JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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82D CONGRESSL
2d Session f
SENATE
EXECUTIVE
REPORT No. 2
3 t
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER
TREATIES RELATING TO SECURITY
IN THE PACIFIC
REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ON
EXECUTIVES A, B, C, AND D
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1952
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
TOM CONNALLY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Georgia
THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, Rhode Island
BRIEN McMAHON, Comiecticut
J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Arkansas
JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabama
GUY M. GILLETTE, Iowa
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
H. ALEXANDER SMITH, New Jersey
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR., Massachusetts
CHARLES W. TOBEY, New Hampshire
OWEN BREWSTER, Maine
FRANCis 0. WrLcox, Chief of Staff
TuoRSTEN V. KALIJARVT, Staff .Associate
0. C. O'DAY, Clerk
MORELLA R. HANSEN, Assistant Clerk
MARY PROCTOR, Assistant Clerk
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CONTENTS
Page
Main purposes of the treaties ---------------------------------------- I
A. The setting---------------------------------------------------- 2
1. Background --------------------------------------------- 2
2. Negotiation of the treaties_______________________________ 3
3. Committee action ---------------------------------------- 4-
4. United States aid to Japan -------------------------------- 5
5. Complementary agreements to be negotiated - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5
B. Treaty of peace with Japan --------------------------------------- 61
6. Nature of the treaty--------------- ---- --------------- 6
7. Brief summary of terms of Japanese Peace Treaty---------- 6
8. When the treaty takes effect_____________________________ 7
9. Territorial provisions ------------------------------------- 8
10. Security provisions --------------------------------------- 9
11. Economic provisions_____________________________________ 10
12. Reparations and debts ------------------------------------ 11
13. Damage suffered by United States citizens - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13
14. The peace treaty and Korea-------- --------------------- 14
15. Relation of Japan to Nationalist and Communist China- - - - _ 15-
16. Japan's trade with the Soviet bloc-------------- ------ 15
17. Attitude of the U. S. S. R. toward the Japanese Peace Treaty-- 16
18. Relation of treaty to the universal declaration of human rights_ 17
19. Question of "belligerent rights" of Soviet Union and Com-
munist China in Japan-------------------------------- 1s
C. Security treaty between the United States and Japan--------------- 19
20. Background-------------------------------------------- 19
21. Provisions of the treaty ------------------------------------ 20
22. United States commitments ---------------------- ------- 21
23. The administrative agreement and the ratification of the peace
treaty --------------21
24. Use of Japanese facilities by United Nations forces---------- 21
D. Security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States- 22
25. Background-------------------------------------------- 22
26. Provisions of the treaty----------------------------------- 24
E. Security treaty between the United States and the Philippines-_----_ 25
F. Conclusions----------------------------------------------------- 26
Appendixes:
1. The Cairo Conference, November 22-26, 1943---------------- 28
II. The Yalta Conference, February 4-11, 1945------------------ 28
ITT. The Potsdam Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945------------- 29
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82n CONGRESS SENATE ExECDTIVE REPT.
2d Session No. 2
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
TnuRBDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1952.-Ordered to be printed with illustrations
Mr. CONNALLY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted
the following
REPORT
[To accompany Executives A, B, C, and D, Eighty-second Congress, second
session]
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the
treaty of peace with Japan (Executive A, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), signed
at San Francisco on September 8, 1951;. the mutual defense treaty
between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines
(Executive B, 82d Cong., 2d sess.), signed at Washington on August
30, 1951; the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and
the United States of America (Executive C, 82d Cong., 2d sess.),
signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951; and the security treaty
between the United States of America and Japan (Executive D, 82d
Cong., 2d sess.), signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, unan-
imously reports the treaties to the Senate and recommends that its
advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.
MAIN PURPOSES OF THE TREATIES
The Japanese Peace Treaty has as its principal purposes the termi-
nation of the state of war in the Far East and the restoration of Japan
to the status of an independent, sovereign nation. The treaty con-
tains provisions for such matters as security and territorial arrange-
ments, trade and commerce, reparations, and property rights.
Accompanying the peace treaty are three collateral pacts which pro-
vide collective security arrangements for the Pacific. The first mutual
defense treaty is between the United States and the Philippine Re-
public, a second deals with security measures between the United
States and Australia and New Zealand, and the third is between the
United States and Japan. These three pacts constitute an integral
part of the peace settlement in the Far East.
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L APANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
1. Background
Since the end of fighting in World War II, international tensions
have mounted, with the result that peacemaking; has become extremely
difficult, if not impossible. In some cases, such as the abortive dis-
cussions relating to the treaties with Germany and Austria, the Soviet
Union has deliberately blocked and sabotaged every major effort to
bring about a settlement. The peace treaties with the former allies
of Nazi Germany-Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Hungary, and Rumania-
were concluded after long and laborious negotiations. Since then the
U. S. S. R. has entered upon a period of complete noncooperation. It
is against this background that negotiations for a peace with Japan
have been carried on.
Great changes have taken place in the Pacific area since Japan
signed the instrument of surrender on the battleship Missouri. In
1945 .some of the major problems of the Allied Powers with respect
to Japan were to complete the surrender of Japan's armies, take over
control of former Japanese overseas possessions, liberate areas over-
run by the Japanese during the war, generally restore order, and
encourage the development of democratic principles in Japan.
These original tasks have been largely accomplished during the last
6 years, but new issues have arisen, principally growing out of the surge
of new-found nationalism in the area which has been coupled with an
urge for self-expression and independence.
The liquidation of colonial empires in the Far East has been accom-
panied by the emergence of new states, the Republic of Korea, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan. Behind the
scenes in these countries, and even in the areas where western control
still exists, such as in the Associated States of Indochina and Malaya,
Soviet imperialism cloaked in the garb of national communism has
been exploiting the generally unsettled economic and social conditions
which follow war and the awakening of nationalism. The result is
confusion and unrest in which aggression, subversion, and sabotage
thrive. The Chinese Communist regime of Peiping is the main dis-
turbing element in this regard. A free, prosperous, and democratic
Japan could exert an. important stabilizing influence in the Far East.
Japan occupies a strategic position in the Far East; it has a large,
energetic, and skilled population; it is the only industrial nation in
the Far East; and it lies athwart the American defense line in the
Pacific.
The committee believes that the occupation of Japan, under United
States leadership, has been successful. As a result, Japan has emerged
from her defeated and. war-torn status to that of a nation slowly but
steadily on its way to becoming self-reliant and a force for peace.
Recognizing the dangers inherent in prolonged occupation, in June
1950, General MacArthur stated that-
historically, military occupations have a maximum utility of from 3 to 5 years.
Thereafter the occupation assumes the character of "colonialism," the occupation
forces assume the complexion of entrenched power, and the people under occupa-
tion become restive * * *
Under these circumstances, and in. spite of the almost certain ob-
structionism of the Soviet Union, the United States initiated the dis-
cussions for a treaty of peace with Japan over a year ago.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
2. Negotiation of the treaties
The United States was given the sole responsibility of appointing
a supreme commander for all the Allied Powers and directing the
occupation of Japan. An obligation to bring the occupation to a
timely end also fell upon the United States. To this end, the United
States as early as 1947 made overtures for a peace treaty to be con-
sidered in the Far Eastern Commission. Persistent opposition from
the Soviet Union, partly on the grounds that only the Council of For-
eign Ministers, where the Soviet Union exercises a veto, should have
jurisdiction over negotiations, successfully blocked all efforts to nego-
tiate a treaty until the fall of 1950. At that time, the United States
entered into conversations with former Allied Powers outside the
Soviet orbit for the purpose of determining if, in fact, a treaty could
be concluded. Frequent consultations took place between the inter-
ested delegations during the session of the United Nations General
Assembly in Now York in 1950.
Representatives of the British Commonwealth worked together to
determine their individual and collective position on the basic prin-
ciples of the treaty, while a mission dispatched by the President of the
United States visited the capital cities of the 10 countries most directly
concerned for an on-the-spot exchange of views. All recognized the
importance of making peace promptly, and agreement was reached on
many of the principal objectives. On January 11, 1951, the President
designated Mr. John Foster Dulles as his special representative, with
the personal rank of Ambassador, to conduct on behalf of the United
States such further discussions and negotiations as would be necessary
to bring to an eventual successful conclusion a Japanese peace settle-
ment. The United States drew up the first draft of a treaty, embody-
ing these objectives in March 1951, and this was circulated among
members of the Far Eastern Commission and other nations that had
indicated their interest, including some of Latin America. In all,
there was a total of 20.
An outgrowth of the conferences among the members of the British
Commonwealth was a draft treaty prepared by the United Kingdom.
In June, the two drafts were combined in a text jointly agreed upon
by the United States and the United Kingdom and shortly thereafter
circulated among the Allied Powers including the U. S. S. R. The
middle of August was set as the deadline for incorporating changes.
