SOVIET UNION MILITARY - ECONOMIC REPORT TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP56S00492A000100120003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 28, 1944
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
99/53/TOPSEC/CIA, D/Z
SC No. 07801
Copy No.
FOIAb3a
SOVIET UNION MILITARY-ECONOMIC REPOR
Translated from the German Report
Dated: 28 October 1944
/THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE
18, U. S. C. , SECTION 793 AND 794. SEE ALSO PUBLIC
LAW 513, 81ST CONGRESS SECOND SESSION. ITS TRANS-
MiSSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY
MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED
BY LAW. /
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
Strategic Division
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FOIAb3a
Copy Nos. 1 - 38 _ for Dissemination
Internal: Distribution L(4)
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During the Second World War the German Signal Intelligence Control
Center of the Staff of the Chief of Army Signal Service (HNW, LNA)
issued a series of reports to show the USSR military-economic situ-
ation as reflectFxUA136asian internal plain language traffic. A total
of 145 reports, appeared at short, irregular
intervii0I,A1.lly six per month, for the period October 1942 - March
1943. include mostly daily reports for March
1943 as well as a few monthly reports covering thea?IV b3j8Lrt of 1942
FaW~early part of 1943. The last four reports,
summarize Soviet economic activities for periods of three
to nine months in 1943 and 1944.
FOIAb3a
Fi athree of these reports have been tranFsG1Ah d issued by
One hundred reports,
are being translated and issued by Strategic Division of the Office of
Research and ft@~Abta(CIA). The series will be completed with the
publication of
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PAGE
Personnel Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Agriculture and Food Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
I. Livestock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
II. Spring Plowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
III. Food Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Metal Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 38
I. Production of Ores and Quartzite Sand . . . . . . . . . . 38
II. Scrap Procurement and Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
III. Production Results at Individual Plants . . . . . . . . . . 43
IV. General Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Coal Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
I. Coal Deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
II. Coal Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
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Military-Economic Report
Survey for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1944
(Based on domestic radio traffic)
FORE WORD
The following report summarizes military-economic information from
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1944 concerning:
Personnel situation
Agriculture and food situation
Metal supply
Coal supply.
Oil Supply and Foreign Trade have been treated specially in previous reports.
This report is based entirely on information derived from domestic
radio traffic. It makes no pretense to completeness, but only presents a
cross section of the economic situation in the Soviet Union. Statistics presented
are not to be considered a maximum, but rather as an indication of economic
development. It should be noted that the messages upon which this report is based
originated almost exclusively from regions of the Soviet Union which were under
great stress, and these messages, therefore, permit only partial conclusions
as to the economic situation of the entire country.
(1)
The shortage of the labor force in the Soviet Union was extremely
serious in the first, second and third quarters of 1944. .In order to procure
auxiliary workers, the time-tested measure of labor conscriptions was resorted
to.
(2) Labor conscription was carried out, as already mentioned in the
previous semi-annual reports, with emphasis as far as possible in the liberated
territories. There they were identical to the resettlement operations carried
on by NKVD troops. This had a duel objective:
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1) To render ineffective any political unrest
2) To procure the urgently needed workers
(3) Thus, labor conscription was carried out in 1943, primarily in the
Caucasus, then in the Eastern Ukraine and in 1944 in the Western Ukraine and
White Russia. For example, according to a message in July, the following
were conscripted in Rovno Oblast' alone:
For Blast Furnaces
Konstantinovka 200 persons
For Coke Chemical Plants
in Ruchenkovskaya 1000 men
in Gorlovka 300
in Novomakeevka 200
in Staromakeevka 100
in Novoenakievo 100
in Staroenakievo 100
in Stalin 100
in Krasnogorovka 300 men
in Patelejmonovskaya 150
in Novoshamotnaya (?) 200
in Krasnoarmejskaya 100
For the Brick Works of the Donbass Water Trust 200 men
(4) Likewise, according to a message in July the following were con-
scripted in West Ukrainian Oblasti for the reconstruction of sugar plants in
areas of the Ukraine on the right bank of the Dnepr:
in Kiev Oblast' 2631 men
in Vinnitsa Oblast' 1960
in Kamenets Podolsk Oblast' 600
in Zhitomir Oblast' 400 "
in Odessa Oblast' 350 "
in Stanislau Oblast' 60
in Rovno Oblast' 150
in Tarnopol Oblast' 50
in Kirovograd Oblast' 210
(5) There were also reports of large scale labor conscriptions in the
Oblasti of Pinsk and Baranovichi. In Kiev Oblast' labor conscription was
carried out for North Caucasian Surface and Underground Construction.
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(6) The following table indicates the general scale of labor conscrip-
tions in the period covered by this report:
Oblast' or Republic Number of Labor Conscriptees
Future Conscription
Azerbajdzhan Republic
13845
17969
Georgian Republic
4693
Armenian Republic
--
500
Dagestan Republic
4155
7700
Ordzhonikidze Kraj
50336
9392
Checheno-Ingush Republic
1127
Turkmen Republic
1239
100
Krasnodar Kraj
1850
8590
Rostov Oblast'
18752
50117
Zhitomir Oblast'
2300
Oblast' of the Western Ukraine
8791
Rovno Oblast'
7150
Total:
114238
(7) During the labor conscription operations large numbers of women,
youths and war wounded were called up. The use of women as drivers and
transportation workers already noted in the first and second half years of 1943
was continued in 1944 and they were even employed more extensively. Reports
were intercepted according to which many women were employed in coal mines.
In June reports were intercepted for the first time concerning the conscription
of women not only for employment for agriculture and industry, but also in the
Army. According to a report of 20 June 1944, female students in the class of
1924 and older were to be conscripted for the Army.
(8) According to radio traffic youths were to be used principally in
agriculture by the NK for the River Fleet and in Stalingrad. Moreover, many
youths were sent to trade schools.
(9) Exact information concerning the use of war wounded was intercepted
in messages from the Turkmen (Middle Asia) Azerbajdzhan and Armenian (Cau-
casus) Republics.
Turkmen Republic
As of 1 January there were 8, 121 persons in the Republic who had been
wounded in the "fatherland war. " Of these, 4, 495 were conscripted for work
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including 2, 941 for work in industry. As of 1 March 1944 the number of in-
valids had risen to 8, 330 persons and the number conscripted stood at 6, 037
persons.
Armenian Republic
As of 1 April 1944, there were 18, 412 war wounded in the Republic. Of
these, 14, 337 had been conscripted for compulsory labor. As of 1 July there
were 20, 308 war wounded in the republic of whom 16, 588 had been conscripted.
On 1 August the number of war wounded had risen to 21, 130.
Azerbajdzhan Republic
As of 1 August 1944, 27, 822 war wounded were counted. Of these, the
following were employed in individual branches of the economy:
Industry
1,204 men
Agriculture
10, 166
Domestic work
156 "
Assigned to other
organizations for
auxiliary work
6, 906
Total 18,432 men
A postcript to this message is worthy of note; according to it 1, 274 invalids of
the third group (?) were deprived of income because of refusal to work.
(10) In general, the military authorities paid particular attention to
removing personnel capable of military duty from plants and activities in the
rear for immediate transfer to the front. Thus, reports were intercepted
according to which a re-examination of all war wounded was to be carried out,
and those persons found capable of any service at the front whatsoever were to
be immediately conscripted. Workers, who formerly had been considered in-
capable of military service, were also to be re-examined and as far as possible
conscripted for the Army.
(11) Despite these extreme measures, in several cases there were ex-
tensive exemptions. Examples: According to a report of 4 July, the exemptions
for students of all classes in technical institutions of the NK for the Merchant
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Fleet were decreed until further notice by the Council of Peoples' Commissars.
Students at plant schools of the NK for Construction Materials were to be indefin-
itely exempted from military duty. Employees of the River Fleet, who were
temporarily exempt from military duty, were to be exempt for the remainder
of the war regardless of their service ability grade. Three categories of person-
nel at cement enterprises (engineering, technical, and administrative) were to
be exempt until the end of 1944. Moreover, the exemptions for all personnel
at the Kiev Construction Directorate of Stalino Oblast', which were to continue
until 1 July, were extended until 31 December.
(12) From these reports it is apparent that not only the requirements of
the Army were considered, but also that it was necessary to consider the interests
of industries important to the war effort.
(13) The needs of Agriculture for tractor and combine operators were
well met. Many reports were intercepted concerning exemptions for tractor and
combine operators. Even agricultural workers without special skills could secure
exemptions. For example: 1, 000 agricultural workers were exempted from
military duty for offices of the NK for Agriculture in Stavropol Oblast'.
(14) In addition, employees of other enterprises and offices were often
conscripted to meet the requirements of agriculture. Several organizations
were included in this compulsory conscription including the NK for the River
Fleet.
(15) The labor shortage was not only a result of large numbers of men
lost at the front and the large number of military assignments, but was also the
result of poor administration and discipline in the labor conscription program.
(16) An order from the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the USSR
gives information on this subject. The order concerns the punishment to be
applied for unauthorized absence from plants and other industrial enterprises.
Plant directors and other administrative personnel who concealed unauthorized
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absences were to be very severely punished.
(17) An extreme example is contained in the following message which
was sent on 24 May from Moscow to Kujbyshev:
As of 1 January the Steamship Agency had a total of 482
transportation workers. During the winter an additional 599
were assigned there. This totals 1, 081 persons. According
to information from the Port there are, however, only 612
on hand at the present time. What happened to the other 469?
(18) Poor shipping conditions had an especially serious effect on the
labor conscription program. Examples:
On 15 January a group of tractor operators had to await further shipping
space for 10 days at the Proletarskaya Railroad Station. The tractor drivers
were urgently needed in the Ukraine.
Likewise, in January a group of 1, 000 labor conscriptees, who were
urgently needed at plants of the NK for Armaments in Slavyansk, were stranded
at the Tikhoretskaya Railroad Station. For days the 1, 000 persons could not be
fed. In March a group of 550 persons was stranded at the Tikhoretskaya Rail-
road Station for two weeks. This group could be neither fed nor housed.
The report from the Office of the NK for Coal in Shakhty is particularly
significant. The report is as follows:
"The Ordzhonikidze and North Caucasus Railways have not
provided enough railroad cars for transportation of labor con-
scriptees in March. The conscriptees who had been assembled
and then stranded at railroad stations were to be either released
or assigned to other NK's. "
(19) Great difficulties were caused at individual offices, because of
deficient housing and supplies for the labor conscriptees.
