FROM THE RECORD OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP58-00597A000200140030-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: MISC

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FROM THE RECORD OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCCK'IITTEE
STAFF CONFERENCE OF
UNITED STATES SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
Present: Robert Morris, Chief Counsel, United States Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee, and Admiral Charles M. Cooke, U.S.N.
(Retired).
Mr. Morris. What is your name, sir?
Admiral Cooke. Charles Maynard Cooke, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired.
Mr. Morris. When did you retire, Admiral?
Admiral Cooke. I retired in May, 1948.
Mr. Morris, Admiral Cooke, the United States Senate Internal Security Sub-
comittee has been, among other things, assessing the events of the last ten years
1. order to determine to what extent subversive forces may have set in motion those
hppenings. As a corollary of this inquiry, the Subcommittee observed that faulty
itelligence as well as a disinclination on the part of certain government offi-
c.als have been contributing factors to the decline of the United States' position
is international' affairs.
Admiral Cooke, you appeared before the Subcommittee on October 19, 1951, and
ya related at that time your personal experiences and observations as they bore
of the inquiry that the Subcommittee was carrying on into the extent to which
Ccmnunist forces were able to influence our foreign policy.
At this time, Admiral, we would like you to relate those experiences of yours
wich indicated that persons charged with the responsibility of shaping policy did
nit receive when it was available, or did not actively go forward to acquire in-
t,lligence that might have caused the outcome to have eventuated differently.
For instance, recently the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was told by
Ambassador Angus Ward that, after he returned from some of his firsthand encounters
t4th the aggressions of the Chinese Communists, not only was he discouraged from
telling his story to the policy makers by his superiors, but that, in at least one
instance, deception was used to prevent him from imparting the necessary informaa-
'ion to the Secretary of Defense.
Admiral, you are a graduate of the United States Military Academy, are you not,
Admiral Cooke. Naval Academy.
Mr. Morris. Naval Academy?
Admiral Cooke, Yes, 1910.
Mr. Morris. And you were Chief of staff to Admiral Ernest King, Commander-
in-,"Chief of the United States Fleet during the war, were you not, sir?
Admiral Cooke. Yes, I was Chief of Staff during the latter part of the war,
'but-Chief Strategical Adviser practically during the entire war.
Mr. Morris. And in that capacity did you attend any of the international
conferences?
Admiral Cooke. Yes. I attended all the international conferences held by the
heads of the leading-governmental, beginning with Casablanca and ending with Potsdam,
Mr. Morris. Why don't you enumerate them? There are only four or five, aren't
there?
Admiral Cooke. Oh, no.
Mr. Morris. Well, go ahead and name them.
Admiral Cooke. There are about eight of them, beginning with Casablanca,
Tllowed by Washington, two in. Quebec, one-in Cairo, one in Yalta and one at
Potsdam, I think that's all.
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Mr. Morris* And you attended those conferences as a Strategic Adviser to
Admiral King; is that right, Admiral?
Admiral Cooke* That is correct.
Mr. Morris. Now, Admiral, during this period of time that you acted in that
capacity, did you begin to be aware in your official military capacity of the
looming threat of Soviet aggression?
Admiral Cooke. I became aware of the attitude and method of operations of
Communists during the war and, with the approaching defeat of Japan and the build-
up of the Russian Communist strength in Manchuria toward the end of the war, I
recognized that a very serious situation would confront the United States, due to
the fact that Japan, completely defeated, would provide a vacuum for Russian ag-
gression after the war was over, and about April, 1945, a few months before the
war was over, I gave Admiral King a memorandum setting forth this prospective situ-
ation in the Far East.
Mr. Morris. To your knowledge, Admiral, did the Army also make a report on
this threat?
Admiral Cooke. Yes, I learned later that the Intelligence Division of the
Army had submitted a similar report in June of 1945.
Mr. Morris. What was your first assignment after the war, Admiral?
Admiral Cooke. After the war I was assigned as Commander of the United States
Seventh Fleet, th3n stationed in Chinese waters, and which came to include all of
the United States comba forces in China during the period of 1946 on to the fall
of China to the Communists.