Meanwhile, an exchange of treaty drafts and memoranda between
the United States and the U. S. S. R. had formed an integral part of
the negotiating process and, in addition, a number of consultations
were held with the Soviet official, Jacob Malik, which subsequently,
however, were broken off by the Soviet Union.
The United States delegation to the Japanese Peace Conference held
in San Francisco last September included a group of Senators and
Congressmen. Senators Connally and Wiley were named as dele-
gates for each of the four treaties. Alternate delegates for the
Japanese Peace Treaty were Senators John J. Sparkman, H. Alexander
Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, and Repre-
sentatives James P. Richards and-Robert B. Chiperfield. Alternate
delegates for the security treaties with the Philippines and with Aus-
tralia and New Zealand were Senators John. J. Sparkman, H. Alexander
Smith, Walter F. George, and Bourke B. Hickenlooper, and Repre-
sentatives Abraham A. Ribicoff and Walter H. Judd. Alternate
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4 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
delegates for the security treaty with Japan were Senators Richard B.
Russell, Styles Bridges, John J. Sparkman, and H. Alexander Smith,
and Representatives Overton Brooks and Dewey Short. Senator
Pat McCarran and Representatives Karl Stefan and John J. Rooney
served as observers.
The committee wishes to express its appreciation for the coopera-
tive spirit in which the treaties were negotiated by the executive
branch of the Government. Rarely, if ever, have committee members
seen such legislative-executive teamwork as that which characterized
negotiation of the treaties. The committee particularly desires to
commend Ambassador Dulles for his outstanding contribution to the
cause of world peace and bipartisan consultation.
Eleven months of exhaustive effort by the Allied Powers resulted in
a treaty which manifested their desire for a just and lasting peace,
and which manifested also a subordination of individual interests to
the common good.
S. Committee action
January 12, 1951, marked the beginning of a series of meetings, nine
in all, between Ambassador Dulles and members of the consultative
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. The meetings continued at frequent intervals throughout the
spring and summer, with Ambassador Dulles keeping the subcommittee
currently informed of the progress of his negotiations with the Japanese
and with the former Allied Powers, until the conclusion and signature
of the peace treaty and related security pacts at San Francisco in
September. Moreover, on several occasions, Ambassador Dulles dis-
cussed with the full committee specific problems that arose during the
process of negotiations. Committee suggestions on these problems
were instrumental in determining the final text of the treaties.
Upon the reconvening of the Congress after the fall adjournment,
President Truman, on January 10, 1952, submitted the treaties with
his recommendation that the Senate give them "early favorable con-
sideration."
As a consequence, public hearings began on January 21, with state-
ments by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Gen. Omar Bradley,
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Ambassador Dulles. Ambas-
sador Dulles returned on the following day to answer questions of
committee members. Hearings continued on January 23 and 25,
with private witnesses both in opposition to and support of the treaties.
Among those offering testimony were representatives of various
organizations as well as individuals expressing their own views. In
addition, a number of statements were filed with the committee for
the record.
At its executive session on February 5, the committee, by a vote
of 13 to 0, agreed to report all the treaties favorably to the Senate.
At that time committee members approved an interpretative state-
ment making clear the position of the Senate with respect to the
Yalta agreement and the territorial provisions of the Japanese Peace
Treaty. The unanimous vote which the committee gave the four
treaties reflected the close cooperation which toot; place between the
committee and the executive branch throughout the negotiations.
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JAPANESE PEACE TRIMI
~. United States aid to Japan
Beginning in 1946, the Congress each year has voted funds to com-
bat disease and unrest in the areas occupied by the United States
military forces and to help reconstruct the economies of the coun-
tries involved. Part of these funds have been allocated to Japan in
the amounts given in the following table and for the broad general
purposes indicated. As the table below indicates the United States
has given in the neighborhood of $2 billion in total, or an average of
over $300 million a year to help Japan with the deficit under which
her economy has been operating.
The figures are as follows:
U. S. GARIOA I aid to Japan, United States fiscal years 1946 to 1951, inclusive
[Millions]
1946
1947-f
1948 ---------------------------------------------
3-------------------------------------------------
1949 --------------------------------------------
1950 ?---------------------------------------?----
1951 ? ------------------------------------- ------
Reorienta-
Economic tion pro-
aid gram
Adminis-
trative
costs
a $101
7
-----
-----
$101.7
.
-------
278.3 $1.2
$12.2
291.7
7 ?7
337
18.0
,354.4
.
8 3.7
506
19.2
529.7
.
9 3.5
415
18.4
435.8
.
176.7 4.0
11.4
192.1
75.2
I 1,905.4
i Government and relief in occupied areas.
2 Department of Army funds used to procure emergency food supplies for Japan; not specified as a
"GARIOA" appropriation; partially estimated.
3 Expenditures (final).
4 Obligations as of Oct. 31, 1951.
5 Obligations as of Dec. 31, 1951.
NOTE.-The above data do not include diverted military stocks or military surplus supplies released to
the Japanese. A financial settlement has been made for certain of these materials and it is anticipated
that a settlement covering the remainder will be negotiated with the Japanese. The fiscal year 1952 OARIOA inclu
$7 million
fort he reorientation on program in Japan and the administrative costs rely ed to the occupattiionof Japan.
5. Complementary agreements to be negotiated
Unlike traditional treaties of peace-which provide for the settle-
ment of the chief areas of dispute between the contracting parties-
the Japanese Peace Treaty leaves a number of important subjects for
future negotiation. The subjects are chiefly of an economic nature,
and are discussed in section 11 (Economic Provisions) of this report,
covering particularly commercial, maritime, fishing, civil aviation,
claims, and related matters.. In addition, it has been necessary for
the United States and Japan to reach an administrative agreement
with respect to the disposition of United States troops in Japan under
the security treaty. It was agreed by the participating parties that
the Japanese Treaty should be primarily an instrument for the termi-
nation of war and for the restoration of Japanese sovereignty. The
committee is pleased to note that the executive branch of the Govern-
ment promptly started negotiations on the important subjects referred
to above. It understands that an agreement relative to fishing between
Canada, the United States, and. Japan has already been drafted and
initialed and is ready for signature as soon as Japan regains sovereign
authority to make treaties. It will also be noted in section 22 Treaty Between the United States and Japan) below, that satisfactory
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t3 A AN ESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
progress is being made on the administrative agreement with Japan.
The committee hopes the complementary pacts with Japan will be
speedily concluded.
B. THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN
6. Nature of the treaty
Perhaps the most notable aspect of this treaty is that it is neither one
of vengeance nor does it conform to the general pattern of postwar
treaties normally imposed by the victorious upon the vanquished.
It is a broad statesmanlike document which is remarkable for the
self-restraint and good will of the victorious powers evidenced therein.
The treaty takes into account the great culture and tradition of
Japan. Furthermore it gives consideration to Japanese dignity and
self-respect. The treaty is one in which Japan is given the opportunity
to achieve peace and freedom while in turn it agrees to live in peace
with others in a spirit of mutual respect.
7. Brief summary of terms of Japanese Peace Treaty
Preamble.-The preamble proclaims that the signatory powers con-
clude the treaty as sovereign equals; it records that Japan intends to
apply for membership in the United Nations, to conform to the prin-
ciples of the Charter, to strive to realize the objectives of the Declara-
tion of Human Rights made by the United Nations General Assembly,
and with respect to trade and commerce, to conform to internationally
accepted fair practices.
Chapter I. State of war terminated.--Article 1 formally ends the war
between Japan and the Allies and recognizes full sovereignty of the
Japanese people over the Japanese home islands.
Chapter II. Territorial provisions. (See sec. 9.)-Japan renounces
all title to the territories the Potsdam Conference announced were to
be taken from her, namely, Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the
Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, the Japanese-mandated islands, Ant-
arctica, the Spratly Islands, and the Paracel Ishands. Japan agrees
to concur in any United States proposal for the placing of the follow-
ing islands under United Nations trusteeship with the United States
as the administering power: The Nansei Shoto, south of 29? north
latitude, including the Ryukyu and Daito Islands; Nanpo Shoto, south
of Sofu Gan, including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and Volcano
Islands; and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Japanese property,
the property and claims of its nationals in the ceded areas, and other
property dispositions are to be the subject of special arrangements.
Disposition of Japanese property under occupation directives is recog-
nized as valid, and Japanese cables connecting the homeland with the
ceded territory are to be divided between the Japanese and the terri-
tory in question.
Chapter III. Security. (See sec. 10.)-Japan agrees to live peace-
ably and in conformity with the principles of the United Nations
Charter, and to settle its disputes with other states by amicable means.
In accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, this
promise is not construed as depriving Japan of the right of individual
and collective self-defense. Occupation forces are to be withdrawn 90
days after the treaty comes into effect, and all Japanese property
supplied to the occupying powers for which compensation has not
been made shall be returned to Japan within the same 90 days. How-
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES 7
ever, foreign troops may be stationed in Japan under appropriate
bilateral and multilateral agreements. All Japanese prisoners not yet
freed are to be returned to their homes.
