SOVIET UNION MILITARY - ECONOMIC REPORT

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP56S00492A000100120002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 31, 1944
• Content Type: REPORT

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This document contains classified Special Intelli-
gence information within the provisions of Public Law
513 - 81st Congress.
Information contained herein referring directly or in-
directly to any Special Intelligence activities, regard-
less of the classification of the information, may be
communicated only to persons officially indoctrinated
for Special Intelligence.
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90/53/TOPSEC/CIA. D/Z
SC No. 06509
Copy No.
SOVIET UNION MILITARY-ECONOMIC REPORT
Survey for the 2nd Half of 1943
Translated from the German Report
Dated: 31 March 1944
/-THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE
18, U. S. C., SECTION 793 AND 794. SEE ALSO PUBLIC
LAW 513, 81ST CONGRESS SECOND SESSION. ITS TRANS-
'MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY
MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED
BY LAW.-/
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
Strategic Division
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Copy Nos. 1 - 38 - for Dissemination
Internal: Distribution L(4)
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FOIAb3a
During the Second World War the German Signal Intelligence Control
Center of the Staff of the Chief of Army Signal Service (HNW, LNA)
issued a series of reports to show the USSR military-economic
situation as reflectecF I4ID38ian internal plain language traffic. A
total of 145 reports, appeared at short, ir-
regular intervals, 1t clix per month, for the period October
1942-March 1943. include mostly daily
reports for March 1943 as well as a few monthly reports covering
the latteFWD3a 1942 and the early part of 1943. The last four
reports, summarize Soviet economic
activities for periods of three to nine months in 1943 and 1944.
ffQAb,8ahree of these reports have been translateEQI b ued by
One hundred reports,
Mare being translated and issued by Strategic Division of
the Office of Research and R f 3QIA). The series will be com-
pleted with the publication of
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Page
General Survey ------------------------ 5
Personnel Situation --------------------- 7
Transportation Situation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13
Railroad - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13
Inland Waterways ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 17
Civil Air Fleet - - - - _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - 22
Food Situation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - 23
Food Production - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 3i
Food Processing - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 28
Food Supply ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 31
Reconstruction of Agriculture - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 35
Metal Supply -
Oil Supply - - -
Coal Supply -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Timber Supply - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 59
Shipbuilding - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 64
Ship Repair - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 68
Reconstruction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 71
Imports - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 75
Imports from Iran - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 75
Imports from the Far East - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 82
Appendix I: Budget Plans of the River Fleet - - - - _ _ _ - 84
Appendix II: Transport Plans of the River Fleet - - - - - - 90
Appendix III: Map -- Civil Air Fleet Airlines - - - - - - - - 96
Appendix IV: Map -- Foreign Trade Routes
Iran - Soviet Union - - - - - - - - - - - 97
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Military-Economic Report
(Based on domestic radio traffic)
31 March 1944
The following report summarizes the military-economic reports for the
second half of 1943 and is based entirely on reports from domestic radio
traffic. The report gives only a sector of the economic life of the Soviet
Union. The statistics are therefore not absolute but only indexes of the
economic development.
1 . General Survey
(1) Intercepts from domestic radio traffic resulted in the following
picture:
(2) Increased military operations and an economic rehabilitation of the
recovered areas resulted in stresses during the second half of 1943 which
permitted the economy of the Soviet Union to improve only slightly.
(3) This was indicated in particular in the transportation field. Owing
to the steady movement of the fronts to the West, the military made increasing
demands on the transportation system. The proportion of the transportation
system available to the economy decreased steadily. The railroad system was
able to place at the disposal of the economy only about half of the required cars
in the second half-year (against about 2/3 in the first half-year). Only about
two-thirds of the transportation plans of the River Fleet could be fulfilled
(against about 3/4 in the first half-year).
(4) The personnel situation formed a grave concern to the responsible
authorities, since the front placed increasing demands on the economy. At
several important plants the remaining personnel were frozen until the end of
the war. To compensate, another part of the economy had to bear a correspond-
ingly higher load of military recruitments. The only reserves worth noting not
yet incorporated into the economy are youths under eighteen years and women
with small children. During the second half year these groups had to be called
upon on a large scale by means of service drafts.
(5) In spite of the shortage of young workers the Soviets attempted to
increase technical training. Many new technical schools in various regions
were established. These schools are an indication that the Soviets want
systematically and with all energies to reach or surpass the prominence of the
old industrial state insofar as technical and special workers are concerned.
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(6) The transfer of military conditions to civilian life through the intro-
duction of military disciplinary regulations and ranks (uniforms) served to
direct the mobilization of the working force.
(7) The reconstruction of the re-occupied region was carried out with
greatest energy. In some cities the economic life was pursued with amazing
speed. The metal and timber supply could only partially meet the requirement
of the reconstruction.
(8) The food situation was affected by the apparently only average harvest.
As a result of deficiencies of transportation, a part of the harvest spoiled. Only
about three-quarters of the expected amounts of potatoes and vegetables were
harvested. 1944 must therefore reckon with increasing food problems. As a
result of the poor supply, the unofficial prices were increased perceptibly. The
official purchase price for a hundredweight of rye amounted to 8. 05 rubles and
for wheat, 12.75 rubles. In the black market 1 kg. of flour cost 110 rubles,
1 kg. of potatoes, 50 rubles, and 1 kg. of butter 400-500 rubles. The average
hourly rate of a worker amounts to 0. 90 ruble. .
(9) An acknowledgement of the unsatisfactory food position of the Soviet
Union is to be seen in imports from Iran. Imports increased considerably in
comparison with the first half year and these imports consisted of about two-
thirds of food The imported materials could not, however, cover the shortage.
(10) The raw material supply problem was by and large a transportation
problem. An example indicative of this situation is in the supply of scrap iron.
While the scrap iron processing schedule was almost 100 per cent fulfilled, the
transportation system could handle only about half of this amount.
(11) The petroleum and coal supply, which had reached serious pro-
portions already in July, by November /December had reached a critical
position. During these months there were numerous interruptions and shut-
downs at the plants. The situation prevailed both in electrical plants and
munitions works.
(12) The increasing difficulties led to more and more drastic measures.
The Soviet administration demanded the expansion of industry within the frame-
work of new output competitions. They comprised the "voluntary conscriptees",
to do additional work in spite of, in many cases, the already existing 12-hour
work day. The yearly plan had to be fulfilled by 5 December. A new production
plan which was above all to-increase ordinance and aircraft production, was pro-
vided for the winter. Although the existing plan figures=-they were purposely
high--had not been met in general, these "voluntary production competitions"
combined with brutality in the execution were the handles used by the government
to gain by force higher outputs.
(13) The economy of the Soviet Union in general maintained the production
level during the second half-year of the previous period. As a result of increased
military requirements and the demands of reconstruction, output however fell
short of the requirements. Whether and to what extent the increasing reconstruction
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of the reoccupied areas will make possible an increase of the productivity of the
Soviet Union cannot at present be foreseen.
2. Personnel Situation
(14). During the second half of 1943 in all aspects of the economy there was an
unalleviated shortage of skilled labor brought about principally by the extensive
military draft. This shortage grew with the increasing occupation of large industrial
and agricultural areas in which extensive reconstruction was necessary. The plants
in the unoccupied regions had to give up workers during this reconstruction in spite
of their own strained labor situation.
(15). The NKRF plants had to transfer its reconstruction staffs for the Dnepr
Steamship Agency. Consequently, there was a large shortage of labor for ship repair
and also travelling personnel. As a result of the shortage of office personnel, the
monthly accounts were considerably in arrears.
(16) Agriculture suffered under a shortage of tractor and combine drivers.
Difficulties resulted in those aspects of agriculture which had a high proportion of
manual labor, as for example, in transportation and timber working. From West
and Central Siberia and the Caucasus there were numerous announcements that the
timber quotas could not be fulfilled.
(17). With the increase of foreign supply through Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and
Iran, large stocks of imported goods accumulated because of the shortage of trans-
portation workers.
(181 By means of large-scale drafts, the work difficulties were to be
alleviated. As a result there was a re-allocation of skilled workers from industries
having little importance to the war to industries of greater importance. Additional
workers were obtained by extending the labor draft to include women and youths.
By a decree of 7 August 1943 it was ordered that women with children between 4 and
8 years could be drafted. War wounded, the aged, and sick were called up to work.
Labor was drafted from the reconquered areas for other regions. Thus, so far as
can be determined from radio traffic, more than 100, 000 laborers were obtained,. as
can be deduced from the following examples. There were drafted:
55, 000 men for the reconstruction of the iron industry in the
Don Basin
10, 000 men for the reconstruction of the "Stalin" Works in
Novokramatorskaya and the "Ordzhonikidze" Plant
in Starokramatorskaya
15, 000 men for the ship repair works in the Middle and Lower
Volga Steamship Agency
10, 000 men for the railroad repair shops in the area of the
south and southwest front
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4, 000 for the North Caucasus Surface Construction and
Underground Construction Industry
3, 000 men for the Turkmen Petroleum Industry
2, 100 men for the Azov-Black Sea Plant in Rostov
1, 500 men for the NK for Building Projects in Rostov
Youths less than 18 years old were drafted:
4, 000 youths for the reconstruction of the railroad in the
Krasnodar district
150 youths for the metallurgical plant in Novotagilsk in
September
60 youths for the Chelyabinsk Steel Works
(19) Likewise, a large number of youths were supplied for the metallurgical
works in Sulin and Taganrog.
(20) The drafts are operating under great difficulties. In the Voroshilovgrad
region, the NK for Heavy Machines was ordered to draft an average of only 5 workers
per day in August. Several enterprises of NKRF were not able to obtain sufficient
workers. Molotov-NKRF needed about 1, 000 men; Gorkij-NKRF, about 300 men;
Kujbyshev-NKRF, about 200 men.
(21) The method of carrying out the drafts may be seen from a pronouncement
of the Chief Directorate of the NKRF in Moscow to the office in Gorkij:
"There is only one explanation for the fact that you have not
obtained sufficient personnel. You do not have sufficient
tenacity and moreover, your connections with the local organi-
zations are inadequate. I suggest that you get in touch with the
regional organizations. I make you personally responsible for
the carrying out of the drafts."
(22) The carrying out of the draft often resulted in frictions. Employees
of the River Fleet, again and again, in spite of all orders which should have
guaranteed the stability of its labor force, were drafted for other organizations. This
could often only be cancelled after a protest. For certain munitions industries, drafts
were carried out without regard to the relationship of the draftees to other enterprises
and agencies. Excluded from this were only the members of the Coal, Tank, and
Aviation Industries.
(23) For seasonal work, school children and students were called up. For
the autumn harvest school children of the upper class were utilized. The populace
of the cities were also used for this purpose. There are messages from the regions
of Aktyubinsk, Akmolinsk, Alma-Ata, and Karaganda. Students were obtained for
timber processing installations.
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(24) Within certain aspects of the economy, a re-allocation of the labor force
was carried out.
(25) At the beginning of the season when navigation must stop (usually in
October), travelling personnel were utilized within the NKRF for ship repairs, pro-
duction of spare parts for ships, and for wood-processing work.
(26) Ufa-NKRF distributed its travelling personnel of 1, 133 men as follows
during the winter:
205 men for special repair
450 men for ships' guards
245 men for NKR.F Industry
85 men for timber procurement
30 men for construction work
20 men for training
109 men to the technical or factory schools
(27) Irkutsk, river port, allocated 1, 300 men as follows:
150 men for repairs
320 men for canal construction
60 men for general overhauling
220 men for timber procurement
300 men for other work
120 men for the Angara Steamship Agency
140 men for NKRF Industry
During the winter period, transportation workers from the River Fleet were made
available to the Merchant Fleet in Arkhangelsk and the transshipment points of
Iransovtrans.
(28) In spite of all these measures, the labor force was not adequate. How
extensive the labor force was at the end of 1943 is indicated in the following table
showing the unemployed persons in large cities (including women with children
under 8 years):
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Rostov
11, 280 persons
including
5, 279 women
Taganrog
4, ?44 persons
1,423
Shakhty
2, 266 persons
1,842
Novocherkassk
417 persons
394
No vo s hakhtinsk
503 persons
503
Sulin
1, 212 persons
1,212
Kamensk
96
Millerovo
Bataisk
Azov
Salsk
Morozovsk
1, 127 persons
301 persons
874 persons
303 persons
401 persons
897
Thus it is seen that future labor drafts can no longer rely on free available reserves
but must be filled at the expense of those industries of little importance.
(29) In radio traffic, abnormalities have often been announced concerning
personnel adjustments and welfare. The non-fulfillment of the labor draft plans,
lack of satisfactory quarters for the draftees, inadequate supply of food, special
clothing and bed-linens were the most frequent bottlenecks.
(30) Often a large proportion of the draftees were sick, another proportion
deserted, and only a fraction of the assigned personnel were useful to the plants.
Two-hundred draftees were assigned to a plant of the NK for the Merchant Fleet in
Baku. Only 77 men actually worked; 81 had deserted, the rest were either sick,
assigned to schools, discharged for various reasons, or transferred to other plants.
(31) Anyone who refuses to accept a work position, must be turned over to the
authorities. Disciplinary action of this type appears to be frequent because a radio
message stated that on the basis of an order of the highest court all penalties against
employees of the River Fleet who have not yet reached their sixteenth birthday were
to be re-examined. If necessary, a modification or complete acquittal of the sentence
was to be uttered.
(32) Non-fulfillment of work quota subjected the worker to severe punishments
based on disciplinary regulations instituted in the middle of 1943. In such cases
investigations were to be carried out and notification given that non-fulfillment of
the work quota was not to be tolerated.
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(33) Exceeding the work quota by workers in the war industries called for
special prizes to be conferred upon them. Transport workers received for sup-
plementary labor devoted to loading of export materials and fuels special allot-
ments of bread, tobacco, rice, meat products, and dried fruits. Many prizes
were also bestowed through Socialist competitions.
(34) Personnel problems existed because of the induction into the military
of the young classes. Up to 15 November 1943 the members of the class of 1926
should have been called into the service. Of the members of this class employed
in industry, however, only those of the two lowest categories (1 and 2) were to
be excluded. Furthermore, all students in this class at NKRF technical schools
were to be exempt from military draft. A renewed report of the industrial
employees in the classes 1922/25 followed and specifically of those in the higher
categories which was to stop further extraction of the labor force from the
economy. Members of the class of 1920 in agriculture were not exempted. As
a result of this, members of this class who were attending agricultural schools
were made available for military service.
(35) From radio traffic, it appeared that mainly agriculture had to give up
labor to the military. In order to guarantee essential workers for agriculture,
certain categories of workers were deferred. The sovkhozes_ could apply for
skilled laborers (tractor and combine drivers), of the three higher categories
without regard to age. In spite of this, there were frequent drafts of tractor and
combine drivers for military service.
(36) In the enterprises of the food industry, deferments were not extended
beyond 1 September. Thus, because of this ordering, qualified workers, engineers,
and technicians were drafted.
(37) In the motor repair plants, engineering=-technical personnel, except
those belonging to the officers' corps of the Red Army, and workers of the fourth
and higher categories were deferred without regard to age.
(38) The deferments of the workers of the Coal Industry were extended to
1 July 1944.
(39) The workers of the River Fleet were, in accord with an order of
20 June 1943, deferred from military service until the end of the war. The
workers of the Petroleum Industry were likewise deferred until the end of the war.
(40) Under certain circumstances, all personnel of an enterprise were
deferred. Thus the total personnel engaged in the construction of a soda plant in
Slavyansk were deferred indefinitely from military service.
(41) From the deferments announced during the second half year, it was
apparent that in certain war industries, such as the Petroleum Industry, further
military drafts are impossible.
(42) This resulted in increased conscription from other branches of the
economy, as is shown, for example, by conscription from Agriculture and the
Food Industry irrespective of office,
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(43) Paralleling the reconstruction of industry there was an intensive
expansion of technical schooling. Both in the reoccupied regions and in other
regions, during the second half-year many new technical schools in all branches
of the economy were established. From radio traffic, newly established technical
schools for about 12, 000 students have been identified as follows:
Maritime Schools in Batum for 300 men;
NKRF Technical School Krasnoyarsk for ? men;
4 craftsman schools for the Metal Industry in the
Stalingrad Oblast' for 2, 000 men;
2 craftsman schools for the Metal Industry in
Rostov Oblast' for 200 men;
3 technical schools for the Metal Industry in the
Stalingrad Oblast' for 3, 000 men;
1 craftsman school for the Metal Industry in the
Voroshilovgrad Oblast' for 300 men;
Technical school for the Mortar Industry in
Leningrad (?) "Vulkan" Works for 3, 000 men (? -;
Technical School for Communications in Voro-
shilovgrad'for 200 men;
Craftsman School for Construction Workers in
the Rostov Oblast' for 750 men;
Craftsman School for Construction Workers in
the Azov Oblast' for 200 men;
Craftsman School for Construction Workers in
the Kamensk Oblast' for 250 men;
Technical School for the Shoe Factory "Mikoyan"
in the Rostov Oblast' for 300 men.
(44) More than 10, 000 technical students attended these schools during the
second half-year. Also during the winter half-year numerous courses for agri-
culture were conducted. In the Stavropol region alone, during this period the
following were trained:
Tractor drivers -
6, 000 men
Combine drivers -
1, 200 men
Assistant combine -
drivers
80 men
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Mechanics
180 men
Foremen for tractor -
brigades
300 men
Repair technicians -
200 men
(45) In addition, in the course of the winter in 2-month long instruction
periods, 200 tractor drivers and 500 combine drivers should be given advanced
training. Employees capable of work of both sexes of the population from
sovkhozes and kolkhozes from age 16 upwards were obliged to attend these
courses.
(46) The plan for increasing technical instruction met with difficulties,
however, because not enough technical students could be obtained. Therefore,
there were drafts made for technical school instruction. In the Vladivostok
rajon there were drafted, for example, 1, 015 youths for the technical schools
and 820 for the Maritime School. The method of drafting did not seem to be adequate,
however, since the NKRF conducted a recruiting campaign among urban and rural
youth for its technical school.
(47) To what degree the training plan was realized is indicated by the
following examples:
Training Plan
Actual Training
Fulfillment
in per cent
NKRF Plant "Zhdanov" in Gorkij
54
17
30. 2
NKRF Plant "Karl Marx" in Gorkij
63
26
40. 1
NKRF Plant in Astrakhan
650
367
56. 5
Technical Schools in North Ossetia
650
469
72. 2
Craftsman Schools in North Ossetia
500
153
30.6
Technical Schools in Azerbajdzhan
2, 300
1,685
73.2
Technical Schools in Khabarovsk
2,217
1, 721
77. 5
3. Transportation Situation
A. Railroad
(48) During the second half-year there was no significant improvement in the
transportation situation. As a result of the heavy requirements of the front, the
railroads were strained to the utmost.
(49) They lacked rolling stock and transportation workers. There were also
stoppages as a result of deficient organization. The raw material supply was therefore
bad. This led to stoppages in the economy. This also resulted in economic loss as
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a result of long storage of perishable goods in the economic stations, as for
example, food, textiles, and leather.
(50) How strained the transportation situation was is demonstrated by the
extension of the state of emergency on the railroad during the first half-year.
During July transportation difficulties seemed to increase. At the beginning of
the month, coal loading in Likhaya (Rostov Oblast') had to be temporarily sus-
pended as a result of lack of coal. Shakhty received during the first days of
July cars for the transportation of coal from the mines. The NK for Ferrous
Metals obtained from Voroshilovgrad in July only 36 per cent of the planned
12, 000 tons of coal.
(51) Millerovo announced great hold-ups of petroleum transport for the
(52) During August only about half of the transportation program was ful-
filled, as is indicated in the following examples taken from the radio traffic:
Planned Amount
Actual Amount
Fulfillment
in % Period
Remarks
NK for
600 tons
231
38
10-15 Aug
Anthracite
Ferrous Metals
from Donbass
NK for
200
96
48
10-15 Aug
to Sulin
Anthracite
Ferrous Metals
from
Kutaisi,
50
1-10 Aug
Novo s hakh-
tinsk
Lithopone
Works
(53) During August the NK for Ferrous Metals should have received
23, 800 tons of coal (16, 000 tons from the current plan and 7, 800 tons residue
from July). From 7 to 14 August, however, no coal was delivered.
(54) In Makhachkala 19, 000 tons of freight arrived, about 8, 500 tons were
shipped. On 1 September 4, 600 tons had not b een shipped.
(55) Frequently there were complaints on trans-shipping difficulties as a
result of the shortage of transport workers In Semipalatinsk only about 40% of
the cars could be loaded, in Kineshma about 31%.
(56) According to an order of 5 September 1943 new ranks and rank
designations were introduced for the workers of the Soviet railroads. In an expla-
nation of this order, it said that it was intended to improve discipline and to intro-
duce a uniform command authority.
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(57) The ranks are:
General Director of Transportation
Vice General Director of Transportation, First and Second Rank
General Director for Transportation, First, Second, and
Third Ranks
General Director for Mechanical Engineering, First, Second,
and Third Ranks
General Director for Roads and Buildings, First, Second,
and Third Ranks
General Director for Communications, First, Second, and
Third Ranks
General Director for Administration, First, Second, and
Third Ranks
II. Director - Colonel
Director - Lieutenant Colonel
Engineer - Major
III. Engineer - Captain, one for each of following:
traffic, mechanical engineering, roads and buildings,
communications, administration.
IV, Engineer - Lieutenant
V, Technologist - Lieutenant
VI. Traffic Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Machine Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Roads and Building Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Communications Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Administration Technician, First, Second, and Third Ranks
Supply Man and Foreman, one each for Traffic, Waterway, and
Buildings, Communications, and Administration.
(58) During September, as a result of the harvest, grain shipments were of
great importance. These transportation plans were fulfilled only about one quarter.
(59) RAILROAD CAR ALLOCATIONS
Amount Actual Fulfillment
For Planned Amount in % Period Remarks
Krasnodar Kraj 6, 540 cars 1, 780 cars 27.5 During Grain
Sept. transport
(Actual period
1-25 Sept. )
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For
Amount
Planned
Actual
Amount
Fulfillment
in %
Period
Remarks
7, 554 cars
1, 835 cars
24.1
1-20 Sept.