For example: In January 15, 671 labor conscriptees were to be dispatched
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from Ordzhonikidze Kraj to the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine. Accommodations
and supplies for these conscriptees were very poorly organized. For days
the group was not actually dispatched. For weeks the workers had to sleep
in unheated rooms without windows or doors. This report concludes with the
note that "unauthorized absences are increasing at an alarming scale. "
Additional workers were required in Baku for the construction of Plant
152 of the NK for the Chemical Industry. The labor office could provide the
necessary workers, but their employment was impossible because of the shortages
of clothing, shoes, linens, etc.
(20) Formalities and difficulties also had to be coped with. For example,
the coal mines in Morosovskaya received 170 workers from Chernogorsk. How-
ever, the workers could not be employed for weeks since the North Caucasus
Military Okrug delayed authorization.
(21) The defects mentioned above caused many losses through illness,
death, and above all, unauthorized absences from work. The following messages
indicate the scale of various types of losses:
Two hundred workers were conscripted for labor at a plant of the NK for
the Merchant Fleet in Baku. Of these, only 77 were actually working, 81 had
deserted and 41 had either fallen sick, been conscripted for training schools,
had left for one reason or another or had been transferred to other plants.
As of 1 January the special construction office in Stalino Oblast' had a
total of 1, 431 workers. In the period from 1 January to 1 July 2, 687 persons
were added. In the same period however, the total losses were 1, 133 persons
or 271 of the total working force.
(22) Personnel status reports intercepted from the "Rostob/Ugol"
Combine in Shakhty give information on a general percentage of losses of workers
for the third 10 day period of April and the second 10 day period of May:
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The third 10 day period of April:
Number of workers
37, 662 persons
Arrived
1,067
Transferred from the NK for Defense
317
Special Cadres (?)
82
Conscripted
335
Others
333
Workers Lost
769
Deserted
557
Sick
108
Invalids
18
Died
8
In prison
14
Special Cadres
(?)
21
Conscripted into the Army 43
Total 769
Second 10 day period of May
Number of workers
38, 626 persons
Arrived
863
Transferred from the NK for Defense
1
Special Cadres (?)
77
Conscripted
78
From Trade Schools
252
Others
455
863
Workers Lost
809
Deserted
643
Sick
60
Invalids
7
Died
3
In Prison
7
Conscripted into the Army
13
Released
20
Other Departures
38
Employed in Mines
17, 759 persons
Arrived
583
Transferred from the NK for Defense
1
Special Cadres (?)
Conscripted
From Trade Schools
Others
23
48
230
281
Workers Lost
546
Deserted
449
Sick
25
Invalids
3
Died
3
In Prison
4
Conscripted into the Army
5
Released
15
Transferred to other offices
13
Other Departures
29
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(23) The percentage of desertions in comparison to other losses is
especially worthy of note in these reports.
(24) Despite the great difficulties which arose because of increased
requirements of the Front, the Armaments Industry and extensive reconstruction
work, etc. , technical training of youths was in no way decreased.
(25) Thus, according to a report in February the Labor Office in Mak-
hachkala conscripted a total of 7, 122 persons for technical schools in the Dagestan
Republic. The majority of these conscripts were for the technical schools of the
NK for Oil. In July 2, 300 persons were to be trained in Baku by the NK for Oil.
According to a report in June 185 persons were to be conscripted in the Turkmen
Republic by the Labor Office for technical schools.
(26) Reports on the establishment of new technical schools were also
intercepted. For example at Plant 447 of the Aviation Industry and at the Textile
Combine in Erevan. Reports concerning the training of agricultural skilled
workers were encountered especially often in domestic radio traffic. According
to a report in July 6, 700 tractor operators had been trained in the current school
year for Rostov/Don Oblast'.
(27) In February the personnel department of the North Ossetian NK
for Agriculture in Ordzhonikidze reported the following number of personnel
under training:
Under Training
Planned
Tractor Operators
406
400
Mechanics
20
20
Combine Operators
51
50
Preparatory Operators
25
30
(28) The Central Committee of the Party in Stavropol reported the fol-
lowing as of 1 March:
For Machine and Tractor Stations
Requirement
Tractor Drivers
14800
Combine Operators
3185
To be trained Actually
Personnel on hand according to plan trained
9798
6000
7879
2292
1200
8
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Requirement Personnel on hand
To be trained
according to plan
Actually
trained
Mechanics
638
475
180
97
Preparatory workers for
tractor columns
1734
1668
300
94
Technical Workers
1378
599
200
821
Tractor Drivers
1801
766
1035
922
Combine Operators
759
240
193
368
Mechanics
110
83
12
?
Preparatory workers for
tractor columns
153
82
112
31
Technical Workers
361
174
90
196
(29) Moreover, refresher courses for tractor drivers were held. In-
stead of the scheduled 2, 000 persons, only 1, 688 attended these courses. At the
Dagestan NK for Agriculture a course for kolkhoz directors was completed on
26 February. Ninety-nine persons were trained.
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SITUATION
I. Livestock
(30) After a large part of the occupied territories had been liberated
by Soviet troops in the summer of 1943, the NK for Agriculture in conjunction
with the Council of People's Commissars began a new reconstruction program
for livestock in the following liberated territories:
Ordzhonikidze Kraj
Krasnodar Kraj
Kalinin Oblast'
Orel Oblast'
Kursk Oblast'
Voronezh Oblast'
Stalingrad Oblast'
Rostov Oblast'
(31) The scope of the entire program, as well as some of the details,
have been reported in the semi-annual report for the second half of 1943. For
the territory liberated during 1944, no livestock reconstruction programs were
noted. However, the initiation of such programs were indicated in messages
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intercepted on domestic radio links for unspecified territories in the West Ukrain-
ian and White Russian Republics as well as for the following oblasti:
Kiev
Stalino
Kharkov
Voroshilovgrad
Dnepropetrovsk
Zaporozhe
Leningrad
(32) The following individual reports present information on the scale of
the construction program:
(33) March:
In March the Office of the NK for Agriculture in Kiev was to receive from' the
Azerbajdzhan Republic 3, 600 head of large cattle and 5, 000 head of small cattle,
and Stalino Oblast' was to receive 1, 000 head of horned cattle from Georgia and
2, 000 head of horned cattle from Azerbajdzhan.
(34) April:
Livestock shipments totalling 6, 375 head were planned from several parts of the
Turkmen Republic to Ukrainian, primarily Western Ukrainian, oblasti.
(35) The Georgian NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry shipped 100 railroad
cars of livestock to liberated Ukrainian oblasti.
(36) May:
According to a report intercepted at the beginning of May, Kharkov Oblast' was
to receive 8, 500 head of horned cattle and 13, 000 head of sheep from the Kazakh
Republic.
(37) The Don Kuban Reconstruction Directorate was to provide river
fords by 1 May at Kalach Kachalinsk and at Serafimovich. About 1, 000 head of
livestock in transit from Central Asia to the Ukraine were to be transferred to
each of these fords.
(38) NKRF officials in Sverdlovsk likewise had to construct fords in May
for the transfer of livestock in transit from Kazakhstan to liberated Western
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Ukrainian oblasti. About 10, 000 head of livestock were to be transferred here.
(39) On 3 May the arrival of 3, 418 horses, 32, 876 head of horned cattle,
and 13, 626 sheep from Karsk Oblast' (Transcaucasus) and 3, 185 head of cattle
from Groznyj Oblast' was reported from Soldato-Aleksandrovskoe. The live-
stock was to be transported to the Ukraine and White Russia.
(40) The transfer of large herds of livestock from Ordzhonikidze Kraj
and Rostov/Don Oblast' to the Ukraine was to begin on 5 May.
(41) As of 1 June the kolkhozes of the Azerbajdzhan Republic sold the
following to livestock procurement offices in the liberated territories. (Sales
are presumably to livestock procurement offices in regions for which the live-
stock construction plans had not yet been included in the program for 1943):
Large Cattle
14, 852
Including:
Cows
1,634
Sheep and goats
1, 502
Pigs
1,716
(42) From 1 through 20 June livestock had passed through transfer points
Tsymlyansk transfer point
Total 4, 895 head
Including:
2, 720
large cattle
937
horses
1,238
sheep
Total
4, 895
(43) From Groznyj and Stavropol oblasti 4, 381 and 514 head of cattle
respectively were transferred.
(44)
Bataisk transfer point
Total 10, 944 head
Including:
8, 714
large cattle
637
horses
1,593
sheep
Total
10, 944
(45)
From Groznyj Oblast' and Ordzhonikidze Kraj 9, 806 and 1, 138 head
of cattle respectively were to be transferred.
(46) The livestock was to be transferred to the following oblasti:
Stalino Voroshilovgrad
Kharkov Voronezh
Kursk Dnepropetrovsk
Orel Zaporozhe
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(47) From 21 through 25 June 2, 790 head of large cattle and 900 head of
sheep were driven through the Zimovniki Rajon in Groznyj Oblast'.
(48) It is notable that Ordzhonikidze Kraj, which in 1943 was still under
reconstruction, was already supplying livestock this year.
(49) The livestock economy and its build-up were essentially confronted
with three principal difficulties:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Transport problem
Disease
Supply of fodder
(50) The following messages present information concerning the especially
poor transportation conditions:
At the Chuvashi station 200 horses arrived. However, horse
drivers, fodder and railroad cars were lacking.
In April, 37 railroad cars of horses were shipped from Tashkent
for the sovkhozes in the liberated territories of White Russia. The ship-
ment was held up so the sovkhozes concerned could not fulfill their spring
sowing obligations.
In May, a shipment of horses destined for Leningrad Oblast' was
held up in Chita. Because of a lack of fodder, more than half the horses
were lost.
In the storehouses of the Animal Raw Material Supply Office in
Turkestan more than 2, 000 tons of slaughtered cattle (live weight) destined
for the Ukraine had piled up. 370 railroad cars were required for ship-
ment of these cattle, but only 160 cars were actually provided.
At railroad stations of the Karaganda Railroad 5, 000 head of large
cattle and 13, 000 head of sheep destined for Kiev Oblast' had piled up.
Railroad cars were not available.
