OSS - LONDON OFFICE(MISSION AND PERSONNEL); OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER; PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES; RELATIONS WITH ORGANIZED LABOR ABROAD; COMBINED JIC ACTIVITIES; JAPANESE MILITARY ASSESSMENTS; DONOVAN CORRESPONDENCE; 1942 -

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100470007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 77
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 18, 1942
• Content Type: MISC

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100470001-2
"THE ADVANCE AGAINST ROMMEL IN AFRICA."
As reported at the J.I.C. Meeting in LONDON,
November 18,1942.
Despite rearguard actions at BUOUQ,SOLUX,HALTYA and"
BARDIA4 the British advance has made about 50 miles a dal.
TOBRUK was reached on the 13th and German departure waC,Oc
heavy that the port was undamaged save for British_botiOtht
and it was opened for use on the Ibth. MATRUH and BARPWare ,
bOth being used and the RR to CAPUZZO will be opened by the A
21st.
The forces which may gather at EL AGHEILA will comprise 4,1
10,000 Germans,30,000 Italians, and 10,000 lines of comtUnii
cationslorces. ,
,, ,
,I. :
forward fields of the enemy airforce re now S. of
BOW= and will toOn be located behind EL AGHEILA. There -
has been a notable lack of opposition from the enezy.A.F
partly due to the speed and continuity of their lotthdraweil==, J"-
'with consequent disturbance of supply and partly to the
enemy policy of conservation in his attempt to maintainAf40,44f
force he has for the support of his troops when they make a
stand. �.
AZ,F
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
William L. Langer
JIG MEETING - LONDON
Attached is a copy of the report sent
to us fram London on the Weekly Meeting of the
cable facilities, we soon should again be re.
ceiving this report weekly by cable.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100470001-2
V", 7
"
"
C4- C Mt-e-LAA0t,
November 18. .,x942.
Various rearguard aotions rAk._,,touelt at Busibuq,
rWICLIVaa. !letter" and. 1:lardia, but the arjtsh adirenew
.abl*Ait 50 mile. a de/. Toz.k was r.�d,:on the 1.3t1i,i.1,1,41:--
Clej. doparture was so h*OtY, -,that thir: port** und�Sd, say.
tr:** British bombips. (04,44 .rot,,!4::on.,�
*Stash and Berdlitiere botb being tie& end:'
opened to .Capuste-bY toto
is oit$141411: -tihat 'tha ;oriioa'Aiiit, lay
.1* nfl 0040, -"$d's000
Of ft
,,F$A14 apid iett
bafa aorta riot
known. and ohe
p2
voitio,..4, iy itt tor nogolth 144., OHttDdakt is'i,",V:14 la-ti Sb* '
,- Diviiiiforia- plus ,
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royal trea Xavoirliss to
APO,* omit,* At
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:-.: Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100470001-2
cil,t44,S17"-o'
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,
NORTILISST AFRICA: This operations Of AMOriCSII and British
..orces were escribed &B. on schedule - the ii.dvaiice into Tunis
being as deep as originalla. planned, but not as_ deep as
I pert:laps hoped, A.11. the,-.p 'alp are useable irithltbe� workt:...dif-
fteulty- at Oren vhere ,ii,f�,,thf), three ships sunk-br t4i!"*It501
fii 111400SS the -south of the _hil*bOr, only one has.90-4,4r.::;,1*� enpv911'.
iiiivimce fOrce3 of parachute, troops, both ArnericanindllrOish, 'have
twilit} forward into Tunis alo tg both the coastal �arid the Anland
rive ships reached Bi and Oiii
serta ,tio.:-h:,rep. d
route. .
.Vms: eatiskate of Llti3 forces in t area on thif.,.l3thwsks
. ..
sir*" 14904,, anoi tbat figUre since then has re14�00..(VuA0 '40.cvi
TbAtae forWit tire considered to be strong in antl.!..ai*Cra
And
to 'have *oat tanks - even 25 tonners.
,
,.., Inive,dais agp it was 4ist5mated. that O di.'
, sUbiaarinel
he nuab
as
1:174r.ir:111!!:61t:111171f; ''�1'' ' ." , lie . � t
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Th. tocental e,04- ti ' ' ",10,eaei Ile�,,nOi-,:!' ir'''-
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711
tain .' ' :06f,,:i.-:.
_ ., , 44st
Sd
7,::,., ,,,,;4,,--,,�
Itirtio- .,, ,_ are - , -4-416 ift-So: Isolt,
__.,.- a
$'440atr$1.
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' on �
_, e otuis4r: ,:t.,..4�,,... �
-t ArJA )
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Frietae.z The occupation of Vichy France has oc,Oetkoned no
e,-"Lalliti� in the total number :of, GerMan troops,. T40,,:#09,11.1274143,
forces solaprised two armored divisions, oz.* mci..torkt�p,..)S., and
3 to 5 infantry, Or -trtinirig�., divisions ; also --,Itsp4Wptioali.;
aceopriting, on0, ilcitori3ed.'and taw infantry' divisions. ' .Th. - _el:41th ,
coastal arras Is divided into three '� tones of which the wittiitn,
up to Toulon, is the _pkortium tither*, Tau Ion ittelt:is ,lei*noh, '
*ma thane* to the: east ie Italian. The Italian s:�ne Aittends
bohirid Toulon at far as Aix.. i
.Tht,..30.14,..7. in, itouthern Prance is expe.c.'ted_tO',Iii44st, o;
150: -- 2(y). planes - cf�lir of :this" tAristr.34n4',..:417,krt..0,4*itAPCI'b,,,*�7 :140
Usti- lb. lt ,rgeirl part: ,,iiimeind4ine,,, referve or;-.trilning-aircirarti
lett "raid nitirsialli be deiefsiibed-es non,40p�riti-latiall They,
te-.0tiap5,,,,Arill too lairtin1-7 ilifentkve .10�i, th!ly will inolude le -stall
t1147114n..foVere ermi, sons iiiaoi:lats� The OtioLtpation,
Otioriaprio *III haVt-,, only ilightLiliffirat on, 'f.hialAii*Iforato of the
, alts(sti- front.
.�, -�-�"f103,4-
-'----,i- '$,-i'q i.--,,,,,,,,,�A�,� .,...",..,
' Itis mus ll atioNt a - ' onooTUrit-infe,a,.
, ,!
iisaire,:p � ..o.r. thpef,e.,4planea
oter t. ,,...
,., ,
the *1* . 4,v _ , - tsr,-,
Iliiii '''''':�'
,..
a ' in that -,those
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'9=
-4",, northern itoigaaY-
e
at TrO,Shjem.i.
id ipsig� sri in
.1its trials Liskit1 �
�Graf, lep.0114�
the Atlantic
24644* gras11
)0(
or 6 subs.
,off the
fiat of the sub.., which
*4004 are now oriented upon the
oporstivs asrota subs. are 230
the laaek 34*.
"
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In the north and contre,are nothiAg .)A4rJOLOsX-oppOW,,,
o There are Indications that the, RUssianivare'buildingHup
streogth south-vest of ilt0�00.."
,
In, the Caucasus the Germans are =the defsnaiAbast
- or Alaghir4 At TUNA* thwy ar.-itakintrno pr910*.., Thereare
inOleations, both in the Caucasus and at st.404044, that the
domisa army is experiencing shortage Vt pitrol,
In the, air the scale of operations or th..A.X44.2. against
ciossUs and $ l
,...,
_. , ,..,.. . ,
,.tobs tctalingrad. has been much redia00- ' - -
last lace*4 Mire are signs here too. ot'cUilY1040.* ,-- - ,
,. ,
It.., wooria it was st0�11,,thit th* German Air Porqs
4i.tribt*tM 60 1.4ir 'int in Ru1011*, and it 0060, ' 0.1,k ,.. -
fo,ta ia#,L1�4 ' �i,..
andliCioditirrit ,-sasw Ogit-'
.. taro* irili relie4ii.1.,-
-*is -r -4.' ' *lit .71) .:0011sit�
,,, .
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PAR EAST:
�
��.-%�-� -
5 -
SECRET
'
- Press reports of Jap. reinforcements are not confirmed.
- ,A.F. remains 200 with 100 in Siam and northern Indo-Ohina.
Ono raid is recorded by six heavy bombers and 20 fighters on WOIMO
coastal launches near Akyab.
In NEW Guinea at Oivi the Japs lost 700 men out of
two battalions. Tb. bridge has been restored by the
Australians. The coastal force has reached a spot 15 miles
from Buns.: There are 2,000 Japs in the area. The air force,
in which an increase was reported a fortnight ago, has, now dwindled
almost to nothing, but reinforcements are expected. -
.��� �1..611/ k �
In the =OWNS Jap troops amount to 20 or 30,000.
