JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC - HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP58-00453R000100010005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 183
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 25, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER
TREATIES RELATING. TO SECURITY IN
THE PACIFIC
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
UNITED STATES
('.OtiERNnIE:NT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1952
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TOM CONNALLY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Georgia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, Rhode Island H. ALEXANDER SMITH, New Jersey
BRIEN MCMAHON, Connecticut BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Arkansas HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR., Massachusetts
JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabama CHARLES W. TOBEY, New Hampshire
GUY M. GILLETTE, Iowa OWEN BREWSTER, Maine
FRANCis O. WILCOX, Chief of Staff
THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI, Staff Associate
C, C. O'DAY, Clerk
MORELLA R. HANSEN, Assistant Clerk
MARY PROCTOR, Assistant Clerk
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CONTENTS
Page
Statement of-
Acheson, Hon. Dean, Secretary of State ------------------------ ~- --1
Allman, Roy G.,attorney -------------------------------------71
Bluemel, Brig. Gen. Clifford------------ -- --- -- ---------
Bradley, Gen. Omar N., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ------------- 15
Coston, Herbert-------------- -- ----- - --- - -------
Devereux, Hon. P. S., Congressman from the Second District-of 67
Maryland--------- ------- ------------------------- ---
Dulles, Ambassador, John Foster, personal representative of the 5 35
President on the Japanese Peace Treaty----------------------- 31
---
r,vans, VV. it., J 1 --------------------- .__
Griswold, Mrs. Frederick, vice president, National Economic Council- 117
Johnson, Rev. William R____-__---------------------------- -- 127
Kendall, Miss Elizabeth A_------------------------------------ 160
Kohlberg, Alfred---- -----------------------------------------
Li.bby, Frederick J., National Council for the Prevention of Wart-_ 154
Magnuson, Hon. Warren G., a United States Senator from the State 54
of Washington ---------------------------------------- --- 76
Muste, A. J., Fellowship of Reconciliation________________________
Uphaus, Rev. Willard, American Peace Crusade___________________ 168
Van Kirk, Walter W., executive director, department of international
justice and good will, National Council of the Churches of Christ-_ 73
Written statements, letters, etc., inserted in record:
Letter from Secretary of Defense Lovett to Senator Connally-___ :__ 4
Letter from Premier Yoshida to John Foster Dulles on Japanese policy 9
toward China __-__-____--_-- ---- --
Letter from General Bradley to Senator Watkins---------------__ 22
Statement of Nationalist Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs ` on 31
Yoshida letter to Dulles - - - _ . _ .
Letter from Dean Acheson to Senator Wiley on belligerent rights of 63
_--__-_ _ -
Soviet Russia and China in Japan ------------------------------
Letter and memorandum from John Foster Dulles on compensation
for claims of the United States Nationals for losses incurred outside
Japan as a result of Japanese military occupation and operations__ 145
Memorandum from the State Department regarding the reference in
the Japanese Peace Treaty to the universal declaration of human 153
rights---------------------------------- ------------------
Resolution of the Daughters of the American Revolution ----------- 177
Statement of the National Society for Constitutional Security ------- 1178
79
Statement of the Japanese American Citizens League - _ -.-- - _ _ - - _ - _ _
Letter from 32 participating organizations in the Twenty-sixth
Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense-------------- 181
Letter from the Women's International League for Peace and Free-
dom 182
---------------------------------------------------?--
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES.
RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
MONDAY, JANUARY 21, 1952
f TNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D, C.
The committee met at 10:30 a. in., pursuant to adjournment, in
the caucus room, 318 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.,
Senator Walter F. George presiding.
Present: Senators George, Green, Fulbright, Sparkman, Gillette,
Wiley, Tobey.
Present of committee staff: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. Marcy,
Mr. O'Day, and Mr. Holt.
Senator GEORGE. The committee will be in order.
The hearing this morning is on the Japanese Peace Treaty and the
security pacts in the Pacific. We will hear first from the Secretary of
State, the Honorable Dean Acheson.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN ACHESON, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary AcIIESON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, it is with deep
awareness of the historical significance of this occasion that I come
before you today for the purpose of presenting to the United States
Senate for its advice and consent four treaties--the Treaty of Peace
with Japan, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, the
Security Treaty with Australia and. Now Zealand, and the Security
Treaty with Japan-the ratification of which will lay a strong founda-
tion for our policy in the Pacific and profoundly strengthen the
community of freedom-loving nations.
The interest of the United States in Asia is historic. Intercourse
between the two continents extends back to the infant days of the
American Republic, when sailing ships navigated the Horn to trade
with China and the East Indies. Our ties with Japan date back to
1853 when Commodore Perry first sailed into Tokyo Bay, ties which
over the years were strengthened by extensive trade and cultural
interchange. Our relationship to the Philippines was for over 40
years that of a guardian, a relationship which by mutual desire and
agreement prepared them for self-government and culminated in
their independence. Our ties with Australia and New Zealand are
based on common language and, institutions and the comradeship
growing out of our association during two world wars.
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2 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
The treaties with Japan which are before you are based on a spirit
of reconciliation and mutual confidence and trust. As early as 1943,
in the midst of war, the United States Government began its planning
for the occupation of Japan, an occupation based not on retribution,
but on altruistic principles directed solely toward the purpose of
rebuilding a peaceful Japan which could assume its full responsibilities
as a member of the community of nations.
The reforms carried out by Japan under the guidance of General
MacArthur and General Ridgway have been far-reaching; militaristic
influences have been eradicated; a forward-looking program of land
reform has been enacted-a program which stands in marked contrast
to the so-called land reforms of Communist-dominated countries;
free labor unions have been fostered; women's rights have been
guaranteed; and a government under civil control and responsible
to the wishes of all the people has been established. These reforms
evoke a sincere response from the Japanese people and were carried
out in a spirit of close cooperation and understanding. The strong
and continuing support which these measures have received from a
majority of the Japanese is indicative of the increasing identity of
interest which has been created between the democracies and Japan.
While Mr. John Foster Dulles, the special representative of the
President, will explain in further detail the bases of our policy toward
Japan and will reply to any questions which you desire to put to him,
I would like to state at this time that the Treaty of Peace with Japan
not only reestablishes Japan as a sovereign, independent nation but
also does justice to the countries ravaged by Japanese aggression.
An integral part of the treaty is Japan's declaration of its intention to
apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances
to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to inter-
nationally accepted fair practices. The treaty confirms the provisions
of the Potsdam declaration that Japan's territory shall be limited to
the four main islands and some minor islands and that Japanese
prisoners of war shall be repatriated. The treaty recognizes that
Japan has to pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and
suffering caused by it during the war. It also recognizes that in view
of Japan's scarcity of resources, these arrangements shall impose
neither additional liabilities on other Allied Powers nor a foreign
exchange burden on Japan. The provisions of this treaty provide a
basis of Japan to take its place in the community of peaceful and law-
abiding nations--a basis clearly confirming to Japan not only its
rights but also its responsibilities.
ASIA'S INDEPENDENCE BASED ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY
However, Japan cannot defend her new-found freedom alone, nor
can any other free nation of Asia stand alone against the ruthless
forces of Soviet imperialism threatening the peace of the world today.
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The continued independence of these countries depends on their
achieving a unity based on principles of collective security which will
deter any would-be aggressor, and it is to this end that the Government
of the United States has negotiated the three security treaties now
presented to you.
In mutual recognition by the United States and Japan of the power
vacuum that would be created in Japan upon the removal of the forces
of the occupation, the United States in the security treaty with Japan
expresses its present willingness to maintain certain of its Armed
Forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan
will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against
direct or indirect aggression.
Furthermore, in order to foster conditions leading to peace and
security in the western Pacific and to relieve the states therein of fears
of any possible revival of Japanese militarism the United States
negotiated with the governments of Australia and New Zealand a
security agreement and confirmed its historical relationship with the
Republic of the Philippines through a treaty of mutual defense. The
essence of the treaties lies in the recognition by each party that an
armed attack in the Pacific area upon one of its partners in the treaty
would be dangerous to its peace and safety. Accordingly, each
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes.
TREATIES AS NUCLEUS OF PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The ratification of these treaties will give courage and hope to
millions of people in the Pacific area, whose primary desire is to live at
peace with their neighbors. It is our hope that these treaties will
serve as a point of departure for the development of an effective system
of regional security in the Pacific.
As Americans, we can be proud of the leadership which we have
taken in negotiating these treaties which reaffirm our historic interest
in the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the countries
of the Far East.
JAPAN'S PEACEFUL INTENTS
It was a hundred years ago this year that Commodore Perry sailed
from the United States to the Far East, an event which was to result
in the end of Japan's isolation and feudalism and in her emergence as a
modern state. During the past century, in the course of her coming of
age, Japan has made mistakes--mistakes which finally brought her to
the brink of disaster. I believe that she has come to a clear realization
of the fallacies of her past actions and that she is now prepardd to
assume her full share of responsibility in the cause of international
cooperation and peace.
The four treaties which are before you will open the way for a new
era in the Pacific.
Mr. Chairman, that is a brief statement which I wanted to make
before the committee this morning in introducing these treaties.
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4 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIDS
TREATIES NEGOTIATED BY JOHN FOSTER DULLF]S
As you know, these treaties have been negotiated by Mr. John
Foster Dulles. The instruction which he got from the President was
dated, to the day, exactly a year before the date of the Japanese
Treaty in San Francisco. During that year he has worked with the
greatest skill, greatest persistence, greatest tact in negotiating these
four important treaties. The President and I have given him all
the assistance which we could possibly give him but the great burden
of the work has fallen upon him. He has been working closely with
the subcommittee of this committee and with the subcommittee of
the House committee keeping all of you,. in both Houses of the Con
gress, fully informed as to each stage of the work.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, at this point I shall ask
that Mr. Dulles should take over the presentation of the four treaties.
Senator GEORGE. Very well, Mr. Secretary. We shall be glad
to hear from Mr. Dulles.
Mr. Dulles, would it be quite agreeable with you to have General
Bradley make a statement before you proceed, or would you rather
proceed in this order?
General BRADLEY. Whatever you wish, Mr. Chairman. I have no
prepared statement. I thought there might be some questions with
regard to the defense treaty which I might be able to answer. But
I have no prepared statement.
Senator GEORGE. In that ease we will hear from Mr. Dulles.
LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LOVETT
General BRADLEY. Mr. Lovett has sent up a letter in case it is
needed.
Senator GEORGE. The letter from the Secretary of Defense will of
course be entered into the record.
lion. Tom CONNALLY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.
DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: My purpose in writing you today is to endorse the
four treaties, regarding peace and security in the Pacific, which the President sub-
mitted to the Senate last week. Taken together, they will strengthen the founda-
tion for United States security in the Pacific. They will furnish a strong shield
for the free nations of the Pacific to ward off Communist imperialism. All four
treaties will benefit the United States in carrying out its extensive responsibilities
in the Pacific.
By many tests, the Japanese people are now entitled to the return of their
sovereignty and independence provided for by the treaty of peace. Their coop-
eration with the objectives of the occupation has been outstanding. They proved
their dependability during the critical months of 1950 when the bulk of the military
occupation forces were stripped from Japan to meet the necessities of Korea. Al-
t
execution of the mission of the hough not a member of the United Nations, Japan has contributed much to the
keeping with the objectives of the I United States that the spirit andeterms of the
treaty of peace should seek to inspire reconciliation, friendship, and cooperation
among Japan and the free nations of Asia. Friendly cooperation between Japan
and the United States will greatly enhance the possibility of maintaining peace
in the Pacific, and thereby enhance also the security of the United States.
More specifically, the security provisions in articles 5 and 6 of the peace treaty
will clear the way for Japan's emergence as a self-reliant nation and helpful partner
in contributing to the security of the free nations in the Pacific in accordance with
the United Nations Charter. The provisions in the treaty, and the exchange of
notes between the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister of Japan on Septem-
ber 8, 1951, on Japan's support for United Nations action in the Far East, will
augment the resources of collective security. At the same time, it is well that the
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OT P C C
treaty of peace obligates Japan to abide by the peaceful principles enunciated in
the United Nations Charter. Although there may be some risks for the United
States in putting this treaty of peace with Japan into effect, the many advantages
of restoring Japan's freedom and sovereignty are overriding.
Extending for over a thousand miles close to hostile forces on the North Asian
continent, Japan is vulnerable to sudden attacks and now is virtually devoid of
effective means to deter or meet them. The United States-Japanese Security
Treaty is of fundamental importance for it permits the United States to be in a
position to make a provisional military contribution toward deterring or meeting
such threats to Japan and thereby contribute to the peace and security of the
Far East. It will consequently directly benefit the security of the United States.
The specific arrangements called for in article III on disposing United States
Armed Forces in and about Japan are essential to carry out the purposes of
article I. These arrangements will be contained in an administrative agreement
which isnow in process for negotiations with the Japanese Government. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised me that from the military point of view the
TJnit:ed States-Japanese Security Treaty and the administrative agreement are
mutually interdependent and should therefore come into effect simultaneously.
I concur in these views and I hope it may he possible for the Senate to give full
consideration to this factor of interdependence in connection with its action on
the United States-Japanese Security Treaty.
The Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand are also essential parts of the
i shield of security in the Pacific. They served valiantly beside ~us in World Wat II;
they are now our partners in the search for peace in the Pacific. The mutual
defense treaty between the United States and the Philippines, and the security
treaty with Australia and New Zealand bring elements of mutual security to the
search for protection against aggression or hostile attack in the Pacific.
Acceptance of these four treaties will add t:o the total collective strength of the
free world. It is appropriate for the United States to join in ratifying tiem
I respectfully recommend their adoption.
Sincerely yours,
ROBERT A. LovrT'r.
Mr. Dulles, we are quite familiar with your work, particularly the
subcommittee with which you have conferred from time to time, but
we should be very glad to hear from ,you at this time, and no doubt
there will be questions which the committee would like to ask you.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN FOSTER DULLES, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE JAPANESE
PEACE TREATY
Mr. DULLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As Secretary Acheson has said, your committee is very familiar
with these treaties, particularly the Far Eastern Subcommittee:
Indeed, it can properly be said that you have helped write these
treaties. Under those circumstances, and because the letter of trans-
mittal from the President contains a rather detailed article-by-article
summary of the treaty, with your permission, I would like to make a
rather general statement, and then supplement it by answers to ques-
tions that I am sure your committee will want to put.
BASIC PROPOSITION UNDERLYING NEGOTIATIONS _
However, there are certain basic propositions that should be kept
clearly in mind, because those basic propositions are controlling, I
think, as to the general course we take in this matter.
1. Community of free nations needs Japan
The first proposition I have to submit is this: The community of
free nations needs Japan. Japan is not just a spot on the map' that
we see. Japan is a living community which can contribute largely
to the happiness and well-being of others.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND
OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Japan's culture, both ancient and modern culture, commands world-
wide appreciation and acclaim. The Japanese, I think, more than
any other people in the world, know how to get happiness out of
beauty. Their craftsmanship is of a very high order. They are
highly literate and industrious and they are brave, as you well know.
They know the west better than most eastern countries, and for that
reason, they are peculiarly qualified to help in the very important
task of bringing about better understanding between the east and
the west.
Japan is the only important industrial Nation of Asia. Its existing
plants, at full capacity, can Produce 10 million tons of crude steel
each year and they can launch at full capacity 800,000 tons of ships
each year. Japan, through its skills, industry, and its trade, cannot
only achieve for itself a good measure of well-being, but can do so in
ways which are going to help the other underdeveloped countries,
particularly in Asia, themselves to develop better their resources and
achieve for themselves a better well-being and a greater industrial
capacity for themselves.
That is one side of the picture. When we look at the other side,
we can see that if perchance Japan, instead of being one of the free
nations, should become a captive Soviet country, that would involve
a major shift in the present power position in the world today. Japan's
capabilities could be exploited to give long-range overseas striking
power to the vast human and natural resources which the Soviet
Communists already control in Asia. Stalin, whose views on these
matters certainly are not negligible, has said that with Japan, the
Soviet Union would be invincible.
The Soviet leaders do not disguise the fact that they seek, above all,
to get control of the industrial capabilities of Germany and Japan.
Those are the two kespots that they are working for. If they came
into control of both-these countries, and perhaps if they came into
control of either of these countries, the stage would be set for a
climactic struggle, the outcome of which would be doubtful.
The community of free nations needs to deny to the Soviet Union
the chance to use Japan for evil and it needs for itself Japan's great
capability for good.
2. Japan needs community of free nations
Now my second proposition is this: If the community of free
nations needs Japan, so equally Japan needs the free world com-
munity.
Czarist Russia has been the historic enemy of Japan, and the
Soviet Communists have enthusiastically taken over that role.
They have closed in on Japan, seizing its northern islands and their
effort to conquer Korea has obviously been for the purpose of com-
pleting the encirclement of Japan. They have refused to repatriate
the Japanese prisoners that they took. At the San Francisco con-
ference, which several of you attended, we saw the Soviet Union
give a preview of its real intentions as regards Japan, when it de-
manded that the peace treaty should give the Soviet Union in per-
petuity the exclusive right to patrol the straits which surround Japan
and even the home waters which divide the home islands of Japan.
The Japanese, now wholly disarmed, need collective security as is
envisaged by the United Nations Charter. Without that, Japanese
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 7
sovereignty would vanish in a matter of hours, and the new hopes and
worthy ambitions which now inspire the Japanese people would be
ruthlessly extinguished.
3. Peace and freedom essential to Japan
My third proposition is this: The mutual goals of Japan and the
free community can be obtained only if Japan gets peace and freedom.
The Japanese are a proud and sensitive people. They have demon-
strated the capacity to be a great people, although at times they have
misunderstood the nature of true greatness.
They accepted, in defeat, the Potsdam surrender terms which were
severe and they have scrupulously and honorably carried them out,
and have lived tip to every particle of those surrender terms. They
expect, and rightfully expect, that their victors will be equally honor-
able and equally scrupulous.
The Japanese people would deeply and justifiably resent being kept
in subjection for reasons which are unrelated to the surrender terms.
GENERAL MAC ARTHUR'S ENUNCIATION OF JAPANESE RIGHTS
General MacArthur who for 51 years administered the surrender
terms as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was uniquely in a
position to judge whether and when Japan was entitled to liberation.
In June 1950 lie had this to say:
The Japanese people have faithfully fulfilled the obligations they assumed under
the instrument of surrender and have every moral and legal right to the restora-
tion of peace. On this point all of the Allied Powers concerned are in full accord
and publicly committed and their failure to protect Japan in this right would be
a foul blemish upon modern civilization. We should not allow ourselves to be
deterred from moving invincibly forward along a course which we ourselves and
the entire world recognize to be morally and legally right.
He went on to say that failure to satisfy Japan's moral and legal
right to restoration of peace and complete sovereignty would, in fact,
be looked upon in Japan and throughout Asia as colonization, and
limitations upon Japan's sovereignty, even if we could get them to be
legally conceded by Japan., would be of little practical value because
their effectiveness would in turn, as lie put it-
be limited by the bitterness and resentment which would thereafter dominate the
Japanese mind.
These statements were made by General MacArthur approximately
a year and a half ago and they inspired the Japanese Peace Treaty
and the security treaties now before you. I have seen General
MacArthur within. the last fortnight and he has told me he holds to
the same views I have told you about.
/F. Japan a reliable member of community of free nations
My fourth proposition is this: Japan can be relied upon to be a
dependable member of the community of free nations.
The Japanese are an intensely patriotic people who love their
country and their distinctive culture and their civilization. They
respect and revere their Emperor and the. stability and unity of the
nation which lie symbolizes.
The Japanese people, with their new privileges and dignities, and
the industrial workers with their new bargaining powers, and the
farmers who have now largely become owners instead of tenants,
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.cherish the now rights and new opportunities which have come to
them under the wise policies of the occupation and which are reflected
in the new Japanese Constitution and postsurrender legislation. All
the Japanese people long fervently for lasting peace which will erase
the awful horror of the last war.
IDENTIFICATION OF JAPAN WITH RESISTANCE AGAINST
KOREAN AGGRESSION
One of the most striking things of recent months has been the intense
voluntary identification of the Japanese people with the resistance of
the United Nations to aggression in Korea. They have done so in
ways that have been dramatic and which, incidentally, have incurred
the outspoken wrath of the Soviet Union and Communist China.
To illustrate that I would mention that the Japanese have enforced
in the strictest possible manner the United Nations' recommendation
with respect to embargoing trade with the Red China and North
Korea. They facilitated the passage of United Nations troops and
supplies over the overburdened transportation system of Japan by
giving them the highest priority.
They have turned over their best hospitals and their resort hotels
to the invalided persons of the UN who have been evacuated from
Korea. They have manufactured and shipped gratis to the civilian
population of Korea 2;/2 million yards of cotton cloth. They have
offered blood donations to a degree which has far exceeded the quotas
which were suggested by the United Nations.
Most significant of all perhaps is the fact that when the United
States Armed Forces withdrew from Japan for use in Korea, so that
there was a considerable period when there was not a single United
States combat soldier in all of Japan, there was, during that period,
not a single instance of Japanese insubordination to the occupation
and in effect the Japanese took over the policing job themselves and
their own employees became the effective guardians of our own in-
stallations in Japan.
INEFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IN JAPAN
Now, of course, in Japan, as in every country of the world, there are
some confused and misled people, and Communist propaganda is
working very intensively in Japan to multiply their number. In that
connection you probably saw the new year's message which Stalin
sent to the Japanese. people. But this propaganda does not have any
great effect in Japan because the overwhelming majority of the
Japanese people know full well where their mortal enemy is and who
it is and they are able to identify him.
They know that if they fell under the Soviet Communist domina-
tion, that would mean an end to the national independence of Japan;
it would mean that the Emperor would be liquidated as a so-called
war criminal. They know that all their newly won human rights, and
their dignities would vanish, and that instead of having peace the
Japanese people, like the unfortunate peoples of North Korea and of
communistic China, would be compelled to pour out their lifeblood to
serve the ambitions of their foreign masters.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 9''
In this connection I would like to call attention to the statement of
the Japanese Prime Minister in his letter written to me on December
24, which I received earlier this year by pouch.
PREMIER YOSHIDA'S WISH TO ESTABLISH TREATY RELATIONS WITH
NATIONALIST CHINA
In that letter the Prime Minister declares his government's inten-
tion and desire to establish treaty relations with the National Gov-
ernment of China. In that letter the Prime Minister sets forth the
various acts of hostility against Japan for Which the Communist
regime in China is responsible and which, in the judgment of the
Prime Minister, preclude the Japanese from having treaty relations
with that regime. The Japanese Government in this matter shows
insight and courage which I think cannot but command our respect
and our admiration.
I would like in clue course to introduce into the record, Mr. Chair-
man, a copy of that letter from the Prime Minister.
Senator GEORGE. I would be glad to have you do so.
(The letter is as follows:)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
January 16, 1951r.
For the press.
Following is the text of a letter from Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan,
to John Foster Dulles which was made public by the Prime Minister last night
(January 16 Tokyo time) : THE GAiMUSHO,
December 24, 1951..
No. 37.
His Excellency JOHN FOSTER Dnnnis.s,
The Department of State, Washington, D. C.
DEAR AMBASSADOR DUi,L,ES: While the Japanese Peace Treaty and the United
States Japan Security Treaty were being debated in the House of Representa-
tives and the House of Councillors of the Diet, a number of questions were put
and statements made relative to Japan's future policy toward China. Some of
the statements, separated from their context and background, gave rise to mis-
apprehensions which I should like to clear up.
The Japanese Government desires ultimately to have a full measure of political
peace and commercial intercourse with China which is Japan's close neighbor.
At the present time it is, Nye hope, possible to develop that kind of relationship
with the National Government of the Republic of China, which has the seat,
voice and vote of China in the United Nations, which exercises actual govern-
mental authority over certain territory, and which maintains diplomatic relations
with most of the members of the. United Nations. To that end my Government
on November 17, 1951, established a Japanese Government Overseas Agency in
Formosa, with the consent of the National Government of China. This is the
highest form of relationship with other countries which is now permitted to Japan,
pending the coming into force of the multilateral treaty of peace. The Japanese
Government Overseas Agency in Formosa is important in its personnel, reflecting
the importance which my Government attaches to relations with the National
Government of the Republic of China. MIy Government is prepared as soon as
legally possible to conclude with the National Government of China, if that
Government so desires, a treaty which will reestablish normal relations between
the two Governments in conformity withthe principles set out in the multilateral
treaty of peace. The terms of such bilateral treaty shall, in respect of the Re-
public of China, be applicable to all territories which are now, or which may
hereafter be, under the control of the National Government of the Republic of
China. We will promptly explore this subject with the National Governin4tit of
China.
As regards the Chinese Communist regime, that regime stands actually, con-
demned by the United Nations of being an aggressor and in consequence,. the
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10 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
United Nations has recommended certain measures against that regime, in which
Japan is now concurring and expects to continue to concur when the multilateral
treaty of peace comes into force pursuant to the provisions of article 5 (a) (iii),
whereby Japan has undertaken "to give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations may take preventive or
enforcement action". Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow in 1950 is virtually a
military alliance aimed against Japan. In fact there are many reasons to believe
that the Communist regime in China is backing the Japan Communist Party in
its program of seeking violently to overthrow the constitutional system and the
present Government of Japan. In view of these considerations, I cn assure you
that the Japanese Government has no intention to conclude a bilateral treaty with
the Communist regime of China.
Yours sincerely,
COMMUNIST BAIT TO JAPAN
Mr. DULLES. Now I do not deny, or try in any way to evade the
fact, that the Communist mainland has raw materials and markets
which the Japanese could use to advantage. The Communists can
offer what looks like attractive economic bait to the Japanese people.
But I feel completely confident that the Japanese people, before they
bite on that bait will be wary, knowing that this bait may be on a hook
and that the hook may be on a line and that the line may run to
Moscow.
JAPANESE AWARENESS OF SOVIET BAIT
The Japanese see the Soviet and the Chinese menace for what it is,
and they can be trusted to resist that menace to the limit of their
ability. Also their ability in these matters is considerable because
the Japanese have had a long experience in dealing with Russian and
Oriental ways. The Russian menace to Japan is not something new.
The Japanese idea as to how to deal with this may not always be
exactly identical with our own, but that fact will not automatically
mean that the Japanese views are wrong or that they are disloyal to
our common cause.
I do not ignore the fact that unless the 84 million people of Japan
find a way of decent survival in freedom they may eventually fall into
the so-called security of captivity. But given reasonable access to
free world markets and sources of raw materials Japan can prosper
without any major dependence on Russia or Communist China.
That fact I think is convincingly demonstrated by what has actually
happened over the last few years.
JAPAN'S COOPERATION WITH EMBARGO ON SOVIET STRATEGIC GOODS
Even before the enactment of our last Congress, the last session in
this Congress, the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951,
the so-called Battle Act, the Japanese had been wholeheartedly co-
operating with the United States policy to prevent the export to the
Soviet bloc of any goods of strategic significance.
Within the last few days, in fact, on January 17, we have received
the Japanese certification under the Battle Act that they have imposed
not only a total embargo upon the shipment to the Soviet Union and
countries under its domination-the language of the Battle Act-of
items deemed by us to be of strategic importance, but that Japan is
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIE'S 11
also controlling the export to the Soviet bloc of additional items not
subject to embargo under title I of the act but subject to control under
title II of that act.
But this recent action by the Japanese Government under the terms
of the Battle Act is merely a reflection of what has already been
going on.
NEGLIGIBLE TRADE BETW SEN JAPAN AND COMMUNIST MAINLAND
Trade between Japan and the Communist mainland for some time
has been negligible. I call your attention to the fact that during the
first 9 months of 1951 the trade of Japan with the Communist main-
land of China has amounted to less than 1 percent of Japan's imports
and less than 1 percent of Japan's exports.
As Prune Minister Yoshida said at the San Francisco Conference:
the role of China trade in Japanese economy, important as it is, has often been
exaggerated, as proven by our experience in the past 6 years.
JAPAN'S SU13STANTIAL RECOVERY FROM WORLD WAR II
Now let us look at the "experience of that past 6 years. Duffing
those 6 years, without any large trade with Russia or China, Japan's
economy has been substantially rebuilt and her living standards, ex-
cept for lrousing, have been restored approximately to those of pre-
war. It is true that this has involved a substantial amount of eco-
nomic help from the United States, averaging about $400,000,000 a
year for the first 5 years of this 6-year period.
On the other hand, these first 5 years were abnormal yearss for
Japan, involving as they did, the rehabilitation of her industry from
the dislocations of war. TO illustrate how great that rehabilitation
has been, I point out to you that in 1946 Japan's industrial output
was 33 percent only of the prewar average, and by 1951 it had come
to be 140 percent of the prewar average.
Exports in 1946 averaged about only $6i2 million per month,
whereas the current into of export is about $125 million per month.
During the past year Japan has more than earned its own way in
the world without any grants from the United States but with, of
course, the help of receipts from economic services rendered in Japan
for account of the United Nations action in Korea and other expendi-
tures by United States forces in Japan. But this is a source of dollar
revenue which Japan will continue for some time to earn in conse-
quence of United States and United Nations expenditures in the area
for security and economic purposes.
JAPAN'S PRIMARY NEED FOR ACCESS TO WORLD MARKETS
Concededly Japan's economic future involves uncertainties as in-
deed does the economic future of almost any country. But unless
the free nations become irresponsible in their attitudes Japan will not
be forced by economic conditions to aline itself with the Communist
mainland area or be forced to strengthen the Communist military
potential by its exports.
Japan will need what the Potsdam surrender terms promised,
namely, "access to raw materials" and "participations in world'trade
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12 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
relations." She will need to modernize her industrial plant which is
now somewhat obsolete and develop further her large natural sources
of hydroelectric power. Such needs will call for technological help
which the United States can supply, and indeed now is supplying, and
it perhaps calls for foreign investments from public or private sources.
As a long-range proposition, looking ahead over many years, it can
be said that it is obviously abnormal that Japan should be perma-
nently divorced from the raw materials and the markets which are
close at hand. But even accepting that fact we do not need to con-
clude from it that Japan must eventually become a Communist
satellite. There is another assumption, and a sound assumption,
and that is that the present situation on the mainland must be
changed, so that China's national interests and her peoples' true
aspirations will not continue to be sacrificed to the alien imperial
designs of Moscow. In other words, we must and can assume that
there will be a change from the present China situation which now
compels the free nations temporarily to restrict closely their economic
relations with the mainland of China.
COMMUNISM IN CHINA ONLY TEMPORARY
I can say to you with complete assurance that the best informed
Japanese are totally convinced, as I think we are, that the alien
doctrine of communism cannot permanently conquer the Chinese
spirit or liquidate the innate individualism of the Chinese race. The
Chinese nation will not permanently suffer the imposition of a tyranny
which places it in the service of alien masters.
There will be an end to a tyranny which the Chinese themselves
will come more and more to hate. We should assume the imper-
manence, not the permanence, of the present Moscow oriented rule
of China.
We cannot expect that this change in China will take place
automatically.
NECESSITY OF PROMOTING FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE IN ASIA
To realize that change will require something besides negative and
purely defensive policies in Asia on the part of the free world, notably
the United States. It will require a determination to promote free-
dom, and independence in Asia and action consistent with that
determination as opportunities arise.
The mood of the people of Japan, like the mood of other free peoples
who are close neighbors of Asian communism will, in the long run,
largely depend on the attitude and action of the other free nations.
If they persevere in positive policies in support of real national
independence in. Asia, Japan will be a dependable and able coadjutor.
5. Faith in freedom
My fifth proposition is this: We can and should have faith in
freedom.
It is not possible to predict with absolute certainty what the future
will be in Asia, and in a sense the Japanese Peace Treaty is an act of
faith-faith that the best weapon against despotism is not more
despotism, but more freedom. It was because the peace treaty was
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 13
infused with that spirit that it attracted unprecedented support
throughout the free world.
At the San Francisco Conference I had the honor to make the
opening statement on behalf of the United States delegation. I used
certain words there which will perhaps bear repetition here. Those
words are these:
There are, in Japan, new-born institutions of freedom. But they will not
flourish if military rule. continues indefinitely to be supreme.
Dignity cannot be developed by those who are subject to alien control, however
benign.
Self-respect is not felt by those who have no rights of their own in the world,
who live on charity and who trade on sufferance.
Regard for justice rarely animates those who are subjected to such grave
injustice as would be the denial of present peaoe.
Fellowship is not the mood of peoples who are denied fellowship.
Those sentiments, Mr. Chairman, became-as those of you who
were there will recall-the central theme of the entire Conference as
delegate after delegate of other countries responded to that note.
The Foreign Minister of Pakistan said of those words that they
would "resound around the globe." The chief delegate of Ceylon,
the brilliant Minister of Finance, reminded us that the people's of
Asia had always had a special admiration for Japan because Japan
had been able to resist western colonialism to which most of Asia
had been subjected, and he said that failure to restore Japan's freedom,
would be bitterly resented throughout Asia.
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AN ACT OF FREEDOM
What the United States proposed by this treaty caught the imagi-
nation and won the good will of the free nations assembled at` San
Francisco because, at a critical time and at a critical place, the United
States again demonstrated its faith in freedom and its faith that'men
in freedom are more to be depended upon than men in bondage.
The treaty was an act of faith in freedom. That is why 48 free
nations of the world joined in a dramatic unity of peacemaking, the
like of which the world has never seen before. That is why the
Soviet delegation went down to its most ignominious defeat in con-
ference history, as it became clear to all that were assembled there
that the words of the Soviet delegates actually masked an intention
to hold the Japanese people in bondage.
FEAR OF UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER
In recent years, Mr. Chairman, our Nation has become for the
first time in its history very powerful in an economic way and., in a
military Way. That always brings with it a certain temptation to
seek certainty through coercion and through imposed contracts rather
than to put trust in freedom. There. are some people in other countries
who fear that the United States, which they knew and loved,, may
succumb to that temptation, the, temptation of its now power, alid in
consequence, some of them now shun an intimacy with the United
States which, in earlier days, they would have sought.
Those who seek certainty through impositions which deny freedom
are taking a stupid course. Because though initially they may get an
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14 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
illusion of certainty, it is an illusion which is sure to be quickly shat-
tered by rebellious conduct.
This Nation found its true greatness in its dedication to human
liberty and throughout our history we have found strength and secu-
rity in the good will of men everywhere who loved freedom and who
looked upon us as the champion of freedom.
I feel confident that it is the overwhelming desire of the American
people that their foreign affairs should be conducted in accordance
with that great tradition. We have sought to do so in this matter.
The Japanese Peace Treaty is essentially an act of liberation, and I
feel confident that this Senate will voice its approval of that act.
6. Need for spelling out United States position toward Pacific area
My sixth proposition is this: The United States should make clear
its concern; not merely with Japan, but also with our former allies in
the Pacific-namely, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.
There is really no doubt in any quarter that an armed attack upon
Australia, New Zealand, or the Philippines would in fact, involve the
United States. The peoples and the governments of these countries,
however, feel understandably that our position in this respect could
usefully be formalized, particularly in view of the new relationship
which we will be formally assuming toward Japan by virtue of the
peace treaty and the United States-Japanese Security Treaty.
Indeed, the interest of the United States also will be served by mak-
ing it unmistakably clear in Monroe Doctrine language our sense of
common destiny with the brave Pacific peoples who were with us in
the great Pacific war. It is highly appropriate that not only our
friends but our potential enemies should learn that our concern with
Europe, evidenced. by the North Atlantic Treaty, and our concern
with Japan in no sense implies any lack of concern for our Pacific
allies of World War II or any lack of desire to preserve and deepen our
solidarity with them for security.
The security treaties with these three countries is a logical part of
the effort not merely to liquidate the old war, but to strengthen the
fabric of peace in the Pacific as against the hazard of a new war.
UNITED STATES INTEREST IN COUNTRIES NOT PARTIES TO SECURITY PACTS
And in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would say that of course these
four treaties before you do not mark the outer bounds of our concern
in Asia and the Pacific. The United States has a deep interest in the
peace, security, and welfare of many Asian nations who are not parties
to the security treaties now before you.
Indeed, even as regards the four Pacific nations which now join with
us in these security arrangements, it may be that the presents separate
arrangements are not the last best word. You will note, in the reading
of these treaties, that each one of them indicates the expectation of the
parties that there will be further development of security in the Pa-
cific area.
These steps for peace and security which we are now taking are
only a beginning. There will be continuing need for the United States,
in cooperation with other free nations, to sustain an ever-mounting
initiative in Asia and to develop an ever-growing relationship of
fellowship with the peoples of Asia who would be free. It is, however,
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 15
necessary to consolidate our present position before we move on, and
that consolidation involves the ratification of these treaties.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Dulles. Before pro-
ceeding with questions, is it agreeable to hear from General Bradley?
General, I believe you said you had no formal statement?
STATEMENT OF GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General BRADLEY. No, sir. I have no written statement.
The Defense Department is in full accord with these treaties., We
have only one concern, Nlr. Chairman, and that is the question of
timing. That is, that we would hope the peace treaty would not
take effect until the administrative agreement with Japan is arranged
and that it go into effect at the same time.
Senator GEORGE. You may have a seat, General. We may wish to
ask you questions on that point.
Before asking any questions, I would like to say the distinguished
chairman of this committee has been detained this morning and
probably will not be able to take over in this matter until a later
session of the committee, today or tomorrow. We regret his absence.
POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE OF PEACE TREATY WITH MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN KOREA
General, I would like to ask you one question. I think you have
indicated it already in your brief statement. It is a question to which
the Secretary or Mr. Dulles would like to address themselves later on.
Will the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan interfere with prac-
tical military operations in Korea assuming that a cease-fire algid end
to hostilities is not reached?
DESIRABILITY OF WITHHOLDING ACTION ON TREATIES UNTIL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT BECOMES OPERATIVE
General BRADLEY. In our opinion, the treaty itself might interfere
with these operations unless the administrative agreement goes into
effect at the same time. I believe that the provisions of the adminis-
trative agreement should cover that point, and if they are covered
in the administrative agreement, then any interference would be at a
minimum.
Senator GEORGE. General Bradley, you may now answer such
questions as other members of the committee may wish to aslk you.
Senator GREEN. I would like to ask, what is the present status of
the proposed administrative agreement?
General BRADLEY. The different Government agencies here in
Washington have been working on a proposal that they wish to propose
to the Japanese Government. That draft has just about been com-
pleted. There will be a team headed by Mr. Rusk, which I believe
plans to leave on Wednesday to go to Japan to discuss this adminis-
trative agreement with the Japanese authorities. So I would say,
the status is that our own Government is just about ready to start
discussions with the Japanese on this draft.
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10 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Senator GREEN. Would it be your advice not to take action on
these treaties until that agreement is completed?
General BRADLEY. From a military point of view, that would be
desirable, sir, because I think that we might have considerable diffi-
culties if the treaty became effective before the administrative agree-
ment was signed.
Senator GREEN. Thank you.
Senator GEORGE. Senator Tobey?
Senator TOBEY. I have no questions, only of Mr. Dulles.
Senator GEORGE. We will ask Mr. Dulles to come back at this time..
Senator TOBEY. Mr. Dulles, before asking this series of questions,
I would state that these questions are not my own, but they are then
questions of Senator A. V. Watkins who asked Mr. Wiley to ask them
of you. Mr. Wiley went out so I will ask them of you.
Mr. DULLES. Excuse me a moment. Could I supplement with
one word what General Bradley said about this?
Senator GEORGE. Yes, of course.
Mr. DULLES. I would like to point out that the coming into force
of the treaty depends, for a period of 9 months, upon the concurrent
action of several other countries. It is not likely that the treaty
could come into force for a period of several months. Under the
provision of the treaty, for 9 months it cannot be brought into force
except as there is a deposit of ratification by 6 countries of the 11 Who,
are named in the treaty. So far, only one of those countries has:
ratified the treaty, and that is the United Kingdom. There is likely-
to be a very considerable period of time before the treaty comes into
force, and it is fully the expectation of the Department of State, I
understand, as well as the Defense Department; that the administra-
tive agreement will, in fact, be concluded before the treaty comes into
force. There is no difference of opinion between us on that point.
Senator TOBEY. I would like to say to you and to Secretary Ache-
son that I have listened to each of your presentations this morning
with a great deal of pride and satisfaction that I am an American.
I want to compliment you both for what you have done. It is,
inconceivable to me that any Member of the Senate could cast a vote
against the ratification of these treaties. I would be surprised if any
of them voted against them. I would like to say that these state-
ments are not only the product of your head, but also of your heart,,
as I see it-an understanding heart.
QUESTION FROM SENATOR WATKINS TO MR. DULLES
Now, sir, I have a series of questions from Arthur Watkins. I will
read them slowly. They are 12 in number, not mine, but his.
No. 1 [reading]:
n !V
In regard to Prime Minister Yoshida's letter to you under date of December
24, 1951, which was just released to the press: Does this letter have any status as
an agreement between nations or is it merely an exchange of letters between Mr.
Yoshida and John Foster Dulles?
Mr. DULLES. The letter, of course, does not constitute a binding
international agreement because such binding international agree-
ments, under the Constitution of Japan and the Constitution of the
United States, require ratification by the Diet of Japan and by the
Senate of the United States.
Senator ToBEY. A meeting of minds.
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PREMIER YOSHIDA'S LETTER A DECLARATION OF INTENTION
Mr. DULLES. It is a declaration of intention which I am confident
we can take at its face value. I am sure it is written in good faith.
.My confidence in that is not only because I have. complete confidence
in the good faith of Mr. Yoshida which has been tested on many
occasions and which has been proved to be totally reliable, but also I
have complete confidence in it because it reflects the natural wishes
and desires of the Japanese nation and the Japanese people. In other
words, we do not have to rely even upon the present Prime Minister.
If there should be a change in the Government of Japan, I am quite
Confident any successor government would feel toward this China
Communist matter the same way as expressed in that letter.
Senator TOBEY. No. 2 [reading]:
Does this letter firmly commit the Government of Japan or is it merely an ex-
change of assurances between two officials who were instrumental in negotiating
.a treaty?
Mr. DULLES. I believe that is covered.
Senator TOBEY (reading):
In the event of a change in government in Japan with the consequent loss of
office by Mr. Yoshida, what will be the status of the Yoshida-Dulles letter?
YOSHIDA'S LETTER ADDRESSED TO DULLES AS PRESIDENT'S REPIZE-
SE:VTATIVE
Mr. DULLES. I think I covered that, also.
Senator TOBEY (reading) :
In your opinion is it sound international diplomacy for the United States to
quiet its apprehensions in regard to future Russo-Japanese relations on the basis
of a letter from the present Prime Minister of Japan to a subordinate official in
the United States Department of State?
That is not my question, understand.
Mr. DULLES. The negotiations have throughout been conducted by
me as' a special representative of the President, and I take it to be
natural in this matter as in other matters relating to the treaty, that
the Prime Minister communicated with me.
Senator Tor3IuY (reading) :
Do the territorial provisions of the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty, especially
those in regard to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, meet the Department of
State's concept of the security requirements of the United States in the Pacific
Ocean area?
Mr. DULLES. I did not quite get it.
Senator TOBEY. I will read it again:
Do the territorial provisions of the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty, especially
those in regard to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, meet the Department of State's
concept of the security requirements of the United States in the Pacific Ocean area?
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF POSITION ON PEACE TREATY
Mr. DULLES. As far as the security aspect of the matter is con-
cerned I would, with General Bradley's permission, call attention to a
letter which you, General Bradley, wrote to Senator Watkins on that
score. Do you have a copy of it with you?
General BRADLEY. No.
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18 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Mr. DULLES. Here it is. It is a letter dated September 21, 1951.
It concludes [reading] :
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that this treaty, along with the
proposed United States-Japanese Security Treaty, should come into force simul-
taneously, and will provide the United States the maximum security obtainable
in the Far East at this time.
HABOMAI ISLANDS
Senator TOBEY. No. 6 [reading] :
In regard to the Habomai Islands, why is it that the treaty remains silent?
Does not Russian possession off these islands constitute a sore in Russo-Japanese
relations which can be conveniently prodded at any time in the future to agitate
and threaten Japan?
Do you recognize these islands?
Mr. DULLES. Yes, I know those islands. Those islands are a small
group of islands which are to the north of Japan. If there is a map-
we have no map of sufficient scale.
Senator TOBEY. He suggested maybe a burr under the saddle.
Mr. DULLES. Yes. Have you a pointer here? My arm is not that
long.
General BRADLEY. You might point it out on a smaller map we
have over here.
Senator GREEN. May I suggest that the pointer will not help the
record any?
General BRADLEY. Perhaps you can point it out to them on this.
Senator GEORGE. We have a smaller map here.
Mr. DULLES. For the information of the committee, the Hobomai
Islands are these islands here, and then there is Shikotav which is
probably in the same status. The Russians are in occupation of that,
although it is our opinion, as I expressed at the Japanese Peace Con-
ference at San Francisco, that those islands are properly a part of
Hokkaido, and that Japanese sovereignty remains over those islands.
Senator TOBEY. He suggests Russian possession of these islands
constitutes a sore in Russo-Japanese relations-"threatens Japan."
Mr. DULLES. There are a multiplicity of sores in Japanese-Soviet
relations, and it is not possible by any treaty or formal words to elim-
inate those. I cannot think of anything that we could have written
into the peace treaty which would have accomplished the very de-
sirable objective of getting those islands back into effective Japanese
sovereignty. The willingness of the. Soviet Union to relinquish those
islands would depend either upon a change of heart by them, or upon
the use of force, which we do not want to contemplate at this time.
JAPANESE FISHERY RIGHTS INFRINGED BY RUSSIA
Senator TOBEY. There are lots of sores. [Continues reading:]
The Japanese are vitally dependent on deep-sea fishing for their subsistence.
What, if anything, in these treaties gives Japan access to the deep-sea fishing
areas of the North Pacific? Does not Russia, by reason of its occupation of the
Kuriles, hold a valuable source of food which can be used for bargaining purposes
in the effort to force Japan to jump through the Russian hoop?
Mr. DULLES. It is quite true that the Soviet Union is excluding the
Japanese fishers from certain fishing areas which they used to fish in
and which we would consider to be part of the open seas. Again that
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIE'S 1
is something I do not know that we can (10 anything about. Cer-
tainly nothing we can write into the peace treaty will end the Russian
conduct in that respect.
JAPANESE FISHERY RIGHTS IN FORMER MANDATED ISLANDS
Senator TonEY. No. 8 [reading]:
Does the United States contemplate opening the area of the former Japanese
mandated islands, now a strategic trusteeship, to Japanese fishing operations?
Mr. DULLES. That will depend upon United States policy as trustee
of the area, but is not a matter to be dealt with by the treaty.
I might say that since the negotiations began, the Japanese Gov-
ernment has taken a very forward-looking attitude toward the prob-
lem of fishing which has been one of the sore spots in the relations of
Japan with other countries, particularly between the United States
and Japan.
FISHING TREATY: UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND JAPAN
There has been negotiated within the last few weeks a fishing treaty
between Japan, the United States, and Canada dealing with the whole
area of the North Pacific. I am not familiar with that treaty in detail,
but I know in general it reconciles the principle of the freedom of the
seas with the proposition that where a country itself takes steps of a
costly and sacrificial character to conserve fish, the country or coun-
tries that do that conserving are entitled. to a certain priority in the use
of the fishing and the fish which result from. those acts of conservation.
I am told that this treaty is entirely satisfactory to our west coast
fishing people, but it cannot come into force until the multilateral
treaty comes into force and restores to Japan its full sovereignty.
But the treaty has been negotiated, has been initialed and .merely
awaits action on the mails treaty to be formally concluded between
our countries.
PROSPECTS FOR TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND ASIA MAINLAND
Senator TOBEY. No. 9 [reading] :
In view of the Japanese need for trade with the Asiatic mainland, is it your
opinion that such trade will be resumed in the immediate future? Do you think
there is a possibility that such trade will include strategic materials and manu-
factured implements of war which could be of use to the North Koreans, the
Red Chinese, and to the anti-American elements in Asia?
Mr. DULLES. I think that question is answered by my main state-
ment, but I would repeat here that there is no reason whatever to
fear that that will be the case, because already the Japanese have
taken steps to restrict that trade so that it is practically nonexistent
today. They have already moved among the first of the other free
nations, to certify compliance with the Battle Act which calls for a
total embargo on all exports to the Soviet bloc of any goods which
we list as of strategic value and a strict control of other goods, even
though not of a strategic character. In other words, the Japanese
have already formally committed themselves to compliance with the
United States policy in that respect as laid down by the Congress of
the United States.
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ZU JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Senator TOBEY. No. 10 is similar to that, namely, this [reading] :
It has been suggested that a reservation be included in the Resolution of
Ratification in the .Japanese Peace Treaty to provide for immediate abrogation
by the United States of Japanese trading privileges with the United States in
the event of Japanese trade with Communist nations in strategic war materials.
What is your opinion as to the legality in point of international law of such a
reservation? What is your opinion as to the practicality of such a reservation?
Mr. DULLES. It seems to me to be totally unnecessary for this
reason: That the policy of the United States, is already established
by the the Control Act, so-called Battle Act to which I referred-it
specifies that the United States shall not give any military assistance
or economic assistance to any country which violates our policy as
laid down under that act.
By accepting that, you have, in effect, an agreement with ample
sanctions because Japan's security depends upon the presence there
of the United States forces. Its economy, to a large extent, depends
upon access to our markets. The Battle Act provides sanctions of a
totally effective character viz-a-viz Japan and any reservation would
be a duplication of the situation that already exists and is voluntarily
and wholeheartedly accepted by Japan.
UNITED STATES AND BRITISH TRADE POLICIES IN ASIA
Senator ToBEY. No. 11 [reading] :
Have the trade policies of the United States and Great Britain been reconciled
in the Asiatic area? What mutual promises in that respect have been made.
Mr. DULLES. Trade policies between England and the United
States, or Japan?
Senator TOBEY. In reconciling the Asiatic area?
Mr. DULLES. Would you repeat the question again?
Senator TOBEY (reading) :
Have the trade policies of the United States and Great Britain been reconciled
in the Asiatic area? What mutual promises in that respect have been made?
Mr. DULLES. I do not quite get the purport of the question, and
the bearing upon Japan. There is a question which might be put and
which perhaps Senator Watkins had in mind-the access by Japan
to the sterling currency area of southeast Asia. That is a problem,
but that is apparently not the question put by him.
Senator TOBEY. You might say "irrelevant and immaterial" on this.
No. 12, and the last one- --
Mr. DULLES. Those are your words, not mine.
Senator ToBEY. I said you might say it.
DISPOSITION OF SOUTH SAKHALIN AND THE KURILES
No. 12, and the last one [reading]:
The original draft of the treaty proposes "the handing over" of South Sakhalin
and the Kuriles to Soviet Russia. What were the reasons for the change in termi-
nology in that respect which now provides merely that Japan renounce right,
title, and claim to these areas? Does this latter provision have the effect of ratify-
ing the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and in effect confirming Russia's military
seizure and retention of these areas?
Mr. DULLES. The Yalta agreement contemplated the handing
over of South Sakhalin and the Kurile, Islands to the, Soviet Union
under the treaty of peace. The treaty of peace before you does not
carry out that provision of the Yalta agreement.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 21
Now that is done deliberately because of the fact that the Soviet
Union itself has been guilty of such violations under the Yalta agree-
ment that we do not consider that the Soviet Union can come with
clean hands and itself ask for the benefits of that agreement.
I call your attention not only to such violations as may have oc-
curred with relation to Europe, but as regards Asia itself.
By the Yalta agreement the Soviet Union undertook to recognize
and deal with the Nationalist Government of China. In pursuance
of that it made a treaty with the Nationalist Government in August
1945 whereby it undertook to give aid and military supplies and moral
support exclusively to the Nationalist Government as the Central
Government of China. The ink was hardly dry on that undertaking
before the Soviet Government turned over vast war supplies in
Manchuria to the Communist regime.
That question was raised by me in the United Nations Assembly a
year ago and no attempt was made by the Soviet Union to justify that
flagrant violation of the Yalta agreement.
Under those circumstances it (lid not seem that the United States
and the other free nations who were largely responsible for drafting
this treaty had any obligation to give the Soviet Union title by this
treaty to South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The treaty does not do so.
It provides indeed that no country which has not signed the treaty
shall get any benefit at all under the treaty.
The Soviet Union, by not signing the treaty, has lost irrevocably its
opportunity to sign the treaty, thereby depriving itself of any claim
under the treaty to any title to South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.
I think that probably covers the position.
Senator TOBEY. Thank you, Mr. Dulles.
Now, may I say if I read your mind aright I see there this thought:
In the words of Shakespeare, "For this relief, much thanks."
Senator GI oRGE. Senator Fulbright?
Senator Smith who is not here today rather exacted a promise that
you be here until lie could interrogate you.
Mr. DULLES. I will be glad to be here tomorrow.
Senator FULBRIGHT. I have no questions of General Bradley.
Senator GEORGE. Any further questions?
Senator WILEY. I have some questions.
Senator GEORGE. I thought if we could finish with General Bradley,
lie might then be excused unless you wish to bring him back.
Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I am very sorry I was called to
Judiciary, and missed sonic of the interrogation. So all I am going
to ask General Bradley is some questions that were submitted at the
request of Senator Watkins. Being the ranking minority member of
this committee I presume that is why they were submitted to xrie.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF POSITION ON SOUTH SAKHALIN AND THE KURILES
So this is the first question [reading]:
Do the territorial provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty, in particular those
provisions regarding South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, meet the security
requirements of the United States in the North Pacific area?
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22 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Then I might say he has a note on that question in which he says
[reading]:
See copy of Bradley letter of September 21, 1951, to Senator Watkins in which
General Bradley say- 7 * * The Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully aware of the
strategic importance of the areas in question and under present circumstances
are not completely satisfied concerning its security. * * *"
Another note:
Original draft of Japanese Peace Treaty provided for "handing"over" to Russia
of Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Present draft merely requires that Japan renounce
all right, title, and claim to these areas. Effect is the same inasmuch as Russia
is in military Occupation.
Now I would like to have your comments to that question and to
his comments.
General BRADLEY. As I stated to Senator Watkins at that time,
from a military point of view we are not completely happy with it.
It so happens that Russia is presently the sole occupying power of
the islands, having acquired them at the close of World War II.
In view of the current world situation, it is believed that the inter-
ests of the United States are best served by leaving the permanent
status of the area to be provided for at a future date when international
tensions have been eased somewhat.
Senator GEORGE. General Bradley, would you like to offer for the
record the letter to which reference has been made? If you would do
so, you may do so and supply the committee, the clerk of the com-
mittee, with the letter.
General BRADLEY. I would leave that entirely to the committee.
It has been quoted from twice and if it would help it might be well to
put the whole letter in the record.
Senator GEORGE. It occurs to me it might be well to incorporate the
whole letter.
(The letter, referred to, roads as follows:)
Hon. ARTHUR V. WATKINS, SEPTEMBER 21, 1951.
United States Senate.
DEAR SENATOR WATKINS: It is a pleasure to give you Iny understanding of
the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the provisions of section (c) of
article 2, chapter II of the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty. It should be noted
that the provisions of chapter II of the proposed treaty are based generally on
agreements reached with other governments at several conference dated back to
1943.
At the Cairo Conference, November 22-26, 1943, it was agreed between Presi-
dent Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill
to force the unconditional surrender of Japan, and compel her to relinquish her
sovereign rights to Pacific islands and other Asiatic territories seized, occupied,
or acquired by her through violence and greed.
The Yalta agreement of February 11 1945, between President Roosevelt,
Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Atalin, provided, in addition to other
matters, for the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan within 2 or 3
months after Germany's surrender, and specified that southern Sakhalin, the
islands adjacent thereto, and the Kurile islands shall be handed over to the
Soviet Union.
The terms of the Allies surrender ultimatum to Japan, in addition to other
provisions, specified categorically that, "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall
be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu
Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such adjacent minor islands as we [the parties
to the surrender proclamation! determine." The terms of the ultimatum were
agreed to by the President of the United States, the President of the Republic
of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain at Potsdam, Germany, July
26, 1945. The Soviet Government joined in the above declaration on August 8,
1945, in the Soviet declaration of a state of war with Japan.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 23
Chapter II of the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty, in general, provides for the
renouncement by Japan of her sovereign rights to certain Pacific islands and Asi-
atic possessions in keeping with the terms of the Potsdam surrender ultimatum.
Section (c), article 2 of chapter II provides for Japan's renouncement of her
rights to southern Sakhalin, islands adjacent thereto, and the Kurile Islands.
The treaty does not define the future status of these possessions.
Currently, Russia is the sole occupying power of the islands in question, having
acquired them at the close of World War Il. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully
aware of the strategic importance of the area in question and under present cir-
cumstances are not completely satisfied concerning its security. However, in
view of the current world situation, it is believed that the interests of the United
States are best served by leaving the permanent status of the area to be deter-
mined at a future date when international tensions have been eased.
The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were freely and
constantly consulted during the preparation of the proposed peace treaty. Essen-
tially, the treaty is drawn in terms which do not contain within themselves the
seeds of another war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that this
treaty, along with the proposed United States-Japanese security treaty, which
should come into force simultaneously, will provide the United States the maxi-
mum security obtainable in the Far Fast at this time.
Sincerely, OMAR N. BRADLEY.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF POSITION ON TREATY PROVISION FOR UNITED
STATES TRUSTEESHIP AREAS
Senator-WILEY. Question 2 [reading]:
Are the present provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty in regard to Okinawa,
the Bonins etc. (art. 3) in accordance with the wishes of the Department of
Defense? Is it necessary to the security of the United States that these islands
be placed under United States trusteeship? Could not the United States get the
necessary bases in these island areas without at the same time taking the islands
and their populations under trusteeship?
About three questions there.
General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.
We believe, from the security viewpoint, this arrangement is better
than any other. It would be very difficult for us to come before you
and ask for funds to build security installations on Okinawa and. other
islands unless we had a rather clear-cut right to be there and to stay
there .for some time. I understand from the question that the idea
is we might make some arrangement with Japan for fortifications
there, even though the islands might be returned to Japan. We do
not believe that would be as good an arrangement as this one.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF POSITION ON SPECIFIED LIMITS IN
RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION
Senator WILEY. Question 3 [reading]:
Would the security of the United States suffer if a specification were included in
the resolution of ratification to limit the term of United States trusteeship and to
provide for an eventful plebiscite by the Okinawans in order that they them-
selves may determine by their own expression their future fate, as to independence
or return to Japan?