(51) Very great value was placed on veterinary services. Shipments of
livestock were provided with veterinarians and veterinary personnel, and at all
large stopping points, animal hospital and veterinary service stations were set up.
Nevertheless, large scale livestock sickness and disease could not be avoided:
For example, Groznyj reported on 12 April that horned cattle fell ill from
pyroplasmus (?) in transit from the mountains to the flatlands. The loss of cattle
was almost complete. Party officials did not feel obliged to assist in the transfer
of livestock from the mountains to the flatlands.
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At the Meat Combine in Nalchik large scale slaughter of livestock passing
through had to be carried out, because of livestock diseases.
The Livestock Procurement Office at Groznyj could not send 400 young
lambs to Stavropol because pox had broken out in Budennovsk Rajon.
There were also instances noted concerning livestock being driven in a
completely starved condition.
(52) The livestock fodder procurement program encountered great diffi-
(53) The Livestock Procurement Office in Stavropol required 14, 187 of
coarse livestock fodder in 1944. However, only 13, 868 tons could be procured
with great difficulty and that from their own stocks.
(54) In Ordzhonikidze Kraj the situation relative to livestock fodder was
disastrous. As a result of drought in 1943 a number of sovkhozes could not
produce their quotas of livestock fodder. An urgent request was made to the
Council of People's Commissars in Moscow for an allotment of about 2, 000 tons
of hay.
(55) Oil cakes and other refuse were also not on hand in sufficient quantity.
The Office of the NK for Sovkhozes in Rostov urgently required 600 tons of oil
cakes. The report concluded with the notation that, in event of non-delivery,
wide-spread deaths of the livestock would be expected. On 1 April the grain
sovkhoz in Ejsk reported that the livestock was in extremely poor condition as a
result of a shortage of fodder.
(56) Despite the isolated instances of poor conditions reported above,
the build-up of the livestock economy generally seemed to be progressing satis-
factorily. Based on preliminary figures in June the Council of People's Commis-
sars of the Ukrainian Republic could report as assured the planned delivery of
a total of 72, 000 tons liveweight of cattle to the Red Army by the end of 1944.
The Council of People's Commissars based its estimate on the delivery of 53, 000
tons liveweight of cattle to the Red Army and other organizations already carried
out by 10 May 1944.
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(57) A new step was taken in livestock raising. Individual messages
concerning artificial insemination are considered extremely notable.
(58) 450, 000 sheep in Ordzhonikidze Kraj during 1944, and 1, 000 cows
and 700 horses in the North Ossetian Republic during an unspecified time were
artificially inseminated.
(59) The following livestock estimates and stock reports were intercepted
during the third quarter:
(60) Azerbajdzhan Republic:
On 1 August the following were transferred for rearing to the NK for the Meat and
Dairy Industry in Baku:
5, 300 head of large cattle
6, 236 head of small cattle
(61) Groznyj Oblast'
The Party Office made the following cattle estimate for 1944 for the kolkhozes
of the oblast':
Horned Cattle
25, 194 head
including :
Cows
9, 194 head
Working Oxen
3,878 "
Sheep and Goats
98, 551 head
including:
breeders
37,290
d
62
270 h
including:
Pigs
breeders
Horses
13, 290
ea
,
7, 322 head
including:
mares
3,070
Working horses
5, 544 head
Camels
419
9
Asses
Fowl
100, 000 head
Beehives
5, 191 hives
The following young livestock were to be raised:
Calve s
2, 244 head
Young sheep and
young goats
22, 765
Suckling pigs
6, 556
Foals
692
Kolkhoz employees and livestock farms were to receive:
horned cattle
2, 020 head
sheep and goats
suckling pigs
2,250 250
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The following were to be sold by the kolkhozes:
Suckling pigs total 3, 462
including to: newly organized kolkhozes 1, 824 head
auxiliary organizations 638 head
resettled kolkhoz employees lr 000 head
Horned cattle were received by the following:
Newly established livestock farms
81 head
Stud farms
2
"
Pig sovkhozes
650
"
(?)
Sheep raising farms
113 head
Fowl raising farms
78
"
Bee raising farms
15
it
(62) The average monthly yield of milk was estimated at 650 liters per
cow; the average monthly yield of wool at 1-6 kilograms per sheep, and the
average monthly yield of eggs at 60 per hen. A total of 400, 000 eggs are to be
laid. 162, 000 chickens are to be sold to kolkhozes and 60, 000 chickens to other
organizations and kolkhoz employees.
The following were to be mated:
breeder folds 150 head
stallions of the Anglo-Don and
Anglo-Kabardino breeds 20 "
breeder buffaloes 100 "
Australian Merino sheep 620 "
folds of the English breed 20
Livestock stalls were to be constructed for the following:
cows
8
horses
11
sheep
12
pigs
47
fowl
24
calve s
16
The following were to be repaired:
cow stalls 225
sheep stalls 198
horse stalls 238
fowl stalls 154
calf stalls 69
pig stalls 111
hay
fodder grasses
including silo fodder
182, 000 tons
37,909 33,000
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(63) North Ossetian Republic:
As of 1 January the following livestock were on hand:
Owner Large cattle
Pigs
Sheep and Goats
Horses
Donkeys
Kolkhoz
9947
1203
23292
44Z4
301
Kolkhoz employees 29764
7047
16192
13
661
?
2635
?
25
30
Workers resettled
128
221
in cities
Cooperative farms
3749
725
2875
1489
1205
802
9
1246
67
(64) Moreover, as
of 15 January the Livestock Procurement Office had
135, 000 head of livestock after fulfilling all delivery plans.
(65) Dagestan Republic:
By 1 January 1945, the kolkhozes were to have reached the following number of
live stock:
Horses 27, 000 head
including: 4, 000 folds
Large cattle 188, 000 head
including: 39, 000 cows
Work oxen 61, 000 head
Sheep 1', 535, 000 head (?)
(66) Turkmen Republic:
As of 1 January a stock of 413, 459 sheep including 276,-054 breeders was reported.
(67) Certain considerations were given to kolkhozes in liberated territories
with respect to the delivery of livestock products. Thus, the following general
rules were set up by a decree of 12 June from the Council of People's Commis-
sars concerning the delivery of agricultural products in liberated territories:
(1)
Kolkhozes in regions liberated before 1 January 1944 were obliged
to make complete deliveries of meat, milk and wool. During the year
1944 the kolkhozes were released from the obligation of delivering
goat cheese, eggs, and raw leather.
(2) Kolkhozes in regions liberated after 1 January 1944 were released
from the obligation of delivering all animal products. In the delivery
of meat the following were not to be included:
Cows which were to be used for government breeding purposes, working
oxen, buffalo, Merino and Karakul breeder sheep, calves and lambs
which had been driven from kolkhozes in 1943 according to an agreement
to restock livestock farms. The same also applied to livestock which
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(3)
had been allotted as government assistance to Kolkhozes in 1943.
The following were not to be included in deliveries of wool: Pure-
bred breeder rams and fine wool English Chigajsker which had been
reserved for breeding purposes.
Delivery of raw leather by the kolkhozes in liberated territories was
to be made in conformance with Point No. 4 of Government Decree
1989 of 20 Oct. 1942. A comprehensive report of deliveries was to
be transmitted to the NK for Procurement by 1 August 1944.
(68) These general rules did not appear to apply to the so-called "liber.
ated" territories of the Latvian and Estonian Republics. A report was intercepted
according to which livestock confiscation points were to be set up in the Rositten,
Rudsen, Modon, Bova and Abrehnen Districts several days after the occupation
by Soviet Russian troops.
II. Spring Plowing and Harvest
(a) Spring Plowing
(69) Great efforts were made to complete spring plowing and thus assure
a good harvest. As far as possible, all conceivable assistance was given to agri-
culture. Thus, government reserve bases in many regions furnished seed grain
in unlimited quantities for spring sowing.
(70) For example the following grains were issued:
Ordzhonikidze Kraj
Krasnodar Oblast'
Wheat
2800 tons
Oats
1100 tons
Barley
11420 "
Millets
400
Oats
2687 "
Wheat
1500 "
Millets
1326
Barley
1500
Corn
420 "
Total 18653 tons
(71) Difficulties were inevitable. They were caused by a lack of shipping
material for artificial fertilizer, by the onslaught of swarms of grasshoppers
and field mice, particularly in Georgia, and also partially by a lack of seed
grain in many newly liberated territories.
(72) Territories through which the battle zone had passed, were in a very
serious condition and an orderly sowing program was impossible. In this respect
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the following message merits particular attention:
The regions and areas below were in the battle zone for two years and
suffered especially heavily under the German Occupation. This year
these regions constitute fourteen to twenty percent of agricultural land.
The regions are as follows:
Bolshokrepinskij Myasnikovskij
Kujbyshev Fedorovskij
Anas to s ievs kij Me klonovs k
Matveevo-Kurgansk Norliono-Nesvetaevsk
(73) The extent to which the spring plowing program was successful is
indicated from the following message which was intercepted on 22 May:
"I report with satisfaction that the Ukraine office has completely
fulfilled the government sowing plan. I express my personal apprecia-
tion to the workers in agricultural enterprises, particularly in the
Voroshilovgrad Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Kamenets -Podolsk,
Nikolaev, and Kharkov oblasti for over fulfillment of regional plans. "
(The signature is lacking, but it may be assumed from the make-up of
the telegram that it was Stalin himself).
(b) Preparations for the Harvest
(74) A series of extreme measures and orders were intercepted con-
cerning preparations for the harvest as well as protecting agriculture enterprises
from demands of other organizations.
(75) Thus, according to a decree from the State Committee for Defense
(GoKO), special commissions were set up in the Krai, Oblasti and Republics
which test the quality of truck and tractor repairs. Special bonuses amounting to
two months' wages were to be awarded to leaders of units involved in the repair
program at machine and tractor stations and at kolkhozes and sovkhozes. More-
over, the State Committee for Defense prohibited the requisitioning of all trucks
and tractors which were in use at agricultural enterprises.
(76) In addition, according to an order from the GoKO on 13 April, the
metal sales office of individual cities and oblasti were directed to make deliveries
of metals to enterprises of the NK for Agriculture and the NK for Sovkhozes for
the second quarter by 1 July. According to the same decree, the NK for Trans-
portation was to ship all cargo needed for the repair of combines and harvest
machinery under the priority of "Armaments Cargo.
