OPERATION ALERT 1957 D I A R Y

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP60-00346R000100350003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 15, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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OPERATION ALERT 1957
D I A. R Y
15 Jule 1957
An initial assemblage of the DD/I personnel was held at 1100
hours to brief the participants on the administrative aspects of
their stay at the Relocation Center.
At 1300 hours the entire CIA contingent convened in the DD/I
Area to hear presentations by the Senior idar Planners of the three
Deputy Directors. Comrianding Officer of the
CIA Relocation Center, welcomed the group. He also described the
two principal ;:fissions of the Center; namely, to maintain a state
of readiness to take care of 650 persons at all times, and to pro-
vide a RecordsCenter, a Vital Materials Center, and a Communications
Training Center as a regular order of business.
25X1A9a
CIA Emergency Planning Officer, dis-
cusse e I emergency plan. He pointed out that relocation
planning was necessary to enable the Agency to stay in business in
case of war. The present concept of operation is based on a force
of 602 people. However, we_are presently considering a plan in
which all surviving Agency personnel would-be members of the emer-
gency team. An additional relocation site or sites are also under
25X1A9a study. The present site rya be expanded to accomr;iodate 1500 to
2000 persons, also stressed the importance of the
Vital Materials grogram.
Special Assistant for Planning, DD/S,
discussed the problems of support planning to prepare for wartime
operation. He pointed out that all such planning must be related
J.
one or more of the following four categories -- men, money,
materiel, and services. In order to know the necessary future
planning, the sup-port elements of the Agency must know the require-
ments of the Agency.
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, assistant to the DD/I (Planning), discussed
the wartime mission of the DD/I. He pointed out that the production
of intelligence will be the DD/Its principal function in wartime
as in peacetime, In addition to this responsibility, the DD/I will
man the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence component of the
CIA Field Commands. DD/I planning has been'carried out under the
following four assumptions of type of war:
a. All out total war with nuclear exchange of not more
than 30 days duration.
b. The so--called "broken back" war, which starts out as
a nuclear exchange and then deteriorates to conventional war.
C. The conventional war, which
eventually spreads geographically and intensifies to
nuclear exchange.
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d, The strictly conventional war from start to finish.
16 July 11057
cussed national estimating in wartime according to the following
outline;
Chief of the Estimates staff ONE di --
ONE turns out estirra tee that take over a year to prepare
and some that are prepared in six or eight hours. Their program
has to be quite flexible. The all important thing, from ONE's
point of view, is coordinating estimates. Iith the help of other
offices, ONE can produce estimates in wartime but the question of
coordinating them is the problem. One coordinated estimate is worth
a thousand estimates that do not represent the views of the entire
intelligence community. In a wartime situation there would be the
problem of communications Faith the I!!C argencies to consider.
1. What are we going to do in a wartime situation
We are going to do what the N" C tells us to do. We
will be working directly j:cr them. ONE will try to
anticipate their needs.
2. What sort of things will the N%TC needs
Coordinated estimates. Merger of political,
economic and military factors. The major link in any
given situation. In wartime :situation it will be very
important that we have iational Intelligence Estimates
speaking to these situations.
NIE's will change in character to be more pointed to the
immediate situation.
Exanm le 5
a. Likelihood of neutrals to enter war.
b. Liklihood of se?:,arate peace.
c. Reaction of USSR to certain peace overtures.
d. What will be the shape of the world at the
end of hostilities'
ONE will require close support from 0R, OCI and OOI.
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3. How are we organized to do this job'
a. Board
b, Staff
ONE Is smallness of size is an asset. A roster of alumni of the
organization would be useful in order to call on these people to
come back{to help in wartime.
ONE will operate as follows:
The DCI, NEC, other components of the Agency, etc.,
reque2t an estimate.
1. Terms of Deference--not necessary in wartime
situation. Give scope briefly would be sufficient.
2. Contributions from IAC agencies..-in wartime
situation these contributions may be oral; informal.
3. Draft--necessary in wartime situation, However,
it may be shorter and sharper.
