COMMENTS TO W.R. THOMAS III MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR, BOB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000800290012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 27, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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27 July 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Special Activities
SUBJECT Comments to W.R. Thomas III Memorandum
to the Director, BOB
1. That time of the year approaches when we must take
up the cudgels and do battle with Mr. Thomas over whether the
OXCART program shall continue or be smothered for lack of
funds. Since it can be said safely that Mr. Thomas will
most likely carry into the fray the same attitude towards
the OXCART program that he had last year, it behooves us to.
be prepared for his attack this year. Assuming his attitude
remains unchanged and not knowing what. tack he will take
this year, our best preparation is to closely examine his
memorandum of 10 November 1965 for errors in fact and
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rationale. Thus armed we will be in a better position to
meet his ass .nlt on the OXCART program's existence.
2. Since the Thomas memorandum is somewhat disjointedly
organized, all comments will be arranged in the same sequence.
(Lines 1-6) In his opening paragraph Mr. Thomas states that the
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state his figure includes the YF-12A and its fire control and
missile "ardware; the TAGBOARD program with its expensive
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modification costs for two mother ships and the purchase of
20 drones; and all the sensor procurement for the OXCART,
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(Lines 20-32) In comparing the flight capabilities of the SR-71
and the OXCART vehicle Mr. Thomas does not tell the whole
story.
What the paper in question seems to avoid is the
demonstrated fact that the A-12 is an operational, proven
system in being. The statement that the SR-71 will suddenly
achieve operational readiness in July 1966 was highly assump-
tive and, in fact, not achieved. As indicated by Mr. Thomas,
the SR-71 in-flight test has yet to demonstrate performance
which would tend to validate design specifications. The
SR-71 is 20,000 pounds heavier than the A-12, which fact
alone dictates the SR-71 will attain about 3,000 feet less
than the A-12 at any given point in a profile of missions of
The same range. Furthermore, the SR-71 project office itself
holds to a December 1966 date for anything approaching full
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operational readiness with a deployment capability.
According to the SR-71 model specification, the planned
altitude for a maximum range of 3,800 n.m. using 60% after-
burner is 74 - 85,000 feet. Range for a 100% afterburner
maximum altitude profile of 80 - 91,000 feet is 3,048 n.m.
According to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Aerodynamic Report
SP-237A, the planned A-12 altitude for a maximum range of
4,351 n.m. using 60% afterburner is 77,500 - 89,500 feet.
Range for a 100% afterburner maximum altitude profile of
85,500 - 97,000 feet is 3,706 n.m. A maximum A-12 altitude
of 90,000 feet with full afterburner has been demonstrated.
An A-12 maximum unrefueled range of 2,800 n.m. at altitudes
of 75,400 - 81,300 feet has been demonstrated. We feel that
the figure of 90,000 feet in the Thomas paper for the SR-71
is grossly unfair and misleading, and that the 3,800 n.m.
range for that aircraft is in the same category.
(Lines 34-52) No comment, other than -,-n up-date of the figures.
Delivery date of last SR-71 should be noted, September 1967,
thus limiting the full fleet SR-71 capability until early 1968.
(Lines 53-74) In treating Proposed Utilization it is apparent that
Mr. Thomas is unaware of the fact that there is a prohibition
;.,_;ainst U.S. military aircraft violating the air space of any
nation be it in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or elsewhere
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without a filed flight plan or the explicit approval of the
President to so do, e.g., Cuba or North Vietnam and Laos.
Except for Cuban and Vietnamese reconnaissance, the SR-71 is
constrained to peripheral missions in peace time.
While not specifying the number of missions projected
for the OXCART capability they would appear significantly fewer
than those projected for the SR-71. Assuming that four SR-71
test aircraft will become operational aircraft (for a total
then of 26 operational SR-711s) and holding six SR-71's on
"hard alert for crises reconnaissance....," it would appear
from Mr. Thomas' paper that 20 SR-719s would be capable of
flying 134 missions in a 60 day period as opposed to 16
missions with an operational fleet of seven (not 10) OXCART
vehicles. The OXCART projection is based on best professional
judgment resulting from a great deal more flight experience
than has been gathered in the SR-71 program. Thus, the
projected ratio is somewhat out of balance with the SR-71
flying at a factor of 6.7 and the OXCART at a factor of 2.3.
Cbvio.,.::;ly, the projections were pulled out of thin air.
