FINAL REPORT - CIA TOP SECRET CONTROL SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP57-00042A000100100005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 18, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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TO:
Assistant Director
Office of Collection and Dissemination
Or and Methods Examiner
Ts Final Repo - CIA Top Secret Control System
1.PROBLEM:
a. Development of a uniform Top Secret control stem for use through
out CIA to insure the proper degree of control in the most efficient
and economical manner;
b. Solution of control problems unique to certain areas;
c. Solution of general problems related tolop Secret controls.
LAT Ai3 ARAS VISITED:
a. Incluyivo Survey Dates: 23 :January - 16 April 1952
b, Tp Secret,Control Areas Viaiteds
(1) Central Top Secret Control Office, OCD
(2) Office of Research and Reports
(a) Cartographic Branch Sub-Station
( Office of Operations
(a) Contact Division Sub Station
Sub-Station
c) FDD Sub-Station
(4) Office of National Estimates
(5) Office of Procurement
(6) Office of the. Comptroller
(a) Finance Sub-Station
(7) Office of Inspection and Security
(6) Office of Communicatione
(9) Office of Personnel
(a) Personnel (Covert) Sub-Station
(b) Military Personnel Sub-Station
(10) Office of Training (General)
(12) Office of Training (Special)
(12) Administrative Services
(a) Records Management Sub-Station
(b) Reproduction Sub-Station
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Technical Services Etaff
Office of Policy Coordination - Office of Special Operations
Office of General Counsel
Organisation and Methods Staff
Executive Registry
TBi FEO3I
Present Control ystemst
Control eystems vary greatly from area to area. The result is
ome areas have limited controls which do not lend themselves to
location of documents, efficient follow-up on documents being
ally circulated, or strict compliance with security regulations.
Other areas have control systems which the examiner considers to be
unduly voluminous and cembersome in the effort to maintain the proper
degree of control.
following are some examples of the variations in controls
exercised in the various areae
(1) Central Top Secret Control maintains a Posting Record on
every CIA control number originated in CC or appearing on the
weekly log of any area, which indicated the movement of each copy
nember from area to area, and final disposition; a Source card;
cover sheets; document receipts, courier receipts; reproduction
requisitions; dissemination orders; plus separate card records of
material on loan from outside agencies.
(2) At least half of the areas visited depend entirely on the
weekly log as their record of documents received, circulated internally
and dispatched to other areas. These logs are maintained in chrono-
logical order. Some areas maintain a handwritten log until the end
of the week when the log is typed in the requisite nuMber of copies.
Document receipts are clipped to the log or signatures are obtained
on the area copy of the loc. Some areas combine the incoming and
outgoing log, other maintain separate logs of Incoming and outgoing
material. One area maintaine 10 separate logs.
(3) Other areas maintain cord: records which are filed by
number, source or subject, and prepare weekly logs only for the
purpose of furnishing the required record to Central ?p Secret
Control.
LiLIN FIAL
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1.7ctirity information
(4) Within area there are no syatematto controls exercised in
Divisions or Branches Some intern 1 offices use the log form for
their internal controls, others use cards, or aim ]y make notes on
sanders or notebooks.
(5) Some areas prefer to keep a separate log of documents origi
nated in that area, and enter these documents on the weekly log at
the end of the week. Other areas simply make a notation on the
block of numbers that the number has been assigned a certain individual
some make a notation in a notebook that a number baa been assigned.
(6) OPC - OSO do not send weekly logs to the Central Top Secret
Control Office due to the fact that many of the documents received
direct from outside agencies or from field stations are of such
nature as to prohibit knowledge of these documents outside the
immediate area. Records Management Sub-Station of Administrative
Services sends copies of their microfilm and vital documents logs
to CTSC in lieu of the standard weekly log.
(7) The method of completing the weekly leg
area, Some areas enter internal distribution
the log form as well as external distribution
d sposition of the document. Some areas use the
rather than areas in listing distribution. Both
make it difficult for CTC to perform its postin
varies from area
in the final column
andfor final
names of individuals
of these practices
function.
(8) ORR and Reproduction channel their incoming and outgoing
documents through separate channels so that follow-up on documents
which have a deadline is not systematic,
b. Unique Preblems
(1) ORR, Basic Division is located in 25X1A6a
which is a considerable distance from the Area control office. When
Basic Divinion sends an occasional Top Secret section of an NIS
to Reproduction, the section is sent direct to Reproduction rather
than being channeled through the Area control office per regulation*,
(2) Office of Operations, Contact Division, does not assign a
TS control number to teletypes from domestic field stations unless
or until they are transmitted outside the Division.