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(77) Especially notable is the "order concerning the repair of teclnical
bases of the NK for Procurement for bringing in the 1944 harvest." According
to this order, the Grain Procurement Office in Rostov received the following
directives:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Before the beginning of procurement operations for bread grain,
the NK for Procurement is ordered to carry out the repair and
disinfection of storage spaces, grain warehouses with technical
equipment, elevators and grain drying plants of grain cleaning
and laboratory installations as wellas tarpaulin. Moreover, the
individual offices are to be supplied with blanks to be filled out
indicating that the above operations have been completed. In order
to expedite shipping the bread grain, shipping areas with a capacity
of 70, 000 tons are to be prepared at railway stations.
The Oblast' Executive Committee is ordered to allot construction
material to the NK for Procurement corresponding to its needs for
reconstruction work. The orders are to be fulfilled by units of the
local industry. Henceforth, unlimited assistance is to be provided
enterprises of the NK for Procurement in fulfilling the plans for re-
construction work. By 1 August 1944, storage points belonging to
other organizations with a capacity of 25, 000 tons are to be prepared
for storage of bread grain, if they are located up to 10 kilometers
from railway stations or river ports of the NK for Procurement.
They are to be repaired by 15 ,August.
"GUGMR" (?) is ordered to take the grain immediately from the
shipping points for its elevator stations and to guarantee expedited
loading of grain shipments. Moreover, grain bases equipped with
drying machines are to process the grain immediately.
(4) Workers of the NK for Procurement who are physically fit for mili-
tary service and who are employed in the repair of technical bases
and the procurement of agricultural products may not be conscripted.
(5) The directive (Point 12 of Order No. 5/94 of the State Committee for
Defense) of 15 February 1944 concerning the exemption from military
duty of workers and engineering personnel of the truck transportation
system of the NK for Procurement engaged in reconstruction work is
hereby extended until further notice. Order No. 4582 dated 15 Novem-
ber 1943 from the State Committee for Defense, prohibiting requisition-
ing of trucks of the NK for Procurement and the NK for Transporta-
tion of the Soviet Union that are in use for shipping bread grain, re-
mains in effect. Moreover, the order prohibiting the conscription
for military duty or for any other type of work of workers in the pro-
curement or transportation industries of the Soviet Union without the
permission from the State Committee of Defense also remains in effect.
(6) The NK for Transportation is hereby ordered to give top priority to the
handling of small shipments of spare parts and small pieces of equip-
ment for enterprises of the NK for Procurement.
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(7)
The NK for Communications is hereby ordered to guarantee smooth
handling of shipments of instruments and electrical apparatus up to
a weight of 8 pounds for offices of the NK for Procurement. During
grain procurement operations local enterprises for the NK for Pro-
curement received the right to give to telephone conversations the
priority level of "government communications. " Telegrams received
the same priority.
(8) The CD for Oil Supply is hereby ordered to carry out its deliveries
to the NK for Procurement by 20 June. Until receipt of scheduled
deliveries, gasoline, petroleum, ligroin and other oil products are
to be drawn from agricultural stocks.
(9) The NK for Electric Generating Stations is hereby forbidden to interrupt
the delivery of power to the NK for Procurement from 1 July through
1 October 1944.
(78) These orders were to be strictly adhered to, and their fulfillment
controlled. A report was to be made by 15 July concerning measures carried out
by that date and reports were to be submitted every five days thereafter concern-
ing further course of fulfillment of the orders.
(79) The message below of 25 June provides extensive information con-
cerning the intensity of the reconstruction program of technical agricultural basest
in Stalino Oblast':
Status
Of total planned
Current repairs of grain storehouses
100%
Reconstruction and Repair of non-grain storehouse
with a capacity of 16, 750 tons
100%
Reconstruction of 19 grain storehouses with a
capacity of 34, 7000 tons
70%
New Construction of 7 grain storehouses with a
capacity of 5, 500 tons
16%
Repair of two grain drying installations
100%
Motors
86%
Separators (?)
100%
Grain cleaning machines
100%
Trucks
50%
Other vehicles
85%
Transportation belts
85%
Repair of railroad equipment
48%
(c) Hay, Grain and Vegetable Harvest:
(80) In the middle of June the hay harvest began. It was undertaken
especially intensively. An order intercepted on 20 June 1944, from the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic
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gives a good deal of information on this program as follows:
"To the Secretary of the Rajon Committee of the Communist Party and to
the Chairman of the Executive Committee. The hay harvest and fodder procure-
ment program this year must be carried out under very difficult conditions. There
are shortages of mowing machines, scythes, and skilled workers. All these dif-
ficulties could be eliminated by good organization and a pron'tpt beginning of the
hay harvest. Employees of the collective farm should be instructed concerning
the importance of procuring fodder for the newly received livestock. In order
to guarantee hay deliveries as well as procurement of hay stocks, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party hereby orders that the hay harvest should be
completed before the beginning of the grain harvest and that the following measures
be taken:
(1) The hay harvest is to be begun immediately. First, the highest
grasses are to be cut down and wild grasses are to be stored in
silos immediately.
(2) In kolkhozes mowing teams are to be made up of men, women and
youths. One scythe is to be issued to each two persons. These
mowing teams are to work in two shifts from 0300 to 2200 hours
continuously. Personnel will sleep in the field overnight in order
not to lose any time.
(3) In making up the mowing teams and brigades it is to be observed that
experienced workers are distributed evenly among the green hands.
The mowing teams are to be equipped with the necessary tools.
(4) Every brigade, mowing team and each individual person is to be
given a definite area of land. The results of the work of the brigades
and mowing teams are to be compiled daily.
(5) A socialist competition between brigades, mowing teams, and kolkhozes
is to be set up. Fulfillment of the daily and five day plans is to be
guaranteed and, as far as possible, overfilled.
(6) Political lectures are to be carried out in all brigades and mowing
teams. Kolkhoz farmers are to be informed concerning:
(a) Daily wages for mowing and silo workers
(b) The right to keep 10% of the hay
(c) The receipt of livestock fodder from collective stocks
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of White Russia is to pay parti-
cular attention to the importance of the hay harvest for successful building-up
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of kolkhozes and livestock. Each kolkhoz is to receive by order of the Central
Committee 46 head of cattle, 48 sheep, 20 pigs, and a number of horses not yet
established. On 1 July 1944 a report concerning the measures taken is to be
made to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Secretary of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of the White Russian Socialist Soviet
Republic, signed Ponomarkeno. "
(81) The absence of reports concerning failures in the hay harvest sup-
ports the assumption that the hay harvest generally was proceeding favorably.
(82) No conclusion can be reached concerning the failure of the grain
harvest because of a lack of reliable information. The Soviet Russian Admin-
istration appeared to place great hopes on it. It was apparent from all inter-
cepted reports that the Soviet Russian authorities were placing particular attention
to the bringing in of grain for shipment. For example, in Leningrad Oblast', a
grain delivery of 71, 600 tons was estimated for the period from July through
October. However, there was a storage capacity for only 34, 400 tons available
at the Grain Procurement Office.
The first known harvest results were from the Sovkhoz Trust in Ordzhoni-
kidze Kraj. They reported on 5 September that 44, 800 tons of grain had been
delivered to the government, thus fulfilling their plan by 100 percent.
(83) The Groznyj Trust of the NK for Sovkhozes reported the following
harvest yield in September:
Cotton Sovkhoz Aksaj Sovkhoz for Sheep-raising No.1
Harvested grain land
1,
368 hectares
9, 080 hectares.
Expected harvest yield per hectare
8.5 dz
10 dz
Actual harvest yield per hectare
4.3 dz
4 dz
Grain delivery plan
Seed deficit
Deliveries
Total delivery for both sovkhozes
701 tons
174 tons
Z56 tons
736 tons
580 tons
Planned deliveries
1, 232 tons
* Abbreviation for Doppelzentner, a measure of weight equal to 100 kilograms.
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(84) The following intercepted messages referred to the vegetable and
fruit harvest. From messages intercepted in August from the chairman of the
Azerbajdzhan Council of People's Commissars in Baku, it may be assumed that
the vegetable harvest for the current year was insufficient because of too great
dryness, The Azerbajdzhan Republic fell short of fulfilling their procurement
plan by 27, 308 tons of vegetables. The potato harvest was also considered poor.
(85) The Azerbajdzhan NK for Agriculture reported that there were not
enough chemicals on hand to spray insecticides on 6, 000 hectares of fruit gardens.
(86) From Ejsk (North Caucausus) it was reported that the tomato har-
vest had fallen below plan because of drought.
(87) In Ordzhonikidze Kraj a serious shortage of vegetables was noted.
A relatively satisfactory report concerning the Vegetable and Fruit Procurement
Office in Kiev was intercepted, according to which the office could deliver the
following in August and September:
3, 000 tons fresh tomatoes
3, 000 tons salted cucumbers
2, 000 tons fresh cucumbers
300 tons fruit
(88) The following message intercepted on 10 October is extremely rich
"Order of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Union of 4 October 1944, concerning the bringing in and procurement of
potatoes and vegetables.
After the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union
had received the report from General..... , it was determined that the
tempo on the potato and vegetable procurement operations was completely
unsatisfactory and delivery to the government by the established dead-
lines was not guaranteed. In the following regions procurement is pro-
gressing especially poorly. On 1 October of this year they are behind
the following quantities compared to 1 August of the preceding year:
Region
Potatoes
Vegetables
Ryazan Oblast'
7640 tons
7910 tons
Tula Oblast'
2723 "
2190 it
Kirov Oblast'
13590
?
Kurgan Oblast'
4380
1153 tons
Omsk Oblast'
6004
2097
Bashkir ASSR
6830 "
5640
Mordvin ASSR
7626 "
2569
Tatar ASSR
500
3030 "
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In addition, the following are in arrears:
Yaroslavl Oblast' Chernigov Oblast'
Tambov Oblast' Sumy Oblast'
Kursk Oblast' Ukraine SSR
Bryansk Oblast'
In these regions the progress of the potato and vegetable harvest is likewise
unsatisfactory.