The air force is atat about 180. Three notable air
actions were recorded in one of which 17 Jap planes were des-
troyed out of 42 and in another 30 out of 33. The results of
the naval action of NovamOokra2/13 equalises the Jap and Allied
fifirso except in respect or esrriers. -The principal concentra�
tiOR Of' forum is now at RaboUl with a lighter force at auin and
StiOtlarld
the Aleution elands .the Jpps have re-occupied
Attn. strength In the islands is 10,000. Based _in either
the Also*Ogirt:Islends or the *wile Islands else One eight-inch and
three rivis-inoh cruisers.
In, two raiders attacked a tanker
1004 ea art 5(O es .soU of the Cocos Islands and one raider
wSs musk by the escort. Szba ars active off Madras and Ceylon.
:704 J1111 1.
d,r4
r,
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�
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t .
-
7:944.
:111.6
4t:7116-�rii
��
At ttme JIC meeting yisterday:.the question was reit*
:..,, of British representation on 4.. American JIC Committee
*sick would, in effect, make it a. combned Committee. I
": ,Astatsdp as did ii'. BE*1.0e stk,bstituteo: that' I i:Ould refer
s ,
ii4.-iiiatter to .,,:p1/4!:' primmeipal., ,Genermil St,ront. ''reci*sted- that
� .. .
) �
._
. �1 ,e
ao-saapor be giiin as 'soca as conyeitient. . Periotiiilly-, I .
,
7
i 4
,.
thAnk- that such a combination would 44r mist- unwise
rimisoas that I eould develop in conversation. The othmir
E., asoliers ot ths JIC Committee (excluding State 6 OSS) were
, .
: mignistri the proposal'. -1
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Vek',
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'11
2
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4.
,�� ' .
AetfP�A'''',,- .
1-4,..c.,. �
a' .4 ..el � 1 40:
.r .4 . _ tiN,,Ake's ,i� -;�:::..37,1 , _ V�4;:i7a3
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it)-1 I
K I adi �Ai e
ate34-V111 -A:14 L
x O tS.Z-.
'7;,) ircl)
October 21, 1942
ajor General George %%Strong
Boon 2416, Munitione Bldg
Washington, DX.
Dear General Strong:
Upon reading the "Draft of
a Resorandts for -We President* dealing
with a proposed diOsesinstion of Radio iht!,.
tolligence, I note that O$S is wholly
*lauded fro* my' Ocean to such iftterial.
�
i41letving thnt euch action
woDid ispair the,abillty of 008 to discharge
�
it* 'lesion I feWit ny duty to have a
dieemai filed War'', the 07,1.C. tomorrow
*en Vkt sitter is considered.
I feel that you should have
01011*** ,notteeLof ovr intention oonorning
itte matter �
�-�
1-.5" ;I�
. -
� - 0 Z2.:
.Vepty- atnolirOy
William J.Donovan
Director
-
z
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- _0
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It seems most unreasonable that
OSS specifically charged. by the Joint 13
of Staff vithe duty *to operate an orienisation
for the collection of inforsEttion through,
espiontges eitd. "to execute subvereive activities*
ed !tied 011$
repreeent.tiver, in foreign
led to tite.lictection and
l'inowledge ,of inter.
.1/4161.1116h ivttelliseace
P, leariting, of ispgrtaat
s stilfic localities' � SI
direceted to mesh localities
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; 4 "
There it oryy.,,Ireidonoe that thee studio*
*re row4.00aLs importfint basii doquaestte.
The .sost inforzation ,vhtell our toonosie
Sootion **Id *To cowman de*elopieonti of
J,� etrength and
1?dd beiiktitattPtfd. 106.604,;*(1,!,-
Aersotor tousiet and niasslig
earrying Yaw siktOrtsis into eisien. siOlH.t
. r
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411 Itk'�A
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. thi, 00" by Inithiti of
, �
It activit 1 ego is al regdy� 0 tk., vait ,,
,
� .a.
Mann% of lost eecret riatertail ft 40. ex91144"
thin Agency fro* the pro40001,4 inter '
044 i4p1y only that the *00iii1:ti not :
,i
tdere4 pert4,nent to the .**1,4,. of the' - '0
t#tot. II *4 osiation;,*". to the 1o71ty,
tin:Irmo iv oi!,414001z4tOn.� tu,:or';41$* .filoweit
.� ,
.tiii istitte . 'It 7
'-':- :1'. 1:. '''':;'.111;-_ -',' � . - ,'ii -�.
....
- w
. .. .
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, qn, ^ 0,-roNstotetufeysvc,
Maggiaga
FOR: The Secretsry of the Joiut Intelligence
Comaittee
MINI The Director, Office of Strategic Services
At! the i.� Calitain Bui�id, am
toots, tag two coplei a lover kepaied by
1404taarat Colonel q41 OallibCOOrit
�kr-A.1414i
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-
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(J01.4. 14, Mc 7, 1942).
la- e J11.811111.11:oeties_sorilaot the Aleutian
volisivostly esirlsolio4 es woe the Udall a ouoli m
sposalliss (e.oss, rather tbiss letor"),
a. loilloo lather thew es effort to seem leftmost Is Or
Aloigilows� sem ressedosi so the meet lihely Japans., emovo.
ins' it whim to memo leftoolost were eamisods,
�411/0/11 BOO* liateh Iletheol sisoltmesso ,.sties eistaot
Me& *Ober sol Ilotors aboorla (iselodall Essohetka)
Miti eti~op alirmos issoholks to the Alostiese.
Ilt W. istteiti ropreeestlag seteolar4 Japanese
sweeeliser Ai Midas. opersitoso is this woes aroma
hipe bow vegisisol. tho mot litisoly Jammu* faisna.
ea 'Olt Is palm WOE* Pm mile. The
er as; attoolot:diroetlit to *ems lodossost
MstooleA11lames WA sot tatiplisitly
- �,�����e- - � ,�,,,1*,11v4sti.144,NOCCOt....attgknact4z1.214,0..r..--
, � -
:47
La
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-
SECRET
J.I.C.Is 5/3 (April 25, 1942), the $010"1 agad.
mere lndleated as the probable immediate limit to the
Japanese attempt to extend their island barrier to the
south.-eatet.
C.I.C.Is
of April 30, 1942 (nals Intentions for 19421)
it Is stated as ',probable's that, as a defensive manenver,
the Japanese mould *done Darwin. lbe limit of Japan's*
000mpation is agpia stated to be the 361maxa Islands,
albs* the speelal interest of the Japanese is Mew
Caledmaimi gambol is noted.
1. C.14C. it April 30, 19421 emphasises the possibility of a
Japanese attempt to swampy Assam and Bengal, and of air
raids as the Caleatta area. Sash action has not yet
developed.
24 2be isms *NOMA states* "Japea is Moly to avoid a
iselsive smosostormith tbo U. 11. basins fleet,. Is
ths possibility of a serious effort to osamP,
Mbar ar the Issafien Islands vas net envisaged.
ESA BMW 1111M1111
44/3,, kg 7, 1942 (06erena OapabiWise in Elyria and
bele) espressos the belief that, &spit* the aentraliation
it 1to, Allisd nivel vaisiees in the Mediterranean, sad the
eensegmat floe et p1iis te Raseel,that she OM sat step
a. We, etfesolvo seseesaltlly withal adiittemal armored
divisisms. Oak veinfersesente as be is reseiving appear to
smerisdest may to emmtelo him to adertabe � limited
40;10840e ger...sx� &Alm. t� Prevost eer two" flvadas=
a1sodia00. The arreetnees et au isdiPs"
*ow latifee admit to GOMIS Papplitelle 11111111014
Amy, atki ineempetesse are bald responsible for
sabssolost; Oionsa ameseas imthis theater.
1.no sem dear suit saphesises the difflealtios inherent in
fleassa everease operetta spinet the Syrian east.
limo prim sepisitisait astellan air bassi is regarded as
a- moteaterf essdittion Sar the redistion: of Cyprus. Theit aura
opsittlast, Jo the liastess lediterranas SA the pat times
emotho is esspetilklo Alb this view.
416Z.Ita ow 23p 11661 ('Qen= Capabilities in Turbee)
gevelops 'the .404 thee fir berme eat, that the eats of a
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.3.
Oormea operation against Turkey far outweigh pre
piss, in view if prosast Germs eassittmests and
di:condos required to achieve &deign results.
