LETTER TO GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000800300001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LETTER

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General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg
Pennsylvania
Pursuant to our telephone conversation of 13 August,
I have requested that a concise account of the events and
circumstances attending the 1 May 1960 U-2 incident be pre-
pared for transmittal to you.
The information and details outlined in the attached
documents are all in the public domain and there are no
security restrictions attached. Nevertheless, they represent
a factual and, we believe, accurate presentation of the events
that transpired prior to and during the fateful mission of
1 May 1960 and the difficult days that followed.
I trust that this data from the record will satisfy
your requirement. However, if there is any additional in-
formation th_at-will be of use to you, please do not hesitate
to call upon me. I will be privileged to be of service.
Sincerely,
John A. McCone
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THE U-2 INCIDENT
In 1954 consultation was initiated on new intelligence collection
techniques with a group of highly competent technicians in and out of
government. From these discussions emerged the concept of a high-
flying, high performance reconnaissance plane. In the then state,of
the art of aeronautics, it was confidently believed that a plane could be
designed to fly unintercepted over the vitally important closed areas of
the Soviet Union, where ballistic, nuclear, and other military prepara-
tions against us were being made.
We also believed, as a result of these consultations, that the art of
photography could be so advanced as to make the resolution of the
pictures taken, even at extreme altitudes, of very great significance.
On both counts the accomplishments exceeded expectations.
While the developmental work for this project was in process,
pursuant to Presidential directive, there came the Summit Conference
of July 1955.
Here, in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the
danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "open skies"
proposal. Moscow summarily rejected anything of this nature, and
Soviet security measures continued to be reinforced.
Accordingly, the U-2 project was pushed forward rapidly, and
about a year later, in June of 1956, the first operational U-2 overflights
of the Soviet Union took place. For almost four years the flight
program was carried forward successfully.
On 10 July 1956, the Soviets publicly protested the overflights
but the protest was rejected by the U. S. Government.
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On 5 March 1958 the Soviets again protested, through confidential
channels, an overflight on 2 March 1958 and specifically identified the
aircraft as a U-2. Again, the protest was rejected.
It was recognized at the outset that the U-2 project had its risks
and had a limited span of life due to improvement of countermeasures;
that a relatively fragile single-engine plane of the nature of the U-2
might one day have a flame-out or other malfunction in the rarefied
atmosphere in which it had to travel. If that resulted in a serious and
prolonged loss of altitude, it was recognized that there was a danger
of failure and discovery. It was also understood, however, that this
operation was one of the most valuable intelligence collection operations
that any country has ever mounted at any time, and that it was vital
to our national security.
Although, in its initial concept, the U-2 program was given a
life span of 18 months, it was, in fact, successfully employed for
almost four years over the Soviet Union.
On 1 May 1960, a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers, was lost
in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk. A chronology of events leading up to
final approval of this mission is as follows:
16 April: The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (COMOR) submitted
three geographical groupings of highest priority targets .in the USSR
for consideration of Operations. Coverage was designed to provide
critical information on the status and deployment of Soviet ICBM's.
19 April: Mr. Dulles briefed the Secretary of State on three
proposed missions, one of which would be accomplished.
21 April: Mr. Hugh Cumming advised the Acting Chief, DPD, CIA,
that Secretary Herter had concurred in the three mission proposals.
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25 April: Brigadier General Andrew Goodpaster of the White House
Staff, advised Mr. Richard Bissell that approval had been granted by
the President for the execution of one of the three missions.
Subsequent to the 1 May incident, in his testimony before the Senate
Armed Forces Committee, Mr. Allen Dulles stated as follows:
'!.On the afternoon of 30 April last, after carefully considering
the field report on the weather and other determining factors
affecting the flight then contemplated, and after consultation
with General Cabell and other qualified advisors in the Agency,
and acting within existing authority to make a flight at that
time, I personally gave the order to proceed with the flight
of May first.
"There was no laxity or uncertainty in the chain of
command in obtaining the authority to act or in giving the
order to proceed, With respect to the flight authorized on
April 30, the same careful procedures were followed as had
been followed in the many preceding successful flights. "
The chronology of events which transpired subsequent to the loss of
the U-2 was described in detail by Mr. Dulles to the Armed Forces
Committee as follows:
"I will now deal with the 'cover story' statements which
were issued following May 1.
"When a plane is overdue and the fact of its takeoff and
failure to return is known, some statement must be made,
and quickly. Failure to do so, and, under normal conditions,
to start a search for the lost plane, would in itself be a
suspicious event.
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"Thus, when the U-2 disappeared on May first and
did not return to its base within the requisite time period
after its takeoff, action was required.
"For many years, in fact since the inception of the
operation, consideration has been given to the cover
story which would be used in the case of the disappear-
ance of a plane which might possibly-he ov-er-unfriendly
territory.
