STATEMENT BY GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 27, 1957

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CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7
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RIFPUB
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K
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10
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December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 20, 2013
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24
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Publication Date: 
February 27, 1957
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MISC
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7! Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 STATMENT BY GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR CH.LEt OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 27, 1957 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 ER. CHAIRMkli, AND MEEBERS OF TRE COMMITTEE: I appreciate tnc opportunity of meeting with you again this yeare Secretary Brucker has already diEcusF>cd some of the important programs upon which the growth and progress of the Army depend. I Should like to extend his discussion and develop in some detail the characteristics of the Army which we will have by the end,of Fiscal Year 1958 with the recommended budget of 9.721 billion dollars. I hope to demonstrate that FY 19c8will be a most important period in which the Army expects to effect major changes in organization, tactics, and weapons!. he change in weapons uill occasion a major shift to surface-to-surface and surface to- air missiles, both with warheads of great destructive capacity. The Army budget for FY 1958 will procure an Army of a million men con- sisting'of 17 reOrganized divisions, 9 regiments or regimental combat teams, several atomic support commands, and an increased number of missile antiaircraft battalions* This force has been developed in consistence with the view that the Army's primary purpose is to provide deterrent strength for the prevention of war, Every element'has*been scrutinized to determine that it does in fact contribUte to the Armyls ability to prevent warp either large or small, in conjunction with the means available to our. sister Services*, I would like to relate proposed Amer forces in their relatien,to the over- all deterrent role of the Army. Our deterrent forces are divided into five categories* The first of these is our overseas deployments consisting of eight divisions, supporting antiaircraft batte1leus and surface-to-surface missile battalions equipped with atomic-capable weapons. The second category of forces are thope of the Army Strategic Reserve in the United States. These are the forces eaemerked for prompt response to local Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 aggression anywhere in the world or to reinforce our overseas deployments in case of general war. They amount to nine divisions with atomic-capable sup- porting units 4 The third category of our deterrent Army forces are those antiaircraft units assigned to the air defense of the continental United States. The fourth category of forces are those of the National Guard and Army Reserve. The present budget is predicated upon a strength of about 400,000 for the National Guard and 300,000 for the Anny Reserve. Next August, as you know, Selective Service men upon the completion of their active duty will be required by law to join the Army Reserve or the National Guard. Likewise, ae-you-Inew all volunteers for the National Guard will be required after 1 April 1957 to take a period of active duty training. Both of these factors should in time add materially to the effectiveness of our reserve farces. The fifth category is the Army's contribution to deterrence through the training of allied forces. Although the number of personnel in this. category is not large, approximately 6,000, the end result, namelyithei. improved readiness of over 200 allied divisions, representlia signifioarit ? contribution to the deterrence of war in areas where otherwise military weakness might encourage aggression. The total of these forces contributing directly to deterrence represents approximately 67 per cent of the Army's uniformed personnel and approximately 58 per cent of its dollar budget. We must have behind these forces a strong 2 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 zepport babe in the continental United States represented by activities in such diverelfied fields as logistics, research and development, command and administration? Without attempting to break out these many heterogeneous activitiee, I would point out that their requirements represent about 33 per cent of our military manpower and approximately 42 per cent of our dollars* Let me now show the principal differences between the Army of FY 1957 and FY 1958. The reduction of two divisions requires explanation. The Army this year has had an actual strength of about 1,C00,000 men with which it has maintained a 19-division structure. We have found that it is impossible with this manpower to maintain the level of strength in the units of the StrategiclReserve essential to its role'of a mobile, combat-ready force* Not only have some of these divisions been under strength but many of them have eeen required to engage in recruit training at the expenwe of their etrategic mission. Another reason for the reduction in the number of divisions was to permit the formation of atomic support commands and additional missile unite* The otructural composition of an Army calls for a careful consideration of roP.17 factors including personnel strength available, types and numbers cf units supportable by that strength, and weapons systems ready for use lie have given the closest attention to these factors in arriving at:sthe-FY 58 structuve which, in my judgment, is conaiderably more effective :than that of the current year,' ,50 much for the unit structure of the Army at the end of Fiscal 19580 I would now like to say a few words about some steps we are taking to improve the Army. The first and perhaps most important is the major reorganization 3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 of, the Armygs main combat forces -- the infantry, airborne, and to a lesser extent, the armored divisions. The purpose a the reorganization is to improve our ability to fight effectively under conditions of atomic warfare without loss of capability to conduct so-called conventional warfare. The organization of our proposed divisions has been based upon four' principles: First" ready adaptability to the requirements of the atomic battle- field. Second, the pooling in higher echelons of equipment not habitually required -1.n the division. Third, recognition of the increased span of control which is pocsible through modern signal. communications. And fourth, adaptability to the integration of new and better materiel as it is deve/Oped. I visualize that the atomic battlefield of the future will have much greater breadth and depth than battlefields of the past. There will probably be a checkerboard disposition of units with considerable gaps between combat elements. Consequently, all Army units must be trained for all-around combat in the same way that we trained and fought our airborne divisions in 'World War II. The problem of the ground commander will be to find the enemy, to determine his configuration, and then to destroy him by directing atomic fire upon him, using his own organic weapons or calling down the fire of distant missiles deployed to the rear. Thereafter, the commander will need instant mobility to exploit the effects of this destructive fire. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 The nee divisions are designed to facilitate the accomplishment of these arduous tasks insofar as organizational patterns can assiste The organic equipment of a division should consist of that habitually needed in agy likely theater of operations, 'Equipment needed only inter? mittent'iy or only in a specific geographical area should not be assigned to the division but should be pooled in reserve behind the division, Adhc.rence to this principle in the new divisions has resulted in considerable economy and inereased effectiveness in the use of equipment, Modern signal equipment permits a commander to contrel a larger number of subordinate units ;than the three which are standard under the present triangular eenceptt In the new taken five eubordinate units as airborne and infantry divisions s we have a reasonable step forward in extending the eran of couteole This action permits the elimination of one echelon of headquarters with a conseqpent econoey in personnel overhead, Finally; in Shaping these new divisions9 we have intluded a capacity for abeorbine Progressively the new weapons which we expect to emerge in the neet few years, In the interim we will equip our divisions with the best meaoone available while we expedite the development and production of the optimum tepee, Now let us take a look at the organization of the new divisions, CURRENT INFAN1RY DIVISION Permit me to remind you of the organization of our present divisions, The infantry division halt., a strength of about 17,500e It contains three infantry regiments and four battalions of field artillery* AMOR Our current airborne division is organized epsentially like the infantry 5 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 division. When moved by air, much of its -heavy equipment and manpower must remain behl.nd. We now have a truly airborne division in the 101st at Forts Campbell: Kentucky which Is completely air transportable. With an approximate strength of 11,500, rather than the 17:087 of the present airborno division, the major features of the new division are 2 Five combat groups as opposed to the Conventional three. Each combat group has a headquarters company, a mortar battery, and five rifle companies. A major reorganization 'of the division artillery has been accomplished, It now contains an atomic-capable HONEST JCAIN rocket battery and five batteries of 105mm artillery* DIKANTRY Nows let us examine the new infantry dirision. The strength of this division is approximately 13,800, again in comparison with the 17,500 of the present division.. The infantry regiments, of which these are five, are 'admin rl stratively self-contained, air-transportable units organized essentially like the groines in the airborne division* The division retains its tank battalion, but the regiments lose their tank companies. A reconnaissance battalion has replaced the current reconnaissance compare-, in consideration of the Ixegency of finding targets in order to employ fully the division's nuclear firepower. The artillery is completely reorganized to include an atomic capability built around available weapons. AMMO Now, a word cm the structure of the armored division. The current division, by virtue of its armor protected mobility, and its favorable 6 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 firepower-to-manpower ratio is well suited for the mobile, dispersed typo warfare we envision for ,the future. However, there is a need for sone modernization in the artillery. The approximate strength of the new division is 14,6000 contrasted with the 140633 of the present division. As in the case of the airborne and infantry divisions the armored division has been eqvipped with the HONEST JOHN rocket and the division's target discovery capability has been increased by adding air and ground reconnaissancejunits. The mw infantry and airborne divisions have the following advantages over their older counterpartsg a. Increased front line fighting strength. b. Increased mobility through aviation and personnel carriers. Reduced tank strength and antiaircraft weapons. d. Atomic capability in the artillery* e, Reduced number of vehicles. f. Improved firepower. I should express a word of warning in regard to the implication that this reorganization of the division will reduce the Army's over-alI personnel requirements. It is true that the divisional strength will go down; however, there are some offsetting factors. First, by taking out those elements which are not habitually employed at division leVelg it becomes necessary to pool some of these elements such as antiaircraft artillery, motor transport, and armor at higher levels. Secondly, new weapons throughout the Army are becoming more complicated and are creating a need for new types and quantities of service support. Thirdly, as the Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 logistical system is dispersed to reduce it vulnerability to nuclear fire, more units and more people are requiredto operate its small, scattered supply installations Finally, other personnel savings resulting from the divisional reorganization will be used in the newly designated atomic support commands, MODERNIZATION In developing the forces for 1958 we have tried to retain an ap- propriate balance between personnel, unit structure, and the modernization of equipment. I have discussed the first two factors and would now like to talk about modernization. he Fiscal Year 1958 programs permit continued modernization in terms of guided missiles, aircraft, and selected items of high priority conventional equipment. These new weapons and equipment will receive over 80 per cent of our produrement funds With respect to Army aviation, the Fiscal Year 1958 budget represents a continuing effort to improve battlefield mobility. We are not programming aircraft for:mbilization reserves, but are providing for the minimum training:!requirements for reserve units. CONCLUSION '41 In closing, let me summarize the progress which I anticipate for. the Army under the proposed FY 58 budget. The Army will enhance its combat readiness and hence its deterrent capability by the reorganization of its divisions, by the introduction of atomic support commands, and by the improved readiness of the Army Strategic Reserve. It will continue the modernization of its equipment particularly in the missile field. Its reserve forces should improve in quality through the further implementation 8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7 of the 'Aeserve Forces Act and related actionst The price of this progress is expressed in the FY 58 budget as recommended by the Department of Defense, -END- 9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/20: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100260024-7