DECISIONS ON AQUATONE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP33-02415A000100070031-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 13, 2001
Sequence Number:
31
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 25, 1956
Content Type:
MF
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CIA-RDP33-02415A000100070031-8.pdf | 437.79 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100070031-8
25 September 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Decisions on AQUA TONE
1. Purpose: This memorandum is the result of extensive and
prayerful reflection upon the future of Project AQUATONE. Its primary
purpose is to urge with all the emphasis I can command that at the next
meeting with higher authority you attempt to obtain full and adequate
guidance on all of the alternatives open to us so that we will be in a position
to chart our course of action with a reasonable degree of certainty for a
number of months at least. The secondary purpose of this memorandum is
to present my recommendations as to the position you should urge upon the
political authorities with respect to the various possible courses of action.
2. Effect of Continued Uncertainty: Although I am sure you are
familiar with many of the circumstances that render continued uncertainty
undesirable, I shall venture to refer to them again. They seem to me to
constitute a powerful argument against any further postponement of decisions.
a. It is not necessary to elaborate on the fact that inaction
compounded by uncertainty is beginning to have a serious effect on the morale
of many personnel assigned to AQUATONE.
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25X1A6a c. The training of SAC personnel for their U-2 unit is to begi25X1A6a
at and this unit will have nowhere else to go under present plans
until March or April. If our Detachment C cannot be deployed out of -
25X1A6a _on time or if another one has to be brought back to be based there for
the winter, the SAC program will be delayed and immediate steps must be
taken to find another base for the SAC unit. We are being pressed hard for
a firm. decision on the availability of space at 25X1A6a
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d. If no operations are to be permitted in the near future, but
if it is desired to maintain the AQUATONE capability intact, decisions are
most urgently needed as to where the three detachments will be based
during the winter. The location should probably be in the ZI but no time
should be lost in obtaining and preparing a site if this is to be our decision.
e. Our suppliers, aware that no operations are in progress
and completely without guidance as to the future, are already beginning to
slacken their development and production efforts on our behalf. A suppliers'
meeting is scheduled for 4 October at which it is most important to give
them some firm guidance. It is in the National interest to take the preilP
off our remaining development work if there is no immediate prospect of
making ""Lae of the C camera,
On the other hand, i opera ions are to resume at
any predictable date, it may be very important to ready these systems for
use.
f. We are tying up a sizeable body of personnel, many of them
with extremely scarce skills badly needed elsewhere. These individuals
should not be kept idle for much longer unless there is a good prospect of
using them for the purpose for which they were originally assembled.
Groups especially worthy of mentioning as falling within this category are
Agency commo personnel (whose scarcity is well known to you), aero-
medical and supply personnel from the Air Force (who have been extremely
hard for us to secure even with our priority because of their scarcity),
highly skilled maintenance personnel and their technical supervisors from
our suppliers.
3. Decisions Required: It would seem that the following three sets
of decisions must be made (either by higher authority or within the Agency)
before it would be possible for us to chart a definite course of action. My
recommendations with respect to these issues and the manner of their
presentation are set forth in succeeding paragraphs.
a. The major decision that has to be made is whether AQUATONE
operations are to be permitted in the reasonably near future against any
denied areas and if so against which areas. It is useful to distinguish four
target areas:
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b. If operations are to be permitted, the second decision
concerns their timing and the desired pattern of operations. Should an
intensive campaign be mounted or is it desirable to accept the probability
of diplomatic protests in order to be less "provocative" by conducting
operations at a slower pace for a longer time?
c. If the decision is that no operations or only very limited
operations will be permitted, say before next spring, then a decision is
required as to whether the AQUATONE capability, both weapons system
and organization, is to be kept in being in substantially its present form
and administrative framework, or alternatively whether the equipment
should be turned over to the Air Force and the present project liquidated.