"Because of its special characteristics, the U-2
plane was of great interest to the U. S. weather
services and to the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, the predecessor of NASA. NASA was
very much concerned with the scientific advances
which operations of these U-2s could make towards
greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for
other scientific purposes. As already indicated,
U-2s have now undertaken many weather and
related missions and their functions in this respect
have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity
has been distributed freely to the world.
"It was therefore natural that NASA's operations
be used to explain the presence of U-2s at various
bases throughout the world, although NASA did not
participate in the development of intelligence devices,
nor did they participate in the planning and conduct
of any intelligence missions.
"Accordingly, when the May first flight was
lost, an initial statement was issued on May 2nd
by the Base Commandant at Adana that a U-2
aircraft, engaged in upper air studies and
operating from the base was down, and oxygen
difficulties had been reported. This was
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identified in the press as a NASA plane. A search for the
plane was initiated in the remote areas of eastern Turkey.
"On May 5, early in the day by our time, Khrushchev
made his claim that "an American aircraft crossed our
frontier and continued its flight into the interior of our
country . . and . . . was shot down. " At that time,
Khrushchev gave no further details of significance.
"Apparently as an attempt at deception, Khrushchev
followed up his speech the next day by distributing photo-
graphs of a pile of junk -- according to experts, pieces of
an old Soviet fighter plane -- possibly for the, purpose
of making us think that the U-2 plane had been effectively
destroyed. Since the fake wreckage was quickly identified
for what it was, this particular ruse had no effect.
"The NASA statement which followed the Khrushchev
speech of May 5 developed somewhat further the original
cover story.- Also on May 5, the Department of State
issued a further release which generally followed the
cover story. Mr. Dillon has covered this in his
testimony before this Committee on May 27.
"At this time - on 5-6 May - we still did not know
whether the plane or any recognizable parts of it or
the pilot were in Soviet hands, or whether the pilot.
was dead or alive. Furthermore, then we did not
know whether Khrushchev desired to blow up the
incident as he later did, or put it under the rug
and spare his people the knowledge that we had been
overflying them.
"Hence, in this situation, there seemed no reason
at that time to depart from the original cover story.
"These two press releases attributed to NASA were
.worked out in consultation between CIA and NASA and
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after conferring with the Department of State.
"These statements did not come out of any lack of
forethought or attention to their preparation or lack of
coordination. The basic cover story had been developed
some years ago for the exigency of a failure, and this
original cover story was on May 5 modified to meet
our then estimate of what was best to say in the light
of what little we knew about the details of the May 1
flight failure.
"Subsequently, on May 7, Khrushchev adduced evidence
that he had the pilot alive, and quoted his purported
statements. He also produced certain of the contents
of the plane and later various parts of the plane itself.
This clearly disclosed the true nature ofthe-mission on
which the plane was engaged.
"The cover story was outflanked.
"The issue then was whether to admit the incident
but deny high level responsibility, or to take the course
that was decided upon and clearly expressed in Secretary
Herter's statement of May 9 and in the President's
statement of May 11, and his address of May Z5.
"In Mr. Herter's appearance before this Committee,
he has dealt with the statements which were issued
during the period after May 6, except for the two
statements involving NASA which I have covered.
"I would only add that in my opinion, in the light
of all the factors involved, the decision taken to assume
responsibility in this particular case was the correct
one. Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would
have been tortuous and self defeating.
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"Those who took this decision knew that I was ready
to assume the full measure of responsibility and to cover
the project as a technical intelligence operation carried
out on my own responsibility as Director of CIA. This
alternative, too, was rejected because of the many
elements making it hardly credible over the longer run."
The foregoing is a reasonably comprehensive account of the circum-
stances attending the incident of 1 May 1960. Attached at Tab A,
is the official report of the Board of Inquiry which was convened
subsequent to the return of Mr. Powers in February of 1962.
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Attachment A
STATEMENT CONCERNING FRANCIS GARY POWERS
Since his return from imprisonment by Soviet Russia, Francis Gary
Powers has undergone a most intensive debriefing by CIA and otherin- -
telligence specialists, aeronautical technicians, and other experts con-
cerned with various aspects of his mission and subsequent capture by the
Soviets. This was followed by a complete review by a board of inquiry
presided over by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to determine if Powers
complied with the terms of his employment and his obligations as an
American. The board has submitted its report to the Director of
Central Intelligence.
Certain basic points should be kept in mind in connection with this
case. The pilots involved in the U-2 program were selected on the basis
of aviation proficiency, physical stamina, emotional stability, and, of
course, personal security. They were not selected or trained as espionage
agents, and the whole nature of the mission was far removed from the
traditional espionage scene. Their job was to fly the plane, and it was
so demanding an assignment that on completion of a mission physical
fatigue was a hazard on landing.
