
U.S. missiles to give a ninety per cent
assurance of destroying a hidden or
underground Soviet missile installa-
tion. This is based on the assumption
that the bomb would have to be a
surface burst within a quarter of a
mile from the installation; the lip
of the crater extends that far.
It would take fifteen Soviet mis-
siles, with their heavier warheads, to
destroy an Allied underground mis-
sile-launching pad. To destroy nine-
ty per cent of a thousand U.S.
pads, fifteen thousand Soviet missiles
would be required, while thirty-three
thousand U.S. missiles would be
needed to destroy ninety per cent of
a thousand Soviet pads. For either
side, the effort to destroy missiles
emplaced in underground or hard-
ened pads, or effectively concealed,
is so great that it is not a feasible
objective with present missile accu-
racy and warheads. If both sides had
missiles underground or hidden,
there would be a standoff, since
neither side could destroy the retalia-
tory force of the other. But when one
side has missiles and the other de-
pends upon airbases which cannot be
hidden and can be destroyed with
relative ease, the situation of the
latter is calamitous. It has only a
"minimum deterrent" and is a vic-
tim of the missile gap. , '. ?.was being conservative in saying "at
The situation is more faeorahle:'`=least 200 miles." A November, 1957,
:,with regard to Strategic Air Com- article in Soviet Fleet, the official
nand retaliatory bases in the United
States. Soviet intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles now operational are too
few in number to be a serious threat
to all the SAC bases in the United
States. Calculations of missile prob-
ability of hitting and destruction at
this range indicate that six-instead
of two-Soviet intercontinental bal-
listic missiles would have to be fired
at each base to give a ninety per cent
probability of destruction.
If official estimates of Soviet pro-
duction of intercontinental missiles
are accurate, the threat will become
serious within two years and over-
whelming in three. The whole retali-
atory and deterrent capacity of SAC,
both overseas and at home, can be
wiped out by 1961 or 1962.
Quiet, Deep, and Deadly
There is also a real threat from sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles.
Marshal of the Soviet Air Force K. A.
Vershinin said in an interview Sep-
tember 8, 1957: "Submarines have
also become formidable weapons as
they can be used to shell coastal cities
and even other targets with rocket
weapons carrying atomic and hydro-
gen warheads." Admiral Hyman G.
Rickover declared last September 29:
"It is common knowledge that the
Soviets can now launch from their
submarines missiles with a range of
at least 200 miles. Before too long
missiles from submarines will reach
any target in the United States."
Earlier last year Rickover said he
newspaper of the Soviet Navy, as-
serted: "Submarines are armed with
rockets [ballistic missiles] with a fir-
ing range of 1,200 kilometers [about
745 miles] which can be launched
from subsurface and surface posi-
tions." This report can be given full
credence. It is not official propa-
ganda, since it was published in a
professional paper read by naval of-
ficers who would know if it were
false.
It has been well known for some
time that the Russians have had
submarine-launched solid-propellant
ballistic missiles. The one referred to
in Soviet Fleet is the Comet II. They
also have an operational ballistic
missile, towed in a container by a
submarine and capable of being
launched underwater. Its range is
about 400 miles. An experimental
missile of this type has a range of
more than 1,300 miles. Three of
them can be towed by a 1,500-ton
submarine. Such missiles are prob-
ably designed to be anchored in
place and fired by remote control.
The U.S. Navy has recently de-
classified an intelligence report to
the effect that the Soviet Union has
fifty ballistic-missile-firing subma-
rines. Another report from naval
sources stated that there had been a
thousand sightings of Soviet sub-
marines in three years in the western
Atlantic. Senator Jackson declared in
a press release last January 22: "Our
best military intelligence is that the
Russians have been working, on com-
prehensive radar charts of the Unit-
ed States coastlines. This means that
a Soviet submarine ^c3mmander will
January 8, 1959 13
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be able to surface 100 miles off the
American coastline, take radar fixes
for position and launch his missiles
with frightening accuracy." In addi-
tion there are reliable reports that
Soviet submarines are constantly on
station off the U.S. coastline, are reg-
ularly relieved, and occasionally
crews are exchanged.
The Russians have, according to
official naval statements, about five
hundred submarines, of which two
hundred to 250 are long-range ocean
types. The editors of Missiles and
Rockets stated in their October, 1957,
issue: "the Red Fleet uses Arctic
waters as a proving ground and test
range, and a large portion of the
submarine fleet is being equipped
for missile handling. These subma-
rines with IRBMs can do what the
ICBM is not yet ready to do."
In the face of such evidence, Sec-
retary of the Air Force James H.