4. How Should the Major Issues Be Presented??: It goes without
saying that the USSR west of Lake Baikal is by very large margin the
highest priority target area. If given complete freedom of action, we
would presumably use the AQUATONE capability as we had planned against
this target area until our resources were sufficient to permit us to operate
concurrently with two units in the West and one in the Far East. The
immediate question, however, is not what we would like to do but how the
issues should be presented to higher authority. During the past two months
it has generally been our feeling that even to discuss the possibility of
operations limited to the Satellites or of redeployment to the Far East,
or of postponing all operations until next season, would invite a decision
in favor of one of these undesired courses of action. Accordingly, both
in discussing future plans and in determining the deployment of our re-
sources we have concentrated upon preparation for the major task of extensive
reconnaissance over the western USSR. Undoubtedly a decision on this
course of action should be the first one requested. I feel strongly, however,
that if it is negative, the time has now come to discuss the less satisfying
alternative courses of action and to seek authoritative guidance concerning
them. Whatever our reluctance to operate over the Satellites and the Far
East, the Air Force is prepared to do so. And it makes no sense to use a
lesser capability while leaving a greater capability idle. Nor can a sensible
decision be made about the preservation of our capability in standby status
except on the basis of guidance as to the probability of active operations
next spring. These considerations argue strongly against the attempt to
exclude certain courses of action from consideration by silence.
S. Should We Favor Intensive Rather Than Attenuated Operations ?:
Up to this point it has been a unanimous view that if operations are permitted
against the Western USSR, we should plan for an extremely short period of
intensive operations conducted with as great a capability as can be
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employed within the limits set by weather patterns. A reading of the
National Intelligence Estimate on probable enemy reactions to overflights
suggests that this view should at least be reconsidered if only to be re-
affirmed. The Estimate concludes that the intensity of any overflight
program is one of the variables that will affect the violence of the enemy
reaction. Perhaps we should plan on quite infrequent operations (say
three missions per month) continued over a long period. Or perhaps
we should propose intensive operations for an extremely short time (say
three or four days), activity then to be suspended and repeated in a month
or six weeks. I am inclined still to believe that a single major operation
to continue until the anticipated protest arrives is probably the most sensible
course of action but urge that alternative patterns at least be mentioned.
6. Should We Favor Operations Against Lower Priority Areas?:
If the decision is made that operations against the major target area cannot
be permitted for some time, I strongly recommend a request for permission
to operate against
in that order. My reasons are as follows:
a. The intelligence to be obtained in this manner has seemed
sufficiently valuable to the Air Force, this Agency, and our Allies so that
we have conducted overflights against these targets in the past and are
developing major capabilities (the B-57D and U-2 by the Air Force and
the PZV by the Agency) to do so in the future. AQUATONE is a capability
in being superior to any others presently available and this capability has
a limited life which has been running out since it was fully exposed to the
enemy last June. Certainly, there can be no justification for permitting
such operations with a lesser capability while holding ours in idleness. It
seems to me the only position this Agency can take is that these operations
should go forward using the beat capability available to our Government.
b. This course of action would involve negligible added risk
of disclosure of our capability to the enemy, since he already can form a
highly accurate estimate of speed, range, and ceiling. The reconnaissance
equipment is not sufficiently advanced to constitute a major technical asset.
c. It cannot be denied that such operations might elicit additional
diplomatic protests which in turn could worsen the chances of operations
against the main target at some later time. If, however, the decision with
respect to the Western USSR is negative now it will probably continue to be
negative until there is some major change in the domestic or international
climate. And I am convinced that, in the event of such a change of climate
and review of the basic decision, any intervening embarrassments in the
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form of diplomatic notes from
would not prove decisive. In any event, I see no reason for attaching great
weight to this argument against Satellite and Far Eastern operations unless
there is a substantial likelihood that access will be permitted to the main
target area next year.
d. It is not necessary to dwell upon the other powerful but
practical considerations which support this view. It will be far easier
to keep the human and organizational capability together if it is being
utilized. Under the spur of actual operations our remaining development
will go forward faster and our equipment will shake down more effectively.