IASTISUIVIROPIAITIOUTSR
C.I.C., of April 30, 1942 (sAxis Intentions for 1942w)
exposed eertais differenoes of opinion in the British and
tarries& J.I.C. views of relative Germanolossian strength,
and of the oompequemt sourss of operations is Bassi&
1942. It vas agreed, however, that the German committment
in bassi& was eufficient to preclude major offensive ground
operations In ether theators (.3000 1,07046,0,
Mrsis& streagth had bees substantially redwood. This
judgment appears thus tar to have been correct.
2. The British view of winter operations lead to the sonclusien
that tho GOMM offensive spearhead would be seriously limited,
mod that a major offemeive is the South alone could he emp
visaped *with subsequent operations against Voesow and
traimpradl for politisal purposes.. Me Amerieen view was
tbst, with Germem strergth substantially unimpaired, a final
Wort woad be mode to dostrOY tksboa= Mass
11 we agreed that the first major effort would eons is the
oath. the British, however, emphasised oamistontly that
this drive would move pmrpossfall7 towards tha Gassasiaa ail
fields, ALA implies were seeded by Germany 'far industrial
porpooses. The T. S. J.I.C. deprecated the Garman mood far
ell, mod coviessed the drive in the South as a battle of
amalhamtiam. It was predicted that the yeisbt of attack
valU Alit to the martheoctim the direetiom of Gorki, to
he }mimed bp, ether drives deeigmed to encirele sad &etre,
the Madam moss la the MOW.
40 nine aced that, in the soave the soothers drive,
eliamikimeeme prewar, vioald be everied in the mirth and
eamier to emetata amosisa fame. Diversi4�07 Utica as04
other easter* et the &eat thus far appears to have *pea
imOleled Wamosia rather then WNW as
(Vis. aligTo
1412610v).
S. la sicawria, it appears'. early to judge the relative
sowereer 04liar Imo views. The felleateig, bower, are to
lok
iwisd4
(a) flovOommoma hove throw a osimeilimrable feria into
the martimialleamosse, mod ooeupled the Maher
15031110 with dispatch;
,
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1.4:SCRaVY.
TO Colonel 7Ni:1:11am J. Donovan
Edward S. 'Jason
ara attaching, the draft of a paper on
?razes as an Active Axls Ally, which will be discussed
at the j 0:1 .0 4. tomorrow afternoon. This is the only
ptivecr to be discussed at that meeting. An Appendix
an a
oz, the ?tench Battle Order, ground, sea,
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ert4mrlf Itqf ilit"taioeviwt*4
441
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Reptiling. to your moo
,
111,414-;Pi
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katORANDV. FOR HUGH WILSON:
am prepared to make this request of Marshall
after they have passed upon our other paper. I think
he would not be' willing to riot on this without having
thi othor submitt44 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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'
-
-
fi.51
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414. ir Mgnic:
11040x R. Wilson
C01001101 DO0011012
S.A. File #0111
PRILININANY CONSIDERATIONs ON THE BRITISE
SEKORANDUK TO J.I.C. RESPECTING
CAPTURED ENEMY EqUIPONT.
ICE.
roading, the report handed to lir. licsont, -I have discussed
*ice with; Colonel Debb and Group Captain Du AC,�illay.
that *ash *At of the British forces�land, saat, and
�100,011vt.. i)renisation for the purpose of, examination
mate,71.,.al:. The preetice of the British of.
POca was
asi
'' - *ft some detail..
_,
014: bikiiIs of Britain in the *WSW" Or, .140 ,.a,aCaber_.
liti, vat no 44�00�42 to each locality, ittiliniglind.
�tes*.'hS to.�plamt siitards, loofa polioei, . or lime ;;Suardsfsii �
it,:' -UM liti/oh. 1644.4 in his area to p.reverkt _
.**Vorip � . etc. , rratpontly'; vide .seiireh
thai 04 tail strewn *tor a oonaidarabloi
.gr $l$ an swim/ airplane by the
.o the.
-Ont eXperts. They eXemLned. in ,
p. .-/t,..4i*,. tromento And, at the stow time,.
citI*icaterials for anstlysic end -Eilaminatio1.
tkrititem doWat to establish ito Contistenor. '
ortf 0,4 reistOics from isttio4 delivered were
4**ot:tide or Poittto of origin as val
woo 410totoo4 thevolq.
nOrnotion conierning economical% matter.
4004Wes. .
-itim that, isc officer- 160.04 done
,11:14,11. i. arri,:r..V., in:i the UniteO, Stites
-1'*PS Mt bS5 il as 10 _ir,40' fin4rioriisiOntativera-� of
tik Ot- IOW 4tWokistapt.. .., .
Aktkithor *ay bad made arrangjjI1haements
-4104inet IA order to shick on
-h3V.$t that* **A donbtloso
;P tbs
00gat1w5, Wing that tho
'AVaoio to ss the Roosiano for
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45Fatw
����
4! �
- 2 -
permission to have British officers present when prisoners were
interviewed; that the British military officer in Russia had
replied that he had not even proffered the reques%; as he knew
how offended it ionld make the Russians.
SITUATION IN USA ARMY
have t,ikan up with Colonel Butler the problem of ascertaining
What the army is doing or plans to do in this connection. Re tells
ma that he will go into the matter at once with a view of informing
himself *s to the situation.
I also discussed the matter with Commander Ravenel. The
IAVT
lattilur however, informed me that the Navy regards this particular
aang as extremely confidential. He invited me to prepare a
***prandua on the subject which he would take to his superior
*Moor* in order to ascertain what might be dons about it.
inktbe light of the foregoing paragra0h, I am reluctant to
Plop**. atiiich * somorsndurs unless you explicitly so direct.
1 st.*4* an error in not going higher in my initial step.
*ay sheel I hesitate to go further on this phase of the matter
In.
U*tU I have your advice.
It viduld,_ of course, be very advantageous if J.I.C. ihould
019g9Wi
fr to, designate C.O.I. as the coordinating unit for this
t*sUpplement by technical civilian examination, the
'Itrits1,0et up by Army, Navy, Air. Such decision would
�
de*, uk: al tnformstion and enable study to be made
, 1144'
.444444*******41P4444,4$448�1.**4:*********-reti**
the wyo# of course, that the most practical study
. of Oerman equipment would be in collaboration
404,
IS type of request would not be asking the
400 any
of their own secrets, but merely to share
of the Germans. They must have a mass of
4 it 110 certein that careful scrutiny by
Offisers and civilians�could not fail to be
eoupt seem to offer a possible laboratory expert:sent
AtictirAperican forces of an Examination Unit. 1
1
, 1, subgerines have been sunk in
:in--s bisve doubtless coo* down. Al
\
PgrattiWObrarlOgii-balitia. ' -' :'41I .
4ttg� -t`
_
,
'
f-4.1
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- 3 -
operations develop further, equipment will probably fall into
our hands. As I understand it, there is a measure of iron and
steel production in Australia which would allow for laboratory
analysis on the spot. I believe that this possibility could
well be explored.
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1,4
046404004,
tisdtbkiiiii.4.,1Rolliia40:,eigoidsa-oahA Jr.
�cr
co
0_
0
co
co
c\I
a)
a)
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tVti
-
2AR1�, ell(11.4
� �
I
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..1"!
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A
r�
V
c.Lz.;31
�T;;
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7,7
'444
4 ;
e:7L4PV
�
April 5, 11042
4c-
Admiral Inkiest 7. Wilkinson
Ohlarmen, Joint Intelligence Committee
*elhington, D. C.
Sydow Admiral Wilkinsons
Sin*e it will be impossible for me to
*Wm. the J.I.C. meeting on Sondsy April 6, I
Amve *eked hsjor Devid eruse to attend sad repro-
,,,,a,sent me in ay absence. I have gone over the
powilai projects with hie.
Ikacirp#01443,-4,20w4s....,
ck�,,�;.
7
'i�
Sinaorely,
William J. Donovan
14. . �
� _,
l'REPT.t7 .4n
� ,31.71i
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1
THE JOINT BOARD
Joint Intelligence Committee
Wash:Ington
OFFICE MORANDUM NO. 11
. SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Joint Intelligence
Committee
In conformity with GCS 23/1, the Joint Intelligence
Comattee has been reorganized as follows:
1. Joint Intelligence Committee.
Rear Admiral T. S-Willdnson, Director of Naval
Intelligonce, Chairman.
Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee, Pssistant Chief
of Staff, G-a
Hal. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.
t'Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information.
Colonel R. B. Lord, Chief of Operations, Board of
Econose arfare.
Secretar*T Major Ludwell L. Montague.
'11IL,IctIntA Sub-Committee.