25X1A9a 4. Final.
Special Assistant to the AD/BI, talked
on the use of Basic Intelligence in wartime.according to the
following outline!
1. In peacetime
The NIS Program operates on the basis that the US Govern-
ment must have the fundamental information on all subjects and on all
areas of the world ready for immediate use in event of war. At prosant,
over 60% world coverage has been completed, and the amount of coverage
is steadily increasing under priorities for production established
by the JCS. The NIS Program is a broad, interagency activity that
taps the intelligence-producing capabilities not only throughout the
I.&C but in certain non-I'?C agencies, such as the Bureau of ti-ines in
Interior, as well. The NIS Committee, chaired by the AD/BI, is a
subcommittee of the IAC and includes members from State, lrmy, Navy
and Air Force,
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The Published i??IS units -- which now number over 3,700 --
represent only a part of the total contribution made by the NIS
Program. Under the stimulation of the program, all contributing
agencies have collected, collated, and produced basic intelligence
data in a uniform and coherent pattern. These files assembled under
the need for NIS production represent a vast reservoir of informa-
tion available immediately to all departments at the outset of
hostilities.
2. Wartime mission and functions
The OBI concept is that the HS Program, operating under
the direction of the interagency NIS Committee as at present, is
the proper and most effective instrument to coordinate the production
of basic intelligence required by the Government in the event of a
global ware
The entire NIS mechanism -- the NIS Committee, the inter-
agency allocation of collection and production responsibilities,
the backlog of departmental experience in the production of national
basic intelligence, and the experienced staff in OBI--- will be
available for use as the most efficient channel through which to
direct and secure response to strategic and high-level operational
requirements for basic intelligence. The NIS Committee can, by
extension of its day-to-day peacetime activities, immediately
translate requirements for special wartime basic intelligence into
coherent production schedules organized according to the particular
governmental componont with the greatest competence to furnish the
desired information. In other words, the TIS mechanism can generate
a maximum of interagency capabilities with a minimum of interagency
communications,
Establishing communications , ith the other hI Commmittee
members will be the first requirement following relocation.
Another immediate problem which would face 0-!I in event
of war would be emergency printing facilities. OBI has begun arrange-
ments to have printing establishments outside the .bashington area
listed to aid in printing the NIS in wartime.
3. Summary
a. The NIS Program will have ready for immediate use
in event of war a large and growing body of published basic intelli-
gence disseminated throughout the Government and at major commands,
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b, The NIS mechanism as it exists during peacetime
would continue to operate in a wartime situation;,
25X1A9a
, both of the Office
of Operations,talked about overt collection in wartime. according to
the following outline:
The current operation was explained and how it would be
modified in wartime, Now 2,000 foreign radio stations in operation.
Monitors foreign broadcasts and exploits them for intelligence value.
In addition to radio monitoring, they review foreign press. Head-
quarters for operation is Washington, D. C., with 10 field stations:
2 domestic and 8 foreign.
Additional responsibilities for this operation in wartime will
1. Provide intelligence community with prompt intelligence
of enemy communique, news and propaganda,
2, Su-,port theater plans through monitoring prropaganda.
3. Provide mobile monitoring units
, Increase propaganda analysis,
5. Provide support to Agency charged with putting out
information to the American people
6. Conduct operation of overseas stations -- do not
contemplate change in command (that is will not be taken over
by theater corm,land).
In wartime would need stations in North iifrica, NE `turkey.
Pakistan, Thailand, and one trore in the far North ?-- _ lasl.a or
Greenland. Need plans for evacuation of their people overseas.
25X1A9a
, Chief, Services Division, ORR, discussed
economic intelligence in wartime.according to the following outline;
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1. Peacetime ca?)abi.lities
Economic Research Area has about 400 people, with primary
responsibility in the Intelligence Community for the analyzing of
economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
2. Wartime plans
Economic Lesearch Area will continue to carry out production
and coordination of economic intelligence with effort directed primarily
to the Sino-`soviet Bloc. Will be concerned almost entirely with
current reporting and appraisal of events in the Sino--`soviet Area;
status of civilians; "damage assessment."
