OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND COORDINATION WITH HEADQUARTERS USAF AND SAC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 185
• Publication Date: April 25, 1958
• Content Type: MF

Suwon':
Approved Focpelease i001R/19SMIP33-0244A000400380185-1
TS 155065
Copy of,a
25 April 9
Director of Operations
Operational Procedures and Coordination with
Headquarters USAF and SAC
1. Reference our conversation on 15 April 1958 concerning ope ationa/
procedures Operational procedures used in the planning of AQUATONE flights
have been reviewed. In addition, the procedures for coordinating aQUATONE
Mile= planning with Headquarters USAF and SAC have been reviewed. The
following represents the results of the review.
(1) it is often considered' good operational procedure to
have a second aircraft follow or fly with the primary mission
aircraft to serve as backup in case of an abort. However; the U-2
has an outstanding record of reliability. This reliability is much
greater than that of operational and/or combat type aircraft. In
two years of operations, involving approximately twenty-five actual
overflight missions, there has been only one abort. This abort was
experienced on the latter part of the mission to Baku and resulted
in a relatively small loss of coverage. The cause of this abort
was an inverter malfunction, Camera malfunctions have occurred during
the course of operational missions. However, to minimize the possi-
bility of a pilot continuing on a mission with inoperative or faulty
camera equipment, a series of indicator lights is incorporated in
the system to indicate proper operation of the camera film trans-
port and shutter; two of the paramount sources of potential trouble
in any aerial camera system. In addition, detailed check liats
which cover all aspects of camera operation are completed during
pre-flight. The in-flight indicator stystem, comprehensive pre-
flight check lists and high experience level of camera maintenance
personnel account for the high equipment reliability rates realized
to date. Camera reliability is estimated at approximately ninety
percent successful on past operational missions. In eonjunction
with a consideration of reliability of equipment, it should be
noted that the quality of AQUATONE reconnaissance photography greatly
surpasses that obtained OD previous operational reconnaissance pro-
grams. Proceseing of AQUATONE products is accomplishea under optimum
laboratory conditions, consequently, the high quality obtained in
the original negative is retained, which increases the intelligence
exploitation potential of this photography.
USAF review(s) completed.
Approved For ReleisnrCONICIA-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1
Ma -4,
Approved For Releue 2004/12/45:
W00,0400380185-1
ization of two aircraft simultaneous
poses, the following is submitted for consider
the decoy technioun was fre n ed by
25X1
b.
su1ts of Iiasion 6011.
(1)
to cover
proposed was roii
Chita, southwest
tration into the
overflight time
back into China
SB entry.
$ originaUy planned as a canned mission
et of a. This mission as originally
to the southeast tip of Korea, into
north through China, making pens -
ed
A
of Dairen,
USSR in the vicinity of Ukrainia. Penetration
was approximately 45 miantee with exit from USSR,
and return to Atsugi on approximately the same route
(2) Based on addittonal requirements, the proposed mission
was altered to return through North Korea on generally a north.
south heading from the Ulu River to the northern tip of South
Korea.
) tater on, the mission plan was changed to exclude entry
hrough either North Korea or China as it was not desired
lye a third country. This was based on the protest which
resulted fraa the first eight missions in the summer of 19,56. The
decision was made to enter and exit in the Sea of J an outside the
presumed enemy radar on headings which would indicate the aircraft
mei operating from South Korea, thus disguising the actual operation
base in Japan. This is thought to have been successful, since the
protest notes do not state or imply that the violating aircraft was
operating from Japan.
(4) The missien was planned to obtain maximum photographic
coverage consistent with the weather forecast and film available.
This explains one reason why the mission was flown over the coast
line from a point approximately one hundred miles north of Vladi
*met:* to a point east of Komeomolek rather than staying off shore
a considerable distance. In addition, it was felt that the U-2
Approved For Release 2004/12/1,5it,CIA14D1331 2415A000400380185-1
?
Approved ForRelease-20D71 2
DR33-02415A000400380185-1
mould have provided eore radar reflection flying off shore 40
or 50 miles than it would be by flying over the coasaine.
tisaion results indicate that the results mould have been the
sane as regards the Russians' ability to pick us ep. In addi-
tion, the aircraft would have been under surveillance by both
the radar etatione on the mainland, as well as those on the
Sakhalin peninsula.