Captain J. V. Ogan
Col. Louis J. fortl�er,
Col. Vincont J. Ueloy, U.S.A.
Xr. Winthrop Purray Crane, Dept.
of State.
Dr. !Award Mason, .C.0.1.
Vr.- Charles B. Rayner, B.E.W.
Omar. J. 8. Foskett, U.S.N.
fat. Cmdr. H. L. Abbott, U.S.N.H.
tit. Cmdr. W. T. Kenny, U.S.N.
Va. or Lodwoll L. Montague, U.S,A Sooretary
AtAahedo Officers.
t1out.0140 M. mo0overn, U.S.N.R.
Ospts(i.ni A,. Sidney ITuford, 111� U.S.A., Asst. Secy.
Wart S. R. Prentiss,, U.S.N.H.
g
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1
THE JOINT BOARD
Joint Intelligence Committee
Wash:Ington
OFFICE MORANDUM NO. 11
. SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Joint Intelligence
Committee
In conformity with GCS 23/1, the Joint Intelligence
Comattee has been reorganized as follows:
1. Joint Intelligence Committee.
Rear Admiral T. S-Willdnson, Director of Naval
Intelligonce, Chairman.
Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee, Pssistant Chief
of Staff, G-a
Hal. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.
t'Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information.
Colonel R. B. Lord, Chief of Operations, Board of
Econose arfare.
Secretar*T Major Ludwell L. Montague.
'11IL,IctIntA Sub-Committee.
Captain J. V. Ogan
Col. Louis J. fortl�er,
Col. Vincont J. Ueloy, U.S.A.
Xr. Winthrop Purray Crane, Dept.
of State.
Dr. !Award Mason, .C.0.1.
Vr.- Charles B. Rayner, B.E.W.
Omar. J. 8. Foskett, U.S.N.
fat. Cmdr. H. L. Abbott, U.S.N.H.
tit. Cmdr. W. T. Kenny, U.S.N.
Va. or Lodwoll L. Montague, U.S,A Sooretary
AtAahedo Officers.
t1out.0140 M. mo0overn, U.S.N.R.
Ospts(i.ni A,. Sidney ITuford, 111� U.S.A., Asst. Secy.
Wart S. R. Prentiss,, U.S.N.H.
g
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leMgMMYWARft � -
The attached directive (C.C.S.43/1) by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff provides for membership in the
Americas Joint Intelligence Committee of appropriate
ropreeentatives of the State Department, the Board of
leomosic Warfare and the Coordinator of Information, in
addition to the Directors of the Intelligence Services
efthe Arwood Wavy.
In ardor to implement this directive,and: sub-
Jett te it agreemat, it is requested that two rep.
�videmtatimee of the Office of the Coordinator of Informa-
tics misated, the senior to serve as a member of the
�
_ Awe/Lean "int tatelligenee Committee (paragraph 3 of the
asalessareh math* janitor to serve vith the "full time
, _ �
: imorbise Committees of the American Joint Intelligence
. amino, Olissirm* 4 of the enclosure).
Paspoottaly,
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U.S. SECRET
BRITISH HOST SECRET
C.C.S. 25 1
FEBRUln_11.1_1242
COY.BIED CHIFS OF STAFF
� .41* � � ���=������.���������� ��������1
COPY Y.O. 54
DIRECTIVT BY THE co�B/TD-OTTIWJS OF STAFF
FOR
ooMBrIND ILLIOIC
4thLOO'ThC, Item 4.)
The Comb*ined Chiefs or Staff, at a mooting held
February 10, 1942, accepted paper C.C.3. 23 (attached
hereto) as terms of reference for Combined Intelligence:
V. DNS,
B. VIM
Combined Secretariat
ENCLOSURIg
1, The proposala in this paper are intended to tmple-
'oont tht tollowiw directives;
Extract from ABC-1;
*10 lxisting Intollicence organizations
. ,
orr the two. powera will (*orate as Independent intelli-
itiptcleat. bvit will, maintain clooe llatson with
tithor trif ordor to ernuttro tho fu11 and prompt
Ctoutg4 Of' portinellt inrormatien concerning war opera-
440 -I0t4111Vinco liaLaon will be amtablished not
tit*. Milltar7 Mionlone but taco $etween all
= 1
It C 040(r* (40" t elna�".
,.�
Vatod atittoo4ritioh Ohists ot Staft
,
ittAtes4$1 Oalabormtion," /alma 2 to Minutes
tar Contorooto J40u4r7 140, 1042,
ihik4OomM*04 14 the fteld with reupoot to mattertv
_
�
of' aim Ana �
'tot, 133 :0.Filafy to, spv:vo r;ho Oonbinetdt-y-,:,
�r=c.--sIN
- . -
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it
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SEC RT
Chiefs of Staff and Combined Staff Planners has boon
referred to the latter body for a report. Hore also,
It is contemplated that existing machinery will be
largely continued."
2. The primary assumption is that there Is to be mutual
wtcha:Age of (a) the intelligence necessary to plan for com-
bined operations with the British; (b) intelligence of the
enemT in all areas, not only on higher levels, but in all
echelons to 'Include n1li4ary Attaches and observers.
3. The American Joint Intelligence Committee will be
c4)mposed of the Directors of the Intelligence Services of the
Army and lavy, and in additio,:: appropriate representatives of
the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare and the
Coordinator of Iftformation. This Committee will be co -equal
with,'and on a status of mutual exchange with, the Joint
ellannias commIttee the service of the Joint; Chiefs of
w-taft.
4. A rull t.tato working committee of the American J.I.C.
composed of the members of the now existing Army-Navy J.1.0.,
with State Doptwtment, lIcenomic Defense and C.O.I. reprosonta-
ttm, w 11 continuo their prespnt duties and will work in
close cooperation with the British J.I.C. in Washington.
Me Joint Intolligonoe Committees will freely ox-
go portIgnolt intolmatiaa concerning war operations. Act-
etS ^ Combinod Intellizoao.o CommIttoo, Vcoy will prepare
0 bt4441d44 tratalletnoo imates (Approolationo) and otherwimo
01,110 CambUstei Ohtani' of 6tuff,
In the �fiold a cios6 lialoon will bo maintainod bok.
tea AP riosa Arol 3ritich Intolligonoe organtzationa th
tdor oneuro- 4 ma uai lntorohango of intelligence 1,nforma
ort
rin
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Alf
SECRET
1.
7. In matters of Counter Intelligence to combat subver-
sive activities, espionage, etc., the Intelligence Services
of the two Powers will continue their prosent activities,
but wherever appropriate the Services will cooperate, through
the individual Joint Intelligence Committees, with the Com-
bined intelligence Committee.
161
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PP it.,
2- Q
�.�
a
a
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CCS 370.2 (2-16-42)
1.9
COPY NO._____
.S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
FEBRUARY 16 1942
0
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF .STAFF
WASHINGTON D.
ITEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
Subject: Timing, rate of build up and scale of
German air attack to be expected at
Casablanca in the initial stages of
Super Gymnast.
1. The Combined Planners directed that the Zecretaries
refer the attached papers to the Combined Intelligence
Committee with the request that that Committee furnish an
agreed appreciation of the views set forth therein.
2. It is further requested that the Combined
InteIligence Committee set forth the various hypotheses upon
which their appetcon is based.
E. L. SIBERT,
P. O. A. DAVISON,
Combined Secretariat.
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O'rA
L
'4'41
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02/I
JCH
February 14, 1942
MEMORAMDUR FOR TRE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WPD:
Subject: C.P.S. 2/2 -- Super Gymnast.
1. In reply to request in memorandum WPD, dated
February 14, 1942, the following are submitted as the comments
of the Military Intelligence Division bn paragraphs 2, 3 and 4,
*Scale of Air Attacks",
Should the Axis move into West and Northwest
Africa their aircraft will form the advance element. Due to the
availability of numerous bases and linos of communication
through Spain, Sicily and North Africa, this move will not
occartion any serious difficulty for the Axis. Air Force require-
ments mould not be great and sufficient means are now available.
The Intolligonee Division estimates that the
Germans have a total of 750 aircraft based in Italy and Sicily
with an additional 200 Gorman aircraft in Spain. The Italians
have a total combat airforce of approximately 1000 aircraft,
lacluding mrily observation typos, which are now based in Italy
omd, Sicily and are not ongagod in North Africa. The foregoing
ostimato is an over all strongth including rosorvos.
The disposition of the Axis Air Forco is such r.s
to pormit the movement through two zones, (1) Sicily and (2)
,Spoin. Operations could occur simultanoously.