Current sup-port will be given in four ways:
a. Through National Intelligence Estimates
b. Through Current Intelligence Center
c. Through DD/I and DCI to the NSC
d. Through a-,. propria-te sections of the Office of
the `secretary of Defense.
It is expected that during, the initial phase, a substantial
number of conflicting reports will be received, `,Ie will be required
to sort out the fact from fiction and to evaluate them. Coordination
on an interagency basis (through EIC) will be a very important part.
Long-range plans
Economic Research Area has one plan which must be flexible,
Principal personnel changes anticipated-,
'ersonnel will be reallocated to perform priority
tasks. Increa..-es would be mainly military. It is an-
ticipated that an increase of a~)-')roxi ante 3,y 90~ would
be required. The size of the ,SIC would require con-
25X1A9a iderable augmentation.
as the CIA iember of the Planning Committee for
Economic Warfare, ODM, talked about economic warfare support by
ORR according to the following outline-
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Economic warfare is the ?rocess of developing and implementing
a program for the reduction of enemy war potential by the limitation
of his foreign sources of economic supply.
Modern economy is an exceedingly com>lex a)-;,aratus consisting
of a wide range of exchanges of raw materials and of an
elaborate mechanism oi' exchange involving transport and credit
documents. This mechanism is indispensible to the consummation
of the movements and susceptible to hnotrledge and intercept by an
effective-collection process.
The assets existing in the Agency include the Trade Controls
Branch in the Services Division of the Economic Research Area.
Four avenues of approach showing the status of our war planning
situation are:
1. Indigenous (ORR/ERA) plans for general economic warfare
support
2. Participation in organizational planning for Emergency
Agency on Economic Warfare
3. Coordination of intelligence support program through ERIC,
and
4. Development of control channels for effective receipt and
dissemination of information available under emergency con-
ditions.
The function of the ORR/CIA support for economic warfare is to.
1. Provide intelligence essential to the establishment and
enforcement of
a. Controls over exports
b. Controls over the ;aovement of shies and aircraft
c. Foreign exchange and asset controls
d. Par trade agreements
2. Provide current information on individuals and organi?.,a-
tions which!
a. Have violated security controls, or
b. day perform unfriendly acts.
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3.
!. rovide economic intelligence u ono t for;
a.
b.
c.
1pplication of military measures against economic
targets
Sabotage, and
Prevention of enemy exorts.
Lt..
Provide intelligence on Sino-r.oviet Bloc external
economic operations.
The intelligence support function for economic warfare is in
large part in place at the present time and is engaged in the produc-
tion of intelligence which would be of direct use in c~uiclsly imple-
menting an emergency prograr;l of economic warfai?e. ' e must preserve
flexibility of these war plans to reflect changes in the Agency in
case of war.
25X1A9a
,special Assistant to the Chief,
Geographic Research, OR?R, described the role of geographic intelli-
gence in wartime according to the following outline;
The Geographic Research Ara (GR,I) is co.-,nosed of four sub-
activities- (1) geographic analysis; (2) cartographic production;
(3) photo interpretations and (LG) man procurement and reference. Tay
nature of its data, geograchic intelligence is strongly concerned.with
su pport of operational and :atracegic planning, but has considerable
use in support of policy determinction, estima tes, and current rei. ort-
ing. The organization and techniques of geographic intelligence as
we accept them now were established primarily on the basis of ex-
perience in World 11'ar II. The growth and development of the geo-
gra-4 hic intelligence effort in Washington and in the field was dis-
cussed. Experience in ` orld `i: ar II established ::our desirable
features for geop;raphic intelligence operations
1. Should be a team activity
2. Should iiieke intensive use of -photo interp,)retacion
C.
3. Should maintain capability to apply efforts on a
world-,,Tide basis to a wide ran ,e of requirements
L . ;';ould coordinate closely ,Tith other geogra hic
r
elements of co.munity in procurement. and utilization
of files.