Chapter IV. Political and economic clauses. (See see. 11.)-In this
chapter arrangements are made for the reentry into force of certain
of Japan's prewar treaties and conventions. The treaty itself is based
on the principle that Japan's economy should be unrestricted. Agree-
ments dealing with commercial, fishing on the high seas, and civil air
transportation problems are to be negotiated and are not spelled out in
the treaty. Pending the negotiation of these various treaties the Allies
are entitled to receive most-favored-nation treatment on the basis of
reciprocal privileges granted to Japan over a 4-year period.
Chapter V. Reparations, claims, and property. (See see. 12.)-This
chapter unequivocally recognizes that Japan is obligated to pay repa-
rations for the damage and suffering it caused during the war. How-
ever, because of its limited resources, Japan is required to apply to
reparations only those assets it has in surplus, namely, excess labor
and unused plant facilities for the processing of raw materials. The
seizure by the Allied Powers of Japanese property within their juris-
dictions is validated, and Allied property confiscated in Japan is to be
returned or compensation made therefor. Japanese property in neu-
tral countries shall be turned over to the International Red Cross for
the benefit of the families of former prisoners of war. Korea is recog-
nized as independent by Japan and entitled to the Japanese property
in that country. China is given the right to a treaty of peace with
Japan on the same terms as the present treaty. China is also given
the full benefits of the article covering reparations payments.
Chapter VI. Settlement of disputes.-Disputes over the interpreta-
tion and execution of the treaty are to be referred to the International
Court of Justice.
Chapter VII. Ratification, protocol, and final clauses.-The treaty
shall come into effect after Japan, and a iajority of 11 specified states,
including the United States, have deposited their ratifications. This
procedure is outlined further below.
8. When the treaty takes effect
Article 23 provides that the treaty shall come into force when the
instruments of ratification of Japan and of a majority of the following
states including the United States have deposited their ratifications:
Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, Kingdom of the Nether
lands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Great Britain, and the
United States. The treaty shall be in force for each subsequent
ratifying state, from the date of the deposit of its ratification.
In the period before the treaty comes into force, the United States,.
as the principal occupying nation, will hold a special position in Japan..
After ratifications are complete, however, all Allied Powers will stand
on a footing of equality. The occupying forces of the Allied Powers
are to be withdrawn within 90 (lays under the terms of article 6.
That article also provides the basis for the stationing or retention of
foreign armed forces on Japanese territory as the consequence of
bilateral or multilateral agreements. Finally (see sec. 5), the supple-
mentary agreements noted elsewhere in this.report will each contain
their own. effective dates.
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8 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
9. Territorial provisions
Chapter II makes provision for the territorial arrangements between
Japan and the Allied Powers. Japan surrenders sovereignty over the
territory which representatives of the great powers at the Potsdam
Conference agreed should be taken from it. Article 8 of the proc-
lamation defining the terms of the Japanese surrender adopted at
Potsdam on July 26, 1945, states:
The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty
shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such
minor islands as we determine.
Article 2 of the peace treaty states, in effect, that Japan surrenders
all rights, claims, and title to all those former Japanese territories
which are not a part of the four main home islands, to wit, Korea,
Formosa, the Pescadores, Kurile Islands, that portion of Sakhalin and
the islands adjacent to it over which. Japan acquired sovereignty as
a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, the islands it
held under the League of Nations Mandate System, any part of the
Antarctic area, the Spratly Islands, and Paracel Islands. It is
important to remember that article 2 is a renunciatory article and
makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed
Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.
During the negotiation of the treaty some of the Allied Powers
expressed the view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve
Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should
indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them.
The committee believes, however, that this would, have been an unwise
course to pursue. It might have raised differences among the Allies
which would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion of the
peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty
enter into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such
areas as South Sakhalin, and the Kuriles.
Committee interpretation of article 2.=Some 'witnesses before the
committee complained that the peace treaty, in leaving the future
status of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles uncertain, in effect gives
validity to the Yalta agreement that sovereignty over these areas
should pass to the Soviet Union. The committee does not subscribe
to this thesis, even though South Sakhalin and the Kuriles are now
under Russian occupation. The peace treaty neither affirms nor
denies the validity of Yalta in this regard. Certainly it does not in
any way imply recognition of Russian sovereignty over the territories
in question.
In this connection, it should be noted that the Soviet Union is not an
original signatory to the treaty nor can it now accede to the treaty.
It is explicit in the treaty (art. 25) that it does "not confer any rights,
titles or benefits" upon any state which did not sign the treaty, and
that the right, title, and interest of Japan is not diminished or preju-
diced in favor of such a nonsignatory. Consequently the Soviet
Union cannot claim any rights under the treaty. Nevertheless, in
order to avoid any doubt or confusion, the committee agreed that
ratification by the United States should be made subject to the
following statement:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate
advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Japan, signed at
San Francisco on September 8, 1951. As part of such advice and consent the
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OT:EIER TREATIES 9
Senate states that nothing the treaty contains is deemed to diminish or prejudice,
in favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or the Allied
Powers as defined in said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin and its adjacent islands,
the Kurile Islands, the Ilabomal Islands, the island of Shikotan, or any other
territory, rights, or interests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941, or to confer
any right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the Soviet Union; and also that
nothing in the said treaty, or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratifica-
tion thereof, implies recognition on the part of the United States of the provisions
in fayy~~r of the Soviet Union contained in the so-called Yalta agreement regarding
Japayof February 11, 1945.
There remains some question as to what the Kurile Islands include,
especially whether they include the Habomai Islands and Shikotan.
The latter are now occupied by troops of the Soviet Union. It is the
view of the United States Government that these islands are properly
a part of Hokkaido and that Japan is entitled to sovereignty over them.
Some question also arose during the hearings as to the disposition
of the Ryukyus which includes the important United States military
base at Okinawa. It was agreed in article 3 that Japan would concur
with any recommendation which the United States might make for a
future United. Nations trusteeship agreement; with the United States
as the sole administering authority over Nansei Shoto, south of 29?
north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands),
Nanpo Shoto, south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands,
Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands), and Parece Vela and
Marcus Island. Pending the establishment of such a trusteeship the
United States will continue to exercise jurisdiction over these terri--
tories and their inhabitants.
Some question has also been raised as to the ability of Japan to
support its 80,000,000 people if it is confined in the future to the four
main homeland islands. The State Department pointed out the fol-
lowing:
* * * A clue to the correct answer is the fact that, when Japan had a vast
colonial empire into which the Japanese could freely emigrate, few did so * * *
Japanese, like other people, prefer to live at home. So far as emigration is con-
cerned, the territorial clauses of the treaty do not establish restraints greater than
those which 98 percent of the Japanese people voluntarily put upon themselves.
It is well to keep in mind, in this connection, that the surrender
terms promised the Japanese "access to raw materials" and "partici-
pation in world trade relations." These promises can be realized only
so long as the parties to the treaty make them possible. The Japanese
people are industrious, inventive, and self-reliant. The conditions o1
the present territorial status of Japan are, the State Department
assured the committee, "* * * no cause for alarm."
10. Security provisions
Chapter III of the treaty deals with the general. problem of security.
Under article 5 Japan agrees to abide by the principles incorporated
in article 2 of the United Nations Charter: to settle its international
disputes by peaceful means; to refrain from the threat or use of force:
in international relations; and to render every assistance to the United
Nations in any action which that organization may undertake in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter. While these provisions
prohibit Japan from resorting to force as an instrument of national
policy, they do not deprive that country of the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense as recognized in article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. In article 5 of the treaty the Allied Powers
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reciprocally agree to be similarly guided by article 2 of the Charter in
their dealings with Japan.
Article 6 stipulates that the occupation of Japan shall end 90 days
after the treaty comes into force. But granting independence to an
unarmed Japan would constitute an empty gesture unless some means
of protecting that independence were also assured. Consequently,
this same article provides that foreign armed forces may be retained
or stationed in Japanese territory pursuant to agreements isbich
may be made between Japan and one or more of the Allied Powers.
The terms are clear that such military forces as are stationed in Japan
will have only such status as Japan chooses to grant them. This
article is the base for the United States security arrangements with
Japan as set forth in the security treaty which accompanies the
Japanese Peace Treaty.
In some quarters it has been argued that Japan would not volun-
tarily enter into security arrangements with the United States,
particularly with respect to the retention of American troops on
Japanese soil. Any such arrangement, the argument runs, would not
be in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese people. The execu-
tive branch sampled public opinion widely in Japan and found that a
large majority of the Japanese people favored it continuing security
relationship with the United States. The vote in the Japanese Diet
on both the peace treaty and the security pact clearly reflect this view.