Mr. Morris. How long did you remain in command of the Seventh Fleet?
Admiral Cooke. I was in command from the 8th of January, 1946, to the end of
February, 1946.
Mr. Morris. Now, Admiral, I wonder if you would briefly state for us at this
time the forces that, from your experience, contributed to the Soviet conquest of
China*
Admiral Cooke. First I would say the build-up of Russian Communist power in
Manchuria and North Korea, as a result of the Yalta Agreements and of the entry of
Russia into the war against Japan about one week before Japan's surrender,
Second, I would say that the failure of the Russians to carry out the treaty
agreements made by Communist Russia and Nationalist China about the 6th of August,
1945, which was in cons mmation of the agreement of the United States Government
to undertake to cause the Chinese Nationalist government to comply with the agree-
ments made at Yalta.. In these agreements of the treaty, the Russian Communists
agreed to give all of their support to the Nationalist Government of China. But
when the war was over, on August 14th, and later, the Russians refused to permit
the Chinese Nationalist forces to enter Manchuria through Manchurian ports to
recover their sovereign territory.
This action provided a great help to the success of the Communist armies who
were coming into Manchuria to be armed with Japanese and Russian equipment.
Third, even with this Russian Communist help, on two or three occasions the
Chinese Communist movement was thwarted by the Nationalists, upon which occasions
our representatives in China forced the Nationalists to agree to a truce.
Fourth, in August of 1946, because the Nationalists had not complied with all
of the demands of the United States representatives in China who sought agreement
between the Nationalist government and the Chinese Communist armies in rebellion
against the Chinese government, the United States imposed a complete embargo
against supplying ammunition and armed equipment to the Nationalist army, even
denying ammunition for the American guns that certain Chinese divisions had been
equipped with to fight the Japanese.
Ns. Morris. How long did that embargo last, Admiral?
Admiral Cooke, Technically the embargo lasted for about ten months. Factually--
Mr. Motx , That was until when?
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Admiral Cooke. Let's sees August, September, Until about May, 1947.
Factually it lasted much longer, because of the great delays that took place
after ty'ie technical termination of the embargo. The effect of this embargo was
set forth in an observation personally made to me by General Marshall in August or
September of 1946; "that with the embargo we had in effect first armed the Chinese
Nationalists and then disarmed them."
Five, the Russian Communists provided the Chinese Communists with operational
advisers, organizers, thereby improving their fighting efficiency at the same time
that the Nationalists were not receiving any such operational advisory assistance
from the United States.
Sixth, the Nationalist armies had been fighting against Japan for eight years
and had suffered heavy casualties during the period that the Communist armies had
not been engaged.
Seventh, I should add that due to the lack of operational advice, badly needed
by all Chinese armies, there was inept leadership on the part of the Nationalist
commands.
Mr. Morris. After your tour of duty as Commander of the Seventh Fleet, did you
retire from the Navy?
Admiral Cooke. Yes. I returned to the United States and passed to the re-
tired list on the 1st of May, 1948,
Mrs Morris. What did you do then?
Admiral Cooke. Then I returned to my home in Sonoma, California.
Mr. Morris. What did you do when you first entered upon your retirement?
Admiral Cooke? I accepted speaking engagements in various parts of the United
States, both in 1948 and 1949, and kept up my interest in the Far East situation,
appearing in Washington on a number of occasions to talk to Members of Congress,
both of the House of Repres~.rtatives and the Senate, giving them such information
that I had on the Far East. T:iis !:And of actli t;- on my part was stepped up to a
much higher degree after the Communist People's government was set up in Peking on
October 1, 19490
Mr. Morris. What did you do after October 1st, 1949, Admiral?
Admiral Cooke. When the Communist government was set up in Peking, I knew that
it was being done largely by the Soviet Communists. This was confirmed by the
recognition of the Chinese Ccariunist government by the U.S.S.R. two days later, on
October 3, 1949,
I felt that this might li,:ely lsad to the recognition of Communist China by
the United States government, whi- in turn wound lead to the loss of Formosa to
the Communists. I considered that if we recognized Red China we would soon lose
Formosa, and if we lost Formosa we would certainly recognize Red China, and that
both or either were very serious disasters to United States security and world
freedom.