Grain trans-
port by the
Northern
Caucasus RR.
300 cars
76 cars
25.3
Daily,
1-15 Sept.
Grain trans-
port by Voro-
shilovgrad RR
Baku, Rear
64, 000 cars
9, 700 cars
15.2
During
Grain
Area of the
Red Army
August
transport
57, 000 tons
1, 100
10.9
1-25 Sept.
Grain transport
Baku Harbor
1, 792 cars
749
41.6
1-10 (?)
Sept.
Residue 24, 000
cargoes
(60) As a result of the inadequate supply of tank cars, by the middle of
September the storage facilities of the petroleum plant in Groznyj were completely
used. As a result there was a production stoppage.
(61) During the month of October the situation was unchanged. The Stalingrad
Railroad ought to have supplied during that month 1, 927 cars for grain transport. Up
to 12 October only 114 cars equal to 6% were shipped. Also the Stalingrad Railroad
was not able to fulfill the coal plan. They should have placed 45 cars daily at the
disposal of the "Rostov.Ugol" Combine. Up to 27 October (?) there was a backlog of
5, 656 tons.
(62) On the North Caucasus Railroad, from 16 October onward, the
Petroleum Supply Office in Armavir should receive 125 tank cars. In the period
from 22 to 24 October, however, no cars were made available.
(63) On 24 October the Transcaucasus Railroad exceeded the monthly trans-
portation plan for manganese ore and it was foreseen that by late October 30, 000
tons would be transported. By 24 October 30,457 tons or 101% had been shipped.
(64) During November and December the situation was unchanged. To carry
out the urgent grain transportation, horse-drawn wagons and trucks, had to be
utilized, for example, in the Krasnodar district. A truck regiment shipped up to
10 November 29, 000 tons of grain for the Directorate of Rear Services.
(65) RAILROAD CAR ALLOCATIONS
Amount Actual Fulfillment
Planned Amount in'% . Period Remarks
Boguraev, 124 cars 155 cars 48. 27 Nov.
Coal Trust
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Amount
Planned
Actual
Amount
Fulfillment
in %
Period
Boguraev,
124
66
55.
28 Nov.
Coal Trust
354 cars
184 cars
52.
In Dec.
Rostov,
253 cars
70 cars
60.8
During
Scrap Depot
(1-15 Dec.)
Dec.
Armavir,
--
--
36.
1-22 Dec.
Petroleum
Supply
Shakhty,
371
315
85.
15 Nov.
Rostov- Ugol
Remarks
For sunflower
shipments from
the Voroshilov-
grad Railroad
(66) The coal combine "Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty announced that the deficient
loadings were mainly due to the lack of transport workers. On 15 November only
190 cars, equal to 60% of those allocated, had been shipped. On 4 December "Rostov-
Ugol" obtained 305 cars of which 148, or 42%, were shipped. Thus the railroads ful-
filled only about one-half of their transportation program. Concerning the difficulties
resulting in the economy, see the various specific paragraphs in this report.
(67) In evaluating the transportation situation it must be considered that we
are dealing here only with the condition of the civilian sector of the economy, in
which the Munitions Industry is also included. In addition there is the military
sector. Military operational and freight shipments had unconditional priorities.
B. Inland Waterways
(68) The strain on the Inland Waterway transportation system appeared in
July to have reached a new high point. The majority of installations of the NKRF
could not carry out their transportation programs. The most important inland
waterway effort which is on the Volga fell short of its plan, as did the Kama
Steamship Agency and several other shipping agencies in European Russia. The
West Siberian Steamship Agency also did not fulfill its transportation quota. As
can be seen from radio messages, the docking facility of the Upper, Middle and
also Lower Volga were clogged. These stoppages resulted from the shortage of
transport workers. Saratov requested blanket authority to mobilize the popu-
lation and to draw upon local military units. On the Moscow-Oka Canal there
were even greater stoppages because in Gorkij and Rybinsk ships could not be
dispatched for the same reason.
(69) Often there were shortages of barges and above all of tugs.
According to messages, there were shortages of tugs at the Lower Volga and
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Kama Steamship Agencies. The West Siberian Steamship Agency also had a
bottleneck. These regions also did not have sufficient barges. Part of this barge
and tug shortage was due to the backlog of repair work and the non-fulfillment of
new construction plans. There were often also complaints concerning the bad
state of repair of the ships.
(70) As far as can be determined, the following Inland Shipping
installations could not fulfill their transport program:
Ust-Usa
Sokolki (Kirov Oblast')
Volga Steamship Agency:
Rybinsk
Gorkij
Stalingrad
Vladimirovka
West Siberian Steamship Agency:
Ilijsk
Tomsk
Omsk
Semipalatinsk
Krasnoyarsk
East Siberian Steamship Agenc
Khabarovsk
(71) The Upper Irtysh Steamship Agency remained continually under its
assigned norms. Semipalatinsk should have transloaded 2, 000 tons every 24
hours. Only the following amounts were, however, dispatched:
11 July 700 tons or 35%
12 July 800 tons or 40%
13 July 500 tons or 25%
14 July 900 tons or 45%
15 July 800 tons or 40%
Thus, in 5 days instead of 10, 000 tons only 3, 700 tons or 37% were dispatched.
(72) Ust-Usa fulfilled 61% of the monthly plan as of 20 July. Up through
22 July Omsk completed only 30% of salt shipments from Pavlodar. In Zemsk
42% of the transloading plan was fulfilled. As a result of the steady failure of the
port of Tomsk, the matter was to be investigated by the government. Good in-
formation concerning execution of the July transportation plan was reported by
the following-
Saratov
176%
Omsk
111%
Ulan-Ude
108%
Lower Irtysh Steamship Agency
107%
(73) The increased output of the Lower Irtysh Steamship Agency resulted
from raft operations as is apparent from the following review:
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Freight
Plan
Fulfillment
Per cent
Grain
54, 400 tons
55, 403 tons
101.2
Steel
150, 000
151,000
100.7
Coal
5, 000
5,815
106.4
Timber on Ships
91,
000
86, 036
94. 5
Timber on Rafts
79,
600
107,765
137.0
TOTAL
380,
100
406, 019
(74) During August there was a complication in Inland Shipping as a result
of the lowering of the water level. In a message from the Central Directorate to
all NKRF offices it was ordered that suitable measures were to be taken to
guarantee the necessary depth of water in the channel passages. As a result of
inadequate preparations, the depth of water was inadequate at many locations, and
especially at the following:
Upper Kama
Vytegra
Vyatka
Usa
Upper Pechora
Upper Volga
Irtysh
Upper Ob
(75) In the regions of the Upper Kama and Volga ship traffic was possible
in only one direction. In these regions the fulfillment of the transport plans was
not possible.
(76) Furthermore, the old problems, as well as the shortage of trans-
portation equipment and workers, remained unsolved so that the progress of
transportation dragged along.
(77) The situation was aggravated by the bad condition of the ships which
became worse and worse toward the end of the navigation period as a result of the
general wear and tear. Novosibirsk, for example, reported increasing damages
to ships' boilers and machines. Uralsk reported that as a result of the degenerate
condition of the ships the August plan could not be fulfilled. For cargoes which
were dispatched from the region of the Upper Volga Steamship Agency for Moscow,
oftentimes ships in such poor condition were used that during the trip a transload-
ing into another ship was necessary. Vladimirovka complained that it had re-
ceived barges in such poor condition from the Upper and Lower Volga Steamship
Agencies for use in transportation of salt that further shipments were no longer
possible.
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(78) In the case of many cargoes the packing was in such bad condition, as
for example in the case of cotton, that before transloading the cargoes had to be
completely repacked.
(79) In a message from the Central Directorate of the NKRF to all in-
stallations, the unsatisfactory operation of all shipping lines was censored. This
message specified the disorganization of dock work, unsatisfactory utilization of
loading capacity and non-fulfillment of the transportation plan.
(80) In August transportation backlogs were found at the following offices
of the River Fleet in addition to those cited in the previous month:
Kujbyshev
Astrakhan
Ufa
Yakutsk
Lower Irtysh Steamship Agency
(81) The backlog in fulfillment of transportation plans was as follows:
Installation
Amount
Planned
Actual
Amount
Fulfillment
in %
Period
Remarks
Upper Irtysh
4, 350 tons
3, 100 tons
70.
1-16 Aug.
Salt from
Steamship
Pavlodar
Agency
Lower Irtysh
7, 500
5,500
73.
1-16 Aug.
Salt
Steamship
Agency
Semipalatinsk
--
--
88.
1-16 Aug.
Salt transport
Vladimirovka
7,000
5, 700
81.4
23 Aug.
(82) In Astrakhan oil shipments had ceased. Kujbyshev and Ufa were in
arrears mainly with lumber shipments and Stalingrad with salt shipments. In
spite of the fact that there were adequate tugs, there remained in Vladimirovka
loaded barges past the prescribed delay time because work was so poorly organized.
(83) A good work record was reported, however, from the following:
Amount Actual Fulfillment
Office Planned Amount in % Period Remarks
Uralsk 350, 000 tons 378, 250 tons 108. August General transport
Novosibirsk 9,700 8, 000 " 82.4 August Coal
(from 1-20
August)
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Office
Amount Actual
Planned Amount
Fulfillment
in % Period
98.4 1-7 Aug.
General transport
(84) As a result of the low water level, considerable transportation problems
existed throughout the entire USSR in September. The Chief Directorate of the NKRF
complained about the low cruising speed of the Middle Volga Steamship Agency. It
amounted to only 160-200 kilometers per day. More and more River Fleet Offices
announced non-fulfillment of transport plans. Among others are the following:
Saratov
Ku jbys he v
Rostov
Uralsk
Blagoveshchensk
Ilijsk
Rybache
Semipalatinsk
Krasnoyarsk
Novosibirsk
Irkutsk
Aralsk
Chardzhou
Khabarovsk
(85) The fulfillment of the transportation plan by NKRF offices was as
follows:
Office
Amount
Planned
Actual
Amount
Fulfillment
in %
Period
Novosibirsk
81.
1-10 Sept.
71.
1-18 Sept.
14, 600 tons
6, 140 tons
42.
1-14 Sept.
Ku jbyshe v
5, 000
2, 900
58.
1-14 Sept.
Remarks
Transportation
plan in ton-kilo-
meters 89% ful-
filled
Principally grain
and building ma-
terial transported
Grain transport
Grain transport
(86) Blagoveshchensk did not fulfill its transportation plan for raft timber,
salt and vegetables; Rostov and Stalingrad did not fulfill their plan for coal.
(87) Only Omsk announced the fulfillment of the September transportation
plan and that was by 110. 1%. Details of this fulfillment follow:
Grain
Coal
Salt
Timber on ships
Timber on rafts
TOTALS
Plan
Actual Output
Percentage
43, 000 tons
37, 500 tons
87. 3
40, 000
44,700
111.8
91, 000
98,000
103.0
40, 000
26, 750
66.4
41, 500
84,800
201.0
255, 800 tons
291, 750 tons
110.1
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(88) In October navigation on most river waterways was stopped. Shipping
reports from the river systems of the Kama and Upper Volga were received only
up to 8 October. At the southern River Shipping offices operations ceased somewhat
later.
(89) River navigation during the navigation period of 1943 was quite in-
adequate. On the basis of messages it can be assumed that the transportation plan
was only about two-thirds fulfilled. In spite of this fact, the actual output, con-
sidered absolutely, was significant. The transportation plans which are consolidated
in Appendix 2 give an idea of the size of the transportation output.
(90) The Civil Air Fleet (Aero-Flot) was utilized not only for the trans-
portation of passengers and post but also for the shipping of valuable or urgently
required goods.
(91) According to radio messages, gold transport from Siberia was carried
out. Frequently medicines were transported by air both for the front and to counter-
act epidemic outbreaks in the epidemic areas. Important imports were also shipped
by air. Each flight from Baku to Moscow had to carry at least 100 kilograms of air
cargo from the branch office of Iransovtrans in Baku. Most of these cargoes were
goods important for munitions. There were also cargoes for the NK's for Heavy
Industry, Machine Industry and Tank Industry. The transportation of replacement
parts for tanks was the most important. The airport at Kujbyshev, for example, was
reported to have been used during the last ten days of December by transport planes
solely for the shipping of repair parts. The centers for airborne supply of tank re-
placement parts were Kujbyshev, Saratov, and Gorkij. Monthly transportation plan
for these airports during the first 20 days of September was fulfilled as follows:
Kujbyshev 68%
Saratov 37%
Gorkij 16%
(92)
From June on there were also large sulphur shipments from
Ashkhabad Rajon (Darvas).
(93) In Darvas the following shipments of sulphur were made:
On 1 August 10.2 tons
On 2 August 6. 9 tons
" 11 August 20. 5 tons
" 14 August 14. 5 tons
For entire month of August 504. 5 tons
(94) The Air Fleet had certain problems to cope with. From time to time,
for example, fuel and lubricants were very scarce. Also the transportation of
cargoes to the airports was not always punctual. Darvas reported that the local
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Ore Directorate was not punctual in delivering its cargoes so that the dispatch of
these cargoes dropped about 50% in 3 days. All in all air transport appeared to
operate better during the second half-year than the first half-year. The airport
at Saratov reported that the September transportation plan had been fulfilled by 110%.
(95) As could be determined from messages, air traffic was to be expanded.
(96) The following airlines were identified in the second half-year:
Chelyabinsk - Salsk - Stavropol - Krasnodar
Baku - Alma-Ata - (For special sanitary purposes)
Kujbyshev - Kursk
Irkutsk - Moscow
Stalingrad - Astrakhan - Baku - Teheran
Tikhvin - Leningrad
Baku - Stalingrad - Saratov - Moscow
Pensa - Saratov - Astrakhan - Rostov - Krasnodar
Voronezh Rostov - Krasnodar
Astrakhan - Groznyj - Baku
Tbilisi - Astrakhan - Tashkent - Zlatoust
Tikhvin - Khvojnaya
Stalingrad - Rostov Stalino
Mineralnye Vody - Makhachkala - 'Baku - Tbilisi
Moscow - Saratov - Stalingrad
(97) All of the known lines of the Civil Air Fleet are indicated on the
enclosed map.
A. Food Production
(98) The food situation in the Soviet Union was desperate during the first
half-year of 1943. Since this year?s harvest was only average, as could be
determined from domestic radio traffic, a prompt, complete processing of the
harvest was necessary. There were, therefore, great efforts made by the state
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to safeguard this harvest. By a decree of the Peoples' Commissariat of 18 July
concerning the bringing in of the harvest and the procurement of agricultural
products in 1943, these efforts were spelled out. First of all it was stated that
the guarantee of food for the front and the home would be of maximum importance.
State and party organs were strictly warned against repeating the previous year's
errors in handling the harvest. Plans concerning the harvest and the delivery of
the harvest were to be worked out. Labor forces, agricultural machines and
fuel were to be available punctually. The problem of the labor force appeared to
be the greatest difficulty to be overcome.
(99) The entire population capable of work was to be drafted for the harvest
work; furthermore the personnel of branches of the economy other than agriculture
were to be utilized as far as they could be withdrawn from their own agricultural
work. The required number of technical personnel from the industrial plants were
to be made available to the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS) for the harvest. Any
further shortage in the labor force required to bring in the harvest was to be
made up by mobilizing the population of the cities. The city people were to give
45 to 50 days of work in the sovkhozes and 50 to 60 days in the kolkhozes. School
children and youths were to give 15 to 20 days respectively to the sovkhozes and
20 to 30 days for the kolkhozes.
(100) In order to alleviate the shortage of agricultural machines, the
exigencies of the harvest of grains and oil crops necessitated an intensive machine
operation. The machines were to be operated not less than 16 hours a day during
the harvest time. Threshing machines were to be operated at least 20 hours per
day.
(101) In order to guarantee the processing of the grain and oil crops, the
proper authorities were authorized to confiscate 50% of the trucks of civilian
industry and 30% of the trucks of the war industry in order to transport the grain.
(102) The hay harvest should have been completed before the beginning of
the grain harvest. The closing date for the grain harvest was set at 20 October.
The potato and vegetable harvest was to be completed before the fall frost. 15%
of the potatoes were to be used as seed potatoes. In many regions this figure was
increased to 18% because the land sowed with potatoes was to be increased.
(103) To bring in the harvest, mainly women, Komsomol members and
school children were utilized. Still the labor force was not adequate; oftentimes
the military had to be utilized. Also the number of agricultural machines was
not adequate as could be determined from the radio. Therefore, tractors and
tractor drivers who had been sent into the liberated agricultural areas had to be
recalled for harvest work. A shortage of fuels likewise often existed (See Oil
supply) .
(104) Owing to numerous delays during the hay harvest, it overlapped the
grain harvest which led to further difficulties. The following NKRF installations,
among others, were behind schedule in the hay harvest:
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Blagoveshchensk Gorkij
Yakutsk Kirov
Omsk Krasnodar
Novosibirsk Z veni go vo
Uralsk
(105) The following had good harvests:
Alma-Ata
Kus tana j
Rostov Oblast'
(106) An unsatisfactory grain harvest was reported by:
Aktyubinsk Oblast' Kujbyshev-NKRF
Armavir Majkop
Blagoveshchensk NKRF Novosibirsk- NKRY
Kirov-NKRF Saratov-NKRF
Krasnodar Kraj Uralsk-NKRF
Leningrad Oblast'
(107) In Leningrad the harvest was so poor that the entire product had to
be used for seed purposes. In Krasnodar Kraj the same was true of the rice
harvest. The millet harvest appeared to be especially bad; for example in Rostov
Oblast' much of it was lost.
(108) The potato and vegetable harvest also did not appear to be especially
good. Various NKRF installations reported poor harvest, e. g.: Gorkij, Irkutsk,
Korenovka (sugar beets), Novosibirsk, Saratov.
(109) The poor harvest yields were in part due to the delay in harvest
operations. In certain places the crop died in the fields. Progress at the
secondary agricultural industries appeared to be especially poor such as at the
sovkhozes of the NKRF. In a message from Moscow Central at the middle of
September to all NKRF installations it was stated that the orders concerning
the bringing in of the harvest were not being followed. The installations received
the order to supervise their agricultural auxiliaries most strictly. The poor
yields of the NKRF operations were due in part to faulty cultivation. The seed-
ing plan for the harvest was only three-quarters fulfilled according to radio
messages.
(110) There were increasing backlogs in the further processing of the
harvest as a result of shortages in labor, machines, and fuels. The sovkhozes
of the following NKRF installations were in arrears by the end of October by
about 20% with the threshing: Gorkij, Ilijsk, Kirov, Krasnodar, Kujbyshev,
Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov, Semipalatinsk, Stalingrad Oblast', Uralsk.
(111) Grain procurement suffered delays primarily because of a lack of
transportation as there was a lack of trucks as well as railroad cars. The Red
Army, therefore, had to supply itself with trucks. In Krasnodar, for example,
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the truck reserve of the NK for Defense and trucks belonging to the North
Caucasus front were requisitioned. By the end of September and the beginning of
October grain procurement had been fulfilled by only a third and in individual
cases by one-half. Deliveries in September became less from week to week
because of transportation difficulties. In Rostov Oblast, grain procurement was
so deficient that grain for the supply of the civilian population had to be diverted
from military supplies. Delays occurred in the following:
Blagoveshchensk
Gorkij NKRF
Kujbyshe v
Krasnodar Kraj
Makhachkala
Molotov NKRF
Novosibirsk NKRF
Omsk NKRF
Upper Volga Steamship Agency
Rostov Oblast'
Stalino Oblast'
Stavropol Oblast'
Checheno Ingush
(112) Ashkhabad Oblast' fulfilled its plan ahead of schedule. In Stavropol
700 railroad cars for the procurement of oil grains were lacking. Hay deliveries
in Azerbajdzhan were 66 percent fulfilled by 15 September.
(113) Delivery of grain at the end of October was only fulfilled by 50 to 60
percent. A shortage of railroad cars was particularly noticeable here. In October
the Stalingrad railway was to have furnished 1, 927 railroad cars but by 12 October
only 114 cars had been shipped. Since tens of thousands of tons of grain had been
left at stations in the open, it was exposed to the danger of spoilage.
(114) The same difficulties existed in vegetable procurement as with grain.
The following NKRF offices were behind schedule:
Gorkij
Kujbyshev
Molotov
Novosibirsk
Omsk
Upper Volga Steamship Agency
(115) In general, vegetable deliveries were better than grain deliveries.
Vegetable deliveries from Armenia by the end of October had been fulfilled by
about 75 percent, i. e. , about 11, 400 tons had been delivered against a plan of
15, 400 tons. 1, 600 tons of this was to be used for cultivation. Moreover,
Armenia had not consumed quite so many potatoes, about 10, 800 tons. The
Vegetable and Fruit Trade Office of Turkmenistan fulfilled deliveries through the
beginning of October by 85 percent, i. e. , about 14, 900 tons had been delivered
instead of 17, 100 tons. The Vegetable and Fruit Trade Office of Azerbajdzhan by
the beginning of October had fulfilled the plan by 115 percent, i. e. , 14, 000 tons (?)
had been shipped.
(116) The Georgian Republic fulfilled the yearly plan for vegetables and
potatoes as follows:
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Commodity
Tonnage
Percent of Plan
Fresh potatoes
8,916 tons
81.
Fresh vegetables
10, 797
63.
Dried potatoes & vegetables
898
51.
Dried fruits
186
46.
Salted tomatoes
814
148.
Salted cucumbers
543
194.
(117) The consumers' union of Dagestan had not adequately fulfilled
established deliveries of potatoes and vegetables for the Red Army. 44 percent
of the potato deliveries and 32 percent of the vegetable deliveries had*been made.
(118) Procurement of oil grains also suffered under the general difficulties.