The potato harvest is considered especially dangerous in the following
regions:
Voronezh Oblast' Kurgan Oblast'
Kujbyshev Oblast' Novosibirsk Oblast'
Penza Oblast' Altai Kraj
Ulyanovsk Oblast' Bashkir ASSR
Tambov Oblast' Tatar ASSR
Orel Oblast'
Kolkhozes and sovkhozes in these regions have not yet commenced
potato harvest operations. The danger exists that the mistakes of the
previous year will be repeated, and that the work will be delayed into
late autumn and will be endangered by rain, snow, and frost. Large
quantities of potatoes will thus be lost, as were in the preceding year.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union hereby
orders:
The Party Committees of the oblasti and republics are hereby charged
with the responsibility for expediting and completing on schedule the potato
and vegetable harvest. For this purpose sovkhozes are to be given five
day plans and the brigades in the kolkhozes are to be given one day plans.
Every kolkhoz employee capable of work is to be given a definite area of
land daily.
In addition to the agricultural workers already recruited from the
urban population, additional personnel capable of work are to be recruited
from cities, the resettled working population and rajon centers for assign-
ment to sovkhozes and kolkhozes during the vegetable and potato harvest.
The vegetables and potatoes are to be dried promptly for immediate
shipment to. the procurement bases and storehouses. A competition
among the workers is to be organized in this operation. The workers are
to continue work until complete fulfillment of the delivery plan.
Cows, belonging to kolkhozes, kolkhoz employees, workers and con-
scriptees are to be drawn on for transport.
The People's Commissar for the Food Industry of the Union, Comrade
Zotov, is charged with the responsibility of expediting potato procurement
operations as well as prompt and scheduled delivery to the alcohol, starch
and syrup industries.
The Party Committees of the oblasti, krai and republics are hereby
ordered to report by 25 October 1944 on measures taken to comply with
the above order.
The Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union
MAZENKOV"
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(d) Grain Deliveries
(89) The poor transportation situation had an especially serious effect
on grain deliveries. At the end of September the following reports were intercepted.
(90) In 13 days of September only 3, 900 tons of grain were shipped com-
pared to a planned goal of 17, 000 tons. The following orders were issued to
carry out the transport plans on waterways in September and to ship all grain
from procurement bases on the waterways before the end of the navigation:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
The total amount of grain to be shipped was to be reported
Grain shipments from the kolkhozes to the harbors of the procurement
bases were to be expedited.
Grain shipments from storehouses were to be increased
To avoid idling time of barges, loading was to be carried out day and
night
The NK for Procurement in conjunction with the steamship agencies
is to draw up a plan, according to which all grains are to be transported
by the end of September.
(91) Grain shipping plans during August for individual railways were ful-
filled by the following percentages:
Stalingrad Railway 50%
North Caucasus Railway 24%
Southeast Railway 21%
(92) .There was a deficit of 2, 970 in deliveries of railroad cars.
(93)
In September the situation became still worse.
(94) In the first ten day period of September the transportation plan was
fulfilled by individual railways as follows:
(95)
Stalingrad Railway
33%
North Caucasus Railway
0%
Southeast Railway
8%
North Donets Railway
0%
There was a deficit of 1, 223 cars in deliveries of railroad cars.
(96) In the last five days shipments ceased completely
(97) 35, 000 tons of grain were stored in open storehouses.
(98) The amount of grain in storage was growing by 5 to 6 thousand tons
daily.
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(99) The danger was arising that stocks of grain would be left in the
open for the autumn and winter periods.
(100) The railroads were directed to make up freight trains in close
order so that all grain in storehouses could be shipped during September. Two
thousand tarpaulins were ordered to protect the grain still remaining in store
houses.
(101) In many regions the use of military personnel was required to
expedite handling grain shipments in every way possible.
(102) The military representative at the grain procurement office in
Kirovograd, Colonel Schneider, received the following order:
You have been appointed senior military representative for Kiro-
vograd Oblast'. You have at your disposal 60 officers, one company of
men and two battalions of trucks. Your assignment is to transport
329, 000 tons of bread grains from internal bases to grain procurement
offices on railroads- and to trarrsfer this grain to suitable storage-. (con-
tinuation of message missing). "
III. Food Supply
(103) Information on the food supply presents a very incomplete picture.
There are relatively good reports from many branches of the Food Industry, but
on the other hand, many unsatisfactory reports have been intercepted. In detail
the following has been determined:
(a) Bread Supply
(104) Especially great difficulties were noted during the report period
in the supply of bread to the civilian population as well as to military offices.
This was partly the result of low production capacity at grain mills, which had
either become antiquated or had not been sufficiently reconstructed, and also
partly the result of a great increase in the city population through labor conscrip-
tions.
(105) In February the Armenia NK for Trade demanded additional allot-
ments of flour pointing to the abnormally large growth of population in many
Armenian cities. The same condition was noted in Georgia.
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(106) In the Krasnodar Kraj and Groznyj Oblast' considerable difficulties
arose in the supply of bread to the civilian population and military units, because
of low production capacity at local mills.
(107) The bread supply for the population of Stalingrad was considered
completely unsatisfactory and it was noted that the population had received no
bread for days.
(b) Meat and Dairy Product Supplies
(108) Relatively favorable reports were intercepted concerning the Meat
and Dairy Industry. Reports concerning unfulfilled plans however, were not
uncommon:
(109) In March the Baku Meat and Dairy Combine achieved the following
production results:
Planned Actual Fulfillment
Meat 450 tons 462 tons
Sausage 120 tons 121 tons
Concentrates 120 tons 147 tons
(110) In the second quarter the Meat and Dairy Industry in Rostov/Don
was to produce a total of 500 tons of meat. On 20 May, 559 tons had already
been produced.
(111) The Azerbajdzhan Meat Combine was also able to report over-
fulfillment of the production plan for the second half year on 17 June as follows:
Meat
113%
Sausage
106%
Pastries
215%
Others
150%
(112) In general, plans for individual regions had been set higher than
in the preceding year. For instance, the delivery plan for the Georgian NK
for Procurement for 1943 had been set at 18, 400 tons of meat products and for
the year 1944 had been raised to 19, 800 tons.
(113) Various measures were also taken to fulfill and overfulfill plans
for meat and dairy products. For example, in Krasnodar Kraj and the Bashkir
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Republic the month of June was declared a month of special effort for the Front.
The NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry of the Union anticipated significant
improvement in the supply situation as the result of this measure and ordered
the dairy combines of Leningrad to take similar measures in order to spur agri-
cultural productive organs to increased production for the warriors of the Red
Army.
(c) Fish and Fish Product Supplies
(114) Very great emphasis was placed on fishing. Some good production
reports were issued.
(115) The Fish Trust in Kislyar had fulfilled the fishing plan for 1943
by 118% and on 28 February had fulfilled the plan for the first quarter by 230%.
(116) The fisheries in Rostov/Don had fulfilled the May fishing plan on
Z5 May by 104. 8% with a catch of 4000 tons.
(117) The deliveries which individual fish trusts had to make were in
no way small. For example, the Fish Trust in Kislyar had to make the following
deliveries in March to plants of the Caspian Fish Industry:
6-10
120
11-15
125
16-20
205
21-25
245
26-31
285
(118) According to the plan the Dagestan and Turkmen Fish Trusts
were to deliver the following:
TurkrrAen Fish Trust:
To the free market of the Uzbek SSR
To the Kirgiz SSR
50
To the Tadzhik SSR
50
Dagestan Fish Trust:
To the Dagestan Republic
To the Checheno-Ingush
300
To the North Ossetian Republic
150
To the Kabardino-Balkar Republic
100
To the Azerbajdzhan Republic
200
Ordzhonikidze Kraj
350
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(119) The Fish Trusts in Krasnodar and Rostov were to deliver 500, 300
tons of fish for supplies to the civilian population in April by order of the NK for
the Fish Industry.
(120) The following catches were reported by naval offices:
Office
5 May
11 May
16 May
10 July
Baku
Lenkoran
7. 0 tons
4.8 "
7. 0 tons
5.1
7. 0 tons
5.5 "
10.4 tons
5.2
Astrakhan
175.4 "
253.7 "
301.7 "
9. 4 "
(? )
Dagestan
17.4
17.4 "
17.4 "
19.4
Krasnovodsk
5.0 "
5.0 "
8.0 "
22.6 "
Total
209.6 tons
288.2 tons
339.6 tons
67.0 tons
(121) In comparison to the good fishing results there were, however,
many instances of shortages. For example, many locations were short of salt
and packing material and, as in all other branches of the economy, the transporta-
tion problem had an especially serious effect. Examples follow:
(122) According to a report of 7 May, at the fish enterprises in Rostov/
Don there were over 700 tons of salted fish which could not be shipped because of
a lack of packing material.
(123) According to a report in August from the NK for the Fish Industry,
long delays resulted because of insufficient shipping capacity in the River Fleet
and the following quantities of cargoes could not be shipped:
Fish
On the Upper Ob
850 tons
In Samarovo
450
On the Konda River
150 "
On the Lower Ob
500 "
In Tasovskaya Guba
1000 "
(124) In the first half of May the Black-Sea-Azov fisheries were to ship
a total of 160 railroad cars of fish. As a result of insufficient furnishing of rail-
road cars however, only 15 cars of fish were actually shipped. The fisheries in
Ejsk had caught 63 tons of fish from 1 through 5 April, but did not have enough
salt to salt this catch.
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(d) Salt Supply
(125) Difficulties arose in the extraction of salt in Manych Oblast'
as a result of heavy rainfall. Extraction of salt in this region during the current
year could not be commenced until the end of June and the beginning of July.
(126) In order to conclude the extraction of salt at Kuulinsk near Kras-
novodsk a railroad spur was to be laid from Kuuli to Krasnovodsk harbor. The
extraction of salt for the year was to amount to 120, 00 tons.
(e) Sugar Supply
(127) In the sugar industry there were many cases of cessation of
operations at enterprises because of a lack of sugar.
(128) During the first quarter in Rostov/Don Oblast' only 59% of author-
ized sugar deliveries were actually made and in the second quarter as of 24 May
only 9% of authorized deliveries had been made so that neither workers in mines
and in forges nor those on railroads could be supplied. Likewise the child
strengthening campaign could not be carried out.
(f) Supplies of Tobacco, Wine and Whiskey
(129) The luxuries industry seemed generally to be operating well. For
instance, the wine and whiskey industry in Rostov reported the fulfillment of its
plans in January and February. In January and February 24, 000 meters of wine
and 10, 000 meters of whiskey were produced.
(130) Difficulties were noted in connection with shipping problems.