I therefore went to Washington and spent about two months in the Washington
area, working in large degree with Mr. William Pawleys ex-Ambassador to Brazil, in
an effort to set up a group of ex-United States Naval and Military officers and re-
tired officers to go to Formosa to assist the Nationalist government in preventing
the fall of Formosa to Communism.
I made formal recommendations to the State Department and informal recommenda-
tions to the President himself, through his aide, that this be carried out, but I
never received any action one way or the other on these recommendations; no red
light, no green light.
Finally, about the 1st of December of 1949, I discontinued my efforts and re-
t%arned to Sonoma, California.
Mr. Morris. How long did you remain in Sonoma, California?
Admiral Cooke. On the 5th of January of 1950, when the President of the United
States and the secretary of State issued statements that the United States was not
concerned with the fate of Formosa and that South Korea was also beyond the peri-
meter of. Unite states d c et isc;~(~$~2=RD ias 59"0~gton from
Calif ornia to ess ew 'fia cool very roux Toe nited
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States, and every effort should be made to modify the government's decision, and I
proceeded that night to Washington and talked with a number of senators, all of whom
agreed, but none of them could do anything about it.
So I returned to my home in Sonoma, California.
Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, in either of these two visits to Washington that
you just related, were there reports circulating that the island of Formosa, con-
taining as it did the Chinese government, was about to fall?
Admiral Cooke. While I was in Washington, during the period of October and
November of 1949, I saw reports, or copies of reports which had been sent by the
United States Consul-General in Taipei, Formosa, stating in effect that Formosa
would fall to the Communists within a period of one or two weeks from the date of
the dispatch report. I knew that we did not at that time have any Naval Intelli-
gence representatives in Formosa, and I felt that these reports were not well-.
founded. In fact, I was sure that they were not correct.
I did not at that time take any action to inquire into the reports, as I felt
that they were probably of a confidential nature. But I felt the urge myself to get
to Formosa somehow or another, in order to find out how correct or incorrect they
really were.
Mr. Morris. Well, Admiral, were these reports, in your opinion, causing damage?
Admiral Cooke. Yes. I considered that they were causing a very serious ad-
verse effect on the United States policy and action. I found that many of the
people in the government to whom I presented the idea that we should help the Formosa
Nationalist government hold on to Formosa against Communist attack were undoubtedly
influenced by these reports of a debacle in Formosa that would be forthcaming in
the very early future.
I did not immediately, at that time, know that our State Department was getting
ready to warn all diplomatic personnel throughout the world to be ready to explain
the fall of Formosa, a warning that was actually issued, as I remember it, just
about the time of my departure from Washington on the 3rd of December of 1949.
Mrs Morriss Did the warning itself have an adverse effect?
Admiral Cooke. Yes, I considered that it did in a very high degree, because
the Nationalist government, just having been driven off the mainland, was in some-
what of a precarious position in Formosa, with particular regard to its relation-
ship with all the countries in the world, some of which would be ready to recognize
Communist China without delay.
In other words, if this warning of the State Department was supported by cer-
tain things going badly in Formosa, there was a great chance that the recognition
of Red China at this time might become fairly worldwide.
Mr, Morris. Did you go to Formosa and, if so, in what capacity?
Admiral Cooke. After going to Washington the 6th of January, 1950, and not
accomplishing very much to save the situation as I thought it needed to be saved, I
felt the need to go to Formosa to see for myself the actual situation and, further,
to see what I, at least, could do about helping hold this island,
I therefore arranged with the International News Service for an accreditation
representing them in Formosa and obtained a passport for that purpose and pro-
ceeded to Formosa, leaving the United States on the 1st of February, 1950, passing
through Tokyo and Hong Kong and arriving in Formosa on the 11th of February, 1950.
Mr, Morris. When you arrived in Formosa, Admiral, did you find that we had
adequate intelligence representation on the island?