For example, in Stavropol through 5 November the following percentages of plan
had been achieved:
24 percent Sunflower seeds
26 percent Castor seeds
28 percent Mustard seeds
18 percent Flaxseed
5 percent Soybeans
(119) In several oblasti government reserve funds were established. About
10 percent of the grain procured, mainly wheat,, barley, millets, and oats were to
be transferred to these reserves, Because of the grain shortage, difficulties often
arose. Thus, Rostov, where 184, 000 tons of grain had been prepared by the
middle of October, was to deliver 18, 400 tons to these reserves. They could
deliver, however, only 14, 300 tons. Fulfillment of the planned delivery was pos-
sible only if reserves on hand for the army were drawn upon. Similar reserves of
fodder, preserved fish, and other foods were also set up.
(120) Because the harvest was behind schedule, delays also resulted in
autumn deliveries. There were also not enough serviceable agricultural machines
because after the harvest many tractors and agricultural machinery had to be re-
paired. In the sovkhozes of the Krasnodar Rajon 409 tractors had to be overhauled
out of a total of 593. The NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Rostov announced
at the beginning of November that the unsatisfactory deliveries from its holdings
were caused by a lack of tractors. Only 7 to 10 out of a total of 25 were in
service. Repair of the others was impossible because of a lack of spare parts.
There seemed to be no exception to this because, according to radio-press reports,
large quantities of spare parts for agriculture machines had been ordered. Ful-
fillment of this order was given a military priority, Plowing the fields was
accordingly in arrears. For example, by the middle of October in the Krasnodar
Kraj instead of 1, 300 hectares only 154 had been plowed, and in Rostov-on-Don
instead of 3, 000 hectares only 2, 000 had been plowed. According to the press, as
reported by radio, Novosibirsk, Kujbyshev and Kirov Oblasti, as well as the
Bashkir Republic were particularly behind schedule.
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(121) As a result of the only average harvest; a widespread lack of seed
grain arose, Thus there was a lack of seed. grain in Krasnodar Kraj, in Armavir
and in Rostov. For example, the Sovkhoz Directorate in Rostov required 2, 000
tons of seed grain, but could receive only 155 tons from the Grain Directorate and
1, 100 tons from government reserves, so that Rostov Oblast' (?) required 3, 000
tons but could receive only 2, 000 tons.
(122) According to a press report, sowing winter grain was accelerated
in the rajons of the liberated oblasti of Kharkov, Sumy and Poltava. The grain was
said to be growing well.
(123) Fishing was also emphasized in the second half year. There was an
attempt to utilize even more extensively this food reserve. The Azov-Black Sea
Fishing Industry was to increase its catch in November from 70 tons per working
day to 100 tons (in September the catch was about 1, 750 tons). Inasmuch as fish-
ing was undertaken as an auxiliary function by the NKRF, results were poor. In
the first 8 months of 1943 NKRF offices fulfilled the yearly plan as follows:
8%
Khabarovsk
50%
Ust-Usa
15%
Gorodets Mechanical Plant
5%
Raznezhe
28%
Gorodets Shipyard
11%
Chkalovsk
11%
Water Transport Base,
6%
Yakutsk
Gorodets
67%
Molotov
B. Food Processing
(124) Flour and food production could not be accomplished on the planned
scale. As a result of transportation difficulties particularly in the case of wheat,
the necessity arose to utilize other grain for baking bread. In the Checheno-
Ingush Republic millets had to be processed for flour instead of wheat. The grain
mills in Millerovo and Tarasovka which were to produce 500 tons of flour monthly
from wheat and millets received only barley. More often there were production
standstills at the grain mills because of a lack of sacks. Thus, the grain mill in
Rostov lacked 25, 000 sacks, so that flour could not be shipped. Millerovo re-
quired 100, 000 sacks and Tarasovka 80, 000 sacks. The latter mills had to cease
operations because of a lack of twine and sacks,
(125) A small mill in Nikolaevsk (Rostov Oblast') reported fulfillment of
the monthly plan for flour production as follows:
In October 363 tons flour 186 percent
In November 229 tons flour 121 percent
(126) Because of the flour shortage, macaroni production was beset with
great difficulties. Conditions were especially difficult in the period before flour
from the new harvest was ready. Many plants had to cease operations in August,
September and December because of insufficient flour deliveries, as for instance,
the Macaroni Industry in Krasnodar and Armavir. Nevertheless, an increase in
production was ordered by the government.
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(127) Potato and vegetable storage by the NKRF did not correspond to plan.
Molotov had stored only 300 tons of potatoes instead of 3, 000 tons, Omsk instead of
1, 400 tons only 100 tons, and the Upper-Volga Steamship Agency instead of 1, 500
tons only 500 tons. Gorodets and Raznezhe also had stored too few potatoes for the
winter. The NKRF Chief Directorate in Moscow threatened serious measures.
(128) The Food Industry seemed to be better supplied with vegetables because
fulfillment of the planned amounts of preserved vegetables were often reported; for
instance, in the Preserves Industry, Derbent, Krasnovodsk and the NK for Trade in
Erevan.
(129) Vegetable conservation suffered particularly a lack of containers at
the agricultural sub-enterprises of the NKRF. Uralsk NKRF expected a harve.st_ of
200 tons of cucumbers, but had the capacity to salt only 25 tons. Saratov NKRF,
Stalingrad NKRF and the Sovkhoz "Vodnik" at Balakhovo, as well as the Food Industry
in Baku urgently required barrels. The Preserves Trust of Dagestan in Makhachkala
also was very badly supplied with barrels. In the barrel factories only 20 barrels
were produced daily instead of 200. Through September the Preserves Industry in
Krasnodar had received barrels for only 500 tons instead of 3, 700 tons. As the pro-
duction of vats, barrels, and other tools for purposes of the Preserves Industry
progressed very slowly, part of the vegetables procured were lost or had to be sold
on the free market.
(130) The Vegetable and Fish Preserve Industries also suffered a partial
lack of salt. This was caused by the great needs of the Food Industry after the
harvest which the Transportation Industry could not keep up with. For this reason,
shipments of salt in excess of plan had to be made.
(131) The Salt Industry otherwise fulfilled its work according to plan. From
the seas of Manych 6, 130 tons of salt were extracted through 20 October. This was
the largest extraction in years, An overall shortage of salt did not exist as it did in
the case of sugar which had to be imported in large quantities (see Foreign Trade).
At the end of November and the beginning of December the sugar factory in
Gulkevichi was forced to cease operations because of a lack of sugar beets. The'
sugar factories in Rostov were also forced to close down operations in November
because of a lack of sugar. Thus, supply of sugar to the miners and to the Arma-
ments Industry was placed in doubt. In December several food enterprises in
Groznyj also had to cease operations.
(132) According to an order the production of dried vegetables was to be
greatly increased. Workers needed for this production increase were to be trained.
(133' The production of fruit preserves suffered difficulties as a result of
the sugar shortage. In September, for example, the Preserves Trust in
Oktemberyan was forced to cease production, while at the same time deliveries
of fruit increased. Likewise, the Preserves Industry in Khachinsk lacked sugar.
(134) Production of fat largely did not keep up with requirements. In
Armenia, there was apparently a regression compared to the previous year. The
Armenian NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Erevan had purchased 1, 250 tons
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of milk in the year 1942 for the production of butter and cheese. In the first 9
months of 19439 only 180 tons (about 20 percent) had been received. In the
liberated territories production of butter and cheese actually rose, but still did
not meet needs. A production increase was therefore ordered for the fourth
quarter. The offices of the NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Krasnodar
and Pyatigorsk did not provide sufficient butter. Instead of 500 tons of butter,
they could deliver only 250 tons to government reserves in Rostov. The Meat and
Dairy Sales office in Pyatigorsk did not even approach completion of delivery
contracts for fat. The Preserves Factory in Makhachkala ceased operations because
of a lack of fat. However, the three dairies in Leningrad fulfilled the plan.
(135) Salad oil plants primarily processed the following as oil grain:
Sunflower seeds
Flax seeds
Mustard seeds
Castor seeds
(136) Vegetable fat production was more unsatisfactory than production of
animal fat. The Fat Combine in Leningrad produced only 70 percent of plan
during the second ten-day period of October and the Fat Combine in Krasnodar
only about 50 percent (80 tons of oil grain processed daily). Many plants such as
the plant in Belorechenskaya had to cease operations because of a lack of raw
material. The oil factories in Krasnodar Kraj, for example, in Novomikhajlovsk
and Nikolaevsk ceased operations. The inadequate production was caused by a
lack of oil grain. Sunflower seeds seem to be especially scarce. In Krasnodar,
the target of grain procurement for delivery to Stavropol was reduced from 10, 000
tons of sunflower seeds to 59 000 tons. The NK for Agriculture in Rostov reported
in November that it had a total of 524 tons from the year's harvest and from stocks,
but required 4, 200 tons (in the case of Rostov it must be considered that it is a
military region).
(137) As a result of the fat shortage, new methods for obtaining salad oils
had to be developed in the Soviet Union. In margarine factories, cotton oil was
widely processed. In Georgia, production of salad oil from peach pits was begun.
The pits were delivered in large quantities from the preserves factories. Accord-
ing to a radio message from Leningrad, the Northwest Fisheries there had under-
taken experimental work on the derivation of vitamin-containing cod liver oil from
sticklebacks. Industrial production of 30 tons yearly was to be achieved.
(138) The limited vegetable fat production resulted in a shortage of oil
cakes. The oil plant in Rostov could not deliver the required 600 tons of oil cakes
to the sovkhozes of the Oblast'. If they were not delivered in January or February,
it was expected that cattle would die in large quantities.
(139) As a result of general transportation difficulties, large quantities of
oil grain and oil cakes were stored in the open air. They were therefore exposed
to the danger of spoilage.
(140) Meat production was likewise inadequate. Whether the principal
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reason for this was the shortage of cattle or the transportation difficulties was not
apparent because there were as many reports about insufficient production as about
insufficient stocks.
C. Food Supply
(141) Food rations for the period from 1 November 1943 to 1 May 1944 were
announced to plants. Compared to the preceding period, allocations were not
basically changed. Apparently the Soviets had two basic categories and several
special categories. Rations for the first worker category (?) were as follows:
(by man and month)
2,200 grams meat or fish
600 grams fat
500 grams sugar or sugar goods
1, 500 grams peeled grain or macaroni
800 grams bread (daily)
500 grams bread (in liberated regions)
(142) An addition for a second warm meal for workers (per man per month)
is as follows:
1, 500 grams meat or fish
300 grams fat
1, 500 grams peeled grain or macaroni
(143) These food rations were given to heavy workers, engineers and all
workers engaged in reconstruction work. Included, moreover, were war wounded
from the "War of the Fatherland" who were at home. Workers in the Felt-process-
ing Industry also received this ration.
(144) Workers in the second workers category received the following
(per man per month).-
1,800 grams meat or fish
400 grams fat
400 grams sugar or sugar goods
1, 200 grams peeled grain or macaroni
600 grams bread (daily)
500 grams bread (daily in the liberated territories)
(145) This amount of food was the normal allotment for industrial and trans-
port workers and for leaders and teachers in children's homes. It applied also for
workers in all NKRF offices and for students in technical and specialized schools.
Workers in the second category also received a warm lunch.
(146) Workers in the Oil Industry who were engaged in drilling operations
received the following (per man per month):
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4,-500 grams
900 grams
500 grams
3, 000 grams
12, 000 grams
1,000 grams
meat or fish
fat
sugar or sugar goods
(?) peeled grain or macaroni
potatoes
bread (daily)
(147) Food rations for the second warm meal are apparently included in
these figures.
(148) Workers in the Meat Industry received an additional ration of 1, 500
grams meat and 2, 000 grams of other foods per man per month. Workers in dairy
enterprises received an additional ration of 300 grams of animal fat and 3, 000 grams
of milk products per man per month,
(149) The following food norms were established for engineers who were
engaged in especially heavy work (per man per month):
3, 200 grams meat or fish
900 grams fat
2, 000 grams peeled grain or macaroni
(150) The extent to which vegetables were to be stored may be understood
from a message from Kujbyshev NKRF in which it was stated that 60 kilograms of
potatoes and 100 kilograms of vegetables per worker were to be stored for the
winter .
(151) From 1 September on, pupils in all children's homes and boarding
schools received the following food rations (per child per month):
1, 500 grams
500 grams
200 grams
300 grams
500 grams
1,500 grams
750 grams
60 grams
60 grams
400 grams
300 grams
7, 500 grams
meat or fish
fat
cheese
cream
sugar or sugar goods
peeled grain or macaroni
flour
tea or coffee
chocolate
s alt
dried fruit
potatoes and vegetables
500 grams bread (daily)
3 liters milk
15 eggs
(152) In spite of the unchanged food rations, bread supply in the second half
year seemed to be shorter than in the first half year. Many workers did not re-
ceive the allotments to which they were entitled. The workers of the Oil Industry
who were entitled to 800 grams of bread daily received only 700 grams. Workers
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in shipyards who received 600 grams of bread had to be refused an authorized
increase. The extensive bread shortage resulting from continually unsatisfactory
deliveries was a phenomenon which existed in all regions. The situation in the
re-occupied territories was even worse - the bread ration there, as far as could
be determined, was set at 500 grams daily. Transport difficulties increased the
shortage considerably. A special problem was the supply to the large cities in the
liberated territories. This question was to be considered in July at a conference
called in Alma Ata.
(153) In the North and Transcaucasas a pronounced bread shortage existed.
Communications indicated this from the Georgian, Armenian, North Ossetian,
Dagestan and Checheno-Ingush Republics as well as from Rostov Oblast". In October
North Ossetia was provided with only 365 tons of flour by the Grain Delivery Office
in Stavropol instead of 700 tons. In October Rostov was to have baked 8, 050 tons of
bread. Flour stocks, however, were sufficient for only 6, 000 tons. The Wine
Sovkhozes in Rostov Oblast' in November received a flour allotment for their
workers of only 60%. Flour deliveries to the open market in November were re-
duced despite the shortages as follows:
Georgia (Tbilisi)
Checheno-Ingush. (Groznyj)
Dagestan (Makhachkala)
Armenia (Erevan)
North Ossetia (Ordzhonikidze)
to 825 tons
to 135 tons
to 205 tons
to 345 tons
to 980 tons
(154) These quantities did not afford full supply. North Ossetia required
an additional 320 tons since their authorized 980 tons had not materialized. Tbilisi
also required large additional amounts. At the Oil Industry in Groznyj great dif-
ficulties in supplying bread to the workers arose since the local grain procurement
offices had no stocks of wheat or barley. Erevan was directed to purchase suf-
ficient bread grain to cover their own needs at cotton sovkhozes. Difficulties had
not reduced by the end of the year--they seemed to have become even greater.
For half a year offices of the Stalingrad Railway in Salsk had received allotments
of flour very irregularly because Rostov could not meet its supply obligations.
For this reason families of the personnel were no longer issued bread after 21
December. In Groznyj great difficulties existed in supplying the population with
bread. In December bread ration cards for 3, 600 persons were, not issued. In
Tbilisi even the children's schools did not have sufficient bread. Supply was even
worse in the recently liberated parts of the Ukraine.
(155) In order to alleviate the bread shortage, other kinds of grain were
used as bread grains, or were supplemented by, among other things, potatoes. In
Checheno-Ingush in October and November bread was produced from flour ground
from millets and corn. The quality of this bread was poor. Therefore, some
wheat and barley was included. A great deal of bread was baked with flour ground
from millets and barley. In Georgia and Dagestan bread from flour and potatoes
was produced. The Dagestan Republic announced in October that even potatoes
for bread baking and as a substitute for the missing bread as well as peeled grain
were not on hand. Conditions were similar in Checheno-Ingush since Groznyj
received an order in December to produce bread from flour and potatoes for the
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Red Army also with the note that if there were not enough potatoes on hand, bread
from pure flour was to be produced. In Krasnodar Kraj large amounts of sunflower
stalks were ground up to be used as an additive in the production of bread. All
NKRF offices and enterprises were ordered that in the allotment of 800 grams of
bread 100 grams of potatoes were to be mixed in. From this it seemed that there
was a wide shortage of potatoes but grain was even scarcer.
(156) Foods such as macaroni and groats were likewise scarce as was re-
ported in radio messages from Moscow, Tbilisi and Rostov. Peeled grain was
especially scarce so that often only a third of the expected quantity could be
allotted.
(157) As a result of a lack of railroad cars or a cessation of operations of
the River Fleet, large quantities of shipments piled up in the fall. They were ex-
posed to danger of frost and spoilage. Even shipments for the front were included
here. At plants and offices of the Upper, Middle and Lower Volga Steamship
Agencies, for example, there was a great lack of potatoes which made import
from other regions necessary, such as from Novosibirsk. Leningrad received
from Penza only about 60% of the expected 5, 000 tons of potatoes in October.
Rostov Oblast' required import of at least 10, 000 tons of potatoes for workers in
enterprises important to the war effort. As a result of difficulties in transporting
fresh potatoes, harvested potatoes had to be partially dried. Ashkhabad also re-
ported that in Turkmenistan there were no potatoes on hand.
(158) Supply of vegetables to NKRF personnel in the fall was very
insufficient.
(159) According to radio messages, planned meat supplies were imperiled
by insufficient imports. The supply to the liberated territories was progressing
particularly badly. Mainly preserved meat was sent into these regions for supply.
In Kharkov and Rostov, for example, there was a lack of meat. According to
Rostov, from 1 through 20 October 15 tons of cattle were delivered, whereas for
the fourth quarter 1, 100 tons were expected. Supplies for the miners were there-
fore endangered. Rostov requested permission to draw 30 tons of beef from the
reserve fund. In spite of these difficulties, the Livestock Procurement Office in
Rostov was to make 900 pigs available to the kolkhozes in the liberated territories.
(160) As a substitute for meat, the Meat Combine in Rostov undertook
successful attempts to produce meatless cutlets from albumen-containing plants
with a mixture of 30% to 50% grape husks. Mass production of this article was
immediately undertaken. In November and December 200, 000 pieces were pro-
duced. Ten tons of grape husks were required for December.
(161) Fish Supply exhibited the same difficulties. In the third quarter (?)
Krasnodar was to receive 100 tons of fish products to supply coal workers, but
up through 5 September only 10 tons had been shipped. The trust of the Tea
Sovkhoz in Tbilisi was to receive 96 tons of fish in the third quarter, but by
5 September only 29 tons had been shipped. In Kislyar, where at the beginning
of December food difficulties had occurred, 50 tons of fish were urgently needed.
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(162) The tobacco harvest in Krasnodar Kraj was 44% completed by the
planned deadline of 10 October. Up to this date, 13. 3% or 800 tons had been pro-
cured. Trucks had to be obtained from the Army for transport from the kolkhozes.
In Georgia the harvest was 84. 4% fulfilled by 1 November; by that date 5, 700 tons
or 36. 3% of the plan had been procured. There was an effort to complete the
harvest and procurement operations by the end of the year. The lack of trucks
made sufficient supply to the tobacco factories impossible. The Tobacco Industry
in Tbilisi, for example, had received no raw tobacco and therefore, in the first
ten-day period in December could make no shipments to the Army. As a result of a
lack of raw tobacco, the tobacco factory in Erevan ceased operation in October.
Finished products could not be shipped.
D. Reconstruction of Agriculture in the Liberated Regions
(163) Agricultural reconstruction in the parts of the Ukraine liberated
during the second half of 1943 produced new problems for the government. In a
decree of 22 August 1943 on the "reconstruction of agriculture in the liberated
regions" these questions were considered. The following measures were to be
taken:
1) Return of evacuated livestock to the re-established kolkhozes in
the oblasti and krai in which reconstruction was to be undertaken. In detail, the
following were to be received (by head):
Kalinin Oblast'
Smolensk Oblast'
Orel Oblast'
Kursk Oblast'
Voronezh Oblast'
Stalingrad Oblast'
Rostov Oblast'
Stavropol Oblast'
36, 573
31,144
8,454
48, 349
31, 413
6,907
21, 399
39,668
8, 375
2, 529
5,492
1, 182
9, 539
20, 228
3, 774
14,530
34, 379
1,749
51, 506
143, 188
17,229
12,741
35,909
5,269
197, 166
341,421
52,939
(164) The evacuated livestock was located in the following oblasti and
republics:
Yaroslavl Oblast'
Gorkij Oblast'
Vologda Oblast'
Kirov Oblast'
Ryazan Oblast'
Tambov Oblast'
Saratov Oblast'
Chkalov Oblast'
Kujbyshev Oblast'
Mordvinian Autonomous Republic
Mary
Dagestan
Kazakhstan Republic
Azerbajdzhan
Armenia
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(165) The NK for Agriculture was charged with the responsibility for
return of the livestock. Livestock was to have arrived in the Kalinin, Smolensk,
Kursk, Orel and Tula Oblasti by 1 October 1943 and in the other parts by 15
October. Through trains for livestock transport, measures for foddering, water
supply and veterinary services were determined and the construction of river fords
and the furnishing of the necessary number of herd drivers, as well as milkmaids,
were provided for. To meet the costs, 11.5 million rubles were authorized. Con-
struction of winter quarters for the cattle had to be carried out. Moreover, in the
freed territories, schools for training cattle breeders and veterinarians had to be
set up.
2) Increase in numbers of livestock at kolkhozes:
(166) The oblasti and republics listed above were permitted to increase
their numbers of livestock by purchase. The following purchase plans were
established (by head):
Kalinin Oblast'
20, 000
30, 000
Smolensk Oblast'
3, 000
3, 000
Orel Oblast'
5,000
10, 000
Kursk Oblast'
7, 000
5, 000
Voronezh Oblast'
15,000
5,000
Stalingrad Oblast'
20, 000
15, 000
Rostov Oblast'
15, 000
20,000
Stavropol Oblast'
6, 000
10, 000
Krasnodar Oblast'
15, 000
10, 000
99,000
113,000
(167) The livestock was to be purchased in the years 1943 through 1945
from the NK for Agriculture and placed at the disposal of the liberated territories.