The committee is satisfied with these assurances.
In recommending ratification of the treaty the State Department
points out that in the world of 1952 it would be a fraud to grant
sovereignty to Japan accompanied only with the token right of indi-
vidual self-defense, as was proposed by some of the negotiating powers.
The security of the Pacific area is being developed on a collective basis,
and any nation which would try to deny Japan the right to that
collective security would be a "conniver at aggression." The security
provisions of the peace treaty are consistent with the security arrange-
ments now being built in the Pacific region, with the dignity and self-
respect of the Japanese, with the interests of the United Nations, and
with the objectives of Allied far-eastern policy.
The committee was interested in the question of any possible
limitations on the Japanese to engage in atomic research or in the
construction of atomic installations. The peace treaty does not
prohibit or even refer to such research. On questioning by the com-
mittee, Ambassador Dulles indicated there was no intention to place
any restriction whatsoever on Japan in this respect. Some committee
members expressed the view that any such restriction would be
impractical if not unwise as an interference with Japanese sovereignty.
Obviously, however, the United States-would be very much concerned
if such research turned in the direction of weapons of destruction.
11. Economic provisions
Like the rest of the treaty, chapter IV, which deals with trade and
commerce, contains generous provisions with respect to Japan. No
restrictions are placed upon its economy. No limitations are imposed
upon its right to trade with other nations. Japan is thus given full
opportunity to maintain its economy on a stable basis.
In chapter IV of the treaty it is agreed that each Allied Power will
notify Japan of the prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with Japan
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES 11
which the former wishes to continue. It is also agreed that most-
favored-nation treatment should be available to the Allied Powers for
a 4-year period on the basis that similar treatment is accorded to
Japan.
Japan renounces several advantages which it had acquired prior
to September 1, 1939. Among these are rights under the Montreux
convention with respect to the Turkish Straits,,rights as a creditor
of Germany, and rights under the Bank for International Settlements.
These are rights which accrued to Japan as a victorious power in
World War I. In addition, Japan renounces any special interests
and rights in China, including such benefits and privileges as were
conferred upon it by the protocol terminating the Boxer Rebellion
signed at Peiping September 7, 1901.
An important segment of Japan's economy is fishing on the high
seas, an occupation pursued by many Japanese. Prior to the Second
World War a number of controversies over fishing rights arose be-
tween Japan and other fishing countries, especially the United States
and Canada. Under article 9 of the peace treaty Japan agrees to
negotiate with the interested Allied Powers bilateral and multilateral
agreements governing fishing and the conservation of fish in the high
seas.
Another economic problem dealt with in chapter IV of the treaty
is trade. In addition to the most-favored-nation treatment referred
to above, Japan agrees for the 4-year period mentioned to conduct
its trade on an individual competitive basis and to make all external
purchases and sales of Japan state enterprises, solely on a commercial
basis. It also declares its readiness to enter promptly into the
negotiation of treaties with the Allied Powers, placing trade, maritime
and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis. These
are important commitments, if one recalls that Japan was making
substantial inroads upon British and American trade in the pre-World
War II period.
Another important commitment contained in the treaty is that
Japan will enter into negotiations with the Allied Powers in order to
reach agreement covering civil aviation. Again in this respect Japan
promises to accord the Allied Powers and their nationals most-
favored-nation treatment with regard to traffic rights and privileges,
and complete equality of opportunity in the operation and develop-
ment of their air services.
These are liberal clauses. They promise Japan a real opportunity
for economic recovery, provided it lives up to its announced inten-
tion in the preamble of conforming to internationally accepted fair
practices and provided also that the Allied Powers accord to Japan
in their domestic legislation the opportunities and possibilities of a
reasonable trade, thus giving Japan a chance to meet its own domestic
requirements.
12. Reparations and debts
One of the most complicated and difficult problems relating to the
Japanese peace settlement centers about the matter of reparations.
During the war Japan inflicted damages 'upon persons and property
that ran into many billions of dollars. It is estimated that the claims
held by various governments against Japan may total as much as
$100 billion. The problem confronting those who negotiated the
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1.2 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
treaty, therefore, was to devise a formula that would make possible
the settlement of some of these claims within Japan's capacity to pay
while still maintaining a viable economy.
Article 14 (a) contains the unequivocal provision that Japan should
pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering
it caused during the war. At the same time article 14 (b) states that,
except as otherwise provided, the Allied Powers waive all reparations
and claims against Japan.
These two sections recognize the limited Japanese economic capa-
bilities with that country's resources reduced by the treaty to those
of the four home islands. They respond to the fact that Japan, has
been unable during the period of occupation to meet the food and raw
materials requirements of its economy by about $2 billion, which
deficit the United States has made good. Obviously insistence upon
the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with
the claims of the injured countries and their nationals would wreck
Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present,
destroy the initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in
which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In
short, insistence upon the payment of claims for reparations in any
substantial amount would be contrary to the basic purposes and
policy of the free nations, the Allied Powers, and the United States
in particular. It should be emphasized, however, that Japan agrees
to pay such reparations as she can shoulder.
At present Japan has an industrial capacity which is not fully
employed. Some of this capacity can be used to process raw materials
which are possessed in abundance by several of the countries with
reparations claims against Japan, Japan in addition possesses a
substantial number of unemployed. These two elements combined
can be utilized to make some restitution for war damages. The
treaty, therefore, provides that Japan shall enter into negotiations
with those Allied Powers which it occupied and damaged in order to
make available the services of the Japanese people in production,
salvaging, and other work. Japan can, therefore, make some small
measure of restitution for the damage it has done.
The committee, while fully sympathetic with the claims of such
countries as Indonesia and the Philippines, believes that the repara-
tions provisions of the treaty are eminently fair. Past experience
demonstrates that these countries stand a better chance of collecting
a portion of their claims than they would if the treaty imposed
reparations far beyond Japan's capacity to pay. In this connection
it should be noted that where the manufacturing of raw materials is
called for, they are to be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so
as not to throw any foreign-exchange burden upon Japan.
Japan also agrees that its property in neutral and ex-enemy coun-
tries shall be transferred to the International Red Cross to be used
for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families. The
purpose of this provision is to distribute these funds on an equitable
basis so as to make some compensation for the hardships which were
suffered by individual soldiers as a result of the Japanese violations of
the Geneva conventions relating to prisoners of war. The United
States has indicated that because our own citizens, who suffered as
prisoners of war under the Japanese, have already received some
compensation out of Japanese assets, equity dictates that comparable
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before further compensation is made to Americans.
Allied property in Japan is to be returned and, where this cannot be
done for practical reasons, compensation will be paid in blocked yen.
Japanese legislation to that effect is now pending in the Diet.
13. Damage suffered by United States citizens
Witnesses, representing several types of American claimants against
Japan, appeared before the committee to point out that adequate pro-
vision had not been made for the compensation of American citizens
who had suffered damage and injury from Japanese actions during the
war. The main examples cited were the confiscation of private bank
accounts of servicemen in the Philippines and the seizure of property
in China.
The committee is, of course, much concerned that just compensation
be secured in deserving cases. As a result of committee interrogation,
and pursuant to the study of memoranda filed by the State Depart-
ment, it now appears that the total of potential claims (as noted in the
section above) against Japan is in an amount well in excess of $100
billion. This amount, of course, includes the claims of all our allies
as well as our own. It would obviously be impossible for Japan to
pay more than a very small fraction of such a huge amount; nor could
American claimants expect preferential treatment.
In determining how to handle the problem of claims, the negotiators
agreed upon the following basic principles:
1. Adequate compensation by Japan is impossible;
2. Japan should make such compensation both in form and
amount as are feasible;
3. Reparations for war losses is a governmental matter to be
settled between governments; and
4. It is the duty and responsibility of each government to
provide such compensation for persons under its protection as
that government deems fair and equitable, such compensation
to be paid out of reparations that may be received from Japan
or from other sources.
Because of the limited ability of Japan to pay its legitimate claims,
our allies in the treaty waive their claims and those of their nationals
in the same way that we do. There are, however, certain compen-
sations provided for in the treaty. Japan agrees to negotiate with
the Allied Powers to provide services-mainly by way of labor and
plant facilities -wherever possible as reparations. Article 14 (a) 2
authorizes the Allied Powers to retain and use for reparation pur-
poses Japanese public and private property subject to their jurisdic-
tion. Article 15 returns Allied property within Japan to the owners,
and article 16 transfers Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy
countries to the International Red Cross.
These provisions do not give a direct right of return to individual
claimants except in the case of those having property in Japan.
As representatives of the executive branch pointed out, individual
remedies must be provided elsewhere.
Japanese property vested by this country as of October 1, 1951,
is approximately $84 million. Certain debt claims of United States
citizens and others are still payable under the Trading With the
Enemy Act. All in all the Office of the Alien Property Custodian
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14 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
has turned over $120 million to the War Claims Commission, of
which amount the latter has paid out $52 million under the War
Claims Act. This leaves a substantial amount available subject to
allocation by the Congress.