Admiral Cooke, No, I did not. When I was passing through Tokyo, I talked to
the commander of our Seventh Fleet, then in Yokosuka, who had the same intelligence
about the situation in Formosa as I had seen in Washington, and from whom I learned
that no Naval Intelligence representatives were in Formosa.
When I arrived in Formosa, I found that there were no intelligence representa-
~.,ives from MacArthur's staff, from the War Department, from the Navy Department or
from the Central Intelligence Agency, then in Formosa. The only official intelli-
gence representatives were the attaches, Army, Navy, Air Force, all of them, of
course, under the State Department representative, Mr. Robert Strong, Consul-General,
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Mr. Morris. Admiral, if Navy Intelligence or General MacArthur's Headquarters
had wanted to send intelligence personnel to Formosa, could they have done so?
Admiral Cooke, So far as I know, they could not. About March of 1950, possi-
bly in April, General Fortier, who was No. 2 in the G-2 organization of General
MacArthur, desired to come to Formosa to learn at first hand what the real situation
was. His request was turned down and later he made a trip to Southeast Asia, and
in particular to Indo-China, and returned, taking passage on a plane that stopped
at Taipei, Formosa, and he stopped over for a few days.
This action on his part was objected to, I was informed, by the United States
Consul-General, Mr. Strong. I do not know, of course, all the details of what
transpired between General Fortier and Mr. Strong, but I believe that General
Fortier has appeared before your Committee.
Mr. Morris, Admiral, after you arrived on Formosa, did you, in fact, find the
situation to coincide with the situation reported by the Consul-General, the re-
ports you had read in Washington and in Tokyo?
Admiral Cooke* No, they did not. Also I found in Formosa that a number of
people were familiar with the reports that had been made. This put me in a positior.
to refer to them because I found that they were no longer confidential. I did not
find anything in Formosa which supported the reports made in October and November
of 1949, setting forth, as they did, the imminence of the fall of Formosa to
Communism with a period of two or three weeks.
I also learned that, in December of 1949, the State Department representation
in Formosa had warned all Americans to leave Formosa because of this imminent fall;
that some had done so, but others had stayed on.
I also was informed that one of the assistant military attaches, Captain J. R.
Manning, had wished to report facts which did not fit in with the character of
reports apparently desired by the State Department representation, and who therefore
made a direct report to the War Department.
Further, I was informed that Captain Manning had been summarily detached from
his duty as Assistant Military Attache and sent to the U. S. Command in Tokyo.
Some weeks later, while in Tokyo, I looked up Captain Manning, and he confirmed
the report about this incident that I had received while in Formosa.
Mr. Morris. That would appear, would it not, Admiral, to be an example of
policy shaping intelligence reports, rather than policy following facts revealed by
Intelligence?
Admiral Cooke. I would rather put it this way: As it appeared to me, there
was a policy that had been set up in Washington by the United States government and
which was being followed by the State Department representatives in Formosa, which
required that Intelligence facts should conform to the policy rather than have a
change of policy that would be guided by the facts,
Mr. Morris. Admiral, were there more episodes and instances of which you
learned while you were on Formosa that were being inadequately reported through our
representatives there?
Admiral Cooke, Yes, there were, But, in order to give an adequate answer to
your question, it is necessary that I relate what happened, first, with regard to
the fall of Hainan to the Communists in April of 1950, and, second, of the Nation-
alist evacuation of the Chusan Archipelago in May of 1950,
When I returned from Tokyo in the middle of April, 1950, I found that the
Communists had landed in strength in Hainan, This landing in strength followed a
number of guerilla landings from the mainland on Hainan during the months of
February and March. I was informed by President Chiang Kai-shek that it had been
intended to evacuate Hainan in February, because it was 700 miles from Formosa, be-
cause the troops there were not too well trained and equipped and because no more
troops, naval ships and aircraft could be spared to Hainan from the defense of the
Chusan Archipelago and Formosa itself.