General BRADLEY. No, sir. I do not believe that should be in this
peace treaty. If later on, several years from now, we wanted to
reconsider the matter, I think you could still do it. You would'know
then what your security arrangements had been and whether or not
you would want to do it at the time. We do not believe, from a
security point of view, that provision should be made now.
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24 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF POSITION ON HAEOMAI ISLANDS
Senator WILEY. No. 4 [reading]:
The treaty is silent in regard to the Habomai Islands just off the northeastern
coast of Hokkaido. These islands are within 3 miles of Japan and within sight of
the mainland. Are the Joint Chiefs of Staff satisfied with this aspect of the
treaty? Russia is in occupation of these islands which are in reality a part of the
Japanese home islands.
General BRADLEY. I believe my remarks on those islands would
be the same as the Kuriles and the Sakhalin Islands. We are not too
happy, but they are in possession of them, and under world conditions
it is probably better to leave final disposition to a later date.
Senator WILEY. If I understand your position in relation to .the
treaty it does not confirm the right of Russia in any of those islands.
General BRADLEY. I believe that is right. I believe it leaves it
open.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF POSITION ON THE KURILES
Senator WILEY. No. 5 [reading] :
The Kurile Islands lie at the edge of the
reat ci
l
i
d
g
rc
e a
r an
sea routes from the
United States to the Orient. It was from the Kuriles that the Japanese staged
their sea and air attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. It was from the Kuriles that air
raids were conducted against the Aleutian Islands and Dutch Harbor. Under the
circumstances, are the Joint Chiefs of Staff satisfied with the present territorial
provisions of the treaty which require Japan to renounce right, title, and claim'to
these vital areas?
General BRADLEY. I believe I have answered that. We were. not,
completely happy about it, but there is nothing we can do about it at
this time. Their final disposition should be left to a future date.
Senator WILEY. That is because of the occupation by the Russians?
General BRADLEY. At the present time; yes, sir.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO RUSSIA OF THE KURILES
Senator WILEY. No. 6 [reading] :
In view of the size of the Russian fleet of submarines, does not Russian possession,
of the Kuriles put Russia in a position to.dominate the commerce and the security
of the North Pacific? Are there any sites in the Kurile I
l
d
i
bl
s
an
s su
ta
e for estab-
lishment of air bases from which Russia could dominate the sea and air lanes to
Japan as well as the Japanese islands themselves?
General BRADLEY. I would say in answer to both of those questions
that it would be to the great advantage of the Russians to have them
in operation in the Pacific, but I do not believe that we can see that
would permit them to dominate the Pacific.
Senator WILEY. To get the matter straight in my own mind, are
there opportunities for air bases on those islands?
General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; but my point is, I would not go so far-
as to say this would permit them to dominate the Pacific. It would
be to great military advantage; yes, but not to a point where we would
admit they could dominate the Pacific by having them.
Senator WILEY. Are there good sea bases there, also?
General BRADLEY. I am afraid I cannot answer that. I do not
know just how good they are.
Senator WILEY [reading] :
Does the Russian possession of Sakhalin and the Kuriles place the Russians in a.
strategic position for cutting off our access to the sea and air bases which we are
retaining in Japan by other provisions of this series of Ades?
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND f H T
General BRADLEY. Again the answer would be "No," they could not
-cut them off but it would help them in interfering.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF POSITION ON SECURITY TREATIES
Senator WILEY [reading] :
What are the views of Australia and New Zealand and the Philippines in regard
to their security as growing out of the present provisions of the treaty?
General BRADLEY. I cannot give you their views. I do not know
their views because I have not talked to them.
Senator WILEY. I understand your general conclusions to be--and
I am sorry that T missed your statement-that the treaty itself, these
several treaties that we have with Japan and the treaties we have
with countries down under, New Zealand and Australia, in your
opinion, constitute a step forward toward the eventualities of peace
in the Pacific?
General BRADLEY. We think they contribute very materially to the
maintenance of peace in the Pacific.
Senator WILEY. And you think also that the treaties, if they become
the law of the land, will contribute beneficially to Japan, as well as to
our own country?
General BRADLEY. Yes, Sit.
Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GEORGE. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions of
General Bradley?
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENT NEARING COMPLETION
Senator SPARKMAN. I have this one question and that has to do with
the administrative agreement. Do I understand correctly that that
agreement is well along toward completion and that you do not
anticipate any undue delay in completing it?
General BRADLEY. No, sir; we do not anticipate any, but as yet, as
I stated before, we have not started the discussions point by point
with the Japanese Government. We hope to do that in the very near
future and I think we would hope to complete that agreement before
too long.
Senator SPA.RKMAN. 't'hat is all.
Senator GEORGE. Senator Gillette, any questions of General
Bradley?
I am asking if you have questions of General. Bradley because
I-thought we might be able to excuse him.
Senator GILLETTE. I have several questions for Mr. Dulles, and
somebody representing the State Department, but I have none for
General Bradley.
Senator WILEY. I would like to ask a question of Senator Dulles.
Senator GEORGE. Mr. Dulles will be on the stand again tomorrow
at 10:30. We desired, if possible, to conclude with General Bradley
today so that he would not be required to come back. The Secretary
will not be back tomorrow unless he is asked and it is necessary for
him to come back. If you could withhold the question on Ambassador
Dulles this morning--
Senator WILEY. Very well.
Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to make this statement.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
I understand that you want to complete General Bradley. I thought
everyone had propounded questions to General Bradley. Before you
recess for today I would like to have a chance to ask Mr. Dulles a few
questions for the reason that I shall not be here tomorrow.
Senator GEORGE. Very well, Senator Sparkman.
Mr. Dulles, you may resume the stand. We have no further
questions of General Bradley at this time. Now, General, you furnish
the committee with a copy of the letter to which reference was twice
made, and we will put it in the record.
General BRADLEY. Mr. Young here will give it to you.
Senator GEORGE. Thank you.
All right, Senator Sparkman.
BIPARTISAN COOPERATION
Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be appropriate
to say that a subcommittee of this committee is meeting at 4 o'clock
this afternoon to discuss this administrative agreement. More than
likely at some future stage in the hearings we should like to ask
questions pertaining to the details of that agreement.
Before asking some questions of Mr. Dulles, I would like to make
this very brief statement. It has been my good fortune during the
last year to serve as chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of this
committee with Senator George, our present presiding officer, Senator
Smith of New Jersey, and Senator Hickenlooper.
I wish very much Senator Hickenlooper and Senator Smith were
here this morning but they are unavoidably detained. I know that
Senator George can bear me out in this statement paying tribute to
Mr. Dulles for the excellent job he has done in negotiating the
Japanese Peace Treaty and the security pacts collateral with it.
Particularly do I want to mention that, to my way of thinking, this
has been one of the finest demonstrations of bipartisan cooperation
that I have ever seen and also one of the finest examples of coopera-
tion between the executive and the legislative branches.
CONTRIBUTION BY MR. DULLES
During the course of the year, our subcommittee was called into
session many, many times, often on short notice, and at all times of
the day. Mr. Dulles kept us informed of every single step that was
taken. Every time he took a trip visiting some of the countries con-
cerned with the peace treaty, he would talk with us before he went,
tell us what he was seeking, and report to us when he came back.
It was my pleasure, also, as it was that of other members of this
committee to be in the peace treaty conference at San Francisco and
to note the very fine work that both Mr. Dulles and the Secretary of
State did there.
Mr. Chairman, it was also my privilege to be in Japan with Mr.
Dulles along with Senator Smith during a big part of the month of
December. I may say this, that to me it was a revelation the manner
in which Mr. Dulles was received by the Japanese people of all levels.
and the confident faith that they expressed in him and in the work
that he was doing and had done.
I was very much impressed with the conditions as I found them in
Japan due to-the very fine job that had been done during the entire
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occupation. I have a great deal of faith and. confidence in the efficacy
of this treaty and the security pacts that have been executed, and I
think a great part of the credit must go to Mr. Dulles.
Of course, I would like to add Mr. John Allison, who was his chief
assistant and who was always with him.
Now, Mr. Dulles, I am not going to ask but just one or two ques-
tions, but I do want to ask one or two just for the record.
I think you have discussed pretty well, in your statement as you
have given it to us, all of the questions that may arise. You c.leal
with the problem of the trade of Japan With China.
JAPANESE ECONOMY NOT TIED TO CHINESE MAINLAND
A great many people have it fixed in their minds I think that Japan
is dependent upon China both as a source for raw materials andalso
as a market for her manufactured goods. You give some statements
which I think largely offset that, but I wonder if you could go it little
more into detail or if you woull make this statement. Are .you
convinced that Japan can build a sustaining economy without being
closely tied with the Chinese ma;nlaud?
Mr. DULLES. I think this, Senator Sparkman. Let me first express
my very deep appreciation of the words, you have been kind enough
to say about my work here. It is not often that a witness oil the
stand has such an enjoyable interlude as you have given me, and I am
deeply grateful for it.
The question you put is probably the most difficult question there
is to give an absolutely clear answer to. I would say this: 7hhat
prior to the 1930's, Japan's trade was primarily overseas trade and
not to any large extent trade with the Asian mainland, and the
mainland was not a major source of supplies for Japan.
When 1.930 came along with the world-wide depression which
largely disrupted Japan's overseas trade, and with the concurrent
growth of militarism in Japan, there developed in Japan a, desire
actually to control its own sources of raw materials so that they would
not be subject to interruption either through world trade convulsions,
or perhaps through economic sanctions which the League of Nations
might impose to try to restrain Japan from adopting an aggressive
policy.
JAPAN'S PAST EFFORTS TO CONTROL RAW MATERIALS SOURCES
So that, beginning with the thirties, there came the effort by
Japan to try to get control of its own sources of raw material oil the
Asian. mainland, particularly in Manchuria.
From then on, Japan increasingly got coal and iron ore from, that
area, whereas, previously it had largely gotten its iron ore, for example,
from the Philippines and Malaya. But, in order that its trade in
those items should not be vulnerable to the forces to which I alluded,.
the Japanese sought to get control of Manchuria.
During the 1930 period there was an increasing change in the
Japanese trade from the overseas trade to a Colonial trade in relation
to the Asia mainland.
That trade was, of course, broken off completely at the end of the
war, and it has never been resumed to any substantial extent.
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ACCESS TO MARKETS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I am able to see the possibility of a healthy Japanese economy
without any large dependence upon the Asian mainland if Japan has
continuing access to the markets primarily of southeast asia where
there are large populations, and no problem about either the size of the
market or the need of the market for such things as Japan can produce.
Also, in southeast Asia there are sources of supply for most of the
raw materials which Japan requires.
The problem today is primarily a problem of freight rates and of the
ships to carry the goods. It has become a very expensive proposition
to import from long distances iron ore, coking coal and items of that
sort, and furthermore, the Japanese shipping is now reduced to where
it can only carry about 20 percent of its exports and imports, whereas,
normally before, it carried between 50 and 60 percent of its exports and
imports.
So that the cost of freight is not only an item in pricing goods, but
it also involves an abnormal foreign exchange drain upon Japan. I
can see that over a period of some years, granted access to southeast
Asia markets and perhaps granted some help to meet the heavy foreign
exchange burden of importing coking coal, particuarly from long
distances, that the Japanese can get along reasonably well. I think
that one must recognize that over a long-range period-I am talking
now in terms of decades and not necessarily just of years---over a
long-range period it is as I say, abnormal that there should be an iron
curtain which cuts Japan's trade completely off from the nearby
markets and sources of raw material in Asia.
EXPECTED DISAPPEARANCE OF SOVIET COMMUNISM IN CHINA
That is why I believe that we must assume and can properly assume
that the conditions which require that interruption of trade are not
going to be with us permanently. It would be, in my opinion, a
wrong and a defeatist policy to assume that these conditions which
exist in China today are in China forever.
I do not believe they are there forever. I think they are going to
change. I do not think, as I said in my main statement, that in-
definitely the Soviet brand of communism is going to rule in China.
There will be increasing resentment against that, hatred of it, and
eventually it will disappear as so many foreign conquests of China
have disappeared in the past.
CONTACT BETWEEN JAPAN AND WORLD MARKETS
Therefore, I do not think that we need to speculate about whether,
10, 15, 20, 30, or 50 years from now Japan can be getting along without
access to these markets because I think there will be conditions at that
,time which will enable Japan to have access to these markets- The
problem that Japan faces and we face at the present time is a transi-
tory problem and not a permanent problem.
As a transitory problem it surely can be dealt with and just as
Japan's economy has enormously improved over the past 6 years
without dependence on these markets, so I believe it can continue to
improve for a period of years without dependence on these markets.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFI TREAT
Surely the healthy and normal thing is that there should be contact'
between Japan and those markets, and I believe that our over-all
Far Eastern policies should have, that as their objective and I believe
it is an objective which can be achieved.
Is that an adequate answer, Senator?
Senator SPARKMAN. I think that is a very fine elaboration of .the
point you discussed briefly in your paper.
Now I think we may easily infer from what you said that it is
highly important that Japan be allowed to rebuild her shipping in
order that she may take as much of her products to the market i?nd
bring the raw resources in as possible. Is that an important part,
do you consider, of this treaty?
Mr. DULLES. 1 think it is a, very important thing that the treaty,
neither by itself, nor by any related understanding, in any way
prohibits the Japanese from building more ships and carrying more
of their own goods. There were suggestions made atone time from
various quarters that the treaty should impose prohibitions and
limitations on Japan in that, respect; that, part ofher shipyards should
be demolished. That was not, done. Indeed the effort to do it
would have encountered very serious opposition in Japan and would
have vitated the good will which has been engendered by the peace
treaty.
The situation is roughly this: That, as I said, Japan is today
carrying approximately 20 percent, or a little bit more of her own.
exports and imports.
That, of course, is a very abnormal thing for a seafaring nation, an
island nation.
Japan has, at present, about 2 million tons of shipping of all kinds
that is, seagoing and coastal, as against about 6 million tons which she
had under prewar conditions.
In other words, her fleet is about one-thirdof what it used to besand
it is carrying roughly about one-third of what it used to carry, 20 J)er-
cent as against about 60 percent.
'['here is a shipbuilding capacity in Japan theoretically of about
800,000 tons a year, gross tonnage. But, actually, there is in- use
only about 050,000 tons. It is not expected-the Japanese do not
expect-under present conditions to put back into operation more
than 650,000 tons.
Senator WILEY. Per year?
Mr. DULLES. Per year. That would mean that the way things are
now going and assuming they can get the steel to use the full 650.000
tons, and allowing for the fact that. some of their ships are being )low
constructed for foreign account, it would mean there would be about
a 10-year period before the Japanese. got back to their approximate
prewar level, and able to carry about 50 percent in their ships.
That is a progressive development I think we should welcome.
Obviously the British and some of the other countries that have been
carrying Japan's goods would like to continue to carry them and be
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
paid in effect by the United States for carrying them-that is, the great
bulk of Japan's exports and imports.
That throws a great burden upon Japan which has been largely
translated into a burden upon the United States. I think that we
should welcome a gradual resumption by Japan of the capacity to
carry at least half of her exports and imports and she will be able to
do ilthat by her own shipbuilding in a period of something like 10
years perhaps.
Senator SPARKMAN. I want to ask one question regarding the
fishing.
You refer to the tripartite agreement that had been executed among
Japan, the United States and Canada. It is your opinion that that
may very well be taken as a model of other fishing agreements to be
executed?
Mr. IDULLES. We would hope that it would be, Senator. A great
deal of thought was given to the underlying principles. The problem
is a very difficult one because, on the one hand, you have the principle
of the freedom of the seas. It is undesirable that there should develop
a scramble among the nations of the world to try and get the exclusive
right to use vast parts of the ocean. That would be an extremely
controversial matter to throw into the world arena at this time, and
we have penty of controversies without that. It would be like the
scramble for colonies that went on during the last century. That
kind of thing would be very bad.
On the other hand, we have a situation where fish that are caught
on the high seas such as salmon, for example, actually breed in terri-
torial waters and in rivers, and that, in order that they shall continue
to breed, it is necessary to take great pains to conserve the hatching
of these salmon and it does not seem right that these people who go
to that expense should do so merely that the fish, when hatched, shall
swim out to sea and be caught by somebody else. You have the
problem of reconciling the freedom of the seas with the application of
the principles of conservation. I am not a fisheries expert and am
not here to explain to you that treaty. It will come before you in
due course. But my impression is, it is a great advance in solving
one of the most controversial problems that exist. The Japanese
approached it in the spirit of good will and we hope that it may
prove an example which will help to solve more broadly this contro-
versial matter of who has the right to fish for what and where.
Senator SPARKMAN. The heart of that is good fishing practices and
conservation. Don't you believe so?
Mr. DULLES. I believe so.
Senator SPARKMAN. One more question and I am through.
FORMULA SET FORTH IN YOSHIDA LETTER OF DECEMBER 24, 1951
You referred to the letter from Prime Minister Yoshida to you
dated December 24, 1951, sent through the diplomatic pouch, with
reference to relations with Nationalist China. He states a formula
in that letter. Is it your understanding, or do you know whether
nr not that formula is acceptable to the Nationalist Chinese Govern-
ment on Formosa?
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Mr. DULLES. We have every reason to believe that it is, Senator
Sparkman, and I call your attention to the fact that the Foreign
Minister of the Nationalist Government has made a statement on the
subject which welcomes the letter of Prime Minister Yoshida, and I
would like, if I may, to put that in the record at this point along with,
the letter from Prime Minister Yoshida, himself,
Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. If you wish, I will read that into the record.
Senator GEORGE. You may place it in the record, or read it, as, you
wish.
Senator SPARKMAN. I do not care to have it read. I believe it
would be all right to have it in the record.
(For letter see p. 9. The statement on the letter is as followp:)
Minister of Foreign Affairs Yeh issued following statement at 1 in. January
18, Taipei, on subject of Yoshida's letter to Mr. Dulles dated December 24,
1951, and made public in Tokyo on January 16, 1952:
"The publication in Tokyo of the letter from Premier Yoshida to Mr. Dulles
on the subject of the conclusion of peace between China and Japan has served
the purpose of clearing up certain misapprehensions in this regard. It also
makes clear Japan's intentions to concert her efforts with the free and democratic
nations in the maintenance of the peace and security of the world.
"My Government has consistently made known its desire for an early conclusion
of peace with Japan and has directed its efforts in conjunction with the anther
Allied Powers toward this end. The conclusion of a peace treaty between China
and Japan has been unduly delayed. The Chinese Government will, therefore,
hold itself in readiness to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government
with a view to its early conclusion.
"It is gratifying to note in Premier Yoshida's letter that Japan fully rehlizes
the true character of the enslaved Communist regime now occupying the Chinese
mainland and of the so-called Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and
Mutual Assistance concluded in Moscow in 1950. We also welcome the exp ossed
intention of the Japanese Government to render every assistance to the United
Nations in all its measures to stem aggression."
Senator SPARKMAN. I believe that is all.
Senator TOBEY. Mr. Chairman.
Senator GEORGE. Senator Tobey.
Senator Tobey, first let me say that Mr. Dulles will be back as I
have already stated in the morning at 10:30, 1 wish to make this
statement, Mr. Dulles.
1. regard the peace treaty and the related pacts in which you have
been so influential in negotiating as one of the finest accomplishrpents
in this postwar period in our international relations. I think, of
course, that we all take due cognizance of the fine record made during
the occupancy under General MacArthur in Japan.
All. right, Senator Tobey.
Senator TOBE Y. It may not be in order, but I make it just the same.
As I have been sitting here I was thinking about Mr. Vyshinsky. I
wondered if and when he saw the report of this gathering, the. matter
as presented by you and the Secretary this morning, the details of
which are being recorded by the facile pen of the lady reporter from.
the Soviet papers over there, whether or not lie will indulge in another
outburst, such as the one which he indulged in with regard to the
disarmament proposals. If so, this one will be even a greater fain pas.
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JAPANESE PEACE TPPi Am-v ATTT 1.,.,rr
REACTION OF JAPANESE PEOPLE TO TREATY
Senator WILEY. I have no comment at this time upon Vishinsky,
but I would like to get your reaction to the general situation in Japan.
It was suggested by our chairman today that the fine administration
by MacArthur prepared, I would say, the mental attitude of the
Japanese. Do you feel that since the Japanese people, for the first
time in history, found the conquering nation a good Samaritan,
virtually giving, instead of taking, that this reversal of history's
technique has sunk deep into the consciousness of the people?
In the recent experience in. Germany, from the highest people in
Government, to, you might say, those of lower degree, they empha-
sized tremendously the impact upon the Germans in the western
sector of what I would call the reversal of the Japanese situation-
the practice of the victor to give, instead of take:
It seems to Die with your background and contacts-especially
those you had with General MacArthur-and. in view of the way the
people have treated you over there, you are in a position. to give on
these pages your judgment that they, too, have a deep sense of
appreciation of this, what I would call reversal technique.
Mr. DULLES. I feel quite confident, Senator Wiley, that the
Japanese people as a whole have been deeply impressed by the way
in which they have been treated. Of course, it was totally different
from what they expected. When our troops first landed they found
that the Japanese civilian population virtually disappeared. They
had all run away and gone up into the hills and the mountains because
they were afraid they would be slaughtered and ravished by the
troops. They gradually came back when they encountered treatment
which was far beyond anything they had dreamed would be possible.
For that, of course, General MacArthur is entitled to enormous credit.
Wherever I have spoken about this peace treaty I have given him the
credit which I know all the world gives him for being responsible for
the policies which have made this kind of peace possible and which
means it may have a chance to work.
There have been many, many peace treaties made in history and
almost all of them have been vitiated from the start because they
reflected an attitude of arrogance, taking, demanding, involving a
treatment of the people in. a way which humiliated them and made
them feel degraded. There has been none of that in this case.
PEACE DRAWN BY TILE OCCUPATION
The peace was made, you might say, by the occupation. What we
are doing here is putting into words a spirit which was born and
which took growth during the occupation period.
If you had been on this last trip with us to Japan-I ani sorry your
duties took you to Europe instead-I am sure you. would have been
deeply impressed as Senator Sparkman indicated he was deeply
impressed, and I know Senator Smith was also impressed, with the
evident good will and manifestations of it by the Japanese people.
Of course, they had that feeling to a very great degree toward
General MacArthur. I believe that through the occupation policies
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
which he exemplified and carried out, and the nature of the peace
which we made in the same spirit, that we have made a peace which,
this time, will really be a lasting and durable peace.
Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Dulles. You will be
good enough to come back tomorrow at 10:30?
Mr. DULLES. I will be here.
Senator GEORGP. All other witnesses who have applied for time in
which to state their position upon the Japanese Peace Treaty and
other related pacts will please give their names to the clerk of the. com-
mittee by noon tomorrow.
Time will be arranged for you on Wednesday of this week.
The committee will be in recess until 10:30 tomorrow morning.
(At 12:27 p. in. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10:30,a. in.
Tuesday, January 22, 1952.)
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JAPANESE PENCE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1952
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. ' C.
The committee mot at 10:30 a. in., pursuant to adjournment, in the
caucus room, 318 Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C., Senator
Walter F. George presiding.
Present: Senators George, Careen, Gillette, McMahon, Wiley,
Tobey, and Smith of New Jersey.
Present of committee staff: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. O'Day,
and Mr. Holt.
Senator GEORGE. We will come to order, please.
We have Mr. Dulles with us again today and we can proceed with
questions of him.
Senator Gillette, you were here yesterday and Mr. Dulles is here
again. If you are ready you may proceed with your questions.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN FOSTER DULLES, PERSQNAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE JAPANESE
PEACE TREATY
Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dulles, there are three or four questions I want to ask you.
At the same time that we are considering the Japanese Treaty, we
have before us the three security treaties. Two of these are bilateral
treaties, as you know, and one trilateral.
First, the Philippine-United States; second Japan-United States,
and third, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Only the
trilateral treaty sets up any international machinery. Article 7 of this
tripartite treaty establishes a council consisting of foreign ministers
or their deputies-
to consider matters concerning the implementation of the treaty.
CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH STATES IN PACIFIC APCA
Now by article 8 of that treaty the Council is authorized-
to maintain a consultative relationship with states, regional organizations, associ-
ations of states, or other authorities in the Pacific area-
pending the development of a more comprehensive system.
Now other such states, regional organizations or associations on
my checking would appear to include the Philippines, Chinese For-
mosa, Japan, Indonesia, Malaya, British Malaya, Thailand, Borneo,
and Sarawak, the British Colonies, the U. N. Trustee Territory, former
85
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36 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Japanese islands and Indochina; the associated states of Viet Nam,
Laos, and Cambodia, probably the western part of Dutch New
Guinea and the French islands such as Now Caledonia would be
included.
Now what other countries or authorities are envisaged than these?
Are there others?
Mr. DULLES. I would suppose, Senator Gillette, that there might
also, under this provision, be consultation with the United Kingdom,
itself, which is in a position of authority in some of the areas which
you mention and in which it is in a position to exert influence upon
the peace and security in that area. It might be France would also
be included because France has a position such as in New Caledonia.
There is no attempt to limit or prescribe the states in question. It
is just a matter of determining in fact what states are in a position
to contribute to the security of this area.
Senator GILLETTE. Of course the provision that I quoted was that
we intend to maintain a consultative relationship with states, regional
organizations, associations of states, or other authorities. That
prompted my question as to what was meant by other authorities
and what is meant by consultative relations.
Mr. DULLES. You will see that the provisions of article 8 are
permissive and not mandatory. It says the article is "authorized to,"
which is different from saying it is required to. In other words, it
is optional upon the Council whether or not it maintains that
relationship.
Obviously, it is optional upon the other bodies. We cannot impose
it consultative relationship upon other states or other bodies so there
has to be reciprocity in the matter. One of the reasons for this
provision in this treaty is to be found in the preamble of the treaty
which contains this clause [reading]:
Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British
Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as in the
Pacific area-
. In other words, Australia and New Zealand as indicated by the
recital here, have obligations of such a character that it naturally
makes it a matter of concern to them as to what goes on in the Pacific
area and also in other areas where they may have military commit-
ments. But we have not attempted, certainly, as _yet, pending the
coming into force of the treaty, to sit down and attempt to work
out what, if any, consultative arrangements would be desirable from
the standpoint of the parties to this treaty, and what relationship
would be satisfactory to the other states or organizations. There
may be development in the future-for example, as you know, under
date of October 13, 1951
the Governments of th
it
U
d S
,
e
n
e
tates of
America, United Kingdom, France, and Turkey made certain pro-
posals to the Egyptian Government for dealing with defense in the
Middle East. There might, out of that, come something that would
be relevant to this treaty. That is still to be determined.
Senator GILLETTE. Please understand, Senator, that I am not
asking these questions in a severely critical way at all but these pacts.
constitute a commitment abroad for our Nation of such nature that
the American people are entitled to know exactly what they mean,
and because there was some question in my mind, I wanted the
record of these hearings to clarify it.
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MAINTENANCE BY UNITED NATIONS OR "OTHERWISE" OF PEACE AND
SECURITY IN JAPAN
Now article 4 of the treaty between America and Japan says that the
treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Government of-the
United States and the Government of Japan there shall have come into
force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual
or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the
maintenance by the United Nations or "otherwise"of international peace
and security in the Japan area. What is meant by "or otherwise"?
Mr. DULLES. The words "or otherwise" were used because it is not
possible at the present time to envisage with particularity just what
future developments may be in this area and there may be develop-
ments in the future which we cannot define with precision at; the
present time. But whatever the arrangements are if they are satis-
factory to the peace and security of the area that would be an occasion
to consider the termination of this particular arrangement.
Senator GILLETTE, Was it contemplated that there would be other
arrangements outside of the purview of the United Nations orgaD'.lza-
tion?
Mr. DULLES. The provisions under which presumably any arrange-
ment would take place would be, at least of a kind which are permitted
by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations which authorize; the
members to make collective defense arrangements.
Senator GILLETTE. It is not contemplated that these organizations
or authorities will be independent of the United Nations but working
within the framework of the United Nations?
.Mr. DULLES. There are two systems of security, you might say,
that are envisaged by the United Nations Charter. One is a system
of security which is operated by the United Nations itself, that could
be under the Security Council, which was intended to be the primary
security agency of the members. Actually, as we all know, through
the abuse of the veto power by the Soviet, Union, the functioning of
the Security Council very largely collapsed. Because of that', fact,
the United States proposed in the 1950 session of the Assembly thrt, to
some extent, those functions should be taken. over by the Assembly
where there is no veto power. There was a proposal put forward by
the United States called Uniting for Peace, a proposal which I had
the honor of handling in the General Assembly on behalf of the United
States, which called upon all of the member states to have forces
trained and equipped so as to be available to serve on a United Nations
mission of security.
At the pending session of the General Assembly in Paris there is a
proposal, which. I cannot go into in detail because I have not been on
the Assembly this year, which, broadly speaking, builds up on the
1950 resolution to the extent of attempting to tie in regional as'rocia-
tions to possible United Nations action.
Now, in the main, those regional associations are organized pmder
article 51 of the Charter which l referred to which states that nothing
contained in the Charter shall prevent the member states from
organizing for collective self-defense. It is primarily under that article
that we have been a party to helping organize the Rio Pact and the
North Atlantic Treaty Pact.
't'hese treaties that you refer to here are of a kind authorized by
article 51 of the Charter.
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Now, under article 51, associations are authorized by the Charter
but they are in no sense operated by the United Nations. I do not
know whether that clarifies it or not.
Senator GILLETTE. Yes; it does and particularly so because my
inquiry had in mind the authorization of regional arrangements under
the provision of the United Nations Charter. I gathered from the
language of these pacts that are now before us that they were designed
to be somewhat temporary in nature until there could be a more
comprehensive pact arranged within the territory, the purview of the
United Nations Charter.
POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE REGIONAL ARRANGEMENT IN PACIFIC AREA
May I ask you, or anyone representing the State Department, if
they can tell me: Is there at this time any preparation or plans being
made for the inauguration or the drawing up of a pact, a regional
arrangement in the Pacific area, somewhat similar to the NATO,
North Atlantic Treaty Alliance?
Mr. DULLES. There is no such plan at the present time, Senator
Gillette. You are quite right that the security treaties which are now
here before us-the Australian-New Zealand Treaty, the Philippine
Treaty, and the Japan Treaty-all, by their terms, indicate that the
parties anticipate that there may be further developments of security
in that area.
As a matter of fact, we would have been glad to have had those
pacts somewhat more comprehensive than they now are. Due to a
number of considerations, which perhaps I had better not go into
here, we found that the only thing we could do quickly which would
meet the immediate exigencies of the situation was to have a series
of three separate pacts.
As I said yesterday, it may very well be that even as regards the
parties concerned those separate pacts are not to be deemed the last
best word on the subject. I contemplate there should be a further
evolution in that area because I do not think what we have now
done should be regarded as final. But there are a great many difficult
problems partly of a strategic character and which relate, in part, to
a certain reluctance of some of the states concerned to associate
themselves closely with us at this time, which have made it im-
practical at the moment to go beyond what we now propose.
I am sure that what we now propose is no more than what the
President said in his statement of last March when he said that these
are "natural initial steps." I do not think that anyone contemplates
that these are the final steps but, on the other hand, there are no new
steps actually under consideration at the moment.
Senator GILLETTE. I have this final question and then I want to go
into another phase of this.
INTERREGIONAL CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY
Is there any machinery at the present time for consultation among
the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, except through
the fact that the United States is a partner of all of them through these
various treaties?
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Mr. DIILLES. There is the clause in the. Australia-New Zealand-
United States Treaty you are referring to, which contemplates that
any council set up under this shall seek to develop consultative rela-
tionships with other states concerned with the area. That would
quite possibly include the Philippines and perhaps Japan, and perhaps
other countries, as you have indicated.
Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, Senator.
WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION FORCES AND STATIONING OF TROOPS IN
JAPAN
Now I will go to another matter very briefly. I want to clarify
my thinking.
Article 6, of the Treaty of Peace with Japan subsection (a) states
[reading] :
All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as
soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty, and in ariy case
not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing, in this provision shall, however, pre-
vent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory
under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have
been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one' hand,
and Japan on the other.
Now, having in mind that provision, which calls for the withdrawal
of all occupying forces of the Allied Powers within the 90-day limit,
I then turn to the security treaty between the United States and
Japan, and in article 1 [reading]:
Japan grants and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the com-
ing into force of the treaty of peace and of this treaty, to dispose United States
land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to
contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far
East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including
assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down
large scale-
and so forth.
Is there a conflict between the provisions that the troops of all the
Allied Powers shall be withdrawn within. 90 days, and this provision
which authorizes the United States to maintain in and around Japan
air, land, and naval forces? Is there any conflict there?
Mr. DULLES. No, sir; there is not, because the bilateral security
treaty between Japan and the United States is drawn to take advan-
tage of the provisions of the second sentence of article 6 which you
read, namely, that [reading] :
nothing in this provision shall prevent the stationing or retention of foreign-armed
forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements
Senator GILLETTE. This bilateral treaty is the type contemplated
by that?
Mr. DULLES. Precisely, sir.
USE OF JAPANESE TERRITORY BY UNITED NATIONS FORCES
Senator GILLETTE. Does this have in mind, or does it contemplate
the use of United Nations forces in occupied area or in transit over
Japanese territory?
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40 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Mr. DULLES. That is not dealt with by this particular article
because there are no special treaties which deal with that However,
that matter is dealt with by the exchange of notes between the
Government of Japan and the Government of the United States,
which appear in the President's message at pages 51 and 52, where
Japan agrees that if there is any United Nations action in the Japan
area, that the United Nations forces will have the right to enjoy
facilities, rights of transit, and so forth, in Japan.
Senator GILLETTE. Where is that contained?
Mr. DULLES. That is contained In the exchange of notes which
appear at pages 51 and 52 of the message from the President of the
United States, which is a committee print which, perhaps is in your
hands.
Senator GILLETTE. Yes; it is in my hands.
Mr. DULLES. You will see there that Secretary Acheson in his note
to Prime Minister Yoshida refers to the fact that armed aggression
occurred in Korea against which the United Nations and its members
are taking action. There has been established a United command of
the United Nations under the United States pursuant to Security
Council resolution for the approval of SCAP. [Reading:]
Japan has been and now is rendering important assistance to the United
Nations action in the form of facilities and services made available to the mem-
bers of the United Nations, the armed forces of which are participating in the
United Nations action.
Since the future is unsettled and it may unhappily be that the occasion for
facilities and services in Japan in support of United Nations action will continue
or recur, I would appreciate confirmation, on behalf of your Government, that
if and when the forces of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged
in any United Nations action in the Far East after the treaty of peace comes into
force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the
member or members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations action-
Prime Minister Yoshida's reply gives the desired assurances in that
respect.
Senator GILLETTE. Is your.interpretation, as a lawyer, such as those
letters carry binding?
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Senator GILLETTE. Even though these men would pass from power?
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Senator GILLETTE. Yoshida and Acheson---
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Senator GILLETTE. You think they would be binding just the same
as though they were written in the treaty itself?
Mr. DULLES. Yes; because they are implementation of the treaty
itself. You will see the treaty itself provides in article 3 dealing with
the security that Japan undertakes-I am reading now from article 5:
Japan undertakes to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it
takes in accordance with the Charter and refrain from giving assistance to any
state against which the United States may take preventive or enforcing action.
In other words, the basic principle is established by the treaty itself
and. this is an executive agreement between our two Governments
which implements and gives effect to a basic provision which is in the
peace treaty itself.
Senator GILLETTE. Thank you.
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41
PRIOR CONSENT OF UNITED STATES NEEDED FOR GRANTS OF BASES, ETC.,
BY JAPAN TO A THIRD POWER
Now just one. further question. Article 2 of the security treaty
between the United States and Japan states that (luring the exercise.
of the right referred to in article t [reading] :
Japan will not grant without the prior consent of the United States of Am;rica
any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever in or relating to bases or
the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to
any third power.
Would that be construed, Senator, to require the consent of the
United States before any element of the United Nations forces now
engaged in Korea or later to be engaged elsewhere should he allowed
to maneuver over Japanese territory or have bases or move in trhnsit
over the territory?
Mr. DULLES. I would say that the answer to that is "No," because
the United Nations is not a third power-whatever the phrase is
here--
Senator GILLETTE. Any third power.
Well, if there is an element of the United Nations forces belonging
to Great Britain, if there is an element of the United Nations forces
belonging to France or New Zealand, it would be your interpretation
that they would not be prohibited from maneuvering or passing in
transit over Japanese territory without the consent of the United
States?
Mr. DuLLEs. As far as the treaty is concerned, I would agree with
you. As a practical matter, as you know, there is a United Nations
high command which is in charge, of the United States. I rider the
command which the. United Nations has set up there could not be a use
of Japan by the United Nations forces except as the United Mates
approved of it in. its capacity as exercising the command authority of
the United Nations. But I do not consider that the United Nations is
a third. power within the meaning of article 2.
Senator GILLETTE. Or any member of the United Nations?.
Mr. DULLES. It depends upon whether it is acting in its capacity
as an independent power, or whether it has forces at the service of the
United Nations. if it has forces which are serving under the United
Nations command, then I do not think they would be covered by
article 2. If they are acting outside the United Nations coim.and,
then. they would be.
Senator GILLETTE. In m_y opinion, in this discussion your answer,
there goes into a field of the most vital concern to America and the free
world--the maneuvering, the handling of our forces, United Nations
forces, within. this zone of disturbance in Korea. I am not going into
this further.
I thank you for helping clarify many of these matters. That is all,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DULLES. I hope I have done so, Senator. If any doubt remains
in your mind, or ambiguities of any sort, I would be glad to have you
pursue it further.
Senator GILLETTE. Doubts do remain in my mind relative to this
last matter, but they are not based on the language of this alone.
They are based on the whole picture of the Korean involvement.
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You have been very helpful in clarifying the other matters of which
I asked.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GEORGE. Senator Green, do you have any questions?
Senator GREEN. Yes; but before asking I would like to seize this
opportunity, which is the first I have had, to congratulate you on the
great service you have rendered our country in these matters.
Mr. DULLEs. Thank you very much.
Senator GREEN. My question is this: In the proposed treaty there
is no reference to the installation of atomic production factories or other
installations of that kind. Is there?
Mr. DULLES. You mean there is no restriction upon Japan?
Senator GREEN. That is right.
Mr. DULLES. No, sir.
Senator GREEN. Was consideration given to it?
Mr. Dui,LES. Yes, sir.
Senator GREEN. It was decided they should have the right to create
installations, atomic installations, and to make atom bombs and
fissionable materials generally?
Mr. DULLLS. No. What was decided was that it was undesirable
to impose upon Japan restrictions of a discriminatory character such
as are not imposed upon any other sovereign country.
In other words, our relationship to Japan in that respect, and
Japan's relationship with others in that respect should be the same
as other sovereign countries. We decided-and it is quite bssic in
this treaty-that the wisest course was to restore Japan to the same
type of sovereignty as is enjoyed by other sovereign nations, and not
to innpww' upon Jaipa i restrictions or limitations of sovereignty of a
kind which are not accepted by other sovereign nations. There is
no other sovereign nation which is restricted by treaty or other inter-
national engagements from doing the kind of thing you talk about.
Now the restrictions will, in fact, operate and result; I have no
question about that. But the idea of creating a second-class sover-
eignty is one which would be offensive to the Japanese, and history
shows that as you seek to impose upon one country limitations and
qualifications of sovereignty which are not accepted by others, that
merely incites a desire on the part of the subjected country to prove
its own sovereignty and its own worth by violating those provisions.
We believe the way to work these things out with Japan is to work
them out on a basis of sovereign equality, and not on the basis of
sovereign inferiority.
Senator GREEN. As I understand it, your rea-son is that no such
rest{rictions exist in any other treaties existing or proposed?
Mr. DULLES. I know of no country, although I defer to greater
wisdom, which is represented on your committee, but I know of no
country which is inhibited by treaty obligations from the type of
thing you speak about except Italy and the satellite. countries. Those
t>rotrrhitions we are nri,v trying to get away from. They have already
been violated in the case of the satellite countries and we believe that
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 43
Italy should be restored to equality in military respects and as re-
gards its sovereignty. That experiment has not proved very satis-
factory. Any prohibitions worked out on a general basis and gen-
erally applicable we would assume would be accepted, and I am sure
would be accepted by Japan in the same way that it would be'ac-
cepted by other countries. But to take advantage of Japan's de,
feated state to impose restrictions of a character which are not''-im
posed upon or accepted by other sovereign nations generally was con-
trary to the basic thesis we operated under in connection with this
treaty.
Senator GREEN. Thank you.
Senator GEORGE. Senator McMahon, you were .not here yesterday.
Have you any questions?
JAPAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD DISARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ATOMIC
WEAPONS
Senator MC?VlAuON. Just pursuing the line of questioning for just
a moment, Senator; I assume that the Japanese Government ,tould
be glad to subscribe to the disarmament proposals that we have made
in Paris. Don't you think so, in view of their own disarmament pro-
visions of their constitution?
Mr. DULLES. I can think of no nation, Senator McMahon, which
would be more eager to see a world-wide development of disarmament,
limitation of armament, and particularly limitation of production of
atomic weapons. After all, Japan is the nation, and the only nation,
which has been subjected to atomic attack. It is inevitable that
there should persist in Japan a strong feeling as to the horror of atomic
warfare and I cannot imagine the Japanese doing anything but em-
bracing with the greatest eagerness any program for limitation of
armament and particularly limital ion of atomic weapons. As-f say,
they have been subjected to them. ?
Of course you have in mind--I should perhaps have referred. to this
in my answer to Senator Green that the Japanese Constitution at
the present time totally prohibits any activities of this sort. That
prohibition is responsive to the overwhelming desire of the Japanese
people. j
Senator MCMAHON. Of course, Senator Green's question is in
point because they would have the power to change their on con-
stitution. I think it is important that we keep two phases'of this
matter distinctly in mind: First, investigation and. research; and
second, production. I think, of course, we would not deserve the
characterization of being civilized if we tried to restrain the inquiry
of the human. mind at any time, at any place. A different question
is raised, I think, which we must consider when we talk about turning
the result of that research into weapons of destruction. I do not
mean, Senator, that I am taking the position that those restrictions
not be laid down. I see the cogency of your argument, but I think
it is well that Senator Green has raised this so that we can understand
What the situation is.
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JAPAN'S CAPACITY TO PRODUCE ATOMIC ENERGY
Mr. DTJLLES. T might add, sir, that there are no known deposits of
uranium or other fissionable material available to Japan. So, as a
practical matter Japan is in this respect dependent upon getting those
as imports from some country that does control them.. In view of
the very close control exercised by what we call the free world over
that, Japan as a practical matter, could not engage in production of
atomic weapons without our consent.
Senator McMAHON. That is assuming, Senator, that uranium and
uranium alone would constitute the stuff of the future. Of course
that, too, probably will be proved untrue some day.
Mr. DULLES. It might be. But as far as is known now, Japan has
no capability of her own to create atomic weapons and could only get
that with the consent, knowledge, and approval of certain members
of the free world. If Japan unhappily should fall under Soviet Com-
munist domination then of course any treaty prohibition in that
respect would be violated and worthless, just as they have proved to
be worthless in the case of the satellite treaties.
Senator MCMAHON. Yes; because then of course their fine tech-
nique and their manufacturing particularly of precision instruments
in quantities would be in conjunction with the Soviet Union of tre-
mendous importance.
As you point out, Mr. Stalin himself appreciates that when he said--
and I quote you in your statement-that "The Soviet Union linked
with Japan would be invincible."
Mr. DULLES. That is one of the important reasons for maintaining
Japan within the community of the free nations because, as you point
out, her technical ability to produce particularly high precision instru-
ments could be of great value to the Soviet Union in the production
of modern missiles and atomic weapons and things of that sort.
Senator MCIVIAIION. I am curious, Senator. In your negotiations
and deliberations, was any reference made to the very unfortunate
destruction of the cyclotron in Japan in 1945?
Mr. DTILLES. I do not think that calve up.
Senator MCMAFION. You remember that incident?
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Senator MOMAHON. An incident which we have all reason to regret
and, of course, the whole scientific fraternity in the United States
have very much regretted that in the past few years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GEORGE. Senator Smith, you were not here yesterday. I
think Senators Wiley and Tobey have completed their questions.
Senator WILE, Y. No; T have not.
Senator GEORGE. Do you wish to proceed?
Senator WILEY. No; I am glad to yield to Senator Sm:th.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. Chairman, before I address these questions which I think are
of importance to Mr. Dulles, I would like to exprass my regret for not
being here yesterday to hear the beginning of his testimony. I had
to be away on an important matter. I want to highlight for a mo-
ment, before I begin my questioning, what strikes me as very signif-
icant with regard to this Japanese Peace Treaty. I think it is a new
chapter in the making of peace treaties, so far as I know anything of
my history.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION ON JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
Mr. Dulles, I want to commend you, as the spearhead of the move-
ment toward this peace treaty, not only because of your skillful deal-
ings with Japan and with the other associated powers, but also becalse
of the way in which you dealt with our own people here in the United
States end of it in the development of each detail of the treaty.
Because the, Senate has the ratifying power over the treaty, you
realize the importance of having the representatives of the Senate, at
least, thoroughly familiar with each detail and each step in the 'pro-
ceeding.
You were very wise, in my judgment, in informing the subcom-
mittee-consisting of Senators George, Sparkman, Hickenlooper,- and
myself-and inviting the subcommittee to sit in with you from :time
to time over a period of 11 or 12 months while you were developing
all the steps of this treaty. You and Mr. Allison, who has been your
able assistant, I recall, met with. us constantly during the months of
preparation. You reported to us your negotiations with the Allied
Powers, and also the points raised by you with Japan. That led,
I believe, to a meeting of minds between the executive and the legis-
lative end of the Government, and especially Members of the Senate
when we come to bring this before the Senate for ratification. 'This
laid the foundation for some of our Members joining with you in
San Francisco, when the treaty was signed. Members of this' com-
mittee, Senators Connally, Sparkman-I forget who all actually
signed, I know on our side Senator Wiley, the ranking minority mem-
ber-signed the treaty. We all felt that was a step in the direction
of cooperative action. here. Then, your step-by-step movement
with the other countries led to the creating of it treaty which again
was unique in history.
This treaty is not a treaty of reparations and revenge, and taking
advantage of a defeated power, but it is a treaty of reconciliation, and
a treaty of striving ahead with the Western Powers for a free world.
I want to take this occasion to snake that little preliminary-state-
ment and tell you how much I personally appreciate what, I feel, was
a very unique and outstanding case of leadership in developing a now
approach to international relations through this Japanese Peace
Treaty.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you, sir.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I read over your statementyester-
day and I found a few things that impressed me which I would like to
develop a little further.
POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN RED CHINA
On page 5 of your statement at the. bottom of the page you make
this statement which is so much in line with what I hoped alight be
the ultimate result in the Far Fast that I want to emphasize it.
You say [reading]:
The best informed Japanese are coi[vuiced with its, that the alien doctrine of
communism camiot permanently conquer the Chinese spirit or liquidate the
innate individualism of the Chinese race. The Chinese nation will not permanently
suffer the imposition of a tyranny which places them in the servicd of alien
masters. There will be an end to a tyranny which the Chinese will come more
and mare to hate.' We should assume the impermanence, not the permanence,
of the present Moscow oriented rule of China.
94413-52-4
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You seem to say there, and I emphasize it because I have thought
of it so many times, that in the long run we must all be thinking in
terms of a free and independent China, as one of the elements of
strength in the Far East to prevent the further spread of exploitation
there.
You say [reading]:
We cannot expect change in China to take place automatically. To realize
such change will require something besides negative and purely defensive policy-
I am quoting now from your statement-
in Asia on the part of the leaders of the free *orld, notably the United States.
It will require determination to promote freedom and independence in Asia and
action consistent with that determination as opportunities arise.
The mood of the people of Japan, like the mood of other free peoples who are
close neighbors of Asian communism, will in the long run largely depend on the
attitude and action of the other free nations. If they persevere in positive
policies in support of real national independence in Asia, Japan will be a dependable
and able coadjutor.
I like the words "positive policies" there.
Now I simply call attention to that because it seems to me that
emphasizes the thing that we are driving at-no more imperialism,
no more exploitation, no more making the people of Asia second-rate
people but wholly free people, free to join with the western nations
working toward the freedom of the world.
It occurred to we that you might possibly have in mind some fur-
ther development of that thought especially a positive policy to com-
bat communism in China, by working with Japan who now is one of
our allies with the ratification of this peace treaty.
Mr. DULLES. I think you have put your finger on what was to me
an important phase of my presentation yesterday. There is a great
tendency on the part of people to take a rather defeatist attitude to-
ward the Communist menace, I think, and to assume that once an
area has been overrun by communism that that is final and for all time
the situation., and. the only thing we need to worry about is what they
are going to take next.
In my opinion, that is a false approach and an approach which is
not at all warranted by the probabilities. There is one thing that has
been demonstrated by history, time and time again, and it is that these
great sprawling absolute despotisms which operate from a few men
in authority who do not delegate responsibility, do not teach the
people to have initiative but, on the contrary, merely to operate as
automatons under direction and command, that that type of structure
is vulnerable; it falls apart, and the innate love of the people for
liberty and the right to conduct their own affairs in their own way and
not simply be regimented, that is the force which prevails.
I am confident that it will prevail in China where, above all, there
are a people who have demonstrated their individualism, that their
love is dedicated to their families as the unit of highest value.
DEFEATIST ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINESE MAINLAND UNWARRANTED
The Chinese have demonstrated time after time after time that they
absorb these alien doctrines that come, and are imposed on them
from without, and in the end it is the innate individualism and love of
their country and their own people which prevails.
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We talk about the relationship of Japan and China to each other
in terms of trade. So many people seem to assume that this is a
permanent situation. If it were a permanent situation, going to last
forever, then there are a good many positions on the outskirts of that
area which become precarious. We do not need to assume that is a
permanent situation, we should not assume it, and the policy of the
United States should be, as it always has been historically from the
time our Nation was founded, to keop alive the love of freedom on
the part of the people, knowing that that love of freedom will find
ways to express itself and. roll back despotism.
When this country was formed and organized the world was ruled
by 'despots. It so happened that the leader of those despots was
Czar Alexander of Russia, who organized the Holy Alliance, exercising
the rule of despotism over a large part of the world. It was largely
inspiration that stemmed from this Nation that rolled back that tide
of despotism. Never before in our history have we adopted a defeat-
ist attitude toward despotism and I see no, reason why we should do
so now. I believe if we can. inspire the free peoples of Asia, those
who are still free, with this spirit, and if they know that that is our
spirit, it will completely revolutionize the whole situation in Asia and
the people who still love freedom will find ways to make that effetive.
To me the most important single thing that the United State's can
do and the thing which is indispensable to hold a free world position,
not only in Japan but in Korea, Formosa, and Indochina, aid to
spread it, is that we must adopt these positive policies and get away
from the idea that this overrunning of China by Soviet communism is
a final, last word as to what is going to happen to China. There have
never been. those final last Words as regards China in the past:,'and I
do not think it is so now.
Senator SNrrrn of New Jersey. You would agree then, Mr. Dulles,
that while the security program is important, and military strength is
important, these psychological approaches are even more important
if we are going to find ultimate and final peace in the troubled nations
of the world?
Mr. DuLLns. Yes. A policy which consists only of a military
defense is doomed to failure.
Senator SNnrmr of New Jersey. I am glad to hear you say that
because it seems to me we must begin to think in the terms you have
just expressed. of a free and independent Asia and a free and iridepend-
en.t China, as one of the keystones to that-putting the JA,panese
people in that same alliance.
Mr. DuLLra. I would like to add a word. I was interested to note
that Mr. Churchill in his address to the Congress, which I had the
opportunity of hearing with the Senators, indicated the same view
that I expressed here, and that is, that it is neither necessary nor
proper to consider that. Soviet Communist domination of China is a
permanent thing.
Senator Sivrrrxof Ncw Jersey. That is a very reassuring statement
from a person of your background and knowledge. You will recall
that, at your suggestion, two of us on the Far Eastern Subcommittee
went to Japan in recent clavs in connection with these discussions.
Senator Sparkman, to whom t want to pay tribute, and Senator Dulles
and I were together on this trip to Japan. For the record, I want to
'say I never had greater satisfaction working with anybody anywhere
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than with Senator Sparkman and Senator Dulles. We worked
together; there was no partisanship, just interest for the best results,
with this whole Japan settlement.
One of the things you will recall, was the discussion of the economic
situation of Japan, and the question of trade. I wanted to see whether-
you had any comments to make with regard to the way the Battle
Act was working in. screening and keeping strategic materials out of'
Communist China. Also do you have any comments with regard to
the relative importance to Japan of trade with the mainland of China
or trade with Formosa and southeast Asia. We discussed that at
some length among ourselves and with representatives of the Japanese
people.
I think, for the record, it might be helpful to get your considered
judgment on this trade situation and the repeated statement of the.
importance of Japanese trade with Communist China as compared
with the importance of her dealing with Formosa, where the.National-
ist anti-Communist group are, and with southeast Asia.
Mr. DULLES. As I indicated yesterday, Senator Smith--
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. If I am asking you a question you:
have answered before, just say so. I are trying to collect my own
thinking on our trip,
Mr. DULLES. I am very glad to have that question because it en-.
ables me to elaborate a little bit some of the things I said yesterday.
As I did say yesterday, the trade between Japan and China, has,
during the past year, diminished to very negligible proportions. That
is primarily because of the effect of the United Nations-recommended
embargo on trade with China as an aggressor. It is also in consider-
able part due to the fact that China, like other Communist areas, has
in fact very little to offer in the way of international trade. The
Communists always put on a good show and a good propaganda about
trade, and they try to make other countries believe that trade with.
them would be an extremely profitable and desirable operation.
They put on trade fairs occasionally, and they put on a few things
for exhibit. As a matter of fact, China itself today is in a desperate.
economic; plight. It cannot offer anything very attractive in the way
of international trade. The same applies to the Soviet Union.
But because of these various reasons, the Japan-China trade has
shrunk to infinitesimal proportions. Less than -1 percent of Japan's.
total trade last year was in. terms of exports to or imports from China,.
Now, as regards the future, countries like Japan-and there are
many such countries, including United Kingdom, France, the Scandi-
navian countries, and so forth--will probably be under the provisions
of the so-called Battle Act which. has been very largely ignored. in the
discussion of such problems as Japan-China trade.
That act lays down the policy of the United States not giving mili-
tary, economic, or financial assistance to any country which does not.
join in the common program of preventing the Soviet-dominated world
from getting goods which are of strategic value, or which will build up
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 49
their potential strength which could be used against the free-world
,countries.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. May I interrupt? We had the Bat-
tle Act in mind at the time we were discussing Korea. Your concep-
tion of the Battle Act is much wider than just for the Korean situation.
Mr. DULLES. The, Battle Act establishes broadly the policy of the
United States not to permit exports to the Soviet Union and any
countries under its domination. It is not directed primarily against
China as an aggressor in the Korean war. China is not mentioned by
the act. The only countries mentioned by the act by name are the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domina-
tion which is deemed to include China. It establishes a very broad
policy of trade between the free world and the Soviet-dominated
areas, and says that the United States will not give military, economic,
or financial aid to countries unless they coop erate in that act.
Japan, like many other eon tries-"the members of the North
Atlantic Treaty-will be receiving military and economic aid from the
United States, and will have to comply with that act as a condition.
The question, of trade in the future between Japan and China is? not
something that is dealt with or determined by such a thing as this
letter of Prime Minister Yoshida's which has been referred to pre-
viously. Some people seem to think that that letter is determinative
on the trade between China and Japan. Nothing could be morealse
than that assumption. The question of trade between Japan and
China'is governed by the provisions of the act which are the conditions
under which the United States gives the military, financial, and eco-
nomic aid which Japan will be receiving. Military aid under the
security treaty, economic aid for instance in terms of $40,000,000
Export-Import Bank cotton credit which has just been extended.
As I said yesterday, Japan has certified its compliance with that.
Under that act there is it long list of articles. You can see from this
sheaf of papers before me what they are. The export of that has. to be
embargoed or controlled.. All of the countries that are working
together here, in the free world are complying with. that. The result
of that is going to be to cut down very sharply trade between the
so-called free world and. the Communist-dominated world. That is
the policy of the United States. It is the policy in which other free
nations are gladly cooperating. It is a policy in which Japan is'coop-
erating and it is a result of that policy that we must anticipate that,
so long as China is under this Soviet-alien domination, there will not
be important trade between Japan and China.
As far as the other aspects of Japan's trade are concerned, of course
the trade with Formosa is of increasing importance. During the last
year Japan's trade with Formosa has been four or five times as large
as its trade with the China mainland. It is back again to about what
it was during the period when Formosa was a part of Japan as ode of its
colonies. That trade is immeasurably more important to Japan than
the trade with Communist China now is, or, under the terms of the
Battle Act, could be.
Also, as I pointed out yesterday, this virtual extinction of trade
between Japan and China has not militated against the steady,
healthy recovery of China's economy.
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Her foreign exchange position is very healthy, has become so during-
this past year. It is partly due to what you might, call fortuitous
accidents, the fact that in some ways the Korean operation has been
of financial benefit to Japan, but in these days most of our economic
life is something we cannot figure very closely in advance, and depends
upon unpredictable circumstances of one sort or another.
I have complete confidence that Japan, with its unique ability of
an industrial character in that part of the world, will find increasing
opportunities to develop and strengthen its economy without this!
trade with the Communist area which, as I say, is foreclosed not by
Japan's policy in regard to Formosa, but by the provisions of the
Battle Act.
FINANCING JAPAN'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That takes me to another thought
with regard to Japan's economic position. We were constantly asked
the extent to which the United States or other countries might help
in Japan's economy. We realize Japan's economy is weak and would
make it difficult in the postwar period to keep Japan alive and a
member of the western group of power.