In its memorandum of January 31, 1952, to the committee, the
State Department said that-
Allied Powers in whose territory United States nationals sustained property
losses may make such United States nationals eligible to receive such compensation
as they are able to provide for war losses. It does not appear, however, that
American nationals who sustained losses in the territories of any of the Allied
Powers can expect to receive compensation commensurate with their losses.
Accordingly, United States nationals, whose claims are not covered by the treaty
provisions or by the legislation of other Allied Powers, must look for relief to the
Congress of the United States.
Congress has provided that the proceeds of the liquidation of Japanese assets
in the United States are to be paid into a trust fund in the United States Treasury
known as the war claims fund, which is available for the payment of war claims
as provided by the war Claims Act of 1948 (Public Law 896, 80th Cong., 2d
sess.), as amended.
The War Claims Commission has recommended to the Congress
that its powers be extended to include payment of claims resulting
from damages caused by the illegal actions of enemy powers during
World War IT. If these recommendations are enacted into law, they
will serve to meet in part, at least, some of the many and varied claims
of American citizens against Japan.
J4. The peace treaty and Korea
While the Japanese Peace Treaty intimately affects Korea in many
ways, it contains only brief references to that country. The most
important is found in article 2, in which Japan. recognizes the inde-
pendence of Korea. The most extensive is found in article 21, which
states that Korea is to enjoy the benefits of articles 2, 4, 9, and 12 of
the treaty. The latter provisions place Korea on a parity with the
Allied Powers with regard to postwar trading, fishing: commercial,
and maritime arrangements. Thus, even though Korea is not a signa-
tory of the treaty, it is to all intents and purposes a treaty power.
Korea was acquired by Japan early in the twentieth century and
was made an integral part of the Japanese Empire both politically
and economically. In the Cairo declaration Korea was promised
independence but when the war came to an end the arrangements
for receiving the surrender of the Japanese soldiers split the country
along the thirty-eighth parallel. Since then Korea has at no time
been united, and at the present moment it is overrun with military
forces as a result of the aggression launched upon South Korea in
June 1950.
The Japanese Peace Treaty is an expression of the Allied Powers
that they seek to make good their promise of freedom and independ-
ence for Korea, and that they agree to assist the United Nations in
suppressing the aggression against the Republic of Korea. Japan in
her commitments both in the peace treaty and in the security pact,
as well as in the exchange of the Acheson-Yoshida notes, agrees to
continue to assist the United Nations in its efforts to suppress aggres
sion in that country.
Finally, Japan surrenders to the Republic of Korea the very con-
siderable property of Japan in Korea
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15. Relation of Japan to Nationalist and Communist China
In visualizing the future role of Japan in the Far East it is, of course,
important to know the intention of the Japanese Government with
respect to the National Government of China and the Chinese Com-
munist regime. In a letter written to Ambassador Dulles on Docem=
bar 24,'1951, Prime Minister Yoshida expressed the desire of his Gov-
ernment to conclude as soon-as legally possible a treaty with the Na-
tional Government so that normal relations could be restored between
the two Governments. At the same time he outlined the various hos-
tile acts which have been committed against Japan by the Communist
regime in China and which make treaty relations with that regime
impossible. The committee believes the Yoshida letter-even though
it is not a formal agrooment-constitutes a clear-cut statement of
Japan's determination not to recognize the Communist regime under
existing circumstances. Pertinent excerpts from the Prime Minister's
letter (which is printed in full on p. 9 of, the committee hearings)
are reproduced here for the information of the Senate:
The Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political
peace and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan's close neigh-
bor * * *
My Government is prepared as soon as legally possible to conclude with the
National Government of China, if that Government so desires, a treaty which
will reestablish normal relations between the two Governments in conformity
with the principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace. The terms of such
bilateral treaty shall, in respect of the Republic of China, be applicable to all
territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of the
National Government of the Republic of China. We will promptly explore this
subject with the National Government of China.
As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that. regime stands actually con-
demned by the United Nations of being an aggressor and, in consequence, the
United Nations has recommended certain measures against that regime, in which
Japan is now concurring and expects to continue to concur. * * * Further-
more, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance
concluded in Moscow in 1950 is virtually a military alliance aimed against Japan.
In fact there are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime in China is
backing the Japan Communist Party in its program of seeking violently to over
throw the constitutional system and the present Government of Japan. In view
of these considerations, I can assure you that the Japanese Government has no
intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime of China.
16. Japan's trade with the Soviet bloc
Japan's controls over exports of strategic materials to the Soviet
bloc are more restrictive than similar controls imposed by other
nations of the free world with the exception of Canada and the United
States. Although these controls were imposed initially by the
Japanese Government at the direction of SOAP, responsibility for
administration of the control system is being rapidly turned over to
the Japanese Government. Upon the coming into force of the treaty,
the determination of export-control policies will, of course, be the
sole responsibility of the Japanese.
It is impossible to state definitely at this time what degree of con-
trols on the export of strategic materials to Communist countries will
be maintained by the Japanese Government in the post-treaty period.
There is every reason to believe, however, that the Japanese Govern-
ment will continue to cooperate with the other nations of the free world
in maintaining such controls as long as the necessity for them exists.
On two recent occasions Prime Minister Yoshida has expressed offi-
cially the willingness of his Government to cooperate with the free
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16 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
world in this regard. In responding to the United Nations General
Assembly resolution of May 18, 1951, which called for action by
governments to embargo the shipments of certain military and stra-
tegic items to Communist China, the Prince Minister voluntarily
rephcd that his Government was imposing restrictions on trade with
China which met the requirements of the U. N. resolution and'that in
carrying out the purposes of the United Nations embargo his Govern-
ment was prepared to consult on the matter with other cooperating
countries. Referring to the United Nations embargo, Mr. Yoshida
stated in his letter to Mr. Dulles of December 24,, 1951:
As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that regime stands actually con-
demned by the United Nations of being an aggressor and, in consequence, the
United Nations has recommended certain measures against that regime, in which
Japan is now concurring and expects to continue to concur when the multilateral
treaty of peace comes into force * * *
On January 17, 1952, Mr. Yoshida stated in a note to Secretary
Acheson that his Government was cooperating with the United States
policy with respect to export controls as set forth in Public Law 213,
Eighty-second Congress (Battle Act). The Senate will recall that this
act provides for the cessation of United States military, economic, and
financial aid to countries which export strategic materials, arms, am-
munitions, and implements of war, petroleum, and items of strategic
significance to nations threatening the security of the United States.
Accordingly, Japan would suffer the loss of United States aid as the
result of exporting any such materials to Communist-dominated
countries.
In view of these and other indications that the Japanese Govern-
inent intends to cooperate with the United Nations and the United
States, the committee feels that it is reasonable to assume that Japan
can be relied upon to continue to cooperate with other governments
in restricting exports of strategic and military goods to Communist
China and other parts of the Soviet bloc after the coming into force
of the peace treaty.
17. Attitude of the U. S. S. R. toward the Japanese Peace Treaty
Although the U. S. S. R. sent a delegation to the San Francisco
Conference in September 1951, neither the U. S. S. R. nor any of its
satellites joined with representatives of the other nations to give
generous support to an instrument designed to readmit Japan to its
proper place in the family of nations. It became obvious, as the con-
ference progressed, that the Soviet delegates were intent upon doing
everything possible to sabotage the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty.
Among the arguments advanced by the U. S. S. R. in opposition was
the charge that the treaty does not provide for guaranties against the
rebirth of militarism in Japan in such a way that a, repetition of
Japanese aggression would not be possible. Effective guaranties
could only be assured, declared the U. S. S. R., by restrictions on the
size of the various components of the Japanese armed forces.
The U. S. S. R. further took the position that the treaty should con-
tain assurances that the territory of Japan would not be used to main-
tain foreign military bases. It argued that without such specific
assurances the treaty does not serve the purpose of reestablishing
Japan's sovereignty and, in fact, "contradicts the interests of the
maintenance of peace in the Bar East."
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The Soviet delegate also complained of undue leniency in dealing
with the subject of Japanese reparations.
With respect to territorial questions, the Soviet Union strongly
urged that Formosa, the Pescadores, the Paracel Islands, and other
territories wrested from China by the Japanese should be turned over
to the present Communist Chinese Government. The U. S. S. R.,
itself, ]aid claim to South Sakhalin and adjacent islands as well as
to the Kurile Islands, but rejected the provisions making possible
future United States trusteeship over the islands of Ryukyu, Bonin,
Rosario, Volcano, Parece Vela, Marcus, and Daito, which were severed
from the Japanese empire after World War II.