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GPI. presently organized to irrcerate these lour activities
as follow:rso
1. Geogra;)hy Division
a. regional anal,,,--.is
b. border Ind route studies
c. urban area analysis
d. unconventional warfare, escape and evasion, and
targeting
e. renort+_n of trends and developments
2. Cartographer 'Di-ri,-ion -_ s,.)ecia.l subject maps
3. Photo Intelligence Division -_. photo interpretation
support
4. iad Librar ~ Division
a. map procurement
b. i %enc;y and community reference service related to
intelligence
War Plan for. GRLA
Practically no change from .)resent m _ssion. mince specific
types of sup,-.ort are difficult to estimate, G'_?,P_ approach to war
plan emphasizes flexibility and widening of capabilities of staff.
3,, e anticipate an immediate and heavy load, primarily in support of
special operations. We would envision field support, under DD/P,
by already experienced field teams of geographic intelligence per-
sonnel.
At Headquarters initially,
1. support of evaluations of current situations
2. support of requests for spot area analysis
3. assistance from Map Reference service
Next stage:
1. rapid and concurrent increase in requests for
photo interpretation
2. cartographic services
3. geographic intelligence support to targeting
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4. unconventional warfare
5. escape and evasion
6. economic research requirements
Finally,-
1. establishment of map collection teams in field
commands
2. prepare special teams of geographic intelligence
and service personnel
Wartime Situation Build-un)
Personnel increase of about 40,?,, will be necessary (ex-
cluding Photo Intelligence Division). Photo Intelligence
Divisionts estimated increase is 300%.
Summary
Widen range of capabilities, but heavy focus inevitable
on operational support.
Essential to place that support where request originates.
Recognize problem of size of Relocation Center -- seek
alternate quarters for the longer war.
25X1B4d
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17 July 1957
Deputy Assistant Director for roduction, OS1,
discussed scientific intelligence in wartime according to the
following outline:
Definitions
1. Scientific intelligence
a. study of foreign scientific capabilities
b. applic:_ tion of science to the :Process of intelligence
2. Technical Intelligence
The study and description of existing foreign materiel
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Functions in Wartime
1."hort, all-out nuclear war (6o to 120 days)
Join others in the community in just trying to survive.
Nainly concerned with technical intelligence
2. Long', drawn--out conflict
Steps:
a. get _'orce to relocation site, with as many necessary
documents on hand as possible end analysts capable
of working on own
b. plan for gradual assumption of liaison relations
with other agencies
establishment of connection with various ex-
ploitation centers
d. maintenance of relations with research and develop-
ment components in military agencies
e. establish relations 1,rith key scientists.
Types ,of Dam.ands-Anticipated:
a. assessment of enemy status
b. bomb damage assessment
c. military planning (e.g., air defense system)
Probable Types of Production:
a. contribution to NIE's
b. increase of activity in current intelligence
c. evaluation of information for DDI and DCI
d. self-initiated reports
e. some detailed studies -- research and development
type of thing
f. feasibility study on getting information
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a. some to various types of exploitation in field
and at home
b. to evaluating of material
c. liaison activities -- relationships ;v-ith other
agencies
d. joint studies with military agencies.
25X1A9a
Chief of the Nuclear Energy Division,
OSI, spoke on ec is intelligence in wartime according to the
following outline;
In covering technical. intelligence, there are two basic
things to consider:
1. 'What subject in terms of military equipment and
weapons systems we are concerned with.
2. hat type of intelligence work we would have to
perform.
In a hot war, scientific and technical intelligence comes into
its otivn. Technical intelligence is concerned w with hardware--
character, design, and methods of production.
Technical intelligence is primarily the responsibility
of the services in time of peace and war.
CIA's responsibilities in technical intelligence:
1. In CL'! we have, in large measure, all aspects of
scientific intelligence, and good expertise on them.
2. Our technical intelligence responsibilities.
a. National Intelligence Estimates, etc.
b. large measure proposes departmental intelligence
0.