In your statement of yesterday I found another paragraph which
interested me. That is on page 5. You said there, and I quote:
Japan will need what the Potsdam surrender terms promised, namely, "access
to raw materials" and "participation in world trade relations."' She will need
to modernize her industrial plant, which is now somewhat obsolete, and to de-
velop further her large natural resources of hydroelectric power. Such needs
call for technological help, which can be supplied from the United States,, and it
perhaps calls for foreign investments from public or private sources.
You will recall, Mr. Dulles, when we were in Japan we spent a
very interesting day visiting first Osaki where very large cotton mills?
are. We had Senator Sparkman with us who knows something about
cotton and he was very complimentary to the cotton development
there.
We then went to Kobe where the enormous shipbuilding plant is
and we saw them complete some fine vessels for sale to foreign coun-
tries.
Then we moved over to the Yawata steel mills. I am not an.
expert in such things but it seemed those mills were doing a great
job in production of steel products. I want to ask you this question-
whether you did not feel that the recovery of Japan economically, as
evidenced by those samples we saw, gives promise of a sound industry
there? Did you feel that financial loans from private or public
sources would be safe loans and would not be simply handing out
money to keep a dying economy alive? Don't you believe that
Japan will be able to go ahead, under proper conditions with her
industrial production?
Mr. DULLES. I had the impression, and I think we all did, that
Japan is a good credit risk, and that particularly, there may be the
desirability of helping Japan to develop more fully its hydroelectric
sources of power. Japan is short of power at the present time and the
loss for the time being, at least, of access to coal from Sakhalin, and.
also from China throws a heavier burden than before upon. water
power resources.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 51
There are opportunities there of very important developments,
Whether Japan can handle that through her own finances, or whether
she will have to call on outside help is something that needs to be
explored.
But certainly from the standpoint of credit risks, from the stand-
point of making a constructive investment, I would think that that
affords as useful an opportunity as I know anywhere.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I have one more question I want to
ask you that has to do with a totally different subject. I refer now to
the Treaty of Peace with Japan, article :3, which reads as follows:
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United Statse to the United Nations
to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole adiainis
tering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29? north latitude (including the Ryukyu
Islands and the Daito Islands) Nanpo Shoto south of Sofa Gan (including the
Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano]s lands) and Parece Vela and
Marcus Islands. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action
thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of
administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants
of these islands, including their territorial waters,
I think the record should show at least that the island of Okinawa,
which is one of the Ryukyus is a very important point on which. we
have some airfields, and it is part of our island chain of defense in the
Far East. When we were there you will recall, Mr. Dulles, that we
were given a memoranda by our Japanese, friends, impressing on us
their desire for an ultimate return of sovereignty of the Ryukyus and
Bonins to the Japanese people.
While this article 3 simply suggests Japan will concur, if they are
asked to, in a trustee system, the question was raised whether that is
the wisest disposition.
As I recall our discussion, we felts it would be wise not to make a
final decision on this matter. Instead, we would think in terms of
working out the best possible disposition of those islands for the hap-
piness of the Japanese people and for the happiness of the inhabitants
themselves, having in mind of course the defense needs of the United
States.
I thought you might want to comment on that and make it clear
whether or not you felt there had been any final disposition made of
Now, how we exercise it, is as you suggest a matter to be determined
in the light of a number of factors, one of which is strategic because
the position does have high strategic value, Also, there are human
elements to be taken into account---sentimental and historic factors.
All of those need to be weighed and appraised and brought within
some formula as to what will be the best all around.. There has been
no effort yet made to reach any final decision on that matter. 'I sup-
pose it will not be gone into in any exhaustive way until after the
treaty come into force,
the United States an option on that position.
that matter up to this time.
Mr. DULLES. There has been no final crystallization -of thought
within the United States Government as to how to exercise the rights
and privileges given us by article 3. Article 3, you might say, gives
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But even if there is a United Nations trusteeship, the terms of such
trusteeship lend themselves to very great flexibility and there is no
rigid pattern of trusteeship. We are not obligated even to apply for
trusteeship. It says if we do apply for trusteeship Japan will concur.
There is a provision, pending application for trusteeship the United
States may exercise any and all rights that it wants. Just what rights
we would select to exercise is it matter which, as I say, has not yet
been finally determined by the United States. So that position is at
the moment fluid and is one of the situations which will have to be
explored more fully by the departments of the Government which are
principally concerned.
National defense will have an important voice in those decisions
but there are other considerations also which we all agree would have
to be taken into account. I would not want to hazard a guess as to
what the future work-out of that position will be.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I have just one more question and
that has party been covered already.
I am asked constantly by people who have read this peace treaty
with Japan why we failed to limit armaments of Japan.
I think you have already discussed the issue of the sovereignty of
Japan. Do you have any further comment to make on the omission
in the treaty of any limitations whatever on armaments of the Japa-
nese people in light of the fact that there has been criticism of Japan's
being militaristic and so on?
I think that we should have the record perfectly clear on that point,
and the reason for omitting that.
Mr. DULLES. The reason for leaving that out was that it seemed to
us that a, practical limitation of Japan's offensive capacity was better
achieved through working arrangements with Japan than by attempt-
ing to prescribe rigidly in a peace treaty what the situation should be.
There is not enough human wisdom in the world to write limitations
of this sort of a concrete nature, and be sure that 5 years from now
they will be what we want.
We already see in the case of the Italian Peace Treaty that pro-
visions which we wrote 5 years ago and thought were going to be good
forever, we are now trying to get rid of.
Now the practical situation is that we hope to work out the security
of the area through such cooperation between the United States forces
and Japanese forces, and perhaps other forces in due course, so that
the Japanese forces of their own could never be an offensive threat.
That basic proposition was rather clearly set out by President Truman
in his opening address at the San Francisco Conference. He said this
Treading] :
The development of regional arrangements for defense in the Pacific will mean
that such Japanese defense forces as may be created would be associated with
the defense forces of other nations in that area. Japan's security would not
depend exclusively on .Japanese forces but on interrelated security arrangements
with other countries. The Japanese contribution by itself would not constitute
an offensive threat.
Now I cannot say just how that will work out because that is a
matter for the military people and even they have not got the picture
finalized.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 53
You will bear in mind that at the present time Japan does not have
any military forces whatsoever and is prohibited from doing so by its
constitution. It does have a police force which it is developing so as
to better be able to deal with matters of internal security, and it is
developing a coast guard. But it has no army, navy, or air force
whatsoever, and there is no immediate prospect that it will have.
But just to take a hypothetical ease, let its assume that there came
about a Japanese army of a certain number of divisions.
There is no reason to believe that the Japanese would, at the same
time, have a comparable navy or a comparable air force because other
free-world nations are in a position to supply that element of defensive
power.
You would, presumably, under, those circumstances, have a combina-
tion of a Japanese land force, and the United States, or perhaps some
other free-world power, would supply air power and others might
supply naval power.
The result would be you would have for defensive purposes a
balanced force involving land forces, sea forces, and air forces which,
combined, would be effective for defense.
But the Japanese land forces would not be able to take the offensive
because, they would not themselves have the sea power and the air
power to take their troops away from their own land. That is the
kind of thing which I think the President of the United States had in
mind when he developed the thesis that collective security is the` best
practical protection that there is against a resurgence of effective
Japanese aggression, because it will mean that the Japanese will not
alone have the capacity to be an offensive threat.
1 believe that that way of working these things out is a modern,
enlightened and effective way, infinitely more effective than the old-
fashioned method which has been tried, and which has constantly
failed, of trying to write discriminatory provisions in a treaty, -which
in fact, are merely provocative of the very action. you want to prevent.
DEPENDENCE ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRA.NCEMENTS RATHPJR THAN
REARMAMENT OF JAPAN
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think that is a very good state-
ment and will answer many people who will say, "Well, if they don't
plan to arm, how are they going to defend themselves in case they are
attacked? We can't defend them indefinitely." You have indicated
it will be through the collective security to be developed there.
Mr. DTJLLES. That is one of the advantages of collective security.
Collective security makes it possible to have adequate defense, but
it is composed of so many different elements that no one can effectively
be an aggressor.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Our collective security plans in the
Pacific will be within the four corners of the United Nations; under
article 51 as you mentioned earlier, so we are not getting away at all
from the United Nations' allegiance, or from working with the United
Nations in this program.
Mr. DULLES. On the contrary, the basic thesis of the United
Nations is- precisely the thesis 1 presented, namely, that security to
be effective, should be on a collective basis; if it is on a collective basis,
then you can get security without, its becoming an offensive national
threat.
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Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Dulles, I want to thank you
for the privilege of working with you on some of these things and I
want to thank Mr. John Allison for the courtesies he has shown me.
I am happy to learn he is going to continue to develop more ideas in
the Far East. I want to state here for the record what a privilege
it was to meet with our people in the Far East. I have in mind Admiral
Radford in Honolulu, General Ridgway and General Van Vleet on
the military front, and our State Department people, Mr. Sebald and
also Mr. Rankin. It was a privilege to go to these points in person
because I felt right along the members of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee could make their best contribution if they were able to work
with those of you in the executive department and see for themselves
upon the ground, how these things were developed.
Mr. Chairman, I am happy to make this acknowledgment of my
appreciation for the privilege of working with Mr. Dulles and Mr.
Sparkman, especially during the last month and a half in these
considerations and lining up of the Japanese Peace Treaty, getting it
in shape to bring to the floor of the Senate in the hope that we will
get a prompt ratification.
Mr. DULLES. I am glad you referred to Mr. Allison. I have
received certain expressions of appreciation which I am deeply grateful
for, but throughout this work Mr. Allison has been my most effective,
loyal, and able deputy, and if we have had a success here, it is not
individual success but a success in which he largely shares.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am aware of that and I had expe-
rienced that, and therefore I wanted to give the twins the benefit of
my own experience.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
Senator GREEN. Mr. Dulles, you have dwelt on the legal and
explicit obligations on the part of our Government to Japan under this
proposed Japanese-American Pact.
I want to ask whether, in your opinion, there is any moral obligation
on the part of the United States to aid Japanese security by supplying
such financial assistance as may appear to be required.
Mr. DULLES. There is no understanding, express or implied, with
reference to giving any particular economic aid or assistance to Japan.
Everybody knows what the United States policy is, and it is natural
that the Japanese should feel, as a partner with us, that they would
not be discriminated against. But there is nothing that has been said
or ,done which gives anyone in Japan any right to come to us and say,
"You are required to continue to give us economic aid."
What we do will be determined, I take it, by what an enlightened
view of our own self-interest requires. That will be a guide and the
policies which the Congress lays down. Within that framework I would
believe and hope that Japan, if it needed it, would be qualified to
receive the kind of help which we are giving others, although Japan
would never, in my opinion., need aid in the form of a grant or a gift.
Japan's economy is entirely capable of sustaining itself and as I pointed
out, within the last year Japan's economy has more than held its own
in the world without any grants-in-aid from the United States.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 1 06
Senator GREEN. I know there is no explicit obligation and I asked
you whether, in your opinion, there would be any moral obligation.
Mr. DULLES. In my opinion the United States would be under a
moral obligation to give sympathetic consideration to aid Japan if,
as a result of following our common policies, the Japanese economy
was in need of such aid. You may recall, Senator Green, that the
Covenant of the League of Nations provided that if, as a result, of
sanctions which were agreed upon, there was an economic burden
which was disproportionate in the case of certain countries, that that
would be shared on an equal basis.
In other words, that the burden of economic sanctions should not
unduly fall upon one country which, in aid of the common cause,
was required to accept a special sacrifice. I think that is a very sound
and basic principle which probably the United States would want to
take into account, as it carries out the policies that are expressed in
the Battle Act.
Senator GREEN. You have also stated you thought Japan would be,
as I understand it, more likely than other nations, many other nations,
to bear the burden itself.
Mr. DULLES. To do what?
Senator GREEN. More likely to be able to bear the financial burden
itself than some of the other nations.
Mr. DULLES. Yes; I do not anticipate that this contingency will
actually arise. I say, if it did arise
Senator GREEN. In that case would there be any moral obligation,
in your opinion?
Mr. DULLES. Yes; there would be. I niay say in that connection
that the Collective Measures Committee of the United Nations has
adopted this same principle which was expressed in the Covenant of
the League, namely, that in carrying out sanctions if the burden' falls
unequally or harshly upon some particular member who is joining in
the common effort, then that should be a matter of consideration by
all of them so as to share the burden equally.
If that contingency should arise in Japan I think that Japan should
be able to invoke the sympathetic application of that principle-
I do not anticipate that it will be necessary, and in my opinion; such
extensions of credit as may be desirable in the case of Japan will be
purely on a basis upon which bankers lend money, namely, that there
is an opportunity to lend money in a way and on terms which will on
the one hand assure you that you got your money back, and d the
other hand, assure of a constructive result through creating a greater
productive capacity.
I think that that normal banking relationship, the kind of thing
that should and would appeal probably to the World Bank or to the
Export-Import Bank, those factors exist in the case of Japan. I do
not think it likely that there will be any occasion for a pure financial
contribution to equalize the burdens of having sanctions against the
Communist world.
But if that should occur, I believe Japan could properly involve the
principle.
Senator GREEN. Do I understand you to say the moral ob1i ration
would be only such and to the same extent as would be the cash, with
any other nation?
Mr. DULLES. Yes, sir.
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Senator GREEN. Senator Wiley, I believe you have some other-
questions?
Senator WILEY. Yes.
Mr. Chairman, I want to join with all my associates in paying a
compliment to Senator Dulles. I could not help but think as I heard
the encomiums pour out from both sides here, that much more of it
and he will be a dark horse.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That is all right.
Senator GREEN. Maybe he does not need any more.
Senator WILEY. Senator Dulles, a treaty can be a scrap of paper if
the contracting parties have the same concept that Emperor William
had. Yesterday you told us definitely that in your opinion this new
experience, this historic turn of approach of victor to vanquished had.
greatly impressed the Japanese people.
I assume that is why you feel that this treaty with Japan will be
full of the spirit and not simply the letter of fulfillment. Is that right?
Mr. DULLES. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. Is there not another reason, and that is, that the
Japanese people know quite well what it would mean to come. under
the dominance of Russia? They would become mere serfs or slaves,
would they not? Is there a realization deep in the Japanese on that
subject?
Mr. DULLES. I do not suppose there is any people in the world,
with the possible exception of some of the Scandinavian countries,.
who have been close neighbors of Russia, but there are no other peoples.
who are as fully aware as the Japanese are of the potential menace
which resided first in the Czars and now in Soviet communism, both
of which are imperialistic and aggressive..
The Japanese have had to cope with that throughout their entire
history. I think they*probably know about that danger, almost better
than we do. Perhaps they can find or help us find some way to deal
with it because they have had a much longer experience in dealing
with it at close quarters than we have had.
Senator WILEY. Then it is your opinion that the possible economic
crisis that might come in the course of not trading with the mainland,
that that in itself, would not influence the direction of Japan as far as
falling away from the obligations of the treaty?
Mr. DULLES. I think that those elements will make the Japanese
eager to become partners in what I referred to here as a positive policy
to change that situation. I do not think that the responsible people
of Japan want to become engaged in an economic alliance which we
all know and they know well, too, always if you are dealing with Soviet
communism, has serious political implications. They did not want to
get caught in that political web.
Senator WILEY. Do you think, as a matter of law, that if and when
this treaty becomes the law of the land, it would operate in any way
to be a ratification of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements?
Mr. DULLES. On the contrary, Senator Wiley, this treaty is the
first formal act which the United States will have taken which involves,
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC THE T E' J
it clear abandonment of Yalta. As you recall, at San Francisco, the
Soviet delegates and their satellites, the Czechs and the Poles, howled
to high Heaven that this treaty was violating Yalta. I do not say it
violates Yalta because already Yalta had been violated and by them.
It can be said that this treaty departs from Yalta, ignores Yalta.
and in that respect I think it is something which the Senate of the
United States will welcome as the first formal act by the United States
which recognizes our total freedom from any obligations that stem
from Yalta.
Senator WILEY. I think that is a very clear statement, and I think
it should rub out a lot of misunderstanding on that subject.
NATURE OF RUSSIAN MISSION IN JAPAN
Now when you were in Japan did you find that the Russians
had an official mission there, and that its activities related to espionage
and cultural. relations activities, and so forth?
Mr. DuiLEs. The Soviet Union has a mission in Tokyo which is
accredited to SOAP at the present time. It is not technically ac-
credited to the Japanese Government because no missions are allowed
to be accredited to the Japanese Government. It is accredited. to
SCAP. The activities of that mission there are not a matter of public
knowledge. I may say that the character of that mission has changed
very considerably within the last few weeks. It had, up to that time,
been primarily of a military character. They have changed their
personnel considerably so that now they are more of the propaganda
and economic. people there, and fewer of the military people.
Senator WILEY. What will be the status of that meeting after
ratification of the treaty?
Mr. DULLES. That is somewhat of an enigma.
REASONS FOR OMISSION OF REPARATIONS CLAUSES IN TREATY
Senator WILEY. Now, Senator Dulles, article 1.4 provides that
[reading] :
Except as otherwise provided in the treaty, the Allied Powers waive all their
reparation claims against; Japan arising from the war or from direct military costs
of occupation.
Was the purpose of this act, of generosity that of aiding the -early
economic recovery of Japan and the creation of good will? Will. this
act of generosity outweigh the bitterness of Japanese aggression against
the Philippines, Australia, and elsewhere? Could Japan have met any
considerable part of the reparations bill in any event? Those are three
or four questions but they are all in one package.
Mr. DULLES. The treaty provides that the. countries that were.
occupied by Japan and damaged through that occupation will have a
right to get reparations from Japan in the only way which it seemed
economically possible--namely, through the use of Japan's surplus
industrial capacity and its surplus manpower. Those are the only two
things which Japan has in surplus which could be used to p> y re-
parations.
The theory of the treaty is that if these reparations creditor countries
want to supply Japan with the raw materials Japan will use its surplus
labor and surplus industrial capacity to fabricate these into what these
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countries want. So that they will get, free of cost, the enhancement of
value which will come through that fabrication.
Also, it is contemplated that certain other operations in the way of
salvaging ships for example, either for the use of the ships themselves,
or if they are too far gone, so as to make the steel available for scrap
purposes-things of that sort will be done by the Japanese.
There are discussions that have been going on actively in. Tokyo
between the delegation from Indonesia and the Japanese with refer-
ence to performing certain services of that sort for Indonesia.
Those negotiations have been conducted with good spirit and just
a (lay or two ago there was a document of what they called a Declara-
tion of Intention, an exchange of letters between Indonesia and the
Government of Japan, which looks to the implementing of that aspect
of the treaty. Similar negotiations are in prospect as regards the
Philippines.
We, believe that the Japanese in ways that are economically possible
to them, should demonstrate a, real desire to try to remedy some of
the wrongs that they have done. We believe that is the sentiment
of the Japanese people themselves. They have frequently expressed
it in. the highest quarters. That is, a desire within the limits of their
capacity to make good some of the wrongs that were committed.
But, as we have learned, through very hard experience under the
Treaty of Versailles, and since then in the case of Germany and Italy
after World War II it is almost impossible for countries situated like
Japan to assume external burdens there, to pay in foreign exchange,
because Japan's problem of getting enough foreign exchange to finance
her own essential imports is going to be it sufficient burden for Japan.
If you throw a reparations liability of that sort upon Japan, either it
would destroy Japan's economy, or else the burden of that would, in
effect, be shifted to the United States.
So we provide there that these reparation liabilities shall not throw
any foreign-exchange burden upon the United States, or throw any
burden upon any other Allied Powers, That is a polite way of saying
that the United States is not prepared to pay reparations as it did in
the case of Germany after the First World War.
Senator WiT.EY. May I interrupt there and say something which I
do not think was brought out by anyone here, but which has been
said by the people of Australia, and I suppose in the Philippines?
That is that it was only due to your ability to sell the Christian prin-
ciple that it was more blessed to give than to take the hide off your
enemy that that clause was really adopted. My question is whether
you. feel now that that Christian idea has been appreciated by coun-
tries who have suffered so much at the hands of the Japanese people,
namely, Australia and the Philippines and the islands which the Japa-
nese so rudely handled? Do they appreciate the change in the ap-
proach in international affairs from that of the victor taking the spoils, .
to the victor paying the bill?
Mr. DULLES. I could not honestly say, Senator Wiley, that spirit
of forgiveness has wholly permeated the peoples who suffered most
brutally from the Japanese. I would say that if we had suffered, as
have some of those people, and as you see in the wreckage of places
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC THE T
like Manila, for example, that it would be difficult for us to be as for-
giving as we have been.
On the whole, however, I think that principle is gaining acceptance
and that there is growing realization of the fact that really a spirit of
hatred and vengefulness, harms you in the long run more than it
harms the other fellow.
As far as the attitude of the Japanese is concerned, I think there is
a real recognition of the fact that this treaty reflects the spirit of
reconciliation to a great degree, which is quite unique in the treaty-
making process.
Of course, I do not suppose one should ever deal with other countries
on the theory that gratitude will be a spirit which will long survive.
I think you do the thing you think is right, and in the long run it will
be of the greatest benefit to humanity, including yourself; you deal
with a thing in a spirit of enlightened self-interest, but gratitude, of
course, is not it spirit which is often retained long by one country
toward another. I would not want to measure the value of what we
have done merely in terms of gratitude because I think we did it for
other adequate reasons. But certainly today there is a very lal'ge
measure of appreciation in Japan of the enlightened spirit which is
reflected by this treaty, and I think there is a good chance that it
will survive as long as such sentiments ever survive in people who
soon become engrossed in their problems and, of course, the fact is
that under this treaty the Japanese will have very substantial bur?dlns
to assume. Their burdens, under the treaty, will be greater than the
burdens they have assumed under occupation.
be
There will be substantial reparations to be met; there will be
substantial burdens in yen for the restoration of Allied property in
Japan, and the Japanese people will have to work hard. They .ire
not going to have an easy time of it. Perhaps in the future, the
present mood of gratitude might gradually vanish. But even if it
does I will not regret the attitude reflected by this treaty and, I am
sure that in the, long run, those who have taken this, attitude will
increasingly come to realize they have taken the wise and statesm.rn-
like approach.
FUTURE SOVIET RE1,A'r'IONS WITII JAPAN
Senator WILEY. If and when the treaty comes into force what will
be the Soviet Union's relation with Japan and what effect will the
Soviet Union's failure to sign the peace treaty have in that picture on
the future of Japan?
Mr. DULLES. No one knows what the future attitude of the Soyiet
Union will be toward Japan. Even if it retains a belligerent status it
will not be able to exercise any belligerent rights so long as a majority
of the members of the Far Eastern Commission are going along with
the peace treaty, which they now are, so far as signatories are con-
cerned.
In other words, the belligerent rights that are possessed can only be
exercised through the Far Eastern Commission and with a substantial
majority of the members of the Far Eastern Commission having made
peace with Japan, they will be in a position to prevent any abuse
through the Far Eastern Commission of belligerent status by anyone
other country.
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6U JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Now whether or not the Soviet Union. makes peace with. Japan one
can only guess. Up until very recently the attitude of the Soviet
Union has been very hostile and belligerent toward Japan. Stalin's
new year's greeting to the Japanese people, may mark a change of
policy. But that again is guessing as to what the mind of the Kremlin
is and that is amusing, but not very productive exercise.
Senator WILEY. You know Senator Dulles, there is a conference
scheduled between the trade delegations of Japan and the Soviet, I
think some time in April, supposed to be in Moscow. Have you any
comment to make as to what effect or what direction that might take
or what you think might happen in relation to the matter?
Mr. DULLES. So far there are no clear indications as to what the
attendance of that conference will be from non-Communist countries.
There are reports from various countries of prospective attendance,
but as far as Japan is concerned, there is no verification as yet as to
what will take place there.
As I have indicated, under the provisions of the Battle Act and
Japanese certification under that, it seems to me quite unlikely that
any substantial results would. come out of it as far as Japan or any
other free world nation is concerned.
Senator WILEY. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Could I ask just one question, Mr.
Chairman?
Senator GREEN. May I ask one further question, please, first?
It is directly concerned with this.
REASON FOR SOVIET RAIFIISAL TO SIGN PEACE TREATY
Mr. Dulles, in your opinion, what was the real motive of the Soviet
Union in refusing to cooperate in negotiating and signing this treaty?
Mr. DULLES. I would think that the principal reason, Senator
Green, why they did not go along with the treaty was because they,
for political reasons, felt unable to go along and make a peace with
Japan unless the Chinese Communist regime was also included in that
peace. That was a position to which we objected adamantly.
The basic position of the Soviet Union was it was not practical to
have an effective peace with Japan unless the, Chinese Communist
regime was also a party to that peace. I think that is it principal
reason. Of course, they also had serious objection to the provisions
of the treaty, which most of the free-world nations wanted, namely the
provision that there would be collective security between Japan and
the United States, and the provision that the United States would
have it right to retain bases in Okinawa, and the Ryukyus. Those
were provisions which they strongly objected to.
Senator GREEN. But those reasons were against signing the treaty,
and not the matter of refusal to take part in negotiations.
Mr. DTILLES. They did take part in the negotiations. I negotiated
at very considerable length with the delegates from the Soviet Union
particularly Mr. Malik who was designated for that purpose. I met
with him on three or four occasions. We discussed the prospective
treaty. In those discussions the principal objections he made were
the three I flow mentioned, namely, the failure to include the so-called
People's Government of China, the provision that Japan would be
entitled to make a bilateral security treaty with. the United States,
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES '
and the retention of United States bases at Okinawa. Those were
the three points they particularly objected to.
We had negotiations which I conducted personally with Malik
which began October 1950 and carried on until February or March
1951.
At that time the Soviet Government announced that they would
not carry on any further negotiations with me. However, we did;
after that time, still have several exchanges of notes with the Soviet
Union with reference to the terms of the peace treaty.
Senator GREEN. Thank you.
Senator Smith, did you have something further?
Senator Siiivu of New Jersey. Just one more question. I wasn't
here yesterday, Mr. Chairman, but f understand no reference Was
made to the security treaty of Australia and New Zealand and the
treaty with the Philippines, and we are considering those together
with this treaty. Before leaving the stand, I would like to ask you
one or two questions about them.
IMPLEMENTATION OF TILE SECURITY PACTS FOR THE PACIFIC
A general question first: The security treaty with Japan which we
have been talking about confers broad general rights and obligations
on the United States in and about Japan.
Now the security treaty with New Zealand and Australia sets forth
arrangements designed to maintain peace in the Pacific area.
These three treaties-that is, the treaty with Japan and with Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, and the treaty with the Philippines--set
forth what has been designated by some people as sort of a Monroe
Doctrine for the Pacific area. How do you visualize these treaties
will be put into effect in actual practice in the event something breaks
out in the Far East? Have we left that to be determined in the future?
I noticed in the treaties themselves we say [reading]:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would Act to
meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutiotlal processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall bp im-
mediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to restore and maintain international peace and security.
That is not quite as binding a statement as we have in the North
Atlantic pact. It is different in the sense of being the Monroe Doc-
trine warning, so to speak, rather than a commitment to'do anything
specific.
Have you any comment to make on the way these treaties are to
work and the reasons for our ratifying them?
Mr. DULLES. It is true, as you point out, that the language used
is what you might call Monroe Doctrine language. In fact, the lan-
guage is precisely taken from President Monroe's message where lie
says that interference in the affairs of South America would be re-
garded as "dangerous to the peace and security of the United Stta"tes."
That language in the Monroe Doctrine has served very effectively
for 125 years. It is a classic expression by the United States. It
seemed to me, and it was acceptable to the other governments con-
cerned, that we should use that language rather than the language
that was used in the North Atlantic Treaty.
94413-52-5
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b2 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
You may recall that the language used in the North Atlantic Treaty
gave rise to a considerable debate in the Senate as to whether or not
that precise language involved any shift in the responsibility as
between the President and the Congress.
I was in the Senate at the time and took part in that debate. It
seemed to me and to the other governments concerned that, there
was no occasion to reopen that precise kind of debate again, through
an effort to use language which, from an internal standpoint, had
possible implications that might not be acceptable to the Senate, or
at least it raised controversy, and that it was better to use the Monroe
Doctrine language which involved no such possibilities of a shift in
the division of responsibility between the Executive and Congress,
and which had proved to be an effective, workable declaration of
policy for 125 years.
The' question of what we do is, in the case of each of the countries
involved, a question for it to decide in the light of the fact that there
is recognition that it is a common danger, and that each will act in
accordance with its constitutional processes to meet that danger.
Just what will be done is something which would perhaps be con-
sidered by the council that is established, or by the consultations that
would take place under the treaties.
No doubt from a military standpoint there will be military views
as to what would be done under various hypothetical cases. But
those are matters which would be dealt with in accordance with, as I
say, our constitutional processes and the decision as to the participa-
tion of the Congress and the Executive in what is done would be
dependent upon the character of what is actually decided the interests
of the United States require in the event of a danger arising.
RELATIONSHIP OF SECURITY PACTS TO THE PEACE TREATY
Senator SMITH. You feel, Mr. Dulles, that as part of the ratification
of the Japanese Peace Treaty, the security treaties are essential, and
you are advocating, of course as representative of the Executive here,
the ratification of all these treaties at the same time; is that correct.?
Mr. DULLES. Yes. They are very definitely interdependent; they
interlock. The whole result of what we are doing here is to try not
merely to create a peace which will liquidate the old war but also will
do so on terms which will strengthen the fabric of peace in this West
Pacific area. That involves provisions which will look out for the
security of Japan, of the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand,
and pledge our common efforts in the common cause. There would
be a very serious gap, in my opinion, in what we plan to do if any one
of these treaties should not be ratified.
Senator SMITH. Thank you. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GREEN. Senator Magnuson has a few short remarks.
RIGHTS OF SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA IN JAPAN
(During the course of the hearings Senator Wiley in a letter to
Secretary Acheson raised the question as to whether the Soviet Union
or Communist China might attempt to send armed forces into Japan
in pursuance of alleged "belligerent" rights. Secretary Acheson's
reply follows:)
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 63
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, February 5, 195P.
Ron. ALEXANDER WILEY,
United States Senate.
My DEAR SENATOR WILEY: I have your letter of January 29, 1952, raising the
question of whether the Soviet Union or Communist China, as nonsignatories
of the multilateral peace treaty, might, after that treaty comes into force, atfempt
to send armed forces into Japan in pursuance of alleged "belligerent" rights.
This is a matter which has, of course, been given the most-thorough considera-
tion over the past few years.
It is my judgment. that the risk of Soviet or Iced China military action in Japan
or elsewhere is neither diminished nor increased by purely legalistic considerations.
I believe that in..such matters the leaders of the Soviet Union and of other nations
dominated by the Soviet Union act externally not because of the presence or ab-
sence of legalistic rights, but because of their own determination of what is in
their over-all interest. If they want to take external action, they will find or
invent legal pretexts. If they do not want, to take the action, they will not take
t even though legal pretexts exist or can be invented.
The Potsdam surrender terms of June 26, 1945, to which the Soviet Union
subsequently adhered, did not give the Allies individually and independent3y the
right to occupy Japan. Whatever individual rights of occupation there might
have been were merged voluntarily by the Allies into a single "allied" occupation,
which was to come to an end after certain stated objectives had been achieve.
As a consequence of the Potsdam surrender terms, therefore, the only right to
occupy is a collective right. Article 7 provides:
"Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that
Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be'desig-
nated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the, basic
objectives we are here setting forth."
Article 12 provides:
"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan aq soon as
these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accord-
ance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined
and responsible government."
The San Francisco Peace Treaty, as you know, was signed by 48 Allied nations,
including a large majority of the members of the Far Eastern Commission_andof
the Allied Council in Japan, including the United States, which it was agreed
should designate the supreme commander who would control all the occultation
forces. It is the view of the Government of the United States that this action
constituted a conclusive determination that the "new order" referred to in-article
7 in the surrender terms is established; that there is "convincing proof that Japan's
war-making; power has been, destroyed"' so that there is no longer any right to
initiate occupation. under paragraph 7; and that the objectives of the Potsdam
surrender terms "have been accomplished" and "that there has been established,
in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully
inclined and responsible government" so that the occupying forces of the Allies
should be withdrawn from Japan in accordance with article 12 and as more fully
set out in the treaty of peace.
Under these circumstances, any effort of any single power hereafter to assert
independent belligerent rights of occupation would not be an exercise of belligerent
rights but a violation of the Potsdam surrender terms by which the Allied
Nations, including the Soviet Union, are bound. _
Upon the coining into force of the multilateral peace treaty, there will sinnil-
taneously come into force the security treaty between Japan and the United
States, article II of which provides:
"During the exercise of the right referred to in article I, Japan will not grant,
without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights,
powers, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or
of maneuver, or transit of groun.d,air, or naval forces to any third power."
It sa,n, therefore, be nssurned that Japan would oppose a.nv effort by the Soviet
Union or Chinese Communists to send armed forcer, into Japan in the guise of
"occupying" forces.
You refer to the fact that there exists in Jr-Pon what you refer to is P.n "imbal-
ance" between western forces and Russia's estern strength. It is quite trite that
in Ja,pa,n as well as many othe- places subject to armed att?ck from the Soviet
sphere of influence there is all "imbala.ncc" of power insofar a?s re'K,-rtls the,, actual
forces which would initially he brought into play at the various hypothetical
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64 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
points of contact. However, initial and local "imbalance" is not necessarily the
determining factor. The-,'e is also to be taken into account the total power, mili-
ta,ry and industri^l, actual and potential, which might be brought into play if
there should be armed aggression.
Recent developments do not suggest that either the Soviet Union or Communist
China contemplate an effort to "occupy" Japan with their armed forces. Prior
to the San Francisco Pen co Conference Communist propaganda suggested that
as a possibility in an effo,?t to frighten the free nations from proceeding with a
Japanese peace. Since they were not frightened, but went rhea.d, the Communist
propaganda line has changed. It is no longer menacing ag,inst .Japan but rather
.an attempt to woo Japan with kind words and promises of peaceful trade rely ?tions.
In this connection I refer to Mr. Stalin's New Year's message to the Japanese
people. Also, since the peace treaty was signed, the personnel of the Soviet rris-
sion in Tokyo has been changed in character to reduce the military personnel
and to inc.e?se the economic and political personnel.
I believe that the courageous initiative which we, with the other free nations,
have taken in relation to the Japanese pence has had a, s-lut".rv influence for peace
and while dangers and hazards obviously exist, these are not, in my opinion, in-
creased by consummating our peace and security t e ties with Japan. I believe,
indeed, that the risk would be greatly increased if we fnlte?c-l in these matters.
As bearing on the Soviet reaction to the "legalities," I enclose a copy of the
statement which General MacArthur made on this subject in June 1950.
Sincerely yours,
DEAN ACIIESON.
(Enclosure: Statement by General MacArthur.)
"I was never in agreement with the reasoning advanced by some that a peace
treaty without the Soviet would either favorably alter the Soviet's legal position
vis-b-vis the .`apanese problem or be seized upon by the Soviet as the basis for
intensified pressure upon .`apan. The Soviet has demonstrated time and again
that his decisions are based solely upon political expediency and relative military
capabilities, without the slightest regard for prior commitment or legalistic
reasoning. Any move which the United States makes is fraught with the dan -er
of Soviet retaliation but hardly more so than is maintaining the status quo vis-a-
vis ?apan, whereunder the Soviet is smarting with a sense of complete frustra-
tion."-Gen. Douglas MacArthur, June 1950.
STATEMENT OF HON. WARREN G. MAGNUSON, A UNITED STATES
SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
JAPANESE OBLIGATION TO ENTER INTO FISHERIES, MARITIME, AND TRADE
AGREEMENTS
Senator MAGNUSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any particular
questions to ask. I did want to appear before the committee because
we, on the west coast, of course have a very distinct geographical
interest in the Japanese and Far East problems. I, too, was fortunate
to be in Japan with Mr. Dulles during some of these negotiations, and
we have been talking here about our obligations under the treaty,
which, of course, we expect to fulfill. I appreciate the prime necessity,
both militarywise and psychologywise, as far as the Far East is con-
cerned, of quick ratification of this basic document. But the docu-
ment does contain other obligations on the part of Japan. Among
them is a chapter in the treaty which provides that-
It shall be mandatory upon Japan to enter into a fishing agreement in the
Pacific.
Another section suggests that Japan would enter into a maritime
agreement and trade agreements. I do hopa that this committee,
even though we all want to see this treaty ratified at the earliest
possible time, will make it crytsal clear that those sections of the
treaty, insofar as Japan is concerned, be also concluded in a supple-
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES - 00
mental way as soon as possible. And the very reason they were put
in the draft of the treaty is so we could go ahead with this basic
document for the reasons heretofore described.
I think the committee has to make it clear, whether it be in the
report or in the debates in the Senate, that some initiative should
be taken to go ahead as soon as possible with the supplemental
obliggations.
The State Department has done very fine work on the question
of the fisheries treaty. That has been initialed and is probably
ready for ratification as soon as this treaty is ratified. I do not
know of any action that has been taken insofar as setting a date for
negotiations on a reciprocal trade treaty with Japan.
I think it should be made clear to the Members of the Senate,
when they ratify the basic document, that this is intended to be
done at the earliest possible moment. We have already run into
some trade difficulties in the rehabilitation of Japan, and those things
can be settled easily. There has been no mood, so far as I know, on
the part of our Government to do so, although I believe Japan is
willing to enter into a maritime agreement.
This is of vital importance in the future rehabilitation and future
relations between ourselves and Japan. Our memories are not so
short on the west coast, when we remember back in the twenties and
thirties when the Japanese merchant marine practically ran the
American flag off the Pacific because we could not compete. Unfor-
tunately, the rehabilitation of Japan depends upon the three- basic
segments of Japan's economy, which are fishing, maritime, and
textile. I am sure. agreements can be worked out which will be
satisfactory.
I believe it should be made clear to this Senate, because all of us
want to ratify this document as soon as possible, that these things
are in the immediate future and that they will be done. I think we
will speed ratification if this is done. I think Mr. Dulles agrees with
me on that because they are matters of great economic concern to
three big segments of American economy that did suffer ,under
Japanese unfair competition-in my opinion-prior to World War II.
Senator GREEN. Are there further questions?
Senator MAGNUSON. Mr. Chairman, if I might be permitted, I
would add this other thought.
We have attempted, and rightly so, to establish in Japan and the
Japanese Government a blueprint of a democracy applicable to its
type of living, culture, and economy. I have had many questions
asked me whether you think Japan. will continue to carry out some of
these basic concepts of democracy. During the course of my trip-
I do not know whether you found this, Senator Smith, but I am sure
Mr. Dulles did-I found that the Japanese people, Mr. Dulles, in
five short years, have discovered that this business of democracy is a
nicer way to live, and they are not going to abandon that.
Senator GREEN. We stand adjourned until 10:30 tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. in., the committee recessed to reconvene
at 10:30 a. in, Wednesday, January 23, 1952.)
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1952
UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at 10:30 a. in., pursuant to adjournment, in the
caucus room, 318 Senate Office Building, United States Capitol,
Washington, D. C., Senator Walter F. George presiding.
Present: Senators George, Sparkman, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey,
and Brewster.
Present of committee staff: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, and Mr.
Holt.
Senator GEORGE. The committee will please come to order. The
witnesses scheduled for hearing today will please come around to the
desk here in front. The first witness is the Honorable James P. S.
Devereux. Mr. Devereux, please have a seat.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. S. DEVEREUX, CONGRESSMAN
FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to thank
you and the members of the committee for the opportunity to appear
as a witness in connection with the peace treaty. I would like to
bring to your attention, sir, if I may, that no provisions have been
made in the treaty for repayment of certain funds that were taken by
the Japanese in the Philippines. These were funds that were on
deposit by various servicemen in the Philippine Trust Co. I do not
understand that attitude of the State Department that our own
people should not be repaid for funds taken by the Japanese. Pro-
visions have been made for reimbursement for our nationals who lost
property in Japan proper, but the treaty provides that there will be
no reimbursement of these particular funds or any other funds lost by
our people to the Japanese any place outside of Japan proper. Ap-
parently the attitude of the State Department is that we are supply-
ing a great deal of money for the rehabilitation of Japan and, therefore,
if we pay our own people for the money that they lost, it will be an
additional burden on the taxpayers of the United States.
Well, if it be the policy of the administration to rehabilitate Japan,
I think the burden should be spread over the entire population of this
country. Those particular people---and I refer primarily to the serv-
icemen who had deposits on hand in the Philippines-should not bear
the brunt of that rehabilitation program. I mean the widows and
orphans of men who were lost on Bataan and Corregidor will have to
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68 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
bear an additional burden, which I do not believe is just. I might go
on. and suggest that here we are trying to win friends throughout the
world, and if we are unjust to our own people I do not believe we are
going to win many friends. That is the substance of my statement, sir.
I think that something should be done about it.
Senator GEORGE. Have you a written statement, sir?
Mr. DEVEREUX. No; I do not have.
Senator GEORGE. I thought if you had you might give it to the re-
porter and make it part of the record.
Any questions?
CONFISCATION OF AMERICAN FUNDS IN THE PHILIPPINES BY
JAPANESE
Senator WILEY. As I understand it, you claim there were certain
funds in the banks in the Philippines belonging to servicemen and those
funds were confiscated by the Japanese; is that correct?
Mr. DEVEREUX. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. What is the amount?
Mr. DEVEREUX. It is rather difficult to determine the exact amount
because there has been no research done on it except by General
Bluemel, who will follow me, I believe. The estimated amount is
around $200,000.
Senator WILEY. That is the total?
Mr. DEVEREUX. Yes, sir; that is the estimate.
Senator WILEY. Is there any other objection you have to the
treaty?
Mr. DEVEREUX. No, Sir.
Senator WILEY. Then to make the matter clear, you believe there
is about $200,000 on deposit belonging to our veterans which was taken
over by the Japanese, and you believe that the treaty should have
taken that into consideration and have provided for it? You believe
that is the responsibility of the Japanese people and that that money
should be paid out of Japanese funds; is that right?
Mr. DEVEREUx. I do, sir.
Senator WILEY. What do you think about the funds in the hands
of the Alien Property Custodian, the funds belonging to the people or
the Japanese Government? Do you have any idea on that?
Mr. DEVEREUX. No, sir.
Senator WILEY. Do you have any thoughts about the rights of
American citizens to file claims with the Alien Property Custodian
against funds belonging to Japanese?
Mr. DEVEREUX. That should be taken care of.
Senator WILEY. These are specific claims of our own individual
boys, having lost various amounts; do you know what the range is?
Mr. DEVEREUX. I have heard of anywhere from $200, maybe some
of them were much less, up to $900. We have one particular case of
an officer who was lost as a prisoner of war. He has left a widow and
two children. Ike had on deposit over $900 in gold.
Senator WILEY. Very well. That is all.
Senator GEORGE. Senator Smith?
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PCE
Senator SMITH of New JerseY. Mr. Chairman, there is just one
question I would like to ask Mr. Devereux. Do you feel sure that the
situation you presented is known to the State Department?
I read article 18, subsection (a), as follows:
It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected, the
obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (in-
cluding those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired
before the existence of a state of war and which are due by the government or
nationals of Japan to the government or nationals of one of the Allied Powerp, or
are due by the government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the govern-
ment or nationals of Japan.
I realize that might not cover the exact case you speak of but it
seems to me it indicates that there was no intention not to give regard
to the kind of obligations you are talking about. I would have to
ask Mr. Dulles or the members of the State Department about this,
but we will certainly make a note of it and check on it.
Mr. DEVEREUX. I would like to bring the, committee's attentioll to
a letter I addressed to the Secretary of State dated August 16.
STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION ON AMERICAN CLAIMS IN PHILIPPINES
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Japanese Treaty negotiations have raised several
questions in my mind. Will you kindly advise me if-1. Americans who own
property which was confiscated by the Japanese will be repaid? By this I mean
property in Japan or in any of the territories taken over by the Japanese during
the war.
and this is the particular thing I am appearing before the committee
on-
Private bank accounts of servicemen in the Philippine Islands which were con-
fiscated by the Japanese after the surrender of the islands in 1942 will be restored?
If these provisions are not included I should like to suggest that they be considered.
This is the reply I received from the Assistant Secretary of State:
DEAR MR. DEVEREnx: Reference is made to your letter of August 16, 1951,
regarding certain provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
Receipt of this letter in the Department was acknowledged by telephone on
August 21. There is attached a copy of the treaty of peace with Japan which
is to be offered for signature at the Conference in San Francisco in September.
Article 15 (a) of the treaty provides for the return of the property of each Allied
Power and its nationals if "such property was within Japan at any time between
December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed
thereof without duress or fraud."
This article also makes provision for compensation in cases where such property
was within Japan on December 7, 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered
injury or damage as a result of the war.
In view of the limited resources available to Japan it has not been considered
feasible to extend the compensation provision to property losses which occurred
outside of Japan, including private bank accounts of servicemen in the Philippine
Islands which were confiscated by the Japanese after the surrender of the islands
in 1942.
In connection with the drafting of the peace treaty the Department has liven
serious consideration to the wide variety of claims of nationals of the United States
and its allies against the Japanese Government.
The problem of providing compensation from Japanese resources for various
public and private claims arising out of the war is a very difficult one. PaCticu-
larly since the extensive losses of life and property and personal injuries suffered
by our allies must be considered on the same footing as our own, insofar as corrtpen-
sation by Japan is concerned.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIE
S
Since the end of World War II it has been necessary for the United States to
supply economic assistance to Japan to the extent of nearly $2 billion because of
Japan's inability to earn from sale of her exports sufficient foreign exchange to
supply even the minimum needs of her population for food and other necessary
imports.
The furnishing of aid to Japan has been considered essential to the basic goal of
the United States with respect to Japan, namely, that Japan achieve political
and economic stability and become a peaceful and self-supporting member of
the free community oriented toward the democratic countries of the world. A
requirement that Japan pay compensation for war losses out of her inadequate
foreign exchange resources would consequently involve the imposition of a burden
on the United States taxpayers-
I might interpose to say that I am glad to see that the taxpayers
are thought of.
and would constitute a barrier to the achievement of stability and self-support
in Japan.
That is the gist of the reply that I received from the State Depart-
ment. I see no justification yet why these few individuals should
bear a burden more than the rest of the taxpayers of the country,
as a whole.
(The full exchange of letters follows:)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., August 16, 1951.
IIon. DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Japanese Treaty negotiations have raised several
questions in my mind. Will you kindly advise me if-
1. Americans who owned property which was confiscated by the Japanese will
be repaid. By this, I mean property in Japan or in any of the territories taken
over by the Japanese during the war.
2. Private bank accounts of servicemen in the Philippine Islands which were
confiscated by the Japanese after the surrender of the islands in 1942 will be
restored.
If these provisions have not been included, I should like to suggest that they
be considered.
Sincerely yours,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 27, 1951.
MY DEAR MR. DEVEREUX: Reference is made to your letter of August 16,
1951, regarding certain provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Receipt of
this letter in the Department was acknowledged by telephone on August 21.
There is attached a copy of the treaty of peace with Japan which is to be offered
for signature at the Conference at San Francisco. Article 15 (a) of the treaty
provides for the return of the property of each Allied Power and its national if such
property was within .Japan at any time between December 7, 1941, and September
2, 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud.
This article also makes provision for compensation in cases where such property
was within Japan on December 7, 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered
injury or damage as a result of the war. In view of the limited resources available
to Japan, it has not been considered feasible to extend the compensation pro-
vision to property losses which occurred outside Japan, including private bank
accounts of servicemen in the Philippine Islands which were confiscated by the
Japanese after the surrender of the islands in 1942.
In connection with the drafting of the peace treaty, the Department has given
serious consideration to a wide variety of claims by nationals of the United States
and its allies against the Japanese Government. The problem of providing compen-
sation from Japanese resources for the various public and private claims arising out
of the war is a very difficult one, particularly since the extensive losses of life and
property and personal injuries suffered by our allies must be considered on the same
footing as our own insofar as compensation by Japan is concerned.
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Since the end of World War II it has been necessary for the United States to
supply economic assistance to Japan to the extent of nearly $2 billion because of
Japan's inability to earn from sale of her exports sufficient foreign exchange to
supply even the minimum needs of her population for food and other necessary
imports. The furnishink. of aid to Japan has been considered essential to the
basic goal of the United States with respect to Japan, namely that Japan achieve
political and economic stability and become a peaceful and self-supporting member
of the international community oriented toward the democratic countries of the
world. A requirement that Japan pay compensation for war losses out of her
inadequate foreign exchange resources would consequently involve the imposition
of a burden on the United States taxpayer and would constitute a barrier to the
achievement of stability and self-support in Japan.
The War Claims Commission, established under the War Claims Act of 1948
(Public Law 896, 80th Cong., 2d sess.), was directed by Congress to inquire into and
report to the President for submission of a report to the Congress, with respect to
war claims arising out of World War II, including recommendations concerning
methods for dealing with such claims. The first report of the Commission was
forwarded by the President to the Congress on May 3, 1950, but, as pointed out in
the report, sufficient time had not been provided for completion of the work
required of the Commission. It is understood that the Commission is presently
engaged in the preparation of a further report which will contain comprehensive
recommendations of the character contemplated by Congress in establishing the
Commission.
Sincerely yours,
JACK I. MCFALL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).
(Enclosure: Copy of the Japanese Peace Treaty.)
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Your problem can be met in either
one of two ways: To require the Japanese to pay these claims, or
else have the United States reimburse these individuals in light of
the policies of no reparations. That would be two ways of doing it.
Mr. DEVEREUx. That is true.
Senator GEORGE. Are there any questions, Senator Brewster?
Senator BREWSTER. No.
Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much.
General Bluemel, take a seat. You wish to be heard on the ratifi-
cation of the Japanese Peace Treaty, or any of the related peace
pacts?
General BLUEMEL. I do.
Senator GEORGE. The committee will be glad to hear you.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. CLIFFORD BLUEMEL
General BLUEMEL. I wish to thank the committee for this oppor-
tunity to appear. I want to supplement the remarks made by
Congressman Devereux. I was on Bataan and lost some money in
the Philippines, in the Philippine Trust Co., to the extent of $213.23.
But it is not so much my personal loss that I am here about-in fact,
I am not particularly interested in that.
Shortly after going to Bataan, a Capt. William H. Ball later pro-
moted to major, came to me one day and said, "General, will we lose
our money in the Philippine Trust Co.?" He says, "I have over
1,800 pesos in there."
That translated into American funds is approximately $900. I
said, "I have not thought of it. I have some money in there, too.
.I will see, if I can, what:can be done about it."
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72 JAPANESE `PEACE ITEATY AND OTHER.: PACIFIC TREATIES
HARDSHIP ON WIDOWS AND CHILDREN OF VETERANS IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Captain Ball did not return. When he died, or where he died,.
do not know. He lived through Bataan. He left a wife and two
children. I do not know his wife nor his children. I know they are
left. I think it is extremely unjust that that widow and the two
children should contribute the $900 of his life savings to the Japanese..
There are other officers in the same. predicament. I talked with
a colonel last night who said he had $100 in the Philippine Trust Co.
The amounts vary, though I think most of them do not have as much
as $900 because that is quite a lot of money for an Army officer to
have.
The way this thing is worded-General Devereux furnished me a
copy of the letter, and again 1 would like to emphasize this portion of
the letter [reading] :
In view of the limited resources available to Japan it has not been considered
feasible to extend the compensation provision to property losses which occurred
outside of Japan including private bank accounts of servicemen in the Philippine
Islands which were confiscated by the Japanese after the surrender of the island in
1942.
It may be of interest to you gentlemen to know that this Philippine
Trust Co. in order to secure the accounts of servicemen established
banks in all the Army posts and a great many officers and enlisted men,
members of the armed services, or their families, carried accounts
there. When the dependents were sent home many of the accounts
were reduced. But some people permitted their funds to remain there.
I know there was a bachelor officer who told my wife just before she
went home that he had quite a sum of money there, how much he did
not tell her.
Now another letter I have here-I have made many efforts to secure
the reimbursement of this money, hoping that I would find a method
by which it could be obtained so that the widows and the children
who had lost their money could get it. This tells me how much I had
in this Philippine Trust Co. letter. and I shall leave a copy of it if you
wish, but I will read an extract unless you wish the whole letter read.
It says [reading] :
We are in receipt of your letter of June 4, 1946. In reply we wish to inform you
that the checking account you had with us shows a balance of 427 pesos 53 cen-
tavos and among those accounts of Americans, Britishcrs., and Dutch nationals
transferred to the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., on September 29, 1944.
(The full text of the letter is as follows:)
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO.,
111anila, Philippine Islands, June 19, 1946.
Brig. Gen. CLIFFORD BLUEMEL, _
11 .SF Sixth Service Command,
Camp Ellis, Ill.
DEAR SIR: We are in receipt of your letter of June 4, 1946. In reply, we wish
to inform you that the checking account you had with uv with a balance of 4427.53:
was among those accounts of Americans, Britishers, and Dutch nationals trans;
ferred by the Japanese to the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., on September 29, 1944.
It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in reopening banks (our bank was
reopened on March 11, 1946), not to consider the transferred accounts as deposit
liabilities of the bank from which they were transferred. However, a case was.
brought by an American against the Philippine National Bank regarding them and
the trial court held the bank liable for the transfer. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court but until now no final decision has been rendered.
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JAPANESE PEACE 'TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES %
For your information, we wish to mention that a new angle on this matter has
developed recently. President Iloxas in his address to the Philippine Congress on
June 3, 1946, suggested a method to be pursued by that lawmaking body so that
the banks concerned may attend to these accounts in the same way that they are
attending to those that were not transferred by the Japanese. It is hoped that
an early legislation, based on the recommendation made by the President, will
finally define the status of these transferred accounts.
Very truly yours,
E. B. Foxn, President.
General BLUEMEL. The bank goes on to say that since the funds
were transferred from that bank they feel they are not accountable
for them and cannot pay it.
Now I do think that something should be done that these widows
and the children of officers and men who did not come home should
not be required to contribute this money to a nation that murdered
their husbands and fathers.
AMOUNT CONFISCATED BY JAPANESE -
Senator GEORGE. General, you haven't a statement of the entire
amount due from this trust company or held by the trust company
at the time, have you?
General BLUEMEL. I have no way of obtaining that. I doubt
very much the bank would give me that, being just a depositor. I
have submitted claims in various places. The present Claims, Com-
mission which is paying some claimsI put my claim in there but
:according to the law, they have no authority to pay it and some
people, they may be able- Cleary, 1 think, is the head of it and he
may be able to give you some idea of what he has in the way of claims.
I made an effort through the Claims Commission operating in the
Philippines to secure reimbursement and they told me it was not
within their jurisdiction to pay. Apparently no one has any authority
to pay this money as far as I can determine.
Senator GEORGE. Are there any questions by members of the
committee? If there are no questions, we thank you, sir, for your
appearance here.
The next witness is Dr. Van Kirk. Dr. Van Kirk, are you appearing
as a representative of the National Council of Churches?
Mr. VAN KIRK. That is right:. I would like to make a brief
statement with regard to the position I hold and the authority under
which I am appearing today, and then I will file for the record the
official action of the National Council of Churches but I shall not
take the time of the committee to read the statement.
Senator GEORGE. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF WALTER W. VAN KIRK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND GOOD, WILL,
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST
Mr. VAN Klitx. My name is Walter W. Van Kirk. I am an
.executive officer of the National Council of the Churches of ;Christ
the United States and I have been authorized by the National
Council. of Churches through its general board to appear before this
committee and on its behalf to urge prompt ratification by the$enate
;of. the treaty of peace with Japan.
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74 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
I desire to file here with the committee a copy of the official action
taken by the National Council in Atlanta on the 28th of November
1951.
I respectfully request that this statement be made a part of the
record of the hearings now under way.
Senator GEORGE. Your statement will be made a part of the hearing.
(The statement referred to is as follows:)
STATEMENT OF WALTER W. VAN KIRK, EXEC(TTIVE `DIRECTOR, I)EPARTHENT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND GOODWILL NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES
OF CHRIST IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
My name is Walter W. Van Kirk. I am an executive officer of the National
'Council of the Churches of Christ in the Ut]ited States of America. I have been
authorized by the National Council of Churches to appear before this committee
and on its behalf to urge prompt ratification by the Senate of the treaty of peace
with Japan. I submit herewith a copy of the action taken by the National
Council in Atlanta, Ga., on November 28, 1951. 1 respectfully request that this
statement be made a part of the record of the hearings now under way.
The National Council of Churches is the officially constituted agency of the
29 Protestant and Orthodox denominations of which it is comprised. These
denominations have a total membership of over 31 million people.
It is our considered judgment that in its statement urging prompt ratification
of the treaty now under consideration the National Council of Churches is reflect-
ing the convictions of the overwhelming majority of the members of its related
denominations.
Thank you.
THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH .JAPAN
A STATEMENT ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST
IN THE UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 28, 1951
The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States supports
prompt ratification by the Senate of the treaty of peace with Japan.
In its statement The Churches and American Policy in the Far East (1949) the
Federal Council of Churches said:
"It should be possible to negotiate a peace settlement with Japan the effect
of which would be to establish a mutuality of interest between that country and
her neighbors and with the West. The creation in Japan of a free state, under
conditions which would safeguard the rights and insure the dignities of her people
and which would accelerate the processes of economic and moral recovery, could
be a powerful stimulus in the evolution of a democratic Asia."
We believe the treaty of peace with Japan, signed at San Francisco, September
8, 1.951, is consistent with the considerations set forth in this statement. It is a
treaty of reconciliation and lays the groundwork upon which a durable peace in
the Far East may be built. The treaty anticipates the establishment of a free
and sovereign Japan under conditions which will safeguard the rights and insure
the dignities of her people. There is in this treaty neither the spirit of vengeance,
nor the intent of subjugation. On the contrary, an opportunity is afforded the
Japanese people to achieve for themselves a place of honor and self-respect within
the society of nations. We express our gratitude that at long last a treaty has
been negotiated in a spirit of fellowship, and concluded in a mood of high resolve,
under terms that do not contain the seeds of a future war.