The Soviet bloc repeated over and over that because the Com-
munist Chinese Government was not represented at the Conference,
the United States had proceeded in an unlawful manner to negotiate
a peace settlement. The delegate from Poland later joined in making
this same charge. Ile further asserted that the United States had
acted in violation of the January 1, 1942, declaration by the United
Nations, pledging each signatory government not to make a separate
armistice or peace with the enemies.
The Soviet bloc leveled other -vituperative charges against the
treaty, some of which sound plausible on the surface. Most of these
argumpnts were directed against the United States.
It is interesting to note that of all the 151 Allied delegations repre-
sented at the Peace Conference, those of the Soviet bloc alone failed
to sign the treaty.
18. Relation of treaty to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
During the hearings questions were raised about that part of the
preamble in which Japan states the intention "to strive to realize the
objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
In the peace treaties with the European satellites of Nazi Germany,
special articles guaranteeing human rights were inserted in the operat-
ing clauses of those treaties. However, it is now clear that such
rights are difficult to enforce. In spite of this difficulty, it appeared
desirable to record Japan's good intentions to respect human rights.
Because it has no legal binding effect the preamble was deemed to be
the most appropriate place for such a statement. Since almost all
nations outside the Soviet bloc have accepted the universal declaration
of human rights as a worthy statement of objectives, the Japanese
people wished to be in the same category. It seemed only equitable to
permit Japan to make the kind of statement of intent that it wanted
and that other free nations have made.
The committee wishes to make clear that there is nothing in the
treaty that makes human rights a matter of international contract,
nor which gives any Allied nation the right to interfere in Japanese
internal affairs in order to enforce such rights.
The committee also wishes to make emphatically clear that the
United States in ratifying the treaty in no way undertakes any com-
mitment with respect to human rights. The statement in the pre-
amble is a unilateral Japanese announcement. It is not even a com-
mitment for Japan, much less so for the United States.
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18 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
19. The question of "belligerent rights" of the Soviet Union and Commu-
nist China in Japan
The committee explored in the hearings the :following question:
When the treaty of peace comes into effect, what legal obstacles, if any,
will stand in the way of the Soviet Union or Communist China dis-
patching a military force to occupy Japan on the ground that they are
still at war with Japan and that such occupation. will be merely an
exercise of a belligerent right?
The Department of State, in a memorandum to the committee,
replied that this matter has been given thorough consideration over
the past few years. The Department believes that any risk of Soviet
or Red Chinese military action in Japan is neither increased nor
diminished by purely legalistic considerations. If military action is
taken, it will. be for other than legal reasons. 01 course legal pretext
can always be invented to support any action which these Govern-
ments might elect to embark on.
The committee agrees with the Department that any right of
unilateral occupation will not exist after the treaty comes into force.
The Potsdam surrender terms of July 26, 1945, to which the Soviet
Union later adhered, provided for a single "allied" occupation-not for
separate and independent allied occupations-.to end with the
achievement of certain stated objectives described by article 7 of
those surrender terms as follows:
Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that
Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be desig-
nated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic
objectives we are here setting forth.
Article 12 of the Potsdam terms provides:
The occupying force of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as
these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accord-
ance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined
and responsible government.
Clearly the Japanese Peace Treaty, having been signed by 48 Allied
nations, is conclusive evidence that the objectives set forth in article
7 of the surrender terms in the Potsdam agreement have been attained.
Furthermore it is equally clear that Japan now has a Government
established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese
people; that this Government is peacefully inclined; and that it is a
responsible Government. Under such circumstances, since occupa-
tion is a collective right and the objectives of the occupation have been
obtained, the withdrawal of the occupation forces of the Allies is in
order.
Any effort on the part of any single power to occupy Japan in pur-
suit of what it might elect to describe as belligerent rights would
be a unilateral action in direct violation of the Potsdam surrender
terms, especially if undertaken by the Soviet Union, which adhered
to the Potsdam agreement.
It is not without some bearing on this subject, that article 2 of the
security treaty provides that-
During the exercise of the right referred to in article 1, Japan will not grant
without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights,
powers, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or
of maneuver, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third power.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND IT
Under these commitments Japan would be obligated to oppose any
Soviet or Chinese effort of the kind described above. This would
immediately bring into play the whole far-eastern security arrange-
ment to which the United States and several other countries are now
parties. Therefore not only legally are the Soviet Union and China
barred from undertaking any unilateral occupation of any part of
.Japan, but, if they do so, that act will be open aggression of the broad-
est and boldest kind-an aggression which would only be undertaken
if the aggressor is willing to assume the consequences of starting
world war III.
C. SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
.20. Background
From the moment the war in the Far East came to an end the
United States, as the principal occupying power, hoped to conclude
satisfactory peace arrangements and withdraw our troops from Japan
at the earliest practicable moment. Yet, as time went on and world
conditions grew worse, it became increasingly apparent that this could
not be done safely unless satisfactory provisions could be made to
protect Japan against the threat of Communist aggression. If any
doubt existed on this point prior to June 1950, it was dissipated by the
attack upon the Republic of Korea. Clearly the complete with-
drawal of American troops from disarmed Japan would leave a political
and military vacuum that would seriously threaten our security
interests in the Far East and constitute a real danger to world peace
generally.
Responsible officials in both Japan and the United States recognized
this basic principle. Early in February 1951 Ambassador Dulles
pointed out that the United States would "sympathetically consider"
stationing some armed forces in Japan to assist in the defense of that
country if the Japanese wished. it. On February 11, 1951, Prime
Minister Yoshida responded affirmatively:
The Japanese Government and a preponderant majority of the Japanese
people-
he said-
warmly welcome the Ambassador's invitation to a security arrangement with the
United States for the protection of unarmed Japan by the stationing of United
States armed forces in and about the country. We realize fully our responsibility
to protect ourselves and defend our own land, and do what we can in this respect.
It was agreed that this objective could best be achieved by the
conclusion of a bilateral security pact between the United States and
Japan simultaneously with the conclusion of the general treaty of
peace. To this end article 6 of the peace treaty provides for the with-
drawal of occupation forces as soon as possible. But it also makes
possible the stationing of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory-
under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have
bean or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand,
and Japan on the other.
Thus the bilateral security treaty between Japan and the United
States forms a natural complement to the Japanese Peace Treaty.
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2O JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
21, Provisions of the treaty
The preamble to the security treaty makes clear that Japan, as a
sovereign nation, has a right to enter into collective security arrange-
ments for self-defense purposes. It also emphasizes the desire of
Japan that our armed forces be maintained there so as to deter armed
attack upon the Japanese homeland. Meanwhile, it is expected that
Japan will "increasingly assume responsibility for its own de-
fense * * * "
Article I of the security treaty grants to the United States the right
to dispose land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. It further
provides that these forces may be used not only for the security of
Japan but "to contribute to the maintenance of international peace
and security in the Far East * * * " In view of the role of the
United States in U. N. operations in Korea, this is an important pro-
vision. It makes clear that any forces we might station in Japan
would not be limited to the defense of Japan but could be used for the
maintenance of peace anywhere in the Far East including, of course,
U. N. police action in Korea.
Article I also provides that at the request of Japan our forces there
may be used-
to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through
instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.
This provision recognizes the danger of indirect aggression and civil
war which have been resorted to so effectively by international
communism against legitimate governments in Korea, Indochina,.
Malaya, and elsewhere in the Far East. It should be noted that this,
provision relates to disturbances instigated by an outside power. It
should not be assumed that our troops would be used to put down
disturbances of a purely local or domestic nature. This right to act
against foreign-inspired insurrection is essential to the security of
United States forces in Japan and of Japan itself.
Article II provides that Japan will not grant any bases or military
facilities to any third power without the prior consent of the United
States. This article reflects the special relationship which exists
between Japan and the United States as the, principal occupying
power.
Article III provides for administrative agreements between the two
Governments to cover the disposition of United States Armed Forces in
and about Japan. Obviously the broad grant of power laid down in
the security treaty will have to be supplemented by detailed arrange-
ments dealing with such matters as the facilities and areas to be used,
the rights of the United States in the areas, transit privileges, meteor-
ological services, criminal jurisdiction, imports, taxation, and so on..
An over-all administrative agreement between the two countries is
now in process of negotiation and will probably be completed before.
the security treaty comes into force.
Article IV provides for the termination of the treaty whenever the
two Governments agree that there exist satisfactory alternative pro-
visions for the maintenance of peace and security in the general area
of Japan. Such alternative provisions might emerge in the form of
a strengthened United Nations or in some other form not clearly fore-
seen at present. It is apparent that the treaty constitutes only a first
step in the development of collective security in the Japan area. In,
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ANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES 21
any event, in spite of suggestions which have been made to the con-
trary, it is apparent that the treaty cannot be terminated without the
consent of the United States.
22. United States commitments
The security treaty imposes no commitments or obligations upon
the United States. We are not obligated to station any forces in
Japan unless we decide it is in our own national interest to do so.
