PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL EFFECT OF SOVIET PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF ROCKETRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP60-00321R000400090006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 25, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/19: CIA-RDP60-00321R000400090006-3
1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 March 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Psychological and Political Effect of Soviet Progress
in the Field of Rocketry
1. Much of the initial world reaction to Soviet progress in the
field of rocketry, and especially to the launching of the first Soviet
earth satellite, was that the USSR was far more advanced industrially
and technologically than people had realized. There was also initially
a widespread feeling that perhaps the USSR had a slight lead over the
US in the ICBM field, but that the USSR had simply beaten the US to the
draw and gotten its earth satellite up first. In sophisticated circles
there continued to be faith that the US could match Soviet achievements
and maintain its superior world power position.
2. However, the launching of the second Soviet sputnik and the
failure of the US vanguard early in December were a rade shock. It came
to be believed that the US was falling seriously behind. The public
debate in the US over management of the missile program added credence to
this view. There developed a growing conviction that soon the entire
strategic situation in the world would be changed. People in allied
countries who had gained a sense of security from US military superiority
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- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/19: CIA-RDP60-00321R000400090006-3
SECIIET
began to doubt US ability to protect them. There developed a general
sense of vulnerability to nuclear attack from the air, without warning
and with no hope for defense.
3. Same of this malaise has been dissipated as a result of our
two recent satellite launchings and a result of the NATO decision to
deploy IRs in Europe. These developments have been regarded as
indications that the US is not hopelessly behind, and that something
is being done to prevent the USSR from gaining a military advantage.
4. Nevertheless, in the strategic field, our allies -- and
particularly those in allied countries who think and write about these
things -- do believe that the military situation will soon be substan?
tially altered. They believe that the US soon will be under the gun
and that, as a result, they are not as well protected by US military
power as they thought they were in the past. This sense of insecurity,
and vulnerability to missiles launched without warning and carrying
nuclear warheads instead of scientific instruments or dogs, has probably
been a contributing factor to the pressure for negotiations with the
USSR, and to the resurgence of neutralist thinking, especially in
Western Europe.
2 ?
SECRET
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OLIBIE. ,
S. Aside from the impact upon strategic thinking in other
countries, there have been effects upon people's receptivity to Soviet
proposals and to Communist doctrines. Soviet scientific achievements
in the field of rocketry have lent credibility to Soviet claims in
other fields. The enhancement of Soviet prestige has dimmed people's
memories of past Soviet misdeeds. Soviet foreign policy pronouncements
and proposals have consequently won, at least a better audience, at best
a greater acceptance. In particular, we feel that the receptivity of
underdeveloped countries to Communist doctrine and to Soviet subversion
has been increased. lib believe that there are probably many more
African and Asian peasants and workers who will say to themselves -- if
the Communists have not Already said it to them -- that "a system and a
country which in forty years can develop fast enough to put a dog in
the sky can probably do something for me."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/11/19 : CIA-RDP60-00321R000400090006-3