The scales of offort aro estimated as followsi
From Sicily - 350 aircraft
FTOM Spain - 3Laircraft
700 total
it it estimated that the enemy's air attack from
vould b* diroctod against Algoria and tho attack from
the diroation of Casablanca.
%t is bolloVod that operations could commenco
decision tO do so has boon made.
For the Lszistant Chief of Staff, 0-2:
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"rt.
ALLAWalt-t-g_t_12.0.1=3..R..44.1a..140-0---AWSLE
Should the !xis move into Wost and Northwost Africa their
aircraft will form the advance elament. Due to the availability
of numerous bases and lines of communication through Spain,
Sicily and North, Lfrica this movo will not occasion any serious
difficulty for the Axis. Air Force requirements would not be
groat and could be furnished by the 2nd Air Fleet, now reported
to be based in Italy, augmented by whatever Focko4olfe bombers
the L'Xi3 deadOd to spar� from France. (The above Air Floot
Is estimatod to comprise 400 aircraft, mostly bombers, and
according to reliable information its strength will be incroasod
shortty, probably with fighters. Its strength then will
probably be between 700-800 aircraft.) The movement through
two tones, (1) Sicily and (2) Spain, would occur simultaneously.
Tho force frdm Sicily of approximatoly 350 aircraft would
cupy and operate from bases in Tunisia and Llgeria thereby
donyinc the Weste?n, Moditorranoan to :461liod forces, Complete
-occupation could be offoctod in two days and within two wooks
offeetivo operations could .be conductod. It has repeatedly boon
dtmodstratod that surface craft cannot cperato within range of
dotorained attack by land bated aircraft without aortal super-
iority. This cannot be socurod by the British at this time.
Oblortously Gibralter would be untenable as a Naval Base. In
tonsoquenca the LX13 would have a direct surface supply route
to. 4ll ports in this theatre, hampered only by sporadic air
and submarino,nttacks.
Th force from Spain, of approxtmately 100 long range
bod0Ors, 200 single =gine fighters ,4101 100 twin engine fighters,
10001d occupT consocatively tho basal from Tangier to Dakar.
't woialdp require about one week, tho distant� involved being
allOott .1700 miles by air. Within another week offectivo opera-
tio40 could be conducted. Roavy bombers will probably be baiod
at Dakar,. Villa Cisneros, Cap Juby and Tangier, with single
isogifto flOters occuvying tho adjacont auxiliary fields. Twin
Ifighters would occupy the Cana and Cape. Verde islands
042",0 4* Oh040=roconnaissancol light bombers and fighterprcteo ,
ilon Or those bases. They could also escort hoavy bombers
00 arid= brsos. There are sufficiont facilitios
islando to protect the pavers which occupy them first.
Wood, that Yraneht POrtUr1030 and Spanish forces would
00 ;Xis fOrecs in this theatre should the lollies attack
ThC r.401sito supply for all Axis forces in this theatre
117 bo accomplishod by air and sea transport.
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BRITISE MOST S2CRET
COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS
Note by the Secretarios.
The ,DrCioUru,which sots out certain
arid comlGfl obtainod by the British Joint
Staff PIannars from London,
eiv.estions for discussion by tho Combined Staff Planners.
Vaal.elnrtori, n.c.
10T7. TSTMATC, 1042.
ft<
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POLICY.
1. London definea the circumstances which are sine qua
non to the whole plen as "a guarantee of no opposition by
the Vichy French Fleet togethor with full information
regarding all minefields laid in the approaches to French
African ports". They add that it is also most desirable
that all French warships shall have moved from Casablanca
teforo the arrival of the first convoy so that all berths
in the harbour may be clear.
ALE OF IR ATTi.
2, The 'Iritish Joint Intolligenee Committee's view is that
there is no imminent throat of air attach on Casablanca
in the postulated eireumstancea. That even operating
throh Spain it is improbable that the German scale of
effort would exceed 30 long range bombers by the and of the
firat month, althou.Ih thereafter it might be built up more
rapidly,
3. Gorvan and. Italian air forces could to-day attach
T�tinisia. Scales of effort are entimated as followsOorafl:
350 aircraft (of which 180 bombers)
Italian 160 aircraft (of whleh 50 bombers
based on Sicily)
A possibility of a further 130 Italian fighters
based on Tripoli (Libya).
40 Tb-,0 view In London is that the onemylo air attack from
s n, would almost certainly be diroctod avainst the
ka" plco, ports before reaching out aa far an Casablanca.
tr this be no, there is little immediate threat to Casablanoa
mhens rttish contingent in diaembarhed in Algeria.
emfewnEir.�chT itR roRcyz.
General Alexander has expronand tho vlow that the
ZrItith air rerces In Tunisia are inadequate. It in
approgiAted that Oaneral Frodendall, the Supremo Commander,
hos not be able, to see hi a way to accepting the suuostiox,
that vottin v.a, air force,* be allocated to General
gictarider. HOW0Ver, havintr, rerPard to the argumentn put
fort/wird above At to the probable scale of air attaclr, on
_.,,An*tx1Anca, it ia thought that General rredondall may be
wIlitrig to reconsider the practioability or malting oome
U. purmait atr forces availaidle to the British in
Tw1414 or Aigerist After nattinr up his squadrons in the
C4101ftincA
,clonbianalt ownoot accomodate 55 ships. Detailed
**MinAtio6 has boost mAdo which shows that we munt reduce
olloan WttiMAteao det6i1ed appreciablon by the
jOint tilAnntirs In London, is aa follows:-
,
tt IR teit thftt 1/3 of the UOCOMMOdAtiOn of the
saieiwed ror torench reqpirementb, oventh during
firSet convoy, It is estimated that
14: 0,,74 atereships, 2 petrol ships, 1 fleet of
-V or w1cort9 can be aeoommodated innide
* , 4 of theso U.T. stortships must be loaded
WV, caw', so that they can be dealt
VIA10 and the remainder must not
Axiolola tono ddad weight stores if the7
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are to be unloaded in a 16 day cycle. It would be poss103.6
to unload 6 more ships artificially flatted and loaded only
with U.T. provided the personnel were accommodated either
at satellite ports such as Safi, or in the outer harbour in
the area marked "prohibited anchorage" which is probably a
controlled minefield area. This is ctill under investigation.
CO Transit capacity is 4,000 tons a day. Allowing
1300 tons a day for French requirements this gives us 2700
tons per day. These figures (i.e. 25,000 tons stores,
10,000 tons coal, chiefly for French Railways, and 4,000
tons petrol) give an average of 2500 tons per day over a
16 day crzle. The allowance for building up reserves will
therefore be sms11.
(c) The capacity of Qasablanca each 16 day period is thus
estimated at 25,000 tons stores, 10,000 tons coal, 4,000
tms petrol and 3,000 vehicles. The vehicle figures must
be reduced to 2,100 if 6 extra M.T. ships cannot be
accommodated. 3,000 vehicles are sufficient for about
6 personnel ships carrying up to 2,000 British troops in
each 16 day cycle; and it is proposed to plan on this
basis. Personnel convoys should arrive 4 days before M.T.
stores convoys.
ALADICZ.
7, It is pointad out that the number of heavy A/A guns
In the A/A regiment detailed for the first convoy is 24,
To add more will probably be difficult as it would involve
another ship.
CONVOXPROGRAKM.
6. A revised convoy progromme appears to be essentials
Ognerel Alexander suggests that the British contingent should
be maintained through Oran as long as possible so as to
reduce the strain on Casablanca. This must however be
subjeet to the proviso that all Allied Forces landed in Africa
must be capable of being maintained through Casablanca should
the Oer=lans enter Spain. The British convoy programme to
Oran Is thereforo dependent upon the British programme to
CasabIenca.
0* e.I cannot now sail before D-24 owing to the release of
'hipping previoluly held in readiness. The fast portion of
the BPItish contingent, includin8 at least two M.T. ships,
04111/010- Arrive before D.a4, while the slow portion cannot
arrtve before 10,-.38, London agrees that the first Casablanca
OsAffofy should, be joint Amorican-British, but they doubt
wIXdOm of planning to me*t at sea.
lla� The miaow* British requirement for carrying A/A and
the necessary administrative units le estimated at 4
14-on1.el and 5 M.T. *hips. Thereafter alternative British
American convoys are proposed - in that order and at 18 day
Attwevals. British convoys to Oran will conform as long
Mt the t car be Lwied. Should the use of Oran be
dented, any convoy which is on route will be
to safe atehorage until CssaUlance can receive it.