(131) The combine "Rostov/Ugol" in Shakhty was to receive 140, 000
meters of wine in the first quarter of 1944. Delivery was delayed however, be-
cause of insufficient delivery of railroad cars.
(132) Little information was available concerning the tobacco industry.
On 18 February the tobacco plant in Rostov had to cease operation because of a
shortage of raw materials.
(133) The Azerbajdzhan tobacco plant in Baku fell far short of meeting
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its delivery obligations in February for the Red Army. Instead of 315 tons of
tobacco and 85, 000, 000 cigarettes only 275 tons of tobacco and 20, 000 cigarettes
were delivered.
(g) Production and Delivery Results from Food Industries:
(134) The NK for the Food Industry in Kiev had fulfilled the May produc-
tion plan by 118%. Plan fulfillment in detail was as follows:
Refined Sugar
110%
Bread Products
101%
Macaroni
99%
Pastries
132%
Vegetables
106%
Butter
77%
Butter Lard
94%
Margarine
107%
Concentrates
114%
Npn-alcoholic drinks
109%
Cigarettes
87%
Tobacco
13%
Makhorka
287%
Alcohol
153%
(135) As of 1 March offices of the NK for Trade in Ashkhabad had made
deliveries against orders from the NK for the Textile Industry in the first quarter
as follows:
Fish
134. 1 tons
223.3 tons
Meat
17.8 "
22.2 "
Vegetable Fat
110.5
26.1 "
Animal Fat
11.3
2. 7
Goat Cheese
11.4 "
2. 7 "
Condensed Milk
1.4 "
0.2 "
Sugar
12.6 "
2.0 "
Sugar Products
15.6
25.3
(h) Allocations for Individual Persons
(136) In the allocations for individual persons considerable differences
could be noted. However, no distinct groups of allotments of food rations could
be determined from the individual messages.
(137) The allocations were distributed according to the difficulty of work.
The food ration most widely distributed was received on 1 March by riveters,
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assembly workers, and machinists in the NK for Construction. These were as
follows: (per man, per month):
4. 5 kilograms fish and meat
1. 0 kilogram fat
3 kilograms pealed grain and macaroni
0. 5 kilogram sugar products
1 kilogram bread
(138) According to a June message the next rationing level was that
issued to engineering technical personnel and workers, working in plants under
unhealthy conditions, at the Taganrog Plant "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" as well as to
workers and engineering technical personnel in Azerbajdzhan salt mines:
3. 2 kilograms meat and fish (mpnthly)
0. 9 kilogram fat
2. 0 kilograms pealed grain
0. 5 kilogram sugar and sweets
1. 0 kilogram bread (daily)
(139) The lowest rationing level was that issued on 15 May in Rostov/
Don to personnel of a plant in Udzhary as well as to students in courses for village
officials:
1. 8 kilograms meat or fish (monthly)
0. 4 kilogram fats
1. 2 kilograms pealed grain or macaroni
0. 4 kilogram sugar and sugar products
(140) Moreover, the students in the training courses received a supple-
mentary warm meal.
(141) White collar workers at the Udzhary plant received the following:
1.2 kilograms meat or fish (monthly)
0. 3 kilogram fats
0. 8 kilogram pealed grain or macaroni
0. 3 kilogram sugar and sugar products
(142) In addition, the following bread rations were noted:
Office Daily Bread Ration
Offices in liberated territories 500 grams
Workers of the engineering technical Rajon Directorate
and of the Mechanized Repair Plant of the Rostov
Electricity Directorate 700 grams
Transport workers in Baku Harbor 700 grams
Workers and Engineering Technical Personnel of the
Geophysical Institute in Groznyj 650 grams
Travelling personnel of the NK for the River Fleet while
in a labor pool 1000 grams
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METAL SUPPLY
(143) Few messages were intercepted concerning the production of ferrous
and non-ferrous metal ores. Most of the messages concern the collection and
procurement of scrap metal. Messages were also available concerning the produc-
tion capacity of individual plants. In detail the following could be determined:
1. Production of Ores and Quartzite Sand
(a) Manganese ores
(144) The production of manganese ores in the Caucasus regions seemed
generally to be progressing satisfactorily.
(145) In April fulfillment of the monthly shipping plan of a total of 33, 180
tons of manganese ore was reported from Chiaturi. In the third quarter the
Armenian Republic was to deliver 250, 000 tons of manganese ore. In July and
August 152, 000 tons of manganese ore or 61% of the quarter plan had already
been shipped. No complaints concerning insufficient production of manganese ores
were intercepted. Reports concerning insufficient delivery were intercepted only
in connection with transportation difficulties. For example, the authorized agent
of the NK for Ferrous Metals in Krasnovodsk reported on 12 April insufficient
shipments of manganese ores. As of 1 April 12, 262 tons were stored in the har-
bor. According to a report from the authorized agent of the NK for Ferrous
Metals on 21 April, 4, 223 tons of manganese ores had arrived in Krasnovodsk
harbor in 20 days of April, while only 458 tons were shipped.
(b) Production of Quartzite Sand
(146) A bottleneck in the ferrous metal industry developed as a result
of insufficient production of quartzite sand, although good results were noted in
this industry also. For instance, the plant for fire-proof bricks in Tarasovka
had delivered 2, 463 tons of quartzite sand in June, thus, fulfilling the plan
completely.
(147) More often, however, reports were intercepted concerning a
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serious shortage of quartz ite sand, principally in foundries.
(148) A message from Moscow to the Mining Directorate in Tarasovka
in August reads as follows:
"Successful operation of the Armaments Industry depends on
regular and smooth performances by the Iron Industry. For this
reason, the Committee for Defense hereby orders that the require-
ments of the Iron Industry for quartzite sand during the third
quarter be met completely and that they take precedence over those
of all other NK's and enterprises. "
II. Scrap Procurement and Collection
(149) The scrap collection and delivery program was undertaken with
great intensity. In general plans were fulfilled; when not, it was usually a
question of transportation difficulties. The following plans, fulfillments, collec-
tions, etc. , were noted:
Azerbajdzhan Republic
(150) In May the non-ferrous metal collection point in Baku had procured
96 tons of non-ferrous metals as follows:
43 tons of brass
33 tons of aluminum
9 tons of copper
4 tons of zinc
2 tons of bronze
(151) As a result of non-delivery of railroad cars, only a part of the
collected metals could be shipped. Thus, in May 17 railroad cars too few were
provided. The stock of non-ferrous metal scrap remaining on hand amounted to
731 tons (probably the stock accumulated at the beginning of the year).
(152) In the second quarter 17, 789 tons scrap were procured from the
entire republic. Procurement of 15, 000 tons had been planned, so the plan was
thus fulfilled by about 120%.
(153) In the third quarter the result of the scrap collection program
was almost as good as in the second quarter. 17, 801 tons of scrap were collected
and 17, 879 shipped. The third quarter plan amounting to 17, 000 tons was thus
fulfilled by almost 104%.
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Georgian Republic
(154) In the third quarter 12, 000 tons of scrap were to be procured,
2, 000 tons were to be processed, and 7, 000 were to be shipped. By 1 September
the plan had already been fulfilled by 71%6.
North Ossetian Republic
(155) In the second quarter a collection plan of 2, 000 tons of ferrous
metal scrap was established. On 1 July, 2, 163 tons had been collected and the
plan had thus been fulfilled by 108. 1%.
Dagestan Republic
(156) In the third quarter 2, 500 tons scrap were to be collected and
shipped. The shipping plan could be fulfilled only 71% with a shipment of 1, 787
tons of scrap, because of insufficient delivery of railroad cars.
Ordzhonikidze Kraj
(157) In the first quarter the scrap procurement plan was fulfilled by
111. 4%. However, the shipping plan was fulfilled 40. 2% because of insufficient
delivery of railroad cars. In addition to collections carried on during the week
in Ordzhonikidze Kraj, a special Sunday duty was organized in which, 10, 000
Komsomol members took part. A total of 2, 198 tons of scrap was collected,
10, 000 tons shipped, and 1, 978 transported to the railroads.
(158) In the second quarter 4, 090 tons of scrap were procured and 4, 652
tons of scrap shipped.
Turkmen Republic
(159) In the second quarter a total of 1, 674 tons of metal scrap was
procured including:
1, 406 tons steel in small pieces
1, 083 tons steel shavings
85 tons cast iron
A total of 1, 718 tons was shipped including:
1, 284 tons steel in small pieces
221 tons steel shavings
213 tons cast iron
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(160) In the third quarter 1, 565 tons of scrap were procured up through
1 September including:
1, 311 tons steel in small pieces
170 tons steel shavings
84 tons cast iron
A total of 1, 556 tons of scrap was shipped including:
1, 243 tons steel in small pieces
184 tons steel shavings
129 tons cast iron
Groznyj Rajon
(161) In the first quarter as of 15 March 989 tons of scrap had been
procured and.458 tons shipped. A total of 1, 900 tons was to be procured accord-
ing to plan.
Rostov/Don Oblast'
(162) In the first quarter the Oblast' had procured 17, 681 tons of scrap
and had shipped 17, 160 tons. In the second quarter the collection plan for iron
scrap had been fulfilled by 104%. According to plan 21, 000 tons were to be col-
lected. However, 21, 845 tons were brought in. Fulfillment of the plan is broken
down as follows:
Office
Planned (tons)
Actual fulfilled (tons)
Oblast' Consumers Union
1500
2074
Soyuzutil (?)
1000
1697
Utilsbytpromsoyuz
900
1469
(163) Other offices had been able to ship only 16, 605 tons instead of the
17, 600 tons planned.
(164) Results of the non-ferrous metal scrap collection program in
Rostov Oblast' during the second quarter were not as satisfactory as the results
of the ferrous scrap metal collection program. Instead of the 535 tons of non-
ferrous metal scrap which were to be collected according to plan, only 397 tons
were collected and shipped.
(165) In 1944 enterprises of the NK for Ferrous Metals were to procure
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2, 800 tons of non-ferrous metal scrap according to plan. However, the Rostov
Executive Committee issued an order to the effect that the plan for 1944 would
be double that of 1943. However, since in 1944 the collection of war material
was to be included, the collection of non-ferrous metal scrap compared to the
previous- year would be reduced by 1, 400 tons.