According to an order of 15 September 1943 from the Council of Peoples' Com-
missars, by 1 November 1943,
55, 000 Pigs
165, 000 Sheep
17, 000 Goats
were to have been delivered to the kolkhozes in the liberated territories for the
purpose of increasing the raising of pigs, sheep and goats. This livestock was to
be delivered as follows:
Pigs
Sheep
Goats
Kalinin Oblast'
10,000
20,000
1,000
Smolensk Oblast'
15, 000
30, 000
2, 000
Orel Oblast'
9, 000
20, 000
2, 000
Kursk Oblast'
5, 000
25, 000
2, 500
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Pigs
Sheep
Goats
Voronezh Oblast'
10,000
25,
000
2,
500
Stalingrad Oblast'
-
159
000
29
000
Ukraine Republic
6, 000
30,
000
5,
000
(168) In order to avoid further transport and to accomplish the transfer of
livestock as quickly as possible, the NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry as well as
the NK for sovkhozes were to furnish 25, 000 pigs and 1159 000 sheep from their own
economy and stocks. This livestock was to be replaced later from that purchased.
(169) The kolkhozes were to pay for the livestock received in agricultural
products in the years 1943 and 1944 and in exceptional cases in 1945.
(170) The Georgian NK for Agriculture and the offices of the NK for Agri-
culture in Krasnodar reported the following total numbers of livestock by
1 January 1945:
29, 300 horses
650, 000 horned cattle
including: 100, 000 cows
365, 000 working oxen
1, 400, 000 sheep and goats
including: 825, 000 breeders
66, 000 pigs
including: 209 000 breeders
300, 000 head of poultry
The NK for Agriculture in Krasnodar Kraj:
64, 900 horses
256, 600 horned cattle
1, 120, 000 sheep and goats
1, 100, 000 head of poultry
95, 000 pigs
including: 51, 000 cows
49, 500 working oxen
including: 635, 000 breeders
including: 29, 000 breeders
(171) The estimate of livestock raising requirements in Rostov Oblast'
had to be changed because the number of livestock returning from evacuation had
been computed too high. Moreover, the difficult fodder situation had to be con-
sidered more than before. The new plan calls for the following large livestock,
small livestock and horses to be reached by 1 January 1945:
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including:
44, 000 head of horses
230, 000 head of large cattle
35, 000 head of cows
60, 000 head of working oxen
480, 000 head of sheep and goats
including: 250, 000 head of breeding sheep
40, 000 head of pigs
including: 9, 000 head of breeders
1, 000, 000 head of poultry
4, 000 head foals
38, 000 head of young bulls
3) Re-establishment of poultry raising in kolkhozes:
(172) In the years 1943 and 1944 all former poultry farms of the kolkhozes
are to be re-established. By 1 January 1945 numbers of poultry were to reach the
following levels (by head):
Kalinin Oblast'
400,000
Smolensk Oblast'
150, 000
Orel Oblast'
150, 000
Kursk Oblast'
250, 000
Voronezh Oblast'
800, 000
Stalingrad Oblast'
550, 000
Rostov Oblast'
11000,000
Stavropol Oblast'
1, 100, 000
Krasnodar Oblast'
1, 100, 000
Total
5,500,000
(173) In order to facilitate the re-establishment of the poultry farms, the
NK's for Agriculture, for Sovkhozes and for the Meat and Dairy Industry were
obliged to deliver 500, 000 head of poultry in September and October 1943. More-
over, the NK for Agriculture was obliged to deliver 9, 600, 000 chickens in the
year 1944 as follows:
Kalinin Oblast'
400, 000
Smolensk Oblast'
70, 000
Orel Oblast'
80, 000
Kursk Oblast'
150, 000
Voronezh Oblast'
1,800,000
Stalingrad Oblast'
1, 100, 000
Rostov Oblast'
2, 000, 000
Stavropol Oblast'
21000,000
Krasnodar Oblast'
2, 000, 000
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(174) The kolkhoz farmers were permitted to purchase young fowl from the
poultry farms after the latter had been completely supplied. By the end of 1944, 55
brooding houses were to be re-established as follows:
1943
1944
Kalinin Oblast' -
3
Smolensk Oblast' 1
2
Orel Oblast' -
7
Kursk Oblast' -
13
Voronezh Oblast' 6
-
Stalingrad Oblast' 6
-
Rostov Oblast' 2
2
Stavropol Oblast' 6
-
Krasnodar Kraj 5
2
(175) 200 brooders each with a capacity of 30, 000 eggs were to be
established for the first half of 1944. The NK for Agriculture was to receive
16, 000, 000 eggs, broken down as follows:
7,
000,
000 eggs from the NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry
5,
000,
000 eggs from the Central Union
4,
000,
000 eggs from poultry farms
The kolkhozes were authorized to accept chickens on the condition that in 1945 eggs
would be returned.
4) Allowances in deliveries.
(176) Kolkhozes, kolkhoz farmers, individual farmers, workers, temporary
workers and craftsmen who had been injured by the German occupation could be re-
leased from all agricultural deliveries to the State in the year 1943. Otherwise,
kolkhozes of oblasti liberated after 1 July 1943 were to furnish the following amounts
of grain and sunflowers to the Red Army Bread Reserve (per hectare):
Grain
Kalinin Oblast'
40 kg -
Smolensk Oblast'
50 -
Orel Oblast'
70 -
Kursk Oblast'
70 120 kg
Ukraine Republic
90 150
(177) Kolkhozes of oblasti liberated in 1943 had to deliver potatoes and
vegetables from that year's harvest to the Red Army as follows (per hectare):
Potatoes Vegetables
Kalinin Oblast' 0. 6 tons 1. 2 tons
Smolensk Oblast' 0.7 1.0
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Orel Oblast'
0. 7 tons
1. 6 tons
Kursk Oblast'
0.6
1.2
Voronezh Oblast'
0.7
1.4
Stalingrad Oblast'
0.4
1.0
Rostov Oblast'
0.4
1.4
Stavropol Oblast'
o.6
1.6
Krasnodar Kraj
0.7
1.8
Ukraine Republic
0.5
1.8
Hay also had to be delivered to the Red Army Reserve.
(178) Kolkhoz farmers, workers, temporary employees and organized
artisans in the oblasti concerned had to deliver 10 percent more than the kolkhozes.
As far as they possessed livestock, each also had to deliver 15 kilograms of meat
(liveweight) and 50 to 60 liters of milk to the Red Army. Individual farmers and
non-organized artisans had to deliver 30 percent more of everything than the kolk?a
hozes (30 percent more meat and milk than the quantities cited above).
(179) As a result of the lowered delivery quotas, the kolkhozes of Kursk
Oblast', for instance, had to deliver only 66, 000 tons from the 1943 harvest instead
of the 148, 000 tons grain expected. Old delivery debts were cancelled.
5) Auxiliary Measures for the Kolkhozes with Respect to the Seed Supply.
(180) In order to guarantee the winter sowing plan, the kolkhozes were to
receive 174, 500 tons of seed grain from government stocks itemized as follows:
Smolensk Oblast'
3,
000 tons
Voronezh Oblast'
26,
000 tons
Stalingrad Oblast'
29,
000 tons
Rostov Oblast'
20,
000 tons
Stavropol Oblast'
46,
000 tons
Krasnodar Kraj
33,
000 tons
Ukraine Republic
12,000 tons
Kursk Oblast'
5, 000 tons
(181) Radio messages on the return of livestock indicated that the return of
herds in some instances was progressing well. For example, in October 122, 900
head of livestock were to be driven from Zhanybek towards Rostov. By 16 October
118, 800 head of livestock had actually been driven including:
32, 200 head horned cattle
79, 000 head sheep
7, 600 head horses
By the end of October the herds were approaching West Kazakhstan.
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(182) The livestock herds were to reach the Volga before the beginning
of winter so that they could be transported further by water. However, long
delays resulted en route at various river-crossing points. The scale of these
crossing operations may be understood from the following reports:
The Lower-Volga Steamship Agency had constructed four crossing-
points in September, the largest at Kamyshin. On 14 September
the following were ferried across there:
1, 200 head horned cattle
8, 100 head sheep
2, 400 head horses
From 1 to 7 October the following were ferried across at Stalingrad:
6, 500 head horned cattle
22, 900 head sheep
3, 800 head horses
(183) By 1 November Baku had completed delivery of livestock to the
assembly points. Further transport, however, was progressing very slowly. The
following were transported further by rail. or by towboat:
Rostov Oblast'
Stavropol Oblast'
1,
100 head
horned cattle
7,
100 head
1,
500 head
sheep and goats
4,
200 head
400 head
horses
250 head
(184) The plan for Rostov was fulfilled by 100 percent. The following
were procured for Stavropol:
1, 000 head horned cattle
1, 400 head sheep and goats
400 (?) horses
There were no railroad cars for further transport of this livestock.
(185) The slaughterhouse in Krasnodar announced that the assignment for
delivery of 1, 200 pigs for the liberated regions had been fulfilled. 1, 230 head of
sheep had been procured for shipping. As a result of a shortage of railroad cars,
only 460 head of sheep could be shipped to the Ukraine through 28 October.
On 9 October 6, 800 head of livestock, including 2, 000 head of goats were to be
shipped from the Armenian NK for Agriculture to the liberated regions. As a
result of the railroad car shortage, however, the goats could not be shipped.
(186) As a result of these difficulties, not only delays occurred but also
actual loss of livestock. At the Kyudamir station the assembled livestock had to
be le ft in the open in the rain because there were no railroad cars. Both men
and livestock became sick; many calves died. In the Elton rajon in Stalingrad
Oblast' 8, 000 head of sheep had to be placed in quarantine; 300 head of horned
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cattle were already in quarantine. At many railroad stations in the Azerbajdzhan
Republic many shipments of livestock were held up. Because of the cold and a
shortage of fodder, additional loss of livestock resulted. The accompanying
personnel also became sick.
(187) The following reports give information on the construction of other
agricultural buildings and installations:
Offices of the NK for Procurement in Krasnodar Kraj and Voroshilovgrad
Oblast' were given reconstruction assignments for the year 1944 listed
below. The following were to be prepared:
Krasnodar Kraj:
1)
2 mills each with a production capacity of 40 tons
flour daily, 1 mill of 50 tons capacity and 1 mill
of 30 tons capacity;
2)
Grain silos in:
Kurganaya of 0. 9 ton storage capacity,
Grechishkino of 0. 9 ton storage capacity,
Kushevskaya of 4. 0 tons storage capacity,
and
Ust-Labinskaya of 4. 0 tons storage capacity,
and others.
3) Larger grain storehouses, some with a capacity
of 40, 000 tons.
Voroshilovgrad: 1) 1 mill with a production capacity of 50 tons of
flour daily.
2) Grain warehouses with a storage capacity
totalling 48, 000 tons.
3) Grain storehouses with a storage capacity
totalling 50, 000 tons.
(188) For the construction of tractor workshops, tractor stations and
tractor repair shops in the liberated regions of the Ukraine, the following con-
struction material was procured:
1, 100 cu. meters
round timber
1, 100 cu. meters
cut timber
25 cu. meters
plywood
7, 000 sq. meters
glass
180 rolls
roofing board
34.
0 tons
cement
7.
0 tons
nails
1.
8 tons
varnish
1.
3 tons
red lead
0.
5 ton
ground chalk
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(189) The Oblast' Consumers Union in Poltava was to receive 1, 026 tons of
cement for the construction of warehouses. The Baku Cement Plant was to deliver
about 1, 300 tons of cement to the Central Union for construction of grain warehouses
by the beginning of December.
(190) The North Ossetian Republic was contracted to procure 60, 000 tons of
coarse livestock fodder. By 30 November 1943, 40, 000 tons had been prepared, in-
cluding 34, 450 tons of hay and 5, 650 tons of straw. The livestock on hand at the
kolkhozes had a requirement of 3, 200 tons of coarse livestock fodder. 3, 400 tons
had been procured on winter pastures.
(191) Livestock quarters were required for the following:
4, 800 head of horses
8, 700 head of large cattle
35, 500 head of sheep
800 head of pigs
6, 600 head of poultry
Winter livestock quarters at the kolkhozes either already existing or furnished
for the following:
4, 540 head of horses
8, 200 head of large cattle
33, 000 head of sheep
760 head of pigs
6, 600 head of poultry
(192) The Oblast' Agricultural Supply Office in Rostov received the
following in December:
120 reapers
128 mowers
87 sorting machines
200 horse-drawn plows
50 tractor-drawn plows
2 railroad cars asbestos sheets
2 railroad cars cement
23 railroad cars cut, timber
14 railroad cars round timber
2 railroad cars glass
1,400 kilograms varnish
(193) Many radio messages indicated that during agricultural reconstruction
in the liberated territories, the reestablishment of the food industry was likewise
ordered (for further details see Reconstruction).
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5. Metal Supply
(194) Iron supply in the economy during the second half year was very
short. Conditions at the NKRF as well as in the economy of the Trans-caucasas,
Donbas and Leningrad Oblast' were about the same. As far as can. be determined
from internal radio traffic, during the third quarter wide scale cessation of
operations at industrial enterprises had not yet occurred. In the fourth quarter,
however, a larger number of plants were forced to cease operations because of a
lack of raw material.
(195) In detail the supply of metals and metal products was as follows: In
July Kujbyshev NKRF urgently needed cast iron and ferrosilicon for its foundries
which were charged with important contracts. The rolling mill of the Heavy
Machine Industry in Irkutsk had ceased operations because it had no raw material.
There was also a partial lack of tools. Hatchets and saws, which could not be
delivered, were needed at Omsk NKRF. There was an attempt to produce these
items on the spot, as well as to rebuild files.
(196) In August the Ship Repair and Shipbuilding Industries (see correspond-
ing sections) were plagued by the iron shortage. The NKRF workshops in
Alekseevka did not receive the iron which had been ordered for repairs. A dock was
also to be constructed there for which the required steel plates were missing. As a
result of a lack of wire rope, the Manganese Trust in Chiaturi had to cease con-
struction of a funicular railway.
(197k In September a rapidly increasing lack of cast iron was noted. In
Leningrad it was so serious that even armaments contracts suffered; in Baku and
Tbilisi also there was a shortage of iron. The iron works in Novotagil and
Novotulsk did not fulfill their deliveries.
(198) In October radio traffic revealed a pronounced worsening in supply
compared to the preceding months so that many plants had to cease work, including
the metal plant "Oktyabr" in Krasnodar, the plant "Krasnyj Metallist" and
"Dzerzhinsk" in Baku. At the beginning of October the copper rolling mill in
Tbilisi had to interrupt its operations. The plant "Novikov" in Leningrad could not
fulfill its contract because of a lack of copper and the light industry plants in Baku
could contique operations only with interruptions because of a lack of brass wire.
They were to receive brass wire imported from Iransovtrans (see Foreign Trade).
(199) The metal shortage was also expressed in the lowered allotments
for the fourth quarter. The Agricultural Raw Material Supply Office in Georgia was
allotted such small amounts that not even the fulfillment of special contracts was
assured.
(200) The following were allotted:
In the Third Quarter In the Fourth Quarter
Steel plate 245 tons 200 tons
Spring steel 105 tons 60 tons
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(201) Steel tubing, high-speed steel and other important materials were not
allotted at all. An additional 465 tons of various steel products and 1, 150 tons of
iron products were necessary for carrying out the most important work.
(202) In November this situation continued. The iron works in Nalchik was
inoperative because of a lack of raw materials. Plant 428 in Blagoveshchensk could
not fulfill special contracts because there was no zinc. The NK for Oil did not re-
ceive enough tubing from Taganrog "Trubostal".. Magnitogorsk could not deliver cast
iron in October and November because there were no railroad cars. The shortage of
railroad cars was often the reason for the bottleneck in metal deliveries.
(203) In December the Metal Sales Office in Baku and the plants in
Ordzhonikidze did not receive the expected 1, 000 tons of cast iron because of trans-
portation difficulties.
(204) In the case of scrap collection and shipments it is especially clearly
seen that supply in the Soviet Union was not a raw material question but a trans-
portation problem.. Radio traffic showed that deliveries of iron scrap were always
much lower than collections.
(205) The following shows conditions in July:
Procurement:
Shipped:
%
f
Remarks:
Planned
in tons &
o
Actual To actual procurement
Groznyj (Iron) -
290 t
- 130 t
44%
(through 19 July)
Gorkij NKRF 860 tons
(Iron)
-
- 170
(through 1 July)
Kirov NKRF 60
(Iron)
(through 1 July)
Kujbyshev NKRF -
625
- 525
84
(through 10 July)
Rostov (non- -
ferrous metals)
1300
- 50
4
(through 20 June)
Rostov " -
August
160
- 40
25
(through 20 June)
Rostov (non- -
ferrous metals)
420
- 240 t =
57
(through 10 Aug)
Tbilisi (Iron)
(through 15 Aug)
(206) Shipments were delayed by lack of railroad cars.
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(207) The result of these inadequate deliveries was a continual scrap
shortage in the industry. For example, Frunze ordered the quickest possible ship-
ment of scrap from the scrap assembly point in Voroshilovgrad, because otherwise
munitions production would be paralysed.
(208) In the scrap collection drive war booty also played a role. Of about
31, 000 tons of scrap which the Voroshilovgrad Oblast' had shipped in August about
14 percent originated from booty.
(2'09) In September the situation was unchanged. Procurement often cor-
responded to or exceeded the plans but shipping remained inadequate. Results of
the third quarter show this clearly:
Procurement:
Shipped:
Planned Actual % % of Actual Procurement
Ordzhonikidze
1700 t
183Z t = 108%
1553 t =
86%
Shakhty, Rostovugol
2410 -
360
15
Consumer's Union, Novokuban
60
100 = 165%
-
Consumer's Union, Ladoga
450
650 = 145%
-
Grozny,
7300
2100 =
29
Donbas Coal Combine
8000
4400
55
Kabardino-Balkar
2000
1100
55
Georgia
6000
7500 = 125%
6500
87
'210) Non-delivery of railroad cars was given more and more often as the
cause of shipping bottlenecks.
(211) The growing importance of scrap from booty was expressed in a
radio message from Leningrad. According to this, in August and September the
iron works in Leningrad shipped about 44,400 tons while in the third quarter the
local Booty Collection Office shipped about 15, 000 tons of booty scrap .
(212) The same situation prevailed in October also:
Procurement:
Planned Actual %
Shipped:
in % of actual
procurement:
Remarks:
Rostov (Iron scrap) - 5068
1894 t =
37%
(through 15 Oct)
Metal Supply 'non- 701 -
ferrous metals)
432 :
62
(through 15 Oct)
Krasnodar (Iron scrap) - 233
152 =
75
(through 1 Oct)
Metal Industry (non- 19 -
ferrous metals)
14 =
74
(through 1 Oct)
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Leningrad (Machine Industry)
in % of actual
Planned Actual 010 procurement:
Procurement: Shipped: Remarks:
9700 - 15000 from beginning
of year)
(Of the 1, 254 tons of scrap collected in Bataisk 900 tons originated from booty).
(213) In November scrap collection exhibited the following picture:
Procurement: Shipped: Remarks:
in % of actual
Planned Actual % procurement:
Rostov NK for Iron 7460 7917t 106 1652 t = 21% (Oct/Nov? )
Rostov NK for Cooperative - 324 - 187 = 62 I._10. 10
Industry (Iron)
Rostov NK for Cooperative - 19 - 4 - 21
Industry (nonferrous metals)
Tbilisi (Iron)
Tbilisi "Non-ferrous metals)
- 1983 - 1266 _ 63
94 - 69 = 73
(214) With respect to the scrap supply, it is thus apparent that only about
half the planned amounts were shipped, although collection corresponded to the
planned goal.
(215) In December the following scrap deliveries were announced: .
Procurement: Shipped: Remarks:
016 of actual
Planned Actual % procurement
Ashkhabad 3300 1975 60 1970 = 100% For the 4th quarter
Iron scrap
Non-ferrous metals-scrap 50 31 60 - -
Rostov-on-Don Oblast' 14, 990 22, 332 149 13, 383 _ 60 Collected by the
Komsomol Org. in
the 4th quarter
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Procurement:
Planned Actual %
Shipped:
of actual
procurement
Remarks:
Tbilisi Scrap Collection
Office for Steel scrap
2132
2132 -
1365
65%
(through Dec.
1943
Non-ferrous metal scrap
-
114 -
73 m
64
(through Dec.
1943)
(216) Manganese ore supply was of great importance for armaments. As a
result of transportation difficulties supply delays often occurred.. In order to
guarantee supply of manganese ore, Stalin issued an order on 23 July 1943 by which
a shipping plan for manganese ore from Chiaturi principally to Magnitogorsk and
Kuznetsk was established for the months of July through October. Because of their
importance, they were to be shipped directly to these two places by existing means
of transport. 145, 000 tons were to be shipped by direct rail lines as follows:
10, 000 tons in July
45, 000 tons in August
45, 000 tons in September
45, 000 tons in October
(217) 125, 000 tons were to be shipped by water and rail with transshipment
at Baku-Krasnovodsk as follows:
15, 000 tons in July
35, 000 tons in August
45, 000 tons in September
30, 000 tons in October
(218) The extent to which this plan was fulfilled may be realized from the
following messages intercepted on the domestic radio links:
The Manganese Trust in Chiaturi shipped 15, 600 tons of manganese
ore from 1 through 27 July; on 1 August 920 tons were shipped.
(219) In the first half of July the Transcaucasas Railway had shipped
10, 539 tons of manganese ore (presumably from Chiaturi); on 13 July 720 tons
were shipped to Magnitogorsk. From 1-20 September the Baku Metal Sales Office
had received about 21, 200 tons of manganese ore and had dispatched about 21, 800
tons. Stock on hand amounted to about 14, 400 tons. In September the danger arose
that because of a lack of explosives, the manganese mines in Chiaturi would have
to cease operations. From 1-25 October the Metal Sales Office in Baku had re-
ceived about 24, 200 tons of manganese ore, had shipped about 30, 600 tons in the
same period and the stock on hand amounted to about 9, 000 tons. Thus manganese
ore shipments fairly well met the planned objectives.
(220) Production at the copper rolling mill in Tbilisi during the second
half year was at about the same level as in the first half year and in detail was as
follows:
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First half year
Second half year
March 70 tons July 48 tons
April 45 tons 11-20 Aug 18 tons
May about 60 tons September 60 tons
1st ten-day 26 tons 11-20 Oct 27 tons
per. in June 1-19 Nov 29 tons
(221) From 2-5 August there was no production because of a lack of mazut.
