SITUATION ESTIMATE FOR PROJECT CHALICE FISCAL YEARS 1961AND 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000200420002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 14, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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SITUATION ESQ
FOR
PROSE T CHALICE
FISCAL YEARS 1961 and 1962
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T O P S E C R E T
CONTENTS
25X1 C8a
introduction
1. Purpose
2. Background and History
II Intelligence Requirements
1. Target Selection
2. Task
3. Targets
4. Corollary Tasks
III Concept of Operations
1. Employment
2. Mission and Mission Planning
3. Utilization
4. Primary Mission Capabilities
5. Maintenance and Support
6. Control
7. Sortie Rate
8. Support
Relationship to Other Forces
1. Augmentation =
2. Pre Hostilities
3. Hostilities
V Enclosures
1. Life Egectancy of the U-2 for Overflights
2. Utilization of Bases
3o Aircraft and Equipment Assignment
4. Estimated U-2 Flying Hours
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I INTRODUCTION
1. PURPOSE
a) To provide doctrinal guidance for the planning and conduct of.
project operations during the FY 1961-62 time period. Due to current
events the need for timely minor changes is recognized. This document
will be utilized as a common reference and/or departure point for all
concerned consistent with the above.
b) Upon approval of the concept the document may be used as the
basis for justification of the budget. As such it will be reviewed and
revised as necessary and. no later than 1 June 1961 in order that it
cap"again become the basis for budgeting and long range'planning for
ry.".1962 and 1963: This to include operational effectiveness, the formu-
l ;tion of policy, tactics and techniques, and the determination of
operational and R & D requirements..
c) In addition, revisions will'; be made consistent with. the latest
technological advancements, the current political and economic situation,
amt new offensive and defensive concepts as pertains to the :national
sec'ur'ity, in order to provide .timely and effective. guidance ;:for any
follow-on program.
2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
a) At the time the Soviet Uniga and its satellites denied normal
apes to its territory, the need for a method to collect all kinds of
intelligence became readily apparent and the requirement was of the highest
priority. The rapid technological advances of the Soviet Union indicated
the.need for prompt and aggressive action in order to obtain a capability
which would satisfy the intelligence requirements.
b) At the request of the highest executive branch of the Government
various studies were performed by the most capable scientific groups in
the country. All of the studies validated the requirements,' emphasized
the need for prompt and aggressive action, and recommended the utilization
of airborne platforms.
e) To provide the capability;tor relatively safe overflights, the
Lgckheed U-2 was developed in 1955."Built into the U-2 was an altitude
c ability of approximately 70,000 feet which, at that time, was considered
almost certain to be in excess of the capability of the USSR to physically,
interfere. Initially, it was expected that, although the Soviets could
not intercept the U-2 with manned aircraft or missiles of any type, might have a limited capability of tracking the U-2 with radar. Thishey
assumption later proved to be correct except for the overly optimistic
anticipation that Soviet radar capability would be "limited":' Soviet
ability to detect and track the U-2 on penetration and during virtually
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its entire flight in denied territory was conclusively established early
in the program and has continued to. be the case up to the present time
with one notable exception; i.e., penetrations of the USSR in the
vicinity of the Soviet-Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In the period July
1959 to February 1960 three such penetrations were accomplished without,
to our knowledge, detection by the Soviet Air Defense system. On the
basis of this experience, we can at least tentatively conclude that if
penetration can be made without detection, there is an excellent chance
that the entire mission can be completed without recognition by the
air defense system.
It is reasonable to assume that Soviet capability to inter-
cept the U-2 will increase during the period under discussion. However,
it is believed that with careful flight planning and target selection,
the use of dispersal and deployment bases for deception, minimum time
on the ground, at pre and post-strike bases, and other tactics designed
to decrease operational hazards, the U-2 will continue to possess a
significant overflight utility during at least a portion of this period.*
d) Diplomatic protests. which the USSR has made as a result of the
AQUATONE operations in the summer of 1956 and again in early 1958 make
it imperative that Project CHALICE operations be conducted in such a
manner as to reduce the probability of protest. In the original protest
of 1956, the violation of the air space over third countries was consid-
ered to have been the primary mot$vation for the USSR protest. This
view continues valid despite a Soviet protest in early 1958 concerning a
flight which, although it did not violate a third country, did fly into
its radar screen with the resultant possibility that the third country
had knowledge that a penetration of the USSR had been made. In the
period between the 1956 and 1958 protests.. a total of 20 penetrations
were made of the USSR and satellite countries without diplomatic protest
from any source. In no instance, however, was the USSR and a satellite
country penetrated on the same mission. Recorded reaction to these
flights indicates that the violated countries were, in most instances,
aware at the very least that a prohibitive flight was being made. It
was further assumed that, in at least some cases, the USSR had equal
evidence of overflight by U.S. aircraft as it had for both the 1956 and
1958 protests. It should be noted that the 1958 protest was not made
*A separate attachment to this report entitled "Life Expectancy of the
U-2 on overflights" purposely has been omitted from general distribution
because of its special classification. This attachment is available in
the Intelligence Section on a "need to know" basis.