In urging ratification of the treaty we observe that Japan, as a soverrign
nati^n, is c-needed what the Charter of the United Nations recognizes as "the
inherent right of individual or crllcctive self-defense." This is a right germane
to the concept of national soverei., nty. The rece snition of this right by the Allied
Powers, with respect to Japan, does not, of itself, compromise the renunciation
of war clause in the Japanese Constitution. The provisi-ns of the treaty which
anticipate the entrance of Japan into ccllective-security arrangements,, constitute,
under existing world conditi-ns, the surest guaranty that that nation, for reason
of self-defense, will not create a military f-rce inimical to the peace. Admission
of Japan into the United Nations, or, failing; that, the acceptance by Japan of the
obligation embraced within the Charter to give every assistance to the United
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Nations in efforts to maintain the peace, offers promise that the independence of
Japan can be safeguarded without resort to war.
In urging ratification of the treaty we note with satisfaction that Japan has
been permitted to retain residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands
We exprers the hope that, once the treaty has come into effect arrangements may
be made such that the people of these islands may be given the opp-rtuoity to
remain, in political, civil, and economic matters, within the administrative au-
thority of Japan.
It, urging ratification of the treaty, it is our hope that the provisions therein
contained will promote the economic well-heing of Japan. The limitati n ^f the
sovereignty cf that country to the Japanese home islands, pose f?-r its 83,000,000
people an exceptionally difcull, but net inssuperahle problem. The raw materials
and privileged markets to which Japan had access prior to the war are no I rifer
available. Lt is clear that the .Japanese people must be given the opportunity to
live and to live well. Since the Japri ese people cannot subsist upon their own
very limited a ricultural resources, Japan sou st be helped to a positi^n where she
can support herself by trade abroad. If we would build constructively f"t? peace
in the Far Fast, Japan crust be allowed access for raw materials and overseas mar-
kets. Japan must be assisted in practical ways to develop and build an ec-momy
capable-of supp-rting her popurati'n.
Finally, in uri,ing ratification of the treaty, we would remind the pe-plo`of our
churches that the achieving of peace with justice in the Far East, as el;ewhere,
depends, in the final analysis, upon the inculcate-n' I the spirit of love, recipreeity
and good nn ill by which nations, no less than individuals, are brought into lac neili-
ati^n with one another.
We request the department if international justice and 'ood will to transmit
copies of this acti"n to the Pre: ident of the United States, the secretary of State,
and the Members of Congress. We further request the department of inter-
nati-nal ju-tics and t;'od will to advis the com'ni: pion on the churches on inter-
national affair, o. this aeti>n, and t c -curtest that. copies of this resoltltini be
transmitted to its constituent units thr-;ugh^ut the world.
We auth-rise the oflic'rs of the departrocnt? of international justice and good
will to teFtify at the hearings on the Japan Peace 1 reaty in the spirit of this resolu-
tion.
Mr. VAN KIRK. May I say just this word about the National
Council of Churches?
It is the officially constituted agency of the 29 Protestant and
orthodox communions of which it is comprised, and the total member-
ship of all of these churches approximates some 31 million. do not
presume to say that the National Council expresses the judgment of
each of these many millions of communicants of these various churches.
What I do say is that in this action the National Council sincerely
believes and I, myself, believe that the statement which I will file with.
the committee does reflect the overwhelming majority of those people
of our churches that give thought to matters of this kind. It is
therefore a statement that reflects, in my judgment, the overwhelming
majority of the members of these various communions.
Thank you.
Senator GEORGE. Thank you.
Are there any questions?
Senator BREWSTER. I presume many of these churches have mis-
sions out there?
Mr. VAN Kn u.. A great number of them have been very active in
missionary work in Japan over the past 150 years.
Senator BREWSTER. I do not suppose you have any figures as to
the number of missionaries involved, or amount of property, or things
of that character?
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Mr. VAN KIRK. No, I would not want to state that offhand for the
reason I am afraid I. would not give a correct answer, but there is, as
you may know, something approximating a Christian population of
some 500,000 in Japan at the present moment. How many mission-
aries are actively engaged in the field at this present moment I would
not attempt to say but the number is being stepped up all the time.
Senator. BREWS TER. Historically, has there been much difficulty
about the missions in Japan? Has there been government opposition,
or anything of that sort?
Mr. VAN KIRx. During the period immediately prior to the war,
of course there was considerable pressure laid upon Christian mis-
sionaries by the military and the influence exercised by them. This
was particularly true in the field of education where Christian mission-
aries in the processes of education came into conflict, of course, with
the ideologies that were prevalent at that particular time. But aside
from that military pressure, I would say that all things con&idered
there has been a very general recognition upon the part of Japan.
Senator BREWSTER. That was something that had developed in the
5 or 10 years preceding the precipitation of the World War?
Mr. VAN KIRK. Quite. By contrast now, a very generous attitude
is evinced, and a wholehearted interest in and willingness to listen
to the missionaries and to provide opportunity for them to teach and
to proclaim his gospel.
Senator BREwsz'E R. So you feel that there is a receptive field there,
and that it is contributing to the development of international. under-
standing and good will?
Mr. VAN KIRK. I feel that profoundly, sir.
I was myself in Japan immediately after the war and had oppor-
tunity then personally to observe the manner in which the Christian
point of view and philosophy was being studied-I would not say
embraced-but studied by a far greater number of people in. Japan
than any of us would have supposed possible before the war.
Senator BREWSTER. Thera are. both Protestant and Catholic
missions there, all groups?
Mr. VAN KIRK. That is right, sir.
Senator BREWSTER. That is all.
Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Van Kirk. Thank
you very much for your appearance. We will call Mr. Muste next.
Mr. A. J. Muste.
Mr. Muste, have a seat and identify yourself for the record.
STATEMENT OF A. J. MUSTE, FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION
Mr. MUSTS. I want to thank the committee for this opportunity to
appear.
My name is A. J. Muste. I am aresident of New York City, a
Presbyterian clergyman, but not appearing on behalf of a Presby-
terian body at this time.
I am the national secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation
which is a religious pacifist body with views similar to those of the
Society of Friends or Quak>rs. I should like to make a statement on
behalf of the national council of the Fellowship.
The notice of this hearing was too short to make it possible to put
this into writing but I should like to have the privilege of doing that
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
immediately after today and to have the statement made a part of the
record.
Senator GEORGE. If you will file your statement it will be mach a
part of the record.
(The prepared statement is as follows:)
TESTIMONY OF REV. A. J. MUSTE OF THE FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION,
NEW YORK, N. Y., ON THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND SECURITY PACT
My name is A. J. Muste and I am a resident of \ew York City. I am a Presby-
terian clergyman, but this does not mean that I am representing any Presbyterian
body at this meeting. I am national secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation,
a religious pacifist organization with views similar to those of the Society of
Friends or Quakers. The national council of FOR at its semiannual meeting last
month adopted a statement opposing ratification of the treaty and the Mutual
Security Pact.
The national council expressed satisfaction over the fact that the treaty is free
from the punitive aspects which have often characterized such treaties, but held
that the policy of rearmament of Japan r~hich the treaty and the pact embody is
politically unwise and morally wrong.
I am aware that the chances the peace treaty and Security Pact will not be
ratified are virtually nil. My main concern is that Senators and the American
people should understand some of the implications of what they are doing in
adopting these two instruments. In certain important respects they are a fraud.
In saying this I do not necessarily charge any individual 1, ith a deliberate purpose
to defraud. I am speaking of the political effect of these instruments and the way
in which they are being "sold" to the people.
1. These instruments do not grant the Japanese people genuine independence.
Occupation of Japan by foreign, i. e. American, troops continues under another
name.-Since there has been some attempt to argue that this is not true of the
peace treaty taken by itself, I wish to emphasize that the treaty does, though
seeking to observe the proprieties, clearly, albeit with weasel words, open the way
for continued occupation. Chapter III, article 6a of the treaty reads:
"All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be 's ithdrawn from Japan as
soon as possible after the corning into force of the present treaty, and in any case
not later than 90 days thereafter."
Having made this apparently explicit statement, the article goes right on to
open the way for the exact opposite:
"! othing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention
of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any
bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between
one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other."
Mr. John Foster Dulles in his address to the Governors Conference at Gatlin-
burg, Tenn., October 1, 1951, warned against the dangers of protracted 66cupation.
Let him and the Senators now ponder what they may expect from occupation in
disguise. Mr. Dulles expressed the view that by 1950 the occupation had "fully
served the purposes specified in the Japanese surrender terms." Accordingly, he
warned:
"From then on the occupation would become alien interference in the internal _
affairs of a proud and sensitive people. It would be increasingly resented and
that resentment would be farmed by all the propaganda skills of which communism,
is maser. The free world would be in the position of jailer; while the Communist
world would be jangling what it claimed were the keys to freedom."
There is plenty of other evidence that, as long as the United States can manage
to impose them, there will be strict limitations On Japanese rearmament although
Mr. Dulles now talks about rearmament as a been bestowed on the Japanese
people in a "peace of reconciliation." Thus in an inter"iew published in United
States ews and World Report, April 27, 1951, Mr. Dulles suggests that Japan
be permitted to have land forces "but the other element for the security of the
area-for instance, naval and air power-might be provided by the United
States." Consequently:
"That would mean that such land forces as Japan had could not possibly be a
menace to any of Japan's neighbors because they v ould be land-bound and
couldn't get off the main islands of Japan as Japan - ould not possess sea power and
air power to accomplish that."
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E PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
It is easy to imagine what Americans would think of "independence" with land
troops but no naval and air equipment, so that the former were "land-bound."
Mr. James Reston, the distinguished New York Times commentator on Npvem-
ber 19, 1951, exposed, though perhaps unintentionally, the farcical aspects of a
situation in which occupation troops are to be evacuated and yet are to remain
where they are. Referring to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk's efforts to
straighten out differences between the State and Defense Departments, he -rote:
"The Pentagon would like to keep most of its buildings, its hotels, itf golf
courses. It would also like to retain legal jurisdiction over its personnel at all
times and, of course, it is concerned to see that the Army post exchanges are
well supplied with everything from American golf balls to liquor, tax-free
"The State Department? recognizes that the Army has an argument on all these
points, but in the political field the United States has made a great play with the
theme that it was restoring Japan's independence while the Russians were using
their security treaty rights to dictate to their allies how they should live and
serve the interests of the military authorit v.
"Mr. Rusk will talk with General Ridgway about trying to work out a compro-
mise that will avoid suspicion that the United States is clamping a phony inde-
pendence on Japan while at the same time preserving the facilities essentjal to
the United States military command."
We have had still another illustration within the past couple of days of the
illusory character of the independence granted Japan in the a.nnoucnem.ent of
correspondence between Premier Yoshida and Mr. Dulles in which the former
states that his Government will immediately make some kind of peace pact with
Chiang Kai-shek's Formosa regime but will have no truck with CDmmunist
China. The British Foreign Office reacted very unfavorably since there was
presumably a clear understanding, negotiated with Mr. Dulles last year, that
Japan was to be left entirely free after peace had been fully concluded, to cjrcide
which if any Chinese regime it won)(] recognize. Now the Japanese Government
is clearly being pressured into recognizing Formosa in order to facilitate ratification
by the United States Senate.
2 The peace treaty and security pact in providing for Japanese rearmament are
fraudul?nt because this is a flat violation of the Japanese Constitution.-That con-
stitution, with the full approval of the United States occupation, contains the
following clause:
"War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force is forever
renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations. The maintenance
of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized.
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."
The Senators will wish to note that as recently as New Year's Day 1.950. Gen.
Douglas MacArthur, referring to this clause in their constitution, said in an address
to the Japanese people:
"A product of Japanese thought, this provision is based upon the highest of
moral ideals, and yet no * on titutional provision was ever more fundamentally
sound and practical * In this historic decision, you are the first. The
opportunity therefore is yours to exemplify before mankind the soundness of this
concept and the inestimable benefit resulting from the dedication of all energy
and all resource to peaceful progress. In due course other nations will join you
in this dedication, but meanwhile you must not falter. Have faith in my country-
men and other peoples who share the same high ideals. Above all, have faith in
yourselves!"
Were not the Japanese Christian groups right who said to Mr. Dulles. last
month: "No country can maintain its existence for long unless its foundation is
based on moral principles. If you approve disarmament today and urge rearma-
ment tomorrow, you will appear to differ in no way from Communists who say
white today and black tomorrow?"
3. If it should give us pause that we are implicated in inducing or.forcing Japan
to go back on its solemn pledge to disarm forever, it should give us pause that we also
are violating a pledge made to mankind and the dead of World War II to disarm
Japan permanently.-Mr. Herbert Evatt, one time Foreign Minister of Australia
and Chairman of the United Nations Assembly, has strongly denounced the
treaty as a road to war rather than peace and as a wholesale repudiation of the
Tokyo Bay surrender agreement and the Far Eastern Commission's 1947 a, ree-
rnent that Japan will never be allowed to rearm. According to the New York
Times, February 16, 1951, Mr. Dulles in meeting such criticisms expressed views
about the pacifism of the Japanese which he is now seeking to get then? to
renounce. A dispatch from Melbourne reads:
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 79
"John Foster Dulles, who began discussions today at Canberra with Australian
and New Zealand officials, said at a press conference that the present sentiment
in Japan was as intensely pacifist as he had encountered anywhere in the world
or even more so.
"He repeated that there had been no discussion of rearmament, official or
unofficial, during his recent visit and said the Japanese did not want to r6arm.
" `I formed this impression from thousands of letters I received in Japan
which represented a cross section of the Japanese people and I met small parlia-
mentary groups who unanimously urged that there should be no rearmament,'
Mr. Dulles said."
4. From an economic point of view the policy represented by the treaty and pact
is extremely dubious.-The time allotted me by the committee does not allow for
any elaboration of this crucial point. Suffice it to say that this policy means
imposing the economic burden of rearmament on Japan at the same time that it
is cut off from or at least seriously hindered in normal trading relations with
China, Manchuria, and Russia. At this very moment we are witnessing in
Western Europe the difficulty---if not impossibility-of combining rearmament
on the scale required in modern war and the maintenance of a tolerable standard
of living. How can we expect the Japanese people whose economy is so much
weaker and whose standard of living is so much lower, to solve this problem? If
we are realistic, we shall recognize that in one way or another the United States
will have to pay the bill. There will be a new strain on the United States econo-
my and an added drain on the American taxpayer.
5. I am aware that even if the Senators grant all these points, they will still con-
tend that the policy represented in the peace treaty and security pact is right and
unavoidable because Russia and communism have to be contained and stopped.
Rearmament of Japan is essential to American security and interests. I contend
that rearming Japan and related measures will not stop Russia and commnism.
Mr.'Dulles has in the main been very frank in stressing the paramount impor-
tance of the security factor, not permitting Japan to be "a power vacuum," etc.
Thus, in the address to the Governors Conference already cited he explained ` the
danger of perpetuating the existing situation in Japan" as of the late spring of
1950:
"China had gone and, unless we acted positively, it seemed that Japan might
go, too. Stalin had boasted: With Japan, "we are invincible." We do not have
to admit that. But we must admit that Japan was formidable when it fought
alone in Asia, and if its manpower anti industrial resources could be joined with
those of China and exploited by Soviet Russia, the total combination could be
extremely unpleasant."
With the desire to stop Itussian expansionism and to destroy Stalinist totali-
tarianism, I am in hearty accord. The question is, How? The proposed policy
in regard to Japan will not do it for several reasons. -
(a) Rearming Japan will not endear us to the peoples of Asia. The vision of
the Japanese under native militarists invading and ravaging their lands is -fresh
in their minds. For its now to conjure up in their minds the vision of Japanese,
serving as American "mercenaries," liberating (?) their countries from Russia or
communism is to play straight into Stalin's hands.
(b) The oriental peoples-as daily events in Indochina, Iran, Egypt, Tunis, etc.,
illustrate-want no more western imperialism or military force in Asia. They do
not want British, French, or Dutch there as military powers. Neither do-thev
want the United States there on that basis- -any more than we would want China,
Japan, Indonesia, or any other Asian nation to establish military bases in the
Western Hemisphere. When we make Japan a United States military base, we
do the exact opposite of what they want us to do, and we cannot expect them
not to resent it deeply.
(c) There is no guaranty that the Japanese military force we build up will
remain dependable from the United States point of -, iew. If war spreads and
Japan as a United States base is thrcatered with atomic bombardrnert by China
and Russia, are Japanese leaders likely to permit; that in the expectation that
after some months or years their land will be ` liberated" by United States atom
bombers? Does it not appear that we sirnpl} are repeating the cycle which we
began some decades ago of building up Japan to hold China and Russia in, line,
only to conclude presently that we "ha, e to" destroy the "friendly power" we
helped bring into being?
(d) The budget President Truman laid before the Congress a few days ago is
.a warning of what it costs to play the role of a big power. History is clear and
explicit as to the fate of big powers that alwa, s om erex:tend themseh as, never can
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80 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC; TREATIES
manage to be or stay big enough. This was true even of those which did not
undertake commitments around the entire planet as the United States is doing
today. Of each in turn it comes to be said:
Far-called our navies melt away,
On dune and headland sinks the fire,
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre.
I have no simple or cheap solution for the problem before us; no course free
from risk is open to us. I believe the one chance to survive and truly serve man-
kind depends on the United States having the courage, imagination, and faith try
adopt the ronviolent way which Gandhi exemplified and which I believe to, be
implicit also in Christian ethics. In practice-very briefly-this would involve:
(a) We mind our own business, so far as any attempt to exercise military power
over other nations is concerned. In particular, we should get out of the Orient..
We may well be forced out of one base after another under the worst circumstances
and after paying an awful price as we are doing in Korea-unless we get outvolun-
tarily and begin to build up again the fund of good will the United States once
had in the east.
(b) We should spend what we now spend on war on helping to build the econo-
mies of needy countries and thus removing the social conditions of poverty,
illiteracy, social tension, which furnish the soil for communism.
(r,) We should maintain and strengthen our democratic way of life and keep
our own economy oil an even keel. Otherwise we shall run the risk, as indeeb
we are already beginning to do, of committing suicide in order to prevent Russia
from killing us.
(d ) . We should train ourselves to offer nonviolent resistance to any form of
aggression or tyranny which might threaten us, despite the fact that our foreign
policy becomes truly reconciling and nonviolent. Some of us are confident that
if we devoted a small percentage of the money and brains which we now devote
to the outmoded "science" of war to the de-elopment of the strategies and the
spirit of nonviolence and creative good will, this would bring us much more secu-
rity even of an elementary physical kind than our atomic armaments can ever
afford.
AN APPEAL OF THE WOMEN OF UNARMED JAPAN TO THE UNITED STATES
SENATORS
We, the members of various women's organizations of Japan appealed twice
to Mr. John Foster Dulles, concerning the peace treaty and security treaty
draft with which he was sent to Japan.
We are extremely anxious that our peace treaty should be such as would
enable us to observe faithfully the principle of absolute pacifism clearly expressed
in our constitution. However, the peace treaty signed at San Francisco is quite
contrary to our ardent hope and= we are greatly disappointed. It is true that
the representatives of the Japanese Government signed the two treaties and the
Diet gave consent to the Cabinet to ratify these treaties by a majority vote,
but it must be borne in mind that over one-third of the House of Councilors
opposed the security treaty; 1.47 for and 78 against. Moreover, the present
Government and the Diet members were elected 3 years ago and cannot be said
to represent the true will of the nation in general concerning the two treaties.
When Mr. Dulles visited Japan recently the press reported his arrival as if
the nation as a whole welcomed him with deep gratitude; but this welcome
("build up") seemed largely a diplomatic gesture of the political and business
circles and also of the rightists who are now regaining power, while on the con-
trary the majority of the people, especially the women and the youth, has met
this occasion with a deep sense of anxiety, uncertainty, and even heartbreak.
A recent public poll on the opinions of 8,932:students of 19 colleges in Tokyo
showed the following results:
Opinion on-
Yes
No
The peace treaty____________________________
24.9 percent
66.2 percent
The security treaty -------------------- _------
16.4 percent
75.3 percent
Rearmament of Japan- Japan------------------------
12.2 percent
81.0 percent
(Figures above quoted are from Educational Report, November 30, 1951?
issued daily by the Institution of Educational Research.)
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A
We, the women of Japan, do not oppose the police reserves for internal security
but cannot agree to the proposal of rearming Japan which contradicts the guid-
ing principle of the Japanese Constitution. We are determined never again to
send our sons and husbands to the battlefields.
The Japanese people understand that article IX of our constitution which
reads "Japan forever forsakes war; the Japanese nation does not possess an
army, navy, air force, or any other fighting force" was originally directed by the
United States of America and her occupation authorities in Japan. Now, con-
trary to their earlier belief, the people in this country have the impression that
according to the two treaties signed in San Francisco, the same United States
authorities are demanding the rearmament of Japan.
These facts can create a general mistrust on the part of the Japanese toward
the sincerity of America and her leaders; we, therefore, feel it is our duty to express
our profound dissatisfaction as we eagerly wish to see a lasting friendship estab-
lished between the United States and Japan.
Thus, when the two treaties are introduced to the United States Senate, we
wish the Senate to keep on record that we, the women of Japan, had eagerly
clesired that our nation be left out of the armaments race.
(Mrs. 1)r.) To nKo W. KoEAS,
(Mrs.) MICHIKO FIJJIWARA,
(Mrs.) NAOKo TAKADA,
Members of Douse of Councilors,
Representing Japan Women's Disarmament Comai.ittee,
Mr. MUSTE. Thank you. 0
The National Council of the Fellowship of Reconciliation expressed
gratification over the fact that this treaty is free from the punitive
features which have often accompanied treaties after wars though
feeling perhaps that we should not lay too much moral unction to
ourselves for that fact.
OPPOSITION TO PEACE TREATY
The - council is, however, convinced that, the treaty, itself, and
especially the treaty in the context of the security pact which opens
the way for the rearmament of Japan is politically unwise, and
morally wrong. I am aware of the fact that the chances that there
will be substantial opposition to the ratification of the treaty and of
the pacts are slight. It is my main concern at the moment that the
Senators and the American people should understand what we believe
to be some of the implications of these instruments and the policies
which they represent.
I think that in certain respects they are frauds, and in saying that
I do not mean to charge any individual with the intent to commit a
fraud. I am speaking of the political implications of the pacts and
the policies that they represent.
NO GENUINE INDEPENDENCE ALLEGEDLY GRANTED JAPAN
For one thing, they do not grant genuine independence to Japan or
to the Japanese people. The occupation continues under another
name. The treaty, itself, provides for this in article 6 which, on the
one hand, states that all occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall
be withdrawn as soon as possible after the coming into force of the
treaty, and- in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. It then
goes on to say that nothing in this provision shall prevent the station-
ing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or:
in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which
have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers
and Japan.
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Ty AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Now, Mr. Dulles warned of the danger of a protracted occupation,
One of the reasons for making the paece treaty at this time, even
though not all the nations who were at war with Japan were ready to
enter into it, was the desirability, of ending the occupation. In that
connection Mr. Dulles in his address to the governors conference in.
November remarked [reading]:
From 1950 on the occupation would become alien interference in the internal
affairs of a proud and sensitive people. It would be increasingly resented and
that resentment would be fanned by all the propaganda skills of which corn-
munisin is master. The free world would be in the position of the jailer while the
Communist world would be advocating what it claims is the way to freedom.
We say that same situation will obtain under a disguised occupation,.
or an occupation under another name.
Senator WILEY. Do I understand your position to be that we should
get entirely out of Japan and just leave Japan open to be taken over
by the Communists?
Mr. MusTE. I should like to have the opportunity, if you do not
mind, of coming to that in a moment in the record in the regular
course of my statement, although I am not unwilling to answer at
the moment!
Senator GEORGE, Very well, you may proceed in your own way.
Mr. MUSTE. Thank you. It is well known that there are limita-
tions, that we are going to impose limitations on the Japanese in
connection with their rearmament although the granting of the right
to rearm is now called a boon which is granted to the Japanese people
in what has sometimes been described as a peace of reconciliation.
For example, in answering certain questions about this security
arrangement in connection with the treaty, Mr. Dulles in the United
States News and World Report stated that Japan would be permitted
to have a certain amount of land forces but the other necessary ele-
ments for the security of the area, for instance, naval and air power
elements, would be provided by the United States. That would mean
that such land forces as Japan had could not possibly be a menace to
any of Japan's neighbors because they would be land bound and could
not get off the main islands of Japan.
Now it seems to me if we were subject to that sort of restriction
we would not think we had independence in providing for our security
and we do not think that we should consider we are providing such
independence to Japan under the treaty. We have another illustra-
tion of the fact that this independence is not genuine in the recent
episode of the exchange of correspondence, sketchily reported in the
press, between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Yoshida, dealing with the recog-
nition or the making of some sort of peace pact with the Formosan
Government but stating that no such relations would be established
with the government at Peking. -
Now there was an understanding apparently with the British Gov-
ernment that the Japanese Government was to be left completely
free, after the peace had been made, to decide which of the Chinese
governments it was to have dealings with. Apparently now there is
an insistence that Japan should indicate which one of them it is going-
to recognize as part of the price of getting the treaty. In the second
place, I think we should be aware of the fact.that the treaty and thee
security pact and the rearmament, which is bound up with them,.
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is a violation of the, constitution of Japan. That constitution con-
tains the clause [reading]:
War, as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force is forever
renounced as a means of settling disputes with other nations. The maintenance
of land, sea, and air forces, as well. as other war potential will never be authorized.
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
PROPOSED REARMAMENT OF JAPAN
There is no way of reconciling the provisions in the security pact
and steps toward rearmament being taken with that clear and specific
language of the Japanese Constitution. The significance of that' for
a good many of the people of Japan who are not unanimous in sup-
porting this treaty and the pact and the significance possibly for the
peace of the world is illustrated in a statement that General Mac-
Arthur made on New Year's Day, 1950, not very long ago. He
refers to this provision in the constitution of Japan which was there
with the full approval of the American occupation. General Mae-
Arthur said [reading]:
A product of Japanese thought,, this provision is based upon the highept of
moral ideals and yet no constitutional provision was ever more fundamentally
sound and practical. In this historic decision you are the first. The o por
tunity, therefore, is yours to exemplify before mankind the soundness of this
concept, and the inestimable benefit, resulting from the dedication of all energy
to peaceful progress. In due course other nations will join you in this dedication,
but meanwhile you must not falter. Have faith in my countrymen and other
people who share the same high ideals. Above all, have faith in yourself.
Senator BREWSTER. What was the date of that?
Mr. MUSTE. New Year's Day, 1950, and addressed by General
MacArthur to the Japanese people a few months before his recap.
Now thirdly, not only I think are we pausing and studying the
Japanese people in a violation of a pledge, I think we, ourselves, are
violating a pledge in having anything to do with the rearmament of
Japan-a pledge to mankind and a pledge also to the men who fell in
the war. There is considerable doubt, for example, in Australia.
Former Foreign Minister Evatt and one-time Chairman of the
United Nations Assembly charged that the armistice agreement with
Tokyo and other provisions were being violated in a treaty and a pact
which provided for the rearmament of Japan.
ECONOMIC BURDEN OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT
I will insert that quotation in my statement but will not take the
committee's time to quote it now unless you want to call for it later.
The fourth point that I want to mention is that from an economic
point of view the rearmament of Japan represents an extremely
dubious course.
At this very moment we, are witnessing in Western Europe the
difficulty-perhaps one day we will have to say the impossibility-
of combining rearmament on the scale required in modern war with
the maintenance of a tolerable standard of living. Now, if we are
having the difficulty at that point that we are experiencing in Western
Europe, how can we expect that the Japanese people, whose economy
is so much weaker and whose standard of living is already so much
lower than that of the western European peoples, to solve this
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problem? If we are to be realistic, if we are not to deceive ourselves,
I think that we should face the fact that in one way or another we
shall have to pay the bill of Japanese rearmament. That will consti-
tute another strain on our own economy and in one way or another,
another drain on the American taxpayer.
My last point is this. I am aware--this is in response to the ques-
tion the Senator asked a few moments ago--I am aware that even if
you were to grant all this, you would still say we had to take this
course because Russia and communism have to be stopped and this
is the only way to do it, this is the only way to provide for the security
of Japan and the security of the United States.
Mr. Dulles, in his address to the governors conference to which I
have already referred, made a. very explicit reference, as he has on
other occasions, to the problem of security, to the threat which
Korea, the Communists on the continent of Asia, constitute to Japan.
It is on that basis I think of the security of the United States that this
treaty is being made.
Now with the desire to stop Russia, Russian expansion, and to
destroy communism, I am in complete sympathy, and that is the
position of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. The question is how we
are to do that, and I do not believe that we shall do it by the process
of rearming Japan and the rest of the policies which accompany that
step toward rearmament. For one thing, rearming Japan will not
endear us to the people of Asia. The invasion by Japanese forces is
very fresh in the. minds of these people. For us now to have any part
in bringing back into power in Japan the military and industrial in-
terests that were responsible for its militarism before the Second World
War, for us to be, in effect, using the Japanese as United States' mer-
cenaries in wars in Asia is, I believe, playing straight into Stalin's
hands. It gives him another opportunity to say that the United
States is not concerned basically about the welfare of these people
but first of all, about its own security and its own national interests
defined according to its own concepts.
ATTITUDE OF RED CHINA
Senator BREWSTER. What do you feel is the present attitude of the
people of China-the relatives and friends and neighbors of the 5 or
10 million who have been liquidated. by Mr. Stalin-regarding possible
liberation from that yoke? That is a little fresher in their minds than
the Japanese atrocities, is it not?
Mr. MUSTE. For one thing there is, I think, a real question as to
whether the, people of China believe that such liquidation as has oc-
curred was done by Mr. Stalin or done by the Russians. It was done
by the Chinese Communist Party. I think myself there is a very
close tie between. that party and the Kremlin and the Communist
International but I do not believe that the vast majority of the Chinese
people hold that point of view.
Now I think we need, also, to keep in mind that though there was
an immense amount of bloodletting in the civil war in China, there was
a great deal of dissatisfaction among the Chinese people with the
Chiang Kai-shek regime, and I think they are inclined to think of the
bloodshed in civil war as an incident to the effort to get rid of a regime
that many of them regarded as unsatisfactory.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREAT
Senator BREWSTER. You do not subscribe to the agrarian reformer
idea of the Chinese Communist?
Mr. MUSTE. I do not, and furthermore, I did not subscribe to that
idea when a good many people in the United States, perhaps even in
the State Department tended to subscribe to that idea. I believe
that there is very close tie to the Communist movement in every
country and that essentially it is dominated from the Russian center.
Senator BREWSTER. What do you say as to the propaganda, the
Communist propaganda, that this is a white man's war on Asia?
Mr. MUSTE. What is the question, sir?
NATIONALISM IN ASIA
Senator BREwSTI.R. What do you say as to the Communist propa-
ganda all through Asia that this whole conflict is a white man's war on
Asiatics because of the very small amount or Asiatics who are at present
participating?
Mr. MUSTE. That, if I understand you, is the next point I was going
to cite.
Senator BRE WSTER. Very well.
Mr. MUSTE. I think one of the basic; convictions of all of the Asiatic
peoples at this moment is that there must be an end of what they call
"the white man's domination in Asia."
Senator BRESTEGR. That is right.
Mr. MUSTE. By that they mean the British, French, Dutch, and I
think by that they mean also the United States. They believe that
when we now go in there with our military power, establishing a defense
or power position, that we ar.e simply following in that same essential
pattern and. they do not want any of it. When we say that we inter-
vene in that situation in China, for example, in order to keep Stalin out,
of there, Rve play into Stalin's hands, I think, because they tolerate
Russian intervention because they think that helps them get us out of
there. Therefore, we are only strengthening their conviction that we
want to get. in there.
Senator BREWSTER. I am directing my point to the specific question
as to whether or not the participation of Asiatics in the war on our side
of the fence would or would not help to dispel the idea that this is ex-
elusively a white man's war on Asia.
Mr. MUSTS. I do not believe it would any more than I think the
participation of the Vietnamese troops in Indochina along with the
French in the civil war there makes the Asiatics feel that that is a war
of Asians. I think they feel it is a war of French imperialism. T think.
that would be true of any war in which American and western Euro-
pean nations participated and in which Asian troops are used..
FUTURE DEPENDABILITY OF JAPAN
Now, thirdly, there is no guarantee that the Japanese military estab-
lishment which we rebuild will prove for any length of time, or an in-
definite period, dependable from the point of view of the United States,
though at the present time there is a genuine limitation upon what
Japan is permitted to do and will be for some time to come.
The necessity of the power struggle, our need of Japan, will require,
in our dealing with this matter, concessions to Japan; it will mean, if
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86 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
you are going to look to them for support they have got to have a more
and more powerful military establishment. That is the logic of these
things.
Now, whether that establishment in a critical moment will remain
dependable from the point of view of the United States is by no means
guaranteed.
If, for example, there is the situation of general war, or the threat
of it, the possibility that Japan itself might be atom-bombed by the
Chinese and/or the Russians, and Japan and its military and political
leaders have to make a decision as to whether they are going to subject
themselves to that risk, largely or partially a risk which is imposed
upon them because Japan is an American base, there is a very real
chance that the Japanese leadership at that point and the Japanese
people will be much more afraid of the atom bombs to be dropped from
a few miles across the straits than they will feel confident in the sup-
port that would be given by the United States many miles across the
Pacific Ocean. In that kind of a crisis, therefore, they will, in the
first place, seek to be neutral and if they have to choose they will not
want to be atom-bombed from the other side and then hope that they
will be liberated by the United States months or years afterward.
There are voices in Japan who warnus of that. 'There are voices in
Japan who warned us of it months ago when this discussion first came
up. We may be entering upon the same kind of a cycle which we
started a few decades ago when we built up Japan as a check on China
and Russia and then finally found that Japan had become so powerful
that we felt we had to engage in a war to destroy that country.
Senator WILEY. Is it your position we should get out of Japan, out
of Korea, take our fleet home, so that the Commies could take Formosa
and the rest of Asia?
Mr. MUSTE. I want to be very frank in answering that question. I
do not believe we have a simple or cheap solution for this problem, or
one that does not involve terrible risks. The course which we are
now taking also involves terrible risks.
But I am, myself, confident that this course which we are pursuing,
of seeking to be a dominant power-whatever the objectives may be-
all over the world, is a fatal course. It is the course which all nations
who have tried to be big powers in the course of history have taken
and we know what the result is.
One by one they are compelled to say :
Far-called, her navies melt away,
On dune and headland sinks the fire;
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday,
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
The United States did not start out with trying to be that kind of a
power. We are seeking to be that kind of power today, and I do not
believe we shall escape the judgment that has come upon other nations
that have tried to do it. Therefore, I would say our one chance is we
should have the courage and the imagination and the faith to'rely upon
other than material and military power for our defense, that we should
rely upon spiritual forces, that we should rely upon the practice of
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
nonviolence, which Gandhi set forth which I think is also an essential
part of Christianity.
There are the gravest risks involved in doing that as there are the
gravest risks involved in doing what we are doing now.
DEPENDENCE ON SPIRITUAL RATHER THAN MILITARY FORCE
The pursuit of that kind of a policy of a genuine dependence upon
spiritual force would involve, for one thing, that we would mind our
own business so far as any effort to exercise military power anywhere
in the world is. concerned. I think we should get out. I think we
may be forced to get out anyway as the French and Dutch and
British have been forced to get out. It would be much better, I think;
even from an immediate physical point of view if we got out under
circumstances which would give us the sympathy, the confidence of
the peoples of Asia, rather than be forced out which results in a very
different attitude.
NONAGGRESSIVE DESIGNS OF THE UNITED STATES
Senator BREWSTER. Do you have anything to indicate that our
motivation and our preparation and our policies are aggressive in
design?
Mr. MUSTE. I think our motivations are mixed and that we are
conscious of some of them and not conscious of others.
Senator BREWSTER. Is not the record of the United States as a great
power rather unique as far as aggressive designs to expand our terri-
tory is concerned?
Mr. MUSTE. I think in certain respects it is unique and that it is
precisely at the points where we have declined to attempt to exercise
military power and get our way by military power that we gained
confidence. But, when we pursue, for example, the course which we
did in the Philippines which, in many respects, was unique and which
earned us therefore the respect and the affection of multitudes in Asia,
but then because we think we have to maintain our defense, our power
position in the Orient, we still continue to use the Philippines as a base
and get involved in the power struggle there, then I think we lose the
confidence which we gained by the other process. One of the il-
lustrations of it is that even in the Philippines there is an effective
Communist guerrilla movement at the present time. It is not these
merely because there have been Communist devils in there promoting
that thing. There are Filipinos there who feel that way about it and
who feel that having American troops on their soil is a violation of
Philippine independence and a contradiction of the policy which we
pursued in the Philippines.
Senator BREWSTER. I was asking you about the intent in the hearts
of the great mass of the American people. Do you have any doubt
regarding their thought or emotions or intent?
Mr. MUSTE. I do not.
Senator BREWSTER. Is not that manifested by our giving this
independence to the Philippines and by our giving independence to
Cuba and by our other actions in the world after the First World W4r
and the Second World War when, in no instance, did we ask territorial
aggrandizement?
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88 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Mr. MUSTE. I think it is true we have not asked territorial ag-
grandizement and I think the great mass of the American people have
not wanted that. Now, on the other hand, I do not think that we
should lay too much moral unction to ourselves, so to speak, because
of that, because we have not been in the situation where we needed
to take territory for our purposes. We lived here between the oceans
with no great neighbors next to us and we were not tempted in the way
that certain other nations have been.
Senator BREWSTER. You have established what I want. You feel
that so far as the American people, by and large, are concerned, they
do not have aggressive designs on their neighbors or on the world?
Mr. MUSTE. That is right.
Senator BREWSTER. That we agree on.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN RUSSIA
Mr. Muste, do you have any doubt as to whether or not those in
control of the policies in the Kremlin do, by all their course of action
in the last 5 years, have aggressive designs to spread their ideology
by force?
Mr. MUSTE. No, Senator, I have no question about that.
Senator BREWSTER. Then would it not be wiser for one like your-
self, who believes in overcoming material menace by spiritual means,
to go there to Russia and undertake to convert those heathens to
your way of thinking rather than here in the United States where you
agree that the-great mass of the American people are entirely as
pacific in their evident intent as you, yourself? Would that not be
the better place for you to sacrifice your time and energies rather than
here in the safe security of the very armaments which you denounce?
If it were not for these armaments you would be at the mercy of the
Kremlin today for all we can know, as well as millions of your fellows
who prefer another solution. Would not that be a better way for
you to sacrifice yourself than to stay here behind our guns and preach
to us a gospel which would only result in the destruction, not only of
yourself, but everybody else?
Mr. MUSTE. There are a couple of things to say in answer to that
question, -which is a valid question to ask, sir.
One of them is that although the American people do not have
aggressive designs, I do not believe that the great mass of the Russian
people do, either, and they fight essentially in self-defense.
Senator BREWSTER. I agree with you.
Mr. MUSTE. Now, secondly, although we have not---
Senator BREWSTER. What they conceive to be self-defense as a
result of the propaganda of their masters.
Mr. MUSTE. Yes. Quite as we see that ourself, defense involves
establishing a power position in Japan, although we would be con-
vinced
that the Russians were aggressive if they thought their self-
defense involved establishing a power position in Canada or Mexico.
Senator BREWSTER. Your position now is predicated on the propo-
sition that both the Russian people and the people of the United
States may be under considerable misapprehension as to just what
this is all about. Now I ask you this: Do you think that the Russian
people and the American people have the same adequacy of access to
information? Do you think that you would be permitted over in
Russia today to say anything that you are saying here today?
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Mr. MUSTE. I do not know just what I would be permitted to say
in Russia.
Senator BREWSTER. Do you really mean you think you could go
into Russia and preach the gospel, which you are preaching here
today? .uo you honestly believe that?
Mr. MUSTS. There are people in Russia, sir--I do not know how
publicly-but there are people in Russia who are preaching this, kind
of gospel.
Senator BREWSTER. You do not know how publicly. Why is that?
Mr. MUSTE. If you are raising the question now as to the extent of
civil liberties and the right to discuss and, so on, in the one country,
as compared to the other, I think there is much less of it in Russia, that
Russia is a totalitarian regime, and we have not come to that point;
but--
Senator BREWSTER. There is much more reason to think that the
American public are arriving at an informed and understanding
position regarding this than the people of Russia, who may think they
are proceeding in self-defense, but who have absolutely inadequate
sources of information as to the good will of most of the rest of the
world.
Mr. MUSTE. I think the American people do have more information,
but there are also conditions here which are tending to limit the
amount of information that the American people get. There is a
tremendous difference between the amount of dissenting opinion on
any of these policies that can get expressed in the United States that
get heard in the press, that. are heard over the radio, and so on, and the
amount of official orthodox opinion that gets expressed.
We have had developments in this country in the last few years
which have tended to produce the same attitude of fear here, the same
tendency to conform, that is characteristic of totalitarian countries.
I do not believe that when people here in the United States exercise
their right to express dissent that that should, in some way, be
regarded as un-American on their part, or a taking advantage of the
situation which may obtain here in the United States. That situation
exists, does it not, precisely in order that people might be free to
express dissent and might not have their heads chopped off because
they do it.
Senator BREWSTER. I think this gathering this morning is the best
evidence that we have a considerably better system than the Russians.
I know of no limitations upon anything that you may choose to say.
But I think you are talking to people both in the committee, the
Congress, and the country who certainly have no aggressive design.
We may be deceived, but not as a result of lack of the fullest oppor-
tunity for information such as you are now being accorded.
Mr. MUSTE. Yes, sir. When it comes to that, I think we are
caught now in this dreadful dilem.m.a: That in the peace treaty with
Jal an, for example, we say on the one hand .that within 90 days of the
ratification of this treaty foreign troops shall leave, there shall be no
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90 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
more occupation. Then in the same breath we say nevertheless these
foreign troops are to remain. When we say to the Philippines, "We
give you independence," but at the same time say, "it is essential for
you and for us that the American Military Establishment should
remain here," now that throws us into the situation where we, too,
are waging the power struggle and waging it in the final analysis by
military means, prepared to wage it in the final analysis with atomic
and biological w~apons.
Now, in doing that I think that we are materially and spiritually
committing suicide in this country. We are committing suicide in
order to keep the Russians from killing us.
Senator BREWSTER. Hasn't it been the historic policy of this
country for the past 50 years to have the so-called open-door in
China which alone preserved China from division by the great powers
of Europe and Asia, a firm stand beginning under John Hay and
leading down all through? Do you think that the tradition of that
policy and its profound impact upon the position of China and Asia
has been entirely _lissipated in the minds of these people by anything
that has transpired? Were they not historically devoted to our
position because of what it meant to them in retaining their inde-
pendence?
Mr. MusTE. Yes; I think that has been true, as we said a moment
ago, to a very great extent. We have an immense fund of good will
and moral support in the Orient.
Senator BREWSTER. Why should they suddenly- turn away from us
in this eleventh hour after we fought the Second World War to keep
China from being dominated by one great power? Do you recognize
that, as a fact? That, if we had been ready to yield to Japanese
domination of China, there would have been no Pearl Harbor, and no
Second World War?
Mr. MUSTE. That leads us back to our fundamental question as to
whether we are going to continue to believe that our security ultimately
rests upon military means and, therefore, are going to be drawn into,
one war after another, increasing our military establishments all the
time, or whether we see that is a dead alley and we must take a corn-
pletely different course.
Senator BREWSTER. That was not my question. My question was,
whether or not, having fought the Second World War-precipitated
into it by Pearl Harbor which resulted because Cordell Hull followed
the policy of John Hay and of Lansing and of Root and Stimson--we
would not yield the control of China to it foreign power? You know
all the discussions brought out in the MacArthur matter. We fought
the war for the independence of China. Do you mean to say, after 50
years culminating in that enormous sacrifice, that all of a sudden all
Asia is going to believe we design to dominate them instead of to
liberate them?
Mr. MUSTE. If you are engaged in fighting or threatening to fight
the people whom you said you were going to liberate, then those people
are going to believe that the United States is not the United States
that it was before, and they are going to change their opinion. That is
what they have done.
Senator BREWSTER. What about South Korea?
Mr. MUSTE. That is an extremely complicated situation.. What
about Korea as a whole?
Senator BREWSTER. It is a very simple one.
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Mr. MUSTE. If we are to believe ultimately that our security
depends upon our military-power position, then we shall be drawn
further and further down the same road which has involved us in two
world wars already, which leaves us less secure now than we were
before, which has lost us a great deal of the good will in Asia because,
instead of not being in there except on it friendly basis, we are now in
there as the power that is seeking to establish itself in a military sense,
Now it is that contradiction which the American people and the
American Government is confronted with. We want to do otherwise.
We would like to be engaged wholeheartedly in raising the economic
level of those people, for example, but we always think that the first
thing you have got to do is to look after our defense position. There-
fore we take care of that. We put billions into that, but we put a, few
paltry millions into the other thing. We think we cannot wait to do
something more to strengthen our military security, that we have no
choice there. I think if we saw the situation more clearly we would
have realized sooner that the Chinese or Asian peasants who almost
literally are going to starve tomorrow if we do not feed them today-
these millions who want independence now--they cannot wait; they
are not going to wait and we should see it is in that realm that we
cannot afford to wait.
Senator GEORGE. Since you are going to file a brief, you can elab-
orate your point. I think we have your position on the treaty.
Mr.,MUSTE. You have been extremely generous, sir,- -in > h-c time ypu
have given me, and I appreciate it.
Senator BREWSTER. I think we should send him as a missionary to
Moscow.
Mr. M CsTE. I was going to say, sir, I was responsible for sending
four young men to Europe this summer who attempted to get on the
other side of the iron curtain with precisely this message: "We are
not supporting our American militarism; why do you support Russian
militarism?" Those young men were denied visas on the one hand
to go into Western Germany, and on the other hand they were denied
visas to go into Russia or Czechoslovakia, or any of those other
countries.
Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Muste. There are
some out-of-town witnesses here.
Mr. William Henry Evans, Jr.
Mr. Evans, we are rather limited in point of time. You may make
your statement, but if you have a prepared statement, we would
prefer that you file that brief rather than take up too much time this
morning. But make your position clear on this treaty. . _
Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, I am very deeply honored to appear
before your committee, and I shall make my statement as brief as.
possible.
CESSION OF KURILE ISLANDS AND SOUTHERN SAKHALIN
In the Congressional Record of August 23, 1951, I inserted an,
article entitled "The Coining Betrayal of Japan," and I shall read from
that article. Much of the betrayal of Japan has been consummated,.
in my opinion.
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y~ J A A TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
No. 1, the cession of the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin to
Russia in accordance with the Yalta agreement sets a very dangerous
precedent when the German peace treaty comes up, the territory east
of the Oder and Neisse Rivers will be ceded to Poland undoubtedly,
in the same way as Japan's Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin.
There are several arguments in favor of the Japanese retaining the
Kurile Islands and southern. Sakhalin-most people do not realize
that all of the island of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were originally
Japanese territory in the first place.
Starting with the island of Sakhalin in 1859, the Russian fleet was
sent to Yokohama demanding cession of Sakhalin, but the Japanese
put them off for several years; and at this time we must remember the
Japanese were just emerging from their self-imposed hermitage, coming
out into the Western World, and they were in no position to engage in
any extreme external affairs at that time.
In 1868 the Japanese and Russians both were colonizing Sakhalin
as fast as they could in order to advance their respective claims, but
they still put off the determination, the final determination, as to the
disposition of Sakhalin until 1875 in a treaty whereby the Russians
acknowledged full Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, and
the Japanese had every legitimate right to them in the first place, in
exchange for temporary, as the Japanese would say, acknowledgement
of Russian sovereignty over the island of Sakhalin.
That position remained constant until the Russo-Japanese Par,
when the Japanese, in order to block Czarist expansion in the Far
East, fought the Russians and defeated them, and at the Treaty of
Portsmouth, N. IT., in 1905, President Roosevelt-Theodore Roose-
velt-awarded southern Sakhalin to Japan.
At that time President Roosevelt was more occupied with preserving
the peace of the world. Japan retained southern Sakhalin and the
Kurile Islands until 1945, where, by the Yalta secret agreement-so
secret it wasn't released until a year later--Japan was stripped of the
Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin and they were awarded to Soviet
Russia.
This Japanese Peace Treaty which the Senate has before it says
that--and I will quote:
Japan renounces all title and claim to the Kurile Islands, to that portion of
Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as
a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905.
Now if Russia isn't being awarded those islands as a consequence
of the Yalta agreement, I would like to know, and I think the American
people would also like to know, why Japan is being stripped of those
islands. There is no other conceivable nation on the face of the earth
that would receive those islands except Soviet Russia.
That is setting a dangerous precedent. First of all, Japan has every
right to those islands. From a military standpoint, the Kurile Islands
break our defense chain from the Aleutians, as you gentlemen can see
on the map. Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands are two daggers pointed
at Japan.
I am certain that Senator Brewster and members of the Committee
on the Pearl Harbor Investigation will remember that the Japanese
fleet sailed from the Kurile Islands when they attacked Pearl Harbor.
Those islands are ideal for submarine and air bases.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 93
When I was in Korea, off the Korean coast, last winter and spring,
we were living in deadly fear, up around Vladivostok and Hungnam,
where we were operating, of a Russian invasion of northern Japan,
Hokkaido to be exact, across Soya Strait from southern Sakhalin.
Not only from a military point of view are the Kurile Islands find
southern Sakhalin essential to the Japanese. A tremendous ainount
of the Japanese maritime economy came out of the Sea of Okhotsk,
between Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.
Now the Japanese are barred from those islands, and their delicate
economy must be strained even further, or else we will have to mike
up the difference.
TROOP WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE
There is a troop withdrawal clause in the treaty, section (a) of
article 6 [reading]:
All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as
soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty, and in any g;ase
not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however,
prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory
under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have
been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one lutnd,
and Japan on the other.
Now I would like to know who are one or more of the Allied Powers.
Under that classification you could presumably still include Soviet
Russia, and with the Soviet China versus Nationalist China clause in
this treaty, Soviet China could be included in there.
The disgrace is that Nationalist China is not represented in the
treaty, according to the present wording. Nationalist China has a
legitimate right to be. there. 't`he. Japanese economy is oriented to
the. Chinese mainland, and tied in with the war in Korea.
The outcome of the war in Korea and whether China stays under
Soviet domination or becomes Nationalist China again- that factor
primarily determines the fate of Japan---whether or not the Senate
ratifies this proposed Japanese Peace Treaty. I will come to the
war in Korea in a second. -But, now [ want to emphasize this. _
In the draft of the peace treaty with > .Japan--whereas Japan for its part
declares intention to apply for membership iii the United Natio ps-
i.n all circumstances conform to the principles of the charter of the
United Nations: to strive to realize the objectives of the universal
declaration of human rights.
I protest that draft immediately because the United Nations his a
dictated peace based on the principles of Tehran, YaLta, Potsdam,
and Alger Hiss. The universal declaration of human rights is a
menace to all free nations.
But, going further into the peace treaty [reading] :
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Natiqns to
place under the trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole adriiinis-
tering authority, the islands south of Japan.
That clause directly infers that the United States is a satellite of
the United Nations, that the United Nations is a world government
and that the United States has to apply for permission to do that.
I protest that as an American. -
94413-52-7
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WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION FORCES
Article 6 of chapter III of the Japanese Peace Treaty says [reading] :
All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as
soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty, and in any
case not later than 90 days thereafter.
Now it is conceivable-perhaps I may sound fantastic-but after
Yalta the people said that President Roosevelt was desirous of a
strong China, after he broke China and made it inevitable that China
would fall to the Communists. It is the same plan here.
It is conceivable that all American. troops could be withdrawn after
90 days-this was written August 23, 1951-at the request of the
Japanese Government that felt unable to accept certain intolerable
conditions of a bilateral agreement intentionally forced upon it by
an American pro-Communist State Department. The Japanese
would have to reject such conditions or else lose a vote of confidence.
Without American troops and bases in Japan, the Japanese would be
an easy prey to communism from within or without.
Remember how close southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles are to
Japan, and the Communist Japanese Army reported to be training in
the Sakhalins.
Under the troop arrangements, if-I say "if," covering all condi-
tions-Japan was forced later on to sign with Soviet China and under
a trade arrangement or pressure from Soviet Russia and Soviet China
was forced to cancel our American bilateral agreement and order
American troops to withdraw and station Communist Chinese or
Russian troops in Japan, it is very possible under the wording of this
treaty, gentlemen.
REFERENCES TO WAR CRIMES TRIALS
Now, going further, article 11 of the peace treaty, chapter IV,
says [reading] :
Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East and of other Allied war crimes courts both within and outside Japan,
and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals im-
prisoned in Japan.
I would like to refer-and in compliance with the committee's
request, I will not take the time at this point-to a book by Lord
13ankey, entitled "Politics, Trials, and Errors," discussing in Chapter
5, "The Japanese Trials"; Chapter 6, "Shigemitsu"; and Chapter 7,
"The Aftermath of Tokyo."
I would like to request the committee to insert those three. chapters
of the book into the record. The committee may examine it, to save
time; otherwise I would like to read it.
Senator GEORGE. You may file the book with the committee,
and it will be considered by the committee.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES _ 95
REPARATIONS CLAUSES
Mr. EvANs. Yes, sir. In. chapter V of the Japanese Peace Treaty,
article 14, paragraph (a), it states [reading] :
It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the
damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recog-
nized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain
a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering
and at the same time meet its other obligations
That is section (a). Now the very next paragraph says [reading]:
1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring,
whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by.rapan,
with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of replaring
the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in
production, salvage, and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such
arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied
Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall
be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign ex-
change burden upon Japan.
Now, gentlemen, section (a) of that treaty, that article, clearly
admits it is utterly impossible from an economic viewpoint for Japan
to pay any reparations whatsoever for the simple and realistic reason
that the Japanese economy cannot stand the added burden of
reparations.
Nevertheless, in the very next paragraph it demands that, the
Japanese process raw materials into finished products, do savage
work, and other services, the joker covering a wide field, which is
perhaps another type of reparation. In plain language, the Japanese
economy must pay reparations in the form of using their industrial
plant and services without receiving compensation.
Not only would these services be profitless for Japan and actually
wear down her industrial facilities, but the industrial,facilities ysrould
need to be diverted from engaging in profitable trade to sustain the
nation.
In one paragraph the State Department views the situation from a
realistic and pro-American viewpoint, but follows it up immediately
in the very next paragraph, with a plan designed to wreck Japan
economically in order to force her into the Communist orbi( more
rapidly.
I would like to take up the signers of the peace treaty next,. In
the peace conference at San Francisco September 8, 1951, Soviet
Russia, Soviet Poland, and Soviet Czechoslovakia were invited to the
conference; whereas, Nationalist China. was not.
That is a disgrace upon the honor of the United States of Atx)erica.
I would like to point out that the Pacific war really began in 1937
when Japan invaded China and ended. September 2, 1.945, with the
surrender aboard the Missouri in Tokyo Bay. -
Now during this period of time the Nationalist Chinese fouglit the
Japanese for eight long and bitter years while in the meantime we were
selling oil, scrap iron, and so forth, to the Japanese. We gave really
no effective help to the Nationalist Chinese until after Pearl Harbor,
although General Chennault's American volunteer group was formed
before Pearl Harbor.
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96 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
After President Roosevelt and his clique had baited the Japanese
into fighting the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands
in order that lie could save Britain and Communist Russia, Nationalist
China still was neglected even though it detained Japanese troops
that otherwise would have conquered India and Australia, thereby
prolonging the war and perhaps making the Japanese Empire
impregnable.
Chiang Kai-shek could have had peace with Japan any time after
1941 on honorable terms, and he would have been much better off
than he is today after having been betrayed by the Roosevelt-Truman..
Churchill-Acheson-Marshall combination. In spite of the tempting
offers proposed by Japan, Nationalist China remained true to the
United States.
China's reward was Yalta, the Marshall mission to China, embargo,
and now exclusion from the Japanese Peace Treaty. The next step
will be the expulsion of Nationalist China from the U. N. and the loss
of Formosa.
The record of the Pacific war proves that only the following should
be, eligible to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty in_ the following order:
Nationalist China, for being the nation that fought Japan for the
longest period of time even when her future allies sold war materials
to Japan and who never thought of betraying her allies.
The United States, for saving Asia from Japanese conquest and
defeating Japan almost single-handed.
Great Britain, for fighting an important delaying action and later
returning to the offensive against the Japanese.
Australia; its fine record speaks for itself.
Canada; same as Australia.
New Zealand; same as Australia.
The Philippines, for their loyalty to the United States, defense of
Bataan, they fought bravely as a free nation, for its independence
was already promised, extremely effective underground, fought as
freemen and. not as colonial subjects.
The Netherlands, for their heroic although hopeless defense against
the Japanese.
No other nation should sign that Japanese Peace Treaty or even
been invited to that conference at San Francisco.
It is really absurd, when we look at the Japanese, Peace Treaty,
even excluding Soviet Russia, Soviet Poland, and Soviet Czechoslo-
valcia, to have such nations-in all due respect to these nations, but
still-Burma, Ceylon, India., Indonesia, Pakistan.
As you gentlemen will remember, on September 2, 1945, those
nations were colonial empires. They were not independent nations.
Why should they have the right to sign?
I would like with the committee's approval, to insert my article,
"'The Coming Betrayal of Japan," as it appears in the Congressional
Record of August 23, 1951., into the hearings.
Senator GEORGE. You may insert it.
(The article referred to above is as follows:)
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACII~ iC '1'H~ ATIE~ 9!
[From the Congressional Record, August 23, 19511 _
THE COMING BETRAYAL OF JAPAN
EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. B. CARROLL REECE, OF TENNESSEE, IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TrIURSnAY, Aucus'r 23, 1951
Mr. REECE of Tennessee, Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks I
include the following communication I have from Ex-Naval It. W. H. Evans,
Jr., because of his comments upon the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty:
EncEWATER, MD., August 23, 1951.
The Honorable B. CARROLL ItEECE,
house Office Building, lhashington 1). C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN REECE: In spite of the fact that the Trumanites have
revoked my commission as a naval officer, they cannot revoke my oath'of al-
legiance to my country.
Consequently, I feel that it is my duty to send you the enclosed article on the
Coining Betrayal of Japan, which I have written in an attempt to arouse our
countrymen to the impending disaster.
My answer to the Acheson Democrats and Truman Republicans is Gad bless
Gen. Douglas MacArthur. He is for the United States first, last, and always.