The hard core of scientific intelligence continues, but would
automatically switch to technical intelligence in -a-artime.,
because of:
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1. Our responsibilities in the field as they evolve
during wartime
2. Experience from World War II and Korea
3? Impact or type of war in which we are engaged
(short duration or long term).
Various sides to be considered by scientific intelligence are:
1. Evaluation side--putting together information that
would help us counteract some of their weapons and
equipment. Support judgment on these subjects.
2. Collection side--directing collection toward the
above problems. Outlined what roles would be
played by the following fields a
a. Nuclear Energy
b. Guided TIissiles--collecting information
here and overseas
c. Electronics--in all weapons systems
d. BW/CVV--has it been used? Will they use it?
Technical Threats.
e. Conventional military equipment--not much work
in this field unless it is a long war.
Summary
In 'wartime situation, OSI will evolve technical intelligence
expertise to bring to bear on this problem. They have to get things
going (a) technical teams set up; (b) pilot interrogations; (c) guid-
ing clandestine activities in Agency; and (d) follow-up to getting
technical teams in.
, Chief, Planning Staff, OCI, discussed
current intelligence in wartime. He pointed out that there were
two major problems in this connections (a) a need to put out more
intelligence on a current basis, and (b) how adequately to coordinate
this production. To meet these problems he said that the four main
criteria were.
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1,. "Nhere the information comes from in time of war
2. When the information ceases to be current intelligence
3. 'Vho sees this intelligence
la.. that will be the production hazards we will have to face.
He then discussed the current intelligence annex to the Global
War Plan for the DD/I J.rea.
25X1A9a
spoke on the war room and support
therefor, according to the following outline.
quoted from a letter which had been sent
from r. Beach at the Vihite House as follows: " ..furnish assist-
ance to providing "Situation Room" in the '.hhhhite House... OCI to
provide current intelligence data as need for this "Situation Room."
Criteria for "Situation Room" (two were established. one
in Nhite House and one in White House Relocation Center);
1. Space available
2. Room not to be elaborate
3. except under emergency situations, the President
would be briefed in his office -- this room a
stand-by operation
4. Support for room with o-L'her IAC chiefs--Joint Chiefs
of Staff from Pentagon
5? Room to be completed by Operation Alert 1957,
20 July 1957.
The President's Naval Aide is responsible for briefing the
President. "Situation Room" is run on 24 hour a day basis in
the White House.
Problems involved (at Relocation Center):
1. Briefer' s lifeline is by wire with outside world
2. Background information provided in each briefing
room (for briefer)
3. Staffing on 2L hour basis
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Physical facilities:
1. Macs -- CIA and JCS consider present maps sufficient
2. "View-graph" -- for JCS briefer
3. Communications equipment
Cartographic supports Section in OCI. Also receive
support from ORR and, in fact, the whole government
are on call.
The Central Support Services in Wartime to be provided by ORR 25X1A9a
and OCR was the subject of presentations b Chief,
Liaison Division, OCR, and of ORR. 25X1A9a
presentation was as outlined belowe
Support services to be rendered by OCR
that the capabilities are in the event of an emergency
situation
Documents Division
Central point in the 1-,gency which receives, codes,, indexes,
and disseminates all intelligence documents from outside
agencies as well as CIA-produced reaaorts. TS control.
Determination of release of CIA documents to outside
offices and overseas areas.
Cable Center (also part of Documents Division above)
Focal point for receiving and dissemination of all
non-CIA cables. Maintenance of a complete file of the
current cables received by the Agency.
Liaison Division
Process and coordinate collection requirements which call
for action in the field.
Collection of information that might have intelligence
significance from non-Iz~LC agencies.
To establish and maintain operational relations with other
agencies in the US Government.
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That there is an organization in existence which, in case
of emergency, can obtain the material necessary to the work
of the community.
25X1A9a presentation was as outlined below:
Support services to be rendered by GRA
Three units are concerned, namely: (1) Map Library
Division; (2) Photo Intelligence Division; and (3)
Cartography Division.