Atteshod ilovectO (Annex I) ls A revised convoy programme
oyel* referred to above.
le to confirm that there is
Ardt objettive. The objective was
WW(4.1.C.)2 by the Joint Planning
Inrobjedt is to establish
nch'ItorOcco ns quickly as possible.
ago from which Spanish Morocco
�o not164. and thus block Germany's
The area Would- also form
�111.4 Clittol could be extended over
tit otd- into, Aar' iiirOtP.
417,
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'NON
Int � Bd.. Group One Heavy
and one light A.A. Regt.
Three Fighter Sqdns, Ad-
ministrative Unita.
Dl - Date loading of ships is ordered
A - American Convoys - B - Britidh Convoys
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The two attached papers, JPS 5 and JPS 5/10
are transmitted to the Combined Intelligence Committee
with the request that a combined evaluation be prepared
of the tvo views set forth, for presentation to the
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SECRET
Copy No
E.022117-2.1-1210.
U.S. JOINT. STAFF PLANNERS
DIRECTIVE
SUMMARY OF RECENT JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE'S
APPRECIATION OF GERMANY'S INTENTIONS
NotE12.9.111
In accordance with directive quoted herewith, enclosure is
forwarded to the Joint Strategical Committee for appropri*te
action.
"It is desired that the attached "Summary of recent Joint
Intelligence Sub-Committee's appreciation of Germany's in-
tentions", received from the British, be forwarded to the
Joint Strategical Committee for study and comment.
A, copy of this document has been furnishlod the Joint
Intolligance Colmittes for analysis.
Th. two Comites 'should collaborate.
EXCLOSURE
NAVAL MESSAGE
IN
T.0.0. 0835A/30
Received 30/1/42
Time : 1531
-*-60110414 344000, ftshington 868
t*Olit Mostriltr.
-:#11taier14401114110.4144,06....00.0.010.1001144V.,4~00641.*40.Asiperli, momarffewormrs.r.o .as.a.r� oweadorftwors....rompooff....01r~osi
011o1S1 Is a tumm.ry of recent Joint Intelligence
'es appreolostioft of German/f intentions.
11.1:1.601Ming ithort of oil and her air force has
to first lino strength of appro%imately 4,000 opera
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gRET
tional and 1,400 transport aircraft.
2. She has recently increased naval mad air forces in the
Mediterranean. Considerable number of submarines and small craft
have arrived in this area and large stocks of oil have boon ac-
cumulated at Uediterranean porta.
30 We believe the supply increase intended chiefly for
protection of Axis communication with North Africa to neutralize
Malta, and to insure against a successful British advance to
the Tunis frontier.
4. On Russian front the initiative still in Ruesials
hands and Gorman forces withdraWing under strong pressure. As
yet, no sign of preaent Russian offensive exhausting itself,
Until it does, it will be trapossible for Germany to withdraw
sUbstentiAl forces from RU5316, to rept and refit 30 as to form
* striking force for renewal of offensive on the Russian frol�
Or fOr large scale operations in other theatres of war.
On the contrary, we know Flak defenses in Ukraine
*re being strensthened at the expense of Roumania and that�
other air units including air tore* troops, recently withdrawn
ttOt Russi*n, front are being hurriedly returned there after
-nlown time svont.in roet and refit.
1.00t4 jio reduction in atronsth of German Air Force
i.y that Oevmany' will be 4blo to make availeble euffieiont
� t4t: oOntaln Russians And at the same time undertake
eta * operations elsewhere. rurther, this weakneee will
Otermat7 to limit her offensive to one major operation
041 ohe mIght hops to concentrate on air force sufficient
to 4 her euperiority. To achieve this she would have to
b.wr *ir rorce ellseethers to a minimum required for aeourity.
ikt, 0440040 (OormtnI etriking force being created now,
041044e7 * strilting force sufficient for largo Deal�ten ,
be tweeted so long as the Rusalan offenaive is main..
tor the oVice or argument that stabilization ia
ObrUary, oarliest date by which divicion (includwo
�
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SMCKET
ins divisions which may be made available from detached squadrons;
for large scale operations could be withdrawn, rested and re-
stored, would be the 1st May. So far as Russia is concerned
large seale opercitions unlikely to take place owing thaw during
April, and the consequently difficulty of movement.
Possible courses of German action.
8. (A) A renewed offensive along the whole Russian front.
For reasons already given this is most unlikely, if not wholly fqk,
'r*
imiossiblo as yet.
(B) A thrust in tho south towards Caucasia (while
contatnins Russian army in north and centre).
Germany must secure, at the earliest opportunity pos-
sAtIO allbstantial supplios of oil. She can only obtain fabric
in Caucasia or Iraq. For reasons given below, Caudasia is
tho:mozt liic:111 Or operation.
' A thrust through Turkey (towards) Syria and thong� to
,
Odlor-r%Vpt� Advanco thrall& Turkey into Iraq would put Ge
tAnylinipotelaion of oil fields potentially capable of mooting h
ouid:4oprilio us or oil on which our Eastern Mediterranoa.
4101$100, pArtiy doponds. Would bring Oormany within strik-
idA60 of Atadon itnd open ray to a further advanco into
y:tOilCtht.othOr hatd transport of oil from Iraq would be
VIVI:PP than ..trora Caueatia. :at least until Gorman/,;had a
rout thrOue Ustert Moditorrnnoan. Moreover, oven
044l4sso4 in passago of Gorman forces through hor ter-
bo, undcrUtkin84, now military oommitmonta.
Tweltoy would acquiesce unions Russian army do.
tUffolrod such reverses that she foit confidont
jt
Ifiin tiLn Itte victr
tontral and wostern Mediterranean areas
fr:tottinsula, against Gibraltar and Fronch Vorth
te, to bo gained substantial but oporation would J.:
'ottOthtr militari commitmont in thoatro of war ro,
owini.soliO�o: at 012 tnd other supplios. Occupation of
4
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would subsequently be a heavy economic liability. This
operation therefore appears likely, only in order to countor or
forestall action against ourselves or America. (b) Through North
Africa ports against Egypt from west, possibly in conjunction wit:
an attack through Turkey. Germans will attempt to maintain and
exploit their position in Vorth Africa, and for this purpose re-
inforce Rommel with forces necossary. Pronence of strong air
tOteta in eontral Viediterranean area would servo to neutralize
Ualt a and protect communication with Tripoli. Germany may try
to capture Uelta.
U.Invasion or British Isles. It is unlikely that Germany
cold undertake so largo and risky operation as long as Russia
rowing undessktod.
Most probable Corman major operation likely to bo made
ort bo made to entrol the central and eastern
ttanean aAd to maintain and (oxploit) th6 position in
Oollow114 is our osttmae or force Germany would roquirc
attoll rcd to in poata:raph 5 to 11 above and of timo
00 Vtitsowl,UeOmnine, of witlidrawal ofj4 0 divisions
ontontrAtion of fore roady Jor attack in
titres of optwation, "Z" day lo date on whieh with-
'V'$ i bozinnlna:
norttAtiod ofronsive aGainst Russia.
(I) An ofronsivo flalone the Russian Front. We
t, 000 posaitoility of tIlla operatton.
Gorman* %Ito got.
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(ii) Thrust in south towards Caucasia (while containini
Russian armies in north nnd contre). Force required against
Caucania some 30 Divisions (of which some 4 to 6 armourod and 4
to 6 motorized) and 1500 aircraft, Earliest date by which this
operation could be developed. Concentration on the southern sec-
tor Z upward 2* months. Fall of ROSTOV Z plus 3 months. Occupat
of MAIKOP TUAPSE area Z plus 4 to Z plus 4.?1: months. Occupation
of SROZNI area Z plus 5 months, Occupation of BATUM - BAKU area
dependent on dsgroc of resistance in Caucasla.
?(B). Thrust throLgh Turkey towards Syria and thence Iraq
andfor Egypt. Land force required 20 Divisions (including 4
armoured and 6 motorized). Air force required - if Oormans decd
to attack Turkoy they would expoot Turks to receivo air assintanc
from ourselves. Unlikely thorefore that Germans would attack unt
they had assembled, in area from centra3 Mediterranean to Black
(which must be troatod as a whole) some 1500 aircraft in additiol
v40 1I available Italian Aircraft.
Earliost date on which I:Oman could bo concontratod on
Turklzh Frontiar. Z plus 2b months. Earliost dato on which forcc
could rotch Syrian Frontidr. Turkey acquiescent Z plus 4 3/4 mon
Ttxrk47 resistance incaloulable.
(C1 InvaSion of BritLah Iolos.
Land forma mquirod; 30 divisions (including 9 armour
exelu#ive Divisions required tor diversion.