The highest single day's production of 5 tons was not exceeded in the second half
year. Daily production averaged out as previously to about 3 tons daily. In detail
the development of daily production and stocks was as follows:
Day: Daily Production: Stock:
28 July 5 tons 69 tons
29 July 4 73
30 July 4 77
5 August - 64
20 August 3 -
14 September 3 98
27 September 3 -
29 September 3 -
30 September - 127
19 November 2 167
4 December 2 160
(222j In the second quarter stocks amounted to between 150-190 tons. At
the beginning of June and during July and August large shipments were made whereby
stocks were reduced to a normal amount. From the middle of September onward
greater transportation difficulties again seemed to appear. This was expressed in
the increase in stocks and in supply difficulties at plants.
6, Oil Supply
(223)) From June onward a shortage of oil supplies was noted in all
branches of the economy, despite the growing delivery capabilities of the
Caucasian oil region as a result of progressing reconstruction of oil lines. This
lag in supply was probably due to preparations for the July offensive. The course
of military operations was probably also the reason that in the following months a
relaxation did not occur. Oil supply in July was very strained. Radio traffic re-
vealed that by the beginning of July allotments for that month to the NKRF had not
arrived. Since notification about them had been given before the beginning of the
month it must be assumed that by the beginning of the month there was something
amiss in the supply situation. Until the establishment of the July allotments, the
River Fleet received fuel advances amounting to 15 percent of the allotment of the
second quarter. Deliveries of fuels and lubricants to NKRF enterprises was in
some cases very poor. Many delays in allotments resulted. This had a worsen-
ing effect in transportation and other forms of work. By the middle of July a
cessation of shipping threatened in Gorkij and Molotov. In Molotov the danger
also existed that loading operations would have to be stopped.
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(224) As in the first half of 1943, the NKRF strove to conserve fuel. For
example, a comparison was to be made between all river ships to determine which
ships were using the most fuel. These ships probably would be rebuilt. As a
result of the great shortage, water was to be added to fuels. For example, the Oil
Combine in Baku was to deliver 90, 000 tons of oil to Groznyj to which 6 percent of
water had been added. From August onward, the percentage of water added was
reduced to 4 percent.
(225) Reconstruction operations also suffered from the oil shortage. Since
these operations were of the greatest importance, the main Oil Supply Office in
Rostov issued an order that fuel allotments for military reconstruction of Don-
Kuban Oblast' were to be completely fulfilled.
(226) Agricultural enterprises were refused large amounts of fuel and
lubricant deliveries. Uralsk also refused a supply to agriculture. This resulted
in extensive delays in agricultural operations.
(227) In order to improve the oil transportation system, in July the oil
pipeline from Groznyj to Armavir was repaired. From 11 July onward, it was to
transport 2, 200 tons daily; that is, 1, 000 tons from Makhachkala to Groznyj, and
1, 200 tons were to come from production at Groznyj. (See the month of November.)
(228) In August all oil supply bases received an order based on a government
decree to deliver fuel to agricultural enterprises of the NKRF as well as to other
NKRF offices before the end of the shipping period. Nevertheless, delays in allot-'
ments occurred.
(229) The Reconstruction Directorate of the Don-Kuban Oblast' did not re-
ceive the required quantity of fuel in August despite this order.
(230) In August the River Fleet also did not receive sufficient oil. Detri-
mental effects occurred in all regions. In the regions around the Water Trans-
port Bases of Astrakhan, Kujbyshev, Saratov and Stalingrad, tractor fuel was
sent to illuminate shore installations and to fuel navigation lights because of a
lack of illuminating oil. As a result of its poor illuminating power, the performance
especially of the red lighted buoys was poor. Fueling the navigation signals in
Kujbyshev was likewise in doubt because the local CD for Oil Enterprises had re-
fused to deliver illuminating oil to the Waterways Directorate. The Waterways
Directorate in Gorkij, Ilijsk and Semipalatinsk could not carry on work in the
waterways because there was no fuel. From August onward they were to be
supplied in the same way as the River Fleet.
(231) The shortage of railroad cars was one of the principal difficulties
in sufficient supply. Thus, the Oil Industry in Rostov was to have received 65
tank cars of avtol from Batumi during the first half of August, but not a single
tank car was shipped. Reflecting the general situation was a message from
Moscow to Uralsk NKRF, by which their mazut requirement was to be satisfied
in unlimited amounts by Gurev without special allotment by August and September
at the latest. Gurev was to utilize this opportunity to charter shipping space for
partial shipment of the mazut to Uralsk.
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(232) In September reconstruction and construction of oil pipelines made
further progress. In September 1, 200 tons of oil was shipped through the pipe-
lines in Makachkala and Groznyj. Work was proceeding on the pipeline from
Groznyj to Armavir. By extending another pipeline to Chalysh, it became possible
to supply the NKRF there with a capacity quantity of 360 tons daily.
(233) In spite of the increasing delivery potentialities, there occurred no
improvement in supply to the civilian sector of the economy. According to radio
messages intercepted from domestic radio traffic in September, it was severely
strained both in transportation (NKRF) as well as in industry and in agriculture.
(234) Kamuste NKRF was directed to issue motor fuel to the motor ships
only in the most urgent cases and then only in limited quantities.
(235) In industry even armaments plants often did not have ample supplies
of fuel and lubricants. In September the Russian Tank Industry was to receive 164
tank cars off' diesel oil. Since nothing was delivered, tank production was
imperiled. The steel industry in Penza could deliver no armaments materials
because of a lack of motor lubricating oil. The Oil Supply Office in Krasnovodsk
had delivered no gasoline to Trust #1 of the NK for Munitions. Combine #179 re-
ceived only 100 tons of gasoline instead of 150 tons.
(236) As a result of the oil shortage, plants of the Machine Industry in
Stavropol ceased operations. The Highway Construction Directorate in Tbilisi
could not keep up with their construction plan because of a lack of fuel. At the
Azov-Black Sea Power Plant fuel was scarce. The same was the case at the coal
mines of Rostov Oblast' ("Rostov-and Voroshilovgrad-Ugol"), as a result of
which coal shipments were in danger of stopping.
(237) With the beginning of harvest work the oil requirements in agri-
culture became urgent. They could, however, be met only inadequately, as a
result of which, harvest was delayed. (See Food Situation.) Machine and Tractor
Stations in Krasnodar Oblast' ceased operations at the middle of September because
of a lack of fuel, because Makachkala had not made delivery of 73 tank cars.
Groznyj also had not received the planned ten tank cars of avtol from Makachkala.
In Georgia the situation was similar. In order to carry out harvest operations,
Tbilisi was therefore forced to borrow 750 tons of oil from government reserves
on the account ors the fourth quarter. The Grain Procurement Office in Rostov
had no gasoline for transport of grain. The grain mills in.Nalchik and
Prokhladnaya had ceased operations because of a lack of fuel. Interruptions in
production threatened at the Preserves Industry in Erevan and the Food Industry
in Rostov. In Krasnodar shipments of timber and procurement of vegetables
could not be made.
(238) Civilian supply suffered particularly as a result of the general oil
shortage. In the Azerbajdzhan Republic civilian requirements in September were
met by only 40 percent.
(239) The seriousness of the situation in October is indicated by the
following radio report:
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The Oil Supply Office in Groznyj was to deliver 1, 000 tank cars of
mazut to Krasnodar Kraj according to the October Plan for Oil
Supply. However, only 95 tank cars were dispatched by 19 October.
A number of important plants were faced with the necessity of
ceasing operations.
(240) At the beginning of October the River Fleet was issued only a pro-
visional allocation amounting to 20 percent of that issued in September.
(241) Industry likewise received only inadequate allotments. The Plant
"Andreev" in Taganrog received an allotment of 1, 000 tons of mazut for October
and the Metal Plant in Sulin, an allotment of 350 tons. The requirements of these
plants were satisfied only by one-half of these allotments. Many of the already in-
adequate allotments were often not delivered. The furnaces of the Sulin Metal
Plant therefore had to be converted to use illuminating gas. The Combine "Rostov-
Ugol" received only three-quarters of the gasoline necessary for shipping their
products.
(242) As a result of decreased allocations and insufficient shipments
serious production difficulties developed in October. For this reason, fulfillment
of the production plan for October and November at the plants of the Machine In-
dustry in Tbilisi was questionable. In the coal mines of Rostov Oblast' current
supply was interrupted because the Azov-Black Sea Power Plant lacked fuel.
(243) The amounts of oil required by agriculture are indicated by
deliveries in August and September to Rostov-on-Don Oblast'. According to
them, about 3, 000 tank cars (60, 000 tons) were received. Nevertheless, these
amounts were not sufficient. In some cases, therefore, agricultural work could
not be carried out. Agricultural enterprises on the average received scarcely
more than one-half of the required amounts of f,,el. Nevertheless, they were to
set aside fuel reserves for spring activities. In detail, the following quotas were
taken from radio traffic (Percentages o-' fourth quarter allocations):
Petroleum 15% (? )
Gasoline 10%
Ligroin 10%
(244) How inadequately requirements were being met in general is
indicated from a report in which fuel supply in Rostov Oblast' during October was
fulfilled as follows:
Petroleum
by
44%
Gasoline
by
68%
Diesel Oil
by
18%
As a result of these inadequate deliveries, the oil storage depots of the oblast'
had no gasoline and ligroin. Petroleum was scarce.
(2451 In November the oil supply in industry and agriculture seemed to
have reached a crisis. Even the oil pumping stations on the oil pipeline in
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Stavropol lacked lubricants and oil. In messages at the beginning of November,
Armavir, Groznyj and Tuapse were critized because of their complete refusal to
deliver fuel to industry, They were ordered to ship 8, 300 tons of oil within 7 days
and to report absolute compliance.
(246) The Armaments Industry was no less affected than other industries.
In Baku plants of the Tank Industry had received no diesel oil for 2 months. The
truck plant in Gorkij could not guarantee delivery of tanks and also the Tank
Industry in Mariupol had an urgent need for lubricants and fuel. The NK for
Armaments in Krasnoyarsk as well as individual plants of the other armaments
industries, for instance the Plant "Krasnyj Aksaj" of the Mortar Industry in Rostov
and the offices of the Armaments Construction Industry of Rostov Oblast' were in a
difficult situation. In Krasnovodsk also supply to the Armaments Industry halted.
In November the Oil Supply Office in Groznyj was to deliver 6, 150 tons of mazut to
plants of the NK for Iron. Since only 3, 200 tons were delivered through 21 November,
production interruptions arose at several plants. The Metal Plant "Andreev" in
Taganrog ceased operations for three days because of the lack of mazut. The Glass
Plant in Rostov likewise ceased operations. The Metal Plant "Stal" in Krasnyj
Sulin received only two-thirds of their allocation of mazut. The Tungsten Combine
in Tyrnya.us had received only one quarter of their allotment of gasoline during the
third quarter. Allotments were often measured much too small. The Plant "Stal"
in Leningrad received an allotment for November which met only half of its require-
ments. The offices of the NK for Construction Materials in Baku received an
allotment which covered only 30 percent of their need. Enterprises of the Rubber
Industry were likewise inadequately si,u.pplied.
Q247T The Food Industry also suffered under the oil shortage in November
which reduced production. In October only 25 tons of oil were allotted to grain
mills in Rostov Oblast' for the fourth quarter to cover a requirement of 3, 000 tons.
Grain processing for the Army was therefore placed in question. In Elista not
enough bread could be baked for the civilian population because of a lack of mazut.
The Preserves Factory in Ordzhonikidze lacked fuel at the beginning of November.
At the middle of November the Alcohol Plants in Khutorok., Kuban, Ordzhonikidze,
and Krasnodar were forced to cease operations . In Krasnodar the plant was in-
operative 120 hours. The Cotton Trust in Karasu had to cease operations.
(248) The Electrical Generating Stations in Ordzhonikidze and Taganrog
were considerably affected in their work by the oil shortage.
?249) Pumping petroleum from Makachkala to Groznyj was carried out
only unsatisfactorily. The following quantities were pumped through the oil
pipeline:
On 22 November 52 tons
On 23 November 450 tons
On 24 November 528 tons
(250) The daily pumping capacities from Makhachkala to Groznyj of 1, 300
tons and from Groznyj to Armavir of 2, 000 tons were to be used immediately.
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(251) Oil supply by rail was even worse. In December Makhachkala could
not fulfill its delivery plan because of a lack of tank cars. Instead of 5, 565 cars,
only 1, 398 or 25 percent were shipped. Only 99 tank cars were delivered to the
NK for Agriculture instead of 743. Orders for increased delivery of tank cars had
no effect. In December the Chief Directorate for Oil Supply in Baku as well could
not comply with its delivery obligations because of non-delivery of tank cars. By
27 December only 6 tank cars had been shipped to the NK for Coal instead of 58.
Moreover, December deliveries of oil had not been carried out to the following:
To the NK for the Aviation Industry
To the NK for the Tank Industry
To the NK for Armaments
To the NK for Munitions, and many others
(252) According to a Government order, motor oil was to be shipped only
to the Ukraine and heavy machine oil only to the NK for Munitions,
(253) The Plant "Instrument" in Taganrog, which had not received planned
shipments of mazut for October, November, and December, had to halt production
of munitions. The Electrical Central and the Plant of the Shipbuilding Industry in
Makhachkala received scarcely a third of their monthly requirements. Both of
them, therefore, had to cease operations on 1 December. The electrical plant in
Kislovodsk which had received no heating mazut from 1 through 20 December had to
stop production of electric power. Reconstruction work in Rostov also could not be
continued because Makhachkala had delivered no motor oil for a quarter-year. Ap-
parently by the end of 1943 oil supply had again reached a critical stage.
7. Coal Supply
(254) In July the coal supply situation was the same as had been described
for it for the first half year. That is, there were ample supplies of hard coal and
it was only a question of transport capabilities whether sufficient supplies could be
guaranteed. Railroad cars, however, were scarce. The coke supply on the other
hand was not sufficient because of the occupation of the Donets Basin. The NKRF
Plant in Uralsk, for example, had received no coke for a quarter of a year. The
carbide plant in Erevan had ordered 120 tons of coke for the second half year but
likewise it was not received, so that in June the plant had to cease operations.
(255) In August also orders far exceeded supply as may be determined
from one radio report. According to this report, Voroshilovgrad-Ugol and Rostov-
Ugol had fulfilled the plan for the first ten days of August as follows:
Coal Orders
Coal Shipments
Voroshilovgrad-Ugol
84%
45%
Rostov-Ugol
88%
54%
(256) In August according to plan 182, 400 tons of coal were to be dispatched
in Voroshilovgrad. Actually, 164, 557 tons or about 96. 2% of plan were dispatched.
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(257) Supply suffered heavily under the transportation difficulties. The Coal
Supply Office in Voroshilovgrad was to ship 12,. 200 tons of coal to plants of the NK
for Ferrous Metallurgy in July; however, only 4, 400 tons or 36% of plan were
shipped. In August 16, 000 tons were to be shipped (plus the amount not shipped in
July, 7, 800 tons, or a total of 23, 800 tons). By 15 August only 6, 000 tons had
been shipped, that is, only 37% of the monthly plan.
(258) The anthracite supply also suffered the same difficulties. The mines
at Sulinsk and Novoshakhtinsk delivered only 231 tons (38%) and 90 tons (48%)
respectively instead of 600 tons and 200 tons to the Plants of the NK for Ferrous
Metallurgy from 10 through 15 August.
(259) As in all fields, untouchable reserves of coal were also to be set up.
Thus, untouchable reserves at the various steamship agencies were to be set up
before the beginning of shipping in 1944 as follows:
Kujbyshev NKRF
Saratov NKRF
Ulyanovsk NKRF
1, 000 tons
700 tons
500 tons
(260) Strenuous efforts to open new sources of coal were urged. The Coal
District in the region of the Polar Circle, for example, sent increased quantities of
coal to Leningrad.
1261) The Coal Shipping Plan in September was not fulfilled by the Combine
Rostov-Ugol. The principal reasons for production arrears seemed to be shortages
of material and personnel. One radio message indicated that the lack of mine
timber at Rostov-Ugol made coal shipments at the beginning of September im-
possible and delayed reconstruction. On 20 and 21 September production inter-
ruptions occurred at Rostov-Ugol because of insufficient supply of electricity. The
coal mines in Tkvarcheli were threatened with flooding because of shortages in
manpower, timber, cement, iron, and concrete.
(262) In order to meet the coal requirements of the liberated territories,
coal shipments from the Combine "Stalin-Ugol" were increased in September.
Shipment from the pit heaps was to be accelerated. From the beginning of October
5, 000 tons of coal were to be shipped daily.
(263) Coal shipments from the Combine "Rostov-Ugol" did not reach the
planned scope. From 1 through 20 September an average of only 3, 484 tons were
shipped daily, compared to a goal of 9, 154 tons, only 38%. Shipments were less
than in August: For example, daily shipments had decreased from the preceding
month's average daily shipment of 805 tons for the NK for Transportation and 165
tons for the NK for Iron. Likewise the Chief Directorate for Coal Supply in
Rostov could not carry out its deliveries because of a lack of railroad cars; on
9 September only 3, 000 tons were shipped instead of the planned 9, 900 tons.
(264) Intercepted radio traffic indicated that in September more than
900, 000 tons of coal had accumulated in pit heaps at the Combines "Rostov-
Ugol" and "Voroshilovgrad-Ugol" because of insufficient deliveries of railroad
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cars and trucks. In order to expedite dispatch of the coal to the camps of the NK
for Coal, a truck battalion of 200 trucks was assigned to the two combines; an
additional 200 trucks were placed at their disposal.
(265) The deficient supply of coal in September resulted in interruptions in
production in the iron industry, in transportation, and at electrical generating
stations. During the last months the Donbas Coal Supply Office in Krasnodar had
not furnished sufficient supplies to enterprises of the NK for Armaments. Therefore,
at certain plants interruptions in production occurred.
(266) In the last months Erevan had received only ZOO tons of coal from
Tkvibuli and Tkvarcheli instead of 5, 000 tons. As a result, enterprises important
to the war effort ceased operations.
(267) A message to Molotov NKRF revealed that for the foreseeable future
there was no possibility of furnishing coal to the Kama Steamship Agency. As a
result this steamship agency was to convert their ships to wood firing. The coal
supply in Western Siberia seemed to be better, as deliveries to the Upper Irtysh
Steamship Agency in Semipalatinsk in August showed:
Delivery Plan
Actual Deliveries
Kuznetsk Coal
6,
000 tons
6,
400 tons
105%
Caucasus Coal
2,
100 tons
900 tons
43%
Cheremkhovo Coal
1,
800 tons
2,
300 tons
128%
10,
000 tons
9,
600
96%
(268) According to the plan, Baku was to ship 108 railroad cars of oil coke
in September but instead only 41 cars were shipped. As a result, so much coke
accumulated at the oil enterprises of Azerbajdzhan that production had to be
halted. Instead of the 111 cars which were planned in October, during the first 10
days of December none were shipped,
(269) The Oil Supply Office in Groznyj had delivered only 300 tons of oil
coke for the aluminum plants instead of the required 1, 200 tons. Plants in the
Rubber and Non-ferrous Metal Industry were primarily affected by the lack of
oil coke.
(270) In October the supply generally seemed to have become worse.
Difficulties occurred widely in the Armaments Industry. Because of the lack of
coke, the foundry at a mortar plant in Rostov had to cease operations in October.
A second foundry in Rostov was likewise threatened with cessation of operations.
The Chemical Factory in Kirovakan could not fulfill armaments contracts because
of a lack of anthracite. The plant "Trubostal" in Taganrog had a coal reserve for
only two days at the end of October. The Food Industry also suffered a lack of
coal. In September and October the Bakery Combine in Taganrog had received
no allocations. Production of bread was therefore jeopardized. The Preserves
Factory "Smychka" in Rostov had received only a quarter of the required amount
of coal in October (50 tons). As a result of insufficient coal supplies the Fat
Combine in Voronezh could not maintain operations. At the end of October
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schools, hospitals and other enterprises in the Armenian Republic were insuf-
ficiently supplied with fuel. From stock reports intercepted in radio traffic it was
apparent that coal stocks at most plants were hardly sufficient for a month and in
most cases for only 10 days.
(2711 In November, as previously, orders were much higher than ship-
ping capacity. Pit heaps continually grew.
(2721 In Tkvibuli conditions were as follows:
Orders Shipped
31 October - 896 t 460 t e
51%
1 November - 762 507
64%
i?2731 A shipping bottleneck was also reported from Stalino.
As a result
of a lack of shipping space Rostov could not deliver 4, 500 tons of coal to Taganrog.
This coal was divided among the cities in the vicinity of the mines.
(274) Shipping difficulties greater than in the Caucasus were reported by
radio in Shakhty (in tonsl as follows:
On 1 November
14 November
17 November
18 November
Coal stocks
376,700
361,
700
364,000
Total shipped
-
5, 300
4,
800
4, 200
Shipped by rail
4, 100
4, 300
4,
700
4, 100
Shipment arrears
-
9,800
4,400
5, 100
Railroad cars required
6, 900
7, 100
7, 600
8, 100
Railroad cars furnished
5, 500
4, 800
4, 900
4, 300
Railroad cars loaded
4, 800
4, 300
4, 700
4, 100
Railroad cars not furnished
1,400
2, 300
2,600
3,800
(275) Thus, only about half of the expected quantities were shipped. Ship-
ments themselves decreased primarily because of a shortage of gasoline for trucks
and the falling off of river fleet operations as winter set in. During the navigation
period, for example, total shipments in Shakhty had been higher. On 12 August
they amounted to 11, 110 tons.
(276) In November also plants of the Armaments Industry lacked coal.
There were interruptions in operations at Plant 543 in Kazan and Plant 614 of the
NK for Armaments, because by the end of November they had not yet received
their monthly deliveries. Shakhty was to make immediate delivery. Plant 264 of
the Tank Industry in Stalingrad had not received the authorized 2, 000 tons by
22 November. This plant did not even have 1 day's supply of coal. Rostov was to
expedite delivery.