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public. The resultant implication is that the Soviets lacking the
physical capability to stop such overflights, are forced to use diplo-
matic measures. In both protest cases, high U. S. political authority
directed that the overflights be stopped immediately. The reaction
to the Soviet diplomatic action will probably continue throughout thie
period and will be taken into consideration for planning and when
submitting proposed overflights for political approval.
e) It is felt that the use of dispersal and deployment bases
in combination with the fast move concepts (maximum ground time 3 -
5 hours) will deprive the Russians of information concerning origin,
termination, etc., and thereby degrade and/or weaken an official,
protest. This would also allow for more plausible U.S. denial.
II INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMEN1q
25X1X7
1. TARGET SELECTION
Intelligence Requirements for penetration flights by Project
ChALICE have been established by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
which is conposed of representatives of the Army, Navy' Air Force,
Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Require-
ments encompass the fields of photographic intelligence, electronics 25X1 X7
intelligence. and enmm~r4r.m+4,n -
committees and, as such, represent the consensus softhe- InteUi_ 25X1 X7
gence Community as a whole. Targets and priorities periodically are
reviewed by the committees and revisions are made based on the most
current intelligence available from all sources.
2, TASK
Basic to the requirement for early warning of the imminence of
a soviet nuclear attack on the United States is the requirement for
reliable information on the present and future Soviet capabilities
for such an attack. Such information is also critical to our national
defense policy and. ping. During the past four years CHALICE
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coverage has been by far the most lucrative source of reliable
information on which we have based our estimates of the Soviet
capabilities for nuclear attack. At the present time, there is an
urgent need for CHALICE coverage of certain objectives and areas
known to be, or suspected to be, associated with the three major
elements (ballistic missile, aircraft, and nuclear capability.
a. The most critical intelligence problem at this time is the
status of the Soviet ICBM program, an inherent threat of overriding
magnitude. Studies over the past two years by the U.S. Intelligence
Cozmnunity have concluded that CHALICE provides the only available
means offering reasonable assurance of obtaining on an immediate
basis the required intelligence on the deployment of Soviet ICBMs.
Certain rail lines which lend themselves to rail launch or logistic
support for fixed sites and test sites are prime search areas for
this information. Increased urgency has been lent to the deploy-
ment question by recent evidence of ICBM series production.
Coverage of the most suspect production facilities y help to
confirm this.*
b. Other requirements (not in order of priority) for CHALICE
coverage which are also critical to national. security are set forth
the following paragraphs.
(1) It is recognized that a part of the Soviet ballistic
missile capability may be launched from submarines, nuclear
powered or conventional. Our need is to determine the
possible modification of existing craft, construction of
new ballistic missile submmrinesj, and employment of both.
CHALICE coverage offers the best available means of answering
the questions. on production, characteristics, and employment
of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles.
(2) The existence of a Soviet IRBM capability is recog-
nized as a fact, although this capability is less critical
to the United States than the ICBM. It constitutes an
inaediate and continuing threat to the West. CHALICE coverage
offers the best known means to answer the question of what
is the deployment concept and should assist with information
25X1 T1 the capability of these weapons as well as their production.
agreed that the most critical question
was guided mri.ssiles, though they did not seem to feel it necessary to
distinguish between IRBM and ICBM. Further, they rate research and
development and production as match higher than deployment at this time
since evidence on these would permit a judgment of whether there was
indeed a threat in existence; current thinking does not put deploy-
ment as probable in the cane of the ICBM.