Alt* rorco poquir)d: -Pull first line strength, donudir
ttoz theatres oC war.
raVal fOrc quird: Substantially tho whole German
gaily would, bo inloolvud. ErArliost date by Which force could be cc
lontrato4 In wwit. Z plus 3 to 4 months.,
Op tion In Central :nd West3rn Moditorranoan.
(1) Through Iborinn Peninsula qgainat 011braltor and
'ch "forth Areloa. Und Air Porel3 required - sineu theso
,rtohs only likely to be contompl!Itod by Germans to forestall
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888 8
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or counter Alliod action, thoy would have to omploy such forcos
as they could mustor at the timo. Timing would similarly depend
on tho state of affair then oxisting.
(ii) Thrcuch North African ports acainst Egypt from
west, possibly in conjunction with an attack through Turkey. Land
force required - 7 ,divisions made up say as follows:- 2 German
armoured divisions, 1 Gorman motorized division, 1 Italian armoure
divisiont 1 Italian motorized division, 2 Italian infantry
divisions.
A3suminc of Axis forcos now in Libya, equivalent of 1
airourod� 1 motorized and 2 infantry division will still be in
Thoso are includd in above. Air Force required - the
fOreo act out in sub paraaraph (B) above would cover this
�potation., Carltest dat by which force in TRIPOLITANA could be
rOettolictd. Uot wawa TUni3ian ports -Z onths from ,Aato of
ombralitztl.on. Us alOunistan parte -i months from date of
cOar tion.
Abovos,puttinz loato terms of CALM' '.nd assuming 15th
Illstirtulry 4* c4r1tost dato on vhlch sastantial force can be with-
yri tram attaltla, IcArliest date for ctaco referred to above
(0 I. r rliost flat� of eoneontration on the south
/1-1zA 400tor 1st 817.
2., ?all of nostov 15th Nay.
3. 00ouption of NAINOP-TUAPSB area
4, Clocuption of WWI area 15th Al
oup tian of tigrini - ONO area,
It Ctioamt4.
onoantr4tion on th.;, Turkizlh frontior lot May.
4,00t ate on whioh far000 could reach the
r asquieacent� e4.r1y Lu6ust, Turkoy
ontorktration or forcoo for invaolon of U.X.
fft
Ittw.
15th Juno to 60t)
ly.
dependent on
�
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STAFF FLAI:lqa�.
A2PRZCI511.212V GEanAllYISIELL7.12aa
Commit.toe in collaboration with tl�e Joint BtroteGical
mIttee, in 4ccordanc.a with airective or
isted for consideration by the Joint U.S.
JOIn ClinF6OF STAFF COMni2TUVjot :
Conlients on a British korrociation
of Germany's Intentions.
(a) nodal 65, a summary of IA re-
cent 3rit:is11 joint Intelligence
Sub-Committee a.,,Treeiation of
Germany I s intent ions
(b) Ncoorandum, Joint St aII :non-
ners, Vebruary 2, 1042.
(b) forwarded reference (a) to the Joint
Cotmittoo and tho Joint Strategical uommittee
tor ocalobsvative littudy and comment. Tho joint Strategical
,4=1,Wto ht* collfiborated iA tho preparation of this ptc) or,
hglrein4
Conaittoo believes that Germany cannot undertone
offozaivt elsewhere b*fore having d,ostroyed Russia's
lt, therefore, agrees in eoneral with the
in paragraph, 12 of the British J.I.C. ap-
most ivobable German major offensive opera-
111I1 bo an atta6r. on Russia intended to
--00010t4 tO' destruction or the Russian Arny awl to gain access
e thg ezucamult. guanWhile, ovDry ffort will be
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made to control the central and eastern Veditorrancan and to
maintain and exploit thL potion in North Africa.
5. This Comaitteets views regarding other hypotheses
may be stated briefly as follows:
S. An op(,ration through North African ports against
Egypt from the west: Likely as a subsidiary undertaking, but
not as the major effort. See paragraph 2.
b. An, operation through the Iberian Faninsula
against Gibraltar and French :iorth Africa: To be undertaken
4mly if necessary to counter an Allied initiative in that
rion
c. A thrust through Turkey to Syria and thoncs to
rktypt or Iraq:- Unlikely.
d. Invasion of the Dritish Iolos: Most unlikely.
4. The aan5ider4tiona from whioh these conclusions
aro reached may be indicated by comment, seriatim, on the
lumWaphsi or the British appreciation.
(II ?WIG it is known that the Gorman oil supply
t1itrnttd, it is believed that it is sufficient to
4t tho ntids,or military operations threugh 1944 at least.
Aktalit%try'Tntoiligenco Division's estimate of German air
bc-isr as foilows:
h
cr_ Totod aircraft in tactical groups 5094
144/rational training units 2097
10 tehools 1490
X0 toservo 4105
Xr civil ropair 2097
Total ozoot transport 14981
tran4port 1700
Total aircraft ntrangtk:. of G.H.F, 16661
**ioitivreAsonal, They are '40 to 24 percent
timn1:1441- eV/on, in the Zriish Tprecia tion,
04#
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(3) Agreed, with recogaition of an additional ob-
jectiva of ultimately gining control of tho Lediturranean.
(4) It is believed that Germany has already with-
drawn the bulk of her Zorces from the Russian front and is
now resting and re-equipping these troops in rear areas. The
so-called Russian offensive has thus far mot little except
stronz German rear guard action. Up to the present time the
situation will not permit a conclusion that a major Russian
Wherever Germany hs taken the initiative sho
has always assured herself of air superiority.
(7) No comments. See para grtph (4).
(OA) A renewed Gorman offensive a1on3 the whole
Russian front is certa inly most unlikely, if not wholly
im-
posiblo,, at the present time, nor is it believed that it
could be launched prior to 15 May.
(8B) Agreed, assuming that the word 'contaLning" is
used
i n active sense. The thrust would be designed to op114
ho Rustian Army. Tho main effort would then be in the south
tkewlittd the Caucaaua. The containing action would depend on
the cApabilitioa or the Russian Army at that time.
()) Turkey will be entirely realistic. If ths
nItuatIon 13 dOeldodly favorable to Germany at the 3ivon
lo =Mira; that Turkey would offer any rcsistuace in the
ipartuin dofoat.
(10A) Agreed..
11001 Agreedr
(41) Agrood,
(13-14) Soo paragraph 5 immediately below:
ad 4V and. "D". dup... (1) The British use a "Zit eay,
t 4t wlech. the Gormanz will begin to withdraw divioionn
bo tUlgann front to re-equip and reorcanize them for
iAir*fret:olio aetLon4 aa the s%arting point for their
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S.L.CRET
estimated rman time-tabl.;s. This Comittoo considers "Z"
day to be mL.aninsless, inasmuch as the Germans rotate their
divisions in line throughout the year and constantly strive
to maintain fresh divisions available for servica anywhere.
Moreover, it is our opinion that numerous divisions as well
as the bulk of the German air forco in Russia have already
been withdrawn to rest and refit.
(2) A more practical starting point would be a "D" day,
that on which the Germans will resume a major offensive
against Russia. This "D" day will be determined primarily
by climatic conditions. From the Sea of Azov to Finland there
is naturally a wide variation ia weather conditions. Along
the Zlack Sea coast the thaw should begin about the middle of
March, whereas north of Voseow winter conitions will continue
well into U. The thaw, urmally combined with heavy rains,
makes quadmires of tha roads, which at best are none too good.
On the front from Taganrog to Kursk, it is extremely doubtful
that climatic conditions would permit th3 launching of a major
�
oftenaive prior to 15 May. For that reason 13 May iu takon as
a probablo "D" day.
gpatall5ipslaLlnst tho Caucasus (1) The campaign
�
Wbth, requires most thoroutsh consideration is that envisaged
oritish Committee in paragraphs 13 (A) Ii and 14 (a);
by
tliat isf a drive on the Caucasus, while containing Russian
forces In th eentur and north.
(2) A campaign in Russia Is primarily a problem in
Tho rallroa.hicIthway not will determine in large
Aloasituo the number of troops that can be employee:. From the
Kharlmv-Taganros throe railways lead eastward to the lino
X* ,0oWkwitootcycf. Prom that line only one railway loads on to
atAlinsvad. In ord,./r to ocure ad,Pluato rail facilities for a
01,00 0;04m:tins' on tho Callcasurl, It b(lcaucs practically naccs-
sari obttIn 1130 of the l'ur.,J%-Vorom zh-Povorino-Stalincrad
rail lin40 Thu3 thero would 'cc four raIlroads east from the
�Ilna Kuret-Taganrog to t'hc lateral Voronezh-Rostov railroad
and, two ;h45/104_ to a-p
1
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(3) Although th.) Germans sun-olemnt railways with heavy
motor columns, it is inc,oncoivablo that evea they can supply
more than 20 divisions to each panctrating rail line.