On the other hand, the rights conferred in the treaty by Japan are
very far-reaching in nature. They constitute a significant contribu-
tion on the part of Japan to the cause of the free word and to collective
security.
During the hearings the question was asked as to whether any obliga-
tion flowed from the treaty for the United States to aid Japanese
security by supplying such financial assistance as may be required.
Ambassador Dulles replied as follows:
There is no understanding, express or implied, with reference to giving any
particular economic aid or assistance to Japan. Everybody knows what the
United States policy is, and it is natural that the Japanese should feel, as a partner
with us, that they would not be discriminated against. But there is nothing that
has been said or done which gives. anyone in Japan any right to come to us and
say, "You are required to continue to give us economic aid."
What we do will be determined, I take it, by what an enlightened view of our
own self-interest requires. That will be a guide and the policies which the Con-
gress lays down. Within that framework I would believe and hope that Japan,
if it needed it, would be qualified to receive the kind of help which we are giving
others, although Japan would never, in my opinion, need aid in the form of a
grant or a gift.
28. The administrative agreement and the ratification of the peace treaty
During the hearings, committee members asked representatives of
the Defense Department whether the entry into force of the peace
treaty with Japan might interfere with practical military operations
in Korea. General Bradley replied that the treaty might interfere
with such operations unless the administrative agreement contem-
plated in article III of the security pact 'with Japan were in effect.
He pointed out that the agreement, which would make the necessary
arrangements for the location of our armed forces in and about Japan,
was then in process of negotiation. He suggested, therefore, that it
might be wise to withhold ratification of the peace treaty until the
administrative agreement is concluded. The two instruments could
then enter into force at the same time.
More recently the committee has been informed by the executive
branch that negotiation of the administrative agreement has been
proceeding satisfactorily in Tokyo. The committee believes it would
be entirely appropriate, therefore, for the Senate to move ahead with
the peace treaty and the related security pacts at an early date.
Ratification will not occur until the President decides, with Senate
consent, actually to deposit the instrument of ratification.
24. Use of Japanese facilities by U. N. forces
During the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the peace
treaty the United States Government took steps to make certain that
the entry into force of the treaty would have no adverse effect upon
the assistance now being given by Japan to the U. N. effort in Korea.
Under article 5, Japan accepts the obligations set forth in article 2 of
the U. N. Charter including the pledge-
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22 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER 'TREATIES
to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance
with the Charter * * *
While this commitment seems fairly clear, Secretary Acheson, on
September 8, 1951, addressed a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida, in
.which he specifically raised the issue. He pointed out that Japan had.
rendered important assistance to the U. N. in the form of facilities and
services made available to variousU. N. members engaged in theKorean
operation.
Since the future is unsettled-
lie wrote-
and it may unhappily be that the occasion for facilities and services in Japan in
support of United Nations action will continue or recur, I would appreciate con-
firmation, on behalf of your Government, that if and when the forces of a member
or members of the U. N. are engaged in any U. N. action in the Far East after
the treaty of peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitite the support in
and about Japan, by the member or members, of the forces engaged in such U. N.
action * * *.
The Prime Minister's reply was completely reassuring on this .point.
Under date of September 8, 1951, he wrote Secretary Acheson, in part,
as follows:
* * * I have the honor, on behalf of my Government, to confirm that if
and when the forces of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged
in any United Nations action in the Far East after the treaty of peace comes into
force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the
members or members of the forces engaged in such United Nations action, the
expenses involved in the use of Japanese facilities and services to be borne as at
present or as otherwise mutually agreed between Japan and the United Nations
member concerned.
D. SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND TFIE
UNITED STATES
25. Background
As has been pointed out above, one of the main objectives of the
United States in the postwar era has been to strengthen the fabric of
peace in the Far East and elsewhere, so as to minimize the possibility
of a third world war. In Asia we have considered it esssential to the
cause of the free world that those ocean countries marking the western
rim of the Pacific should remain free and independent. Consequently,
as an integral part of the peace settlement in the Far East, and in
addition to the security treaty with Japan, our Government proceeded
to negotiate security pacts with Australia and New Zealand, and with
the Philippines.
The desire of Australia and. New Zealand to establish some sort of
security relationship with the United States is understandable. As a
result of World. War II, these countries feared the resurgence of
Japanese aggression, and they were deeply concerned about the
possibility of Japanese rearmament. Their natural inclination,
therefore, was to think in terns of a peace treaty that would make
such eventualities impossible. They could agree to a generous treaty,
imposing no restrictions upon Japanese .rearmament, only if the United
States would formally express concern for their security and agree
to stand with them in the event of an attack. The security treaty
between the United States on the one hand, and Australia and New
Zealand on the other, gave these countries the assurances they
needed, and at the same time served the national interests of the
United States.
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PACIFIC TREATY AREAS
AUSTRALIA &
NEW ZEALAND
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24 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
26. Provisions of the treaty
Like the Rio Pact and the Atlantic Pact, the security treaty with
Australia and New Zealand provides for consultation and, when nec-
essary, appropriate action. Article III calls for consultation among
the three parties whenever the territorial integrity, the political inde-
pendence, or the security of any of them is threatened in the Pacific.
Under this article there is no obligation to take any action as a result
of the consultation contemplated.
Article IV is the heart of the treaty. Under that article each of the
signatories recognizes that-
an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to
its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common
dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.
The committee noted that the language of article IV, which is based
upon the language of the Monroe Doctrine, is more general than
the specific commitments contained in the Atlantic Pact. It is
believed, however, that the formula which worked so well for so many
years in the Americas will serve to meet the security situation which
we now confront with respect to New Zealand and Australia in the
Pacific.
In view of the general language of article IV, the question naturally
arises as to the type of action contemplated in the event an armed
attack should occur. This problem was raised with Ambassador
Dulles during the course of the hearings. He replied that each coun-
try would have to decide that question-
in the light of the fact that there is recognition that it is a common danger, and
that each will act in accordance with its constitutional processes to meet that
danger.
There is, of course, a whole range of defensive measures which might
be appropriate depending upon the circumstances. Just what might
be done is something that will no doubt be considered by the Council
that is to be set up under article VII of the treaty, or by the consulta-
tions that would normally take place under article III. In any event,
any action in which the United States joined would have to be taken
in accordance with our constitutional processes.
Article V defines, in a geographic sense, the area within which the
treaty is to operate. By the terms of that article an armed attack on
any of the parties includes not only an attack upon the metropolitan
territory of the party but also on the Pacific island territories under
its jurisdiction or on its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in
the Pacific. So far as United States interests are concerned, this is
an exceptionally broad provision. It would mean, for example, that
Australia and New Zealand would be obligated to take appropriate
action under article IV if an armed attack were launched against our
occupation forces in Japan. Likewise, an armed attack against the
former Japanese mandated islands which we are now administering-
the Marshalls, the Marianas, and the Carolines-or an attack upon
the Ryukyu or Bonin Islands over which we will be exercising juris-
diction under the Japanese Peace Treaty, would be considered an
armed attack against the United States and would bring the security
treaty into play.
It is not contemplated that any elaborate international machinery
will be set up as a result of the treaty. Under article VII the parties
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES 25
establish a Council, which consists of their Foreign Ministers or their
deputies, to consider problems relating to the implementation of the
treaty. While the Council will be organized so as to be able to meet
at any time, it is not expected that the Council will find it necessary
to convene often unless an emergency should arise.
The committee paid particular attention to the language of article
VIII. The words "Pending the development of a more comprehensive
system of regional security in the Pacific area" leave the implication
that the treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and the other
security treaties, are but the first step in the creation of a more
effective security system for the Pacific. Representatives of the
executive branch expressed the conviction that there should be a
further evolution in that area although there are at present no plans
for the negotiation of a regional arrangement in the Pacific compa-
rable to the Atlantic Pact or the Rio Treaty. At the moment it seems
impractical to go beyond what is now being proposed, particularly in
view of the reluctance of certain states to enter into a regional secu-
rity pact.
According to the terms of article X the treaty is to remain in force
over an indefinite period. Any party may cease to be a member of
the Council, however, 1 year after notice of withdrawal has been given.
Since the threat to peace in the Pacific is of indefinite duration, the
provision seems to be a logical one.
The committee agrees that the treaty will serve the national
interests of the United States by making clear our mutual interests
and our sense of common destiny with our allies in the Pacific. It
seems highly desirable that our friends as well as our enemies under-
stand that our concern over such matters as the North Atlantic Pact
and the Japanese Peace Treaty in no way implies any lack of interest
on our part in working together for peace with such valuable allies as
New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines.
E. SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
PHILIPPINES
The deep interest of the United States in the welfare and security
of the Philippines dates back to the Spanish-American War. Follow-
ing World War II, relations between the two Governments were
formally established in a series of important agreements. These in-
cluded the Treaty of General Relations, signed on July 4, 1946, which
recognized the independence of the Philippines, and the two agree
ments of 1947 relating to military assistance and the use of certain
bases in the islands.