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(3) The Soviet heavy bomber force today poses an immediate
nuclear threat. Intelligence derived from sources other than
CHALICE has provided a fairly accurate measurement of the magni-
tude and capability of this threat. Previous CHALICE coverage
has served to confirm and euigna. .At this intelligence. However,
we also have evidence that the'. Soviets are developing a follow-
.on bomber aircraft which may replace the present bomber. force.
In order to establish the status and magnitude of the Soviet
effort in the heavy bomber'prog , to clarify the inter-
.1,
relationships of this and other Soviet weapons delivery syatemms,
and thus to gain a more accurate measurement of the overall
Soviet nuclear threat, both present and future, it is also
'critical that we cover cert4in key Soviet bomber bases,;' bomber
production sites, and R & D facilities.
( ) In addition, to knowledge of Soviet delivery system,
information on the production of fissionable materials. is
essential to an accurate a positive meaOurement of; the
Soviet nuclear thereat. Although. extensive coverage oP Soviet
Atomic energy. installationsalready been acquired through
CHALICE operations.. three of ten lurgeat AE sites in
the, Soviet
Union remain uncovered and are ';Highest priority require cents .
Production rates at these sites are a major source of uncertainty
in estimates of Soviet plutonium production. Although wd concede
an i ihte-3evje bility to launch a, de ostating nuclear
attack against the U*S., we do not have su `ieient information
to gauge whether the.Soviets'bave, or are producing sufficient
fissionable material in order:
(a) To provide the required nuclear warheads for air
(b) To mint a sustained attack;
(c) To arm all or a great portion of their tactical
weapons with nuclear warheads.
(5) The number and pattern of deployment of Soviet surface-
to air missile sites (SA-2) is of critical concern to the
Strategic Air Command. CHALICE photography has already pin-
pointed approximately 50 of these sites including support
facilities. Coverage of additional SAM defended areas remains
a high priority requirement.
CHALICE coverage of one production area has enabled us to make a
reasonably accurate estimate of the plutonium and. U-235 production
from this location. Coverage of the remaining key production sites
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can supply us with information for an estimate of the production of
fissionable material at this time and can also permit a projection of
production for three or more years. Such information has never been
obtained through other collection methods and, in addition to its
critical urgency for estimates of immediate Soviet capability, indi-
cations of a program out of all proportion to our estimate of Soviet
needs would be a most significant indication of possible Soviet
intentions and of inestimable use for political maneuvering, as well
as military planning.
3. TARGETS
Photographic and electronic objectives (targets) to fulfill the
needs outlined above are set forth in separate listings which are
constantly under review and revision by the Ad Hoc Requirements
Committee.
4. COROLLARY TASKS
Valuable intelligence by-products also can be anticipated as a
result of the coverage of the primary systems herein discussed.
Route photography can be expected to yield significant details of
other Soviet air installations, transportation systems, industrial
facilitiies, IRBM and ICBM installations, and other economic and
military targets which could be of a significance only slightly less
than the information we anticipate on primary objectives. One of
the outstanding bonus effects that we know will be derived from future
exercise of the CHALICE capability will be an increase in our knowledge
of Soviet air defense capabilities. Fairly precise data on the
general deployment and characteristics of Soviet defensive electronic
sites in otherwise inaccessible areas can be obtained through the
capability of CHALICE equipme=nt to detect and record electronic
intelligence data. This increase in knowledge will result in a
firmer base for operational plans that involve employment of our
nuclear strike force. It should also be noted that exercise of the
CHALICE capability over otherwise largely inaccessible areas of the
USSR could reveal installations and activities of a completely
unknown but highly significant nature. As a specific byproduct,
CHALICE photography yields terrain information from which accurate
radar navigation and target charts, and radar prediction plates,
can be constructed. It is also anticipated that this photography
will permit resolution of invaluable precise geodetic data which is
so essential to the successful destruction of enemy targets by
guided missiles.
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III CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
25X1A6a
1. EMPLOYMENT
a) In order to fully exploit the operational capability built
into the airframe of the U-2, considerable support will be maintained
in the form of overseas and ZI bases, highly skilled personnel, and
above all, airborne collection equipment. In order for Project
CHALICE to have maximum capability, permanent overseas bases will be
maintained in Europe at Adana, Turkey,
b.) in addition, an air base facility within the ZI is necessary
to carry on continuing research and development, and, for further
perfection of equipment and techniques. Due to the fact that a follow-
on aircraft will not be available for approximately 12 to 18 months every
appropriate action will be taken to product-improve the existing capa-
bility as pertains to aircraft performance. Primary mission capabilities
product improvement will be in the form of increased reliability, weight
reduction, quantitative and qualitative improvement relating to the
end product. In order to offset "end product" degradation due to
increased performance, every effort will be made to improve the existing
and/or develop new, primary mission capabilities to the extent that
the end products will be equal to or better than those now obtained.