(166) In the third quarter 19, 459 tons of ferrous metal scrap were pro-
cured and 17, 681 tons were shipped. However, this only fulfilled the shipping
plan by 68%. This nonfulfillment was attributed to non-delivery of railroad cars.
In the third quarter the Stalingrad Railway had provided only 68 railroad cars in-
stead of the 110 planned, and the North Caucasus Railway had provided only 422
instead of the 780 planned.
Leningrad Oblast'
(167) In the first quarter Komsomol members were to procure and ship
41, 000 tons of scrap. The plan was almost fulfilled with the procurement and
shipment of 40, 200 tons. By 27 June, the local scrap metal collection points had
processed 3, 956 tons of scrap, received 4, 921 tons, and shipped 4, 127 "tons since
the beginning of the month. St pcks on hand amount to 38, 956 tons.
(168) Despite the above good results, many messages were intercepted,
according to which plants either had to close down or could not fulfill important
armament contracts because of insufficient deliveries of scrap metal. Examples
of these follow:
(169) The plant "Stankolit" in Rostov Oblast' ?) required 500 tons of
ferrous metal scrap in March in order to complete important specialized contracts.
Scrap was not delivered, however.
(170) The plant "Shmidt" in Baku required a minimum of 2, 300 tons of
ferrous metal scrap in March. Scrap deliveries did not result, however.
(171) A steel foundry in Baku required 1, 000 tons of steel scrap per
quarter, but received for the second quarter an authorization for only 380 tons.
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(172) A metal processing plant of the NK for Oil in Baku received in
the second quarter only 5, 127 tons of steel scrap instead of the 8, 100 tons re-
quired.
(173) The plant "Trubostal" in Taganrog received only 230 tons of scrap
instead of 4, 000 tons needed.
(174) As a result of the shortage of ferrous metal scrap, the plant
"Andreev" in Taganrog had to shut down its Martin furnaces. In August this
plant received only 460 tons of scrap instead of the 3, 000 tons needed.
III. Production Results at Individual Plants
(175) The iron foundry in Baku of the NK for Oil produced the following
in January:
Cast steel 450 tons
Cast iron 677 tons
Forged parts 975 tons
Rolled metal 6, 027 tons
(176) In March, production at the foundry remained at about the same
Cast steel 459 tons
Cast iron 977 tons
Forged products 1, 077 tons
Rolled metal 612 tons
Kramator s kaya
(177) A metal processing plant fulfilled its plan in the first quarter by
producing 210 tons of metal products including the following:
Parts for railroad bridges 40 tons
smoke pipes 50 tons
gas and steam pipes 50 tons
cargo cranes 40 tons
other metal products 30 tons
(178) The following production was planned for the second quarter:
10 tons cast steel
225 tons of metal products, including:
50 tons parts for railway bridges
70 tons gas and steam pipes
70 tons parts for cargo cranes
35 tons other metal products
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Makeevka
(179) On 29 April the daily production of the foundry was reported as
892 tons of steel.
Krasnyj Sulin
(180) An approximate conclusion concerning the capacity of the foundry
can be derived from the following first quarter production plan:
Steel
Rolled Iron
Dinas?
January
4400 tons(?) 2000 tons
100 tons
February
3600
2000 "
250 "
March
3800 "
2000 "
350 "
In the quarter
12000 tons
6000 tons
700 tons
(181) On 29 June 5 tons of steel were produced making a total of 603
tons since the beginning of the month. On the same date 100 tons were rolled
making a total of 1, 965 tons rolled since the beginning of the month. The power
consumption amounted to 10, 470 kilowatt hours making a total 305, 340 kilowatt
hours since the beginning of the month.
(182) In the second quarter the plant delivered 1, 013 tons of metal to
enterprises of the NK for the Coal Industry. Thus, the delivery plan was fulfilled
on 21 July.
Krasnogvardejsk
(183) The iron works had fulfilled the June plan for rolled metal products;
402 tons of corrugated iron and iron sheets were produced.
Leningrad
(184) The "Kirov" plant can deliver only 130 tons of thin sheeting per
month, but nevertheless, received a contract amounting to 870 tons for a month.
IV. General Supply
(185) For individual branches of industry various levels of importance
were set up. The highest level of importance is given in an excerpt from an
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order from the State Defense Committee of 17 May for the NK's for Munitions,
Armaments and Communications. The excerpt from the order reads as follows:
"Point 2: The directors of foundries and metal processing plants
are unconditionally ordered to carry out production and shipments in
the second quarter of all metal products for the railroads before all
other NK's and to apply the same priority as for the NK's for Muni-
tions and Armaments. The following deliveries are to be made:
From the Plant "Amurstal" 1, 500 tons of iron sheeting,from the
Plant "Andreev" in Taganrog 1, 300 tons of steel sheeting. The follow-
ing deliveries of steel strips for railroad cars and locomotives are to
be made:
From the plant in Nizhnij Tagil 31, 000 tons, from Plant "Andreev"
in Taganrog 3, 000 tons, from Plant "Skoba" in Kulebaksk 3, 900 tons. "
(186) Individual reports concerning the supply of metal and metal products
are as follows:
January
(187) Plant "Kirov" in Tbilisi has a serious shortage of cast iron. In-
stead of the 155 tons of iron ordered for December, the plant received 15 tons.
(188) The motor repair shop in Erevan had to cease operations because
of a shortage of steel.
February
(189) Additional cases of plant shut-downs were noted at the metal pro-
cessing plants of the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine. Serious difficulties had arisen
because of a shortage of cast iron, steel and fire resistant brick. Drill press
parts could not be produced. The following were immediately required.
cast iron
1,
700 tons
construction steel
1,
700 tons
bricks
700 tons
(190) Plant "Stvol" in Rostov/Don had not delivered 900 tons of 115
millimeter plates to Plant 92 in Gorkij according to a report of 19 March. Plant
92 was forced to cease production of military equipment.
(191) In the first quarter the Local Industry in Makachkala could produce
only 1, 000 sickles and scythes. As a result of the metal shortage, further
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production was interrupted. For the second quarter, the production of 6, 000
sickles and 3, 000 scythes was undertaken, assuming ample stocks of metal.
(192) A plant of the Iron Industry in Krasnyj Sulin was to deliver 155
tons of profile iron to the NK for Power Stations for the reconstruction of elec-
trical generating stations. As of 12 March Plant "Sevkabel" in Leningrad had
received 1, 300 tons less of non-ferrous metals than required in the first quarter.
As a result of a copper shortage contracts for the State Committee for Defense
could not be carried out.
April
(193) A rapidly increasing shortage of cast iron was noted.
(194) At "Trubostal" in Taganrog there was a shortage of cast iron and
iron alloys which were urgently needed for production of special steels.
(195) Plant "Kirov" in Leningrad did not receive the authorized deliveries
of cast iron and ferrosilicon.
(196) Foundries of the Rostov/Ugol combine in Shakhty were forced to
cease operations because of a lack of cast iron.
(197) The plant of the NK for Agricultural Machinery in Rostov/Don
could not fulfill armaments contracts because of a shortage of mold sand and cast
iron.
(198) In the Azerbajdzhan Republic production of field kitchens was
halted because of a shortage of spring steel.
May
(199) The open hearth plant in Gorkij could not produce parts for military
vehicles because of a shortage of electrodes.
(200) Plant "Andreev" in Taganrog reported that, as of 8 May, 120 tons
of iron sheets had accumulated in the plant storehouse. No possibility existed to
ship this metal.
(201) Plant "Komsomolets" in Tambov could not carry out contracts for
the NK for Defense because of a lack of iron sheets.
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(202) The motor repair plant in Pyatigorsk urgently required aluminum.
Parts for motors and combines could not be produced.
(203) At Plant No. 7 in Leningrad production of munitions was halted
because of a shortage of cast iron.
(204) Plant 848 in Moscow had no ferrosilicon. Operations in the foundry
had to be halted.
(205) The motor vehicle plant in Yaroslavl urgently required 400 tons
of tin. Production of special vehicles for the front had to be halted.
(206) "Trubostal" in Taganrog complained about insufficient delivery of
railroad cars. At the plant the following were stored:
2, 036 tons rolled sheets
732 tons strip iron
1, 500 tons tubing
(207) The foundries of the NK for Oil in Baku had to cease operations
because of a shortage of cast iron.
(208) The ferro plant in Zestafoni required 1, 000 tons of iron shavings
for production of silicon. This delivery did not take place in June.
(209) The plant of the Tank Industry "Ilich" in Mariupol required 5, 200
tons of cast iron. The open hearth furnaces at the plant were taken out of operation.
July
(210) Plants in Zestafoni, Magnitogorsk and Chusovo were behind schedule
in their deliveries for the NK for the Oil Industry. In the second quarter the ferro
plant in Zestafoni was behind schedule in deliveries to enterprises of the NK for
the Iron Industry to the extent of 887 tons of 75% ferrosilicon.
(211) The foundry in Ejsk had to shut down because of a shortage of cast
August
(212) The rolling mill at Chelyabinsk had not fulfilled its delivery obliga-
tions to the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine.
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(213) In order to avoid shutting down the foundries and other enterprises,
the Oil Machine Industry in Azerbajdzhan required the following deliveries:
U shaped iron bars
Iron sheeting
Cast iron
Cast iron scrap
Bronze in blocks
Zinc in blocks
Welding wire
ferrosilicon
tubing
carbon containing construction steel
steel alloys
aluminum blocks
electrodes
(214) The foundry in Magnitogorsk had not carried out its prescribed
deliveries to the foundries in Baku.
(215) Deliveries of sheeting and tubing from Plant "Trubostal" in Taganrog
were being carried out very unsatisfactorily: Instead of the 1, 090 tons of sheeting
contracted for in July and August only 463 tons were delivered, and only 161 tons
of tubing were delivered compared to the production plan of 967 tons. Because
of the shortage of sheeting a very serious situation had arisen. Reconstruction
of mines in the Donbass was delayed.
September
(216)" The plant of the NK for the Merchant Fleet in Makhachkala had to
cease production of ship components because of a lack of cast iron. The plant
required a shipment of 40 tons of cast iron.
(217) The ship machine plant "Gadzhiev" in Makhachkala had not received
220 tons of steel in August and September from the foundries in Magnitogorsk.
Contracts for the NK for Defense could not be carried out.