Moreover, no mention is made of the immediate availability
of the OXCART as opposed to the severely limited SR-71 capa-
bility in being.
Mr. Thomas assigns, as one of three overflight missions
to the SR-71, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and to the
OXCART ire assigns Southeast Asia as one mission. Except for
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appear. To the reader, who would not examine closely the
assigned missions, it would be im ie tt that the SR-71 has
reconnaissance responsibility for China. Unless there have
been major policy reversals by the NSC, 303 Committee, or
high authority, this responsibility resides on the covert
side of manned overhead reconnaissance.
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(vines 101 - 104) It is neither for Mr. T7oir-s or the writer to
determine whether overflights are to be attributed to clandestine or
military departments. That is a decision for the President to
make in consultation with the highest councils in government.
To measure the value of a covert reconnaissance asset in
dollars is a difficult chore. Certainly the people of the
ited States wo;. not quarrel with the cost of the U-2 program
om conception , ;.sough that day, 14 October 1962 3 when the
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Thus I cannot but disagree with Mr. Thomas when he writes that
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reductions in projected budget requirements "...would not
affect the basic economics of the alternatives which are dis-
(Lines 123-162) A.ternative 1 - No comment to recommendation to
-:procure more SR-71's since a decision has been made since the
memor. dum was written. No comment to the predicted attrition
rate of the SR-7l, except to mention that the first SR-71 loss
has been experienced since Mr. Thomas wrote his memorandum.
Mr. Tomas writes: "'.':e only thin? that will be lost is the
._-12' "OXCART) claimed dis rccion of covert overflights.
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As incL_cated in our discussion above, we do not believe this
distinction is meaningful. It is certainly not worth the cost
o:_~ maintaining the A-12 program." The initial assignment of
responsibility for covert overflight of hostile territory to
a CwA was a Presidential decision based on the strong recom-
... ndation of the so-called Land Committee which concluded that
was "dangerous for one of our military arms to engage
directly in extensive overflight." The 1 May incident of
1960 and its aftermath provide no evidence which would-indict
t -Ie validity of that decision. On the contrary, the Soviets
engaged in extravagant, but unsuccessful, efforts to link
Powers with the military in order to strengthen their propoganda
position. His documentation and identity with CIA, however,
had been too well established for them to make even a super-
ficially convincing case. It is our strong conviction that
we would be doing a considerable disservice to the President
xkaxn were we to permit the OXCART capability to be lost. As
has been demonstrated over the last nine years, the flexibility
of choice between committing a military asset or a non-military
asset with non-military attribution has been most advantageous...
t also should be pointed out that, when advised of OXCART'S
operational status an_ eeadiness to deploy to Kadena in late
1965, Mr. McGeorge nd r , while f ? ling the time was not appropri-
at then for such re e , :_ was an ace we should keep
up our sleeve.
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When Mr. Thomas speaks of disposing of the OXCART
aircraft, he does not suggest the method of disposal. To
mothball he OXCART fleet under this proposal would be a
scandalous waste of an asset. He also suggests disposing
of them at a time (September 1966) when there will not be a
fully operationally ready capability to assume the OXCART
role.
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A decision to close is unwise for several
reasons. It denies to TAGBOARD any semblance of covertness.
Simply to state that as great a degree of security can be
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to that program at as is afforded the
AL Q 1:;ogram at Edwards AFB is not the comp~.ete story.
uub~: ly, p.ysical security could be maintained, but
speculative conjec-:,ure on the part of base and off-base
personnel could not be contained. The TAGBOARD, fully rigged,
is an unusual configuration, to say the least, and its mission
could be surmised easily. The same would obtain with the
OXCART program by basing the A-12 fleet at an accessible
airfield facility. At the present rate of expenditure, the
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not z. _: rm figure. le is a paper savings having no re-
lation to actual dolla _ vc ,_ ..e for the years covered.
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SU-11_::, qtr it should be notes: ;hat the OXCART program is
z___l will be .. e only integrated supersonic reconnaissance asset
available to the Unites: States Government through calendar 1966.
rase out t...- T now or in 67 would be to deny the
7aldent a.d A._.ueed e Unites ;sates a non-military (covert)
overflight capability. The lack of intelligence information
a~wilable only from high r , .ut_: overhead reconnaissance
severely restricts policy and de--r.s on making ability of the
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Research and Development
Special Activities
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