However, he went on to add that this evacuation had been delayed because the
Nationalist forces were still fighting Communists in Sikang, a province to the west
of Yunan, and the communications by air between Sikang and Formosa had to be routed
through Hainan. I suggested to the President that it would be desirable to repel
this Communist invasion if possible and afterwards to evacuate it while not under
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With this view, he agreed. I volunteered to go down to Hainan with his Chiefs
of Staff and give them any advice that I could, and I did go down, accompanied by
the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
A few days after my arrival in Hainan, the Communist armies overthrew the
Nationalist armies, and I flew back to Formosa. Admiral Kwei, Commander-in-Chief of
the Chinese Navy, stayed in the Hainan area and succeeded in removing practically
all of the Nationalist troops, preventing their capture by the Communists.
The representative of the Associated Press, also in Hainan at the time of its
fall, and probably misled by certain of the generals who had failed in Hainan, re-
ported in an AP release that President Chiang Kai-shek had himself engineered the
debacle. This press release was of a character that would cause serious damage to
the cause of the Nationalist government and was, as I knew, completely unfounded.
When I returned to Taipei, I asked all of the naval and military attaches to
come to my place, in order that I could relate to them what had happened. I told
them that whereas the performance of the Nationalist forces in Hainan was not cre-
ditable, it did not carry with it the venal aspects reported in the AP dispatch,
The attaches accepted this report.
I also wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, reporting what had
taken place.
In addition to the above, I reported that I had questioned the Chinese, both
on the ships and on the planes, about the ammunition that had been directed toward
the ships and Nationalist aircraft from the mainland across the Ten-Mile Strait
from Hainan and had reached the conviction that the Communists, probably including
Russians as well as Chinese, were using proximity fuses in their ammunition.
Mr. Morris. What were proximity fuses, Admiral?
Admiral Cooke. A proximity fuse was developed very secretly by the United
States in World War II and is sometimes called an "influence fuse", which causes
the ammunition to be detonated without striking a material object, but merely
passing near to it.
Mr. Morris. Of what significance was it to you, Admiral, that the Communists
were using proximity fuses?
Admiral Cooke, This fuse, developed by the United States Navy in World War II,
was at that time of such a secret character that our forces on land did not use it
against the Germans because it was feared that the secret might be discovered by
the recovery of unexploded ammunition.
Therefore, I reached the conviction that this was no longer a secret; that the
Russians had probably had it for some time; that the Russians were supplying it to
the Chinese Communist armies and that probably Russian personnel themselves were
participating in the Liuchow Peninsula, just across the Strait from Hainan, against
the Nationalist ships and planes.
The information of the rather discreditable performance of the Nationalist for-
ces in Hainan seemed to be received by the attaches with an acquiescing reception.
However, a different reception was accorded to the reports that I furnished them
after the evacuation of the Chusan Archipelago, which is about 350 miles north of
Formosa, just off the Chinese Coast and near the port of Hangehow. The Nationalist
government regarded, properly in my opinion, the holding of Chusan as very important
to their strategical security, because Chusan would flank any amphibious movement in
strength mounted in the Yangtze River.
Therefore, they had a strong defensive force stationed in Chusan, of about
25,000 men. They had had an important battle in October of 1949, in which they
had repelled further advance at that time of the Communist Armies against the rest
0z the archipelago.
But in April of 1950, photographs taken by Chinese Nationalist planes estab-
lished the fact that Russian jet planes were flying from air fields around Shanghai.
B, this time the Communists had established 14 air fields in the Shanghai-Hangchow
area, from which air strikes could be delivered against Nationalist forces in the
Chusan area. The Nationalists had only one air field in Chusan.
Further, the Communists had between two and 400,000 troops in the same area,
available for attack against Chusan. It was evident to me that, if the Chinese
Corrmmnists and their Russian components decided to attack Chusan, they should be
able to take it p d MoRdl%Me 260=6023 ~~I,oF lp~ p 1y two
miles away from the Nationalist positions. I felt that a strong possibility existed
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of such an attack taking place during the summer, June, July or August. I felt that
if such an attack took place, not only would Chusan be lost, but the Nationalist
strength would be so depleted that Formosa itself probably could not be held.