1. Map Library Division
a. History of development
b. Its current activities in support are reference
and procurement related to maps and map
materials on foreign areas.
(1) Reference
Center in government for intelligence type map
materials
Focus on special subject maps
Collection restricted to latest and best maps
(2) Procurement
two-fold responsibility
(b) Domestic
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Run with cooperation of 00. Involveq
procurement of foreign map end map
materials as available from domestic
sources. Also services spot require-
monts.
c. In Wartime Situation
We anticipate services presently available will
remain essentially the same.
(1) Professional assistance in map and map
materials
(2) Special procurement of maps
(3) Information on coordinates, place names, etc.
(Li.) Circulation of Acquisitions Lists
A collection of about 50 thousand maps is presently
in the Relocation Center. These represent what
we believe would be essential for any wartime
situation, but it would be well for those interested
in this material to check the stock to see that
their needs are covered.
Primary effort will be devoted to augmentation of
map-procurement.
Establishment of four-man teams attached to field
commanders.
Comtaunityy coordination of collection will be
maintained, emphasizing CIA responsibility for
captured ma.;-)s relating to Headquarters require-
ments.
Need for continued close coordination with other
map collections.
2. Photo Intelligence Division
Entirely a military services development during World
War II; refinement of phot intelligence in Korean ~dar.
D/G:? set up in 1953.
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Types of people involved:
a. Photo Reader
b. Photo Interpreter
C. :Photogrammetr. ist
d. .Photo Intelligence Officer
Will continue to be the CIA and i\TSC Center for photo
intelligence services and training. Functions will remain
essentially the same. Will continue to emphasize flexi-
bility, new experience, and a wide range of substantive
training.
Expect wide variety of support tasks.
1. Continuing surveillance of strategic areas
2. 7miiediate and heavy load in current reporting
3. Expanded support of operational and strategic
planning
1. Direct support of 1NTSC
Large contribution to OCI, ObI and ORR research
projects as priorities permit
6. Training in PI will be accelerated and enlarged
7. PI personnel will be prepared for service with
the Geographic Intelligence teams (probably 10
PI men per team.)
8. Will require intimate coordination with military
services
Capability of the unit will depend on the extent of expansion
of its personnel. late contemplate a 3001- increase will be
necessary.
Establishment of a central Photo Interpretation Center in
the Government may be necessary.
3. Cartography Division
Currently has the responsibility in CIA for production of
intelligence maps, charts and cartograns.
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Present support functions include:
1. Provide maps for intelligence reports
2. Substantive research for background data
3. Review and correction of standard reference maps
Lj. Handle problems in mathematical geography
5. Technical research
1. The Center has been equipped with material and
equipment considered necessary for minimum
emergency use,
2. It is expected that very shortly after deployment,
a Priority 1Zeview Group will be necessary.
3. Special emphasis to support of clandestine operations.
L. Additional support to the President's Situation Room
s. Will prepare cartographic elements for special
Geographic Intelligence Field teams
6. Close coordination with other cartography units
in Government
7. Continue to provide cartographic support to
Department of State
8. Must retain flexibility
23
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Chief, Biographic Register, OCR,
discussed the Central Reference services in wartime according
to the f ollovvring outline:
The mission of OCR is to insure that all intelligence
information which is produced in the intelligence community is
sent to CIA, disseminated'vwrithin CIA, properly indexed by subject
and area, and that the Agency has a library available to it.
In addition, OCR has taken special measures to insure that
this information will be readily accessible.
The wartime plan would depend on the type of war in which we
are involved.
1. Situation where we do not relocate--under these
conditions, there would be very little change from our present
activities and the Central Reference services now available,
would also be available in wartime. However, emphasis would
turn to the area of primary concern. More reports would be
written and, more information disseminated to the field. More
cables would be received.
2. Situation when we do relocate"--,vital materials are
available.