Most respectfully, W. H. EVANS, Jr.,
Ex-Naval Lieutenant.
THE COMING BETRAYAL OF JAPAN
The proposed Japanese Peace 'treaty that is to be signed in San Francisco is a
clever plan designed for the purpose of enabling communism to triumph in'Japan.
At a quick glance, this peace treaty may strike the upsuspecting reader as being a
fair and generous offer. However, upon careful examination and consideration
of all the possible implications of the various articles, it becomes clearly evident
that the State Department once again is placing the interests of Communist
Russia above those of the United States.
There are four major betrayals in this treaty which should be pointed out to the
American people before it is too late: -
1. ACKNOWLEDGMENT 01' ROOSEVELT'S YALTA BETRAYAL
Section (c) of article 2 of the impending treaty states:
"Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that
portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired
sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. "
According to this cleverly worded statement, the secret agreement of the Yalta
betrayal whereby Communist Russia was given the Kurile Islands and southern
Sakhalin is acknowledged as binding. So secret was this protocol that it was not
released until 1 year after Roosevelt's sell-out at Yalta in February 1945 when
Japan already was beaten and suing for peace.
Naturally, the Acheson Democrats and Truman Republicans will deny that this
article acknowledges the Yalta betrayal but; they cannot whitewash the facts.
If this article does not acknowledge Communist Russia's claim to the Kurile
Islands and southern Sakhalin then why is Japan being stripped of these two pieces
of her territory which are so essential to her defense and important to her economy?
The whole world knows that no other nation could conceivably get the Kurile
Islands and southern Sakhalin except Communist Russia. It is a subtle way of
legally giving the territories to the U. S. S. R. without directly admitting it.
Everyone who reads this section should immediately get, a map of the Far
East and spread it, before them. It can plainly be seen that the Kurile Islands
and southern Sakhalin are two daggers pointing at the Japanese homrie island
of Hokkaido, Kunashiri, the southernmost Kurile Island is only about 10 miles
from Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin is separated from Hokkaido by the narrow
Soya Strait which is only 25 miles wide.
The Treaty pf Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, ending the Russo-Japanese
War awarded southern Sakhalin to Japan because President Theodore Roosevelt
clearly saw that it was essential for Japan's defense against the surging tide of
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98 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Czarist imperialism. Moreover, Japan had and has just as much claim, if not
more, to territory in this region because Russia looted all of it from China in
the first place.
Moreover, there are important fishing grounds in the Sea of Okhotsk that
were an important part of the Japanese economy. The Japanese are now barred
from these areas since the. Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin are in the
possession of the Communist enemy.
This territorial provision of the peace treaty with Japan is keeping in line with
the Roosevelt-Truman-Acheson policy of making the world safe for communism.
Section (a) of article 6 reads:
"All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan
as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty, and in any
case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however,
prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory
under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have
been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand,
and Japan on the, other."
The possible implications of this proposal present the most immediate danger
to the retention of Japan as a member of the anti-Communist nations. It could
readily force Japan into going Communist. A careful analysis of the above
quotation shows that events could be made to follow this pattern.
All American troops could be withdrawn after 90 days at the request of a
Japanese Government that, felt unable to accept certain intolerable conditions
of a bilateral agreement intentionally forced upon it by the American pro-
Communist State Department. The Japanese would have to reject such con-
ditions or else lose a vote of confidence. Without American bases and troops
in Japan, the Japanese would be an easy prey to communism from within or
without.. Remember how close southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles are to Japan
and the Communist Japanese army, reported to be training in Sakhalin.
Another fact to boar in mind is that it would be possible for the U. S. S. R.
to offer to return the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin to Japan under a
bilateral agreement in exchange for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and bases
from Japan. The Communists are willing to execute a minor strategic retreat
now in order to be able to cleverly bring Japan into the Communist orbit. The
Soviet Union ha nothing to lose and everything to gain by such an arrangement.
Perhaps this speculation may sound fantastic but it must be remembered that
the same thing was said about China when the inevitable conclusions of Yalta,
the Marshall mission to China, and the effects of the embargo upon supplies to
Nationalist China were pointed out.
The pro-Communist tactics of the State Department are repeating themselves
again in Asia.
The first two paragraphs of article 14 state:
"It is recognized that, although Japan should in principle pay reparation for the
damage and suffering caused by it during the war, nevertheless Japan lacks the
capacity, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make adequate reparation to the
Allied Powers and at the same time meet its other obligations.
"However, (1) Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers
so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and
damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the
cost of repairing the damage done, by making available, the skills and industry of
the Japanese people in manufacturing, salvaging, and other services to he rendered
to the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition
of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of
raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question,
so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan."
Section (a) clearly admits that it is utterly impossible, from an economic view-
point, for Japan to pay any reparations whatsoever for the simple and realistic
reason that the Japanese economy cannot stand the added burden of reparations.
Nevertheless, the very next paragraph demands that the Japanese process raw
materials into finished products, do salvage work, and "other services" (the joker
covering a wide field which perhaps is another type of reparation or loot). In
plain language, the Japanese economy must pay reparations in the form of using
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their industrial plants, labor, salvaging facilities, and other services Without
receiving any compensation.
Not only would these services be profitless for Japan and actually wear down
her economy without compensation, but also a tremendous portion of her indus-
trial facilities would have to be diverted from engaging in profitable trade to
sustain the nation.
In one paragraph, the State Department views the situation from a realistic and
pro-American viewpoint, but, follows it up immediately in the very next paragraph
with a plan designed to wreck Japan economically in order to force her.into the
Communist orbit more rapidly.
The last major proof that the peace treaty favors communism is the provision
allowing Japan to sign either with Nationalist or Communist China or neither one.
Now, it is time to remember that the Pacific war began in 1937 when Japan
invaded China, and ended in September 2, 1915, with the surrender abpard the
U. S. S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The Nationalist Chinese fought the Japanese
for eight long and bitter years while the United States sold war materials to the
Japanese invaders and gave no effective help until after Pearl Harbor.
After Roosevelt and his clique had baited the Japanese into fighting the United
States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in order that he could save Britain
and Communist Russia, Nationalist China still was neglected even trough it
detained Japanese troops that otherwise would have conquered India and Aus-
tralia thereby prolonging the war and perhaps making the Japanese Empire
impregnable.
Chiang Kai-shek could have had peace with Japan any time after, 1941 on
honorable terms and he would have been much better off than he is today after
being betrayed by the Roosevelt Tnrnian-Churchill-Acheson-Marshall combina-
tion. In spite of the tempting offers proposed by Japan, Nationalist China
remained a faithful and important ally in the war against Japan.
China's reward was Yalta, the Marshall mission to China, embargo, and now
exclusion from the Japanese peace treaty. The next step will be the expulsion
of Nationalist China from the UN and the loss of Formosa.
The record of the Pacific war proves that only the following should bj/ eligible
to sign the Japanese peace treaty in the following order:
Nationalist China, for being the nation that fought Japan for the longest period
of time even when her future allies sold war materials to Japan and who never
thought of betraying her allies.
The United States, for saving Asia from Japanese conquest and defeatilrg Japan
almost single-handed.
Great Britain, for fighting an important delaying. action and later returning to
the offensive against the Japanese.
Australia, its fine record speaks for itself.
Canada, same as Australia.
New Zealand, same as Australia.
The Philippines, loyalty to the United States, defense of Bataan, fought bravely
as a free nation, for its independence was already promised, extremely effective
underground, fought as freemen and not colonial subjects.
The Netherlands, heroic although hopeless defense against the Japanese.
No other nation should sign the treaty as they did not give any assista~rce note-
worthy of rendering there eligible to determine the treaty provisions dr sign it.
These nations should not have the privilege of signing the treaty for the stated
reasons.
Burma, never at war with Japan as a nation and part of the British Empire
until after VJ-day.
Ceylon, same as Burma.
India, same as Burma.
Indonesia, never at war with Japan as a nation and part of the Dutch Empire
until after VJ-day.
Pakistan, same as Burma.
Soviet Union, 6-day looting of an already defeated Japan. Communist Russia
has no right whatsoever to sign the treaty.
It is a complete farce to allow the above nations to sign while noh allowing
Nationalist China to do likewise.
In reference to Communist China, that government is merely a satellite of the
IT. S. S. R. so she can be included under the Soviet Union.
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The "joker" in the treaty signing is the statement that Japan can refuse to
sign with either Nationalist China or Communist China, the province of the
U. S. S. R. As Japan wants to trade with the mainland, she must have rela-
tions with the controlling power there.
If and when Japan signs with Red China, then the clamor for admission of
Red China to the pro-Communist United Nations will increase. The plan to
recognize Red China and abandon Nationalist China takes another step near
completion.
The administration is already pro-Communist with particular emphasis upo
the State Department. If the Senate ratifies this treaty, then it also falls into
this same classification.
This is an appeal to all Americans to protest this treaty designed to force
Japan to go Communist and, with Japan, all of Asia will inevitably follow.
With her Asiatic flank secure, the U. S. S. R. will no longer have the threat of
a two-front war thereby enabling her to concentrate against Europe.
THE WAR IN KOREA
Mr. EVANS. Now in reference to the peace treaty with Japan,
regardless of whether the Senate ratifies this peace treaty or not, it
glance at the map of Asia will show that the war in Korea will really
determine the fate of Japan and largely the position of the United
States in Asia.
Now, with the committee's approval, I would like to request that
General Chennault's foreword in his book, "Way of a Fighter," be
inserted in the record.
Senator GEORGE. We wouldn't care to insert it in the record. You
may file it with the committee, and the committee will be pleased to
look at it. There, is no need to incorporate it in the record.
Mir. EVANS. I will file it with the committee, but in the meantime
I would like to give a resume, General Chennault--
Senator GEORGE. I will ask you .to be as brief as possible. We
have two other witnesses.
Mr. EVANS. I am taking that into full consideration in making
everything as brief as possible.
General Chennault has pointed out that with China under Soviet
domination, the fate of Japan and Korea is endangered and, their
position is untenable, as we have found out now in the case of Korea..
Furthermore, the war in Korea to keep Japan in the western orbit
or from going into the Communist orbit will have to be fought to a
successful conclusion by following the MacArthur plan, inasmuch as
Japan must trade with the, Chinese mainland; and, furthermore if-
as it is likely to happen-Japan goes Communist under this proposed
treaty, if Japan goes Communists, all of Asia will follow, regardless of
any propaganda to the contrary.
If all of Asia is under her control, Soviet Russia is no longer dreading
a two-front war. She will concentrate against Europe, and Eisen-
hower's Maginot army will not stand up, and we will lose everything
in Europe as well as in Asia.
Europe is our primary concern, but we have to fight a two-front
war to save Asia. An air and sea blockade on China, as General
MacArthur pointed out, and I Chink Admiral Sherman very well
confirmed in his testimony before the MacArthur hearings, will defeat
Soviet China.
Otherwise, regardless of whether or not you ratify the treaty, the
fate of Japan will be settled; it will be drawn into the Communist
orbit.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 101
Now I would like to propose a constructive Japanese peace treaty,
inasmuch as I have said quite a bit about what is wrong with this
one. I implore the Senate of the United States and this committee
to reject the. Japanese Peace Treaty as proposed now in the interests
of the United States of America with which we are all primarily
concerned, not with the United Rations or anything else.
The Kurile Islands and Southern Sakhalin are still part of the
Japanese Empire, and also the Ryukyu Islands south of Japan., of
which Okinawa is a part, Okinawa being retained as a United States
base, the Volcano and Bonin Islands, less [we Jima, a United States
base.
Serious consideration was given to having the entire Island of Xew
Guinea fairly transferred to Japan along the lines recommended by
Dr. E. Stanley .Jones. I would like to eve a very brief resume of
that. It is pages 100 to 102 of Pearl Har, ror, the Story of the Secret
War, by George Morgenstern.
In 1941, Dr. E. Stanley Jones, who was a missionary of long expe-
rience in the Orient, served as unofficial mediator between the' Jap-
anese and President Roosevelt. Dr. Jones evidently was sent by
President Roosevelt to see if we could deter Japan from its course of
aggression in 1941. They had a plan at that time-with Dr. Jones
attempting to arrange the buying of the island of New Guinea from
Australia and the Dutch and giving that island to Japan in order to
have an outlet for the surplus Japanese population.
Australia and the British were agreeable to it, but it was the Dutch
who blocked the plan. The Dutch said that no part of the butch
Empire is for sale. That scheme then was dropped.
Gentlemen, there is one point that the treaty misses entirely.
Japan must have territory, legitimate territory, for those 82,000,000
people crowded on those four small home islands. They cannot
exist otherwise.
This treaty, while on the surface it may sound generous and con-
ciliating, is simply a second Versailles Treaty. If you will compare
the Versailles Treaty with the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty, you
will see the similarity.
Not only are the Japanese limited to those four islands, their main
trade area is cut off, and they are practically defenseless. The pro-
posed peace treaty as written is a, pro-Communist treaty under any
circumstances, and not only should this be given serious considera-
tion-the transfer of the Island of New Guinea-but it must be pointed
out that in 1941 there were only 300,000 primitive natives on the
island, the Island of New Guinea, and Dr. E. Stanley Jones points
out that the Island of New Guinea could sustain up to 40,000,000
Japanese.
If we want a dictated, peace, such as we had at Versailles-the
United States Senate in those days wisely rejected the Versailles
Treaty for that reason----we can sign this treaty. It was a dictated
peace, a. victor's peace. If we pass this proposed Japanese' Peace
Treaty, we are sowing the seeds of a third world war in Asia and
forcing Japan into the Communist orbit.
The Japanese naturally have no choice except to sign this treaty
and say that it is a good treaty, since it is the best that they can get
at the present time.
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Further, in my proposed Japanese peace treaty there should not be
any reparations from Japan. I concur with General Devereaux that
all Americans should be taken care of as it seems to be "Americans
last" in the policy of the present administration.
The claims of all Americans against Japan should be taken care of,
but in reference to any other nation, there should not be any repara-
tions.
There should be a fully rearmed and industrailized Japan to regain
the balance of power in the Far East, deliberately destroyed through
the policies of Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam and those following.
Now, as history has well pointed out, from the Conference of.
Vienna in 1815 to the First World War in 1914, the balance of power
was the only thing that kept the peace. The balance of power was
deliberately destroyed in World War II and the United States is
already paying the consequences in the blood bath without victory
called Korea.
Now in conclusion I would also request the committee and the
Senate to demand immediate cessation of the appeasement policies
at Kaesong and Panmunjon and immediately follow up with the
MacArthur plan for victory against Soviet China and North Korea,
the provinces of Soviet Russia.
Otherwise Japan will inevitably fall into the Communist orbit.
Therefore, we should have an immediate air and sea blockade over
Soviet China. This Kaesong thing and the Panmunjon thing are the
worst disgraces that has ever fallen upon the United States, it is waving
a white flag of appeasement.
I was in Japan at the time that General MacArthur was relieved,
and the Japanese felt like it was a dagger stuck into their backs. They
were rather fearful of the Japanese Peace Treaty to come. I think
their fears have been realized now.
We want Japan on our side, and I think we had better scrap the
entire treaty and have Americans write a pro-American Japanese
Treaty in the interests of the United States and the peoples of a free
Asia.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Senator GEORGE. Any questions?
Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask many
questions, but the time is so short, There are one or two things I
would like to suggest to Mr. Evans.
DEFINITION OF "ALLIED POWERS" IN TREATY
You made the statement a while ago that even Russia or Soviet
China might have certain rights under the term "Allied Powers." I
call your attention to the fact that article 25 defines the term "Allied
Powers," and makes it apply only to those governments signing the
peace treaty.
So, tinder the definition of the term as used all the way through the
treaty, it would be impossible for either Russia or Communist, China
to get the right to which you refer.
Mr. EVANS. Yes, sir. I would like to add something, Senator
Sparkman, that I forgot on that. If I remember correctly, the April
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OThER PACIFIC TREATIES. 103
9 issue of Time magazine contained an atricle wherein Mr. Dulles
pointed out-this was April 9, 1951- that if Russia did not sign the
Japanese Peace Treaty as a whole, we would not recognize the cession
of the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin to Russia.
Russia did not sign that treaty at all. Now why is Japan being
stripped of the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin? Haven't we
the courage to say that those territories still belong to Japan, as they
legitimately do? Are we following Yalta again?
Senator SPARKMAN. I would just like to mention the correct record
on that, too. Under the surrender terms at Potsdam it was specifically
provided that Japan would be stripped of the Kuriles and southern
Sakhalin as well as various other islands that remained.
This provision in this treaty carries out the surrender terms of
Potsdam without giving any right to Russia or anybody elsee ust as
it does with other islands which may be disposed of later. The dis-
position is left pending so for as the treaty is concerned.
Mr. EVANS. If Japan is being stripped of them, what nation is going
to get them? It doesn't make sense.
Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, it is not complete. We would all
like to have it complete; but if you were here the other day when Mr.
Dulles testified, or if you read the record, you will see that he answered
that question, that it was it matter of future determination, even
though we much preferred that the matter be settled right now.
YALTA, TEHRAN, AND POTSDAM AGREEMENTS
Mr. EVANS. I would like to add one more statement on that.
You pointed out these agreements-Yalta, Tehran, Potsdam, and so
forth-I would like to know if the United States is going to be bound
by the insane-I will give them the benefit of the doubt-the insane
or Communist policy carried out at Yalta, Tehran, or Potsdam.
I have spent 4 years working on a thesis on Potsdam alone, and I
have gone back into it. The precedin~ conferences as well as those
treaties are a betrayal of the United States for the sole purpose of
making the world safe for communism. I will debate that conclusion
with anyone. Are we bound by it?
A traitor in our midst condemns our country to national suicide.
Is the Senate of the United States or the American people bound to
follow that road to national suicide? I think not.
Senator SPARKMAN. When I think of some of the people who
participated in the Potsdam agreement, I do not subscribe to any
extent to the statement you make because I know them as patriotic
Americans.
That doesn't mean that I favor everything that was done there or
at any other conference. I don't suppose any of us could. I rho not
like the treaty 100 percent, but when we remember that there were a
great many nations that were interested in this matter, nations for
instance, like the Philippines that suffered certainly great damage
at the hands of the Japanese, I think we can understand that, it was
not an easy matter to work out. It was full of complexities and
complications.
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104 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
I am rather impressed with your statement. Did you say this was
not a document of peace, but that it was a document that would lead
to war?
Mr. EVANS. Yes, sir. I will try to make a summary of it for the
record there.
Senator SPARKMAN. The thing that attracted me to that statement
was the fact that I sat in the San Francisco Conference and heard
Gromyko make exactly that same statement time after time. He
tried to instill the fear into the hearts of little Asian countries, that
this did mean war instead of peace, but they didn't accept that theory.
I just can't understand your pointing up the same thing.
Mr. EVANS. I will try to explain that to you. You have heard the
old, trite expression that actions speak louder than. words. San
Francisco was really a three-ring circus. It is my belief that a deal
was made long before that, such as the secret deal at Yalta.
President Roosevelt came back here and told you gentlemen in
Congress on March 1, 1945, that there was nothing secret at Yalta,
that it was a high tide of freindship and what have you.
A year later one Yalta secret protocol was released. I contend there
was a deal made before San Francisco that Russia would go up on the
stage, so to speak, and be made a monkey of, and we would win a-
verbal victory, but the actions-Russia got everything that she wanted
:)n that Japanese Peace Treaty.
Senator SPARKMAN. I don't know whether you fully recognize the
full implications of your statement there.
Mr. EVANS. Yes, sir, I fully do.
Senator SPARKMAN. If a deal was made, the United States was a
party to it all?
Mr. EVANS. Were we not a party to Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam?
Senator SPARKMAN. I am limiting your charge to San Francisco.
Mr. EVANS. I am not saying that I know definitely.
Senator SPARKMAN. You say you believe it.
Mr. EVANS. I believe it:
Senator SPARKMAN. You know Mr. John Foster Dulles negotiated
this treaty, devoted a full year's hard work to it. I don't believe you
would sit there and say you believe Mr. Dulles would be a party to any
such agreement as that, would you.
Mr. EVANS. How can you explain the other ones, going back to
that? To answer your question, and not deviate from it, How can
you explain Yalta and Tehran? Alger Hiss at Yalta, at Potsdam,
there is still evidence of secret agreements unrevealed.
How can you explain Tehran, Yalta, and Postdam? I am not
accusing Mr. Dulles of anything. I am saying the treaty he has
written is a pro-Communist treaty, and I will go into that later if the
committee so desires.
I am looking out for the interests of the United States. I do not
care anything about the United Nations which is a Communist-front
organization. That is beside the point at this time.
Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, you know that the Russian delega-
tion would not participate in the signing of the peace treaty.
Mr. EVANS. Yes, sir.
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.TAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 105
Senator SPARKMAN. I am sure you know that their spokesman,
Gromyko, as well as their puppet spokesmen from Poland and Czecho-
slovakia, hurled every charge and challenge that they possibly could
against this treaty, trying to get an Asian block built up against it,
not to sign it; don't you know that?
Mr. EVANS. Yes, sir. Now, Senator Sparkman, have you ever
heard of Lenin's old saying, "Retreat, step back 1 or 2 steps and
advance 10 steps"? That was the same principle here.
If you were Russian or if I were Russian, I would have done the
same thing that they did at San Francisco. I would have allowed
them to make a monkey out of me if I could have obtained :all Asia
eventually. I am certain that you would, too, if you were in Stalin's
position. That was precisely done at San Francisco-the old policy of
Lenin of retreating 2 steps and advancing 10 when the occasion de-
mands, following the practices and theory of communism.
Senator SPARKMAN. You believe that Japan may well be the key to
the Pacific?
Mr. EVANS. It is the key.
Senator SPARKMAN. You said when. you left Japan, back last spring,
you felt that the Japanese people. were fearful of the peace treaty.
Are you familiar with the press reports on the reaction of the
Japanese people since that, time?
Mr. EVANS. I have read the press reports, saying they were favor-
able. It is my opinion, I would say, and I would emphasize that,
that the Japanese people had ao choice. If they protested they
would follow the fate of China before them. They had to go along
with it or else get stabbed in the back and betrayed. They figured
that it was the best that they could get and they would hang on until
a future date when they could rectify that.
Senator SPARKMAN. And you think the whole mass of the Japanese
population could be swung over to that kind of maneuvering?
Mr. EVANS. Into the Communist orbit, sir, is that what.you are
referring to?
Senator SPARKMAN. You have just said, that they are just pretend-
ing to believe that this is a good treaty until an opportune time comes
along.
Mr. EVANS. Yes, sir. I frilly thi;rk that.
Senator SPARKMAN. You think the press of Japan, which has sup-
ported this treaty in very strong editorials, the whole press could be
swung over to that kind of a maneuver?
Mr. EVANS. It is very possible. I would say it is because they have
no choice in the matter. They have a dictated peace. before them.
Senator SPARKMAN. Who dictated it?
Mr. EVANS. It is like Versailles. Mr. Dulles, of course, discussed
it with the Japanese leaders but, they had no choice iii the matter.
Senator SPARKMAN. Who dictated the peace? You said it was
dictated.
Mr. EVANS. Who wrote the peace? That is the one who dictated
it and is presenting it.
Senator SPARKMAN. You know that the United States had a leading
part in it, don't you?
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Mr. EVANS. The United States, controlled by the temporary
administration in power, but not in the best interests of the United
States.
PEACE TREATY AND BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
Senator SPARKMAN. You mean all the work that Mr. Dulles did was
not in the best interest of the United States?
Mr. EVANS. No, sir; it definitely was not in the best interest of the
United States.
Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe Mr. Dulles knew it was not in
the best interest of the United States? Or, was he just a puppet?
Mr. EVANS. Not knowing Mr. Dulles' mind, I would not say, in my.
opinion, the treaty-the treaty is not in the best interest of the United
States and perhaps Mr. Dulles thinks it is in the best interest of the
United States and does not realize the full implications of that treaty.
You have to take everything into consideration, even the fantastic,
just so it is possible. Quite often the fantastic is possible. Remember
after Yalta, I know that you will remember, Senator Sparkman, and
everyone else too does, it was said, that President Roosevelt was in
favor of a strong China but he split Manchuria wide open and made it
inevitable that China would fall into the Communist fold. The
analogy is the same here. If you will compare the Versailles Treaty
with this treaty I think you will see my point. My primary purpose in
appearing before this committee is that I conscientiously feel that this
treaty is not in the best interests of my country and I am an American
first, last, and always, and I have no allegiance to any super govern-
ment, or anything else--just the United States. I took the oath of
allegiance to my country, to defend it against all enemies, foreign and
domestic, and I intend to keep it. Otherwise I would not be here
today before you gentlemen.
Senator SPARKMAN. Of course we all concede, not only the right,
but the obligation to do those things and to do them in keeping with
the very best dictates of your conscience. We all appreciate your
coming here and making this statement. It seems to me, however,
that you are seeking to play upon the imagination of the people when
you make a statement here that a treaty that has received the time
and attention of good, loyal Americans that this treaty received, is one
that was written not in the best interest of the United States either
because somebody willfully made it that way or because they were
simply not smart enough to understand what they were doing. l.t j ust
seems to me those are pretty serious statements for you to make.
Mr. EVANS. I still stick to them, sir.
Senator SPARKMAN. That is all.
Senator GEORGE. All right. Thank you, sir, for your appearance.
,(Additional statement of William Henry Evans, Jr., is as follows:)
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WRITTEN STATEMENT OF WILLIAM [IENRY EVANS, JR., Ex. NAVAL LIEUTENANT
IN PROTEST AGAINST THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY SIGNED IN SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIF. ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1951
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS CoMbIITTE, -,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
GENTLEMEN: As you undoubtedly remember, I was relieved of duty in the
Navy because I warned on March 16, 1951, that the State Department intended
ecret protocolllon remaii) the Far East agave them under to
because Islands the and
to let Russian the
control Kurile
Stalin.
Since my letter of March 16, 1951, correctly predicted this confirmation of
Yalta and since the ultimate fate of Japan is dependent upon the outcome of the
present war against Soviet China and North Korea, the provinces of Soviet
Russia, it, therefore, is necessary to insert the following letter as it appears in the
Congressional Record of November 9, 1951, on page A7164 in order to under-
stand the future status of Japan under the proposed treaty:
FIGHTING ZONE, EAST COAST OF NORTH KOREA,
U. S. S. "RoeREs" (DDR-876),
c/o Fleet P. 0., Sun Francisco, Calif., March 16, 1951.
Mr. ALFRED KOHI.BERG,
New York 18, N. Y.
DEAR MR. KOHLBERG: Keep up the good work. I just received your questions
to Red Dean Acheson. I post your open letters for all the officers on the ship
to read and they feel the same way as 1 do.
Now that the time for a Ja anese Peace Treaty is nearing, for the love of God,
let's keep our pro-Communist and pro-Soviet State Department from again
putting the interests of Soviet Russia or the pro-Soviet United Nations above
the welfare of the United States.
I greatly fear that the Red Dean Acheson clique will allow Soviet Russia to
retain Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands because the insane or Com-
monist Roosevelt (Alger Hiss) gave them to Russia. To hell with the Yalta
betrayal. The Japanese Peace Treaty should be signed on American terms, as
we did defeat Japan by ourselves.
Here is the essence of a sensible and pro-American Japanese Peace Treaty.
1. Japan still owns Kurile Islands.
2. Southern Sakhalin to be returned to Japan. (Eventually all of Sakhalin
when the opportunity presents itself.)
3. No reparations from Japan to anyone (because the United States will have
to foot the bill as usual).
4. A fully rearmed and industrialized Japan in alliance with the United States
to regain the balance of power in the Far East.
5. A Japanese-Nationalist Chinese-American alliance against communism in
Asia.
We are out here waiting for "Acheson's agrarian reformers" to attempt an
invasion of Formosa. Now, instead of allowing the Nationalist Chinese and the
Seventh Fleet to attack the mainland to break up any such plans before they
start, we have to fight with both hands tied behind our back-one hand bound by
Acheson and his pro-Red gang and the other hand by the pro-Soviet United
Nations. When are the American people going to wake up? When it is We late,
I guess.
That pro-Soviet one world administration of ours * * * would rather have
Americans slaughtered than attack Red China everywhere. In the history of
warfare, was any nation so restricted even though it could destroy-its enemy
readily if its hands were freed?
Damn the United Nations. Long live the United States.
The Roosevelt-Truman-Acheson-United Nations followers in the United
States should be loaded onto ships and used as shock troops in Korea, instead of
America's best citizens. Americans are dying by the thousands, thanks to the
pro-Red administration.
If you desire, you may reproduce any portions of this letter and send an open
letter to Congress in another appeal. I wish that you would because it is no fun
getting shot at and exposed to mines without being able to destroy the source of
attack.
God bless Alfred Kohlberg. There are too few like him, though.
Most respectfully, W. H. EVANS, Jr.
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E PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
TIIE KURILE ISLANDS
In addition to my oral testimony in reference to the Kurile Islands, I would like
to add the following hitherto not publicized facts:
From volume II of The Memoirs of Cordell Hull on page 1596, Cordell Hull
recorded Roosevelt's viewpoint on the Kurile Islands on October 51943:
"Ile mentioned Truk, the Bonin Islands, the Kurile Islands '(although he
thought the Kuriles should really go to Russia)" * * *
It can be readily seen from the above statement by Cordell Hull that Roosevelt
was determined to give an integral and necessary segment of Japan to Communist
Russia without any justification except to make the world safe for communism as
well as endangering the main islands of Japan and giving the forces of world
communism. a strategic chain of air and submarine bases in the Northern Pacific
Ocean. How many American lives will be lost as a result of this deliberate pro-
communistic attitude of Roosevelt if Russia ever attacks us from bases in the
Kuriles? Roosevelt felt this way even before the Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran
conferences of 1943.
Even after the fatal conference in Secretary of War Stimson's office in the
Pentagon on May 29, 1945, where George C. Marshall deliberately blocked an
early peace with an already defeated Japan that was ready to surrender (for a
completely documented account of this conference, see Did Marshall Prolong the
Pacific War? by Forrest Davis in the November 5 and 19 issues of the Freeman
Magazine, 1951), there still remained a possibility to save the Kurile Islands
because Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, told the Russians at the Potsdam Con-
ference that the United States could keep open a passage in the Kurile Islands but
would not attempt any landings there, according to page 415 of I Was There,
by Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.
At Potsdam, Harry S. Truman, James F. Byrnes, and Ben Cohen not only
confirmed the previous betrayals of Roosevelt but also added more of their own, as
the record of this meeting clearly proves.
At the end of the Pacific war, Russia seized the Kurile Islands in accordance
with the Yalta secret protocol.
THE INTRODUCTION TO THE PROPOSED TREATY
Paragraph No. 2 of the introduction to the proposed treaty of peace with Japan
requires Japan to "apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circum-
stances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to
strive to realize the objectives of the universal declaration of human rights."
Why is Japan being forced to apply for membership in a Communist-front
organization of world government? This organization is comprised of Soviet
Russia with two extra votes in its provinces of White Russia and the Ukraine, given
to her by Roosevelt; soviet Poland, soviet Czechoslovakia, and other communisti-
cally inclined nations. Alger ]Iiss was one of the important figures in the founding
of this organization which was set up deliberately for the sole purpose of destroying
the United States of America. With the United States and its system of govern-
ment abolished, a world-wide Communist state would be established.
This treaty very cleverly is attempting to get the Senate of the United States to
acknowledge the supreme authority of the United Nations over the affairs of our
country. Do the freemen of the world find the governments-in-exile of Free
Poland, Free Czechoslovakia, Free Estonia, Free Latvia, Free Lithuania, Free
Bulgaria, Free Hungary, Free Rumania, etc., in the United Nations? Of course
they do not. This organization is a group set up to enforce the present and future
gains of world communism.
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
This section of the treaty is a subtle way of getting the Senate of the United
States to ratify the universal declaration of human rights by recognizing it as a
legal law applying to Japan. With this precedent established, the Acheson
Democrats and Truman Republicans will attempt to convince the Senate that it
should ratify the universal declaration of human rights when and if they dare to
present it to the Senate for consideration.
This declaration would automatically abolish the privileges of American citizens
as guaranteed by our Constitution and Bill of Rights. Are not the Constitution
and Bill of Rights to be preferred to a document that intentionally furthers the
cause of a dictatorship? Why is this declaration in the treaty?
One must always consider the personality and search very thoroughly into the
background of the author of this treaty.
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.JAPANESE PEACE TREATY :Al NO L A 1
It has been continually stated that Mr. J. F. Dulles has spent over it year in
preparing this treaty of peace. He has been credited with being the author of
this treaty. Having observed Mr. J. F. Dulles throughout the hearings on
January 23, 1952, I, therefore, must conclude the following impressions:
(1) Perhaps Mr. J. F. Dulles is sincere in his belief this is a good treaty and in
the best interests of the United States, Japan, and the free nations of At If
this be the case, then Mr. J. F. lhdles is merely a puppet or showpiece for the
State Department. His position, under such circumstances, apparently is to fool
the Republican Members of the Senate (or enough of them to ratify the treaty)
into gaining a false impression of the real purpose of this treaty; or
(2) If the above impression (1) is incorrect, then Mr. Dulles automatically
falls into the same category as ])call Acheson, Philip Jessup, Owen Lattimore,
etc. He then is classified as a Truman Republican representing beliefs contrary
to either of the major parties of our American system of two-party government.
Mr. J. F. Dulles has been purposely built up as an authority on foreign affairs.
But, if one examines the record very carefully, it will be found that Fair Deal
propaganda is responsible for his widespread publicity. Why has this man been
selected as the author of the proposed peace treaty? The answer is obvious:
Because he represents the Dewey faction of the Republican Party. A Truman
Republican is the same thing as an Acheson Democrat. The State Department
realized that Mr. J. F. Dulles would give this treaty the best possible window
dressing, under the circumstances. Consequently, the combination of 4cheson
Democrats and Truman Republicans hope to tool enough of their fellow Slenators
into ratifying this treaty.
COMMENTS ON SAN FRANCISCO, 1951
On March 1, 1945, Franklin 1). Roosevelt told Congress that-
"* * * unless you here - in the Halls of the American Congress, with the
support of the American people-concur in the general conclusions reached in the
place called Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have
produced lasting results."
Then, on August 9, 1945, Harry S. Truman told the American people:
"In the Conference of Berlin, it was easy for me to get along in mutual under-
standing and friendship with Generalissimo Stalin," * * *
At San Francisco on September 8, 1951, there was another Yalta bptrayal.
But this time the disciples of Russiaveltism did not dare to be as brazen-as they
were at Yalta and Potsdam so they had to find a smoke screen that would enable
them to attempt to hide another deliberate sell-out of the free world. As V, result,
a deal apparently was made before San Francisco whereby Soviet Russia would
lose the meaningless verbal victory at the conference in order to further its con-
quest of all Asia. The proposed treaty substantiates this assertion.
(1) Return the Kurile Islands to Japan.
(2) Return all of Sakhalin to Japan.
(3) When the MacArthur plan is followed in Asia, if Soviet Russia intervenes
openly in Asia, then Japan will receive the following section of the Soviet Far
East:
That section of the Soviet Far East south and east of a line from the in tgrsection
of the Amur and Shilka Rivers running approximately northeast through the
Stanovoi Mountains, to Port Ayan in the Sea of Okhotsk, this territory was; forcibly
ceded to Russia by China in 1858 and 1860. Japan has more claim to territory in
this region than Soviet Russia.
This proposed treaty is not in the best interests of the United .States, Japan, and
the free nations of Asia so I request the Senate to reject it completely and authorize
pro-Americans to write another treaty. Otherwise, Soviet Russia will move for-
ward in her quest for world domination greatly assisted by this present treaty.
For my final statement, I request the Senate to study And Now Japan in the Jan-
uary 28, 1952, issue of The Freeman magazine on page 264; this article conclusively
proves that Japan is doomed to communism under the present far-easterp policy.
94413-52- -S
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Senator GEORGE. Do any of the witnesses this morning desire to
put their statements in the record? If so, we will be glad to receive
them at this time.
The next witness is Rev. William R. Johnson. Mr. Johnson, is your
statement lengthy?
Mr. JOHNSON. I am afraid, sir, I wish to continue the discussion that
has just been going on here, not as my first point. I have four major
points I would like to make and my last one will take up this very
issue. I am afraid it would be lengthy if I may say as much as I wish.
I have nothing in writing. I must ask the committee's permission if
I may, to put what I have to say in writing. I received notice only
13 hours before I had to take a plane yesterday morning at 6 o'clock.
that I would have a hearing. I have had no opportunity to prepare
for this.
Senator GEORGE. We will be glad to have your full statement in
the record if you wish to do so and make your personal appearance
brief. I am making this inquiry now because we must go to the Senate
floor very soon.
Mr. JOHNSON. I would hate to have to confine my remarks to either
5 or 10 minutes at the close of this session. Is there no possibility of
further hearing?
Senator GEORGE. There may be a hearing later, and that is the
reason I am making inquiry now of you, whether or not you would
desire to make a lengthy statement.
Mr. JOHNSON. I would rather make it more lengthy than would seem
to be practical.
On the other hand, if we have the full 35 minutes I would attempt to
put it within that. I mean the, 25 minutes before 1 o'clock. I do not
know what your time is you are aiming at.
Senator GEORGE. I expect we will have to ask you to come back
another day if you want that much time this morning.
Mr. Coston is an out-of-town witness. Is your statement lengthy?
Mr. COSTON. It is three pages but I planned to shorten it and then
request that the full statement be put in the record.
Senator GEORGE. You may have a seat and proceed. Your full
statement will go in the record.
STATEMENT OF HERBERT COSTON, STOCKBRIDGE, WIS.
Mr. COSTON. Thank you. I appreciate this opportunity very much
to speak as a private citizen. I am not representing any large group,
but I am representing a person who has lived in Japan with the Japa-
nese. I was a missionary under the Methodist Board of Missions and
just returned about 5 months ago. I am not an expert on diplomacy
or dealing with foreign ministers and that sort of thing, but I lived with
the people and I became friends with them. Though they are very
formal to strangers they speak their mind freely to friends.
Right after the war I feel America won the true friendship of the
Japanese people but gradually we are becoming less their friend.
Cooperation is continuing, but I feel it is more of a surface cooperation
which is based on necessity rather than true friendship. We need an
active friendship in Japan rather than reluctant cooperation.
I agree with Mr. Dulles' statement yesterday: We need Japan.
But I would qualify that statement-we need it to be an active
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friendship in Japan. I have chosen three aspects of the treaty I would
like to bring up and I will not substantiate them with my quotations
and other data I have gathered, but I would like to ask permission,
if I may, to add additional quotations to the record later besides those
I have here.
Senator GEORGE. You may do so and furnish it to the clerk of the
committee.
(The following additional information was supplied:)
SUPPLEMENTARY QUOTATIONS TO THE STATEMENT OF HERBERT COSTON, FORMER
MISSIONARY IN JAPAN, CONCERNING THE PROPOSED PEACE TREATY WITH
JAPAN
In support of my point that the Japanese people are becoming convinced that
American policy is selfishly using Japan in her fight against Russia, I cite the
following quotation from a letter written by a Japanese university student pre-
paring for the Christian ministry (January 3, 1952) :
"In my opinion, half of the present anti-Unified States feeling in Japan is
groundless, and it is up to us Japanese to remove it, but the other half has fairly
good reasons. One of them is the above-mentioned self-centered way of thhiking
(which sometimes amounts to a downright vainglory in our eyes) of the Americans.
Also, we don't like an intimidation. `If Japan,' says Mr. Sparkman and Mr.
Smith of the Upper House, `refuses to choose the Formosa government, America
will also refuse to ratify the treaty,' as if America had not taken the lead in its
preparation. Frankly speaking, I am against the two pacts, and so are most of
the sincere young people in Japan. Again, we do not like to be treated like
material manpower to be `utilized in case necessity arises,' as Mr. Truman quite
unconsciously and innocently blurted out."
lit support of my point that it is doubtful whether a majority of the Japanese
people favor rearmament, I cite the following quotation from a letter written in
November 1951, by a Japanese law student,:
"Nowadays, so-called public opinion is not trustworthy, for newspapers only
only can make it after their repeated inculcation of `facts.' Then if the result of
investigation of public opinion shows majority of its are welcome to rearmai tent,
it isn't significant."
Mr. CosTON. Thank you.
The first point which I feel the Japanese people resent in the peace
treaty is the granting of trusteeship to the United States under the
United Nations of such islands and possessions as the Ryukyu group
of which. Okinawa is the principal island. Not only the Japanese
people but other people in Asia read into this imperialistic ideas often
which I am_ sure are not in the minds of the members of this t;om-
mittee or of :til.r. Dulles. or of any American, but they are read, into
our actions by these very racially conscious people in Asia. The,only
reason I have heard given for our appropriation of these islands: or a
trusteeship of them is that it will be easier to appropriate money by
Congress.
This was in the testimony Monday of General Bradley. The. reasons
against, T. feel, outweigh the reasons for our taking this trusteeship.
Not only the attitude of suspecting us of imperialism, but also the
very fact that you know the conditions on Okinawa under American
rule are bad, so bad that they have been printed several times in
American newspapers. These conditions are known in Japan and
also the fact that the people of the. Ryukyu Islands petitioned to be
under the rule of Japan and it. is the will of the people of the islands.
If we are to respect the sovereignty of Japan, which is one of the
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
purposes of this peace treaty, I think we should also respect the
sovereignty of the people of the Ryukyus and their request to be
there under the rule of Japan.
My second point is concerning the possible curtailment of Japan's
sovereignty by restriction, present and future, on shipping and trade
relations. Mr. Dulles pointed out yesterday that our policy in
Japan is following a world-wide policy of supporting economically
and financially only the countries which will not send materials de-
scribed on this list to Russia or any of the Russian satellites. This
rules out communistic China.
A case was made that at least temporarily communistic China
could. be ruled out and the Japanese trade integrated into the western
sphere. I believe this overlooks the actualities, because the extreme
prosperity which has been achieved since 1945 has been achieved not
as a result of this trade, but as a result of the American help which we
have been giving which has kept Japan alive and we will have to con-
tinue getting this help for an indefinite time unless Japan is allowed
to trade with the mainland of China. This we do not want to do,
of course.
Senator SPARKMAN. Do you mind if I break in there?
Mr. CosTON. Not at all.
Senator SPARKMAN. I am going to have to leave in just a few
minutes and I am probably not going to be able, to stay until you com-
plete your statement. I would just like to call your attention to this
fact, that this is not an arrangement that is directed against Japan
specifically.
Mr. COSTON. I understand.
Senator SPARKMAN. It is a general world policy and under the Battle
Act which Congress passed in the last session, what we might call
hardship cases, or where it is necessary to complement the economy
of a country, arrangements can be made. It seems to me that is an
answer to this particular point that you make.
Mr. COSTON. I was at the hearing and I understood that fully
before I made the point. But I am surprised that this committee is
willing to continue for an indefinite period of time such large amounts
of trade as will be necessary, I feel.
I might say that the press in Japan has been extremely critical of
Premier Yoshida's assurances that he will not trade with China.
I believe that the people who were my friends and who confided in me
are also of that opinion. We, in America, may want to give them
money in order to keep them from trading with China but they would
prefer to trade with China, I believe.
My third point was concerning the rearmament of Japan. Of course
the peace treaty does not make this mandatory, but it does go almost
out of its way to make it optional, to make it sure that we will permit
them to rearm. Of course, Mr. Dulles knows that there is great
opposition to this in Japan, the stack of petitions he received while
there and which all of you know about make it quite obvious there is
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great sentiment against this. But I believe this has been soft-pedaled
in America. It was played up in Australia for instance to get the
Australians to agree that since the Japanese did not want to be
rearmed, therefore it was fine and all right to rearm them. It was not
played up in America and many Americans do not realize it. There
are many reasons why the. Japanese fear rearmament. The first is
resurgence of "authoritarianism" which is a mild type of militarism
or fascism. This is already coming out in types of thought examin-
ation going much further than the loyalty which we require in America.
I have quotations from college graduates who have been seeking
jobs and who have been required to either endorse the peace treaty or
keep quiet about it. Former Army officers are now in command of
the national police reserves. The people fear this. Purged political
leaders are back in power.
The people fear this.
I am presenting the views of the Japanese people as clearly and
truthfully as I can.
The second point against rearmament is the prohibitive cost. We
are asking Japan to make sacrifices which they feel we are unwilling
to make ourselves, and they resent this. It may not be true, but they
feel it is true and they resent it greatly. We are losing their active
friendship even though surface cooperation is continuing.
I am trying to speak of grass roots people that were my friends.
Now all of you know the Japanese fear resurgence of militarism
more than we do. I wonder that we think we understand Japan better
than the Japanese understand Japan.
In summary I will simply say that all of us realize there is a great
revolution going on in Asia which includes Japan, the revolution in
China which ended in 1947, or 1948-well, it is still not ended-but
that is all part of the revolution that has been going ili China since
even before the Boxer Rebellion in L900.
The revolutions in Indochina--these are, as Life magazine so aptly
put it, to throw the white man out of Asia. I am concerned that we
remain friendly with the Japanese people and with the Japanese
Nation and really be friends. I think that these three elements in
the peace treaty are detrimental to our friendship.
Thank you very much.
Senator GEORGE. You may file your full statement with the re-
porter. It will be incorporated in the record.
(Tire statement is as follows:)
` STATEMENT OF HERBERT COSTON, FORMER MISSIONARY IN JAPAN, CONCERNING
TOE PROPOSED PPACE TREATY WITH JAPAN
Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to exercise my democratic rights and responsibilities
in presenting my, views before this committee. It was particularly generous of
the committee to hear my views as an individual, since in this hearing I represent
no great organization. I believe I do represent a first-hand experience of living
with the Japanese which ought to be shared with this committee in your considera-
tion of the effects in Japan of the proposed peace treaty.
I returned to America about 5 months ago after a years in Japan as a missionary.
I taught English in a mission night school in Kobe, so that I became acquainted
with many of the more ambitious and intelligent workers in banks, trading
companies, small-home industries, shipbuilding companies, workers with the
occupation forces, etc. I became friends with Inany of these Young Japanese;
they are reserved, formal, and polite to strangers and are noted for their ` expres-
sionless" faces-but to a friend they reveal their true hopes and fears.
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114 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
I am no expert on diplomacy and dealing with prime ministers or foreign
secretaries; but the experience of seeing my country's policy through the eyes of
my Japanese friends moves me to overcome my stage fright and try to present
their ideas in this hearing, though, of course, I can hardly claim to represent them,
personally. I feel that I must speak out because others are afraid to speak:
some Japanese, when receiving exit, permits to study in America were told not to
discuss political subjects while here; some Americans planning to go to Japan
have been warned not to express political opinions.
Right after the war, we won the friendship of the Japanese. But gradually
they are becoming convinced that American policy is selfishly using Japan in her
fight against Russia. Cooperation is continuing on the surface but now it is
becoming based on necessity rather than on true friendship.
We need the active friendship of Japan rather than her reluctant cooperation.
I have chosen three aspects of the treaty which I feel Japanese resent. We
cannot gain or keep their friendship if we force these three things upon them.
The first provision Japanese resent is the granting of trusteeship of most of her
former Pacific island possessions to the United States, under the United Nations.
I realize that you already are aware of this feeling, but I wonder if you have
given proper weight to the importance of the implications of not only Japanese
but also other reactions of other Asians. The loss of these islands is a bitter pill
for Japanese to swallow, and it makes them wonder if we really mean it when we
say we have no imperialistic desires in Asia. Other Asians, too, understand that
we are maneuvering for strategic positions preparing for a possible war with
Russia-but they see, too, a possible threat to themselves, and uneasy suspicion
replaces friendship. I believe that this disadvantage of our assuming trusteeship
of these islands far outweighs the advantage gained. The only advantage I have
heard mentioned is the testimony of General Collins on Monday that it would
make planning and building of installations and appropriation of necessary
money by Congress easier than if we were to arrange for such bases through agree-
ments similar to those contemplated for the use of the Japanese homeland by our
forces. This committee is aware of the poverty, hunger, and dissatisfaction on
some of these islands such as Okinawa, which is so bad that the American press
has mentioned them more than once. Well-fed, happy Okinawan would work
harder on our airfields; present living and working conditions negate in loss of
good will what little security advantage may be gained.
If we are concerned to recognize the sovereignty of Japan, why should we not
recognize the sovereignty of the people of the Ryukyu Islands and let them be
under Japanese rule as they have requested? If we expect friendly cooperation
from Japan rather than reluctant obedience, we must consider this point seriously.
The second provision of this treaty which Japanese may resent is our curtailment
of Japan's sovereignty by restrictions- specifically provided for or implied-on
shipping and trade relations. As Mr. Dulles pointed out yesterday, our policy in
Japan is following established precedents throughout the world. We require
promises that she will not sell certain items to Russia or any nation under the
domination of the U. S. S. R., as a requisite for our granting financial, economic,
or military aid to Japan. This causes some frustration in Japan, since Manchuria
is her most natural source of such products as coal, iron ore, salt, soybeans, etc.
For example, the Lytton Commission report to the League of Nations in 1932
pointed out that economically China could live without Japan, but that Japan
could not thrive without trade with China. Unless and until Japan's trade rela-
tions with the mainland of Asia is restored, either the United States will have to
subsidize the Japanese economy heavily, as we have done since 1945 in one way
or another, or else the economic level in Japan will sink so low as to be a danger
for the spread of unrest and communism. But real resentment against America
will be lessened on the part of most Japanese if we help Japan obtain other
sources of raw materials and other outlets for her manufactured products. I
translated several Spanish letters for various friends working in trading com-
panies in Kobe, and I found that many Japanese traders are putting high hopes
in developing trade relations with Latin America. But, if we restrict Japanese
competition in such areas previously dominated by our products, we will cause
resentment against our selfishness.
A Japanese friend recently wrote upon this subject: "Unfortunately, our experi-
ence shows that your commerce has been a good job only when based on our
sacrifices. When (America's) `democratic fair dealing' is proved not, lucrative,
then what measures will be left to ,them?" His English may be somewhat un-
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 115
polished, but his point is clear. We must consider carefully before we put pro-
visions in this treaty which allow us to place restrictions now or in. the future on
Japan's shipping and trade.
The third aspect of the treaty which I feel Japanese resent is its encouragement
of rearmament and military cooperation with the west. Mr. -Dulles stated
yesterday that a majority of the Japanese favor rearmament. If this is true,'it is
certainly a grudging acceptance of what they have been led to believe is a neces-
sity; such grudging acceptance cannot lead to lasting friendship. But I am not
convinced that a majority of the Japanese people favor rearming, even grudgingly.
I have here a translated quotation from the Kirisuto Shimbun (which means
"Christian Newspaper") of January 20, 1951, stating the view, well known in
Japan, of former Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida: "If a general election takes place,
there will be many people, especially women, who will be a ainst Japanese rearma-
ment. Hence an election will result in opposition to Japans rearmament. There-
fore, rearmament should be enforced, without holding a general election."
Furthermore, a student studying law, preparing for a diplomatic career sefving
the Japanese Government, recently wrote in a letter that if we hear that the
majority of the people favor rearmament it is not a reliable test, for the people
have only the so-called commercial press opinion now. But, without arguing
whether a majority or only a strong minority of the Japanese people oppose
rearmament, the fact remains that we cannot build friendship with people' who
are pressured into rearming.
One reason many Japanese oppose rearmament is their fear of authoritarianism,
which necessarily follows in Japan, and their dread of the possibility of the return
of militarism and outright fascism. Already, tendencies in that direction are
visible. I quote a recent letter of a young person working in a bank in Osaka:
"In your letter you asked about a thought examination at the bank. Not only
in the banks but also in any of great companies it is done before we can get a job,
and at present it is especially strict." A college student who will soon gra uate
said: "The hardest part of getting work in a bank or office is the thought exa iina-
tion. Many have scruples about answering that they approve the peace treaty
and the rearmament pact in order to get a job on graduating from college."
(Meaning unchanged, though not, a direct quote.) This fear of a return of mili-
taristic rule is fed by the knowledge that former army officers, purged ` until
recently for their activities during the war, are now officers in the National Police
Reserve, which every Japanese knows is the beginning of their new "ahrny?"
A group of women members of the Japanese Diet said in a memorandum preonted
to Ambassador Dulles, February 6, 1951: "We believe there is danger of the return
of the old militarism if weapons are given to professional military men. Democ-
racy in Japan and parliamentary rule. will be threatened with bayonets. Already,
less than a year after this prediction, a number of previously purged political
leaders have been returned to public life, and it is believed that they will soon
assume important places of leadership in Japan.
Another reason for the opposition to rearmament is its prohibitive cost. Japan
is a poor country when measured by American standards, and the increased bur-
den of rearmament would almost certainly be fertile ground for fascistic or, com-
munistic movements. Japan, similarly as in other countries which the tinted
States is asking to live austerely in order to rearm, looks at our "business as
usual" and "politics as usual," our lack of adequate price and wage controls, our
lack of rationing of staple foods, our high standard of living, and they resent the
fact that we seem to be asking more of them than we are willing to sacrifice
ourselves.
Now, all of you know that many Japanese fear resurgence of militarism as do
the governments of the Philippines, Australia, and other countries of Asia. But
this fear has been discounted here in America so that we often think of it as
only old ladies looking under the bed. Don't Japanese know more about their
country than we know about their country? And though their leaders with
whom our delegates talked tried to discount all the petitions which were `sent to
Mr. Dulles, my friends gave me the impression that the deep longings within the
people who sent those petitions were widespread. And certainly this was the
impression which Ambassador Dulles tried so successfully to give to the Au4tralian
Government when he visited there to obtain their agreement on rearming ;Japan.
This was given wide publicity in Japan; and, whether Americans see it ichr not,
the Japanese were most surprised that anyone would accept the fact they that
didn't want to be rearmed as a valid argument for rearming them. Is this the
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116 JAPANESE PEACIE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
way to build permanent friends, or are we here, too, fostering temporary grudging
cooperation instead of building lasting friendship?
Gentlemen, we cannot stop the movement now going on in Asia, which Life
magazine (December 31, 1951.) has described as a fight to "throw the white man
out of Asia." To the extent we try to dominate Japan and limit her sover-
eignty by this treaty and future pacts and agreements, we are only aggravating
this movement. We should not force these unwanted parts of the treaty on
Japan. In his statement on Monday, Mr. Dulles said "We need Japan"; and,
to me, this means we need Japan's friendship.
Senator GEORGE. There are some three or four witnesses who have
not been reached today, including Mr. Johnson.
The committee will recess until Friday morning at 10:30, and all
the witnesses will then be heard that have not been reached today.
(At 12:45 p. in. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10:30 a. in.
Friday, January 25, 1952.)
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER TREATIES
RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC
FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1952
1TNITI+,D STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
W Vashington, D. C.
The committee met at 10:30 a. in., pursuant to adjournment, in the
caucus room, 318 Senate Office Building, United States Capitol,
Washington, D. C., Senator Theodore Green presiding.
Present: Senators Green, Gillette, Wiley, Smith of New Jersey,.
Hickenlooper, and Brewster.
Present of committee staff: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. O'Day,
and Mr. Holt.
Senator GREEN. The committee will please come to order. Some
of the other Senators are on their way here, but we have a limited
time. We hope to got through by 12:30. Thisis the fourth day of
these hearings. If each of the speakers scheduled will take about a
quarter of an hour, we will just about get through. I am not urging
anybody to take a quarter of an hour. I would like to remind you
that I believe most of you received a telegram when you asked for
an opportunity to be heard which in part stated the committee, wishes
oral testimony to be as brief as possible consistent with adequate
presentation of arguments with the privilege extended of submitting
additional written statements, if that is desired, for consideration in
the printed hearings on the treaty.
I hope you gentlemen will each bear in mind the necessity of being
as brief as possible. I believe that the Reverend William R. Johnson
had expected to be heard at the last, hearing and had to be put off
until today. Mr. Johnson, will you take the stand?
STATEMENT OF REV. WILLIAM R. JOHNSON OF POLO, ILL.
Mr. JOHNSON. Honorable Chairman and members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, I am deeply grateful for this privilege
of stating my views relative to the treaty now pending. May I be
permitted to say that I speak from a background of 35 years of resi-
dence in the interior of China, and. that, 1 have done extensive famine
and war relief work, the latter in territories occupied by Communists
both before and after their occupation. In 1941, I was in charge of
the American Red Cross China, Relief Unit office at Hongkong.
My first point relative to the treaty is that it is of the nature of
the Yalta Agreement itself. It has been worked out at a conference
from which China was excluded. It presumes to dispose of China's
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territory, for which Britain and America presumably are primarily
responsible, both of them being signers of the Cairo Declaration and
the confirmation of that agreement at Potsdam, pledged specifically
to the entity of the Republic of China, the same entity who had
fought with us during the war, turning it back to the enemy for
decision as to whether it shall be returned to the Republic of China
or to the now enemies of China, the Soviet Union control through its
satellite, Red China.
I think the treaty is also based on the assumptions that we continue,
relative to the war in Korea, as if we are now in a police action fighting
North Korea and Red China; just as if we did not know that there is
a united command of the forces fighting against us in Korea, with
General Malinovsky, a general of the Red Army, with united command
headquarters at Mukden. The President, in his state-of-the-Union
message a year ago, said very positively, and I quote:
The new imperialism-
referring to the imperialism of the Soviet Union-
has powerful military forces * * *. It has complete control of the men and
equipment of its satellites.
That makes the Soviet Union responsible for the action in Korea.
We are trying to fool ourselves that we are not at war with Russia as
if we were not already 18 months along in world war III.
We propose to turn back to the enemy we fought to complete
surrender the decision as to whether Formosa and the Pescadores
shall be ceded to the Republic of China or to Red China rather than
standing on our own feet and making the decision according to the
written agreements we have made and repeatedly confirmed.
I want to say it will take a lot of insistence on Yoshida's part,
against the resistance of pressures I understand are being built up
from Britain and from Japanese interests as well, to keep Formosa
and the Pescadores from being given to Red China, for, unless we are
to support her, either Britain must lose her markets in southeast
Asia or Japan must lose her markets in the mainland of China, leaving
one or the other or both still to draw on America for food supplies.
My second objection to the confirmation of the Japanese Treaty
will be but one more of a long series of events which marks a continu-
ous disparagement of Nationalist China and its interests, amounting
almost if not quite to a traitorous betrayal of American interests as
well.