(3) Administrative Services, Records Management Sub-Station/
has responsibility for sending analysts and photographers to the
various offices of CIA to scan TS documents for selection of those
to be microfilmed and filming the documents in the office. The
film is then carried back to Records Management for control and
filing. These analysts encounter difficulty in convincing CIA
offices that they are authorised to have access to such documents.
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(4) Aduin.ietrat1ye ..,ervices, Reproduction Sub-Station, has a
security problem in that CIA offices occasionally send members of
their own staff to stay with "super -sensitive" documents through-
out the reproduction procese. A member of the Reproduction staff
must remain with the visitor throughout his visit to protect the
security of the plant. Such visitors draw attention of the plant
workers to the fact that something special is in process.
(5) Certain T6 materials are sent to the Technical Services
Staff for analysis and the material is usually destroyed or
mutilAted during the analysis process. The analyst prepares a
memorandum report to the requesting office on the findings of the
analysis. The Area TSCO requests instructions as to disposition
of the cover sheet attached to the destroyed material and proper
handling of the memorandum which is frequently not Top t,ecret in
itself.
C.
Probi
(1) ultipie numering of documents from outside agencies.
Every area visited receives documents direct from outside agencies
rather than through the Central Top Secret Control Office. Fre-
quently copies of the same document will be sent to two or more areas
of CIA. Each area receiving a copy of the document assigns an
area 5-digit control number to the copy received. The result is
that each copy of the document is controlled bv a different CIA
control number.
(2) Multiple numbering of actions on the same document --A
document originated in one area or received from an outside agency
is frequently sent to other areas for comment or *Lotion. Each
area assigns its control number to its action on the document.
This practice makes it difficult to assemble in one group the
complete series of actions on one document,
(3) Lock of complete controls and record copies in Central Top
rot Control Office.--The theory on which a central control office
s based is that this central office will have a complete record
of every transaction on any given document and that a master file
copy of the documents themselves wilLreside in the central files.
Under the present system the CTUU does not record movement of doe
wants originally controlled by CTSCO (6-digit numbers) beyond the
first CIA recipient. CISCO maintains a complete posting record of
all Area originated documents (5-digit numbers) but only about
20 per cent of the documents themselves are furnished to the CTSCo
for the central files.
(4) Signature Record and Cover Sheet. Although Regulation
states that "Lech CIA member who reads or learns the contents of a
Top Secret docueent will sign his name on the cover sheet", this
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regulation is is not obesrved by a number of CIA off gials. In some
instances officials have instructed their clerical' staff to remove
the cover sheet before submitting documents to them.
(5) Rand-carrying of documents without recome to control
channels.--Rand-carrying of TE documents by officials from area to
area without recourse to the Area control office is prevalent
throughout This practice also extends to outside agencies.
Reguistio states, "The CIA Top Secret Control Officer and
Area and Alternate Top Secret Control Officers are the only persons
who shall be permitted to transmit end receipt for Top Secret
material moving between CIA and outside agencies.'
(6) Authoritf vested in Assistant Top Secret Control Officers.--
Regulation fill= Section L.(9) infers that Assistant Top Secret
Control Of cere are authorized to transmit and teceipt for doe-
=onto moving anywhere within CIA. The Top Secret Guide which is
furnished to Areas states that, ".....a limited number of Assistants
to provide for the securitg. of TS documents dispatched internally to
various sub-divisions of the office....Re may release a document for
transmittal to another Assistant within his Area.' The apparent
conflict between these instructions has resulted in confusion in
the areas; hence, in some areas assistants are authorized to transmit
and receipt for documents from other areae. This practice prevents
the proper degree of control in the Area TCO.
(7) Authority to see Top Secret documents gulation
states that,"Office heads are responsible for the designation of
persons in their offices...whom they deem are operationally
required to see Top Secret material.. ."Area control officers state
tl?uU they are not furnished with up-to-date lists of persons
authorized to see.
(8) Over-class cation.--Although some progress has been made
toward overcoming the tendency toward over-classification, the
examiner hes found indications that at least 50 per cent of docu-
ments classified Top Secret should bear a lever classification. This
survey was Ifinited to catrol offices so that information on this
subject is limited; however, in only one area was evidence found
that an objective review is made of classifications as directed in
Regulation
(9) Physical security of Top Secret documents.--Bindings of Top
Secret documents which are not issued in the form of publications are
not sufficiently secure in that the cover page and the last page are
of the same flimsy material as the remainder of the document and the
pages are stapled together. Frequent handling results in pages being
torn completely swig or mutilated.