(277) The Plant "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" in Taganrog had to cease
operations. Stalino was to send 400 tons of coal immediately. The Preserves
Plant in Rostov also ceased operations for 5 days because of a lack of coal. A
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Plant in Novocherkassk was on the brink of halting operations. The Leather
Factory in Taganrog had received no supplies of coal during the last two months.
(278) With the reoccupation of the Donets Basin the important cokeries
also became the property of the Soviet Union, production from which was to
partially alleviate the serious coke shortage in the first half year. According to
plan the cokeries in Stalino were to produce 60, 000 tons of coke in November. Pro-
duction apparently was not satisfactory because the Coke Chemical Plant in Kemerovo
still had to deliver coke to Rostov in November.
(279) The unsatisfactory development of coal supplies led to an investigation
of.the causes producing it. According to a report from authorities on the State
Committee for Defense, from the beginning of December stocks were not sufficient
for fulfillment of the shipping plan. From 1 through 5 December Shakhty, "Rostov-
Ugol" had been able to ship only 25, 000 tons instead of the planned amount of
42, 500 tons (59%).
On 11 December 4, 324 tons were shipped
On 15 December 8, 700 tons were shipped
On 17 December 3, 600 tons were shipped
On 25 December 4, 222 tons were shipped
(280) On 5 December the Combine had a coal supply of 371, 000 tons and on
17 December a supply of 396, 000 tons including 16, 000 tons and 19, 000 tons
respectively stored in heaps on railway branch lines and 28, 000 tons and 17, 000
tons respectively in heaps on narrow gauge branch lines. The remaining stocks of
coal of 327, 000 tons and 358, 000 tons respectively were in heaps which were 60 to
180 kilometers from the railway. Because of the poor shipping conditions at the
time, transport was impossible. In order to fulfill the coal shipping plan the
following measures were adopted:
1) Increased production at mines which were supplied by railway
branch lines. The Combine in Shakhty had 30 such mines. At
the beginning of December its daily production amounted to 400
tons compared to 2, 800 tons in November. The mines could
increase their production to 1, 500 to 2, 000 tons daily if they
could have been supplied with mine timber, machines, electric
mine locomotives and other transportation equipment.
Delivery of 10 small gauge locomotives in order to make
complete use of 80 kilometers of narrow gauge line.
3) Delivery of spare parts for trucks. The Combine operated 140
trucks of which 60% were not serviceable because no spare
parts had been on hand for 10 months.
(281) In December the coal supply situation seemed to have reached a
critical point. The electrical generating stations in Stalingrad, Voronezh,
Kharkov, Moscow, Saratov, Kujbyshev and at other locations were not able to
supply adequate power to industry because of deficient coal deliveries at the
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middle of December. Rostov, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino were to ship 3, 500 tons
of coal to them daily. On 17 December the Plant "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" in
Taganrog was forced to cease operations because it had no coal. On 20 December
the munitions plant "Instrument" in Taganrog ceased operations for the same
reason.
(282) At the beginning of 1944 the coal situation in Rostov Oblast, was
critical, because according to a report of 5 January six principal mines belonging
to the coal combine "Rostov-Ugol" had been under water since 4 January 1944.
Work of the combine had, therefore, almost ceased. The cause of this was a
damaged boiler at the power plant in Artemovsk.
(283) It was determined from domestic radio traffic that an operation was
started to transfer small mines to trusts or other organizations for their own
management. The combine "Rostov-Ugol", for example, had to transfer a small
mine of about 30 tons daily capacity to the NKVD storehouse in Shakhty. Likewise
the Bakery Trust in Rostov was to receive two small coal mines near Shakhty for
their own use; the NKRF workshops in Pavlodar were to take over the local coal
mines and coke rie s .
8. Timber Supply
(284) The timber requirements of the Soviet Union had risen even higher
in the second half year because of construction of industry, conversion to wood
fuel in transportation, especially in the river fleet but principally by the growing
needs for reconstruction. Continuing difficulties in timber supply resulted from
the lack of manpower and of transportation. Therefore plans were set up by which
the river fleet would obtain timber by themselves from the NK for Timber. Radio
traffic indicated that the NKVD also received this right. For example, in order
to obtain 10, 000 cubic meters of timber, the Directorate of Military Supply for
the NKVD in Stavropol was provided with a plot of forest in the second half year.
Similar measures by which sources of raw material were placed directly at the
disposal of the consumers were also undertaken with coal supplies (see Coal
supply.)
(285) In July timber allotments to several NKRF enterprises encountered
difficulties because of insufficient serviceable supplies. The timber allotment
for the second quarter to Kujbyshev Oblast, was postponed and not noted for the
third quarter. An allotment was refused for the Gorkij, Ivanov and Chkalovsk
Oblasti and the authorized allotment of 2, 000 cubic meters of timber for Uralsk
was not carried out. The result was that Kujbyshev for example had no timber
for its river fleet and was forced to obtain it themselves.
(286) In August larger authorizations of shipbuilding timber were noted.
They were intended both for shipbuilding as well as for repairs. It was par-
tially a question of authorizations for the construction and repair period of 1943-
44. Fairly extensive shipbuilding activities for the river fleet may be concluded
from this. In the procurement of shipbuilding timber the usual transportation
difficulties occurred. Thus, Omsk-NKRF received only 3, 000 cubic meters of
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the 14, 000 cubic meters of shipbuilding timber expected in the shipping period
through 1 July.
(287) Horses to be used in timber procurement operations were widely
lacking. Floating equipment was also scarce.
(288) In September the same difficulties in procurement and shipping were
noted. Khabarovsk and Ufa-NKRF were behind schedule on the timber. procurement
plan for the third quarter. In September and October no railroad cars for timber
shipment were furnished to the Georgian NK for the Textile Industry in Tbilisi. How
great these arrears were in some cases is shown by the timber trust of Checheno-
Ingush where, according to the yearly plan, 25, 000 cubic meters of timber were to
be shipped. In Stalingrad and Sarepta large amounts of mine timber were stored
which could not be shipped. As a result of this situation "Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty
suffered a lack of mine timber. In order to avoid a complete cessation of
operations in coal delivery and reconstruction, the most rapid possible delivery of
the September allotment was demanded.
(289) In September a greater need for timber to be used in reconstruction
became apparent. For example, the Rostov-on-Don Rajon was to receive 100, 000
cubic meters for reconstruction of buildings to be used in livestock raising. In
order to meet this additional requirement Komsomol members were conscripted to
undertake voluntary procurement of timber for reconstruction work.
(290) Nevertheless, the timber supply was not sufficient. In Rostov, for
example, reconstruction of fruit and vegetable processing enterprises had to be
halted. As a result of a lack of boards the necessary roofs could not be con-
structed at the grain procurement office in Mozdok.
(291) As a result of deficient timber supplies the coal mines of the Donets
Basin encountered difficulties in October. At all trusts of the combine '.'Stalino-
Ugol" in Stalino there was a lack of mine and construction timber. At the combine
"Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty reconstruction work at the coal mines as well as the
coal deliveries had to be halted because of a lack of timber.
(292) Insufficient manpower and shortage of railroad cars and river
ships were given more and more often as the reason for the transportation dif-
ficulties. For example, the timber industry of the Gorodets and Ust-Alekseevsk
Rajons could not meet their deliveries for the fourth quarter because of a lack of
manpower. As before, the river port of Groznyj was congestedbecause of a lack
of shipping space. In the harbor of Baku barrel staves remained more than a
month because of the lack of railroad cars. Plant 182 in Astrakhan was to re-
ceive 3, 000 cubic meters of round timber and 2, 300 cubic meters of shipbuilding
timber from Saratov for 1943. By the beginning of October, however, no
delivery had been made. The Bridge Building Directorate in Krasnovodsk re-
ceived only half of the required construction timber.
(293) The amounts of timber required for reconstruction of mines,
factories, and agricultural enterprises may be partially computed from the
following message:
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Consignee
Rostov Oblast',
Machine Tractor Stations
10, 000 cu. meters
Stalingrad Oblast',
Agricultural Organizations 40, 000
Astrakhan Oblast' 10, 000
Rostov Oblast',
Agricultural Organizations 100, 000
Sulin,
Plant "Krasnyj Sulin"
For reconstruction of
stalls.
3, 000 pieces of For reconstruction
timber
Taganrog,
Plant "Instrument" 600 cu. meters
Taganrog,
Boiler Plant 35 railroad cars
(294) With the cessation of river fleet operations NKRF offices transferred
their activities to the procurement of timber for the winter half year of 1943-1944
which apparently lasted from 1 October 1943 through 31 March 1944. Quotas for
procurement and shipments were announced to the individual offices.
(295) The NKRF offices below had to fulfill the following timber shipment
quotas in the winter half year of 1943-44:
Office and Oblast'
of Procurement
To be Procured
To be Shipped
Gorkij,
Water Transport Base from the
7,400 sq. meters
7, 800 sq. meters
Tatar Republic; Gorkij
Water Transport Base of Saratov
3, 600
5, 300
Oblast'
Gorkij,
Water Transport Base of Ivanovo
6, 100
4, 500
Oblast'
Yakutsk-NKRF
75,000
50,000
Kirov
51, 000 cu. meters
55, 000 cu. meters
Molotov
175,000
154,000
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(296) The Rostov-on-Don Forest Directorate was to procure the following
amounts from 18 November through 10 April 1944:
Total: 65, 000 cubic meters of timber
Including: 5, 000 cu.
10, 000 "
meters of fuel timber
timber for
other uses.
Included in the 4th quarter:
25, 000
fuel timber
59 000
timber for
other uses.
(297) According to the December plan Kujbyshev-NKRF was to procure
7, 500 square meters as follows:
1, 500 cubic meters timber for general use
6, 000 cubic meters firewood
(298) The following timber procurement plan was established for the region
of the Upper Volga for the winter half year 1943/44:
Oblast' Total Quantity
Timber for General Use
Yaroslavl 19, 000 sq. meters
4,200 sq. meters
Ivanovo 21,000 "
3,500 " it
Gorkij 50,000 "
17,000 " if
Mary 11,000
Chuvash 7,500
5,000
1, 500
Tatar 15, 000
4, 500
(299) In November the situation was unchanged. On one hand, there was
a shortage of timber so that even deliveries to the Army were delayed and on the
other hand additional quantities of timber were ordered procured for reconstruction
work.
(300) In December great difficulties also prevailed at the coal mines in
Shakhty because of a lack of mine timber. Shakhty could erect no community
dwellings for the 33, 000 conscripted workers. Above all, timber was lacking for
reconstruction. The oblast' procurement office in Rostov received the allocated
50,. 000 cubic meters of timber from the Oblast' Forest Directorate for repair of
livestock stalls. By the beginning of December about 13, 500 cubic meters had
been felled and 11, 000 cubic meters had been shipped. In November the NK for
Agriculture in Krasnodar was to receive 887 railroad cars of construction timber.
The contract was not fulfilled, however, In Krasnovodsk, especially important
work had to be suspended because of a lack of timber. For the same reason the
setting in operation of plants was often delayed. The continual requirements of the
economy were met only with great delays. Thus, the railroad car repair plant in
Ordzhonikidze had received no cut timber for repair work in September and
October.
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(301) In the Caucasus timber supply was apparently better in the regions not
contiguous to the war. The Azerbajdzhan Republic had procured 76, 000 cubic meters
of timber by 20 September against the yearly timber procurement plan of 96, 000
cubic meters. The NK for the Meat and Dairy Industry in Erevan had received an
allotment for 1943 of 1, 650 cubic meters of firewood, of which 1, 083 cubic meters
had been delivered by 1 October.
(302) Yearly allotments for individual NKRF offices have been determined as
follows:
Quantity
Commodity
Consignee
10, 500 cu. meters
Shipbuilding
timber
Kujbyshev-
NKRF
700
"
11
10,000
Firewood
Ufa-NKRF
20, 000
Shipbuilding
Novosibirsk-
timber
NKRF
105,000
Firewood
60, 000
14,000
Shipbuilding
timbe r
135, 000
Firewood
Novosibirsk-
NKRF
Consignor Remarks
Kama Timber To be delivered
Industry during the 1943
navigation period.
Middle Volga
Timber Industry
Supply Office
For the 1943
navigation period.
Allotment during
shipping period.
Allotment in the
shipping period.
of 1943.
Allotment in the
shipping period
of 1943, includ-
ing 3, 300 cu.
meters received
by 1 July.
Novosibirsk Total
Chief Timber
(303) As far as could be determined from radio traffic, during the third
quarter a total of 1, 850, 000 cubic meters of timber were to be procured by the
NKRF. In the fourth quarter this figure dropped to 520, 000 cubic meters. Pro-
curements determined in the first half year are totalled as follows:
1st quarter
887,
000 cu. meters
1st half year
2, 362, 000 cu. meters
2nd quarter
1,
475,
000 "
2nd half year
2, 370, 000 cu. meters
3rd quarter
1,
850,
000 If
4th quarter
520,
000
Total for
4,
732,
000 cu. meters
year
4, 732, 000 cu. meters
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(304) By a rough computation based on this table a yearly procurement of
from 12 to 15, 000, 000 cubic meters of timber may be inferred.
9. Shipbuilding
(305) Of 154 establishments identified in the NK for the River Fleet (NKRF)
there were 75 shipyards and 35 ship repair yards. Often shipyards and repair yards
were included together. 42 plants were not clearly identified. Often auxiliary
enterprises and spare part plants were included with the shipyards and repair
plants. The highest plant numbers encountered in the NKRF lay in the 600's.
According to this, the NKRF probably had slightly more than 700 plants. It is con-
sidered that at the beginning of 1943 almost half of the river shipping capacity in
the European part of the Soviet Union was lost through military action or had been
heavily damaged (for example, the Dnepr, Dnestr, Bug, Don, Kuban and Donets
Steamship Agencies) and that not all the plants of the numbering system repeatedly
referred to in radio traffic were in operation, so it is probable that about one third
of the NKRF plants have been identified.
(306) By construction of new shipyards and new dock installations the NKRF
strove to increase productivity in the river fleet. In the second half of 1943 con-
struction of new shipyard equipment was noted in Cherdyn. In Omsk also the con-
struction of a new shipyard was planned. In Igarka the construction of tow barges
was to be undertaken. New docks were under construction in Gorkij and Kujbyshev.
In August a new dock was completed in Alekseevka which was apparently destined
for the shipyard in Raznezhe. Chistopol was to receive new dock installations
from Krasnoarmejsk. In Krasnoyarsk the construction of a wooden floating dock
was to begin in August.
(307) Domestic radio traffic indicated that the construction of river shipping
had to cope with a shortage of material and manpower in the second half year also.
Bobrovka reported, for instance, that in the third 10-day period of July no work
was being carried out on the motor ships for the Fishing Trust because of a lack
of workers and material. At the beginning of August construction work on two
barges in Molotov had to be halted because there were no nails and other con-
struction materials. In Novosibirsk work was delayed because there was no red
lead or canvas. The order from Kujbyshev for long timber to be used in con-
structing wooden flatboats was refused with the notification that flotsam timber
should be used for this purpose. At the shipyards of Astrakhan in July only work
on wooden ships was to be carried out and the construction of motor ships was
postponed until August and September. At the shipyard in Cherdyn considerable
interruptions in work occurred in July.
(308) As a result of these conditions, shipyards were far behind their
work schedules. Intercepted reports revealed that conditions in July had not
improved over the preceding month, In August even greater arrears were noted.
In Kostroma, for example, only 80 percent of the shipbuilding program was ful-
filled in the first 20 days of August compared to that in July. At the shipyard in
Zurazhevka the arrears likewise increased. In the first two 10-day periods in
August only 53 percent of the plan was fulfilled. The following shipyards were
behind schedule:
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Astrakhan
Baturino
Bobrovka
Khabarovsk
Kostroma
Kujbyshev
Novosibirsk
Orel
Zurazhe vka
Che rdyn
Ufa
Molotov
(309) On the other hand, several NKRF organizations and spare part plants
reported overfulfillment of the production plan, as follows:
Plant "Krasnoarmejsk" 139% in October
Plant "Stalingrad" 140% "
Plant "Uritskij" 109%
Vladimirovka Workshops 112%
Sergeev Workshops 133%
(310) The critical situation at NKRF plants was also shown by an order in
August which stated that work on all contracts which were not issued by the State
Committee for Defense was to be halted.
(311) In addition to planned shipbuilding, the shipyards had to carry out ad-
ditional construction. In Cherdyn, for example, during 1943 a tow-barge was
produced above plan. In September, Borovaya was to produce the sixth 1, 700-ton
tow-barge above plan.
(312) At the beginning of 1943 an extensive construction program was
established for the Fish Industry. In the first half year construction of about 250
fishing boats was noted, and in the secQtid half year a construction program by
Irkutsk NKRF for the NK for the Fishlndustry- of over 50 motor ships and 3 tow-
barges was identified. Delivery deadlines had to be extended to 1 July 1944. It
was notable that 20 motor ships were to have wooden hulls.
(313) Reconstruction of river shipping in the re-occupied territories con-
stituted an additional burden. The scope of this work is shown by the following
excerpt. On 1 October 1943 the Don-Kuban Steamship Agency had the following
ships:
3 Freight-passenger ships
69 Motor cutters
7 Tugboats
100 Tow-barges (wooden)
16 Tank.tow-barges (metal)
4 Dredges
27 Other craft
According to the reconstruction plan, this inventory was to be increased by
almost 100 percent in July 1944, that is by 165 ships as follows:
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6 Freight-passenger ships totalling 900 tons
30 Motor-cutters totalling 1, 207 tons
9 Tugboats totalling 2, 015 tons
106 Tow-barges (wooden) totalling 19, 100 tons
14 Tank Tow-barges (metal) 3, 110 tons
(314) Because of the oil shortage at the beginning of the year many ships
were converted to wood firing. In the second half year Kujbyshev intended to re-
convert their river ships from wood to oil firing because wood procurement
operations had encountered serious difficulties. This conversion (to mazut) was,
however, strictly forbidden. Nevertheless, Kujbyshev received permission to con-
vert some ships from coal to oil firing. This was considered only a temporary
measure.
(315) In the second half year NKRF shipyards were to carry out the follow-
ing construction (figures for December not available):
July
August September
October
November
Total
Steamships
4
4
Motor ships
10
45
Motorboats
Motor cutters
2
Tug boats
3
3
Tow barges
21
15
8
1
54
Flat boats
75
17
26
5
126
Small boats
15
55
70
(316) The amount of planned new construction in the third quarter amounted
to approximately that of the preceding quarter and in the fourth quarter indicated
a seasonal decrease. The following numbers of motor-driven ships were
identified:
In the 1st quarter
89
In the 3rd quarter
49
In the 2nd quarter
9
In the 4th quarter
15
The following numbers of non-motor-driven ships were identified:
In the 1st quarter 265 In the 3rd quarter 216
In the 2nd quarter 180 In the 4th quarter 40
(317) The total amount of new construction from December 1942 through
December 1943 was as follows:
Dec. /June 1943
July/Nov. 1943
Dec.42/Nov.43
Steamships
8
4
12
Motorships
10
45
55
Motorboats
30
-
30
Motor cutters
12
7
19
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Dec. /June 1943
July/Nov. 1943
Dec.42/Nov.43
Tugboats
40
6
46
Tug barges
160
53
213
Flat boats
82
126
208
Small boats
223
70
293
(318) For motor driven ships further details were lacking. In one case only
the size of a motor ship was given as 1000 tons and the power of barges given as 400
horsepower.
(319) In the months of July through November there were 54 barges under
construction totalling 82, 100 tons compared to 160 barges totalling 95, 600 tons in
the period from December 1942 through May 1943. The average weight thus in-
creased considerably, reaching 1, 500 tons compared to 500 tons in the preceding
half year. More vessels were built of 1, 700 tons than of any other weight - 19 tow
barges of this weight were built. Barges were built of tonnages ranging from 200
to 3, 000 tons. The individual tonnage groups are broken down as follows:
Tonnage
Number of Vessels
Total Tonnage
200
- 250 t
3
650
500
- 600
3
1,
740
1500
- 1700
42
65,
225
2500
- 3000
5
14,
500
(320) The increase in the number of flat boats constructed was also remark-
able. In the second half year 126 vessels were under construction compared to 82
in the period from December 1942 through June 1943. Also many larger vessels
were identified: flat boats up to 750 tons compared to a maximum of 200 tons in
the first half year. The average tonnage was 186 tons. The most vessels con-
structed of any one weight were of 40 tons 14 vessels of this tonnage were
constructed. Individual tonnage groups are broken down as follows:
Tonnage Number
Total Tonnage
40
- 50 t
16
660
100
8
800
200
- 250
1;
650
700
- 750
2,
850
not given (16,
930
?)
If we assume the average weight of 186 tons for the 91 flat boats for which the
tonnage is not given, a total tonnage for these 91 vessels of 16, 930 tons is
arrived at. The tonnage of all flat boats can thus be computed at 22, 900 tons.
(321) New construction plans for tow barges and flat boats in the first as
well as in the second half year amounted to about 100, 000 tons each. The actual
new construction program can thus be computed at 600, 000 tons in the year 1943,
(see Foreword). At any rate, the new construction plans were not fulfilled.
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According to repeated reports on the progress of the work intercepted from
domestic radio traffic, the plan was only about two-thirds fulfilled.
10. Ship Repair
(322) A government decree in July to all NKRF offices ordered that the
scale of preparations for carrying out ship repairs for the year 1943-1944 be not
less than that in the preceding year. During the winter all ships which had been
damaged and which were therefore of limited serviceability were to be completely
overhauled.
(323) During the summer all ships were to be supplied with available spare
parts. During the interval between the navigation seasons it was forbidden to trans-
fer specialists in ship repair to other types of work.