(5) Attached as enclosure,is a graphic swary. of the
route as flown and indicates suitable weather encountered, as
well as equipment performance. The tracker malfunctioned early
in the minion. Thie malfUnction has been traced to a new
operating procedure which was to turn the tracker on approxi-
mately thirty minutes after take off to avoid photographing the
launch base and surrounding geography. It is believed that the
delved turn on of the tracker and the resultant lack of heat due
to equipment operation resulted in freezing of the film and may
have contributed to subsequent failure. However, since the tracker
camera is utilized primarily for orienting photography obtained
with primary camerae, and since primary cameras operated with complete
success, there was little loss of arty significant intelligence in-
formation due to this malfunction,
(6) The malfunction in System III was only a partial failure
of two of the three channels and was caused by a break in the antenna
lead to channels 2 and 3 which occurred approximately one third of
the way through the mission. This is the only known failure of
System 1.11 on operational missions.
(7) Both the A-2 camera (primary mission capability):and the
System I operated 100% and obtained excellent results.
ed Meet
(1) Mission 6011 track was reviewed by at least one or more
liaison officers from the !connaissanoe Section of Headquarters
e at least two or three days before it WA flown. No
objection to the route was indicated.
(2) An objection was voiceet by 3AC. This was in regard to cur
procedure
for; lon missions volving _RAINBOW atr 2 )(1
craft, This an rescinded and SAC did obtain full and timely
reaction reports on the mission.
Approved For Releas0064/ : CIA-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1
Approved F0rReleasie4SFATIA-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1
tration and peripheral niieeione, the
at Headquarters notified at
ve hours in advance. One of the cleared officers
section personally comes to our Control Room and is
briefed on each mission. They are given the route to be flown
by coordinates, which includes points of penetration and exit.
The reconnaissance Section then passes all of this information
to 6AO not later than six to eight hours before the mission
takes off, usually earlier. If the Reconnaitsance Section kneels
of a SAO minion which may conflict with our proposed mission.,
they advise SAC immediately.
(2) The reconnaissance Section reviews our proposed routes
primarily for glaring errors as they realize minor points of
routing are either dictated by requirements or are matters of
individual opinion. At no time has USAF or SAC objected to any
of our planning. It is understood that Gen. Preston and, in some
etses, Gen. Tunner or Gen. LateNr, review every mission plan in
sufacient time to voice a tinely objection. A working arrangement
exists that it objection is taken by USAF, they would notify us
Ismodiately at the working level through our established liaison
people.
(3) At one time, San, erreU, DCSO? SAC, thought that SAC
should have a liaison offieerpleyeically located in Project Opera
tions to aid in planning. Subsequent diecussions with the officers
of the Bacon Section, Hqs? USAF, satisfied Gen. Terrell that existing
procedures for coordination between the Project, Headquarters USAF,
and SAC were adequate and, therefore, agreed, that a SAC liaison
officer was not necessary.
(4) Close liaison has been maintained with SAC over the past
two yearn, particularly on the subject of ROB. In fact, the Project
operates on SAC ROB information which in received through Headquarters
USAF. In the cased the first Klyuchi mission, and on the basis of
SAO,* recommendations, we launched froal lrather than Ateugi.
This was done in an attempt to avoid radar detection, o all
missions I
Ekcept for the missions from r--------lfindi v not been auffi-
ciently Consistent
Approved For Release 2?
12(11V RDP33-02415A000400380185-1
5X1
5X1
5X1
5X1
Approved For Rele 0 : CIA-RDP33-0;415A000400380185-1
I With the in-
creased nwthers and types of 'Russian radars, as well the
obvicue increase in efficiency of their operation, it is Oper-
ational opinion that no matter how mission 6011 had been planned
it would have been detected and tracked\
2, Full considerationis given to all aspects of opera
tional planning
to include taking advantage of the experience which Ileadquartere USAF end SAC
can provide, as well as effective and timely coordination with both Headquarters.
Further, it is felt that he reliability and performance record of our aircraft
and collection equipment is probably unequalled in the history of reconnaissance,
Therefore, no major change to operating techniques is considered necessary.
3. Although AQUATONE operations have been exceptionally successful to
efforts to improve reliability and effectiveness are being continued.
Att.
I map msn 6011
Approved For Release Inf 12tpri
-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1