COAL SUPPLY
I. Coal Deliveries
(218) In internal radio traffic only messages from limited coal regions
were intercepted concerning the coal supply situation, principally messages con-
cerning the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine at Shakhty and the coal supply office in Rostov,
concerning the "Tkvibuli" and "Tkvarcheli-Ugol" Combines in Georgia and
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individual messages concerning the "Voroshilovgrad-Ugo1" Combine. They
presented the following picture:
a) The !'Rostov/Ugol" Combine at Shakhty and the Coal Supply Office in Rostov
(219) Since 4 January 1944.6 main lines of the "Rostov/Ugol" Coal Combine
were under water. For weeks no assistance could be obtained and the loss in
working hours was estimated at 15 hours daily for the month of January. The
Power Directorate in Rostov Oblast' was held responsible for the flooding of the
mines and was charged with negligence in administration.
(220) In February the mine damage seems to have been at least partially
eliminated and coal production was taking its normal path. Nevertheless, pre-
scribed deliveries could not be fulfilled. On 10 February 1944, the State Committee
for Defense set daily deliveries from the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine at 6, 174 tons of
coal and 285 railroad cars and for the Coal Supply Office in Rostov at 4, 000 tons
and 186 railroad cars. These obligations were not met. As early as the first
12 days in March, the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine was 7, 750 tons of coal behind their
shipping schedule. The relationship between actual and planned shipments is
apparent from the following table:
Date Rostov/Ugol Rostov/Ugol Coal Supply Office Rostov/Don
Planned Delivery Actual Delivery Planned Delivery Actual Delivery
10/12/43
6890 tons
4297 tons
--
1.5/12/43
8666 tons
17/12/43
--
--
8640 tons
3609
25/12/43
--
--
-.,
4222 -'
30/12/43
5800 "
5164 "
-_
--
29/1/44
--
--
6234 "
4567
In the period
from 21 thru
30 January
62294 "
--
--
--
18/3/44
--
3735 "
--
--
22/3/44
6428 "
5584
1571 "
892
29/3/44
6584 "
5195
I thru 30 May
199640 tons
163911 "
..-
--
21/6/44
8597 tons
4052 "
5745 "
1091 "
23/6/44
8553 "
5882 "
5601
1728
26/6/44
8396
5100 "
7626 "
1570
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(221) Work was proceeding especially poorly I.t the following:
Boguraev/Ugol
Gundorovskaya
Ne s ve to j -anthracite
(222) In March troubles continued at individual mines of the "Rostov/Ugol"
Combine. According to a report of 18 March the main shaft of the mine Artem
had been flooded with water and was expected to be unusable for 4 months. The
local party official indicated that the shaft would be under repair for about 3 years.
(223) A serious shortage of construction timber was also noted. This
delayed reconstruction of the cokeries at the Boguraev mine.
(224) A serious problem was posed in the transportation of coal from coal
mines. Large heaps of coal had piled up at the coal mine mouths because of a
lack of trucks. For instance, according to a report from 2 January, at the mine
mouths of the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine in Shakhty 400, 000 tons of coal had piled
up. The Coal Supply Office in Rostov could carry out shipments of the coal only
very slowly. The danger of spontaneous combustion was increasing.
(225) The following two messages give fairly accurate information on
conditions at the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine:
"To the People's Commisar for Coa,l,, Comrade Vakhrushchev,
and to the Chief of the Chief Coal Supply Office attached to the Council
of People's Commissars, Comrade Kumashev. I question the accuracy
of the telegram from Comrades Gridijko and Kagan. Coal stocks at the
mines amount to 310, 690 tons and not 187, 812 tons. Comrade Gridijko
was incorrectly informed. He has not included the entire stock of coal
in his report and has completely overlooked a stock of 80, 000 tons of
coal in the mines. 6, 000 tons of coal are shipped daily. I request
expedited shipment of the coal in July and August. Signed Karchev"
"To the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade
Beriya; copy to People's Commissar for Coal, Vakhrushchev; copy to
People's Commissar for Transportation, Comrade Kaganovich Lazar
Mojseevich. The coal shipping plan in all'months previously has not
been fulfilled by the "Rostov/Ugol" Combine. Responsibility for this is
1 a i d on the railroad which has not provided enough railroad cars. All
storehouses at the mines are overflowing with coal. For this reason
many mines are unable to increase coal production. Since 20 June the
delivery of railroad cars has become much worse. In 26 days of June
only 6, 906 railroad cars with a capacity of 144, 933 tons of coal have
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been provided instead of 7, 826 railroad cars with a capacity of 169, 200
tons of coal as planned. Railways are behind schedule in deliveries of
railroad cars as follows:
Stalingrad Railway
172 cars =
3, 717 tons
Southeast Railway
52 cars m
? tons
The North Donets Railway
27 cars #
1, 966 tons
The North Caucasus Railway
252 cars :
7, 126 tons
`conclusion of message missing)"
b) Tkvibuli-Ugol, Tkvarcheli-Ugol
(226) The following messages reporting plans and shipments are our only
source of information concerning the combines Tkvibuli-Ugol and Tkvarcheli-Ugol:
Tkvibuli-Ugol
Total shipments in the first quarter of 1944: 75, 200 tons including: by railway
73, 200 tons and by their own
transportation facilities 2, 000 tons
Daily average of 805 tons in 36
cars. By their own transportation
facilities 22 tons.
January 1944:
By railway 25, 000, by their own transportation facilities, 700 tons.
Daily average of 805 tons and 36
cars. By their own transportation
facilities 22 tons.
Tkvarcheli-Ugol
Total shipment in the first quarter of 1944: 54, 000 tons including: by railway
21, 000 tons and by their own
transportation facilities 33, 000
tons.
Daily average 594 tons of coal,
by railway 231 tons in 10 cars,
by their own transportation
facilities 363 tons.
January 1944:
By railway 6, 300 tons, by their own transportation facilities 10, 800 tons.
Daily average of 552 tons, by
railway 204 tons, by their own
transportation facilities 384 tons.
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(127) Tkvarcheli-Ugol and Tkvibuli-Ugol shipped the following quantities
in February 1944:
Tkvarcheli 17, 582 tons
Tkvibuli 21, 000 tons, distributed as follows:
'Lenin" mine 5, 623 tons; "Stalin" mine 4, 884 tons;
the Western mine 9, 408 tons and the "Galati"
1, 085 tons. Total 21, 000 tons.
(128) A report of 13 September indicates daily deliveries from the Tkvibuli-
Ugol Combine. The following were shipped.
Mine Ordered Shipped
Lenin 346 tons 388 tons
Stalin 550 " 699 "
Galati 75 - -
(129) In September the coal production plan for Galati Ugol was set at
24, 700 tons.
c) Voroshilovgrad Ugol
(230) Only five day reports from 1 thru 5 May and from 5 May thru 10 May
were available. They provided the following information:
(231) In the first five days of May the Voroshilovgrad Ugol Combine shipped
23, 179 tons of coal (= 1, 165 railroad cars). 26, 668 tons were shipped by truck
(2 1, 176 cars per day). In the period from 5 thru 10 May 13,460 tons of coal in
683 railroad cars were shipped. A total of 21, 974 tons were shipped by truck
(: 819 cars per day).
H. Coal Supply
(232) The following was determined in detail:
January'
(233) In the Caucasian and East Ukrainian regions a serious situation with
respect to coal supply was noted. Examples follow:
(234) The Ingush Paper Combine had not received the December delivery
of 300 tons of coal by January.
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(235) Shipments of coal to the Plant "Instrument" in Taganrog were far
behind schedule: 827 tons in December and 680 tons in January.
February
(236) The critical situation continued and seemed to become even more
threatening. A serious shortage of coal seemed to be prevailing not only in the
regions mentioned above, but also in the entire Soviet Union. At any rate, the
State Committee for Defense was forced to prohibit all deliveries of coal which
were not expressly authorized. This order was issued on 14 February. However,
coal shortages continued.
(237) The chemical combine in Dzhulfa has no heating material; neither
the factory nor the living quarters were heated.
(238) Plant 572 of the NK for Munitions in Zatvor (Chelyabinsk Oblast')
had not received the allocation of 400 tons of coal for January and February.
(239) The shoe factory "Mikoyan" in Rostov/Don was forced to cease
operations because of a shortage of coal.
(240) The meat combine in Leninakan had not received the coal allocation
in February.
(241) The Lithopone Plant in Kutaisi was shut down because of a lack of
March
(242) A change in the coal supply situation was not noted.
(243) The Bakery Trust in Leningrad did not receive its coal deliveries
in March.
(244) The alcohol plant in Petrovsk was forced to shut down on 10 March.
A ril
(245) The power plants at Stalingrad, Voronezh, Kharkov, Moscow,
Saratov, Kujbyshev and Rostov/Don were suffering particularly as a result of the
shortage in coal supplies.
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(246) The Azov-Black Sea power station received only 16, 700 tons of
coal instead of the 26, 600 tons authorized.
(247) The Stalingrad tractor plant required 300 tons of coke for April.
However, only 45 tons were authorized.
(248) The coal supply office in Shakhty delivered only 180 tons of coal to
the NK for Sovkhozes instead of the planned 320 tons. As a result, the repair of
agricultural machinery was greatly delayed.
May
(249) In the first 20 days of May only 109, 800 tons of coal were delivered
from the Coal Supply Office in Donbass to the coke chemical plants instead of the
planned 187,220 tons. The shipments were made by the following:
Office Planned Delivery
Actual Delivery
Stalino "Snab Ugol"
108,220
61,
531
Voroshilovgrad "Snab Ugol"
64, 000
40,
809
Rostov/Ugol
15, 160
7,
540
(250) Great difficulties had arisen ;-t the coke chemical plants in Ruchen-
kovo, Starokramatorskaya, Stalino, Khanzhenko, and Konstantinovka. Reports
were also intercepted concerning shut-downs of munitions plants as a result of
coal shortages. For instance, Plant 558 of the NK for Munitions in Gorkij was
forced to cease production of munitions.
July
(251) Plant "Instrument" in Taganrog was beset with great difficulties be-
cause of the coal shortage.
(252) As a result of the serious coal shortage, several hospitals of the NK
for Health in the Caucasus were made unsuitable for patients.
(253) In the months of June, August and September there were very few
messages concerning the coal supply situation. As far as could be determined
the situation remained the same as in the preceding months.
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