Remember that at this time, early May, 1950, the U. S. government disclaimed any
interest in the fate of Formosa.
I therefore recommended that Chusan be evacuated before such an attack. The
decision was made by President Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers on the 9th of May,
to evacuate, and the evacuation was completed by the 16th of May. All the forces
and equipment on Chusan were successfully removed and returned to Formosa without
any casualties and without any Communist interference by air or otherwise. The
evacuating forces had difficulties because of swift currents amongst the Chusan
islands, and fog.
I therefore flew up to give assistance during the last two days, accompanying
the Chinese Naval Commander, Admiral Kwei, I therefore was fully informed as to the
plans of the operation and of the final steps in the completion of the evacuation.
The secret of this move was so well kept that it did not become known to the Com-
munists, nor to those in Formosa not concerned with carrying it out. It was there-
fore very much to my surprise when, about the 17th of May, I was informed that our
attaches had the information that many Nationalist troops had been killed by Com-
munist gunfire, many troops had been left behind, much equipment had been lost and
that a serious debacle had taken place.
It was also stated that the Island of Quemoy, or Kinmen as called by the Chi-
nese, had been evacuated and that the Pescadores Islands had been ordered evacuated.
The garrison of Kinmen Island at that time was from 60 to 70,000 men.
The attaches and others associated with them in United States government circles
had also stated that Formosa would fall in June and not later than July, that is,
within less than two months, These assertions of facts and of views first trans-
pired in a secret meeting and were transmitted to me by someone who had learned of
them. I immediately asked the attaches to join me at my headquarters. I informed
them that I had been in the Chusan area on the last two days of the evacuation; that
no debacle had taken place; that the Communists were not aware that the evacuation
was taking place; that no troops and no equipment had been left behind and that all
troops were being returned to Formosa.
I further informed them that Kinmen had not been evacuated and was not being
evacuated, and, further, that there was no intention to evacuate the Pescadores. To
this the attaches replied that their information and their informants were of a
character they they were sure that they were right and that I was wrong.
In spite of all of my assurances that I had personally witnessed what had taken
place in Chusan and that they would find that Kinmen had not been evacuated, they
insisted on retaining their own view and so reported, I gather, to Washington.
Mr. Morris. Admiral, were all of these attaches under the direction of Mr.
Robert Strong?
Admiral Cooke. Yes.
Mr, Morris. Is he still in the State Department?
Admiral Cooke. After his being relieved in August of 1950, he proceeded to
the State Department and I heard that he was in the State Department in 19520 Since
then I do not know,
Mr. Morris. Admiral, had you finished that last episode when I interrupted?
Admiral Cooke. No, I had not finished,
To go on with the report to Washington of-what had taken place in the middle of
May in Chusan and Kinmen and the Pescadores, I wrote a letter to the Chief of Naval
Operations, relating in detail what had happened, stating that I considered the
whole Chusan operation to be very creditable to the Nationalist government, but that
the attaches had not accepted my reports and I was therefore sending them direct
to the Chief of Naval Operations.
However, I knew that my report, being made by myself, who was in an unofficial
status, would not be accepted in the face of the strong official report coming in
from the attaches and the Consul-General, I therefore wrote separate letters to
Senator Knowland and Congressman Walter Judd, relating what had taken place, In my
view it was necessary to counteract the very serious deterioration in the position
of the NationaliA~oM mf, eqLimLad2/bbmTpota op0099 ;0"20044IONDs4
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I was convinced then, as the United States government has since become con-
vinced, that the security of Formosa to the free world was of vital importance to
the United States. It is to be borne in mind that the Communist attack on South
Korea had not yet taken place.
Mr. Morris. Admiral, were there any other episodes?
Admiral Cooke. Yes. A day or two after my conference, let me say abortive
conference, with the a.t+taches, all Americans were warned to leave Formosa, and all
the women in United States government employ in Formosa were ordered to leave, and
were given the choice of going either to Seoul in Korea or to Saigon in Indo-China.