(324) As early as July a number of repair yards reported that they were
behind schedule in preparations for ship repairs and procurement of fuel because
great difficulties had to be surmounted. The following shipyards were included:
Gorkij
Ilijsk
Kirov
Ku jb ys he v
Molotov
Uralsk
(325) The repair work underway also progressed very slowly. At the
beginning of July ships which had been damaged as the ice broke up in the spring
were still under repair in Yakutsk. The following were behind schedule in repairs:
Kazan
Molotov
Morkovka
Ufa
(326) At the drydock of Morkovka (Novosibirsk Oblast') 19, 240 tons of
shipping were to be repaired in July, however, only 16, 170 tons or 84 percent
was actually repaired. In Borovaya, on the other hand, work was progressing
well.
(327) Since the repair work was taking longer than foreseen, many more
ships than planned were not placed in service. The administrative personnel and
engineers at the shipyards were personally directed to speed up the working tempo.
Deficient organization was widely blamed for this situation. Kujbyshev reported
that at several offices under their jurisdiction there were over 30 tow barges
which were half-sunken and dried out and the technique of repair was not known.
In this way, the most important contracts assigned to the Middle-Volga Steamship
Agency were neglected. The administrative personnel were charged with lack of
foresight and flexibility. The personnel shortage also delayed repairs.
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(328) Several NKRF offices had large numbers of immobilized ships which
were to be repaired in August and put in service. Thus, the plan called for repairs
as follows:
Gorkij
3C, 000 tons
Stalingrad
20, 000 tons
Kujbyshev
3, 000 tons
(329) Domestic radio traffic indicated that some tow barges were contracted
to other organizations for repairs.
(330) It was widely reported that NKRF plants, for example, Gorkij, Uralsk
and Kujbyshev, were behind schedule in the assembly of spare parts. Since this
endangered the ship repair and construction plan, there resulted increased control
over the production of spare parts by introduction of daily accounting of hourly work
production.
(331) Bottlenecks also resulted from the slow progress of the acceptance
tests on repaired ships. In Kujbyshev and in Ulyanovsk the plan was only 29 per-
cent fulfilled in June. In Stalingrad also, the tests were proceeding unsatisfactorily.
(332) In August there was an increase in reports of arrears in preparations
for the approaching ship repairs. The following ship repair plants may be added to
those listed in the preceding month:
Aralsk
Krasnoyarsk
Pavlodar
Z venigo vo
Chistopol
Chardzhou
Ust Ussa
(333) In Aralsk and Chardzhou preparations had completely stopped. In
Zvenigovo the repair of installations for production of ships' spare parts was
behind schedule, and in Chistopol the construction of a foundry for ship repair
purposes was also behind schedule.
(334) In August the Kama and Middle-Volga Steamship Agencies were
behind schedule in current repairs. At the Kama Steamship Agency many
instances of damaged inventory were noted. The Middle-Volga Steamship Agency
was forced to halt ship repairs because of a lack of available spare parts.
Chkalovsk and Ulan Ude were also behind schedule in repairs. The following were
behind schedule in production of ship components:
Kujbyshev
Pavlodar
Chistopol
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(335) In connection with the approaching repair period, NKRF offices were
to draw up plans by 1 September for a modernization of the river fleet during 1944.
Measures were to extend to improvement of utilization of fuel and motors as well
as to an increase in motor power.
(336) At the end of September there was a conference in Kujbyshev
attended by steamship company officials and directors of all NKRF shipyards and
workshops . Questions were discussed there concerning preparations for the
winter ship repairs and the production program for the next eight months.
(337) Headquarters of the NKRF in Moscow ordered all offices to eliminate
arrears in preparation for the winter repairs. It was especially important that
sufficient tools and heating material be on hand.
(338) Many NKRF plants had to undertake production of tractor spare parts
in order to meet the urgent needs of agriculture (see Agriculture). Radio reports
indicated that for this reason preparations for the imminent ship repairs were
often considerably behind schedule. Some NKRF plants protested this obligation.
Of all enterprises subordinate to the Kama Steamship Agency the NKRF plant at
Zaozere was the farthest behind schedule in preparations for winter repairs.
(339) In October the oblast' committees and the governments of the
autonomous republics were obliged to furnish vehicles and drivers for ship repair
work for two months.
(340) In September the Omsk-NKRF Plant "Stalingrad" had fulfilled
current repair work very unsatisfactorily. Chistopol, on the other hand, conformed
to the current program. Work on "Volgatanker" ships was to be given top priority.
(341) As a result of shortages of metal and special work, Chardzhou was
not in a position to produce the ship components which had been ordered.
(342) The extent of ship repairs in Ust-Usa during 1942-43 gives an idea
of the scope of the repair work. 363 vessels totalling 174, 440 tons were repaired
there. During 1943, 327 vessels totalling 154, 550 tons were to be repaired.
(343) Appendix I presentsthe budget plans of the River Fleet inter-
cepted from radio traffic, from which the significance of the individual shipyards
is apparent. The construction and repair costs of river ships presented in the
following table may serve as a scale for judging the amounts in the budget plans
allotted for construction and repair purposes:
Production costs for tow barges:
Shipyard
Vessel
Tonnage
Cost
Gorkij
Coal Tow Barge
1, 700
288, 000 Rubles
Grain "
it
1,700
325,000
Raznezhe
Coal
1,700
229,000
1,700
195,000
Grain "
1,700
250,000
Tow Barge
1,700
276,000
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(344) Repair of a steamer in Rybache cost 10, 000 rubles.
(345) With the continuous re-occupation of larger areas, more important
to the economy, reconstruction became a more and more important task.
(346) Next to the first assignment of re-building Stalingrad and the North
Caucasian region, in the second half-year the reconstruction of the Donbas was
given top priority. As early as July, reconstruction of industry in the Don Basin
was in full swing. With the continuous expansion of the area to be re-built, increas-
ing difficulties occurred; before the end of the year there was an increasing lack of
construction materials, such as timber, glass, cement, roofing paper, building
blocks, nails, etc. Transport difficulties also played an important role in this
situation. Nevertheless, progress was achieved in all areas. In the North
Caucasus and in the Ukraine extensive re-establishment of agriculture was under-
taken (See Food Situation). In the Donbas the Coal and Iron Industries were
rebuilt. Moreover, living quarters and phases of the economy important to life,
such as electrical generating stations, water-works, transportation, and the news
services, were reconstructed and economic life slowly was brought back into
operation. In this program economic organizations in regions untouched by the war
assumed "sponsorships" over the enterprises in their branches of the economy to
be rebuilt.
(347) Details taken from radio traffic and presented below give an insight
into the progress of the reconstruction program.
(348) Many plants of the Food Industry were repaired or newly rebuilt. As
of 1 September, Krasnodar had repaired 85 mills and had newly rebuilt 29 mills.
In October, however, these mills could not be put in operation because of a lack of
drive belts. In the fourth quarter a mill with a production capacity of 100 tons
daily was to be put in operation in Taganrog. A flour production quota of 2, 500
tons was set for the mills in Taganrog. The reconstruction of a mill was also
reported from Prokhladnaya.
(349) Before the war in Voroshilovgrad Oblast' daily capacity of
bakeries was 1, 254 tons, including 242 tons in Voroshilovgrad. By 10 September
the following had been repaired:
in Voroshilovgrad
100 bakeries
Krasnodar
78
Bokovo -Anthracite
13
Sverdlovsk
62
Rovenkij
16 "
Total: 269 bakeries
(350) By 1 October an additional 80 bakeries had been placed in operation
as follows:
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in Voroshilovgrad 20 bakeries
Sergo-Parizhskaya-
Kommuna 15
Bryanka Settlement 20
Ka me nka 5
Other Places 20
(351) By 20 August in Rostov and Krasnodar Oblasti a large number of
macaroni plants had been placed in operation. Daily production from these plants
amounted to:
Armavir
Krasnodar
Maikop
Rostov
5 tons
3 tons
10 tons
15 tons
(352) The following sugar factories were under reconstruction in October:
Plant Pervokhimsk
Plant Sumsko-Stepanovsk
Plant Kalininsk
Plant R akityansk
(All Stations above lie
Plant Kollektivist
(Dzerzhinsk Railway)
Station Kenig
Station Toropilovka
Station Tetkino
Station Sinajdino
on the Southeast Railway)
Station Blokhino
(353) In Korenovskaya a sugar factory was put in operation in November.
In Voroshilovgrad as early as September a plant for non-alcoholic drinks with a
daily capacity of 2400 liters was in operation. The plant for liquor production
was to be rebuilt with a daily productivity of 10, 000 liters.
(354) According to a report in October the refrigeration installation from
the Fish Trust in Mariupol which had been evacuated to Baku was returned to
Mariupol and re-set up.
(355) Large reconstruction orders were placed by the two largest
branches of industry in the Donets Basin-the Coal Industry and the Iron
Industry. Ten small-gauge locomotives were delivered to the Combine
"Voroshilovgrad-Ugol" in June. In July two railroad cars of window glass were
delivered to this combine for reconstruction and three railroad cars of window
glass were delivered to "Rostov-Ugol". In-September they received an additional
5 railroad cars. In September "Rostov-Ugol" was to receive 9 railroad cars of
cement for reconstruction operations. Because this shipment did not arrive,
operations had to be interrupted. In November all trusts of the Coal Combine
"Stalin-Ugol" in Stalino lacked construction and mine timber. The Coal Combine
"Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty also had to cease both reconstruction operations at the
coal mines and production because of a lack of timber.
(356) The Mine "Smolyanka" in Stalino Oblast' reported at the middle of
December that reconstruction of mines was halted because of a lack of
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construction material. The following construction material had been authorized for
the fourth quarter:
800 cbxn..
1000 "
570 roles
7000 sq. m.
450 tons
75 "
10 it
The following were actually delivered:
Mine Timber
Construction Timber
Roofing Paper
Glas s
Cement
Section Iron
Girders
550 cbm.
Mine Timber
- 79.0%
21 roles
Roofing Paper
3. 6%
300 sq. m.
Glass
4.316
50 tons
Cement
= 11.1%
60 tons
Section Iron
= 80.0%
(357)
Reconstruction of shelter rooms was completely interrupted.
(358) The reconstruction plan called for extensive repair of the Iron
Industry before the end of the year. The Steel Plant "Krasnyj-Sulin" was to set its
Martin furnaces in operation as follows:
6 Martin furnaces in September
1 Martin furnace in October
3 Martin furnaces in November
(359) On 15 October the first Martin furnace at the Plant "Andreev" in
Taganrog was fired and 13 tons of steel were produced. A rapid increase in pro-
duction was indicated because "Andreev" proposed a receipt of scrap of about 8, 600
tons for the fourth quarter and 44, 000 tons for the first quarter of 1943. In
December the Plant "Andreev" reported that the deadline set for the reconstruction
of the Mannesman Department could not be met because construction material had
not been received.
(360) At the Plant "Ilich" of the Tank Industry in Mariupol, a blast
furnace was placed in operation. Its current needs for gas coal were computed at
4, 000 tons monthly.
(361) The boiler factory "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" in Taganrog was insuf-
ficiently supplied with construction material such as timber, glass, and roofing
paper. At the beginning of December work had to be completely stopped because
of the cold. The Plant "Sedina" in Krasnodar which was to produce lathes for
agricultural enterprises was rapidly reconstructed in October. 1. 6 million rubles
were authorized for the reconstruction. In Rostov the Plant "Instrument" was
rebuilt.
(362) The Trust of the North Caucasus Heavy Machine Industry reported
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that the reconstruction plan in October had been over-fulfilled by 10 percent.
Dozens of destroyed plants and buildings were reconstructed. First priority was
given to the setting in operation of electrical generating stations including the
Electrical Plant at Rostov, plants of the Agricultural Machine Industry and the
blast furnaces of the NK for Ferrous Metallurgy. Even during reconstruction, pro-
duction for the Front valued at about 600, 000 rubles was turned out.
(363) By the end of October the Tank Industry in Stalino had been repaired.
Aircraft of the Civil Air Fleet supplied spare parts to the Tank Industry in Stalino.
(364) In the fourth quarter a magnesium plant was rebuilt in Rostov.
(365) By the middle of September, a shoe factory in Taganrog was already
fulfilling orders for the Army.
(366) The State Committee for Defense demanded in July the reconstruction
of the Oil Industry in Groznyj in the shortest possible time. Work was delayed,
however, because there were no heavy trucks available.
(367) In October a Solidol Plant was to be put in operation in Rostov which
was to produce solidol from either emulsion or fat. At the Oil Storage Base in
Taganrog two metal tanks with a capacity of 100 tons were repaired in September.
In addition there is an underground tank there of 106 tons capacity.
(368) In Krasnodar Kraj cement plants were reconstructed. On 23 June
a cement plant resumed operations in Voroshilovgrad.
(369) A large amount of material and a large working force were required
for reconstruction of railroad lines. Thus Rostov Oblast' placed 81, 000 tons of
lime and 1 million bricks at the disposal of the North Caucasus Railway.
(370) In Stalingrad Harbor electro-technical and drainage operations
were carried out in July. Reconstruction here also was subject to delays. The
Kuban Steamship Agency also was reconstructed QSee Shipbuilding).
(371) In September a reconstruction staff for the Dnepr Steamship Agency
was set up. The following NKRF offices were to furnish personnel for this purpose:
Gorodets Rostov
Gorki j Semipalatinsk
Kujbyshev Saratov
Kirov S venigovo
Molotov Ufa
Omsk Ust Ussa
(372) The NKRF Offices at Kujbyshev, Omsk, and Rostov were to furnish
administrative personnel to set up reconstruction staffs for the Desna and Dnepr
Steamship Agencies. Personnel from the NKRF offices in Irkutsk, Novosibirsk,
and Uralsk were conscripted for reconstruction of the Dnepr-Duna Steamship
Agency.
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(373) In August reconstruction work was carried out in Krasnodar on the
electrical generating station and on the city street-car line. At the end of October
the electrical generating station in Artemovsk urgently required construction
material because freezing of the station was imminent. The following were still
required:
200, 000 bricks
2 railroad cars of roofing tin
2 railroad cars of glass
10 railroad cars of construction timber
(374) Through 24 October 1, 900 sq. meters of horizontal window area
were framed. 1, 000 sq. meters still remained to be framed and 1, 250 sq. meters
in the boiler and turbine house were to be glassed-in.
(375) The following reports pertain to the reconstruction of communications:
As of 1 August Krasnodar had reconstructed and put into operation 895 kilometers of
telegraph and telephone lines consisting of 5, 289 kilometers of cable. 35 telephone
centrals (47% of plan), 12 telegraph and telephone offices (59% of plan) and 23 radio
centers (30. 5% of plan) were put into operation. Reconstruction continued on 12
other installations.
(376) Through 1 August 812 kilometers of telegraph and telephone lines
consisting of 4, 626 kilometers of cable had been re-strung in Voroshilovgrad Oblast'.
580 kilometers consisting of 3, 932 kilometers of cable had been put in operation.
(377) Through the middle of October in Rostov Oblast' the following enter-
prises of the NK for Trade had been re-established:
Salesbooths
298
Restaurants
60
Sales outlets
91
Bakeries
27
Industrial enterprises of
the NK for Trade
31
Storehouses
40
(378) Radio messages indicated that reconstruction of living quarters
was far behind construction in the armaments field. Significant in this respect
was a report from the region of North Osetia, according to which, many houses,
schools, hospitals, and public buildings were without windows at the beginning of
winter because of the German occupation as well as aircraft activity and
artillery fire. In order to reconstruct living quarters for workers' families in
the liberated territories, each family was granted a government loan amounting to
10, 000 rubles with a 7-year repayment period.
12. Imports (from Iran)
(379) Imports from the Anglo-Saxon countries afforded essential
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economic assistance to the Soviet Union. Of the three principal import routes to the
Soviet Union via the North Arctic Ocean, the Far East, and Iran, imports via Iran
from September 1943 onward were most widely covered in radio traffic. This dis-
cussion is limited therefore to the last country during the months of September
through December 1943.
(380) Radio traffic indicated that administration of imports was handled by
"Iransovtrans" which operated in conjunction with the specialized organizations in the
NK for Foreign Trade (for example, Promsyreimport, Eksportkhleb, Eksportlen',
etc.) The organization "Vostokintorg" was also involved in imports via Iran. The
representative of "Iransovtrans" in Iran was General Milovskij.
13. Transportation Routes
(381) As a result of inadequate railroad connections with the Soviet Union
the sudden and great increase in the goods to be transported across Iran produced
great difficulties. It was necessary therefore to utilize all possible means of trans-
portation and ship a large proportion of the cargoes by highway and the Caspian Sea.
This involved increased trans-shipment operations and the concomitant delays; for
example, cargoes which were going from Teheran to Baku via Naushahr had to be
trans-shipped from the railroad to the highway, then to ships and then for further
transport had to be again trans-shipped to the railway.
(38Z) The relatively limited transportation capacity at individual locations
made it necessary to set up many trans-shipment bases. Even small ports without
railroad connections were utilized. (See Map: Foreign Trade Routes, Iran-USSR,
Appendix 4.)
(383) The following Iransovtrans trans-shipment bases have been
identified:
(Railway) Teheran
Kazvin
Tabriz
Bender Shah
(Shipping) Bender Shah
Nakhmudabad
Naushahr
Shakhsevar
Pekhlevi
(not located) Khorosan
Chanshar
(Railway) Dzhulfa
Erevan
Leninakan
Tiblisi
Astara
Baku
Makhachkala
Astrakhan
Krasnodar
Krasnovodsk
Kizyl Arvat
Ashkhabad
(Shipping) Baku
Makhac hkala
Astrakhan
Krasnovodsk
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(384) Import of goods proceeded over the following import routes:
(Shipping) Bender Shah -- Baku
Nakhmudabad - Baku
Naushahr -- Baku
Shakhsevar Baku
Pekhlevi Baku
(385) The Iranian points of departure for the cargoes arriving in Makhach-
kala, Astrakhan, and Krasnovodsk were not given in the reports. They probably are
the same as for Baku.
(Railway) Tabriz -- Erevan
Dzhulfa - Erevan
Dzhulfa -- Tiblisi
Dzhulfa -- Moscow
(Highway and Teheran -- Astara
Mixed Trans- Kazvin -- Astara
port) Pekhlevi -- Erevan
Naushahr Tiblisi
Pekhlevi Tiblisi
(not located) Chanshar Tiblisi
Khorosan Ashkhabad
14., Trans-shipment at Individual Bases
(386) Next to Bender Shah, Pekhlevi was the most important Caspian port
in Iran. In one 5-day period, from about 2, 900 tons (20-25 December) to 7, 200 tons
of goods (1-5 December) arrived there for further shipment. Daily shipments
ranged from about 500 tons (30 December) to 900 tons of freight (31 December). As
a result of insufficient means of transportation, by 6 December about 31, 800 tons of
cargo had accumulated there, i, e. , turnover for about a month. Offices of
Vostokintorg in Teheran reported that shipping was needed in Baku to transport
about 1, 700 tons of agricultural products in November and 1, 400 tons in December,
The goods were to be shipped from Pekhlevi, Naushahr, and Bender Shah.
(387) There was a general shortage of railroad cars and ships, both in
Iran as well as in the Soviet Union, For example, at the beginning of November,
26, 350 tons of straw had arrived in Bender Shah from Southern Iran which could
not be shipped because of a lack of shipping space.
(388) In Baku about 1, 700 railroad cars of imported goods were dispatched
in September. Assuming an average load of 18 tons per car this amounts to
30, 600 tons. On 1 October, 56 railroad cars of imported goods were shipped from
Baku, about 1, 000 tons.
(389) On 21 November about 2, 500 tons of imported goods arrived in
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Baku and 1, 200 tons were shipped on. From 1 through 5 December about 7, 100 tons
of freight arrived there. According to this about 1, 200 tons on the average arrived
in Baku and about 1, 000 tons could be shipped on (daily). Trans-shipment reports
pertaining to the other bases were less informative. From 1 through 20 October
about 1, 900 tons of flour and beans arrived in Erevan.
(390) In November livestock imports to Astara were on the following scale:
Arrived Dispatched
5, 800 head Large cattle 7, 100 head
22 tons Small cattle 27 tons
Stock on 1 December:
300 head Large . cattle --
Small cattle --
Increase during the 1st 10 days of December:
2, 400 head Large cattle
-- Small cattle
(391) On 12 November 420 tons of military supplies arrived in Leninakan.
(392) At Iransovtrans offices large stocks were piling up which could not
be shipped further because of a lack of transportation; for example, at the beginning
of October 3, 400 tons of preserves were stored in Makhachkala and at the end of
October, 5, 400 tons.
(393) On 22 September there were 1, 980 tons of flour, 7, 590 tons of
beans, 360 tons of peeled grain, 1, 400 tons of rice ready for shipment in Baku. At
the beginning of November there were 400 tons of vegetable fat stored in Baku. On
1 October Baku had 900 tons of brass in storage, and at the end of November,
70, 000 meters of fabric. An additional 100 tons of steel including special steel was
also stored in Tiblisi.
(394) In Baku harbor about 31, 700 tons of freight had accumulated by
5 December. In order to fulfill the transport plan for January 1944 the Trans-
caucasus Railway was to furnish:
1) Daily for imported goods only 100 open freight cars
50 closed freight cars
2) Trucks in lieu of railroad cars 500 tons daily;
3) 8 Shuttle trains, each of 20 cars,
as follows:
2 Shuttle trains for transport to the Chief Directorate for Metal Sales in
Kishly of 10, 000 tons steel alloys;
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2 Shuttle trains for transport to Kishly of 4, 000 tons of flour and beans;
2 Shuttle trains for transport to Kishly of freight for Engineering
Directorate Offices at the Karada,
Sumgait and Kishly Stations;
2 Shuttle trains for transport of rails and railway equipment to the store-
houses of the NK for Transportation.
(395) The compilation of individual deliveries from Iran indicates that the
major portions of deliveries passed through Baku, Makhachkala, Erevan, Dzhulfa,
and Krasnovodsk.
The following table summarizes imports through these points:
October
November December
4th Quarter
Baku
3, 200 tons
14,
000 tons 7, 900 tons =
25, 100 tons
Makhachkala
8,000
450 5,500
13,950
Erevan
2, 600
700 300
3,600
Dzhulfa
100
100 1,200 -
1,400
Krasnovodsk
70
620 200
890
15. Total Imports
(396) Compilation of all imports, reports of which were intercepted from
radio traffic, results in the following quantities:
September
18,
700 tons
included here are certain quantities of
October
14,
300
goods for which the weight varies--
November
20,
000
primarily textiles, leather, and rubber.