(la) Officer-courier schedules.--Inasmuch as all Top Secret docu-
ments must be transmitted by officer-courier, it would be helpful if
each Area could be furnished with an up-to-date officer-courier schedule.
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(11) Destruction of documents and waste.--Location of
many offices at a considerable distance from "M" Building
*tore all Top Secret material must be destroyed imposes a
hardship on the areas as to transportation and sufficient
time. Also, Regulationstatee that, "P reliminary
drafty, copies, carbons, cils, stenographic notes,
work sheets, and the like, pertaining to classified matter
ofe411classifications, will be torn or shredded into small
pieces, and placed in envelopes or other receptacles come
spicuously marked 'SECRET,.' The examiner believes that
intelligible Top Secret waete should not be included with
Secret waste.
(12) Unnumbered TS document-B.?Occasionally an area
will receive an unnumbered document from another area and
willeeekUn a control number. In some instances these
documents are still in draft form.
(23) Inventory of TS documental?Inventory of
documents has been implemented in only one area to the
knowledge of the examiner. This inventory covered
50,000 documents and was completed over a period of
seven months as an additional duty to the regular duties
of the area control office.
CONCLUSIO
a. ..1.1Cottalliedal
(l) Establishment of Uniform Control ?yetem:
(a) A uniform control system should be established
throughout CIA which would include instructions for
control of documents from the highest to lowest
echelon. These instructions should be issued in the
form of Procedures Manual which wold outline in
detail the regulations to be compl, ed with, the forms
to be used, the channels of control, etc.
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(1) The following control
the examiner for consideration-,
prectical and feasible for use
Central Top Secret Control Office.
Wee
cunnt Number
lAttec
Date
is proposed by
le considered
1 areas and the
oli Control No,
No. of Pages Received from
tnolosuren
o Num
Dispatched to
Date
The above card would be prepared in quadrupijeata
transaction in which a document is originated
a, transmitted from an Area to another Area, or
tr.njjtte4 to an outside agency. This card would aleo
be prepared on any document received from an outside
agency. The card would be a snap-out type with carbon
interleaved and each copy would be a different color.
One copy of the card would be sent to Central Top Secret
Control Office at the end of the week indicating
"Received from" and "Date." One additional copy would
be held by the area until the document le transmitted
eleewhere, then completed as to "Dispatched ton and
"Date" and forwarded to CTSCO at the and of the week in
which this transaction tock place. If the document is
received and transmitted within the same week, both
copies of the card would go forward to C=0 at the
same time. CTSCO would file one copy of the card by
control number end the other copy by souree.
(d) One coy of the yRykLkftnicAlpd by the
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a control card would replace (i) the Posting
Record maintained by Central Top Secret Control Office on
all CIA control numbers, which is obtained by transfer of
information from weekly logs to a osting Record Card, (Ii)
the source card which is intellofsxed for Central MSCO on all
CIA control numbers, (iii) the weekly log prepared by areas,
(iv) the various other reccrds maintained by areas, which are
necessary- under the present system to facilitate ready loca-
tion of documents or records.
(b) The control card could be flag.ed with colored tate
for use in follow-up on documents which must move out of an
area by a deadline date, follow-up on return of signed docu-
ment receipts.
(1) Central TCO would have a complete record of all
ansactions on both 6-digit and mdigit numbers though the
actual amount of work necessary in CTSCO to obtain these
complete recorde would be preparation of the control cards
on documents which are receivaa in CISCO for transmiesion to
areas and/or Reproduction.
(d) The space on the lower half of the card would enable
to have on the one card a record of internal routing as
as transmiesion and dispatch to other areas. The space on
weir half also permits space for signatures of personnel
n the area who receive the document.
(0) Use of the control card would enable areas to main-
tain in a separate block the cards on all documents originated
by the area.
(1) Docum?nt receipts could be made in single copy only
and the Card flagged that a signed receipt is due to be.
returned. The returned receipts could be filed immediately
back of the control card.
( ) The control card provides ample space for listing of
internal dissemination whereas the log form does not provide
space for internal dissemination.
) The proposed control card is the eise of the LEM
card. Thus, file cabinets for the control cards can be easily
obtained,
the info
rega din
The proposed control card provides for listin,g of all
ation that areas and 0=0 are presently listing
any document.
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(41) Use of the proposed control card would enable those
areas Which handle sensitive material, information on which
should not be sent outside the area, to readily separate
those caros from cards dealing with material of general know-
ledge and send the appropriate cards to the CT;.-CO.
(k) Use of the proposed control card would facilitate
future inventories of documents.