I would cite as perhaps the first of those events the agreement made
at an arranged conference in the State Department, at the demand of
the chairman of the Communist Party, Earl Browder, and its secretary,
Robert Miner. An agreement by Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary
of State and Laughlin Currie, representing the President, that sub-
stantially equal treatment would be given to the Chinese Communists
and to the Nationalist Government of China. Reference to this
agreement is to be found in the second volume of the hearings of the
Senate committee under the chairmanship of Senator McCarran,
recently published. That agreement was the opening wedge, ap-
parently, marked the beginning of a change in American policy which
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 119
soon became in fact pro-Chinese Communist and a determinative
element in the overthrow of the. Chinese Republic on the Chinese
mainland.
Another of these significant events is the manipulation of the de-
liveries of munitions to China including the specific failure of General
Stillwell to approve General Ch.ennault's request that he be allowed
to supply cartridges for rifles and rnachine guns to troops making
their last stand in the mountains of South China; in 1944, when
they had only a 2- or 3-day supply, General Stillwell's refusal to
approve that delivery was a major factor in the defeat of Chinese
forces which left South China open to the Japanese. That denial of
munitions was typical of what transpired from 1943 or thereabouts
to the end of the war and continuing through the postwar period,
except during General Wederneyer's period of command, until the
defeat of Nationalist forces before Nanking.
I would cite also the activities of General Marshall in China. After
he had established the truce of January 10, the Soviet Union and Red
China announced the formation of independent Soviet governments
covering the territory from the Yellow Sea through the total of
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. By the end. of 1946 they
had announced the formation of a similar government in Western
Inner Mongolia, extending a line of Communist Soviet controlled
territories continuously across North China, from the Yellow Sea
westward. to Sinkiang province in Central Asia. No public mention
was made of those seizures of China's territories so far as .1 know by
the State Department or the administration at any time until on
January 12, 2 years ago when the Secretary of State made his Press
Club speech in. Washington denouncing the seizure of North China
by the Soviet Union; as if it had just occurred.
It was then 3 or 4 years after the seizures, but the speech was in de
just 2 days before the signing of the Russo-Chinese Treaty in Moscow
between Stalin and Mao, apparently surrendering that territory to
Russia-that is, to Russian satellites, other than the present Peiping
regime.
The Secretary of State has made no formal protest either to Moscow
or to the United Nations over this alienation of China's territory.
The Press Club speech could have been intended as notice to both
Moscow and China that the administration was informed of the
seizures but intended to do nothing about it.
That being the case, it marks the surrender to the Soviet Union1 of
the very territory over which arose our dispute with Japan, bringing
us into World War II, It seems that this involves the complete
abandonment of the open-door China territorial integrity policy by
our State Department. Another event in the series occurred during
1046, while General Marshall was in China. The Chinese Govern-
ment troops defeated the Communist troops of Lin Piao (the present
commander of Chinese troops in Korea) in Manchuria and drove
them northward. The insistence of General Marshall just at 'that
time upon a further truce prevented the utter route and destruction
of the Red troops and the recovery of Manchuria for Nationalist
China.
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For brevity (I will only 'mention one further item of many that
could be cited and without further comment, as additional evidence
of the State Department's abandonment of the China territorial
integrity policy, its failure to support China's charges against the
Soviet Union before the United Nations of aggression.
I now cite this treaty as consistent with this line of evidence and
which, if true, sir, I believe in itself parallels the evidence of the
McCarran committee's investigations which I think fully establishes
in the mind of any impartial reader the fact that the Institute of
Pacific Relations is a captive organization of the Communist Party
which used. Soviet agents Guenther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Joseph
Epstein, and others as the men whose writings cover essentially the
attitudes toward China, Nationalist and Communist, that have
spread throughout America.
The Institute of Pacific Relations records throughout all this
period have been considered thoroughly impartial, objective, and
trustworthy. As was certified in the Christian Century by a group
of mission board Protestant officials and others, who are well rep-
resented in their attitude by that of Dr. Van Kirk who appeared
before you here on Wednesday, to assure you that, speaking as an
official of united groups, with millions of Protestant members, he
asked that this treaty be confirmed.
I address you now, sir, as one of the constituents of that group.
't'hroughout my experience in China, I have been with the Board of
Foreign Missions of the Methodist Church. Eighteen months ago
I published a pamphlet setting forth my views on China. I had
dinner last month in New York with a missionary with whom I shared
prison life, under the Japanese for 6 months at Hongkong, who went
back to China in 1946 or 1947 and returned only a year ago. He is
now on the staff of the National Christian Council, as, I believe, is
Dr. Van Kirk.
As we discussed these matters he said to me, "Johnson, you told
me this long ago but I had to go to China and go through what I have
experienced since, before I could believe the truth of what you had
to say."
I have had word from a number of missionaries confirming the same
attitude, of missionaries who changed their minds completely after
their recent China experiences on the merits of Red China as an
organization which the United States ought to recognize.
Senator GREEN. Dr. Johnson, I remind you, you have already had
15 minutes. If you can conclude your argument briefly, we will be
glad.
Mr. JOHNSON. I would like to make two further points. The
first one is our China policy seems to have completely changed from
support of the open-door China territorial integrity policy to a now
policy with the objective at this time of maintaining an island chain
in the western Pacific as a defense line for our protection, a defense
line made necessary only because we have an iron-curtain psychology
on the mainland-a complete abandonment of the theory of the
open door.
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I pass that and go on to my fourth point. The only possible suc-
cessful policy for the United States today is it complete return to the
policy of the open-door policy for China, a policy that substantially
parallels the Monroe Doctrine for the Americas. A program for
such a return to America's long-held policy should include the items
mentioned in the Now York Times this morning, quoting from
Governor Dewey's address of yesterday, but I would add two or three
things to that.
That line of defense marks the border where wars will begin down -
the generations if we include only the maintainance of that chain
of defense as our policy. And any policy that continues our appease-
ment of Moscow will be equally fatal. We need to remind our-
selves, as we think of Korea that, of six international wars involving
the Far East during less than six decades, four begain in this region,
two of them started. in Korea--I am including the present world war
III as one of these-one of them started in Manchuria, anti one began
simultaneously in Korea and Manchuria.
Korea, with here circlet of farthest-north ice-free Pacific Asia
ports, is a gateway comparable only to the Port Arthur-Dairen and
Tientsin area for the hinterland of northeastern Asia.
Senator GREEN. Thank you. Are there any questions?
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I have one, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. JOHNSON. I did riot= mean to stop there if I could say a few
more words, sir.
Senator GREEN. What is the question.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I have a question if the witnei s is
through.
Senator GREEN. You may ask the question.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. The witness just said he had some
more.
Senator GREEN. I know it. You may ask the question if you have
one.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Johnson, I am very much in-
terested in your testimony and with much of it I am in accord with
your analysis of the China situation. I am riot quite clear what you
meant in your statement that we were turning some decisions back
to the enemy. You take chapter 2 article 2 of the treaty, and in-that
"Japan renounces all right and title to these various areas." She is
out of the picture.
How those are disposed of is a question-
Mr. JOHNSON. I am saying we turn back to her the decision as to
whether she will deliver Formosa to Red China. or to the Republic of
China to whom we agreed to give it specifically.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. She has renounced all right, title, and
claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, so she has no say about turning
Formosa back to anyone. Having been identified with Mr. Dulles
over 12 months in developing this treaty, and having been a delegate
to the San Francisco meeting which signed the treaty and having; just
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122 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
been to the Far East and discussed all these issues I do not share your
view that Japan has any say at all as to what will be done with
Formosa.
I agree with you that it cannot be turned back. I am definitely
opposed to its being turned back to Communist China. I am entirely
in accord with our recognition of the Nationalist Government but I
do not think that this treaty gives Japan any such powers as you are
suggesting.
I agree with you that it cannot be turned back. I am definitely
opposed to its being turned back to Communist China. I am entirely
in accord with our recognition of the Nationalist Government but 'I
do not think that this treaty gives Japan any such powers as you are
suggesting.
Mr. JOHNSON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
Senator GREEN. No; you are not permitted to ask questions.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. If you want to submit questions
that are on your mind I am sure the committee will consider having
it appear in our report as to how those matters are considered, but
we cannot answer questions from the witnesses.
Mr. JOHNSON. I confess my reading of the treaty has been hasty
but I have listened to others giving testimony on the point here as
well as my hasty reading, which has left the strong impression that
Yoshida, as he has announced in the press recently, is expected to
determine whether he will make a treaty with Formosa, recognizing
Formosa to belong to Soviet China, or whether he will make a treaty
with Nationalist China and Formosa will therefore remain with
Nationalist China.
I may be mistaken--I hope I am---and if I am I withdraw the
remarks.
Senator GREEN. Dr. Johnson, you are at liberty to supplement this
statement with any written statement you would like to have in our
record.
Thank you very much.
(The following statement was subsequently submitted:)
Honorable Chairman and members of the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Senate of the United States, I am deeply grateful for the privilege of presenting
my views to you as those of one who has long been a student of far eastern affairs.
Permit me to say that I speak out of 36 years of experience as a resident of
the Orient, 35 of them in a provincial capital in the interior of China as a mis-
sionary of the board of missions of the Methodist Church. During 1991, I was
loaned by the board for service with the American Red Cross China Relief Unit,
in charge of their Hong Kong office. Previously, I had administered famine and
war relief in China including extensive dike-repair projects, the setting tip of
war refugee camps with industrial and cooperatives features including the spend-
ing of a portion of the American wheat and cotton loan to China on dike repair
in 1932. In New York in 1928, f was executive secretary of China famine relief
through its first financial campaign.
I was for 6 months imprisoned by the Japanese at Stanley Prison at Hong
Kong. There and in China I lost my possessions including a library of a thousand
volumes, household furnishings, etc.
Furthermore, I am one of those millions of constituents of Dr. Van Kirk's
organization; who has the privilege of speaking for himself.
My first objection to the confirmation of the Japanese Treaty is the grave
injustice that it inflicts upon China and its only legitimate Government, the
only one based upon constitutional processes and having a genuine program for
China's welfare and progress. The Western World is only beginning to be con-
scious of the deplorable state to which China's mainland is being reduced-to
despair, greatly increased poverty, and almost literal serfdom for the farmer,
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 123
slavery for the industrial worker, and death for the intellectual, the properties,
former officials and those with western training and sympathies; who do not
continuously demonstrate loyalty for the Communist cause. 15,672,050 execu-
tions and an additional 20,000,000 estimated deaths by suicide and starvation
are the incomplete totals of lives destroyed in China during the 2 years prior to
last August. The Christian churches are being reorganized to make their tea .h-
ing, preaching, and practices conform to the Communist pattern to the satis-
faction of the local Communist Party organization. The alternative is persecu-
tion, imprisonment until recantation or death for many leaders. The less
prominent often are arrested and disappear without trace. This treatment is
not peculiar to Christians, but equally characteristic of the so-called land reform,
and other movements that, together, include everyone but the privileged official
groups, including the military. Moscow's advisers and technicians are every-
where, "advising" and directing. There can be no question of Peiping's satellite
status under the Kremlin's power. Brainwashing and discipline is so strict that
no one dares to trust a friend. The obligation to report even slight vagaries
of suspicion of disloyalty puts everyone under grave suspicion of his neighbor.
Such statements regarding Chinese conditions are most difficult to accept.
They are nevertheless, true. Destruction of life by such means continues at
upward of l.% million monthly. Such is the lied China that seeks entrance to
the United Nations.
The world thought that China was practically out of the war with the
disastrous defeat at Nanking in December 1937, yet China had recovered suffi-
ciently to administer a stinging defeat to the Japanese (luring the following
March on the railway north of Nanking. From that time they repeatedly fought
the Japanese to a standstill in heavy campaigns as they withdrew gradually
westward. Three times the Japanese were defeated in major campaigns before
Changsha in the rice bowl of Ilunan on the railway south of Hankow, where the
Chinese held their position for more than 4 years. It was in 1944 in the moun-
tains farther south that lack of ammunition finally permitted the Japanese
break-through into south China. Six months after Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedetnever
took over his command sufficient divisions of the Chinese troops had been rearmed
and defeated the Japanese in a considerable battle. China would soon have
recovered its control in the south had the Japanese not surrendered in August 1945.
For several years China contained more Japanese troops than the total of
Japanese forces met up with by American troops during the whole of their island-
hopping Pacific campaigns. During the war more Chinese civilians were driven
from their homes than in all the rest of the Allied nations. China's losses in
human life were in like proportion to the rest of the Allied nations. She fought
Japan 4 years longer than we did. Yet China held on. Her record of achieve-
ment and loyalty to the Allied cause gives her every right to full recognition
and participation in the negotiation and signing of the peace treaty, in spite of
these later defeats at the hands of foreign-armed, trained, and technically assisted
troops, which are unqualifiedly the puppets of a foreign state.
It was for the integrity of China's territory that we fought the Pacific war.
The treaty under consideration leaves our great Pacific ally outside the peace
settlement, as if in ignominy. China's people are now being purged, murdered,
driven to suicide, and starved to death in the greatest genocidal holocaust in
history, without even a protest from us to the former ally responsible for it.
We have spent more money since the war to feed our enemy, Japan, that precpi-
tated the Pacific war than the total value of all American supplies actually
delivered to China during the whole course of the war and since. Much of the
supplies charged to her account were not delivered to her. Much was demil-
itarized before delivery, out of repair, etc., yet it was charged at full cost values
on our books.
We now insist on making a treaty with that enemy that goes far to insure
Japan's future well-being, while China is left standing outside the door, to alone
make the best terms she may. Flow could we give greater offense to China and
to China's neighbors living in fear of a like fate, not at China's hands, but at
the hands of Moscow, using Chinese and Korean levies as pawns in Korea and
elsewhere, in its war and mass murder of unarmed civilians, in its determined
drive for world conquest.
For the United States to go to war in defense of China's territorial integrity
against the Japanese aggression, and now to give assent to the exclusion: of
China from the Peace Conference and there to negotiate a treaty that gives
precedence to payment of American and British held prewar bonds over the
payment of Chinese reparations, is not only a serious injustice and affront to a
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124 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
loyal ally, but it brings to a climax a series of like betrayals that will long rankle
in the minds of millions.
My second reason for opposing the confirmation of the Japanese Treaty is that
it seems to mark the emergence of a new American policy as a substitute for the
open-door policy-the establishment of an island chain of defense in the western
Pacific. Admittedly, the earlier abandonment of the open door and the Soviet
attack in Korea and the widespread infiltration of its agents into this country and
elsewhere, have brought us to a pass where this country most seriously needs to
look to its defenses, including this Pacific line. Adequate defense is urgent. This
necessity for defense is the corollary to our earlier seeking of Moscow's aid against
Japan, bringing in its wake this lowering of the iron curtain over China's main-
land, the very danger foreseen by the founders of the China territorial integrity
policy, a situation that now requires much more than a western Pacific line of
defense.
The fundamental concept of the open door-China territorial integrity policy is
that a securely established, constitutional Republic of China on the western shore
of the Pacific and the United States on the eastern shore, both loyal to concepts
of human rights, constitutional government, and peaceful international relation,
would be able to so dominate the Pacific area as to make long periods of peace,
if not lasting peace the norm for the area.
This policy, closely paralleling the concepts behind the Monroe Doctrine, was
only brought into force in the first place by strong American support; and the
fact that John Hav was able to convince the nations that China's control by any
one power or China's division among a number, or all of them, could not possibly
be accomplished without an exhaustive world war, involving them all. Such is
the catastrophe that now confronts us in the Far East.
I am not unaware of the false claims of Red puppet China to inherit the bene-
fits of American assistance and the benefits that accrue under the pledges and long-
standing treaty obligations to China. But Red China has no more right to these
benefits than the Soviet Union itself. They are determined upon acquiring the
immediate fruits of conquest, and have no sympathy for the objectives for which
those pledges were given. Any benefits received from reparations or other settle-
ments would only be devoted to furthering their conquests, and be of no benefit
to its subjects who sustained the losses.
As for Britain's objections to the presence of representatives of the Republic
of China at the Conference and as a signer of the treaty, our claims and China's
are paramount on this issue, even more than on any other; for it raises the funda-
mental issue in the Far East of peace in our time. The underlying reasons for
State Department departure from fundamental American foreign policy at this
point deserves the closest scrutiny of this Senate committee and of the Congress.
My third reason for opposing the confirmation of the Japanese Treaty is that,
when made effective, it will fall into place as another of a long series of events,
policy declarations, and subversions; whereby the long-established open-door
policy has been secretly displaced by a contrary policy involving the delivery of
China to the Kremlin as a forward step in a continuing program of world con-
quest. This new policy has been but gradually coming to light,, though the fact
that the scheme was in the making was long ago plainly written into the projected
plans of Moscow, and numerous voices have warned us from time to time of dan-
gers ahead. In embryo, this conspiracy was brought to this country by the first
organizers of the American Communist Party.
The facts already revealed by congressional investigating committees are
adequate for certain definite conclusions to be drawn and in the opinion of this
witness, such conclusions as cannot much longer be neglected without the gravest
peril.
For instance, the reports of hearings being conducted by the Senate committee,
of which Senator McCarran is chairman, make it reasonably clear that the
Institute of Pacific Relations for nearly two decades has been, as Mr. Budenz
alleges, a, captive organization of the American Communist Party. Throughout
this period the public generally has accepted, in spite of occasional challenge,
the institute's claims that its publications are thoroughly impartial, objective,
and. trustworthy. Assurances to that effect were certified in a letter to the
Christian Century, for instance by a group of leading Protestants and others
last June. Their attitude on Chinese affairs parallels the position presented by
Dr. Van Kirk, who appeared before you here on Wednesday morning.
Throughout my experience in China I have been under the hoard of missions
of the Methodist Church. Eighteen months ago I published my views on China
in a pamphlet. I had dinner last month in New York with another Methodist
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E E EACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
missionary with whom I shored prison life under the Japanese in Hong Kong,
and who had gone back to China in 1916 or 1947 and returned a year ago. He
is now serving on the staff of the National Christian Council, as is Dr. Van Kirk.
As we discussed these matters, be said to me, "Johnson, you told me long ago
about the Chinese Communists; but I had to go back to China and live through
what I have experienced since, before I could believe what you said." ~ I have
had word from a number of missionaries confirming the same attitude. Methodist
Bishop Carleton Lacy died last month in a hospital at Foochow, a city on the
China coast opposite Formosa. He had been restricted in his movernints for
more than 2 years; and had been given a so-called public trial. Though details
have not been given out, insofar as I know, he seems to have been long under
house arrest at the hospital. After restrictions had been placed upon his move-
ments, he wrote me, "You certainly have a right to say, `I told you so.' " Both
these quotations have to do with my insistence that the Chinese Communists
are what they are now proving themselves to be, and that American policy and
the American public have been unduly influenced in their favor by false propa-
ganda in their favor.
The Institute of Pacific Relations' literature relative to the countries-of East
Asia has presented an ideological line, in spite of its protests that it presents all
sides, rather than the plain, objective, and impartially presented facts that it
has claimed to give its readers. Known Soviet espionage agents have presented
fully and unmistakably, in their published writings for the institute, the Kremlin
design for directing American thinking and policy in the Far East, in wb.ich the
determined destruction of the fundamentals of our long-held far eastern policy
is paramount. Agnes Smedley, Gunther Stein, and Israel Epstein are typical
examples of this rather numerous group. Serious variations from the indicated
line is the exception rather than the rule among the institute's authors and
specialists, according to the testimony. The records of the hearings reveal the
story, for instance, as to how serious consultations were held by members of the
institute's staff and others, in correspondence and interviews, to make sure that
the individual most influential with General Marshall that could be enlisted
should induce the general to read a particular book on Chinese affairs written
by Soviet, Spy Israel Epstein, with its weighted testimony in support of the
Chinese Reds and to the detriment of President Chiang Kai-shek and the
Nationalist Government.
In a 7-month lecture tour for the USO in 1944 -45 1 found such books in general
use for the orientation of officers and soldiers in the Army training camps.
Guenther Stein, a proven Soviet agent, served as Chungking correspondent of the
institute, and also as correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor. He had a
long article in the usually authoritative magazine, Foreign Affairs, in October 1945.
Like Foreign Affairs, whether knowingly or not, many American newspapers and
magazines publish such material as authoritative. Officials, researchers, mission
boards, students, and governmental agencies have been widely influenced by such
institute publications. All unsuspected by the public as to these subversive in-
fluences, its publications are in use in all colleges, high schools, libraries, and gen-
erally accepted as authoritative, as you of course know.
The hearings of the Senate committee under Chairman McCarran become must
reading for those who need or wish to know the story of the subversion of our far
eastern policy.
To illustrate with a few significant events or statements of policy with which the
treaty seems to have direct relation in establishing such objectives as those of
Yalta, I call to your attention the following:
1. The agreement to the effect, that it is American policy to give equal treatment
to the Chinese Communists and the National Government of China, secured from
Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, and Lanchlin Currie, personal repre-
sentative of the President, at an arranged conference at the State Department on
October 12, 1942, by Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party in America, and
Robert Minor, its assistant secretary. This is the first admission or official declar-
ation of such a recognition of the Iced satellites of Moscow that has come to my
knowledge,
2. The unnecessary and fatal betraal of Chinese and American interests-in
the war by the limitations, largely by' administrative manipulation it seems, of
essential arms and ammunition suitable for use of ground forces in China, to, not
$3 billion, but to well under $300 million worth during the whole war and postwar
pperiod up to the defeat of Chinese Central Government troops before Nanking in
December 1948.
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126 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
3. As an instance of such manipulation in the delivery of arms'to China, mention
is here made of General Stilwell's refusal to assent to General Chenault's appeal
to be permitted to deliver rifle and machine-gun cartridges to Chinese troops
making their last desperate stand in the mountain passes around Hengyang in
southern Hunan in 1044. The resulting defeat opened all south China to the
Japanese. A differing attitude and policy under General Wedemeyer gave the
Chinese a substantial victory within 6 months.
4. The successive dismissal or displacement from the Far Eastern Division of
the State Department of men who were known supporters of the open-door policy
and their succession by supporters of the coalition of Communists and National-
ists. In each case dismissal followed public attack upon the individual for his
anti-Soviet attitude, organized and led by the Communist Party through the col-
umns of the Daily Worker. Men displaced by these means included Joseph B.
Grew, Under Secretary of State; Eugene C. Doom.an, head of the far eastern ac-
ti, ities; Cen. Patrick J. Hurley, Ambassador to China; A. A. Berle. Lt. Gen.
Albert C. Wedemeyer, of the Army, suffered a like fate.
The wrecking of the Chinese Republic's great superiority over the Reds by the
fatal policy of General Marshall in withholding American arms from the National-
ists when the Reds were being supplied and trained by the Soviet Union and again
by the general's insistence upon a truce immediately after a major defeat of the
Red forces in Manchuria. In this way the utter rout of Lin Piao's troops was
prevented. General Lin commanded practically the whole of the Communist
troops then in Manchuria.
The failure of the administration to protest the announced establishment of
independent satellite Soviet governments, amounting to effective seizure by the
Soviet Union, throughout the provinces of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The
establishment of these governments involved a broad area extending right across
north China from the Yellow Sea to Singkiang Province in the heart of Asia. It
appears that no official notice was taken by the State Department of this seizure
of Chinese territory by Moscow until Secretary Acheson's Washington Press Club
speech of 3 years later, just 2 days before the signing in Moscow of the Russo-
Chinese (Reds) Treaty on January 14, 1950. Unaccompanied by any protest
whatever to Moscow or to the United Nations, the apparent purpose of the
Secretary's address was to reassure the American public that due regard was being
taken of American interests in that region; and, of course, it would assure the
Chinese Reds and the Kremlin that the facts were known and that nothing would
be done by Washington about it.
The failure to accord to the Chinese Republic even American moral support
against the aggressions of the Kremlin and of the Chinese Reds either (a.) in the
United Nations, or (b) in the end projection of an adequate policy of technical aid
and the prompt delivery of adequate arms and ammunition for resistance either
as a diversionary activity in south China, to aid V. N. forces in Korea, or by giving
China her rightful place in the treaty-making processes with Japan. In fact, the
State Department's publicity has consistently favored Red China as ever against
the Chinese Republic.
In presuming to make such an all-inclusive attack upon the treaty arrangements
now before the committee for confirmation, and the administration's policies, one
feels the necessity to indicate in a few lines the skeleton of an alternative policy,
which, as it seems to this writer, is indicated to secure a better and more permanent
result for peace in our time and a promise for a more secure future.
1. It should be recognized that it is the Soviet Union, whose Red army General
Rodion Malinovsky, commands the Communist forces fighting in Korea, that is
the enemy we are fighting in Korea and not primarily puppet North Koreans and
Chinese.
2. Such a program should involve announcement at the proper time of the
denunciation of the Yalta Agreements.
3. Full and unqualified support of the open door-China territorial integrity
policy should be announced and demonstrated.
4. Strengthening and maintenance of the island defense chain.
5. The items mentioned by Governor. Dewey in his address of yesterday as
reported in today's (January 25, 1952) New York Times should be effected: A
Pacific pact to include all nations in that area willing to join in the common
defense.
6. Effective technical and munitions aid to Formosa, Indochina, Malaya, and
other nations being subjected to Communist pressure. This aid should be given
as aid to the local national governments, so related by liaison with other nations
giving like or even closer assistance in each case, as to give close cooperation. A
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREAT t',S
constant reiteration of this relationship to Asiatic countries is essential j,o success.
We must go into Asia only to support the national government in each case, not
as in support of France or Britain or Holland. Any policy in Asia that supports
only or primarily Japan, Britain, France, and Holland is doomed before it starts.
It is against just such aid to "imperialistic" powers that China and Asiatics
generally have been conditioned.
Japan is neither the "key" to Asia or more than one of the "keys" to the island
defense chain. All the territories now in need of -defense against Soyiet power
except Japan can be better defended by projecting a line across China from the
coast opposite Formosa to the mountains of Yenan and Burma, than by any plan
to defend separately the rest of the countries named.
7. China remains the "key" to Asian defense from Formosa, to India.
But such a line cannot be successfully defended except by (7) primary use of
Asiatic troops. Time $800,000,000 pay raise voted the other day by Clio Congress
for our present military forces, might better have been used to place 2,666,000
new native troops into training for defense of that China line- These troops could
have been outfitted and maintained on that sum. It would take, probably,
several times that many Asiatic troops to match those now trained or.in training
in China for the attack that threatens. That attack in Asia is near: It could
very possibly begin in Japan, and/or Indochina and/or Thailand any day; or in
Malaya, the Philippines and/or Indonesia, reasonably soon thereafter.-
8. Unqualified, open, constantly proclaimed moral support must be given to
the Republic of China and each of the national governments involved Oirough the
Voice of America and all agencies concerned.
9. When A-bombing is used, it should be used primarily against the power that,
ordered North Korean and Chinese troops into battle and continues to command
them there.
That a large portion of the captured Chinese "volunteer" troops in Korea, seek
to return to Formosa is a revelation of the present overwhelming desires of the
Chinese people were they correctly informed. Doubtless, large numbers of the
remaining prisoner's are restrained from like declarations by t' ,e certaitiknowiedge
that venganee will be meted out- to then by their superiors if they snake their
choice and are later returned to Red Chinese authorities. Of course; many are
just too dazed and suspicious to attempt individual action. The Soviet Union
as the nation responsible for the aggression should be dealt with accordingly.
I thank the committee for the -privilege of being heard on these issues, one of the
most vital we have to face. in this generation.
Senator GREEN. The next witness is Miss Elizabeth. Kendall. Is
she here? -
STATEMENT OF MISS ELIZABETH A. KENDALL, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Miss KENDALL. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, .I
appreciate the opportunity to be heard at this important tune.
My name is Elizabeth Kendall, Washington, D. C. I am here as a
private citizen. Of course, in a republic, an individual taxpayer is
important in his own right, but I would like you to know I am not
exactly here by myself, because there are people in the country
interested in the whole general question that I would like to bring up,
not necessarily on the specific points I want to speak on, but in the
general question and I will be as brief as I can because I know that
probably all of you know my views, anyway. - -
Now, in regard to the Japanese 'T'reaty-first I would like to say
this: That a little string of fortified islands is not really our first line
of defense. Our first and our real line and our sure line of defense,,
of course, is our trust in (sod and our understanding of His purposes?
and we do not sometimes use that line of defense as a protection so
we take human footsteps which are these treaties. I think the next
best thing to relying on spiritual protection is to take these human
steps with a great deal of care and with a great -deal- of attention to
detail and also with a great deal of explaining to the public of exactly
what the human footsteps are. -
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1.28 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
There are points here that I believe we have not brought up at all,
have not brought up in these hearings, have not been brought up by
anybody that I can fend-that may have more bearing on our eco-
nomic well-being and our military well-being than the points that
have been discussed.
CLARIFICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC POLICY NEEDED
Now the first one in the Japanese Treaty, under "Territorial
material," chapter 2, we find, paragraph (e) [reading]:
Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with
any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese
nationals or otherwise.
As far as I can tell, that has not, been explained to the public. It
is the sort of thing that is just left up in the air. As it is written it is
not too clear. It has been left up in the air and there are three points
or three questions I would like to ask.
First, does the import of that paragraph mean that our Antarctic
policy as expressed in our encyclopedia and by our State Department
has been reversed, completely reversed? Is that what it means? If
so, that might be a good point.
I would like to have it explained thoroughly to the public.
My question No. 2: Does it mean that it is the first step, or concrete
step, in the State Department's project of internationalization of the
Antarctic Continent? If it is a, first step in that line, it is a point that
should be presented to the public and have it turned over in their
minds.
I think 150 million people are the ones who should, at least, discuss
the matter and maybe decide the matter whether internationalization
of the Antarctic should go forward.
Question No. 3: And this has two little subheads: Has an arrange-
ment been made between the, makers of the treaty and another power
regarding disposal of the section that Japan was claiming in the
Antarctic? Under that there are two points.
If we handle it a certain way there could be very, very great com-
mon sense. It would show shrewdness politically and it would be a
matter of kindness if we handle it a certain way. Then another way
that we might handle it would be-it would just mean disaster to
South America and to us probably. I would like to have that cleared
up for the public.
I do not want to talk any more about that now but you know what
I mean but you would know what I mean if you had noticed the little
items scattered through the New York Times in the inside pages, very
:small items, the last 3 years, you will know what disposition might be
made. I am talking strictly from the standpoint of the United States,
and not from the standpoint of Japan at all, because she is not in this
picture here in the disposal of territories.
If you are a loser in a war you have to expect probably certain terri-
tory to go somewhere else. I think all honor should go to Admiral
Shirase and his hard work, it is hard work to go 160 miles into the
Antarctic; it is hard work to go 10 miles into the Antarctic. All
Antarctic explorers deserve all the acclaim they can have. But I
think it is right that this territory should be taken away from Japan.
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PECE ftY AN OTHER PACIFIC If I know what I am talking about, it is a very small amount of terri-
tory. It has never been explained to the public exactly what it is
but I think it is just that small area down there that they covered..
RELATIONSHIP OF PACIFIC PACTS TO ANTARCTIC
Now about the Pacific Pact. You all know that the United States
never has claimed one square inch of Antarctic territory. We do not
have any now. That is the official policy of the United States, to-
gether with the fact that we do not recognize any other' nation's
claims, but we reserve our rights, whatever that means. That is. in all
encyclopedias, and it is the expression of the State Department and
the present policy, and has been for most of the twentieth ' century.
It hasn't much meaning-hasn't any meaning in connection :with our
technological progress.
Well, now, 1. would like to say that I think probably the Pacific
Pact with Australia and New Zealand is a good pact more or less.
It reads pretty well. There are two or three territories left out of it.
The point is, I think we are putting the cart before the horse by
ratifying a treaty like this before we claim our Antarctic territory,
because the whole South Pacific is dominated by the Antarctic
Continent.
We are rushing down into the South Pacific in this pact with
Australia and New Zealand. We are not staying in the North, we are
not staying in the Far East, we are going right down into the South
Pacific. You can say, "But there are no people in the Antarctic,"
and that makes a point showing the advisability of our attention to
the matter.
If there is some subversive activity going on down there, we cannot
get telegrams and cables about it. The penguins do not, send us
warnings. We should go down there in person, have surveys con-
tinually and have our intelligence thoroughly conversant with that
part of the globe, if we are going into a pact like this especially. There
are two areas that I do not believe are in the pacific Pact with Australia
and New Zealand ; as far as I can understand the language we are
leaving Alaska out of that and we are leaving the Cape Horn area
out of that.
It might be that it could be explained that Alaska is in there,
although Alaska is not an island; Alaska is not metropolitan territory
if you consider that to mean mother country; or if you consider it to
mean where there are cities where there is population, why then
Alaska would be in the pact, and. also the Antarctic would be as soon
as Australia and New Zealand have settlements there on t eir own
Antarctic properties. So it is all involved and I think it should be all
explained in black and white to the American public and I think that
the Senate should consider these points prior to ratifying a treaty of
this nature.
Then the Cape Horn area you cannot divorce from the Pacific and
it is not covered in the treaty as far as I can tell. It does not come
under island territory or metropolitan territory of the United States.
Of course the Cape Horn area may be taken care of in the Rio Pact
.of 1947 and if it is taken care of then, maybe that is all right,,because
we are pledged there to offer mutual protection to a zone in the Ant-
arctic between, I think it is the twenty-fourth and the ninetieth
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1.30 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
meridians with a point pointing down to the South Pole. We still
have not claimed our rightful Antarctic territory. It just seems to
me we are putting off something that is very important. That is all
my oral testimony and I would like to submit a few things to go into
the printed matter if I may.
Senator GREEN. What is that?
Miss KENDALL. May I submit a few things which may go in the
printed part of the record at the committee's discretion?
Senator GREEN. Yes.
Miss KENDALL. First, it is important that we have the Depart-
ment's press release of August 28, 1948.
Senator GREEN. You may leave that for the record.
(The press release referred to follows:)
I)EPARTNIENT OF STATE,
August 28, 1948.
For the press.
No. 689.
The Department of State has approached the Governments of Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom in-
formally with a suggestion that a solution for the territorial problem of Antarctica
be discussed. It is the viewpoint of the Iepartment of State that the solution
should be such as to promote scientific investigation and research in the area.
The Department of State has suggested that this can perhaps be done most
effectively and the problem of conflicting claims at the same time solved through
agreement upon some form of internationalization. The Department of State ex-
pects that the question is one which will require an extended exchange of views,
consideration of suggestions and probably reconciliation of varying viewpoints.
Until such exchange of views and necessary further study is completed, it is not
believed that any useful purpose could be accomplished by a conference on the
subiect and no such conference is contemplated at present.
Miss KENDALL. Then there is an article supplementing that I would
like to have put in. It is regarding the Antarctic but it is the first
thing I have seen in print. There are only three lines and it. is from
a foreign correspondent.
Senator GREEN. That will be put in the record as part of your re-
marks.
(The article referred to is as follows:)
[From the Christian Science Monitor, August 20, 1950]
WHAT COMES NEXT IN ANTARCTICA?
AU6TRALIAN SMOKE SIGNAL
(By Albert Norman)
SYDNEY.-If anybody ever thought that Australia was blowing hot and cold
over Antarctica, he has another thermostatic think coming. Australia is in the
Antarctic business for keeps. There are lots of reasons why. Some of them are
impressive, stirring world scientific interest. Others of lighter impact are none
the less significant.
Take that new polar ship, for example, and the related idea of putting Aus-
tralia's Antarctic exploration on a "permanent" basis. The Federal Govern-
ment now has decided. on the construction of what surely will be the world's most
modern polar exploration vessel. This after unsuccessfully poking around the
world's creeks and breakers' yards for a make-do model.
According to one tentative work schedule we've seen, the new ship will run
almost continuously between Australia and what's ambitiously described as the
"first permanent Australian settlement on the Antarctic Continent."
To most grizzled polar old-timers, that sounds as if the old voyages of Antarctic
derring-do now are to give way to just a humdrum ferry service, with a three-
piece band playing California, .Here I Come and other request numbers to while
away the crossing.
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Of course, all this talk about. an Australian "permanent settlement" in Ant-
arctica gets a good deal of inspiration from the fact that Australia holds inter-
national title to a chunk of country down there about half the size of the United
States. And that is a lot, of land even in the Australian language. So much so,
that in these days of the veto, the Government obviously feels obliged to keep its
antarctic interest, to turn a diplomatic phrase, "continuously in the affirmative."
Actually, the Australian "title" is internationally doubtful; at least the United
States State Department hasn't recognized it to date, notwithstandii>g that
Australia's formal claim dates back to 1933.
But, along with Australia's close interest in the sprawling polar eantinent,
.something has happened in recent years to spark a sudden sustained burst of
interest by all nations having Antarctic "possessions" and some not having them,
such as Soviet Russia.
For example, in recent months the French have landed an expedition in Adelie
Land in the so-called "French enclave" which i' a thin slice cut into the enormous
Australian territory.
At first, the French expedition ha-_1 trouble in reaching Adelie Land owing to
heavy pack ice. But the Australian Government graciously gave Hie' French
leader, M. Andre Liotard, permission to make a temporary base in Australian
territory, a concession which M. Liotard graciously accepted.
Those meticulous observances of diplomatic protocol in remote howling polar
wastes would'be incongruous if they didn't, underscore the growing international in-
terest in and respect for polar possessions."
Right now the center of this lively international interest is the joint British-
Scandinavian expedition, with Australians in its complement, which recently has
entered Norway's Queen Maud Land for a 2-year stay.
Actually, it was some chance photographs taken by a German Luftwaffe ship-
based plane engaged in an illegal air re connaisance over Queen Maud T r.nd in 1938
that started the present British-Scandinavian expedition on its way.
The Nazi pilot's report and photographs, found in the German archives in 1945,
surprisingly revealed a 30,000 square Wile ice-free "oasis" of valley and range in
the hear of Queen Maud Land.
This discovery of an extensive ice-free area in the Antarctic Continent.seem s to
be the major piece of evidence that the southern polar climate gradually Is chang-
ing. But is it just a remarkable coincidence that, this surprising discovery is
accompanied by an intensified international exploratory trend with various
nations dusting off old "claims," and even thinking in terms of "permanent
Antarctic settlement"?
Of course, the people who see a natural sequence in these indications of added
polar warmth and intensified interest in "permanent" settlement could be in-
accurately anticipating their history.
Climatologists, for example, point out that "added polar warmth" is a very
comparative terra in a region where some folk still have to beat hard to `.thaw out
on summer mornings.
But that doesn't gainsay the fact, olimatologically speaking, that things appear
to be warming up down Antarctica way.
Future teachers in Antarctica high schools may yet tell young Antaretics that
it was the Australians who first, began to suspect a serious shrinkage in the itountry's
icecap.
Australian interest in Antarctic weather can be called traditional. And since
1947 it has. been on a 24-hour basis when two A-class weather stations with elabo-
rate scientific staff were established bordering Antarctica itself.
It is not clear whether these station, were put there following the discovery of
the Luftwaffe report. on the Queen Maud Land oasis. But the fact is they are
there and are producing the kind of arithmetic needed to solve this modern
mystery.
1'he British -Scandinavian expedition now in Queen Maud Land certainly will
have its own findings to make on a possible. changing Antarctic climate when it
breaks camp in 1952. But it probably will be the patient continuous figuring of
the Australian Antarctic meteorologists which finally will answer the polar
continent's climatological riddle and whether in consequence the country will have
an ordinary civilized future.
And judging by things we bear, that. new polar ship with the three-piece band is
going to have more to do than just ferrying new settlers southward. The Aus-
tralian Department of National Development wants it to start surveeing Ant-
arctica's marine wealth as soon as it is built. The department has the Idea there
are lots of potential dollars floating around in the region, mostly carried in the
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J E PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
hides and blubber of sea cows and emperor penguins. Could be. Along with
weather statistics that certainly is a feasible beginning for industry. What comes
next in Antarctica?
Miss KENDALL. Then there is an article about Australia's plans
for her Antarctic territory. Then there are several letters, my letters
to the committee.
Senator GREEN. Would it not be sufficient that those latter papers.
be filed with the letters of the committee?
Miss KENDALL. May I date them, please?
Senator GREEN. Those can be filed for reference.
Miss KENDALL. Not in the hearings?
Senator GREEN. Not the long papers.
Miss KENDALL. Well, all right. There are two letters, one to your
committee and one to Mr. Connally, well, three, one to the Armed
Services Committee when they sat with you.
Thank you very much.
Senator GREEN. Thank you.
(The article referred to is as follows:)
[From the Christian Science Monitor, December 8, 19511
BRITAIN, ARGENTINA, AND CHILE RENEW ANTARCTIC AGREEMENT
(By a special correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor)
MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY.-Britain, Argentina, and Chile have renewed their
formal agreement not to send warships south of latitude 60? during the present
Antarctic summer, and Washington, for the third time, has nodded in approval.
The decision is little more than a statement of intention, to avoid the risks of
incidents which are apt to result from naval demonstrations.
the first declaration was made in January 1949, after "incidents"--usually no
more serious than soccer snatches between warship crews on snowy island pitches-
involving the three powers claiming the same Antarctic territory.
TENSION RAN 11I,111
But tension ran high at times, before agreement was reached. There always
was the risk of an unpleasant incident. The Argentines sent their squadrons and
admirals down to roam the far southern seas. The Chilean President, Selor
Gabriel Gonzalez, himself went in the same direction.
Both countries, although with their own Antarctic differences, have signed a
pact to settle these bilaterally, and meantime are barking at John Bull's Antarctic
coat-tails. Each has established bases on lands which the British have incor-
porated as dependencies of the Falkland Islands colony.
Before the agreement to avoid naval demonstrations, Sir Miles Clifford, the
Falkland Islands governor, used to dash ashore from his sloop or a specially
despatched cruiser, delivering notes of protests to the South American squatters,
some of them separated by many hundreds of miles in those isolated waters.
Without the risks, the situation might have been regarded as full of comedy,
but the Antarctic contains something more than ice, penguins, and whales.
Latterly, there have been reports of mineral findings, including coal and perhaps
uranium.
The Chileans and Argentines, especially the latter, also resent foreign inter-
ference in what is considered a natural prolongation of their territory. The
Argentines have never recognized British occupation of the Falklands.
ANOTHER RYRD TRY?
The announcement of a new American expedition to the Antarctic by Admiral
Richard F. Byrd has come at a time of special local susceptibility. Although no
definite plans have been announced-the admiral speaks of going south for the
fifth time when world tension has eased--the South Americans feel that further
American explorations and discoveries will prejudice their claims of sovereignty.
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Officially, the United States encourages the goal of Antarctic internationaliza-
tion. The Argentines, particularly, are opposed to this conception. They are as
nationalistic in their Antarctic as in their Peronista outlook at home.
American expressions have been aimed at an eventual solution of Antarctic
problems through scientific research- an aspect invariably stressed in Byrd and
other expeditions-but this is an aim which has gained little foreign support.
The South Americans emphasize the scientific side in exclusively nationalist
form. The British have been mainly associated with the Scandinavians in joint
scientific expeditions.
The British have their eyes turned anxiously on the latest Argentine "task force"
which sailed for Margaret Bay in the Antarctic in the last days of November.
Although the primary aim of the recently renewed tripartite declaration is to
avoid the risks of naval demonstrations, the hope was also entertained that it
would avoid further encroachments on what is considered British territory.
Senator GREEN. The next witness is Mr. Roy G. Allman.
STATEMENT OF ROY G. ALLMAN, ATTORNEY, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. ALLMAN. Gentlemen, members of the committee and of the
Senate, my name is Roy G. Allman. I practiced law in China for
some 8 or 10 years and my remarks are solely for Americans. It has
no geographical limitations, and it has no other nationality other than
American.
Senator GREEN. You are addressing the committee, and We are all
Americans.
Mr. ALLMAN. Thank you. I am here to protest on behalf of myself
and other Americans similarly situated against the treaty with Japan
as it now stands. The treaty with Japan is an outrage as it is now
written.
I disagree, and if it is finalized, it is a fraud on Americans who lost
their property and in some cases their lives at the hands of the Japa-
nese.
On page 18 of the treaty
Senator GREEN. May I interrupt? Are you speaking here in your
own behalf or in behalf of clients?
Mr. ALLMAN. I am speaking on my own behalf and other Americans
similarly situated.
Senator GREEN. Are you speaking in behalf of clients?
Mr. ALLMAN. Yes, sir. - -
Senator GREEN. That is all right. It is perfectly proper. I
wanted to know.
Mr. ALLMAN. On page 18 of the treaty with Japan, beginning on
the first line of that page--the last line of that page-under section
(b), it is as follows.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Do you mind stating what article
that is? We have another edition, the committee print, which
doesn't follow those pages.
Mr. ALLMAN. Chapter V, article 14, section (b), second line in
section (b). Under asection (b) it is as follows [reading]:
Except as otherwise provided in the present treaty, the Allied Powers waive all
reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and
their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the
course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct
military costs of occupation.
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134 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER. PACIFIC TREATIES
Gentlemen, that covers the field. There is nothing left. When
they said waive the right to the claims and waive all other claims,,
they made sure that if an individual lost some property by the Japa-
nese stealing it, this American Government waives that individual's
rights to file a claim against that individual Japanese or his Govern-
ment.
Gentlemen, if you will analyze this just a little, you will see that
the hidden or the weasel clauses throughout this treaty this is one
of them- what I call illegal acts of this government against its own
nationals by waiving the claims of Americans and other claims of
Americans.
'I his prevents these citizens from filing a claim against the Japanese
Government or its nationals. It forever shuts them off.
A treaty with the United States is the supreme law of the land; we
observe them; and in my observation other nations do not observe
them except if it is to their benefit to do so. This Government does
not act that way.
'T'hese Americans who lost their life savings and in most cases were
imprisoned and harassed and prevented from carrying on their lawful
commercial pursuits in China and the development of trade and com-
merce and the western ways of life-this treaty steps right in and
waives their rights.
In the opinion of the writer, it is a violation of the fifth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States in the, letter of the law if
not the spirit wherein it deprives American citizens of their property
without due process of law.
'T'he treaty being the supreme law of the land, the Senate has the
final say in this matter, which is now for some unknown reason being
urgently and energetically urged upon the Senate for quick ratifica-
tion, perhaps so it can be done without too much thought on the part
of the Senate or the American people as to this treaty; and when it is
clone, the promoter of this treaty will probably have a. nice job repre-
senting the United States in Japan because of the efforts they are
supposed to have put forth in negotiating this treaty, a very small
group that drew up this treaty- they didn't want too much informa-
tion, too much truth, about it..
This treaty as it stands is a fundamental violation of contractual
rights of the American people who lost their rights in. China, when
their property was confiscated.
here is a certificate of seizure by the Japanese Government of
American property in Tientsin, China. This I consider, and the
American owner of this property considers this was a contractual
obligation. It reads in part as follows. It is M. Japanese and signed
by the gendarmes in Tientsin, and it is also in English-probably
printed long before Pearl Harbor for just such a situation. It reads
as follows: a
The above articles shall be taken over by the Japanese Army solely for
military necessities.
11 'hey listed this and there are 17 items in Japanese and English,
and the total amount of this property is approximately $498,000.
The person who lost it lives in Irvington, N. J., and he has a wife and
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND I
two children and. he is having a hard time getting along because the
Japanese took everything he had., his home in Pehtailro, his home in
Tientsin. He was a contractor. They took his steel beams, his
concrete reinforcement, took it some place in the South Pacific and
used it against our men, Americans. lie is eking out a living now the
best he can because he lost everything he had.
The certificate goes on [reading]
After restoration of peace, shall be returned to respective owners or disposed by
appropriate means under prevailing circumstances.
That is pretty good English language for the Japanese. The
Japanese military garrison in Tientsin signed that. They weren't
very good spellers in English, and so they spelled Tientsin wrong-
T-i-e-n-t-s-n-i--in place of "i-n".
If the members of the committee would care to see this, I would be
glad for them to take a look at it. I have several photostatic copies
of it. Here is it photostatic copy listed by the Japanese and gives to
the Chinese in Tientsin---this American was in jail, so the Chinese held
it for him until lie got out of jail, and gave it to him, and so he gave it
to me, to file his claim with somebody in the hope that he could spend
the rest of his days-he is about 65 years old and having a tough time
making a living up there in New Jersey. There is no place, to file it.
If this treaty stands as it is, this Serrate waives his right to claim this
against the Japanese when the Japanese, agreed with him in part that
he could file it, it would be returned in kind or some adjustment would
be made so that he could get compensation for it.
By waiving the rights of Americans it shuts off this company from
collecting from the Japanese. when the Japanese stated in the receipt
for the property they took that they should return the property
to the owners or dispose of it by appropriate means.
This is the most anti-American document I have ever read, this
treaty, with respect to that particular phase of it, cutting off their
rights to claim, civilians, in the Japanese courts or any courts. This
shuts them off.
Mr. Dulles and his assistants went to great length-
Senator WILEY. What is the date of that instrument there, the
instrument where you say there was an obligation on the state of
Japan? Was it before Pearl Harbor?
Mr. ALLMAN. No. Just a minute. I have the date here.
Senator WiLEY. This receipt that you read.
ABILITY OF JAPAN TO PAY CLAIMS -
Mr. ALLMAN. The (late is blurred out, but it was January 1942,
during the month of January 1942. If Mr. Dulles and his assistants
are concerned about the economic fate of Japan, I can assure him that
the Japanese will come out of this doldrum they are in. 'l'lrey are
rather progressive. They can produce goods to bring their finances
up to date.
When Mr. Dulles and his assistants wrote this up, I asked Mr.
Allison, his assistant, if I couldn't submit some program where the
Japanese could issue, bonds or something to pay for that, but they
didn't go for that. They didn't care about receiving anything from
me, or apparently, any other American who knew what this was all
about.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
If he is concerned about the poverty of the Japanese nation, he can
rest assured they will be all right. If he has visited a 5- and 10-cent
store in America anywhere, particularly in Arlington County, he will
find that the 5- and 10-cent store has a considerable amount of things
in there, both cheap and fairly good.
When the Japanese bonds were permitted to be traded on the Stock
Exchange in New York, the British were buying them at about
25, and when we started buying them about 1950 or 1951, they were
46. A couple of days ago they were 91.
That isn't bad. The people have confidence in the Japanese in
respect to paying their bills. They will pay their bills. The Japanese
are progressive, they are patriotic-to Japan, of course. They are.
industrious, they are energetic, they are patriotic; and the people who
deal in their bonds, their commercial transactions, their shipping
they have confidence in the Japanese.
Senator GREEN. If you would confine yourself to criticism of the
treaty-
Mr. ALL MAN. That is what I am doing. Mr. Dulles apologizes for
the Japanese, in this treaty, the Japanese being so poverty stricken
that they don't have their finances up to date and they can't pay
reparations.
To me that is right on the treaty.
On the other hand, he waives the Americans' rights to file claims
against the Japanese, the Government or otherwise. If you would
strike that word "waive" out of this treaty, the American people
would have a way of getting along with the Japanese, could get the
Japanese Government to honor these obligations they signed.
Senator GREEN. Is that your specific request, that that language
be changed?
Mr. ALLMAN. Yes.
Senator GREEN. Have you any other specific requests?
Mr. ALLMAN. The request for the Americans to have the same right
to file claims for reparations as other countries who signed the treaty
in San Francisco, like the Indonesians, like the Philippine Islands.
They are very cagey in couching this in double-talking language, what
I call weasel clauses, in that they said any territory occupied by Japan,
they would have the right to take it in kind or in labor or in some other
form of manufacture.
There was no territory of America occupied by Japan except prob-
ably a couple of rocks in the North Pacific.
That is a clever piece of work. It is against American interests.
Senator GREEN. I hate to have to remind you that the quarter
hour is up.
Mr. ALLMAN. Is it up?
Senator GREEN. Yes. If you have anything further you would
like to submit to the committee, we would be very glad to have it.
Mr. ALLMAN. Would you indulge me just a minute, please?
Senator GREEN. Yes.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND d1HER PACIFIC TREATIES 13T
Mr. ALLMAN. I have a letter here from the American Chamber of
Commerce in Shanghai, written to me, submitting a list of the. Amer-
icans who had claims. This is part of the Americans, not all of them;:
but I would like permission to file this with the committee, L would
like to file a list of claims that I have for Americans against the
Japanese.
Senator GREEN. You say all these are waived by the treaty?
Mr. ALLMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator GREEN. You represent all these? These are all clients of
yours?
Mr. ALLMAN. Most of them are.
Senator WILEY. What is the total?
Mr. ALLMAN. The total in this letter here from the American
Chamber of Commerce is : Individual claims, the total is $2,279, 168.53;
corporation claims-that is, American corporations, it isn't British,
French, Japanese, or some other, it is American--
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. Is that dollars or yen?
Mr. ALLMAN. United States dollars. The figure would be fantastic
to put it in any other kind of dollars. Corporations, $32,238,074.44.
Just in glancing through the list --you understand this is not the
complete list, this is only from the chamber of commerce in Shang-
hai-R. T. Bryan, Jr., 149 Yuen Ming Yuen Road, $50,000. Ile is
in jail in Tientsin right now if he isn't dead. He was formerly with
the State Department for it while after 1946. His wife is on her way
from Hong Kong now. She had to leave from over there.
Senator GREEN. We haven't time, to hear of the family details.
Mr. ALLMAN. C. S. Franklin, 149 Yuen Ming Yuen Road, $20,000;
Louis Henkel, 451 Kiangse Road, Room 211, $504,980: American
Asiatic Underwriters---
Senator GREEN. You have given us an example.
Mr. ALLMAN. I would like to read you two more, Senator, if 1 may.
Senator GREEN. All right.
Mr. ALLMAN. American Asiatic Underwriters, which is an Ameri-
can corporation, $123,202.60; Shanghai Power Co., $21,509,067.16.
That means General Motors, General Electric, and other companies
supplied materials that the Communists are now using in Shanghai.
The Japanese made the most of it when they took it over, and used
it and dissipated it.
The Shanghai Telephone Co., a subsidiary of the Bell Telephone
System, $7,339,109.00.
That is some of the corporations. I would like to comment right
there--
Senator GREEN. Would you like to include the whole list in. your
remarks?
Mr. ALLMAN. Yes, I would like to submit this whole list with the
letter from the chamber of commerce, and with your permission,, I
would like to have the letter back, because it is addressed to me..
(The documents above referred to are as follows:);
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138 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
AMERICAN CHAIgIBrR OF COMMERCE.
Shanghai, May 8, 1950.
Mr. R. C. ALLMAN,
Federal Resident Agents, In.c..,
Washington 5, D. C.
TEAR MR. ALLMAN: With reference to your letter of April 1, 1950, we are
enclosing herewith list of both individual and corporate claimants in connection
with war damage claim-, and losses. It is understood that the American Chamber
of Commerce in Shanghai cannot supply proof or details of these several claims.
Each claimant, of course, will have to prove his or its own claim.
The chamber will be glad to render any assistance feasible in connection with
inducing the Congress to ask appropriate legislation to pay these claims.
On March 23, 1950, we radioed you that these claims amounted to the following:
Individuals -------------------------------------------------- US$2, 000, 000
Corporations ------------------------------------------------- 11,000,000
Since that date, however, additional claims have come in and the correct figure
now stands at:
Individuals ------------------------------------------------ US$2, 279, 168. 53
Corporations------------------------------------------- 32,238,074.44
Will you please submit the revised claims to the Commission?
War clairns
CORN IiLL S. FRANKLIN,
Vice President
Allman, N. F_______________________
INDIVIDUALS
208 Hamilton House-_ ------
US$56, 100. 00
Avery, John S------------------------
901 Grosvenor House _
25, 000. 00
Boyd, Ralph S--------------------
Fah Wah Lu, House 6-----------------------
480, 000.00
Blest, E. L--------------------------
)311 Kiangse Rd--------------------------------
112,420.00
Blest, Mrs. Lea -- ------------------
Browne, J. R-----------------------
209 Foochow Rd., room 205____________________
28,000.00
Bryan, R. T., Jr-------------------
149 Yuen Ming Yuen Rd-----------------------
50,000.00
Chang, Harry Chou_________________
1036 Bubbling Well Rd__.-______________________
2, 500.00
Coleman, Innhelle G________________
University of Shanghai, Yangtzepoo Rd_________
2,000.00
Desmond, Walter___________________
150 Nanking Rd. West__________________________
18,100.00
Dixon, Thomas-------______------
Care of Postmaster, Boston, Mass______________
12,400.00
Farrnham, W. C--------------------
Care of Allman Kops & Lee, 208 Hamilton House-
28,432.37
Franklin, C. S_______________-_____
149 Yuen Ming Yuen Rd______________________
20, 000.00
Franks, Martha L-______-__-___-__-_
209 Yucn Ming Yuen Rd ----------------------
3,000. 00
Flook, Mr. and Mrs_____ ___
Care of Allman Kops & Lee, 208 Hamilton Rouse-
29, 094. 10
Hager, A. R----- ------------------
263 Kiangsc Rd--_______--____________________
120,000.00
Hallock, H. G. C
480 Chapoo Rd---------------------------------
364, 019.00
Henkel, Louis -----------------------
451 Kiangsc Rd., room 211_ ---------------------
504,980.00
Hilburn, J. E_______--_____________
Care of Yee Tsoong Tobacco, 175 Soochow Rd--
1,000.00
Hines, W. E-----------------------
Foreign YMCA, 150 Bubbling Well Rd__--____
12, 257.00
Javier, Mariano_____________________
651/C21 Weihaiwei Rd__________________________
15, 000.00
Langdon, E. W------------------
30 Rue Cardinal Mercier_______________________
6,644.00
Lawler, Rev. Emma B______________
350 Hingkwo Rd No. 2----- --------------------
10, 000.00
Lazarovich, L. I)____________________
219 Cardinal Mercier, Grosvenor House, apart-
19,000.00
Lawler, Miss E. Beatrice____________
ment 202; 3507 , South Norton Ave., Los
Angeles 16, Calif.