December
18,
100
(See below)
(397) Radio messages on the delivery of railroad cars to Baku for
imported goods indicated that reports of only about a quarter of the actual
deliveries were intercepted. This probably was true in the case of the numbers of
radio reports intercepted concerning the other locations. The actual monthly
imports from Iran therefore probably amounted to about 80, 000 tons.
16. Details of Imports
(398) Imports consisted primarily of foods and metal products; textiles,
chemicals, rubber and leather were also imported in smaller quantities. In detail
they were as follows:
Foods
Metals
Textiles
Leather
Chemicals
Oil
Others
September
11, 900 tons
6, 000 t
--
100 t
300 t
300 t
100 t
October
9, 700
4, 500
100
November
13,800
3,900
400
300
900
--
1100
December
11,100
5,400
100
100
700
--
700
46,500
19,805
500
500
2000
300
1900
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(399) Imports of goods for which the weight was not specified were reported
as follows:
Foods
Metals Chemicals
September
4, 000 head of
livestock
10 motors for --
1. 1 million rubles
for machine tools
12 kilometers of 344 barrels of toluol and
wire phenol
38 drums of cable
Textiles
Leather Rubber
September
50, 000 meters of
Shoes (no quantity Automobile tires (no quantity
fabric
given) given)
October
47,000
500 pairs of shoes
November
80, 000 "
5000 " 125.railroad cars, cars, auto-
mobile tires
35, 500 sets of automobile tires
December
3, 000 "
900 "
November
53 railroad
cars of
fabric
500, 000 bags
December 2, 000 sheets of linen
600 special suits
500 rugs
(400) Percentages of weights of imported goods were as follows:
Food
65. 0%
Metals
27. 7
Textiles
0. 7
Leather
0. 7
Chemicals
2. 8
Oil
0.4
Other
2.7
100. 0
(401) Consequently, food occupied the largest percentage. Included here
were principally beans and flour making up about two-thirds of the food imports.
Next came preserved meat, rice, sugar and fat.
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(402) Breakdown of the individual foods was as follows:
Beans
16, 500 tons
35. 5%
Flour
12,700
27. 3
Preserved meat
5, 500
11.8
Rice
3,800
8.2
Sugar
2,500
5. 4
Fat
1,000
2.1
Other
4,500
9. 7
46, 500
100.0
(403) Included in the 19, 800 tons of metals imported from September
through December were about 55% ferrous metal products, 25% non-ferrous metal
products, and 20% mixed metal products which are broken down as follows:
Brass
Brass Wire
4, 470 tons
70
Cast iron
Sheet iron
370 tons
2, 120
Iron wire
1,320 3, 810 a
19. 3%
Copper
20
Copper Wire
20
Steel
1,210
Sheet steel
11980
Telephone Cable
360
Steel wire
410 3,610_
18.2%
Aluminum
Tubes
860
Iron hoops
360
Nickel
2
Nails
150
4,947 =
25.
0%
Cables
160
Slip rings
450
Railroad
1,570 3, 450 =
17.4%
Munitions
3, 130 tons
materials
10, 870 =
54. 9%
Armored trucks
180
Miscellaneous
670
3, 980 =
20. 1%
(404) With the exception of motors and machine tools (See Table in Para-
graph 403 of Imports of Goods for Which Weight is not Given) metal deliveries con-
sisted primarily of raw materials and semi-finished goods.
(405) Brass made up the largest portion of non-ferrous metals (91. 2% of
non-ferrous metals and 22. 6% of all metal imports); apparently production of brass
in the Soviet Union was inadequate. Telephone cable, copper wire, and other
deliveries were consigned for reconstruction of the communication system in the
re-occupied regions.
(406) A report on brass imports in October lists imports of 3, 070 tons
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Baku
781 tons
Makachkala
1995 "
Astara
231
Krasnovodsk
63
(407) A large part of the ferrous metal products was composed of iron
sheets and wire as well as steel and steel sheets. Many special steel alloys were
also noted. The portion of railroad material was also high. Rails and switches were
most widely referred to as needed for reconstruction work.
(408) Finished war material was delivered via Iran in only limited
quantities; with the exception of some armored vehicles, munitions (3, 130 tons)
were most frequently referred to.
(409) For almost all types of goods, Baku was the most important trans-
shipment base. A large portion of metal products, food, and chemical imports went
via Makhachkala and many food imports went via Iran, while rubber was principally
routed through Dzhulfa.
(410) Caustic soda and urotropin were the most important chemicals.
2, 000 tons were delivered as follows:
Urotropin
800 tons
Caustic soda
560
Explosives
216
Trinitrotoluol
111
Graphite products
103
Ethyl alcohol
100
Others
110
Among the other chemicals were deliveries of the following: Sodium nitrate, phenol,
ethylene trichloride, sulfides, castor oil, and soap.
(411) Textile deliveries were made up primarily of uniform material:
(180, 900 meters) and bags for transport of flour, etc. With the exception of shoes,
leather shipments were primarily of sole leather. Rubber shipments were primarily
of automobile tires.
(412) The delivery of 300 tons of gasoline is surprising. Apparently it
was a special mixture.
(413) Under other deliveries were noted 1, 014 tons of Palmolive oil,
73 tons of cigarette paper, and 54 tons of plexiglass.
17. Imports from the Far East
(414) Only a few messages refer to imports from the Far East. Trans-
shipment bases for imported goods were established at Nikolaevsk, Vladivostok,
Komsomolsk, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk. The scope of this operation
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cannot be determined. In a message to Khabarovsk-NKRF it was ordered that in
the first ten-day period of July 10, 000 tons of imported goods were to be loaded to
eliminate arrears. In the fourth quarter imports of steel, angle irons, preserved
meat, leather shoes and rubber boots (6, 000 pairs) were noted via Vladivostok.
These imports thus are qualitatively similar to those via Iran.
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Budget Plans of the River Fleet
(415)
NKRF enterprises in Stalingrad for July:
General repairs
300,
000 rubles
Current repairs
580,
000
Other operations
280,
000
New projects
120,
000
(416)
Uralsk NKRF for July:
Shipbuilding
30,
000
General repairs
15,
000
Current repairs
65,
000
Other operations
55,
000
Orders
10,
000
(417)
Ust-Ussa NKRF for September:
Shipbuilding
140,
000
General repairs
60,
000
Current repairs
85,
000
Other operations
45,
000
Industrial operations
1,270,
000
Administration & economic projects
265,
000
(418)
Plant "Molotov" for November:
Shipbuilding
250,
000
General repairs
50,
000
Contracts for the NKRF
190,
000
Contracts for other organizations
210,
000
(418)
NKRF Plant "Gorodets" for November:
Contracts for the NKRF
40,
000
Contracts for other organizations
630,
000
(420) Gorkij:
Shipbuilding
275,
000 rubles
250, 000 rubles
General repairs
300,
000
300, 000
Current repairs
550,
000
670,000
Other operations
525,
000
450, 000
Operations for external orders
280,000
270,000
1,930,000
1,940,000
Additional contracts
400, 000
450, 000
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(421) Ufa:
Shipbuilding
General repairs
Current repairs
Other operations
Operations for external orders
(422) Molotov:
135, 000 rubles 120, 000 rubles
35,000 20 , 000
150, 000 250, 000
70, 000 60, 000
110,000 100,000
500, 000 550, 000
15,000 25,000
Shipbuilding 60, 000 30, 000
General repairs 28, 000 140, 000
Current repairs 470, 000 850, 000
Other operations 330, 000 180, 000
Operations for external orders 700,000 700, 000
1P850,000 11900,000
Additional contracts 250, 000 300, 000
(423) Kirov:
Shipbuilding
General repairs
Current repairs
Other operations
Operations for external orders
90, 000 77, 000
15, 000 10,000
45, 000 88, 000
30, 000 30, 000
40, 000 45, 000
220, 000 250, 000
15,000 25,000
(424) Shipyard in Rybache for the third quarter:
Shipbuilding
General repairs
Current repairs
Other operations
100, 000 rubles
100, 000
35, 000
35, 000
270, 000
(425) Shipyard in Ufa for the third quarter:
Shipbuilding 400, 000
General repairs 485, 000
Current repairs 250, 000
Other operations 240, 000
Allied operations 325, 000
1,700,000
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(426) Shipyard in Orel (150 km north of Molotov) for the third quarter:
Shipbuilding
Assembly operations
(427) Shipyard in Cherdyn for the third quarter:
Shipbuilding
Assembly operations
(428) Budget plans for the third and fourth quarters
Aral Sea
Aral Sea
Astrakhan
Kirov
Ku jb ys he v
Kujbyshev
Molotov
Molotov
Chardzhou
Ufa
Ufa
Blagoveshchensk
Blagoveshchensk
Khabarovsk
Yakutsk
Yakutsk
Semipalatinsk
Semipalatinsk
Uralsk
Uralsk
44, 000 rubles
43, 000
4,640,000
130, 000
1,020,000
597, 000
106, 000
383, 000
220, 000
180, 000
348, 000
655, 000
230, 000
448, 000
187, 000
370, 000
142, 000
80, 000
185, 000
13, 000
4th
3rd
4th
3rd
3rd
4th
3rd
4th
3rd
4th
(429) The plan called for 2, 100, 000 rubles worth of production
turned out by the NKRF Plant in Saratov during the fourth quarter, but an
additional 350, 000 rubles worth of production was ordered to make up for
production in preceding months.
(430)
Kujbyshev NKRF,
Middle Volga Steam-
ship Agency
Construction in the 3rd quarter
Repairs " it if
Construction & Repairs in the 3rd quarter
Repairs in the 3rd quarter
Repairs It " It it
20, 000 rubles
20, 000
40, 000
150, 000
50, 000
200, 000
4th
3rd
" 4th
Construction in the 3rd quarter
Repairs in the 3rd quarter
Remarks
For production in 4th quarter
it
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Zurazhevka, Ship- 1. 5 million rubles For production in 4th quarter
yard
Stalingrad, Lower 34.4
Volga Steamship Agency
(431) Arkhangelsk for the 4th quarter:
Shipbuilding
750,
000 rubles
General repairs
600,
000
Current repairs
1,
100,
000
Other operations
880,
000
Contracts for other organizations
1,840,000
5, 170,000
Above-plan authorization for repairs
on their own equipment
1,045,000
(432) Vologda NKRF for the 4th quarter:
Shipbuilding 580, 000
General repairs 200, 000
Current repairs 450, 000
Other operations 220, 000
Contracts from other organizations 100, 000
1,550,000
Supplementary authorization for 210, 000
repairs on their own inventory
(433) Uralsk NKRF for the 4th quarter and October:
4th quarter October
General repairs
Current repairs
Other operations
Allied operations
(434)
Blagoveshchensk NKRF, 2. 8 mil. rubles
Upper Amur Steamship
Agency
65, 000 rubles 30, 000 rubles
275, 000 20, 000
170,000 60,000
165,000 50,000
For winter ship repairs:
Current repairs: 1. 5 mil. rubles
Minor repairs: 1e 0
Other repairs: 0. 3 "
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Khabarovsk NKRF,
Lower Amur Steamship
Agency
(438) For repairs at River Fleet Bases in 1944:
Krasnoyarsk NKRF, 5. 5
Upper Enisej Steam-
ship Agency
Ulan Ude NKRF, 1.8 If
Selenga Steamship Agency
Winter ship repairs:
Current repairs: 3. 0 mil, rubles
Minor repairs: 1.7
Other repairs: 1.5
Winter ship repairs:
Current repairs: 3. 2
Minor repairs: 1.8
Other repairs: 0. 5
Winter ship repairs:
Current repairs: 1. 0
Minor repairs: 0. 6 "
Other repairs 0.2
Ust-Ussa NKRF, 2.0 it it For 4th quarter:
Northern Steamship Agency Repairs: 1.3
Heating materials: 0. 7
(435) The Water Transport Base in Omsk was authorized 1. 6 million
rubles for ship repairs during the winter half year 1943/44,
(436) The Water Transport Base in Molotov was authorized an additional
250, 000 rubles for ship repairs.
(437) Gorodets NKRF production plan for the year: 8, 000, 000 rubles
Zvenigovo production plan for the year: 11, 720, 000
Baturino shipbuilding plan for the year: 90, 000
Ulan Ude 100, 000 rubles
Blagoveshchensk 700, 000
Krasnoyarsk 200, 000
Khabarovsk 300, 000
Irkutsk 75, 000
For current ship repairs in 1944:
Gorkij 15,000, 000
Kirov 1,600,000
Kujbyshev 8,000,000
(439) Stalingrad NKRF has received the following monetary authorizations
1) Fuel 205, 000 rubles
Ship repairs 6,668,000
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2)
Winter wages for operating personnel
1,
628, 000 rubles
Bonuses and salary increases
106, 000
Other purposes
366, 000
3)
Wages for shore personnel
1,
037, 000
Bonuses and salary increases
67, 000
Materials
40, 000
Training
207, 000
Amortization
660, 000
4)
Wages for communication personnel
150, 000
Bonuses and salary increases
10, 000
Materials
65, 000
Other purposes
104, 000
5)
Community lodgings
200,000
Wages for administrative and working personnel
311, 000
Bonuses and salary increases
20, 000
Other purposes
50, 000
(440) Following are the production plans for 1944 at the Astrakhan and
Kujbyshev NKRF offices:
Astrakhan NKRF
1944 Plan
Plan for the 1st quarter
Shipbuilding
575, 000 rubles
50, 000 rubles
Major repairs
7,695,000
970, 000
Current repairs
11, 090, 000
5,490,000
Kujbyshev NKRF
Shipbuilding
3,219,000
350,000
Major repairs
5, 770, 000
11550,000
Current repairs
8, 917, 000
440, 000
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APPENDIX II
Transport Plans of the River Fleet
(441) Transport plans for individual steamship agencies have been con-
firmed as follows: In July Chardzhou-NKRF was to load 48, 200 tons of freight as
follows:
2,
300 tons
Grain
300
Fish
1,
150
Timber
1,
000
Chemical products
8,
900
Fibrin
3,
000
Raw materials
6,
900
Seeds
5,
000
Imported goods
5,
150
Other cargoes
5,
800
Oil
8,
700
Special cargoes
48,
200 tons.
The unloading plan for the same
month was set at 46, 200 tons.
(442) In July Aralsk-NKRF was to load 22, 000 tons of freight as follows:
2,
000 tons
Grain
1,
200
Fish
1,
000
Chemical products
8,
200
"Fibrin
2,
100
Seeds
3,
000
Imported goods
4,
000
Special cargoes
500
Other cargoes
22,
000 tons.
August:
(443) The following transport plan was set up for Ulan Ude-NKRF in
1, 300 tons
Salt
(0. 5 million ton/kilometers;
1,400
Timber aboard ship
;0. 6
400
Coal
0.1
400
Fish
0.2
6, 500
4, 200
Live livestock
Other cargoes
1.2
(444) The transport plan for the third ten-day period of August for Ust-
Ussa is as follows:
8, 000 tons Coal
11000 Timber
6, 000 Floated cargoes
3, 500 Miscellaneous
18, 500
(6. 7 million tons /kilometers)
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(445) Ilijsk-NKRF was to ship 13, 000 tons of freight (3.6 million tons/
kilometers) by the end of August.
(446) Timber transport plan for August:
Quantity
Ulan-Ude
a) Planned:
100, 000 tons
b) Above-plan shipments
voluntarily proposed:
30, 000 tons
Krasnoyarsk
30,000
75,000
Irkutsk
---
10,000
(447) The following shipments were to be carried out in September:
Amount
Millions of ton/kilometers
Grain
2, 000 tons
2. 9
Salt
1,100
1.0
Coal
4,000
5.3
Minerals
1,500
0.1
Other cargoes
800
_ 1.4
9,400
10.7
From Semipalatinsk-NKRF
Grain
10, 000 tons
3.6
Salt
5,000
2.8
Coal
3, 100
1. 1
Timber
9, 700
Z. 1
Clay
15,000
4.0
Livestock
4,000
1.5
45,800
15.1
Salt
800 tons
0. 5
Timber
100
?
Livestock
4,000
0.8
Fish
1,400
0.6
Freight from the NK
for Foreign Trade
4, 500
0. 1
Other cargoes
15,000
2.0
(448) In September Kujbyshev-NKRF was transport 401, 900 tons of
freight or 242.3 million ton/kilometers. Included in this assignment were 97, 900
tons of bread grain (48. 8 million ton/km) and 5, 600 tons of timber aboard ship
(4. 7 million ton/km).
(449) In order to catch up on arrears, the following NKRF offices had
to carry out the following shipments during the first ten-day period of September:
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A. Blagoveshchensk, a total of 26, 000 tons of freight (15 million ton/km)
including:
6,
300 tons
000
Bread
Salt
500
Coal
1,
500
Timber aboard ship;
B. Khabarovsk, a total of 53, 000 tons of freight (38 million ton/km)
including:
20, 000 tons Oil
1,500 Salt
2,000 Coal
1, 500 Timber aboard ship
28, 000 Other cargoes;
C. Krasnoyarsk, a total of 38, 000 tons of freight (30 million ton/km)
including:
6, 000 tons Bread
500 Salt
5,000 Coal
2, 000 Timber aboard ship
18, 000 Timber in rafts;
D. Irkutsk, a total of 20, 000 tons of freight (3. 5 million ton/km)
including:
2, 000 tons Bread
5, 300 Salt
10,000 Coal
2, 000 Timber aboard ship
3, 500 Timber in rafts.
(450) In order to eliminate arrears in the second ten-day period of
September, Novosibirsk was to ship 120, 000 tons of cargo (30 million ton/
kilometers).
(451) In the third ten-day period of September the Enisej Steamship
Agency at Krasnoyarsk was to ship 54, 000 tons of freight (40 million ton/kilometers).
(452) Offices of the NK for the River Fleet had to make grain shipments
in September as follows:
Office
Amount
Molotov-NKR,F
6, 900 tons
Molotov-NKRF
14, 540
Kirov-NKR.F
11,000
Kujbyshev-NKRF
38, 000
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Office
Saratov-NKRF
Ilijsk-NKRF
Omsk-NKRF
Omsk-NKRF
Gorkij-NKRF
Belaya Steamship Agency in Ufa
(453) Third quarter transport plans
A. Gorkij-NKRF Cement
Minerals
Coal
Metals
Timber
Chemical products
Other cargoes
Floated cargoes
B. Kujbyshev-NKRF Grain
Cement
Minerals
Coal
Metals
Timber
Chemical products
Floated cargoes
Other cargoes
C. Stalingrad-NKRF Grain
Salt
Minerals
Coal
Metals
Timber
Chemical products
Other cargoes
Floated cargoes
D. Ust-Ussa-NKRF Grain
Salt
Minerals
Coal
Metals
Timber
Other cargoes
Oil
Floated cargoes
Amount
31, 400 tons
700
22, 000
12, 000
2, 000
4, 100
30, 000 tons Q 5 ton/km
200,000 50
25,000 13.2
60, 000 36
300, 000 72
32,000 16.6
792,000 9
1, 100,000 161
180,000 101
45, 000 23
100,000 20
10,000 0.6
30,000 18
100,000 33.4
22,000 9.2
900, 000 660
200,000 90
50,000 17.5
440, 000 450
30,000 4.5
30,000 21
25,000 15
40,000 35
12,000 6
125,000 87.4
0 0
11,000 3.6
1,000 0.3
3,000 1.2
42,000 24.8
1,000 0.4
15,000 5
15, 000 ?
500 0.4
200,000 49
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E. Molotov-NKRF Grain
Salt
Cement
Minerals
Coal
Metals
Timber
Chemical products
Other cargoes
Floated cargoes
F. Uralsk-NKRF Grain
Salt
Minerals
Timber
Chemical products
Other cargoes
Oil
Floated cargoes
Grain
Salt
Cement
Minerals
Coal
Metals
Timber
Other cargoes
Floated cargoes
18, 000 tons
85, 000
20, 000
30, 000
45, 000
120, 000
45, 000
45, 000
200, 000
2, 600, 000
15, 000
2, 000
3, 000
16, 000.
9, 000
8, 000
2, 000
4, 000
62, 000
6, 000
5, 000
40, 000
2, 000
8, 000
60, 000
45, 000
150, 000
62 ton/km
66. 7
15
9
16. 5
62
13.5
34. 6
86
900
3. 8
0. 6
0. 8
4. 4
2. 7
2. 7
1.3
0. 7
16. 8
1. 3
1.4
5. 6
0. 6
3. 8
10.8
18
27 ).
(454) In the third quarter NKRF offices were to transship cargo as
Office
Kirov-NKRF
Gorkij-NKRF
Ufa-NKRF
Molotov-NKRF
Stalingrad-NKRF
Kujbyshev-NKRF
Uralsk-NKRF
Cargo
40, 000 tons
620, 000
60, 000
300, 000
300, 000
350, 000
10, 000
(455) The barge towing plan for certain offices was reduced as follows:
Molotov to 290, 000 tons
Khabarovsk 15,000
Krasnoyarsk 48,000
Yakutsk 15,000
80, 000, 000 tons /kilometers
2,500,000
45, 000, 000
13, 700, 000
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(456) During the first half of October B lagoveshchensk-NKRF and
Novosibirsk-NKRF were to make the following shipments:
Blagoveshchensk 27, 000 tons 0. 8 million ton/kilometers
Novosibirsk 135,000 42. 0.
(457) In the second half of October Stalingrad-NKRF was to ship 2, 000
tons of gravel to Astrakhan. During the fourth quarter Stalingrad-NKRF was to
transship 182, 000 tons of cargo, 91, 000 tons by aid of mechanical equipment and
91, 000 tons manually.
(458) During the fourth quarter NKRF offices were to transship cargo as
Office
Cargo
Mechanically
Manually
Molotov-NKRF
217, 000 tons
119, 000 tons
98, 000 tons
Ufa-NKRF
35,000
20,800
14,200
Kirov-NKRF
24, 000
7, 900
16, 100.
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Appendix 4
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