Douglas told the Air Force Associa-
tion last October: "We know also
that the Soviets could be developing
ballistic missiles to launch from sub-
marines. Factual evidence in this area
is lacking." The President was asked
in April during a press conference
about reports that Soviet submarines
were reconnoitering American ter-
ritorial waters. He replied: "As a
matter of fact, I don't know what
has been stated. I don't know of any
facts that haven't been published.
But you are making a statement that
there is a, rather a campaign, along
our coasts. You'll_ have to get the
facts on that one because I haven't
any such facts." Rear Admiral Raw-
son Bennett, Chief of Naval Re-
search, testified before Congress in
1957, "At this point we are not in a
very rapid state of advance in anti-
submarine warfare."
Last August, the Underseas War-
fare Advisory Panel to the Military
Applications Committee of the ,Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic
Energy released a report that stated:
"The Soviets could mount a devas-
tating nuclear attack [from subma-
rines] against the United States early
in the 1960s;
"Our existing defenses could not
stop such a missile attack;
"No weapons system now in exist-
ence, even on an experimental basis,
offers an adequate defense against
non-snorkeling submarines which
run quiet and deep."
However, despite Senator Jack-
son's fears of their "frightening accu-
racy," ballistic missiles launched
from submarines are inherently in-
accurate. To the normal low degree
of accuracy of a long-range missile
they add the inaccuracy of location
of the ship's position and problems
of launching from an unstable plat-
form. (This is equally true of the
U.S. Navy's Polaris, of which one
submarine and fifteen missiles may
be operational in 1960 or later.) For
this reason, submarine-launched mis-
siles are not so serious a threat to
SAC bases in the United States as
land-based missiles are to our over-
seas bases. However, it can be ex-
pected that SAC bases near the coast
would be the object of attack by
Soviet missile-launching submarines.
McElroy Said It
The official conclusion from these
considerations, both in the Soviet
Union and in the United States, is
that bombers still are needed where
accuracy is essential. One B-52 can
carry twenty-five or more bombs,
each with an explosive yield equal
to that of the warhead of U.S. ballis-
tic missiles. It should be noted, how-
ever, that Soviet ballistic missiles,
with warheads of five-megaton ex-
plosive capacity, are three to five
times more powerful than compara-
ble U.S. missiles of the same type.
The rockets to carry these Soviet
warheads were designed before the
art of packing great nuclear explo-
sive power in small packages had
been perfected. The Soviet T-3 inter-
continental missile, for example, has
about twice the thrust of the U.S.
Atlas..
The United States has no opera-
tional intermediate or intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles, so bombers will
have to do the job if they can. They
are the preferred means of delivery
it they can make delivery. Whether
or not those that are left after a
missile attack are able to penetrate
to their target is the second vital
question that determines the extent
of the missile gap.
It is known that the Russians
lave developed an advanced air-
defense guided missile similar to the
U.S. Nike Hercules. It carries a nu-
clear warhead, has a range of about
a hundred miles, homes on the tar-
get by infrared, and is reported to
be able to outmaneuver any air-
plane. Its kills are reported as nine-
ty-eight per cent. The Russians are
known to be building a wholly new
air-defense system at a frantic rate.
This system, about twice as large as
that of the United States, uses radar
and computers similar to our SAGE
system. The Russians have two types
of Mach 1.9 interceptors (about 1,300
miles per hour) in operation-the
MIG-21 and the Sukhoi Delta, and
supersonic all-weather interceptors.
Their radar is reported to be supe-
rior to that used in the U.S. air-
defense system.
In testimony before the House
Appropriations Committee on No-
vember 20, 1957, in response to a
question about how long our bomb-
ers would be effective as a deterrent
-in other words, when would Soviet
air defenses neutralize them-Secre-
tary of Defense Neil H. McElroy
said: "I would believe that would
be true [that they could get through
Soviet air defenses] certainly for a
year, and I think, in my judgment,
it would be equally true two years
from now." Representative George
H. Mahon (D., Texas), who is briefed
on such matters, was less optimistic.
He said: "I have felt confident in
our position of mutual deterrence
(luring the past twelve months, but
I do not feel as confident about the
next two years as I have previously
felt...
r HE AIR FORCE has long been com-
rmitted to the thesis that the
bomber always gets through. But it
has never been up against anything
like guided air-defense missiles. It is
working frantically on counter-radar
measures, on decoy missiles, some in-
tercontinental and some carried by
bombers, on bomber-carried 600- to
800-mile ballistic missiles, on diver-
sionary tactics, on saturating the
control systems of the defense, and
finally on preliminary destruction of
the air defenses by missiles to clear
a relatively safe route.