3,10 Hingkwo Rd., No. 2________________________
10,000.00
Lenzer, Reuben---------------------
17 Canton Rd, suite 202_________________________
54, 050.00
Louie, Mrs. Theadora Y__________--
90 Kinnear Rd ----------------------------------
2,110.00
Mateos, Alfredo_____________________
651/021 Weihaiwei Rd__________________________
15, 000.00
Dorothy ___-
Moll
608/83 Yu Yuen Rd_____________________________
4,000.00
,
,Oss, John---------------------------
515 Ningkuo Rd--------------------------------
3, 1W. 00
Pattison, A. P -----------------------
9 Chung Shan Rd -------------------------------
143, 320.00
J. S____________ ____
Potter
1131320 Kiukiang Rd_ _ -----------
19, 000.00
,
Read, Vaughan_____________________
Rd ----- _____________
18, 825.00
Ross, Miss Julia B__________________
400 Ave., Ilaig, apartment 12____________________
12, 000.00
Louis Frank__________________
Roth
227 Nanyang Rd, apartment 12_________________
18, 500.00
,
Roth
Daisy -------------------------
-----do---- --------------
4,650.00
,
Smith, 11. Maxey________________
Care of Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 94 Canton
3, 000.00
,Starr, C. V--------------------------
Rd.
Care of American Asiatic Underwriters, 17 The
25, 222. 26
Wang, George K. `1'_________________
Bund.
Care of George, Young, 2145 Liliha St., Honolulu,
2,000.00
Young, Paul B____-----------------
Hawaii.
48-12 194th St., Flushing, Long Island, N. Y.;
51, 278.00
Young, I. J-------------------------
209 Sassoon House.
Care of Yee Tsoong Tobacco, 175 Soochow Rd__
2,000.00
Yung, Bartlett, Jr___
749/32 Yu Yuen Rd_____________________________
1,166.80
Total------------------------
US$2, 279, 168.53
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 A1410005-9
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JAPANESE PEACE TRE. A_ e A
American Asiatic Underwriters-
Asia Life Insurance Co
Bakerite Co__----------------------
Cathay- Grand Corp _ _ _
_
I athay Oil __ _ Co........................
China Fibre Container Co_ __ _
Cosmos Paper Co_____-._____-------
lienuingsen Produce Co_-_-___.-_-_
P. W. Langdon & Co ------------
E. W. Langdon & Co. (IlongKong)_
Poplar Grove Farms____________
Post Mercury Co____________________
Radio Engineering Corp_ -----------
-_
Reliance Motors..................
'Itsmenitsky Bros-------------------
Shanghai Power Co-----------------
Shanghai Stevedoring Co ------------
Shanghai Telephone Co_____________
Shanghai Wharf & Warehouse Co___
United States Life Insurance Co____-
Underwriters Bank__________________
17 The Bund_-_-- ----------------------------
- - d0 ---------------------
2,,Kiani'selid lid----------------------------------
11 Canton Rd _- ___ ----
Caro of Allman Kops & Lee, 206 namilton
ouse.
House.
do Rd -------------------------.
51 Canton .-------------------------------
10 Mowming li,d ----- ------------------r---
- ------------------------ --------------
51 CaSiton-ltd---------- ------------------ ----
17'1'he Btind-------- --------------------------
5l Canton Rd--------- ------------------------
1711w Buud _ -----------------------
89 Foochow Rd., suite 307 ----------------------
181 Rankin" Rd. - of Album Kops & Lee, 208 Hamilton
I Iouse.
232 Kiangse Rd ---------------------------------
.131 Canton Rd --------------------------------
17 The Bund------------------------------------
--- do- --------------- ------------------------
17 The Ilfund-----------------------------------
US$htl, 202.00
,14,118.17
2.I1, 940.24
90 481.38
i8, 692. 25
3 532.58
17, 785.00
50.000.00
A, 265. 93
I1, 0.5(1.42
75, ((00.00
89, 633.83
50,000.00
l0, 613. 55
4G, (100 00
21, 09, 067.16
l0, 000.00
7,139,109.00
is, 310.6f,
3,850.95
4, 414. 72
US532, ?38,074.44
Total -------------------------
Underwriters Bank_________________
Total..-----------------------
IKf81, 112.74
11 K.$81,112. 74
Mr. ALLMAN. I would like to comment on the fact that the, bank
accounts of these soldiers on Bataan are comparable to the bank
accounts of most all Americans in China. A lot of Americans had
bank accounts, and they haven't seen them since, because the Japanese
used them, took there and used them against Americans.
Nov this treaty says we waive our right to get your bank arscount
back. We don't care. We will waive it for the sake of getting
something across through this Senate.
Senator GREEN. Thank you very much.
Senator HICEENLOOPER. I would like to question this witless for
,just a moment if I may.
Senator GREEN. Very well. You weren't here when I made my
introductory remarks, and that was we hoped to get through by
12:30. This is the fourth day of these hearings, and there is a list of
eight witnesses to be heard; so we asked them to limit their remarks
to an average of 15 minutes. So far they have gone beyond that, and
the questioning, I hope, will not be prolonged.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry I wasn't here when you made
the remark. Nevertheless, this witness has touched on a most
important phase of the Japanese Treaty.
Senator GREEN. Of course, the Senator has a right to ask the
questions.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I would like to explore this point just a
little bit.
Mr. Allman, I understand it is your contention that this treaty
waives the right of American nationals who had their property seized
or confiscated or taken under certain process by the Japanese; is that
correct?
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140 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Mr. ALLMAN. That is correct, Senator.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now does your contention also go to the-
fact that American nationals, for instance, who were in China prior
to 1941 and had their property seized by the Japanese in their invasion
of China-that is prior to Pearl Harbor, in 1941 and earlier-that
they are also barred from making any claim against the Japanese?
Mr. ALLMAN. Absolutely.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it your contention that under this
treaty, even though the Japanese at the time of seizure of this property
gave a receipt acknowledging indebtedness or acknowledging the
right of the individual to compensation for the property seized, that
this treaty bars that right which the individual thought he had?
Mr. ALLMAN. It certainly does.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it your contention that this treaty gives
other nations the right to claim compensation in one method or
another against the Japanese, while barring claims of American
citizens?
Mr. ALLMAN. That is correct, Senator. It most surely does shut
them off.
Senator Ilickenlooper. One of the Senators wonders if I made my
question clear. Your answer may not have been responsive to the
question..
I will restate it. Is it your contention that other nations have
preserved the right in this treaty for their own nationals to go into
some forum, either a Japanese court, or international settlement, and
get compensation for their nationals who lost property through. seizure
or otherwise to the Japanese, either before or after Pearl Harbor, and
that that right is barred to American nationals?
Mr. ALLMAN. That is correct. I spoke to the First Secretary of the
Indonesian Embassy the day before yesterday, and they are negotiat-
ing in Japan right now to receive compensation, reparations, for their-
Government and their nationals. Under this treaty they can do that.
Under this treaty the Americans cannot do that.
Senator HIICKENLOOPER. In other words, I understand your con-.
tention is that this treaty has preserved the right to those nations and.
their nationals who were occupied by Japan to go into some forum and
present their claims and have their claims, not only of the nations?
but of their nationals, adjudicated for the losses which they suffered..
Mr. ALLMAN. That is correct, Senator.
MOST-FAVORED NATION CLAUSE ON REPARATIONS. ANA CLAIMS
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have you examined article 26, the last,
paragraph, which states as follows-the last sentence of article 26,
which is as follows [reading]:
Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any state
granting; that state greater advantages than those provided by the present treaty,
those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present treaty.
Have you examined that provision?
Mr. ALLMAN. Yes, sir. That is the most-favored-nation clause,,
and that is as full of gobbledegook as the rest of the treaty, because it
does not have the binding effect, because it says, the nations whose
territory Japan occupied will have this right.
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That is just like saying America---it doesn't say America didn't
have any territory occupied, but there it is, that is the way out of it.
That is the way I interpret that.
Senator HICKENLOOPEI. Let me go a step further. In that
sentence I just read to you it refers to a state. That is, "Should
Japan make it peace settlement * * * with any State," using
the word "State"-the words "national of that State" are not used
In other words, even in this sentence the right of the state might
be preserved in some way under the most-favo,?ed-nation theory, but
the question of whether the national or the citizen of that state would
have his private claims preserved so far as adjudication is concerned
can be raised perhaps.
Have you thought of it from that standpoint? The reason I am
asking you is you are a lave yer. You apparently represent-excuse
me--you represent, according to your statement-and I didn't mean
to qualify it-you do repress nt certain clients who have claims which
they assert against the Japanese for seizure of their property at one
time of another in the past. Therefore, I would like to get your
considered opinion on that particular statement as a result of your
investigation of this treaty.
Mr. ALLMAN. The other nations who signed this treaty at San
Francisco, they dominate their nationals, they act for their nationals.
In the United States there is it slight, difference. The Government
legislates for the nationals, but it doesn't enter into commercial
transactions for losses; and in the case of the Indonesians, for example,
if an Indonesian loses property, which he did, the Government
negotiates with Japan-and is negotiating now-to pay the. Govern-
ment, and the Government pays the individual. There is it difference
there.
That is choice language there. It doesn't say the nationals, but
it comes back to paragraph 14 (b) and it says waives the claims, ww've
all reparations claims and all other claims.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Altman, did you present these claims
on the theory of protecting the right of the individual American citiken
whose property had been seized by the Japanese to the State Depart-
ment or to other persons in charge of the negotiation of this treaty?
Mr. ALLMAN. Most of them have been filed with the State Depart-
ment, but it is a waste of time to do such things.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I suggest, Mr. Allman, that the
conclusion that it is a waste of time, we can eliminate. I am trying to
get at the facts as to the steps that have been taken.
Now these claims that were filed, were they filed prior to the final
draft of this treaty? What I am trying to get at is this: Was the State
Department fully conscious of the fact, were they fully cognizant of the
fact that American citizens' property had been seized by the Japanese
either subsequent to or prior to Pearl Harbor?
Mr. ALLMAN. They certainly were. The State Department bad
representatives right there; and the Americans would go to the con-
sulate and file their claims for the loss of their property. The State
Department would give them some double talk. All of the claims
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have been filed with the State Department, and the State Department
is cognizant of the. losses by these Americans, I will say.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now about the double-talk business, can
you give us the names at the moment of any representatives of the
State Department who were tallied to about this matter by any
individual? Did you talk to any representatives of the State Depart-
ment who were involved in this treaty making, or were you permitted
to or were you able to?
Just give us the facts about that.
Mr. AU MAN. I called for a conference three or four times to Mr.
John Allison. He was busy; lie was in conference. The answer is I
didn't get to see him. I didn't get to submit anything. I wrote
him a couple of short letters and got a couple of other letters back
similar to the one the gentleman received yesterday about payment
to these soldiers who lost their money in the Philippine Islands. I
believe it is almost a copy of that letter.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. Now, Mr. Allman, you made the flat
allegation here that our soldiers in the Philippine Islands and Bataan
especially and in that action lost their deposits in the banks-that
is, the Japanese seized them; is that correct?
Mr. ALLMAN. I didn't make the allegation, but I believe it, because
Genera] Devereux and the other general who was here stated from
this microphone-and I belic-,e what lie said and other Americans
in Hong Kong, in Shanghai, in Tientsin, throughout China, had the
same losses or similar losses, except they were greater.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Inasmuch as you have been looking into
this matter, do you know of any provision, either by our Government
or through treaty or through negotiation, with the Japanese, or from
any other source, whereby our soldiers or their estates could recover
or receive the money they lost through Japanese seizure, let's say
(luring the period of the capture of the Philippines by the Japanese?
Mr. ALLMAN. They most certainly cannot recover because this
treaty shuts them off.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say, Do you know of any negotiations
or arrangements that were under way?
Mr. ALLMAN. I do not.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. By anybody, our Government or any
other government, for reimbursing our soldires who lost their money
there?
Mr. ALLMAN. I do not. On the contrary, the War Claims Act of
1948 was supposed to be for the Americans, a few of the soldiers.
That even doesn't cover it.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will say to you, Mr. Allman, that 1 have
been interested somewhat in this particular provision of the treaty,
and I raised substantial objection to the failure to protect the rights of
American citizens whose property had been arbitrarily seized or con-
fiscated by the Japanese.
I raised it after the draft treaty had finally been concluded, and
apparently there was nothing that could be done except reopen all
negotiations. But I had objection to this provision in the treaty, and
I will say to you I think it is really a failure to take care in some manner
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AN D OTHER P CI
of the rights of American citizens who had their property confiscated
and who are now poverty stricken not as a result of their own action,
but as a result of Japanese seizure over there, both prior to Pearl Har-
bor on the continent of Asia and after Pearl Ilarbor in Japan itself.
I am very much concerned about this point of the treaty. I am- not
certain at the moment what can be done about it. Ohl treaty has been
negotiated. We were not completely aware of all its irxtplicatiorls until
some time after it had been completed and signed and agreed to by the
various drafting powers.
So I think you have raised a very pertinent point. I am frank to
say ghat can be done about, it at this moment I don't know. The. im-
practicability of overturning this treaty at the moment is very appar-
ent to you, I am. sure- I mean the difficulties involved.
But I, for one, just want. to suggest that you have touched upon a
matter which I have personally criticized in the treaty myself.
Senator GREEN. Mr. Allman, in reference to your reply to Senator
Hickenloop er that your claims relate. both to the time before and the
time after Pearl Harbor, may f draw your attention to article, 18 (a)
:anad ask you whether you think that has any bearing. In order to get
it in the record I will read it. It reads:
It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the
obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts ~includ-
ing thos' in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before
the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or n ttionals
of Japan to the government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are due by
the government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or
nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be re-
garded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or
damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence
of a state of war, and which may be presented or represented by the government of
one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the Governncut of
Japan to any of the governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this
paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by article 14. _
What meaning do you give to that?
Mr. ALLMAN. Article 14 precedes this statement. It says it waives
the rights of reparations.
Senator GREEN. But this comes after article 14. -
Mr. ALLMAN. It waives the cla.irns. 'Phis J. E. Hayes Engineering
Corp., Julie Davison, of New Jersey, owns that company. Is there
any contractual right with the Japanese, either prior to that or after?
I don't mean to ask you a question, Senator. But I say "No; this
does not apply to this particular loss."
Senator GREEN. I am talking about your general assertion, which
you have made in response to Senator Flickenlooper's question, and
I -am asking you what meaning you give to this article 18, which I
have read.
Mr. ALLMAN. I gave it the meaning, 1 interpreted section 14--
Senator GREEN. I am talking about article 18.
Mr. ALLMAN. I interpreted it, as not to mean anything as far as
practical effect is concerned for these Americans to collect their bank
accounts or their losses in China or other places in the world Against
the Japanese.
Senator GREEN. You have read this article 18 before?
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144 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES-.
Mr. ALLMAN. Yes; I have read it several times.
Senator GREEN. And you give it no meaning whatever?
Mr. ALLMAN. For practical effect, none whatsoever.
Senator GREEN. That is all. Senator Gillette?
Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Chairman, I had two questions to, ask,,
and one of them the chairman has already asked. The other ques-
tion, Mr. Allman, is this:
SIGNATORIES ALL TREATED EQUAL
The subsection to which you referred here as precluding the rights:
of the nationals of Allied Powers, I understood in answer to one of"
the questions of my distinguished colleague, Senator Hickenlooper,.
that you said the nationals of other Allied Powers signatory to this
treaty were placed in a preferred position and were not in the same
position as our nationals, with us as a signatory power. Is that true?'
Mr. ALLMAN. In the sense that the other powers that signed the
treaty take care of their nationals from a commercial point of view..
The government collects it and then pays it to their nationals.
This Government--
Senator GILLETTE. Without referring to the way the different sig-
natory powers treat their own nationals, which is an entirely different
question so far as the provisions of this treaty are concerned, this.
subsection provides that each Allied Power makes these same con-
cessions relative to its claims and the claims of its nationals as the
United States does, everyone that is signatory to this treaty; do,
they not?
Mr. ALLMAN. With the exception of the fact that they have the
right to claim, to have the Japanese process goods,. raw materials,
from their country without charge from the Japanese.
Senator GILLETTE. I bring you back to this treaty. So far as this.
provision of the treaty is concerned, there is no differentiation made
between the United States and its nationals under the treaty and the
other nations and their nationals so far as the provisions of the treaty
are concerned. Isn't that true?
Mr. ALLMAN. From a practical effect, no; it isn't.
Senator GILLETTE. It is not true?
Mr. ALLMAN. From the practical effect. I am talking about com
mercial transactions. I am not talking about the fancy language or
about something some other nation would do for its nationals. This.
Government does not interfere with the commercial transactions of
American citizens. If you pass this treaty, the American Government
should pay the American nationals for their losses.
Senator GILLETTE. Is it your opinion as a lawyer-and I am very-
much interested in this, I will say, along with my colleague-is it
your opinion that this waiver, if this treaty is adopted by the United
States, closes the door on all avenues of recovery of compensation for-
these property claims?
Mr. ALLMAN. It most certainly does close the gate, and it locks it;.
I might say that John Allison, in talking to me over the telephone,.
that is what he said in effect. He said there isn't anything we can do.
about it.
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Senator GILLETTE. Who is John Allison?
Mr. ALLMAN. Mr. Dulles' assistant.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
Mr. Allman just one question.
Mr. Allman, you have referred to Mr. Hayes, of New Jersey.
Naturally I am interested in that specifically because he is a con-
stituent of mine. I have never heard from Mr. Hayes on this :matter,
but I am interested in knowing whether the articles taken over by
the Japanese Army were in Japan or somewhere else.
Mr. ALLMAN. In Tientsin, China, where his place of business was.
Senator SMITII of New Jersey. [f you could furnish me with copies
.,of material bearing on that case, I would be glad to have it checked up,
just from the standpoint of my personal interest in a constituent. I
would like to follow it through. If it is a good, typical case You are
citing, I would like to have a set of the papers just to see what the
situation was.
Mr. ALLMAN. I will give you the Whole thing, Senator Smith.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Let me ask you this question. If
this property was in Tientsin, China, then article 15 wouldn't cover it.
If the property happened to have been in Japan, there would be-nothing
to this case, because article 15 would send it back.
Mr. ALLMAN. It would go right back to the American if i.twere in
Japan.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am trying to sec why there was a
distinction made as to whether the article might have been ill Japan
or in China, which the Japanese seized. As Senator Hick?nlooper
says, that is a very relevant question, and I think we ought to explore
particular circumstances were that prevented the recovery.
(The following information was supplied by the State Department:)
JANUARY 31, 1952.
The Honorable Tom CONNALLY, -
Chairman, Committee on Foreign l?etations,
United States Senate.
My DEAR SNNrATOR CONNALLY: During the hearings on the Japanese Peace
Treaty, witnesses presented to the committee the interests of several different
groups of American claimants against Japan. Members of the commjttee have
indicated the desire for further information on the effect of the treaty on such
claims.
The question of claims against Japan is a complex one and involves the interests
of other categories of claimants besides those represented at the hearings- The
total of all potential claims by Americans is very large and the total of all potential
claims by persons in various nations is far beyond Japan's ability to pay. It has
been necessary, therefore, to give careful consideration to various kinds, of claims
to make as equitable provision as possible for the various groups of claimants.
In order that the committee may have the facts on the full scope of this matter
of claims, I am submitting for the eouuoittee's consideration a memorandum
explaining how the matter is dealt with in the treaty.
Sincerely yours,
JOHN FOSTER DULLrs.
[COMPENSATION FOR CLAIMS OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS FOR LosSPS )NCURRED
OUTSIDE JAPAN AS. A RESULT OF JAPANESE MILITARY OPERATIONS 4ND OCCU-
PATION
Serious consideration was given in the drefting of the peace treaty to the claims
by the Allied Powers and their nationals against Japan for losses incurred outside
Japan as a result of the Japanese military operations and the occupation by
I think we ought to have the papers on that case and see what the
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E CE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Japan of large areas of Allied territory. Japan conducted military operations
against and then occupied the Philippine Islands and a major portion of Southeast
Asia for almost 4 years, and waged war within and occupied a large part of China
for twice that period. The problem of providing compensation from existing
Japanese resources for the various public and private claims arising out of those
acts is extremely difficult, particularly since the extensive loss of life and property
and personal injuries suffered by our allies has to be considered on the same basis.
as those of the United States.
Japan ended the war deprived of its overseas possessions and of property abroad
valued at more than $3 billion and faced with the problem of supporting a growing
population out of meager natural resources and an obsolescent and war-damaged
industrial plant. It was obvious that adequate compensation by Japan for
Allied losses would submerge Japan under liabilities in excess of $100 billion.
Clearly, under the burden of such reparations obligations Japan would face a
hopeless economic situation in which its people would become an easy prey to
totalitarian exploitation, and any attempt to exact adequate compensation in the
form of foreign exchange payments would result in the imposition of an additional
burden on the United States taxpayer. As the result of Japan's inability to earn
sufficient foreign exchange to sustain a minimum standard of living, the United
States has supplied economic assistance to Japan since the surrender to the extent
of nearly $2 billion.
Our allies have recognized these facts, and they also b?y the treaty waive their
claims and those of their nationals arising out of Japan's acts in the prosecution
of the war, except for the forms of compensation provided in the treaty. Not-
withstanding these considerations, every effort was made by the drafters of the
treaty to maximize the amounts which Japan oculd pay in compensation for losses
incurred as a result of its aggression while maintaining a viable economy and the
ability to meet its other obligations.
While by article 1.4 of the treaty the Allied Powers waive all claims against
Japan on behalf of themselves and their nationals arising out of any actions taken
by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, it should
be noted that article 18 provides that the intervention of the state of war shall
not be regarded as affecting the obligations to consider on their merits claims for
for loss or damage to property or for personal. injury- or death which arose before
the existence of a state of war. The Department of State is presently reviewing
claims which have been filed with it by United States nationals with a view to,
determining which of them may be appropriately presented to the Japanese
Government under article 18. The Department, is prepared to receive additional
claims of United States nationals of this character.
By article 14 Japan agrees to enter into negotiations with Allied Powers whose
territories were o"cicpied by Japan with a view to compensation in the form of
Japanese services, and recognizes the right of each of the Allied Powers to retain
Japanese property within its jurisdiction. The United States does not benefit from
the first, which is designed to assist by services rather than by monetary com-
pensation the areas occupied by Japan in repairing the damage done. The
United States does benefit from the second provision.
In addition, by article 16 Japan agreed to transfer Japanese assets in neutral
and ex-enemy countries to the International Committee of the Red Cross for
the benefit of former prisoners of war. It was recognized that many civilian in-
t^rnec;s suffered undue hardships. However, in view of the limited funds which
will result from the liquidation of Japanese assets in neutral and ex-enemy coun-
tries, it was not practicable to deal with all cases of hardship. Prisoners of war ir
had protection under Geneva conventions not accorded to civilians and, therefore,
in the allocation of limited funds it seemed that consideration of international
morality called for recognition in the first instance of prisoners of war, as has been
done in article 16.
By article 15 of the treaty Japan undertakes to return Allied property within
Japan to the owners, and when such property has been damaged or cannot be
returned, to make compensation in yen. This provision does not give a preference
to property claims arising out of losses incurred within Japan over claims arising
elsewhere, but is based upon the practical consideration that Japan can out of its
domestic resources make whole Allied losses within Japan without impairing
its economic stability.
The satisfaction by Japan of other types of claims is necessarily limited by its
foreign assets and the services provided by articles 14 and 16.
Japanese property in the United States valued at approximately $84 million
as of October 1, 1951, has been vested by the United States. Certain debt c'aims
of United States citizens and other claims payable under the Trading With the
Enemy Act, as amended, are payable from this amount. The Office of Alien
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AID OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Property has turned over $120 million of the proceeds of the liquidation of J4pa-
nese and German assets in the United States to the War Claims Commission.
The War Claims Commission has paid out. $52 million to claimants under: the
War Claims Act of 1948.
It is not possible at, this time to venture a prediction with respect to the amounts
which may be realized from the liquidation of Japanese assets in neutral and ex-
enemy countries or the methods of distribution which will be adopted by the
International Red Cross. On September 5, 1951, at the San Francisco Coflfer-
ence, Mr. Dulles, on behalf of the United States delegation, made the follo ping
statement with reference to article 16: "* * * The United States, in response
to some Allied inquiries, has indicated that, since its own prisoners of war have
received some indemnification out of the proceeds of Japanese property we seized,
we would assume that equity would require first distribution to those who have
had no comparable indemnification."
The basic concept underlying these provisions was, first, that ac}equate com-
pensation by Japan. was impossible; second, that compensation in those forms
and amounts that were feasible should be made; third, that reparations for, war
losses is a matter between governments; and fourth, that it is the responsibility
of each government to provide such compensation to the persons enjoying its
protection as it may determine to be equitable out, of reparations received from
Japan or from other sources.
Allied Powers in whose territory United States nationals sustained property
losses may make such United States nationalseligible to receive such compgnsa-
tion as they are able to provide for war losses. It does not appear, however,`that
American nationals who sustained losses in the territories of any of the Allied
Powers can expect to receive compensation commensurate with their losses. , Ac-
cordingly, United States nationals whose claims are not covered by the treaty
provisions or by the legislation of other Allied Powers, must look for relief tp the
Congress of the United States.
Congress has provided that the proceeds of the liquidation of Japanese assets
in the United States are to be paid into a trust fund in the United States Treasury
known as the war claims fund which is available for the payment of war claims
as provided by the War Claims Act of 1948 (Public Law 896, 80th Cong., 2d sess.),
as amended.
The War Claims Act provides compensation for (1) claims arising out of the
detention, injury, disability, or death resulting from injury of employees of con-
tractors with the United States; (2) claims of American civilians who were captured
by the Japanese at Midway, Guam, Wake Island, and the Philippine Islands,
or in any territory or possession of the United States, or while in transit to or,from
any such place, or who went into hiding at any such place to avoid capture;
(3) claims of members of the military or naval forces of the United States who,
while imprisoned by the enemy, were not furnished with the quantity or quality
of food to which they were entitled as prisoners of war under the terms of the
Geneva Convention of July 27, 1949: and (4) claims of certain religious organ-
izations for reimbursement of expenditures incurred for the purpose of furnishing
aid to military personnel of the United States or to civilian American citizens
during their imprisonment or internment in the Philippines. The War Claims
Act, does not presently provide for compensation for property losses of American
nationals incurred as a result of Japanese action during World War II.
However, the War Claims Commission has recommended to Congress that
y legislation be enacted by the Congress amending the War Claims Act of 19,18 so
as to provide for the receipt, adjudication, and payment of claims resulting from
loss of life caused bythe illegel actions of an enemy government during World
War. II, and claims resulting from mistreatment. personal injury, disability, or
imnairment of health caused by the illegal actions of an enemy goverrlrnent
during World War II. It also recommended that provision be made for the
receipt and evaluation of claims for loss, datimt~.'e, destruction, or seizure of;prop-
erty, real or personal, arising out of World 1\ cr 11. The Commission further
recommended that payment be withheld in connection with property claims
until all such claims had been received and evaluated, and a determination `made
as to the amount available for 1heir settlement. The Commission is preparing a
snpnlemental report for submission to tr'e Congress which will contain. compre-
hensive recommendr,tio"s for the disposition of war claims, not authorized to be
paid under existing legislation.
Mr. ALLMAN. Thopk you Senator.
Senator GREEN. If there are no further questions, you are excused.
'Fhe. next witness is Mrs. Frederick Griswold.
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1
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
STATEMENT OF MRS. FREDERICK GRISWOLD, VICE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL
Mrs. GRISwOLD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss certain
aspects of the treaty.
Senator GREEN. Please state first who you are and whom you
represent.
Mrs. GRISWOLD. I am Enid Hall Griswold from New York. I
represent the National Economic Council in New York. I would
like to discuss certain aspects of this treaty which I have not heard
touched upon at all this morning which, in my estimation, are ex-
tremely dangerous.
From a reading of the treaty I find that the proposed Japanese
Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty have two dangerous provisions,
both of which tie Japan very closely into world government, and give
the United States of America rights in the Pacific only as a segment
of the United Nations. This treaty fails to provide any military
security for the United States in the, Pacific and it has clauses which
could actually work out greatly to the advantage of Red China-not
our friends, Nationalist China--and to the Soviet Republic.
The preamble of the peace treaty commits Japan to becoming a
member of the United Nations, agreeing, and I quote-
in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations to realize the ojbectives of the universal declaration of human rights; to
seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in
articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by
post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and com-
merce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.
This provision has two important efoets. It establishes Japan as
a segment of world government, committed to a world welfare state.
It also constitutes formal approval by the United States Senate of
the declaration of human rights, the international declaration of
human rights, which is quite different from our American concept of
human rights, the social welfare clauses, articles 55 and 56 of the
United Nations Charter, and of interational trade agreements which
are still to be negotiated.
You must remember we have already had one case out in the State
of California where the court decided that merely because you gentle-
men of the Senate had ratified the United Nations Charter, the laws
of the State of California and the Federal laws of the United States
of America had been invalidated.
Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter commit, signatory
powers to promote, and I quote again:
higher standards of living, fuller employment, solutions of international economic
social health, and related problems, to aid international cultural and educational
cooperation, universal observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all, without distinctions as to race, sex, language, religion-
and so forth. This provision limits Japan's future development,
political, economic, and cultural, to the framework as instituted under
the United Nations.
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The second major issue is the military provisions which tie the
present and future United States forces and bases in Japan into the
military framework of the United Nations. This can be seen plainly
only by looking at both the peace treaty and the security treaty
together.
Chapter 3 of the peace treaty provides that Japan accepts the
obligations in article 2, section 5 of the United Nations Charter, and
I quote:
(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it tales in
accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any state
against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.
Under article 2 of the United Nations Charter Japan shall continue
to aid the American forces in Korea in a war sponsored by the United
Nations, but if the United Nations should accept the Communist
peace terms in Korea and we did not, a not impossible situation,
Japan would be barred from assisting its in any way under section 4
which says, and I quote:
All members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
If we are in agreement with the United. Nations we can have
Japanese support, but if a left-wing government comes into power
in France and a few other countries, we could not move a single man
or a single weapon or any supplies whatsoever through any Japanese
territory.
To understand the full potential of this clause we must read-it in
connection with the security treaty between the United States and
Japan. In that treaty, article I, Japan grants the United States the
right to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about
Japan; but in article 4, it says that--
this treaty shall expire whenever, in the opinion of the Governments of the
United States of America and Japan, there shall have come into force such
United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance,
by the United Nations or otherwise, of international peace and security in the
Japanese area.
This means in unmistakable language that whenever the present
American Government wished to transform our land, sea, and air
forces in the Pacific entirely into United Nations forces, all right to
keep any special United States forces there would come to an immedi-
ate end. The administration, if they should decide this transforma-
tion was satisfactory, without any consultation whatever with the
Senate or the House of Representatives, could effect it. Our right to
keep troops in and about Japan can be ended in a moment by either
the President or the Secretary of State.
Perhaps it is part of the detailed plan to end our rights in this area.
This treaty really gives the United States nothing tangible. Every
concession by Japan is made to the United Nations rather than to us.
We may be unable in a short time to take any steps for our defense in
the Pacific except through the United Nations chain of command,
which includes the, Soviet Union and its satellites,
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Another clause which needs special attention is the provision for
reparations and I consider this extremely important. The peace
treaty provides in article 14 (a) that Japan is to pay reparations for
war damage in the form of labor, of production, salvaging, and other
work for the Allied Powers in question. Raw materials are to be
supplied by the Allied Powers. This provision is hailed as a great
forward step over monetary reparations but it is certainly not very
clear to me just how. If the Japanese perform labor for their former
enemies, someone must pay their wages. If these come out of the
Japanese economy they are identical with any other monetary repara-
tions in lowering the standard of living of the Japanese.
If there are hidden agreements by which these wages are to be paid
by us, the people of the United States, in some form not yet revealed,
or by the United Nations, will ours be the principal contribution?
It hardly seems possible that we are told the whole story and that
the Japanese would consent to so slight a change from reparations
which destroyed the peace of Europe after World War I.
This brings us to China; the country with the greatest claim for
reparations is China. China is also the country with the largest
supply of raw materials and without means to process them and with
the greatest need for both consumer and capital goods.
The treaty is conveniently silent about who is sovereign in China.
The administration has already at times expressed willingness to let
Red China into the United Nations pro-vided it is not an aggressor
nation.
In other words, the moment a peace treaty is signed in Korea, Red
China can again apply for admission to the United Nations and be
eligible for billions of dollars worth of Japanese labor set to producing
war equipment of all kinds.
Japan's economy is geared to Chinese raw materials and Chinese
markets. Such a provision. could, during a peace lull in Asia, permit
the arming of Red China at a rate far faster than either the Red
Chinese or the Russians could possibly accomplish.
There is so far no commitment by Japan to recognize the sover-
eignty of our -friends, the Nationalist Government of China, over
continental China. There is a public statement by the Premier that
he will recognize the sovereignty of Formosa but he is not definite
whether that means only over Formosa, or over the mainland, also.
it would be very easy for the masters of general and vague statements
to leave that point quite unsettled. Japan is soon to hold elections
and here we have a perfect opportunity for fifth-column violence or
merely Communist political skill in winning a majority. What,
exactly, would be the position of the United States militarily if a
socialist or Communist majority should come into office legally after
this treaty was signed?
We know perfectly well that the objectives of Communist penetra-
tions into Korea were to get a base for the attack on Japan. Japan..
with its modern industrial power and its strategic position over th
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JAPANESE PEACE TR.E. A\1 I I
whole Pacific area is Russia's real target. This treaty does nothing
to weaken Russia's power in the Pacific. It even adds to its virtual
possessions of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, each only a stone's throw
from Japan's most northern islands. No experienced observer could
possibly be taken in by the stage-managed objections of Soviet
Russia to the peace treaty. Anyone who has heard Molotov, Vishin-
sky, or Malik in the United Nations could not possibly be fooled by
any of their performances.
At best the two treaties make Japan a segment of world goverment
and give us rights only as we occupy the same position.
At worst, the treaty greatly strengthens the position of the Soviet
Union in the Pacific area.
OBJECTIONS TO UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGIITS
As I consider that the tying of this peace treaty to this Universal.
Declaration of Human Rights, it is of tremendous importance. In
fact, I think the whole scope of this treaty is very, very far i eaehing.
I would like to ask the distinguished members of this committee
whether you have ever had the time to realty read and study this
Universal Declaration of human Rights?
It is a most amazing charter of social, political, and. economic so-
'called rights for all mankind and I believe that in ratifying this treaty
as it now stands, it would be plain later that you had approved and
accepted this Declaration of lluma.n Rights.
I do not believe it was intended. to be merely an expression of high-
,sounding ideals. I believe it has been cleverly phrased and devised
as a means of draining off the resources of the American people. I
am sure some of you may consider this a very extravagant statement.
But what other nations belonging to this sups;?gevarnmerit, the
United Nations, possess the resources, together w,;,_i the ability to
produce wealth, which are to be found in the United States of Ameerica?
What other nation would be willing or so naive as to expend so
generously and so extravagantly its substance?
I venture to answer my own. question in the negative. None,
among then all.
Besides this world bill of rights is a complete contradiction -of our
United States Bill of Rights embodied in our Constitution. )t is a
complete contradiction of our principles of government, for our Bill
of Rights reserves to the individual citizen certain specific inalienable
rights, and upon those rights government may not trespass. You,
who are in the Senate and in our Congress, are the servants :of the
people for, under our Constitution, the power still remains in the
hands of the people the people, high and low, rich and pool-, who
have placed their confidence in you as their agents to do their will
and to protect their interests both at home and abroad.
In taking office, having sworn Co uphold the Constitution of the
United States, do you have the authority to nullify this great docu-
ment and place all power and authority in the hands of thesuper-
government which includes representatives of many countries, whose
nationals are unfamiliar -with and quite uncomprehending of our way
of life and our concepts of human liberty?
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PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
ALLEGED DANGERS IN THE TREATY
I wish you would consider whether you wish to further bind the
American people in intolerable foreign entanglements such as I
believe this treaty will prove to be. We have had our Tehran, our
Yalta, our Potsdam, and we don't know yet just what Korea holds
in store for us.
I feel that these have all been betrayals of our citizens and of our
men who fought so valiantly to preserve peace and to bring harmony
to mankind. I do not believe an agreement such as this can bring
peace and security to the world, for peace can be won only through
courageous and upright dealings. Security, must be earned, it can-
not be arbitrarily granted to any people or any nation. To me that
is one of the most fundamental things in our American character and
our American principle of government.
We were once afforded the opportunity to know Hitler's plans for
world conquest far in advance of his assault upon other countries,
but we could not believe Mein Kampf. Lenin also wrote down his.
plans for all of us to read. In his book Marxism and the Colonial
Question you will find the blueprint for the conquest of the Far East
and. for the eventual subjugation. of the West and of the entire earth,
to the godless doctrine of the dictations, and the complete enslave
meet of world communism.
We have been following this plan which was long ago laid out to
entrap us, and thus far we have obediently pursued it step by step.
Must we go further or shall we recognize the dangers in this treaty
for what they are and while there is still time try to retrace some of
the disastrous steps which we havo> taken.
I should like to urge the Senators on this committee to weigh care-
fully the provisions of this treaty which so enmesh our Government
and our destiny with the other nations of the world. Should we not,
instead of this, on a realistic approach have a treaty which guards and
upholds the inter.'sts of the American people?
I believe it was for America that our soldiers fought and died and
brought victory in the Pacific. Let's not throw that victory away.
Senator GREEN. Are there any questions?
RELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I have one observation to'"make.
The question you raise about the human rights declaration hasj;been
raised before, and the committee is having a statement from the
framers of the treaty-the ones concerned with this-as to just what
this meant.
I want to call attention to the fact that it is only referred to in the
preamble where it says:
to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
That is, Japan does that. There is no obligation for Japan in the
obligational clauses.
It is just that one reference, but we are going to hava for the record
a complete statement from Mr. Dulles himself, who has made a long
study of this, as to just what the significance is.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 153
Mrs. GRISWOLD. I am very much interested in this, but of course
in the case that was decided out in California it was decided merely
on the human rights clauses in the United Nations Charter.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am aware of that and that will be
considered in this statement to be put in the record.
(Tire following statement was subsequently supplied by Mr. Dulles:)
MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE Ri FERl:NCE IN THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
TO THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION Or HUMAN hIGHTS
There is nothing in the peace treaty which wakes human rights it matter of
international contract or which gives any Allied nation the right to interfere in
Japan's internal affairs on account of human rights. There is no article of the
treaty which mentions human rights.
The preamble of the treaty contains a number of declarations of intention as is
customary and one of these is a statement by Japan that she intends "to strive
to realize the objectives of the universal declaration of human rights." Some
wanted the treaty to include a legal obligation to respect human rights ahd
fundamental freedoms. This was done in the case of the Italian and satellite
treaties. However, there has developed in the United States considerable objec-
tion to trying to make human rights a matter of enforceable treaty obligatFrln
because, under our Constitution, treaties become "the supreme law of the lacici"
and a treaty on human rights might perhaps impair States' rights in relation to
this subject. Therefore, we did not make human rights a matter of treaty
obligation.
However, almost all of the nations of the world, except the Soviet bloc, h4ve
accepted the universal declaration of human rights as a statement of worthy
objectives and the Japanese wanted to be in the same category. Also, almost"all
of the provisions of this declaration are already engrafted in the Japanese Con-
stitution adopted during the occupation.
It would be rather absurd for the United States to oppose Japan's making the
kind of declaration of intent that she wanted and that other free nations have
made.
Mrs. GRISWOLD. I think that is tremendously important, Senator.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. The other question I wanted to ask
you is: Are you advocating the complete turn-down of this treaty
by the Senate and a new start on peace in Japan?
Mrs. GrtISwoLD. I believe it should be written so that it guards the
interests of the United States. I don't think we should be so en-
meshed in this United Nations Organization that we cannot take a step
on our own.
The United Nations Charter in one place says it is an organization
of sovereign nations.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You are implying that those who
participated from the United States in getting this treaty together
were not considering the interests of the United States?
Mrs. GRISWOLD. I do not think they considered our interest3 as
paramount. I certainly do riot. I think they considered them only
m connection with other nations and that they would be definitely
:subordinated in the interests of the United Nations as a whole.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. We e are glad indeed to have your
views even though some of us may not agree fully.
Senator HICKENLOOPElr. NIr. Chairman, I merely want to say to
Mrs. Griswold that I think several of us are concerned about deciara-
tions in a treaty of this kind which may affect our constitutional
provisions internally in this country.
The California case, to which you refer, while we might disagree
with the logic of that decision-1 haven't fully made up my mind-
tend to disagree with the logic of the decision in the California case
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154 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
that is, the logic, of the court, and of course it is the court's business,
and not mine. But nevertheless I think we are concerned, in the
light of that decision as to what effect certain declarations in a treaty
may have in superseding the, internal limitations or provisions of the
Constitution-
I assure you that point will be examined.
Mrs. CGinswor,n. I assume that eventually the Senators will take up
the question of treaty making anyway, because that seems to have
become a very i_nportant matter, whether they are going to-change our
Constitution. or whether they are not going to be permitted to do so.
Senator BREWSTER. It was suggested on the agenda that you
might present certain reservations. Have you incorporated those
reservations?
Mrs. GRISwoLD. In my written statement; yes. 't'hank you,.
Senator.
Senator GREEN. Thank you. Next, is Mr. Frederick J. Libby.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J LIBBY, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR
PREVENTION OF WAR
1\'[r. Linny. I am Frederick J. Libby, executive secretary for the
National Council for the, Prevention of War, with headquarters in
Washington.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, I support the ratification of the proposed treaty with Japan
and the correlative pacts, but possibly from a different point of view
from that of some, at least, of the members of your committee. It is
not because I look upon the terms as just and enduring that I support
ratification, but because I think they will serve well enought to meet
the immediate situation until the .inevitable changes in the direction of
equal justice can be made.
Some 15 years ago, in May 1936, to be exact, I saw in the papers
several paragraphs of a speech that had been made at Princeton on the
topic, "Peaceful change within the society of nations." I had never
heard of the speaker, but, I wrote him and got a copy of the speech.
It revolutionized my thinking on peace, although I had at that time
been working in, the cause of peace since 1921.
'I he theme was simple: That peace is not the maintenance of any
status quo, The world is a world of change. No status quo will
endure. The attempt to perpetuate things as they are is the road to
war; or revolution. since violent change results when pressures are
dammed up until they become irresistible.
Peace, on the other hand, is the name we give to peaceful change,
when we permit the forces that are pressing for change to find an
outlet without violence.
I was so impressed by this spcecli that. I sought out the speaker
and, with his permission, distributed 100,000 reprints of it. The
man that made that speech was John Foster Dulles.
I want to begin. my brief statement by congratulating Mr. Dulles on
his success in eliminating punitive clauses from this treaty and above
all, in giving it sufficient flexibility to permit the peaceful change that
lie rightly says is essential in a true treaty of peace.
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It is from this standpoint that I support ratification. The. Japan
Treaty will not endure for 50 years, nor for 10 years, not 5 years, nor
should it endure at all, unless it proves to he to the mutual advantage
of all parties concerned.
NI.r. Dulles has said that Communist tyranny has within itsglf the
seeds of its own destruction, because the hunger for liberty is one of
the compelling impulses of human nature that will not permanently be
denied. I think he is wrong in expecting Japan to refrain from trading
with Communist China until this principle has worked. But the
principle is sound and applies to this treaty. Insofar as the treaty rests
solely on the military and neonon).ic power of the United St.ttes and is
contrary to the enlightened self-interest of the Japanesee people', it is
foredoomed to revision, either by peaceful agreement or through
violent overthrow at extremist instigation, either of the left or the, right.
As M r. Dulles says in the. little book he wrote in 1950 on somi'what
the same theme, entitled "War or Peace":
Change is the law of life. If we set; up barriers to all change, we make itcertain
that there will be violent and explosive change. Peace must be a conditio4 where
international changes can be made peacefully.
POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE TREATY
Now what are some of the changes in this treaty, which may, fairly
be called inevitable, tither by peaceful means or by violence? ,
1. The Japanese people must have, more independence than the
treaty actually gives them, fine phrases to the contrary. They must
not look upon themselves as puppets of the United States, either
economically or militarily. Americans, in the light of our ,history, can
hardly conceive of Japan's acceptance, on it long-term basis, of sub-
servience to the United States, such as many Japanese and. many
Americans see in the military and economic terms of the treaty and
pact. Could there, be any better handle for the growing Communist.
Party in. Japan to take hold of, for stirring up violent change, khan a
cry for independence?
Your first concern, it seems to me, after the treaty and pacts have
been ratified, should be to solve the problem of Japan's l.iberatioyi from
dependence on its.
You may find thst this goal cannot be attained except as you push
to fruition the Flanders resolution for universal disarmament,' which
some of you have signed, but on which your committee. has as yet
taken no action. It is the only solution of many problems that are
troubling all nations.
THE BATTLE ACT AND CHINESE-JAPANESE TRADE
2. Let us take up next the economic; strait-jacket which Mr. Dulles
says is not imposed by any secret pressure the State Department is.
exerting on Mr. Yoshida but is due to our Battle Act, which prohibits
nations that are receiving our aid from trading with Coro) nunist
nations.
The Washington Post, in an editorial last Tuesday, January 22,
discussed the stupidity of cutting off Japan's trade with Communist.
China with a realism, which your committee would do well to take
tinder consideration. [Reading:]
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Certainly, if the Japanese cut off all commerce with mainland China, we shall
have to carry Japan on our backs indefinite l,v. Such a state of economic mendi-
caney and political satellitism will sit well neither on the American taxpayer nor
upon the proud people of Japan.
It is denied that the State Department exerted any pressure in getting this
letter out of Premier Yoshida. The denial squares neither with the circumstances
nor with Japanese characteristics, as is shown by the article that Mr. Yoshida
wrote in Foreign Affairs 12 months ago. "lied or white," he said, "China remains
our next-door neighbor. * * * Economic law will, I believe, prevail in the
long run over any ideological differences." V
The Yoshida letter to Mr. Dulles, of course, is a pledge binding only NIr. Yo-
shida. It is said that his signature is equivalent to his political death warrant.
The man who will come after, the estimable Yoshida (who, assuredly would not
have recogriized the Peking regime formally if he had been left on his own) may
not be so accommodating; and, in any case, the letter, whether upheld or dis-
carded, will bedevil the relations between the two countries, and there should be
no mistake about it.
I might add, the Now York Times on January ll of this year took
a similar position [reading]:
But the problem of trade with China which drove Japan to war with that coun-
try continues to weight heavily on a nation suffering from serious population
pressure, and it will take steadfast determination to resist new temptations. In
this circumstance complete restoration of Japan's freedom as a nation and its
return to the normal trade channels and. raw-material resources of the world seems
to provide the best and perhaps the only solution.
The Battle Act is an. obstacle to peace which can be removed by
Congress under the leadership of your committee. Japan cannot live
happily and securely on the present war boom occasioned by the
United Nations war in Korea nor on the United States dole under any
name. This is not independence. This is economic slavery.
Our tariff arrangements constitute another potential economic
hurdle for Japan that could deprive her people of the decent living
standard they will rightfully demand. Possessing meager economic
resources and producing only a part of the necessities of life for its
84,000,000 people, Japan subsisted on a low living standard, even
when the riches of Manchuria were at its disposal. Now, confined to
four islands, Japan, as the Congress must recognize it, will have, to
export and import on a large scale to survive.
Already our fisheries industry has taken alarm at the prospect of
the importation into our country of the products of Japan's fisheries.
Our textile industries, and even more the British textile industries,
have begun crying for limitations on Japan's sale of textiles in com-
petition with those of the Allies. Strong pressure will be brought to
bear on Congress to exclude or limit to a trickle Japan's sale of fish
and textiles, not only in our country but in competition with our t
exports in the world market.
Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Libby, have you seen the fish agreement
that has been worked out?
Mr. LIBBy. I have not.
Senator BREWSTER. There is an agreement which I know has been
consummated, but I do not know just what its status is in dealing with
this matter.
Mr. LIBBY. I will be happy to see it. You have to watch that.
It will be the responsibility of your committee-will it not?-to
maintain the long look-ahead and see to it that a continuing policy of
"live and let live" succeeds the ratification of this treaty.
The promises that are male to one's foes during a war to induce
their people to surrender are commitments that should not be for-
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JAPANESE PEACE TREAT ND ( A
gotten, as men have forgotten the solemn declaration of President
Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill on August 14, 1941, which was signed in
January 1942 by all of our allies. It goes down in history as the
Atlantic Charter.
Paragraph 4 reads as follows:
They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further
enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal
terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world, which are needed for
their economic prosperity.
POSSIBILITY OF JAPANESE REARMAMENT
3. And now we come to what seems to many Americans as well as
many of the Japanese people a: shocking violation of the Japanese
Constitution, which Japan is required to ignore as a condition of our
continued economic aid.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you will recall, I
think, that. General MacArthur's testimony before the Congress on
May 5 contained a moving account of the origin of the section of the
constitution to which I allude.
Being asked by a Member of the Senate for some formula to "settle
the whole matter," General MacArthur replied:
It is the abolition of war. When their [the Japanese] Prime Minister came to
me--Mr. Shidehara--and said "I have long contemplated and believed"-and he
was a very wise old man; he died recently--"long contemplated and believed that
the only solution to this problem is to do away with war.
He said: "With great reluctance I advance the subject to you, as a military
man, because I am convinced that you would not accept it"; but, he said, "I
would like to endeavor, in the constitution we are drawing up, to put in such a
provision."
And I couldn't help getting up and shaking hands with the old man, and telling
him that I thought that was one of the greatest constructive steps that could
possibly be taken. I told him that it was quite possible that the world Would
mock him-this is a debunking age, a cynical age, as you know-that they would
not accept it; that it would be an object of derision, which it was; that it would
take great moral stamina to go through with it, and in the end they might not
be able to hold the line; but I encouraged him, and they wrote that provision in.
And, if there was any one provision in that constitution which appealed to the
popular sentiment of the people of Japan, it was that provision.
The requirement that Japan rearm in violation of her constitution
raises three important questions:
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Libby, I do not recall any, pro-
vision in the treaty requiring Japan to rearm.
Mr. LIBBY. I read quotations of what people understand is follow-
ing from the treaty.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You say there is a requirement for
Japan to rearm. As far as I know, it does not appear in the tri,,aty.
Mr. LIBBY. Let me turn to the treaty.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You would not say that Japan would
not be entitled to protect herself against attack from the outside
world; would you?
Mr. LIBBY. What I have in mind, Senator, is article 6, in which we
read:
Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of
foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral
or multilateral agreements which have. been or may be made between one or more
of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.
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Now, you are correct in saying that that is a requirement of our
troops, but may I just finish as to how people are reading it?
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. This, as you know, was the back-
ground of the security treaty which was to keep Japan from being
invaded or aggressed against by Russia.
Mr. LIBBY. I know, but may I just finish?
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You go ahead.
Mr. LIBBY. First, can she afford it? Mr. Dulles has fought hard,
is his negotiations with the countries which Japan overran, to save
Japan from being ruined by reparations which she cannot carry, and
which would ultimately come back upon the American taxpayers.
However, in her present improverished state, is it not probable that
the costs of rearmament will be so heavy a burden that living will be
depressed to a point that may be dangerous?
BEST METHOD FOR STOPPING COMMUNISM
This leads directly to a second question intimately related to the
first. This is the fundamental question how the spread of communism
is to be halted. The foreign policy of our Government since March
1947 has been the Truman doctrine, the underlying theory of which
is that communism can be stopped by military means. "The Com-
munists recognize nothing but force" has been the governing slogan.
Our organization has fought this theory from its first announcement.
We have maintained that the only way to defeat communism is to
offer a better program, and that America has this better program to
offer. We have maintained that communism thrives in misery and
want; and, therefore, that militarism, which lowers living standards
instead of raising them, plays into the hands of the Communists.
The Marshall plan and the point 4 proposal were sound, but both have
been subordinated to military considerations.
We believe that our Government and your committee, as the body
which is primarily responsible with the President for the direction of
our foreign policy, should now shift the emphasis, not only in our
relations with Japan but also in our relations with Europe, from
military aid to economic aid. The present concentration on arms is
ruining the economies of other nations as well as our own and is
alienating peoples everywhere because of the growing conviction
that our Government intends war, a war which we cannot win any
more than the Russians can.
UNITED STATES USE OF JAPAN AS A BASE
But there is a third aspect of this rearmament program that is
undermining the cordial relations between Japan and the United
States, which General MacArthur has done so much to cement.
Mr. Hanson Baldwin, in the New York Times of September 2 last,
published a two-column article under the headline "Japan now
cornerstone of United States Pacific strategy." The subhead was
similar: "She is destined to fill the gap in our defense against aggres-
sion."
The article goes on to discuss Japan as our "bastion," "a base for
United States power," and says:
For some time to come, Japan's chief military importance will be as a United
States base-
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but eventually, if all goes well, we can shift from our shoulders
to Japan s shoulders-
some of the burden of a strategic defense of the Pacific.
Now, Mr. Chairman, this is in partial answer to your question.
Is it not plain from this and many other similar articles that have
appeared in the American press that our Government is using Japan
for our purposes-for our military purposes?
Would any self-respecting people willingly tolerate being used like
that by a foreign power? Walter Lippmann in his column last Tues-
day, under the title "Some Self-Examination," took up this subject.
Must we not agree with him when lie warns us that we must not treat
Asian peoples as "pawns in the strategic policy of military contain
ment"?
That will not work-
lie continued-
that is what is not working now. That is the main cause of the immense Asisn
feeling against us. The people there believe- -and those who can read or listen
to what is so commonly said in Congress and elsewhere find much to support
them--that we think of them as means to our ends-noble ends, no doubt, but
still our ends.
He ended this important column on the note that the peoples in
Asia and Africa, to whom independence is now more important than
life itself, understand by independence --
not merely universal suffrage or even a better standard of life but, above all, a
new, personal self-respect.
Mr. Chairman, if our Government had borne this in mind the past
2 years in its dealings with Red China and, specifically, had refrained
from contemptuous treatment of China's delegate to the United Nam
tions, Dr. Wu, the world might have been spared the costly experience
we are having now in Korea. The nations of Asia are clearly de-
termined to be treated henceforth as equals. And this holds for
China and India, as well as for Japan. Words will not deceive them.
Only deeds will win their friendship.
These, Mr. Chairman, are my reflections, in qualified support of
the Japanese Treaty. I hope it may be the basis for its own revision
and for a fundamental change in our foreign policy, from leading an
arms race to leading all nations in disarmament, which is the only
hope of prosperity and of enduring peace through the processes and
methods of the United States.
Senator GREEN. Are there any questions to ask of Mr. Libby?
If not, we thank you very much for coining.
- The hour at which I said we would have to adjourn is past and there
are some witnesses still to be heard; so we will reassemble at 2 o'clock
this afternoon in this room.
(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. in., the committee adjourned to reconvene
in the same room at 2 p. m.).
AFTERNOON SESSION
(The committee reconvened at 2 p. in., Senator Guy M. Gillette
presiding.)
Senator GILLETTE. The committee will come to order. The com-
mittee meets pursuant to the recess taken over the noon period.
Mr. Alfred Kohlberg.
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1F)~ TA E E ATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Mr. KOHLBERG. Yes, Sir.
Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Kohlberg, will you take the stand?
Mr. KOHLBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Kohlberg, you are on the list of witnesses
that have asked to appear, and we will be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF ALFRED KOHLBERG
Mr. KOHLBERG. I appreciate appearing here, Mr. Chairman, and
I want to say I would like to take the suggestion of Mr. O'Day and
submit in writing for the record and without reading the letter to
Senator Connally asking that I appear here. Attached to it is five
pages of comment and questions on particular sections of the treaty,
and then a letter to Mr. Dulles dated August 9 last and his answer
referring to two particular sections of the treaty, because in my
questions and comment I quoted from the letter and I think the letter
should be there complete so that nothing seems to be taken out of
context.
Senator GILLETTE. Is there any objection to including this matter
in the record?
Mr. KOHLBERG. I would appreciate it.
Senator GILLETTE. It will be included.
Mr. KOHLBERG. Thank you very much, sir.
(The documents above referred to are as follows:)
Senator TOM CONNALLY, JANUARY 17, 1952,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
MY DEAR MR. CONNALLY! Because of 36 years of business, and travel in, and
study of, the Far East, and because I represent a viewpoint with some following
in this country, I respectfully request an opportunity to testify before your com-
mittee during the hearings on the Japanese Peace Treaty.
Meantime I take the liberty of enclosing questions on certain points that do not
seem clear to me. I trust these may be clarified during the hearings.
Awaiting your pleasure, I beg to remain,
Sincerely yours,
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
GENERAL COMMENT AND QUESTIONS
1. This treaty has been hailed as a treaty of reconciliation. One of the great-
est, if not the greatest, stumbling blocks on the road to Japanese-American re-
conciliation is the Japanese exclusion law.
January 6, 1952, in his 300 newspapers, George E. Sokolsky said:
"I can say, from my own long experience in Asia that if we spent billions upon
billions on that continent to make ourselves popular and to engage the good will
of these peoples, we shall fail as long as those peoples believe that we are superior
because of race."
A repeal of the Exclusion Act, putting Japan on the quota basis, the same as
China, passed both the Eightieth and Eighty-first Congress in the House, but
failed of passage in the Senate. Could such a repeal be added as an amendment
to the treaty, or at least passed by the Senate concurrently?
2. Which China shall Japan recognize?
Mr. Dulles is reported to have stated that the Foreign Minister of Nationalist
China originally proposed the solution of having neither China at San Francisco
and letting Japan sign up with one of them later. As Mr. Dulles did not visit
Formosa he must have learned this second hand, if he made the statement. The
Chinese deny it.
It is reported that when Senator Jenner made his original broadcast he was
informed that the Japanese would sign up with the Nationalist Chinese before we
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND A I
ratified the treaty. Walter Trohan reported this in the Times Herald of August
30, 1951. Is this correct and why has it not been done? Japanese visiting Wash-
ington have reported that Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in late No-
vember, advised the Japanese Government to delay action on this matter. Is
that true?
3. By a vote of 91 to 0 on January 23, 1951, the Senate resolved "that the
Communist Chinese Government should not be admitted to membership in the
U. N." Would Japanese recognition of Iced China act as a counterweight to the
vote of 91 Senators?