Vital Materials
Informal list made by OCR of materials which they felt should
be included in vital materials storage. This list was sent to
all offices for their review with request that they supplement
with the documents necessary to them in the even of relocation.
Vital Materials Committee of the DD/I is chaired by OCR.
Their mission is to elan for and coordinate over DD/I Vital
Material Program and recommend to the DD/I and the AD's,
specific action for improvement in the program.
Typical Materials Contained in Vital Repository
1. Photo copies of raw materials
2. IBM cards referencing documents
3. Copies of Intelligence Publication Index and copies
of each document referred to
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Z,.. Non-CIA cables covering period of six months; TS over
one year period
5. Reference books
This information would provide facilities for research similar
to those available in Washington, D. C.
Facilities in OCR are:
1. Biographic Register---covers foreign scientific,
industrial, and technical personnel
2. Graphics Register--graphics material
3. Industrial Register--target folders on cities and
t oiivu s
4. CIA Library
expressed several of his oven opinionsa
1. We will not relocate unless iashington is under
nuclear attack.
2. Intelligence needs will be limited in the event of
war to recent cables, NIE's, SNIE's, OSI, ORR, and OCI
studies, and orders of battle.
The problem of coordination of intelligence production in
wartime was discussed by presently of
the Office of the Deputy Director Coordination , but formerly
Executive Secretary of the Economic Intelligence Committee. Dr.
- spoke according to the following outline:
We are here to do some planning on actual facilities which
would be available in a wartime situation. In connection with this,
the following points should be considered:
1. Personnel--do we have people vh o know about such things
as world-wide petroleum supply, agricultural situation,
etc.?
2. Reference files--do we have all material necessary on
hand or know where we can get it?
3. Communications channels--can we contact the knowledgeable
people and agencies?
Overall Responsibilities of IAC in Wartime:
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What vv-ill the IAC do? -- They will be concerned with
integrating 'OOoli.tical, scientific, economic and military
intelligence into support estimates of.
EnerW capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions
2. Intentions and uncommitted countries
3. Capabilities and requirements (logistics and supply)
of allied and uncomuiitted countries
Li.. Postwar economic and political situations
In Wartime, Intelligence Community must:
1. Support IAC in production of NIA's
2. Support other operations and wartime programs
This will require many studies not presently being under-
taken ?--. for example, analysis of economic and logistic
situations on a world-wide basis. How do we propose to
cover those areas presently outside our routine operations?
Especially world food., POL and medical supply situations.
Important that planners in `vashington are in general
understanding with those in the field. Better to "service"
requests from knowledgeable people in the field than to
attempt to press unsolicited ldashington "analysis."
Why do we need coordinated (integrated) intelligence
support?
1. Need policy agreements (inter-agency)
2. Weed better technical analysis in support of
both policy and operational decisions
1. Less concern about arrangements for producing NIL' s
than for adequacy of detailed technical analysis of
new and different types of problems -- especially
of wworld requirements for logistics and supply.
2. Ask the working-level people to think in more detail
about the problems they must face, including how
they would expect to get together.
More emphasis in contacting knowledgeable individual
personnel.
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People in other agencies who should be called in.
The key conclusion is that planning should not be so much
to predetermined organization patters and delineations of office
responsibility as for arranging to assemble quickly the technical
co petei e ?+ri th the necessary back-stopping) necessary to analyze
emergency situations.
18 July 1957
0/DD/I, discussed the recommendations mad.e
by the Killian Committee and how these recommendations were being
staffed within the Intelligence Community. Two of the recommendations
have direct bearing on the operation of the DD/I Area in wartime.
One of these concerns itself with the wartime organization of the
Intelligence Community, and tie other with the revision of the
NSC125)~1A9a
of the Management Staff, DD/S< described
briefly the Vital Materials Program and;.p.oint:ed out that OCR had
executive responsibility within the DD/I Area for the accomplish-
ment of the program. He was very generous with his praise of the
exc,allence of the Vital ''Materials Program within the DD/I Area.
The balance of the day was spent in drafting the paper
attached to this report as Tab "C".
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