7. Should the AQUATONE Capability Be Kept in Being_?: If no
operations are to be undertaken for the next few months, I believe the
choice between the maintenance of the existing capability, at least on a
standby basis, and its liquidation accompanied by transfer of its equipment
to the Air Force should be determined largely by the outlook for operations
next spring. Unless there is a strong probability that overflights will then
be permitted, I would recommend prompt liquidation (subject to one reserva-
tion noted below). Above all, I urge that instead of relying upon our guess
as to how our own political authorities may feel in six months time, we
secure definitive guidance from them by asking bluntly whether or not the
prospects are sufficiently favorable so that they wish this capability kept in
being and in our hands. The main considerations that bear on this conclusion
are the following:
a. The basic consideration is that, in the judgment of most
technically competent persons, the risk of enemy interception may be
expected to become significant sometime before the and of 1957. By that
time, therefore, the Project will be liquidated in any event. Unless there
is a reasonable likelihood of using the capability during the 1957 season,
therefore, there is no reason for maintaining it in being through the coming
winter.
b. A secondary consideration is that to maintain the organiza-
tion on a standby basis will require quite a major effort, since it was built
up in an atmosphere of urgency and designed for a single period of active
operations. Attitudes of personnel as well as a variety of administrative
and other arrangements would have to be modified. This can probably be
done successfully but it will be almost impossible in the absence of the con-
viction that we will be allowed to do the job next year.
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RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director
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c. The other consideration I will mention is that to maintain this
type of capability permanently in being is assumed to be contrary to Agency
policy, which still further complicates the task of maintaining morale and
efficiency for an indefinite period of inactivity. Quite apart from AQUATONE
I believe a case could be made for reversing this Agency policy and for
consolidating all of our air operations into a permanent organization con-
siderably more self-contained than that represented by our Air Sections
overseas and the Air Maritime Division at Headquarters. It might well be
easier to maintain a capability in being, much of the time on a standby basis
but prepared for recurrent situations in which it could be used, with such
a consolidated organization which was designed to be permanent than with
the present type of highly temporary arrangement. Were we to move down
this road, the case for maintaining the AQUATONE capability throughout
the useful life of the equipment would be much stronger than stated above.
8. Summary: Reflecting the various recommendations made above,
the following is what I would urge as the desirable procedure when guidance
is sought from the political authorities:
a. First, permission should be sought to resume operations against
the primary target area. This would be the appropriate time to introduce
the NIS and, in the light of its conclusions, to discuss the relative advantages
of long, drawn out, as against intensive, operations and the possibility of
operations against the major target areas but with certain allegedly sensitive
districts excluded.
b. If permission to operate against the primary target area is
denied. the several alternative courses of action should be outlined and
permission sought to operate against the secondary target areas, with the
highest priority
c. If such permission is also denied, the desirability of maintaining
the AQUATONE capability until next season should be explored. Authoritative
guidance should be sought on the prospects for next spring with the explanation
that such guidance is essential to a sensible decision on this point.
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CIA (Continued)
TS-143425
Cy 1 of 8
Memorandum for DCI, dated 1 May 1956, from Project
Director, "Political Approvals for AQUATONE.
TS -143425 /B Same as above - dated 3 May
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TS-143443/B
Cy 5
a. AQUATONE Proposed Operations 23 May 56 - Prepared
by R.M.Bissell, jr.
b. Draft Press Release
c. -Program. Using U-2 - Guide to Handling Press Queries
Resulting from Initial Release (Questions 9, Answers)
AQUATONE Operational Plans, dtd 31 May 1956, Prepared
by Project Director
SAPC-6753
Cy I
TS-143448
Cy1of4
25X1X7
TS-143451
Cy 1of 5
TS-143450
(Rev 1) cy 3
& cy 4 of 5
'1S-143450
cy 1 of 5
25X1X7
Memo for: DCI, dated 13 June 1956, from Project Director,
(Operations to be conducted under authority granted USAF)
Approved by Chief, ODACID, 13 June 56
Memo for Record: dtd 22 June 56, From Project Director,
Subject: Conversation with Col. A. J. Goodpaster, Dr. J. Killian,
and Dr. E. Land, 21 June 56 (Attached: AQUATONE Operational
Plans, TS-143443/B, copy 6)
Memo for DDCI, dtd 15 Aug 56, from Proj Dir--"Next Steps
Re Project AQUATONE"
Memo for DCI, dtd 8 Aug 56, from Proj Dir -- "Decision on
Project AQUA TONE"
Memo for DCI, dtd 1 Aug 56, from Proj Dir --'!Decision. on
Project AQUA TONE"
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