(3) DisadvantaOst
The examiner believes that the only disadvantage inherent
in the proposed system is that, whereas the present Posting
Record of CTSCO incorporate, on one card all transactions on
any one document of the 5-digit series, the proposed system
will reqoire a separate card for each transaction. However, it
is believed that this one die advantage is far outweighed by
the many advantages. After a given period of time all cards
on a document can by retired except the card on each copy
number indicating its final dispoeition.
b. Unipe Problemss
The unique problems outlined under L'ection 31b. can be handled
on an individual basis with the areas concerned end appropriate
action will be recommended under Section h,b.
c. 20222IILEERDIMPSI
(1) Multiple numbering of documents from outside ;gencies.--
It is impractical from the standpoint of control and
sfficisnt operations to have documents trickling in to the various
areas direct from outside agencies. Any document which is of
interest to more than one area should be controlled originally by
the Central TCO in order that this office can be, in fact, the
central source of information on any document of general interest.
Also, many documents from outside agencies are received in single
copy and most be reproduced for CIA purposes. Central TCO has
the facilities for obtaining rapid reproduction of such documents.
It is also in a position to obtain a valid estimate of CIA
requirements.
It is recognized that this problem of areas receiving
documents direct can never be completely overcome inasmuch as
documents are sometimes handed to officials in meetings or the
urgency of the matter necessitates the most direct approach.
However, exceptional treatment for such documents is recommended
in Section 4, 43.(1).
(2) Multiple numbering of actions on the same document.--
Recommendation for correction of this problem is proposed in
Sectiom4? c. (2).
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(3) Lack of complete controls and record copies in Central
TSCO.- se of the proposed control system would complete the records
of Central TSCO. It is believed that it would be of considerable
value to CIA to have record copies of documents in the Central files.
It could be a function of the areas to determine which documents
are of general interest and send a copy of the document to Central
TSCO when the control card goes forward. To keep the files of the
Central TSCO as *mall as possible, such documents could be micro-
filmed and the copy returned to the area.
(4) Signature Record and Cover Sheet.--This appears to be an
instance where the regulation should be either enforced or revoked.
It is beyond the authority of area control officers to enforce this
regulation if officials are unwilling to observe it. This seems
to be a matter for review by the Office of Inspection and Security.
(5) Rand-carrying of documents.--Lvery area visited by the
*miner seems to make ever., possible effort to obtain the
Cooperation of the ;staff in the observance of channels. The
answer to this problem seems to be the full support and cooperation
of Office heads in impressing upon their otaff the importance of
control channels and enforcement of punitive measures to correct
Osfaulte.
(6) iuthority of Assistant lop Secret Control Officers.--
The exeminer believes that the regulation should be revised to
state plainly that assistants are authorised to transmit and
receipt for documents 221.1y. within their own immediate Division
or Branch. Any movement of a document between Divisions or
outside the Area should be channeled through the Area TSCO.
(7) Authority to see.-- Office heade should be reminded of
their responsibility in this respect and should designate someone
to inform the Area TSCO and assistants as to the names of such
individuals and maintain current lists.
Over-classification.--To overcome the rob of over-
classification of documents by the originator, it is recommended
that Office heads should designate a limited number of persons in
the various divisions and staff offices to review objectively
each document originated in that office, for the purpose of disapproval or
approval of a classification of Top Secret or Secret proposed by
the originator. These individuals should also review periodically
all Top Secret or Secret documents originated by that Office to
determine whether that classification is still valid. The
reviewer should be thoroughly indoctrinated by the Office of
Inspection and Security as to the criteria to be applied in
determining the proper classification.
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(9) Unnumbered TS documente.--The examiner believes that any
document, as soon its it evolves into intelligible form, should
be assigned a control number because the material therein is Top
Secret regardlees of the form. When a draft is being circulated
from area to area for comment: or action., it is very, difficult
to maintain a proper degree of control without a control number.
The present practice of assigning the control number of one area
to a draft prepared by another area leads to confesion.
(10) After review of the problems involved in conducting an
inventory of all documents from the inception of CIA to the present
the examiner believes that inventory should be started with all
documents from January 1, 1950, through June 30, 1952. Thereat
quarterly inventory should be taken in each area . Report of
results of inventories should be provided to the CIA Top Secret
Control Officer within fifteen days after the cut-off date of
the period covered by inventory. The first inventory will be
the most difficult and should be initiated at the earliest possible
date. Each area should be responsible for all documents (all
copies thereof) originated by the area plus all documents received
direct from outside agencies. Central Top Secret Control would be
responsible for accounting for all documents bearing a 6-digit
control number. If the proposed control system is adopted,
Central Top Secret Control would be responsible after June 30,
1952, for initiating the quarterly inventory and requesting an
accounting from the areas for all documents not recorded in the
Central MO.
