PLANNING BOARD COMMENTS ON COYNE REPORT RE DICLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION ABOARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00357R000100060025-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 19, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI
SUBJECT
19 August 1959
Planning Board Comments on Coyne Report re
Disclosure of Classified Military Information
Abroad
I. There may be a good deal more to this apparently innocuous
problem from the Agency standpoint than meets the eye. As I
understand it our interest in this report springs from three sources.
a. DCIls authority under paragraph 4 d of MSC ID 1
to disseminate national and interdepartmental intelligence
toT foreign governments and international bodies with
concurrence of USIB. As I understand it the exchange of
letters with the Secretaries of State and Defense in 1958
(IAC-D-115/2) in which State and Defense agree not to
exercise their SD-MICC authority with respect to classified
military information containing national and interdepartmental
intelligence further clarifies our position.
b. Under MSCID 5 CIA has certain responsibilities for
counter intelligence liaison abroad and maintaining certain
counter intelligence capabilities which cannot be divorced
from the policies and practices of sr.iacc. a is anxious
that aey expansion of SD-MICC responsibilities not infringe
upon these.
c. We are apparently having a problem with AEC and Defense
over transmission of MII material for intelligence purpose:A
by CIA. We got the Alt act amended last year to permit us to
be the transmission agent but have since been unable to reach
agreement with AEC anii DOD on procedure3 for doing this (see
comment below).
2. Ihen.I queried Pat Coyne as to whether there was any
intention in his report to question our responsibilities he assured
me that there was not Bence in order to protect our position I
got a general demur inserted in the Planning Board comment where it
appears as paragraph 5 c.
,__Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100060025-8
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3. However, AEC has apparently raised questions about this
.4111* querying in effect 'whether NSCID 1 is applicable 'where
RD matters are concerned. As Pat Coyne puts it, Charlie Reichardt
kept waltzing around the question of whether under NSCID 1 the
intelligence community could release RD data. Hence, DCI better
be briefed on this problem before BSC. The AEC reservation in the
Planning Board comment appears in 1-(g) under paragraph 3.
4. With respect to Coyne's recommendation that State and
Defense prepare a comprehensive restatement of military information
release policy (paragraph 5 b of Planning Board recommendations),
we can hardly object to this but must be on our guard against any
infringement of our responsibilities in the restatement. Hence
I suggest rewording Paragraph 5 bs line 2 to substitute "consulting
as appropriate" with DCI for "after appropriate consultation"
with DCI. Also it seems preferable that the policy statement be
sent to the BSC for consideration rather than just information.
5. Jack Warner has made the very interesting suggestion that
we seek to have the comprehensive restatement of SD-UICC policy
include RD, thus giving us additional leverage. This may have
considerable merit, though I am not sure that substituting SD-
UICC for AEC as our antagonist on RD matters would improve things
any. However, if SD-HICC assumed the responsibility for RD
perhaps the intelligence transmission of RD would come under the
exception procedure of NSCID 1.
R. W. KOMER
ODDIFRWK:its
Distribution:
orig - DDI
1 - Leg Counseli---/
1 - Dir of Security
1 - Chief, CI Staff
1 - AD/SI
1 - RK Cbrono
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/01: CIA-RDP61-00357R000100060025-8