Electronic countermeasures have
not lived up to the early hopes
placed in them. The ground elec-
tronic systems can shift frequency by
pressing a button, and can do so
much faster than the airplane equip-
ment can detect the new frequency
and jam it. Infrared homing devices
cannot be jammed by any known
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means. Bomber-launched ballistic
missiles will be even less accurate
than submarine-launched missiles
and of low yield. Decoy missiles, al-
though painted to give a radar re-
flection similar to the bomber, will
unquestionably be sorted out and
identified in time, just as is alumi-
num chaff (strips of aluminum foil
scattered through the air to confuse
radar trackers). The main hope at
present is saturation of the defenses
or their preliminary destruction.
Saturation, sending in more aircraft
from different directions than there
are control systems, means heavy
fosses, even though some get
through. Whether or not the air de-
lenses can be knocked out in advance
is unpredictable. But our bombers
will also have to meet and pass the
air-to-air guided missiles armed with
nuclear warheads that Soviet inter-
ceptor aircraft will hurl against them.
The most hopeful measures against
air defenses is to fly close to the
ground where radar is ineffective.
This uses fuel at an astronomical
rate, since current jet bombers are
built for flying at high altitudes.
Nevertheless, the Air Force has mod-
ified its B-47 fleet so that the medi-
um bombers can carry out what is
known as toss bombing-where the
bombers approach low, soar skyward
to hurl the bomb in a high trajec-
tory,, and then escape by getting back
close to the ground. There is a short
period in this maneuver, however,
when the bomber is a perfect target.
The modification of the B-47 has
not increased its low-altitude range,.
but has strengthened it to withstand
the bombing maneuver.
The effectiveness of modern air-
defense systems against manned
bombers probably cannot be de-
termined except in war. In the mean-
time, the bomber advocates are sure
they will get through, while the air-
'defense experts are equally, `certain
that losses will be so,great that the
bomber force will disa-hpear after -a
et weapons today make questionable
the wisdom of developing bomber
forces because the former are more
dependable and surer weapons. For
a rocket to fail to reach the target
is practically out of the question.-
None of the modern anti-aircraft
means are effective against them."
A Bird in the Bush
The United States has been busy for
three years counting its missiles be-
fore they are hatched. Atlas ICBM
has had two successful full-scale tests.
range along the Siberian coast to
distances of more than 3,000 miles.
The problems of accurate guidance
and nose-cone re-entry had not been
solved, but the propulsion problem
had. Late in 1956 the Russians
started testing their ICBM at the
missile range north of the Caspian
Sea, extending 4,500 miles to the
Kamchatka Peninsula. They have
made more than fifty test firings;
how many were successful full-scale
tests we do not know. When Khru-
shchev made his boast, the Russians
Thor IRBMs have also had two were undoubtedly ahead of where
successful full-scale tests; but even we are now, in missile development.
before they had any, one or more hac~ ?o- li the U S Y _ss}le program
been sent to Great Britain asoper- has had very great success after a
ational missiles, although it was esti- slow start, the production program
.. ... ........
mated that their reliability was con- has always been inadequate. Only
siderably less than fifty per cent. The twelve to fifteen intermediate squad-
Jupiter IRBM has had two success- rons, 200 to 250 missiles, were pro-
ful full-scale tests. Polaris has had no grammed. Only twenty interconti-
successful full-scale test. All our tests, nental squadrons were programmed,
except the two latest Thor tests, have fewer than 200 missiles. Half of
been fired by scientists and not by these ICBMs may be lost in the 1960
soldiers. In the last test of Jupiter, budget.
supposed to be the final test firing
of this missile by scientists, the OUR SIGHTS appear to have been
Jupiter blew up on its launching. set so low because of lack of
pad, so the scientists will have an- understanding of the nature of mis
:
ther go at it siles Artiller
has a reco
nized
4
e
y
g
range
In contrast to the U.S. t -rorce s In England, on April 23, 1956, of error and it is never hoped to hit
continuing faith in bombers, Soviet Khrushchev declared: "I am quite a target with one shot. Dozens may
Air Marshal Vershinin said in the sure that we will have a guided mis- have to be fired on a single target.
interrviewreviously c~uoted "Bomb- site. with a hydrogen warhead that Missiles are like artillery, only
ers arse, o course, s r being built. can fall anywhere in the world." their error is measured in miles,
[The Russians are building four in- Was this an idle boast? Intellr ratTer than _ yards. In preparing to
tercofl qLh.] gence since then indicates that it retrieve the Atlas warhead after its
emphasis on making them. But rock- their ICBMs in the northern missile about thirty miles in diameter was
January 8, 1959 15
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watched. This indicates an estimated
circular probable error of fifteen
miles' radius. The reported Soviet
error for 5,000 miles is ten miles.