Uniform Cont
fleeting with all Area Top Secret Control Officers to
discuss he proposed uniform control system.
Preparation of a Vrocedures Manual outlining in detail:
(a) Regulations to be complied with;
(b) Each step of the control procedure to be performed
by Central TSCO, Area TSCOls, e,ub-Stations, 1:ivision8
Branches, etc.;
) Forms to be used;
a) Annexes which are removable--li ting all Alternate and
Assistant Top Secret Control Officers, all persons
authorized-to see Top Secret material, persons desig-
nated to review classifications, persons authorized to
hand-carry material outside the Agency, officer-courier
schedules, arrangements for destruction.
Periodic visits to each area by the CIA or Central Top
Secret Control Officer to review the problems of the area.
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Unique Poblemei
(1) ORR, Basic Division should become a Sub-Gtation to
tate handling of Top Secret sections of NIB.
(2) Office of Operations, Contact Division should assign a
TS control number to teletype and 25X1 A
execute a control card.
(3) Administrative Services, Records Management Sub-Station,
should be provided by the Office of Inspection and Security with
special passes for analysts and photographers to use when visiting
offices to microfilm TS documents. These passes should be controlled
by the Area TSCO and retained in that office except when in use by
analysts and photographers.
(4) In order to cut down the number of visitors to Reproduction
who accompany documents through processing, it is recommended that
clearances could be obtained for the Reproduction TS control officer
and the Production Coordinator to handle certain extra-sensitive
materials. The Production Coordinator is capable of operating the
various machines in the plant and could personally process such
material.
(5) Analysts in the Technical Services Staff should execute
the destruction certificate at the bottom of the Signature Record
and Cover Sheet when TS material is destroyed by analysis. The
memorandum report, regardless of the classification, should be
attached to the cover sheet for return to the office of origin.
Osneral Problems?
(1) Multiple Numbering of documents from outside agencies.--
IA ?op Secret Control Officer should request all outside agencies
to send all Top Seoret material through the Central Top Secret
Control Office. Exceptions could be made for "eyes only" and
other sensitive materials. In the case of exceptions, the area
receiving the document direct should call the Central TSCO for a
6-digit control number. Central TSCO would place a control card
in suspense until further information would be submitted at the
end of the week by the area.
(2) Multiple number of actions on the same document.--A
control number should be assigned by the originating CIA area.
All actions taken by other areas should bear the same control
number followed by a dash and the office symbol, for example,
43567..00. If the same document returns to 00 for a second
action the symbol would be 43567.40.20
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(3) Lack of complete controls and record copies in Central
T- 0.--Adoption of the propoeed control asters and submission of
record copies of documents to Central TSCO are recommended.
(4) Signature Record and Cover Sheet.--It is recommended that
the Office of Inspection and Security should be requested to
review use of the cover sheet and either insure enforcement of
the regulation or revoke same.
Hand-carrying of documents.--It is recommended that the
fice of Inspection and Security should be requested to instruct
Office Heeds to designate certain officials to be authorized to
hand-carry documents to outside agencies. Office Heads should be
requested also to give their full support to the observance of
control channels through the media of periodic memoranda to
their staff and verbal reminders in staff meetings.
(6) Authority vested in Asst ant Top Secret Control Office
It is recommended that Regulation should be revised to restrict
Assistant TSCO's to transmitting and receipting for documents only
within their immediate areas (Divisional, Drenches, staff offices).
(7) Authority to see.--Office Heade should review periodically
the lists of persons authorized to see Top Secret documents and
issue a. memorandum as to revisions to the Area Taco and the Central
TECO.
(8) Over-classification.--Office Heads should be instructed to
designate a limited number of persons in the various divisions and
staff offices to review objectively each doaument Which the origi-
nator has classified Top Secret or Secret. The reviewer should be
thoroughly indoctrinated Iv the Office of Inspection and Security
as to the criteria to be applied in determining proper classifica-
tions.
(9) Physical security of Top Secret documents.--It is recommended
that each Top Secret document should be backed by a thick backing
sheet on which only the classification and the document control
number would appear-. The documents should be stapled at least
twice both front and back.
(10) Officer-courier echedules.--Schedules should be furnished
to each Area TCO and kept current.
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Inventory of of documents rom 1 January 1950, through,
30 June 1952, should be initiated immediately. Thereafter,
quarterly inventories should be initiated by the Central Top
Secret Control Office.
ONCURRENCLS
CIA Top Secret Control Officer
Peel
Organization SflU Methods Service
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