4. Stalin's New Year's greetings to the Japanese people make it seem plausible
that we fell into a trap when Secretary Acheson replaced Percy C. Spender of
Australia as chairman at San Francisco last September. Did it give Stblin an
apparent basis for charging Acheson's steamroller prevented his people from
offering "trade and peace," as they wished?
1. Preamble
What is the meaning of the promise by Japan "to strive to realize the objectives
of the universal declaration of human rights"? Is that a pledge or a pious hope
only? How. will Japan strive so that "everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including
food, clothing, housing, and medical care * * *?" Does that impose social-
ism?
In reply to a question as to this human rights declaration in the treaty, ~enator
Dulles wrote me, August 11, 1951:
"In respect to the declaration of human rights, there were many who wanted to
incorporate that as a treaty obligation. I feel as you do that we should nht force
upon the Japanese obligations which the United States itself may quite likely be
unwilling to assume. Therefore, the reference to the human rights declaration
was not incorporated in the treaty proper as an obligation. The preamble states
that Japan will `strive to realize the objectives of universal declaration of human
rights' but there is no treaty obligation on Japan in this respect."
If this is not an obligation assumed by Japan, but only an indefinite hope,
would it not be better to delete this clause to avoid later Communist charges of
treaty breaking?
Chapter II, arlic ie 2
Paragraph C: Japanese renunciation to title to the southern half of Sakhalin
and the Kurile Islands is based on the secret Treaty of Yalta. Both areas are
now in the hands of the Soviet Union. To the knowledge of the writer no ,sound
justification of this cession has ever been made. The promises of the Yalta
agreement have long since been broken by Russia.
On this subject, Mr. Dulles wrote me as follows on August 11, 1951:
"With reference to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, they are deal with pursuant
to the provisions of the Potsdam surrender terms that, "* * * , apanese
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku,
and such minor islands as we determine." These Potsdam. surrender terms were
formulated without Soviet participation, the participants being Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek. The treaty expresses renunciation by Japan
conforming to that. However, there is no cession of the Kuriles or South akhalin
to the Soviet Union, or other endorsement of the Yalta provisions in this respect.
Furthermore, the draft treaty provides that "* * * the present treit?y shall
not confer any rights, titles. or benefits on any state which is not an Allied power
as herein defined; nor shall any right, title, or interest of Japan be deemed to be
diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the treaty in favor of a state which
is not an Allied power as so defined." "Allied power" includes only states which
sign and ratify this treaty, and as you point out there is "unlikelihood of, Russian
acceptance of the treaty."
Was this sop to the Soviet Union put in as bait to get Soviet signature to the
treaty? Tf so, was it not naive in view of the fact that the Soviet Union now holds
these territories? In short, it has those nine points of law that reside in possession.
The case of the Kuriles is especially pertinent, as they break the American
defense line in the Pacific announced by Secretary Acheson in his press statement
of January 5, 1950. The defense line he sketched from Alaska to the Philippines
was broken by the omission of the Kuriles and of Formosa.
Should not some positive provision re the Kuriles be inserted in the treaty,
looking to their restoration to Japan or to us, or alternatively, should not the
present provision be struck from the treaty, leaving the situation fluid?
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It should be noted that the phraseology "Japan renounces all right, title, and
claim" to Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles is a vague phrasing
that. contains the germ of future conflicting claims. In the original draft this
phraseology was used for Formosa and the Pescadores, while in the case of Sak-
halin and the Kuriles they were "ceded to the Soviet Union." On objection of
the Chinese Nationalists this was changed. This leaves the final disposition un-
certain whereas in the very next paragraph (par. d) a definite disposition of the
mandates is provided. Why not change paragraph B to read "Japan cedes all
right, title,. and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China,"
the exact phraseology of the declaration of Cairo? And delete paragraph C?
Chapter III, article 6
This article does not mention the military forces of the Soviet Union now sta-
tioned in Japan, said to number about; 60, in all. If the U. S. S. R. is an occupying
power, who can force them to withdraw their force, or prevent them from increas-
ing same to any extent, once the treaty has come into effect and we are no longer
an occupying power? Could not the United States undertake the removal of
all occupation forces when the "security treaty" is confirmed?
Chapter IV, article 7
Paragraph (b) : Does this not permit the various Allied Powers to cut off Japan
from normal trade relations with former Japanese and Allied controlled areas which
are normal and needed Japanese markets and sources of supply? If Japan is to
stand on its own feet, should it be so excluded?
Chapter IV, article 9
Fisheries: Could not this agreement to negotiate provide for arbitration by
the International Court, or other body, in case of long-continued disag_ reement?
Chapter IV, article 12
Paragraph (a) : A reading of articles 21, 23, and 25 seems to exclude both Chinas
(Nationalist and Communist) from the list of Allied Powers and hence from the
terms of this article and of the entire treaty except for articles 10 and 10 (a) (2).
Do not these articles make it impossible for Japan to sign completely with Nation-
alist China, even if it wished to?
Chapter V, article 14
What will be the status of Japan's prewar foreign debt? The language on this
point seems somewhat obscure.
Chapter V, article 18
The same question as under article 14 arises here.
Chapter V, article 23
Does this permit the treaty to come into effect without ratification of the
United States Senate? And would we have to withdraw our forces from Japan
within 90 days after it came into effect in this manner?
Chapter V, article 24
Which paragraph (b) is referred to in the next to the last line of this article?
Chapter V, article 25
Again the question arises as to the status of the Soviet Union if it fails to qualify
as an allied power under the terms of this treaty, but chooses to continue as an
occupying power?
QUESTIONS ON BILATERAL SECURITY ACREEMENT WITH JAPAN
Article 1.-Why are United States forces in Japan limited to use of Japanese
basis for "maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and
to the security of Japan"? Why not usable for offensive action against the
U. S. S. R. or Red China if present Korean negotiations break down?
Also why limited to internal action in Japan only if riots and disturbances are
caused by an outside power? How can that be proven or determined?
Article 3.-Will bases and conditions agreed on be sufficient for the United
States forces during the Korean war even if same becomes an all-out war with
Red China and the U. S. S. R.?
Will the use of bases for atom bombers or others be restricted to cases approved
by Japan, as in the recent agreement between President Truman and Prime
Minister Churchill?
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 163
Mr. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Office of the Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
My DEAR MR. DULLES: I greatly appreciate your letter of August 8 and am
happy to know that the rumors that I heard were inaccurate, and that you would
not have hesitated for the sake of the anti-Communist cause to have remonstrated
with me directly.
Other friends, who are equally anti-Communist, have remonstrated with me,
as they think some of the charges I have made are too extreme. In each instance
I have suggested they point to charges which they think go too far, and have
offered, if they will point to one or two of them, to prove the particular charge.
They all agree that the truth should not be suppressed, but in the several instances
when this has come up, they have not been able, or have not taken the trouble,
to point to a charge which they think is inaccurate. If you have noticed,any
public statement of mine which you think inaccurate, I would be happy to prove
it, as I think, contrary to the opinion of some others, that I have been extremely
careful.
There are two matters in the Japanese Peace Treaty which have puzzled.me.
The first is the writing in of the requirements of the U. N. bill of human rights,
which we seem thereby to be forcing on the Japanese, although it is very question-
able whether our own Senate will confirm it when it finally comes before them.
The other is the question of cession of the Kuriles and South Sakhalin. Why
they should be forced on the Japanese, in view of the unlikelihood of Itusoian
acceptance of the treaty, also puzzles me. Both questions, I am sure, will arise
when the treaty finally comes before the Senate. I wonder if you are free to
explain these points now.
Very sincerely yours,
Personal and confidential.
Mr. ALFRED KOHLBERC,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, August 11, 1951.
New York 18, N. Y.
DEAR MR. KOHLBERO: I have your letter of August 9, 1951. I am glad to
explain at once the two matters in the Japanese Peace Treaty which have puzzled
you.
In respect to the declaration of human rights, there were many who wanted
to incorporate that as a treaty obligation. I feel as you do that we should blot
force upon the Japanese obligations which the United States itself may quite
likely be unwilling to assume. Therefore, the reference to the human rights
declaration was not incorporated in the treaty proper as an obligation. The
preamble states that Japan will "strive to realize the objectives of universal
declaration of human rights" but there is no treaty obligation on Japan in this
respect,
With reference to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, they are dealt with pursuasct
to the provisions of the Potsdam surrender terms that "* * * Japanese
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku,
and such minor islands as we determine." These Potsdam surrender terms were
formulated without Soviet participation, the participants being Roosevelt, Church-
ill, and Chiang Kai-shek. The treaty expresses renunciation by Japan conform-
ing to that. However, there is no cession of the Kuriles or South Sakhalin to the
Soviet Union, or other endorsement of the Yalta provisions in this respect. Fu1'-
thermore, the draft treaty provides that "* * * the present treaty shall not
confer any rights, titles, or benefits on any state which is not an Allied power as
herein defined; nor shall any right, title, or interest of Japan be deemed to be
diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the treaty in favor of a State which
is not an Allied power as so defined." "Allied power" includes only states which
sign and ratify this treaty, and as you point out there is "unlikelihood of Russian
acceptance of the treaty'.'
Sincerely yours,
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164 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Senator SMITH. I might ask, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Kohlberg plans
to comment on these things or just put them in the record,
Mr. KOHLBERG. Just put it in the record and then 1 have two
brief suggestions that I would like to present for your consideration.
That will take just a few moments.
Senator GILLETTE. Do you have copies of the material that you
just put in the record so that they are available to the members here,
if they wish to interrogate you?
Mr. KOHLBERG. I have some extra copies, yes.
Senator GILLETTE. I wish you would make them available to the
members of the committee.
Mr. KOHLBERG. Yes, sir. I previously sent a copy to each member,
but in the vast mail you receive, it may not have come to your atten-
tion.
Senator GILLETTE. All right, Mr. Kohlberg, will you proceed, with
any further statement you wish to make?
Mr. KOHLBERG. Thank you very much, sir. I merely want to
make two suggestions for consideration. The first suggestion is that
General MacArthur testify publicly, giving such information, opinion
and advice as he may have on all the various questions raised in
connection with this treaty, for the benefit of the Senate and the public.
DEFERMENT OF RATIFICATION ADVOCATED UNTIL CHANGE IN WORLD
SITUATION
My second suggestion, sir, is that the ratification of the treaty be
deferred for the following reasons: that the interests of Japan and the
United States equally, or almost equally, call for this deferment.
.1 recall that other peace treaties that have been signed since the
war, that with Italy and with three nations of Eastern Europe, have
now turned out unsatisfactorily, not because they were not good
treaties at the time but because of the change in the world situation,
and we are in the middle of a change in world situation with the war
in Korea. Japan is the base for that war, and our security treaty
with Japan as made public, this security agreement that is before you
now, limits us to a defensive position, and if this war in. Korea were
to spread, as it may, there would be a question about the use of those
bases for purely offensive action where no question of the defense of
Japan was concerned.
Maybe in China, maybe in Indonesia, maybe in Siberia there would
be a question. And furthermore, those bases that are being agreed
on by the State Department and the military with Japan may seem
suitable and ample, but in the unforeseeable future they may not
prove that, and it would seem to me that for that reason also it might
be well to defer consideration and ratification of the treaty.
Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Kohlberg, may I interrupt you? If treaties
of peace were not negotiated because of change in world conditions
until the conditions of the world would cease to change, we would not
have very many peace treaties, would we?
Mr. KOHLBERG. That might seem so except that this is a world
situation and it might be that a world peace treaty, that is treaties
with all our former enemies and present enemies might be more profit-
ably concluded at one time, as was done more or less after World
War I.
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Senator GILLETTE. Do you have any target date to suggest when
that condition might justify the negotiation of a peace treaty?
Mr. KOHLBERG. No, sir; I do not, not in the near future I am cer-
tain, but for another reason I also think that ratification might well
be delayed, and that is that no irrevocable commitments in the Far.
East should be made at this time.
It may be that next year we may have a new administration. with
a new over-all policy in the Far East and a new State Department to
implement it. If that should be the case, it might prove very unfor-
tunate if we made irrevocable commitments now which might not seem
suitable to that new administration and under that new policy
For that reason I suggest, sir, that this is a good time to follow a
policy previously stated in regard to the Far East, that is to let some
of the dust settle first. Thank you, sir.
Senator GILLETTE. Before, Mr. Kohlberg, I turn you over to the
members for any questions they may have to ask, I omitted for the
record establishing your identity. You reside in New York City?
Mr.KOHLBERG. Yes. My address is 1 West Thirty-seventh Street,
New York City.
Senator GILLETTE. In what capacity do you appear here, as an indi-
vidual or in a representative capacity?
Mr. KOHLBERG. I appear as an individual. I am chairman of the
American China Policy Association and also national chairman of the
American Jewish League Against Communism, but I would like to
make clear that neither organization has studied this treaty, and I do
not represent them in appearing here.
Senator GILLETTE. You appear just in an individual capacity?
Mr. KOHLBERG. Yes, sir.
Senator GILLETTE. Senator Wiley?
Senator WILEY. I have no questions.
Senator GILLETTE. Senator Smith.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, you very ably made
certain suggestions here, but I have one or two questions I would like
to ask Mr. Kohlberg.
In the first place, Mr. Kohlberg, I read these questions you sent to
Senator Connally, and I think you raised some very interesting points,
and I hope that we will be able to provide the replies to your ques-
tions. The record will show clearly that the questions were raised
and that the replies were made.
Mr. KOHLBERG. Yes, sir.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I do not know whether you received
any reply as yet to any of them.
Mr. KOHLBERG. No. I did not expect replies to come to me per-
sonally, I merely thought that the committee in its consideration
might take them into question.
. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I think the points are very wisely
raised because other people have raised similar questions, and I am
glad to have them raised and have the record show them. I could
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~6 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
not gather from your statement here, Mr. Kohlberg, whether you
are opposing the treaty.
Mr. KOHLBERG. No, I should not say I am opposing the treaty.
I think probably there are some amendments that may seem neces-
sary, but I think that it is premature for the ratification of the treaty.
If this war out there becomes an all-out war, this treaty will
be binding on us in ways that we may regret, at least that is my
opinion, sir.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Of course that ought to be very
carefully considered by the committee. As one who has been work-
ing on this with Mr. Dulles for the past 12 months, and as a delegate
to the San Francisco Conference when the treaty was signed, I am
one of those who feels the treaty not only should be ratified but
should be ratified promptly if we are going to move toward a settle-
ment of conditions out there. I think the Japanese are somewhat
restless over present conditions. Our occupation is restless because
it has been going on pretty long now.
I remember General MacArthur said to me 2 years ago he felt very
strongly that we should have a peace treaty soon and put an end to
our occupation. What happens after that with reference to the
defense of Japan would then be up to Japan to determine with us,
as they have, and I want to emphasize here that the security treaty
was at the request of Japan They asked us to protect them in the
post-treaty period against possible aggression by Russia.
Now unless that is settled pretty promptly, we are going to be
between sea and skv as to our whole Far Eastern policy, and I am
rather surprised to vhear from you an approval of the dust-settling
idea.
Mr. KoHLBERG. I said I thought at this time.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I thought you had been very much
opposed to that in your past writing, which I follow religiously.
POSSIBLE TESTIMONY FROM GENERAL MAC ARTHUR
Mr. KOHLBERG. That is correct, I am opposed to it. That was
the reason that my first suggestion was that General MacArthur be
called to express his opinion on this treaty in great detail.
I asked these questions in there. I do not have the answers, sir,
but I think they need answers. I think that there may be a whole
new Pacific situation and a whole new Pacific policy in the very
near future, and when that comes about we may find that some of
the decisions and agreements made in this treaty may not fit, just
as we find now for instance that we wish we could let Italy have
more forces than that treaty binds her to.
I think maybe we are acting too late or too soon on this matter.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I understood that Mr. Dulles worked
very closely with General MacArthur on this whole treaty, and a great
deal of it is General MacArthur's own suggestions. At least, he sug-
gested the approach to the kind of settlement in the Far East with
Japan that would be most effective in bringing about the right relation-
ship between our country and Japan as a free aid independent sov-
ereign nation, as a member of the western democratic group, which we
hope she will be.
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Mr. KOHLBERG. Yes, sir. Well, I have understood that from the.
newspapers, but I think it would be well if General MacArthur would
confirm it. You will remember he was dismissed or recalled in April,
and there may have been changes since then in the treaty itself. It
was submitted to many nations and may not be just what lie approved
of at the time. I really do not know.
If he approves of it, I feel sure that it is the best that can be done.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Then you almost would be willing to
leave it to General MacArthur's approval as to whether you would
approve it, is that the implication?
Mr. KOHLBERG. I would say that he knows so much more that-riot
only I but the,country would accept it if he approved it completely,
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I would tend to agree with you on
that, because I have the highest regard for General MacArthur and his
views would be all right with me. I go along the line of his own
thinking.
As events have proven, he appears to me to be very right, but
whether he should appear before this committee I just do not know,
but I would be very glad as far as I am concerned to take your sug-
gestion.
. Mr. KOHLBERG. It is a suggestion submitted to your committee
for your consideration, sir.
Senator WILL Y, Mr. Chairman, I thought because of our experience
in the Italian peace treaty provisions, which have been considered out
moded at this time, that we drew a different kind of a treaty here.`
Now you mentioned specifically one instance where you thought if
the world picture changed that there might be need for a different ap-
proach. Have you any other instances?
Mr. KOHLBERG. Yes, sir. In that memo that I put in the record,
I take some of these up in detail. I could go into many of them, but
I do not want to take so much of your time.
I think the question of the recognition of Communist China or
Nationalist China, or Nationalist China for Formosa only, is a very
important question, and if Japan recognizes Nationalist China, for
Formosa only and then later recognizes Red China for mainland China,
we have another situation that might prove very embarrassing to us
if that war spreads.
We might not then be able to use those Japanese bases under this
treaty for offensive war against mainland China. There are so many
things there. I think the country would feel much reassured if they
had General MacArthur's opinion and judgment on these matters.
Senator GILLETTE. Well, thank you, Mr. Kohlberg. The com-
mittee appreciates very much your contribution.
I might say in connection with your suggestion that we take ad-
vantage of it in. calling General MacArthur, this committee I am
advised has not called any witnesses excepting those concerned in
drafting the treaty, and so far as I am advised, General MacArthur
has not asked to appear. Of course, if he should ask to appear, the
committee would give that request or any similar request their most
earnest consideration. Thank you very much.
Mr. KOHLBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GILLETTE. Rev. Willard Uphaus.
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168 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
STATEMENT OF REV. WILLARD UPHAUS, ON BEHALF OF THE
AMERICAN PEACE CRUSADE
Senator GILLETTE. Your name is what, please?
Reverend UPHAUS. Willard Uphaus.
Senator GILLETTE. Are you here in a, representative capacity, Mr.
Uphaus?
Reverend UPHAUS. Yes, sir, Mr.. Chairman, I am representing the
American Peace Crusade. '
,SENATOR GILLETTE. And what is that organization?
Reverend UPHAUS. It is a peace organization to which many
Americans belong who are working for peace in Korea, who are en-
couraging negotiation among the nations working for disarmament and
other peace purposes.
SENATOR GILLETTE. And what is your official relationship, if any,
to that organization?
Reverend UPHAUS. I am a national codirector. There are two
national directors. I am a codirector of the Crusade.
Senator GILLETTE. Who is the other codirector?
Reverend UPHAUS. Mr. Thomas Richardson.
Senator GILLETTE. Where is the headquarters of this organization?
Reverend UPHAUS. In Now York City.
Senator GILLETTE. And its objective you say is promoting world
peace?
Reverend UPHAUS. World peace, that is true.
Senator GILLETTE. You have a formal statement which has been
:made available to the members of the committee. ' Do you desire to
read this into the record?
Reverend UPHAUS. I think, Mr. Chairman, if I may I will follow the
suggestion in the wire of invitation, make a few remarks and then
submit the two page report for the minutes.
Senator GILLETTE. I am sure there will be no objection to that.
You may proceed, Reverend Uphaus.
Reverend UPHAUS. The American Peace Crusade feels that it is
very close to the hearts of men and women in America, particularly
the workers, Negro people, the grassroots folks out across America who
profoundly long for peace in the world, not only in the Orient which
we are concerned mainly with now, but in the entire world.
I think probably that the people I speak for remain more than
others-I would not say that for sure but, anyway, the common people
of America remember the fact that their sons and fathers, relatives
paid a heavy price, Corregidor, Pearl Harbor and other places in the
Orient, in the thought that they were destroying fascism, totali-
tarianism in the world, and that their sacrifices would result in peace.
So it is a profound concern that brings me here to speak for the
Crusade and for them.
I should say that through the committees and councils of The
Crusade, I would be speaking for several hundred thousands of our
American people. We are concerned about the immediate ratifica-
tion of the Japanese Treaty, and I would like to indicate four or five
points very briefly, if I may, that trouble us in connection with
ratification.
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NONSIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY
In the first place we believe that too many of the people in the
world are not involved in the signing of the treaty, too many people
in the world who are not legally or morally or spiritually a part of it.
I suppose that the people in India, Burma, the Soviet Union and
China on the mainland, the Peoples Republic of China must approxi-
mate something like a billion people, and it would be' our position. I
am sure that even though ratification would have to be deferred for
a considerable time, it would be much better if a treaty finally were
signed to which all those countries that had fought Japan were per-
mitted to attach their names:
I say in the first place that we would like to see all the peoples of
the Orient through their representatives attach themselves whole-
0 heartedly to this treaty, and we do not see any future for peace unless
the. emerging desires and normal revolutions of these people are fully
taken into account.
JAPANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE TREATY
Now I believe despite conditions that make self-expression rather
difficult in Japan at the present time, some 5,000,000 people, that is
Japanese people, have signed a petition urging the rejection of 'the
treaty at the present time.
Senator WILEY. On what basis?
Reverend UPHAUS. Well, there are a number of bases, and I think
that some of them are probably best expressed in the document that
I have here entitled "The Women of Japan Speak."
It is a document, a memorandum, which was addressed by the
Japanese women members of both houses of the Japanese Parlia-
ment to Mr. Dulles on February 6, 1951, and in this document you
have, if I may very hurriedly lift a few sentences, I think the substance
of this fear or this misgiving. These Japanese women say in the
memorandum [reading]:
Our first and the last prayer is to avoid war-war of all kinds civil, interna-
tional, or class war. We, mothers and wives and sisters, simply {sate war.
Thus, believing it a great honor for U. S. A. too, that it should help Japan to
keep its constitution unchallenged and be faithful to the Potsdam Declaration
under which Japan has surrendered, and striven hard to fulfill every item of the
demands upon it. We urgently wish you to take all possible measures to per-
suade all nations, not excepting U. S. S. it, or China on the mainland, to sign a
peace treaty with Japan.
At another point these parliament members say:
We must develop Japan into a real, trustworthy, democratic nation, not under
military supervision. * * * We can only survive as a heartily repentant,
disarmed nation. .
Then at another point these women indicate in the memorandum
that they have-
no definite fear of the much discussed immediate military invasion by Communist
neighbors-
but indicate a little later on that the way to resist penetration or
totalitarianism is to fulfill the major problem to feed the hu4gry,
94413-52-12
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PACIFIC TREATIES
the starved., feed even the enemy until there will be no hungry and
frustrated man or child. Then they praise our country by pointing
out-
the U. S. A. taught us this by feeding us, the former enemy. Therefore we cannot
forget that kind of Christianity forever.
I submit this as one expression of misgiving on the part of a rep-
resentative group of the people in Japan itself. Then there is a
second problem.
FUTURE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF JAPAN
!I notice it was stressed a number of times this morning, but I speak
of it again, and that is the economic question as to whether the treaty
will tear the Japanese people away from their neighbors with whom
they have basic social, cultural, and economic ties.
One of the insecurities of the treaty it seems to me in time will
come at this point that despite any ideological differences between
the Japanese people in the future and the regime on the mainland or
in the Soviet Union, the sheer elemental drive to survive that must
arise in an industrial nation will compel the Japanese people, it seems
to us, to seek economic ties with the people on the mainland, and we
believe that the treaty as at present written would rather discourage
that and encourage rather, which is all right too, Japanese trade
relations with the West, but too much at the expense of the constant
dole of the West by upholding her economy.
Now one very direct economic bearing here it seems to me-and
I speak for the moment as a trade unionist not representing any
trade union organization-is I wonder what will happen to the stand-
ards of the American people as these relationships develop, as American
interests develop enterprises on the islands and as goods go to all
corners of the earth competing with even our allies, the British indus-
trialists. We wonder what will take place.
For example last night an eminent attorney in speaking in New
Haven pointed out the fact that a western auto concern is manufac-
turing autos in Japan at the present time. The workers receive a
monthly wage of $40. That is a simple illustration of one of the
basic economic problems that I think the treaty makers and those
who are ratifying it will have to think about, what will be the reper-
cussions for the trade union standards that the West has built up.
STATIONING OF TROOPS IN JAPAN
Then we feel also as representatives of the Crusade that the self-
respecting oriental, the Japanese people, and of course peoples closely
bound to her, that is in Indochina, China and other southeastern
countries proper, they will be bound to feel a sense of resentment at
what seems to us to be a condition of rather prolonged occupation.
At this point I read certain sections of the treaty rather carefully
and then certain sections of the later bilateral security treaty with
Japan, and it would seem that we have taken care to provide for an
indefinite occupation. There is one section there that troubles me a
great deal, and troubles our movement, and that is that the Japanese
military forces, presumably aided and abetted by our own who are
there, would be there to put down insurrection inspired from outside
sources,
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Well, now the inference there is clearly of course that .the C o"m-
munist penetration would be responsible for revolutionary feelings
and actions on the part of the Japanese workers, but we know: from
the history of the development of antilabor forces and of fascism
generally in different countries of the world how very very often; the
natural homogeneous drive of workers to improve their own' lot
through normal, even nonpolitical trade unionism is interpreted as
Communist penetration, and we feel very very deeply concerned
there as to whether the final byproducts of the treaty will eventuate
in lifting the standards of the Japanese people, or whether really
our major concern is the development of the military, with the. un-
fortunate result that the old industrialists, the old generals will by
necessity be revived more and put back into power to cooperate
with us.
Now two more points, very briefly. One has to do with the Presi-
dent's budget. It would seem at first that to bring this in there
would be no relationship to the problem we have at hand, but we do
see, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, a very definite
relationship from the standpoint of the future history of our relation-
ship with nations in the Orient, and that is that here is a budget,
here are recommendations that clearly ostensibly indicate that-the
United States puts its present and main trust upon the military, upon
armed might to the extent that at least 85 cents out of every dollar
goes in that direction, and I recall with considerable pain the absence
or neglect of reference to patient negotiation to iron out some of
the difficulties in the Orient.
I read from this theoretical position, this philosophy in the message,
the idea that might is right, that negotiation, patient, long-suffering
negotiation will take secondary place.
I agree very, very much with the women who wrote this memo-
randum to Mr. Dulles, that if the President had put emphasis upon
the social and economic redemption of the people of Japan and of the
impoverished of the Orient, that indeed would have been the way to
peace.
I would say in closing that the heart of the American people today
is nearer to Korea than at the moment it is to the ratification of the
Japanese Treaty. As important as that is, we believe that that is
the first duty that the world has, that America has with its prestige
and power, at the earliest possible moment to bring the Korean
struggle to a successful conclusion, because that will have a very, very
direct bearing upon the final solution of the problems in the Orient
that are written into the ratification of the treaty.
That I think would summarize the feelings that the American
Peace Crusade has relative to the treaty, that is that ratification be
deferred, that much more emphasis be given to the social and economic
factors in the Orient, much less dependence upon the military and
armed might to face these vast problems that concern the world.
Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, sir.
Senator Smith?
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I just have a couple of questions,
Doctor. How recently have you been in the Far East yourself?
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Reverend UPHAUS. I have not had the privilege of being in the
Far East. My wife was a missionary in China for 15 years, and my
closeness to the oriental scene I feel largely through her experience
and her reading and thinking. I regret that I have not had that
privilege.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Has she been there since the Japanese
war was closed?
Reverend UPHAUS. She left just at the beginning of the war between
China and Japan.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Then neither you nor your wife has
been there since VJ-day as we call it.
Reverend UPHAUS. That is right.
ATTITUDE OF JAPANESE PEOPLE TOWARD PEACE TREATY
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You have not been there since the
MacArthur regime in Japan, and you have not personally talked with
the Japanese as of today in Japan. I am only asking you this because
I have just come back, and my conclusions as to the feeling of the
Japanese people are quite different than the picture you have pre-
sented to us.
Reverend UPHAUS. I feel confident, sir, that as in America, the
Japanese people are divided into segments of opinion, and that there
may be many people who have been under the influence of Christian
missions, mothers, women as represented here, and industrial workers
who would have some misgivings. I do feel that.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am not suggesting that they are all
agreed. There are lots of differences of opinion there. I am just
suggesting that it is very helpful to be on the ground and talk per-
sonally with people who are doing the thinking in this postwar period
on the whole question of peace, and so on.
I can say that the Japanese people are very anxious to have peace,
and generally speaking they seem to be very much pleased with the
kind of treaty that has been presented.
REALITIES OF FAR EAST SITUATION
Now the other question I want to ask you, you seem to be unhappy
about this particular treaty, and you thought we ought to have a
treaty that other neighbors of Japan might sign, and suggest that
Russia ought to be brought in to sign a treaty. Were you familiar
with the discussions in San Francisco at the time the treaty was
ratified and the conditions of signing that Mr. Gromyko presented to
that assemblage?
Reverend UPHAUS. Insofar as I was able to understand them from
the press, though I was not able to be there in person.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Then you would have yielded to his
demands as the price of Russia's signing, would you?
Reverend UPHAUS. Well, regardless of Mr. Gromyko's particular
position, I would argue for a deferment until the rough and difficult
problems of negotiation would take the Chinese people on the main-
land and the Soviet Union into account.
I recognize the intransigeance on all sides in reaching agreements,
but nevertheless we still feel that those people, by virtue of their
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 17$
geography and their relationships, must be involved socially, cul-
turally and economically.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I assume, Doctor, if you have not
been in Japan you have not been in Korea. You have not talked to
the people in Korea, of their yearning for freedom and to have a free
and independent Republic of Korea set up.
You probably have not been on the island of Formosa where they
have made a wonderful comeback in setting up a free China presen-
tation of civilization that seems to me to hold great prospects for the
future. I assume you have not been able to see those things at first
hand.
Reverend UPHAUS. I have seen them only through motion pictures
and through the testimony of the people. I have a very very close
trade union friend who was to Korea only recently and gave his version
of the picture as he saw it, and I think, to sum up for him and myself,
our way of "saving," I say in quotes, or liberating, was not the best
way that could have been found.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Well, I do not disagree with you that
the rehabilitation of those people, their economic plight and all that,
to me all those questions are much more important than the force of
arms, but sometimes you get to a place where the aggression is such
that you have got to stop the burglar in his tracks before he goes to
far. I am just suggesting that we can't overlook that difficulty in the
world situation today.
Reverend UPHAUS. If I may speak to that very briefly, I think
history will have to indicate for us in time the relationship between
aggression and provocation.
I think not nearly enough thought has been put upon that, and some-
where or other I remember our own history, and I am not surprised
that emotionally, temperamentally the oriental has his own type of
Monroe Doctrine, regardless of injustice on either side.
The impulse, the racial impulse as never before now is to kick the
white man out, and I am the first to believe that he fails to appreciate
much that the Christian missionary and other people have made by
way of contribution, but that is one of the eventualities of a revolu-
tionary period. I am not surprised at all that the Chinese and the
Koreans, the North Koreans have the psychology that they do, in
view of our own attitude.
If we were being approached below the Rio Grande, or if bomber
bases were at Habana, I can scarcely imagine the psychology of the
American people.
Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GILLETTE. Senator Hickenlooper?
EFFECT OF BETTER COMMUNICATIONS ON AMERICAN SECURITY
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Doctor, that last statement of yours about
being approached south of the Rio Grande, bomber bases in Central
America I think perhaps is an apt suggestion, but I wonder if it might
not have been more appropriate 50 years ago when we did not have
the fast moving communications.
I am wondering if in your mind there is any comparison between
bomber bases in China for instance which might threaten us, and
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174 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
bomber bases in north Africa which might threaten us now, which
might affect our attitude.
In other words, what was close to us or what is close to us today
might have been very far removed 30 years ago, with modern trans-
portation. So perhaps the bomber bases in China today are just as
close to us, just as threatening to us as the bomber bases in Mexico
would have been or military bases, let us say in Mexico of a hostile
power would have been 30 or 35 years ago.
Reverend UPHAUS. I think you are perfectly right in indicating the
change in transportation, but to follow through the same thought, if
you are going to measure it in distance of miles, the people of Moscow
have several times more reason for fear than we do, because our
bombers can reach Moscow in a matter of 3 or 4 hours, and I do not
think any Chinese or Soviet bomber could reach us in that time.
I am speaking about not what is right or wrong. I am speaking
about human reaction to the situation in the world in which people
react to the imminence of danger when it is very very near.
Senator HICKENr.oOPER. I need not argue the point except to sug- 4
gest that there might be something to the idea that communication,
speed of access has changed a lot, and what might have been no threat
at all 35 or 40 years ago might be a very real threat today.
ENDING THE KOREAN WAR
But you made one statement that you earnestly hope for a satis-
factory solution in Korea, which of course we all hope for. Would
you care to state what you believe a satisfactory solution in Korea
would be?
Reverend UPHAUS. I believe that on the whole the enemy has made
some major concessions. I think that one was made with respect to
the thirty-eighth parallel.
I would I think consider a situation in which truce discussions are
going on, a situation in which there would be a complete secession of
killing, dying, and hostility. That would include the ravishing of
property and people on the part of our planes.
I think we could, without running any risks due to the bases that
we have in Japan and our armed equipment, show the Korean people
that we have a deeper desire than we have shown.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I did not quite understand what you
meant by the thirty-eighth parallel. That is where we are now.
Reverend UPHAUS. No, not exactly.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, to all intents and purposes. They
are below the Thirty-eighth parallel on one end.and we are above it
a little bit on the other, but we are generally along the thirty-eighth
parallel.
It is only alleged to be a militarily defensible line rather than on the
thirty-eighth parallel itself which has certain difficulties, so I am just
wondering about what concessions if any that the Reds have made in
these whole negotiations. They never changed any territorial rights
below the thirty-eighth parallel when this matter began. I don't
quite follow you on the concessions that they have made.
Reverend UPHAUS. Wasn't that in the early stages of the truce
discussions very much to the fore, and they did withdraw. I have a
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC I
very, very definite picture of Korea with the west line being below the
thirty-eighth for a very small segment of Korea, but on the east the
line being far, far above.
STRUGGLE FOR THE MINDS OF MEN
Senator, I would like to take it out of that category and say as a
Christian minister that if the President in his address to Congress
and in his budget proposals had made some breath-taking policy with
respect to the social and economic uplift of the people, that we were
suffering, to spen I have through faith to believe the that would have been
more startling.
After all Moscow, the Kremlin, and Washington both respond to
world opinion, and the struggle in Korea is not just a struggle under
two tents. The struggle is a world struggle among world opinions.
My great fear is that in this struggle of world opinion we are losing
the high regard that we had in the minds of the millions and millions
of colonials, the colored people, and we could recover it if we took the
whole thing out of the hands of generals, out of the hands of the mili-
tary and made a magnanimous electric proposal for a completely new
life for the people in the Orient. I know it sounds idealistic, but
maybe a minister is idealistic on the question. of peace and war.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think idealism has a very proper place.
If we lose idealism we have lost everything. But I am frankly at
a loss, in the light of the experience and patience that we have hac
in trying many of these things, to know just how we should proceed
along that line that would have any substantial effect. Certainly I
hope we can do something that has an effect. I am always looking
for someone that has the solution.
Reverend UPHAUS. Don't you think. that it comes down to this:
That we get what we pay for, and f refer to the simple illustration of
the $85 billion budget, which incidentally 2 or 3 days ago the Wall
Street Journal editorial I think rather mashed to smithereens.
Certainly it represents the business interests of the community.
We are saying in that budget to the world that our solution for
international tension and for the griefs and sorrows and the economic
needs of the hungry, our solution is, well, they ask for, as the Bible
says, bread and we give them a stone.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. The only thing I can say to that we lhavo
already spent about $50 billion on peaceful things, aiding other na-
tions feeding their people, attempting to tend the good things to them
or the opportunity to do better, so we have not been derelict.
We have done more by many many times than any other nation has
ever done to vanquished and destroyed peoples in the history of the
world, as far as I know, so that I do not think we could be criticized
for being derelict in. our humanitarian activities around the world, at
least since World War II has been over and even after World War l
when we were very generous with our aid. The American people
sacrificed a great. deal which they otherwise might have held selfishly
for themselves, in peaceful gestures, in economic help, moral uplift
and so on. There are those who believe that it has not borne much
fruit.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Senator GILLETTE. Is that all, Senator?
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. Yes.
Senator GILLETTE. There are just two matters that I think ought
to be corrected in the record before you are excused, Reverend Uphaus.
You were perhaps in the room when I stated to ,a prior witness that
with reference to the calling of General MacArthur we had not re-
quested the appearance of these witnesses that were here. They came
at their request.
I understood a statement by you in the early part of your testimony
to be that you were appearing here at the request of the committee,
and I wanted to correct that. I am informed by the staff that all of
these witness requested the privilege of appearing and were accorded
that privilege, and I wanted that corrected in the record.
SIGNATORIES TO THE TREATY
The other matter I wanted to clarify, I do not want to leave this
statement of yours in the record without some reference to it, and I
am quoting, when you asked:
How was the treaty negotiated? The United Press reported on July 13 that
"When an ally balks the United States does some arm twisting." The fact re-
mains that despite all arm twisting almost half of the people of the world have re-
fused to sign * * * 1 billion people including Japan's nearest neighbors,
India, Burma, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
I am sure that that statement is inaccurate, if I may say so, because
I do not believe that the People's Republic of China by which you
refer to so-called Communist China, was urged to be a signatory to
this treaty. Isn't that correct insofar as you know, sir?
Reverend UPHAUS. I think it is true that Communist China was
not urged, but that fact is true because of our present relationship
to her and our failure up to date to recognize her.
Senator GILLETTE. Whatever the reason, there was no arm twisting
of the People's Republic of China to get them to sign this treaty,
was there?
Reverend UPHAUS. With that particular reference, that one country
should be excluded. The point intended to be made was that
475,000,000 people are not parties to the treaty.
Senator GILLETTE. Because of the fact that I wish the matter
corrected and clarified with reference to the People's Republic of
China, I do not want to have it deduced from that, that I, as acting
chairman, admit the charge that there was arm twisting of these other
nations. I wanted particularly to correct that statement.
Thank you very much, Reverend Uphaus. We appreciate your
coming before us and giving us the benefit of your comment.
(The prepared statement submitted by Reverend Uphaus is as
follows:)
STATEMENT PRESENTED ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEACE CRUSADE ET
REV. WILLARD UPHAUS, OF NEW HAVEN, CONN., NATIONAL COEXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE AMERICAN PEACE CRUSADE
It gives us a great deal of pleasure to be able to discuss the proposed Japanese
Peace Treaty before this committee. Throughout our Nation a most fervent
desire for an end to war and threats of war is felt among those of us who went
through the horrors, the privations, and the strain of the war with Japan. If
those who made the supreme sacrifice at Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Corregidor,
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Okinawa, and Iwo Jima shall not have died in vain, an agreement must be reached
by all of the peoples of the Pacific and of Asia that will prevent mankind from
ever again undergoing the same horrors. Those of us who follow the teachings
of the Prince of Peace and of the Ten Commandments hope never to have placed
upon our conscience again the responsibility for the use of the atom bomb, that
most fearful weapon of destruction. It is our feeling therefore that a peace
treaty with Japan is of life and death importance to all of us and requires the
most searching and sober examination. We do not believe that this treaty
meets the needs of the situation as we see it. It will not serve the best interests
of our people and for peace. We take this position for the following reasons:
Stripped of all verbiage we find that the treaty places no ceiling on Japanese
rearmament. In whose hands are the weapons to be placed? The very men
who engineered Pearl Harbor have been cleared and are back in power, the group
of militarists headed by Emperor Hirohito. In fact there is not even a word
about Japan's war guilt.
How was the treaty negotiated? The United Press reported on July 13 that
"When an ally balks the United States does some arm twisting. The fact re-
mains that despite all arm twisting almost half of the people of the world have
refused to sign-1 billion people including Japan's nearest neighbors, India,
Burma, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.
Nor is the treaty acceptable to the Japanese people. Despite repression, over
5,000,000 have signed a petition urging a rejection. The treaty in fact requires
the Japanese people to nullify their constitution which provides that "land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."
As part of the treaty arrangements, Japan's trade with China, her principal
source of iron, coal, and other necessary raw materials is to cease. Japan has to
date received from the United States over $2 billion. Cutting off trade with,
China will mean that she will remain on this American dole indefinitely. The
economic consequences of this treaty to the American people will add to the
already unbearable burden of high prices and mounting taxes. One-third of
Japan's national revenue is to be used to cover "the expenses of the United States
garrison and the new Japanese militia" (New York Times, January 24, 1952).
Under the treaty Japan is implicity required to enter into an agreement for
the retention of United States troops and bases. This will be presumably on a
99-year "lease" similar to the arrangements under which the United States bases
are now held in the Philippines.
The American people have demanded peace. In prayer meetings, public-
opinion polls, letters to the press, ballots and every form available they have ex-
pressed their desire for an end to the war in Korea. A speedy conclusion is
urgently needed to the armistice negotiations now taking place and a settlement
of those major differences in the Far East which were the cause of the fighting in
Korea and can become the cause of "new Koreas." It has been shown that this
treaty we are considering here toda~yy does not negotiate differences, does not
eradicate the causes of war in the Far Past but intensifies them. For these reasons
it is our considered proposal that this treaty should not be ratified by the United
States Senate. The American people, the Japanese people, and all those nations
vitally concerned should have the opportunity to negotiate a genuine peace treaty
which advances the cause of peace, democracy, and security for the peoples of
Asia and the world.
Senator GILLETTE. There were two witnesses on the list that was
made available to the acting chairman here by the chairman of the
I committee: Marion U. Mansen, national president, Daughters of the
Revolution, and I understand that this lady is not present but h&s
submitted a brief statement, and if there is no objection it will be in-
cluded in the record.
(The statement above referred to is as follows:)
JANUARY 25, 1952.
To the CLERx OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.
Whereas the omission of Nationalist China is a grave injustice and will arouse
hate for the United States in all Asia not under Communist control; and
Whereas the text of the Japanese Treaty of September 8, 1951, contains no
termination date and no means for its revision; and furthermore article 22 states
that all parties to this treaty concerning future disputes regarding its interpreta-
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tion bind themselves to accept the decisions of the International Court of Justice
and; Therefore be it
Resolved, That the national society, Daughters of the Revolution urge the
United States Senate to refuse to ratify the Japanese Treaty of September 8,
1951; and be it further
Resolved, That the United States Senate be urged to ratify only a wise and just
treaty with Japan which would leave no loopholes for a subsequent Japanese
Treaty with Red China and future Russian ownership of any former Japanese
islands, possessions, fishing rights, and Antarctic claims (see arts. 2, 9, 10, 23, and
25) ; would not legalize past and future Allied war crimes courts outside and
inside Japan (art. 11) ; would not publicly accept the legality of the secret Potsdam
agreements (art. 6b) ; would not endanger our sovereign rights by accepting the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (art. 22) ; and the dangerous
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (See Preamble Par. 2.)
Senator GILLETTE. Another witness that asked the privilege of
appearing was Mrs. Elise French Johnston, of Williamsville, Vt.,
representing the National Society for Constitutional Security, and I
understand that she is not present but has submitted a one-page
statement which, without objection, will be included in the record.
(The statement above referred to is as follows:)
STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL SECURITY IN
OPPOSITION TO THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1951
Whereas the omission of Nationalist China is a grave injustice and will arouse
hate for the United States in all Asia not under Communist control; and
Whereas the text of the Japanese Treaty of September 8, 1951, contains no
termination date and no means for its revision; and furthermore article 22 states
that all parties to this treaty concerning future disputes regarding its interpreta-
tion bind themselves to accept the decisions of the International Court of Jus-
tice; and
Whereas parties signing this treaty specifically force upon Japan and therefore
themselves acceptance of the legality of the objectives of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which could supersede the Bill of Rights
in our Federal Constitution (preamble par. 2) ; and
Whereas article 11 commits Japan and cosigners to accept the legality of past
and future actions of Allied war crimes courts both within and outside Japan; and
Whereas article 12 grants to all Allied Powers who do not sign the treaty ex-
tremely generous most-favored-nation treatment for a period of 4 years and in
addition article 12 confers upon Allied Powers nonsigners for a period of 4 years
the benefits accruing from Japan becoming a party of the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation; and
Whereas Russia, by abstaining from ratification of this treaty will reap all the
benefits for a period of 4 years this treaty confers upon nonsigners among the
Allied Powers, and she will not be caught in the confusing provisions and dangers
to sovereign rights clearly endangered by those parties who do sign the treaty:
Therefore be it
Resolved, That the National Society for Constitutional Security urge the United
States Senate to refuse to ratify the Japanese Treaty of September 8, 1951; and
be it further
Resolved, That the United States Senate be urged to ratify only.a wise and just
treaty with Japan which would leave no loopholes for a subsequent Japanese
treaty with Red China and future Russian ownership of any former Japanese
islands, possessions, fishing rights, and Antarctic claims (see arts. 2, 9, 10, 23, and
25) ; would not legalize past and future Allied war crimes courts outside and inside
Japan (art. 11) ; would not publicly accept the legality of the secret Potsdam
agreements (art. 6b)r would not endanger our sovereign rights by accepting the
jurisdiction of the' International Court of Justice (art. 22) ; and the dangerous
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see preamble par. 2).
WILLIAMSVILLE, VT.
Mrs. ELISE FRENCH JOHNSTON,
Corresponding Secretary.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 179
Senator GILLETTE. That completes the list that was presented to
the acting chairman as those who had been cleared under the rules
under which we are proceeding.
If there is nothing additional to present, the committee will rise and
reassemble on the call of the chairman.
(Whereupon, at 2:55 p. m., the committee rose; to reconvene at the
call of the chairman.) -
(The following statement, submitted by Mike Masaoka, national
legislative director, Japanese American Citizens League, Anti-Dis-
crimination Committee, Washington, D. C., was received after the
conclusions of the hearings:)
STATEMENT OF TIRE JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEA(=UE
The Japanese American Citizens League-- the only national organization repre-
senting persons of Japanese ancestry-joins with the overwhelming majority of
our fellow Americans in urging early ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
We believe that the treaty has been carefully worked out, with proper regard
for the spirit of reconcilliation and justice that such a precedent-setting document
must demonstrate and with appropriate attention to the harsh realities of a
troubled world. We do not suggest that the treaty is a perfect one, or that it
begins to please every party concerned. But, we do believe that under the circum-
stances it is as good for all parties concerned as one can reasonably expect.
As Americans-and all of our members are American citizens-we are primarily
interested in the specific benefits which will accrue to the United States as a result
of the prompt ratification of the peace treaty.
At the same time, because most of our members are of Japanese ancestry, we
are especially interested in promoting lasting friendship between the United
States and Japan, believing that in such amicable international relationships lie
our best hope for peace and security in Asia.
It is our conviction that the best Interests of our country are served by making
and keeping Japan a friendly and willing copartner in the new Pacific era which
this treaty inaugurates.
Japan, by every conceivable yardstick, is our natural ally in the Far East, for
she has a traditional animosity towards the common enemy, Soviet Russia, and
the productive capacity to be a helpful partner in the common defense against
world communism. Moreover, Japan has the best orientation of all the Asian
countries to democracy and to the so-called western way of life. And her strategic
position off the Asia mainland cannot be overlooked.
During the late war, more than 10,000 American soldiers of Japanese ancestry
fighting in the Pacific discovered that the Japanese were a worthy foe. After the
surrender and during the occupation, thousands more serving in Japan itself
found the people eager to embrace the democracy which Gen. Douglas Mac-
Arthur and our Government exemplify.
For the first time, according to reports from our own members among the occu-
pation personnel, the Japanese learned the meaning of personal freedom and
dignity, the value of the ballot for both sexes, and the security of social legislation.
And, the reports unanimously indicate that the Japanese people liked what they
learned.
Early ratification of the peace treaty will confirm to the Japanese that we do
not in fact seek to impose our occupation on her, that we have confidence in her
ability and willingness to make her own destiny in partnership with the free
nations. No occupation, however benevolent and well-meaning, is long wel-
comed by any people. And Japan has been occupied now for almost 7 years.
Early ratification will also serve as a concrete demonstration to the peoples of
southeast Asia that this Government does not intend to keep dominion over even
the most strategic territories longer than necessary for the maintenance of peace
and the containment of the present threat of communism. It will help tip prove
the sincerity of our motives to the native peoples of many lands who today are
beginning to feel the urge of national aspirations.
We are told that Japan is anxious to work out her own?salvation and to become
as self-sufficient as possible. We suggest that it is to our own self-interest that
she be encouraged to do so, for a strong and friendly Japan will not only be our
greatest defense against aggression from the East but also less of a drain on our
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National Treasury. But, in the interim, we must be realistic; we must continue
economic and other aid until Japan once again has easy access to needed resources
and the industries and the trained manpower to make her own way in the world
of nations with honor. We believe that the Japanese are too proud a people to
allow needed aid to deteriorate into international charity.
We are not suggesting here that the ratification of the peace treaty will solve
all of Japan's problems, nor ours in the Far East. But national sovereignty will
enable Japan to take the initial steps to put into actual practice the new concepts
and perspectives which we, as the occupying power, have presented her. Ameri-
can responsibilities, too, should be correspondingly decreased.
While we deplore the admonition of some that the United States must build up
Japan as our first line of defense in the Far East as unworthy of our ideals and
traditions and because it creates the impression in some Japanese minds that our
only interest in them is as possible "cannon fodder" in the event of a future war,
we do subscribe to the long-range view that a strong, independent, and friendly
Japan can be the most formidable deterrent to the ambitions of the Communists.
Looking at the matter even more positively, we envision a Japan that will be
helpful not only in maintaining the peace but also economically and socially in
"westernizing," in the best sense of the word, the undeveloped areas of Asia and
the Pacific. We see a great new era of civilization, if you will, being created
around the so-called Pacific basin in which the United States and Japan, partners
in a heroic enterprise, will work together for the greater good of all mankind.
Recalling that prior to the outbreak of war Japan was our best "customer"
in the Orient, we look forward with confidence to increased trade and commerce
with her on a mutually advantageous basis. But, more important, we can visual-
ize both nations developing new markets and locating new sources of materials
in the many countries that border the Pacific and Indian oceans, countries whose
peoples need the industrial output of both the United States and Japan.
The more quickly the peace treaty is ratified and goes into force, the more
quickly can Japan assume her place in the community of free nations and assert
her leadership in the Orient as the champion of democracy. Her background and
her potential, among all the nations of Asia, qualify her for such leadership.
The longer ratification is delayed the greater the chances for the relatively few
dissidents and malcontents in Japan to foment discord and anti-American atti-
tudes. Delay plays into the hands of the Communists, particularly those in
Japan. Delay prevents Japan from instituting her difficult program to prove her
right to sovereignty. Delay means more in occupational costs and supplementary
aid and weakens American prestige.
Thus, because we are convinced as Americans that the best possible insurance
against aggression from the East is in a potent and self-sufficient yet friendly
Japan and because we believe that Japanese-American friendship of a real and
enduring character can make for a more peaceful and prosperous world, we urge
the early ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
At the same time, we feel that in all honesty it should be pointed out that as
long as our immigration and naturalization laws continue to single out the
Japanese for discriminatory treatment, a source of irritation and humiliation
which was one of the major causes of World War II in the Pacific remains to
threaten the future international relations between the United States and the
new Japan. As long as her people are stigmatized as "inferior" by our Federal
laws, the Japanese may rightfully question the sincerity of our proffered friendship
and doubt the widsom of sharing in the defense of a way of life that denies to them
equal opportunity with other nations.
Along with the early ratification of peace treaty, we urge the speedy enactment
of legislation that will extend to the Japanese immigration and naturalization
privileges at least equal to those granted other Asian countries. To the Japanese,
this is a matter of principle, and we who have always insisted upon equality of
treatment and opportunity can ill afford to deny to the Japanese these minimum
privileges.
We ought to couple recognition of Japan as a sovereign nation through ratifica-
tion of the peace treaty with recognition of the Japanese people through repeal of
discriminatory statutes that contradict the violate the very spirit of the peace
treaty we week to promulgate.
International friendships, like personal ones, must be based upon mutual
admiration and respect. And, in these tension-filled, troubled days, we need
friends as never before in the common cause of freedom and human dignity.
We Americans of Japanese ancestry hope and trust that in the spirit of mutual
cooperation the United States and Japan will blaze a new path in international
fellowship in the coming Pacific era which holds so much promise for both nations.
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JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES 181
(The following letters were also received for insertion in the record:)
WASIINGTON, D. C., January 28, 1952.
Senator Tom CONNALLY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: Thirty-two organizations participating in the
Twenty-sixth Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense adopted the
enclosed resolution urging the ratification of only a just and wise treaty with
Japan and suggesting certain reservations. Will you be so good as to make this
resolution a part of the hearing record?
MADALEN (Mrs. W. D.) D. LEETCII.
Participating organizations January 26, 1952:
American Gold Star Sisters, Inc.
American War Mothers
American Women's Legion of World Wars
Auxiliary to Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War
Blue Star Mothers of America
Catholic War Veterans of the U. S. A. Ladies Auxiliary, Army and Navy
Union, U. S. A.
Dames of the Loyal Legion of the United States of America
Daughters of Union Veterans of the Civil War (1861-65), Inc.
Daughters of the United States Army
Gold Star Wives of America
Ladies Auxiliary to the Military Order of the Purple Heart
Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic
Marine Corps League Auxiliary
National Gold Star Mothers, Iite.
National Society for Constitutional Security
National Society, Daughters of the Revolution
National Society, Daughters of the Union (1861-65), Inc.
National Society of New England Women
National Society, Patriotic Women of America, Inc.
National Society, Service Star Legion, Inc.
National Society, Women Descendants of the Ancient and Honorable Artil-
lery Co.
National Woman's Relief Corps, Auxiliary to The Grand Army of the
Republic
National Yeomen F
Navy Club, U. S. A. Auxiliary
Navy Mothers Club of America, Inc.
New York City Colony, National Society of New England Women
Reserve Officers Association, Ladies Clubs of the U. S. A.
Society of Sponsors of the United States Navy
The Wheel of Progress
United States Army Mothers
Women of the Army & Navy Legion of Valor of the U. S. A.
Women's National Defense Committee of Philadelphia
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY 32 PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS IN THE TWENTY-
SIXTH WOMEN'S PATRIOTIC CONFERENCE oN NATIONAL DEFENSE, JANUARY 26,
1952, HOTEL STATLER, WASHINGTON,. D. C.
OBJECTIONS TO JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR AN ADEQUATE
TREATY
Whereas the omission of Nationalist China is a grave injustice and will arouse
hate for the United States in all Asia not under Communist control: and
Whereas the text of the Japanese treaty of September 8, 1951, contains no ter-
mination date and no means for its revision; and furthermore article 22 states that
all parties to this treaty concerning future disputes regarding its interpretation
bind themselves to accept the decisions of the International Court of Justice; sad
Whereas parties signing this treaty specifically force upon Japan, and therefore
themselves, acceptance of the legality of the objectives of the United Nations
universal declaration of human rights which could supersede the Bill of Rights in
our Federal Constitution (preamble, par. 2) ; and
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182 JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER PACIFIC TREATIES
Whereas article II commits Japan and cosigners to accept the legality of past
and future actions of Allied war crimes courts both within and outside Japan; and
Whereas article II grants to all Allied Powers who do not sign the treaty ex-
tremely generous most-favored-nation treatment for a period of 4 years and in
addition article 12 confers upon Allied Powers nonsigners for a period of 4 years
the benefits accruing from Japan becoming a party of the Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation; and
Whereas Russia, by abstaining from ratification of this treaty will reap all the
benefits for a period of 4 years this treaty confers upon nonsigners among the
Allied Powers, and she will not be caught in the confusing provisions and dangers
to sovereign rights clearly endangered by those parties who do sign the treaty,
therefore be it
Resolved, That the twenty-sixth Women's Patriotic Conference on National
Defense urge the Senate of the United States to ratify only a wise and just treaty
with Japan which would leave no loopholes for a subsequent Japanese Treaty
with Red China and future Russian ownership of any former Japanese Islands, pos-
sessions, fishing rights, and Antarctic claims (see arts. 2, 9, 10, 23 and 25) ; would not
legalize past and future Allied war crimes courts outside and inside Japan (art.
II) ; would not publicly accept the legality of the secret Potsdam Agreements
(art. 6b); would not endanger our sovereign rights by accepting the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice (art. 22); and the dangerous United Nations
universal declaration of human rights. (See preamble, par. 2.)
WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM,
UNITED STATES SECTION,
Washington, D. C., January 31, 1952.
Senator TOM CONNALLY,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
MY DEAR SENATOR CONNALLY: The United States Section of the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom received a letter from one of our
members in Japan explaining that some 30 women, representing various organiza-
tions, have formed a committee with the specific purpose of working against the
rearmament of their country. Their first undertaking was to address their con-
cern to each of the United States Senators. They have forwarded to us the copies
of these letters and asked if we could see that they reach the Senators "in a proper
way."
To quote from their letters, "we are sending you under separate package some
hundred sheets of printed `message' to your Senators concerning the two treaties
(the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Mutual Security Pact). As time goes on our
disappointment grows greater and we thought we had better express our view.
* * * We wish very much to ask you, if it is not too much trouble for you to
see that these letters are delivered to them in a proper way. This is our first
venture. We don't know how to. I hope you would be so good as to help us in
this matter."
We commend their message to you, and urge you to give it the consideration its
seriousness and sincerity demands.
Sincerely,
ANNALEE (Mrs. Alexander) STEWART, M. It.,
Legislative Secretary, for the United States Section of the Women's Inter-
national League for Peace and Freedom.
(See p. 80 for letter previously inserted.)
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