But the point is that to ensure hit-
ting a target with Atlas, or any other
long-range, missile, a number of
shots, or a salvo-the numbers needed
being dependent upon the expected
error, the size of the burst, and the
extent of the target-is required.
Considering the low degree of ac-
curacy and the unreliability of the
U.S. intercontinental missiles, our
twenty squadrons would give us,
when we have them, a chance at
about twenty targets. With the in-
termediate-range missile, our twelve
or fifteen squadrons would give us
perhaps thirty or forty targets. A
Polaris submarine, with fifteen mis-
siles of still lower accuracy, could
take on two or three targets.
The argument made by those who
are satisfied with or who justify these
programs is that solid-propellant
rockets, the Minuteman and the
land-based version of Polaris, will
be coming in soon. But no one re-
ally knows how soon. The problems
involved. in getting satisfactory com-
bustion with chunks of solid propel-
lant eight and more feet in diameter
are far from solved. General LeMay
said August 23 that the Minuteman
"is at least several years from being
a fact, but research and develop-
ment. leading to this system is well
on its way." But in the meantime
production orders on other missiles
has been limited. The United States
is letting go a bird in the hand for a
bird in the bush.
r~ WIIAT IS NEEDED now to start clos-
ing the missile gap, a gap that
currently is widening, is to build sev-
eral times more than are now planned
of the missiles that already have been
developed and are in early produc-
tion--the Jupiter and Thor IRBMs
and the Atlas and Titan ICBMs. It is
surprising that although the hard-
ened missile pads now planned for
these missiles cost two-thirds as
much as the missiles themselves, no
reserve missiles are being provided
that can be fired after the first ones
have been used. It is like putting a
cannon into battle line with only one
shell for it to fire. Behind this pecu-
liar planning are such reasons as
economy in defense, unwillingness to
spend on weapons'that soon may be-
come obsolete, slowness in accepting
the awful mathematics of missiles
and evaluating their effect on strat-
egy, and, most important of all, the
unwillingness of top civilian officials
of the government to accept incon-
testable intelligence reports of Soviet
advances.
Recent successful developmental
tests of our ballistic missiles indicate
that the hard work and expenditures
of the past three years are be-
ginning to pay off. But these tests
should not blind its to the fact that
it's going to be a long time before we
have an adequate number of opera-
tional ballistic missiles.
The missile gap need not neces-
sarily mean war. But when the
Communists are certain that the West
is too weak and confused to stand
against them, crises caused by Com-
munist pressures all over the world
may be expected to succeed each
other in orderly procession as Com-
munist expansion moves ahead.
The sham Battle 'over `Spending'
' t tq + ord the extravagance of thrift and drill?
TIIE PRESIDENT has announced that
he will devote his remaining
years in the White House to a cam-
paign against government spending.
To prove that this is not an idle
threat, the directives have gone out
to the departments to slash their
budget estimates and the usual ex-
penditures ceiling has been slapped
on the Defense Department, throw-
ing the procurement of military hard-
ware into the customary turmoil and
confusion. The Democratic Jeaders,
still smarting under the Presiderlt's
campaign rhetoric, have announced
that they are not "spenders" either,
and that when the budget comes to
Capitol Hill they will slash it as they
have before. The stage is thus set for
great yearly spectacle of the econ-
omy drive-and this when the coun-
try is still not entirely out of the re-
cession doldrums, the Soviets are
pulling ahead of us in armament and
initiative, and our unmet needs for
every form of public improvement,
from schools to roads, cry out for
more, not less, public spending.
Only the' naive, however, would
conclude from all this-or even from
the ]President's statement that he will
present a balanced budget of about
_77 billion-that Federal expendi-
ture will be cut substantially. After
the ceremonial struggle has been
staged, the budget and the rate of
spending will remain about the same.
Still unanswered will be the question
of whether this result is good enough
for what the nation needs. Yet it is
of the reatest urgency that a full-
scae debate 1e started on one of the
most fundamental issues of our time:
the forniulatiot}-o(,an adequate,
sensible, and long-range policy of
public spending.
IN SPITE OF all the ritual exorcising,
the Federal budget rises steadily.
Its rate of increase is generally great-
er than the rise in the price level.
The press and the higher levels of
government profess to regard this
tendency with indignation, even with
horror, as if, jt were a nervous clis-
order .tfrat' could. be, cured -by will
power and moral preaching.
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