25X1 A6a Therefore, the facilities presently in use at
will be maintained throughout the lifetime of the U-2.
25X1 A6a c) The support of the facilities at - will be required
for the entire period. Increased activity due to the follow-on program
and product improvement of CHALICE will have to be provided for.
d) Certain other facilities will be required for periodic staging
and for ferrying of aircraft between the ZI and overseas bases. (Encl #2)
2.. MISSION AND MISSION PLANNING
a) With reference to CIA's responsibilities as pertains to the
National Security, the following primary and secondary missions are
stated:
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T O P S E C R E T
1. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon-
naissance (Photo and Elint) of the USSR and the USSR satellite
countries in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence
consistent with the provisions mentioned in Section II
"Intelligence Requirements".
2. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon-
naissance (Photo and Elint) on a world-wide basis in order to
obtain adequate and timely intelligence which will uphold and
advance the national policies and interests of the U.S. as
well as safeguard the security of the U.S.
b) To fulfil the above requirements the "Operational Concept"
will take cognizance of the latest political considerations and
intelligence requirements as outlined by the ARC. The concept which
has evolved from experience, and which will be followed during the
period will feature careful selection of highest priority objectives
and prudent application of all planning factors to minimize the probability
of protest. During the period we have programmed a maximum of 35
photo-overflights. (20/1961-15/1962) However, a number which will
actually be accomplished will be dependent upon executive approval.
c) Since it is reasonably sure that the permanent overseas bases
are known by the Russians, and their proximity to Russian territory
allows for radar surveillance, and the fact that operations from these
bases would necessitate penetration of heavily defended areas, extensive
use of staging bases will be required. In addition, it can be assumed
that these bases are possibly under visual surveillance. All of which
points out the need for greater deception and mobility during this period.
It is planned that future Project CHALICE missions will be directed
against areas in which the Soviets have the least radar tracking
capability and in such a manner as to create ninximum difficulty for positive
tracking. Selection of such areas will be consistent with highest
priority target coverage requirements. In addition, every effort will
be made to avoid the involvem at of third countries (specifically, Soviet
Satellite Nations) either by w.,trflying them on penetration or withdrawal
from the USSR, or by permitting them to become knowledgeable, through
their radar defenses, that such a penetration is being made. In all
operational planning and execution, the safety of the aircraft will be of
primary consideration.
3. UTILIZATION
a) Training should be realistic in that wherever possible the
results obtained will be useful in the event that the bases and/or
areas flown over are denied to the U.S. in the future.
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b) Training will include the exercise of mobility plans utilizing
airlift to support staging to and from dispersal and deployment bases.
Training exercises will be accomplished on the fast move concept with
minimum U-2 ground time at any of the bases utilized.
c) The U-2 will be used in tactical situations and to accomplish
The advantages
peripheral electronic and photographic
~~ availability reconnaissance.
operational
in terms of training, eeono ,
capabi 11+y- have been demonstrated during the past years inTSuch 8 a etas
25X1 X3 as the no
cLoThm so. The
n
-
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that we stand to lose more than we w
relative value of the exercise we give the Russian radars does not
outweigh the relative economic and operational reasons for doing so.
The Russian radar operators are known to be proficient and the quali-
tative technical characteristics of their equipment is such that the
above-mentioned flights - per se - would not induce greater Russian
technological efforts in the radar field. In addition, it is felt the
that maximum utilization of_ the U-2 should be planned througQu
estimated operational life- of the U-2 rather than wait for primary
mission political approval that may never come. In addition, it is
felt that knowledge of continued and current successful operations by
higher level would be conducive to obtaining Political approval-
.. PRIMARY MISSION CAPABILITIES
a) In addition to photographic and electronic collection equip-
ment which would be carried on overflight missions, it will be necessary
Too WaUT.aILL WQ.I,-w& ..,..~,.. -_ _z-
during periods when
25X1 X4 ,Y4e1p,'I ~ht~ are not in progress. as o ed equipment is
err attached as Enclosure 3.
