NOTES FOR MEETING WITH GENERAL TWINING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000100070018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 17, 1958
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP33-02415 000100070018-3
17 January 1958
NOTES FOR MEETING WITH GENERAL TWINING
1. It seemed to me that the President left absolutely no doubt that
whatever overflights he authorized were to be performed by AQUATONE.
We have ample experienced pilots and probably enough aircraft to support
a very substantial effort.
Z. I received the clear impression that the President definitely
authorized overflights to cover all the target areas on the map placed before
him, subject only to the following limitations;
a. If one or more of the most remote areas could not be
reached with RAINBOW covered aircraft, these should perhaps
be omitted.
b. A shallow penetration overflight should be carried out
shortly prior to the commencement of a major program to test
ttussian interception capabilities.
c. The program of overflights should be carefully planned.
3. General Twining argued for a large-scale and intensive effort con-
centrated in a short period of time. The President seemed to view this
approach favorably but did not specifically direct that it be followed. I
believe this approach has the following serious limitations:
a. Weather will rarely permit more than two or at the most
three missions on the same day and will practically never permit more
than five or six missions in a single week, provided we wait for really
good weather as we most certainly should.
b. I am convinced that multiple missions on a given day or
intensive activity over a period of one or two weeks are far more
provocative than operations at the pace of two or three a week which
we have achieved in the past.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100070018-3
 Approved For Release 2001/03/30 P33-0241000100070018-3
1 ;
c. One of the major purposes of the forthcoming operations
is to search for operational missile sights under construction. There
is a real advantage in spreading our operations over a considerable
period of time so as to increase the chances of observing this activity.
4. If intensive operations compressed into a short period of time
are to be undertaken, it will be almost essential (as stated yesterday) to
wait until April or May so as to maximize the number of clear days likely
to occur within a two-week period. Such a delay in commencing operations
seems to me most undesirable for at least two reasons:
a. The requirement for coverage of certain of the high priority
targets has a high degree of time urgency.
b. The risk that the Russians will reveal an effective inter-
ception capability increases with every passing day.
5. Recommendation: Our position on the foregoing matters should be:
a. That we have permission to proceed with operations against
all target areas reachable with RAINBOW_covered aircraft without
further reference to higher authority.
b. That we will begin operations against the three highest priority
target areas as soon as equipment and weather permit.
c. That missions over the northerly targets or over areas
with difficult-to-predict weather will be postponed until spring.
d. That in all cases we will wait for really promising weather over
specific targets before securing coverage thereof.
25X1A9a
RICHARD M. BISSELL, J
Project Director
'4111, 464U,
=s
25X1A9a
Approved For Release 2001/03/30 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000100070018-3