The pilots' -contracts provided that they perform such services as
might be required and follow such instructions and briefings in connection
therewith as were given to them by their superiors. The guidance was as
follows:
"(a) If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots
should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward
their captors.
"(b) At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will
conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward
their superiors.
"(c) Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the
full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications
of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians,
to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment,
and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission. "
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They were instructed, therefore, to be cooperative with their captors
within limitations, to use their own judgment of what they should a ; ,tempt
to withhold, and not to subject themselves to strenuous hostile interrogation.
It has been established that. Mr. Powers had been briefed in accordance
with this policy and so understood his guidance. In regard to the poison
needle which was prominently mentioned at the trial in Moscow, it should
be emphasized that this was intended for use primarily if the pilot were
subjected to torture or other circumstances which in his discretion
warranted the taking of his own life. There were no instructions that he
should commit suicide and no expectation that he would do so except in
those situations just described, and I emphasize that even taking the needle
with him in the plane was not mandatory; it was his option.
Mr. Powers' performance on prior missions has been reviewed, and
it is clear that he was one of the outstanding pilots in the whole U-2
program. He was proficient both as a flyer and as a navigator and showed
himself calm in emergency situations. His security background has been
exhaustively reviewed, and any circumstances which might conceivably
have led to pressure from or defection to the Russians have also been ex-
haustively reviewed, and no evidence has been found to support any theory
that failure of his flight might be laid to Soviet espionage activities. The
same is true of the possibilities of sabotage.
Accordingly, Mr. Powers was assigned to the mission that eventually
occurred on May 1, 1960, and accepted the assignment willingly.- It was
a particularly grueling assignment across the heart of Soviet Russia and
It was necessary to maintain
extreme altitude at heights at which no other plane but the U-2 had steadily
flown. So far as can be ascertained Mr. Powers followed the scheduled
flight plan, making a prescribed turn to the northwest when nearing the
city of Sverdlovsk where he was directly on course. According to his
statement, he had settled on his new course and had Sverdlovsk in sight,
perhaps 20 or 30 miles away, when he felt and heard something he
describes as a push or feeling of acceleration on the plane accompanied
by a dull noise unlike the sharp sound of a high explosive. This caused him
to look up from his instruments, and he saw surrounding him, or perhaps
reflected in his canopy, he is not sure, an orange or reddish glare which
seemed to persist. He felt this phenomenon to be external to the plane but
says he cannot be sure. For a moment the plane continued to fly normally,
then it dipped to the right but he found he was able to control this dip and
level the plane with his normal controls. Shortly thereafter, however, the
plane began to nose forward, and Mr. Powers states that as he drew back on
the stick he felt no control as if the control lines had been severed. The
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plane nosed sharply over and went into violent maneuver, at which point
he believes the wings came off. The hull of the plane then turned completely
over and he found himself in an inverted spin with the nose high revolving
around the center of the fuselage so that all he could see through the
canopy looking ahead was the sky revolving around the nose of the plane.
This motion exerted g. forces on him which threw him forward and up
in the cockpit. At this point he stated he could have reached the destruct
switches which would have set off an explosive charge in the bottom of the
plane. However, he realized that this charge would go off in 70 seconds
and he did not yet know if he could leave the plane. He stated that he. tried
to draw b.imself back into the seat to see if he could activate the ejection
mechanism, but the g. forces prevented him from recovering his position.
Being forward and out of the seat, even if he could have used the ejection
mechanism, which was below and behind him, it would have seriously
injured him if activated. He recalled that it was possible to open the canopy
manually, and shortly thereafter he was able to do so and the canopy
disappeared. His last recollection of the altimeter was that he was at about
34, 000 feet and descending rapidly. To see if he could get out of the
cockpit, he released his seat belt and was immediately thrown forward
out over the cowling of the cockpit to a position where he was held only
by his oxygen tube. He tried to pull himself back in the cockpit to the
destruct switches which take four separate manipulations to set and found
himself unable to do so because of the g. forces,, the inflation of his pressure
suit, and the fogging up of his face mask which totally obscured his view.
By pushing he tore loose the oxygen tube and fell free, whereupon his
parachute opened almost immediately, indicating that he was probably at
15, 000 feet or below at this time since the automatic mechanism was set
for this height. In connection with Powers' efforts to operate the destruct
switches, it should be noted that the basic weight limitations kept the
explosive charge to 2 1/2 pounds and the purpose of the destruct mechansim
was to render inoperable the precision camera and other equipment, not to
destroy them and the film. After he landed he was taken by commercial
plane to Moscow the same day.