Seoul was to be attacked and taken by the North Korean Communists about one month
later, and Saigon was the scene of frequent bombings by Communist underground ele-
ments in that city. I had hoped to forestall this blow to the Nationalist govern-
ment of ordering Americans to leave, or warning them to leave for the second time
in five months.
The facts as related by me to the attaches and to the U. S. Navy Department
were, of course) all borne out. The troops and equipment from Chusan did arrive.
Kinmen or Quemoy is still occupied by Nationalist troops.
Now it seemed evident to me after these two incidents, that of Hainan and that
of Chusan, had taken place and the facts had been related by me, an Admiral of the
U. S. Navy, retired, in detail as of one who was present in each case) that the
attaches accepted the report on Hainan which reflected discredit on the Nationalist
government and rejected completely the report on Chusan which reflected great credit
on the Nationalist government. There seemed to be a confused distortion and apprai-
sal of certain strategic aspects of the general situation.
For instance, the Naval attache attached to Consul-General Strong's staff, in-
formed me that Chusan should not have been evacuated; that it should have been held
by the Nationalists. He had further stated that Chusan did not have more than
60,000 troops in that area, but he strongly asserted his view that the Communists,
with many squadrons including jet aircraft, and with several hundred thousand troops.,
could not take Chusan, some places only two miles distant from Communist-held ad-\-,
jacent islands.
At the same time, in defense of the order for Americans to leave Formosa, he
stated that the Communists crossing a 100-mile strait could take Formosa with one
LST.
Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, to your knowledge has anything been done to cor-
rect the defective intelligence situation which you have described here today?
Admiral Cooke. I have read about the task force formed under the Hoover
Commission, the task force headed by General Clark, which I believe went into the
Intelligence situation exhaustively, but I believe that very little, if any, of the
report was ever published. I myself, in October of 1951, was asked to talk to the
heads of the Central Intelligence Agency by General Bedell Smith, who was then
head, to convey to him the Formosan situation, while I was in Washington after
testifying before your Committee and before my return to Formosa. I gave General
Smith and his assistants most of the facts that I have related to you herein.
More recently, about last January, I learned that the President had appointed
a permanent or continuing commission to watch over the Intelligence activities, con-
sisting of six or eight people, and headed by the President of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Mr. Killian. I wrote to the Navy Member of this Commis-
sion immediately, to tell him that I could bear witness to some very serious failures
in Intelligence that had caused great harm to the United States, and would like to
appear before this committee. When this offer, originally made in January, was not
accepted, I repeated it several months later, but I have now come to the conclusion
that the Commission is not interested in hearing what I have to say.
Mr. Morris. Admiral, you have pointed out here for the record some serious
failures on the part of Intelligence in the past, What do you think should be done
about them, in order to insure the internal security of the United States?
Admiral Cooke. It seems to me that there is a possibility, a serious possi-
bility, that the future may bring others who will, in pursuance of a policy, be
ready to twist facts, head off facts, deny information to other members of the
government and to the people which can endanger the security of the United States.
The need to provide against such possibilities apparently was felt about atomic
energy.
3o not onlyAopbv-~ecp R? eft /46/~gt CAF fe[pPF.r&~Q 2d~~4 which
could scarcely be liable to go off on such tangents. I think, therefore, that the
 Approved For Release 2004/06/23 : CIA-RDP58-00597A000200140030-4
Security Council of the United States should include a full-time committee composed
of able military officers of each service, perhaps those nearing the retirement age,
or just past the retirement age, and of representatives of the State Department who
would be furnished a command ship which would permit them to visit critical areas
such as the Far East, or the Mediterranean, acquaint themselves with the local situ-
ation, the local intelligence, and report then back to the Security Council, in-
cluding the President, of course, and to the Defense Department.
Further, to insure that such a committee should not at any time be composed of
those who would conform to an adopted theory of policy, that a committee of Congress
similar to the Atomic Energy Commission should be established.
Mr. Morris. On behalf of the Chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee,
I wish to thank you for the very important information and the very well-informed
views you have presented here today.
Approved For Release 2004/06/23 : CIA-RDP58-00597A000200140030-4