5. MAII?MWCE AM SUPPORT
a) in order to maintain the high reliability of aircraft and
equipment, the concept of contractor maintenance will be continued.
by = will be
t b
h
ht
25X1A5a1
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In addition, processing of overflig
continued to insure maximum, intelligence exploitation. (Personnel
strength will remain as stipulated in current TO's, with possibly
minor adjustments. )
CONTROL
t of overflights (and certain other missions) being
a) The concep
controlled by Headquarters will be continued to insure efficient target
coverage and compatibility of operations with national policy. -
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7. SORTIE RATE
a) Estimatedd, sortie rate and flying hours by type of mission will
be as indicated in Enclosure 4. Approximately 4076 flying hours will
be required to accomplish 1057 sorties in FY 61 and 3800 flying hours
to accomplish 968 sorties in FY 62.
8. SMORT
a) Support will be required from the following echelons as
indicated. This support will be in accordance with current directives
and agreements.
1) Headquarters USAF for military personnel, commo logis-
tics, special airlift, and to serve as intermediary on liaison
matters. AFCIG-5 will be the channel for support to all subor-
dinate headquarters.
2) Theater Comanders for air base facilities, logistic
support, airlift requirements and for special liaison.
3) Strategic Air Command for certain air base facilities,
personnel, logistics support and liaison matters.
4)
Airways Air Conamications System for communications
support.
5)
Headquarters Air Weather Service for weather support.
6)
National- Security Agency for special intelligence
reaction reports.
7) National Technical Processing Center for ELM readout.
8) Department of State for negotiation for use rights to
operate from certain foreign countries.
IV RELATIONSHIP TO OTSER FORCES
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25X1X7
a) If international relationships deteriorate to a point where
hostilities are considered im ent, Project CHALICE will conduct
penetration and peripheral photographic and ELINT sorties at a n x3mum
rate which available personnel, aircraft and equipment can wort.
Although the military services have photographic and ELINT collection
capabilities in the overseas theaters, the U-2's of Project CHALICE
are the only capability in place overseas able to penetrate deeply
and, with tiomparative physical inammity.
b) During this period it will be essential that the maximum
amount of potential enemy territory be photographed so as to provide
the:
1) Most probable time when an enemy attack would be launched.
2) Size of the available enemy attack force.
3) Type and extent of probable enemy attack.
4) Locations from where attacking forces and/or mimiles
would be launched.
5) ovrerall capability of the enemy to sustain an attack.
6) Most current target data for friendly attacking forces
to use for retaliation.
c) The need for current electronic intelligence will be very
necessary to make available the frequencies and locations of enemy
radars so that:
1) Friendly attacking forces can employ Jamming techniques
most effectively.
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2) Weak spots can be located through which attacking
forces can penetrate with the least probability of interception.
3) Radar guidance of enesry interceptors and/or missiles
can be interrupted.
d) During the pre-hostilities period operational control will,
remain with Project CHALICE Headquarters. Deployment to prearranged
rear bases may be necessary as dictated by the existing situation
(Encl. #2). Project CHALICE resources will be utilized, on a first
priority basis, to obtain reconnaissance coverage of SAC objectives
as outlined in Appendix 1 to Annex "B" of SAC Operations Order #1009.
3. HOSR~ILIyn?,S
a) When hostilities break out'-Project overseas assets will
revert to the operational control of the Strategic Air Command under
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This transfer of control and assignment
will be in accordance with the provisions of a Joint Agreement
(CHAL 0239), dated 19 July 1958, with USAF, DCS/O, comae date
24 Sept 19588 and in accordance with the CHALICE EWP Operational
Plan., dated 20 January 1959. Upon execution of the SAC 50 series EWO,,
SAC Operations Order Number 1009, Appendix 2 to Annex "B" contains
the necessary instructions for utilization of CHALICE resources.
b) Military personnel will be effected in accordAnee with the
arrangements contained in the Personnel Annex of the above-mentioned
transfer agreement.
c) It is planned that civilian personnel will continue to
function until relieved by military personnel.
25X1A9a
25X1A9a
Colonel USAF
Chief, Operations Branch
DPD-DD/P
Enclosures (4
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25X1A2g
Distributions
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