In the processing into the prison he was given a hypodermic injection
which may well have been a general immunization, and there is no evidence
of the use of truth serums or other drugs. From then until the time of the
trial, about 100 days, he was kept in solitary confinement and subjected to
constant interrogation, sometimes as long as 10 or 12 hours a day, but on the
average considerably less than this. He had no access to anyone but his
Russian guards and interrogators despite repeated requests for contact with
the U. S. Embassy or his family and friends. He states that the interrogation
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was not intense in_the sense of physical violence or severe hostile ? ,; (-)d
and that in some respects he was able to resist answering specific que stior:
As an example, his interrogators were interested in the names of people
participating in the project, and he states that he tried to anticipate what
names would become known and gave those, such as the names of his
commanding officer and certain other personnel at his home base in Adana,
Turkey, who would probably be known in any case to the Russians. However,
they asked him for names of other pilots and he states that he refused to
give these on the grounds that they were his friends and comrades and if he
gave their names they would lose their jobs and, therefore, he could not do
so. He states they accepted this position. It is his stated belief, therefore,
that the information he gave was that which in all probability would be known
in any case to his captors.
At his trial he had only the advice of his Russian defense counsel to
go by, and he advised that unless Powers pleaded guilty to what the Russians
considered a clear violation of domestic law and expressed penitence,
matters would go hard for him, including a possible death sentence. These
actions were consistent with his instructions from CIA. After the trial and
sentencing, Mr. Powers states that there was only intermittent interroga-
tion of little importance and that on the whole he was well treated, adequately
fed, and given medical attention when required. 6
All the facts concerning Mr. Powers' mission, the descent-of his
plane, his capture, and his subsequent actions have been subjected to intensive
study. In the first place, Powers was interrogated for many days con-
secutively by a debriefing team of experienced interrogators, one of whose
duties was to evaluate Powers' credibility. They expressed the unanimous
view that Powers was truthful in his account. Secondly, an intensive inquiry
was made by Government officials into the background, life history,
education, conduct, and character of Powers. This team included doctors,
specialists in psychiatry and psychology, personnel officers, his former
colleagues in the Air Force and on the U-2 project. All these persons were of
the view that Powers is inherently and by practice a truthful man. Thirdly,
Powers appeared before a board of inquiry and testified at length, both
directly and under cross-examination. The board agreed that in his appearance
he appeared to be truthful, frank, straightforward, and without any indicated
attempt to evade questions or color what he was saying. In the board's
judgment he reflected an attitude of complete candor. In the fourth place,
when during his examination before the board a question was raised as to the
accuracy of one of his statements, he volunteered with some vehemence that,
although he disliked the process of the polygraph, he would like to undergo za
polygraph test. That test was subsequently duly administered by an expert
and in it he was examined on all of the factual phases which the board
considered critical in this inquiry. The report by the polygraph oper;itor
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is that he displayed no indications of deviation from the truth in tah
course of that examination. In the fifth place, a study of the photo,_; :?aph
of the debris of the plane and other information concerning the plan
revealed in the opinion of experts making the study no condition which
suggested an inconsistency with Powers' account of what had transpired.
The board noted the testimony of Russian witnesses at the trial in Moscow
which dealt with the descent and capture of Powers and with technical
features of the plane and the incident.
The testimony was consistent with the account given by Powers.
Powers was able to identify a spot near a small village where he thought
he had landed. This location checked with prior testimony given by
Powers as to physical features, directions, and distances and also cor-
responded with earlier independent information not known to Powers that
certain of the persons who captured him lived in this same small village.
Some information from confidential sources was available. Some of it
corroborated Powers and some of it was inconsistent in parts with Powers'
story, but that which was inconsistent was in part contradictory with
itself and subject to various interpretations. Some of this information was
the basis for considerable speculation shortly after the May 1 episode and
subsequent stories in the press that Powers' plane had descended gradually
from its extreme altitude and had been shot down by a Russian fighter at
medium altitude. On careful analysis, it appears that the information pn
which these stories were based was erroneous-or-was -susceptible of varying
interpretations.. The board came to the conclusion that it could not accept
a doubtful interpretation in this regard which was inconsistent with all the
other known facts and consequently rejected these newspaper stories as not
founded in fact.
On all the information available, therefore, it is the conclusion of the
board of inquiry which reviewed Mr. Powers' case and of the Director of
Central Intelligence, who has carefully studied the board's report and has
discussed it with the board, that Mr. Powers lived up to the terms of his
employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in his
obligations as an American under the circumstances in which he found himself.
It should be noted that competent aerodynamicists and aeronautical engineers
have carefully studied Powers' description of his experience and have con-
cluded on the basis of scientific analysis that a U-2 plane damaged as he
described would perform in its descent in about the manner he stated.
Accordingly, the amount due Mr. Powers under the terms of his contract
will be paid to him.
-5-
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SAL/ OSA/_: sld
Distribution:
1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - Exec. Dir.
4 - DD/S&T
5 - DD/S&T
6 - AD/OSA
7-GCG
8 - Security/ CIA
9 - SS/ OSA
10 - SAL / OSA
11 - SAL/Chrono
12 - RB/OSA
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