On April 18, 1951, President Truman, in a public statement, under-
lined the importance which the United States attaches to the security
of the Philippines:
The whole world knows-
stated the President-
that the United States recognizes that an armed attack on the Philippines would
be looked upon by the United States as dangerous to its own peace and safety
and that it would act accordingly.
This is the principle which is incorporated in the security treaty be-
tween the two Governments and which is now before the Senate. In
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JA NESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
a sense it can be said that the treaty merely formalizes a relationship
that has been in existence for some time.
The committee agrees that, in view of the importance of the Re-
public of the Philippines in the Far East and its new status as a sover-
eign state, it would seem highly desirable to include that country on a
basis of complete equality in any collective arrangements for peace and
security in that area. That is why, during the negotiation of the
Japanese Peace Treaty, members of both the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee agreed with the
executive branch that a mutual security pact be concluded with the
Philippine Government. On the Senate side, consultations relating
to this matter took place between Ambassador Dulles and the Far
Eastern Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee.
It will be noted that, in general, the provisions of the treaty with
the Philippines follow very closely the terms of the security pact with
Australia and New Zealand. Since that agreement has been outlined
in section 25 above, it will not be necessary to repeat those comments
here. Suffice it to say the two parties agree to settle their disputes
by peaceful means (art. I), to develop their capacity to resist armed
attack (art. II), to consult if their territorial integrity, political
independence or security is threatened in the Pacific (art. III), and to
take appropriate action in the event an armed attack is launched
against them (art. IV). The treaty does not formally establish a
council as does the pact with Australia and New Zealand, although
adequate provision is made for consultation between the Foreign
Ministers or their deputies.
Article VIII provides that the treaty shall remain in force indefi-
nitely. Either party, however, may terminate it following a 1 year's
notice of its intention to do so.
CONCLUSIONS
In various sections of this report the surrender terms of the Potsdsm
Conference were alluded to. The Potsdam proclamation of July 26,
1945, which ratified earlier wartime conferences, called for-
(1) The elimination of irresponsible militarism from Japan;
(2) The destruction of Japan's warmaking power to be imple-
mented by the occupation;
(3) The limitation of Japanese sovereignty to the four home
islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku;
(4) The complete disarming of Japanese military forces;
(5) The meting out of stern justice to the war criminals; and
(6) The establishment of freedom of expression, and other
democratic institutions in Japan.
The committee believes that in general these objectives have been
fulfilled. Further occupation of Japan would serve no useful pur-
pose and might easily be misconstrued as United States imperialism
Since the end of hostilities it has been the view of the United States
Government that the occupation of Japan should be ended and our
task as victorious occupiers completed at the earliest practicable time.
The committee is fully aware that any action in this area involves
risks. The Soviet Union and Communist China have made clear
their objection and vigorous opposition to the pacts. It is, of course,
problematical if the support of these two countries for the treaties
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would have diminished in any way the danger of aggression to Japan.
The facts, however, are that Japan has no effective defense force
with which to oppose aggression and must depend, for the present
at least, upon the United States and the United Nations for protec-
tion. Since Japan's neighbors on the continent of Asia are branded
aggressors, who pose a real menace for Japan, they also pose the pos-
sibility of involvement of United States troops in Japanese defense. It
is also important to add to these risks the danger to Japan from in-
direct aggression growing out of the newness of her democratic in-
stitutions, which makes them more vulnerable than if they were
mature. Finally there are many problems which Japan must iron
out before she can attain security and stability, not the least of which
are her difficult trade adjustments in the Far East.
But the risks would not be avoided by postponing peace. Indeed,
such inaction would probably bring new and much greater risks.
Positive action for peace is called for by the following considera-
tions: The community of free nations needs Japan, which can be a
strong. force for peace and stability in the Far East. Conversely,
Japan needs the free nations, especially as a bulwark against its
ancient enemy,. Russia. If Japan is to develop its resources and its
productive capacity, and take care of its people, it will need the
independence, peace, and freedom contemplated in these treaties. If
the free world is to maintain faith with itself, it needs to recognize
Japan's freedom. Finally, these treaties constitute an important
contribution toward clarifying the position of the United States in
the Pacific. They are logical and desirable steps in liquidating the
old war and in strengthening the fabric of peace in the Far East against
the danger of a new war.
For these reasons the Committee on Foreign Relations strongly urges
the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the four
treaties.
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APPENDIXES
Because the Japanese Peace Treaty deals with several matters con-
sidered and acted upon at Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam by the heads:
of the major Allied governments, the pertinent parts of these agree-
ments relating to the Far East and Japan are reproduced below.
APPENDIX I
THE CAIRO CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 22-26, 1943
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SEER, AND.
PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL, DECEMBER 1, 1943
The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations.
against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unre-
lenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure
is aheady rising.
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggres-
sion of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of'
territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the-
islands in the Pacific which she has seized-or occupied since the beginning of the
first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from, the
Chinese, ouch as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to
the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from al] other territories
which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers,
mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due
course Korea shall become free and independent.
With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the-
United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and
prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.
APPENDIX II
THE YALTA CONFERENCE: FEBRUARY 4-11, 1945
AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN
The leaders of the three Great Powers-the Soviet Union, the United Staten
of America and Great Britain-have agreed that in two or three months after
Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet
Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition
that:
1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic),
shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan
in 1904 shall be restored, viz:
(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to.
it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,
(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-
eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and
the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U. S. S. R. restored,
(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Rail-
road which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the-
establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES Gy
that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded
and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports
and railroads referred to abovewill require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-Shek, The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence
On advice from Marshal Stalin.
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the
.Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the
National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the
U. S. S. R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces
for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.
JOSEPH V. STALIN
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FEBRUARY 11, 1945
[Made public, March 24, 1947.]
APPENDIX III
THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE: JULY 17-AUGUST 2, 1945
PROCLAMATION DEFINING TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER, JULY 28, 1945
(1) We-The President of the United States, the President of the National
Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain-
representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree
that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British
Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from
the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power
is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prose-
cute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the mi?ht of
the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example
to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably
greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid
waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German
people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will
mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and
just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.
(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be
controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calcula-
tions have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or
whether she will follow the path of reason.
(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no
alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those
who have deceived and misled the people of Japan. into embarking on world
conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be
impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof
that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be
designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic
objectives we are here setting forth.
(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shi-
koku and such minor islands as we determine.
(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be
permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and
productive lives.
(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed
as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including
those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300001-1
30 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies
among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as
well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her
economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which
would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from
control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation
in world trade relations shall be permitted.
(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as
soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established
in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully
inclined and responsible government.
(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional
surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate-
assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is.
prompt and utter destruction.
O
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 Map to Illustrate Territorial Clauses of
THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
Territory or area to which Japan renounces all
right, title and claim under the Peace Treaty.
200 400
200 400
0 CIA-RD5,800453R000100300001-1
"Japan .... renounces all right,
title and claim to Korea, including
the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamil-
ton and Dagelet."- Article 2 (a).
(Korean territory)
(Dagelet)
title and claim to the Kurile
lands, and ...... [southern]$(
NOTE: The dashed outlines below
-ere arbitrary frames designed for
locational purposes; they are not
boundaries or territorial limits.
"Japan renounces all right,
title and claim to the Spratly is-
lands and to the Paracel Islands."
Article 2 (f).
(sovereignty undetermined)
tat\y ., ~~
/ J.S. adminisrretion) kinawa ji
"Japan renounces all right, title
V and claim to Formosa and the Pesca-
dares." Article 2 (b).
(Chinese territory)
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE IPA,
(U.S. administering authori
CELEBES
SEA
tions to place under its trusteeship sys.
(Rosario I.1
tam, with the United States as the sole I (P 0 BONIN
..J_:_.-__.... -. . . iet nnmc
the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Is-
lands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan
(including the Bonin Islands, Rosario
Island
d th
V
l
l
an
e
o
cano Is
ands) and
Parece Vela and Marcus Island." Ar-
ticle 3.
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Pulap Is.,.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300001-1
title and claim to the Kurile Is- o
lands. and ...... (seufher 1Sn4- O
NOTE: The dashed outlines below
are arbitrary frames designed for
locational purposes; they are not
boundaries or territorial limits.
a
stu.gan
O'
;Ma - -\
L1
tP BONIN
ISLANDS
(U.S. administration)
5Agrihan
C, Pagan
MARIANA
ISLANDS
p Saipan
"Japan renounces all right, title and claim in
connection with the League of Nations Mandate
System, and accepts the action of the United Nations
Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the
trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly un-
der mandate to Japan." Article 2 (d).
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE I PACIFIC ISLANDS
(U.S. administering authority) ,
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 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300001-1
Sri/
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