Accord
ingly, a maximum of BO divisions could be maintained on the
initial Kursk-Taganrog front, which is 400 miles lons.
For
general global planning purposes, it is reasonable to assume,1
z
,)
one division for every 5 or 6 miles of front in a normal c3rn-
1
A
14
paign, or 70 to 80 divisions on a 400-mile front. This aGrees 4
with the estimated maxima capacity of the railroad net. 14hus
the German main effort may be estimated as a mass of about 80
divisions advancing from the lino KurSk-Taganrog.
(4) For purposes of general estimation, it may
be as-
limited to 100 miles a month, in alternate
oq'L1 stages of movonont and consolidation. (In the Russian
' 'OftenSilte of 1941 the Germans covered approximately 500 miles
in fivernths*)
(0 The, ;offensive from Nursli-Taganrog against the Cau-
casus' would probably take the form of a right wheel pivoting
010 1103to1i, so that eventually this group of armies would
tluttnizo 'fipra: aft. easterly direction to a southeasterly one
alma lito of Don RiVerr between Rostov and Stalingrad. Within
Utpttlaeks Rostov would probably have fallen. Tho drivo to-
atallnsrsd, however, mieht well take three or four months.
741. I* the( eleuloonts of the *orman Army that reached Rostov in
tifOi we**43 tiCuld, well gebouch therefrom, say within "D" plus
44- 1p-w1thout awaiting the fall of Stalinzrad, they would
1* 0011t01.74 limited in, str-ongth to no =re than 20 divisions,
*Mt. Stalingtad-Rostov calls for a force of nearer 40
UYI*LOnThosa can 170 supported when StalIngrad is taken,
iwtkos-rall lizte Staltngrad-Tikhoretsk inaicates. The ro-
.4n* 5''.411rislon1 of the original attnekins rorco would be
in. ooritttining or asdiating in contaitinG the Russian
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�,�,/
advance frar:. Rostov to the line Armavii-Maikop-
Tuapso (150 mils) could be made in about 1 months; that is,
about 2 months a fter "D" day, or by 15 July.
is based on an assumption that the Kerch Peninsula is de-
lzs_ndinc at Nevorossis1;: and Tuapse. These assumptions are con-
sdered reasonably sound. The occupation of Grozni could well
is 'ID" plus 4 months, or 15 Sept.
(7) If the campaign reached this point in
accordance
with this hishly theoretical time schedule, it would find the
Germans siltdly in control of Stalia2;rad and the Vola north
therOof, while the Russian Army defending the Caucaaus would
have fallen back beyond GroLni. A major decision would then
ariao as to whether the remnants of this Russian Army would
withdraw towards Astrakall or docido to continuo the defense
the oil rosions of Baku, fallin3 tack on thrl Trms-Caucsasus
ultizixtely on Iran. It must be remombered that the rails-
foraes defending in this Caucasus area would then be hope-
7 s0Paratod from the main Russian Armic,s, which would
probOly bava withdrawn on the Kazan-Kuibyshcv front.
SecoxIclax.2241/25.11ons in Russia. Containing action to
Itu$StiArt forces in the north from disrupting the German
litigt00 tow0d tho Caucasus is essential to the success of tho
ort outlintodin such detail above. It is believed that
tka aa'complished by a socondary attack northeastward,
�trio Oka Rivor, wl,th a view to seizing Gorki and
thtt ruzsiat, forcea north and uast of tho Volga
Cho samo roasoning and cm:adoration of timo schedul
i 14AWOU that Oda mancuvor would require about 4 months.
guoalan torms4 ir all want wAlo would thus becom hope-
kat is p5rtinont, This off ort woula eivinav hoavlo
490
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seizing the Suez Canal, drivin; eastward aad threatening
Basra. This large-scale double mvelopmmt is of the typo
nornally onvisaged by the Germans. The drive through Egypt,
with the present weakened strength of the Allied forces, would
probably relivire not more than 20 division.
(2 If this gigantic maneuver was succeedin3,
tude of Turkey would notlonger be in doubt.
Rathc
cept certain defeat, it is probablo that the
Turks
grudgingly permit the use of their railroads and
t1
Those time-tables are purely trtooroica
indicate the ,;:a%imum rate of progress of
aro apt to be capable. So much spculat
and so many imponderables, that rigid os
mates as to forces and elapacd tine required to roach various�4
diatant objectives may be misleading and dangerous. If the
Gerzans Can Maintain such a schedule, they can gain a major
daelaion against Russia in 1942 and perhaps a decIsion in the
_Vilddlo &kat as well. They would then be in a position to move
Oa India in. 194Z,, if they so elect. The Russian Army might
diivupt the schedule. The outcome therefore d3pends more upon
t itivo combat valuo of Russian and German divisions than
tot j: other factor.
LUDVELL L. MONTAGUE,
Major, Cavalry,
Secretary, J.I.n.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
Subject: Possible Japanese action against
Australia and New Zealand.
The Combined Staff Planners directed the
Socrotaries to refer the attached papers (C.P.S. 10 and
C.C.S. le) to the Combined Intelligence Committee with the
request that an agreed appreciation be furnished the Combined
Planners based on the two views set forth in the papers
'attached. This request should be given higher priority
than the request with reference to Super Gymnast.
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POSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AGAINST
The enclosure, prepared by the Joint Intellirence
Committee, is circulated for consideration by the Combined
1.The reference directs that the Joint Intelligence
COmmIttift furnish the Combined Staff Planners with its comments
,
. appradiation of the subject enclosed in the reference.
-2. The Committee agrees in substance with the conclusions
the 1n4losure (paragraphs 2 and 11). Specifically, it believes
�
thst at thas OAP Japan would be content to deny the use of
Orr,* Straits and to isolate Australia and New Zealand, without
401mborkIng *ft *major-Invasion of either
3d Thit Committee is in substantial agreement with the
ArteI0e41011 etetemtnt or conditions precedent to a major Japanese
Wok 00 Australis or Now Zealand (paragraphs :5 and 4). In
' �ph, 40 however, the Itnelosurs hypothecates Japanese consol-
liOrt of $ position Including tne Netherlands East Indies and
eilistisr4 sitter et Now Caledonia, nil., and Samoa as
Gatat4* .to:tUrthor effousive operations. in J.I.C. Special
Ospaneet tostic Capabilities," this Committee
. -
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estimated that the Japanese would consolidate the Burma-MalayaBetherlanls East Indies-Mandates barrier before undertaking
further offensive operations. Subsequent comment will be made
with reference to hypothetical Japanese consolidation of the
3M-NX barrier, as outlined in J.I.C. 1.
4. From the barrier, without undertaking a major off en-
sive operation, Japan could deny the use of Torres Strait by
neutralizing or occupying key points on the north coast of
Australia. This coast is so inaccessible by land from the
aettled area of Australia and so accessible by sea from the
it-..therlands aast Indies that it is, strategically, an integral
part of the barrier rather than of Australia. From the barrier
tho Japanese could also raid the ports of Australia and Now
Zealand, as envisaged in paragraph 1 of the Enclosurc. Operations
to Interrupt or harass supply routes from the United States
SboUid,alsa be anticipated. It is not necessary to occupy Samoa,
741, or New Caledonia for that purpose.
5* Australia and New Zealand are sparsely inhabited
*hit o communities Ssolated Trom other whites by the 6,000 miles
of oarimin *hick' separate thorn from the United States and from
South- Africa. Soth are dependent on overseas communications for
lls. Vizir individual characteristics are as
(a):Australia,. In an area of 30000,000 square miles
%haft aro only 7,000,000 Australians, nearly half of them in
%ha fivo cities of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide,
tind tarthie Thm vital area is the southeastern corner of the
-ctintIoarttp bounded, by the line Brisbane-Adclaide. There aro
fvuind thd bulk of the. population, industry, agriculture,
minounioation* facilities, and other utilities. Perth is
tho immter of an isolated community on the west coast. The
Or1 0* country Is larg&ly uninhabited dedort.
S.
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The 12,000 mile perimeter of Australia is too
long for all-around dfc:.ns.; by the limited forces available.
The terrain offers faw serious obstacic-;s. Communications
are poor by American standards and virtually nonexistent
outside of thd vital area. A significant war industry hes
been dveloed. but it is rendered vulnerable by dcpendmcs
(b) New Zealand, with a population of 1,600,000 in
100,000 square miles, is divided into two main islands in-
capable of mutual support. The terrain 's rugwed, but the
p4;rimter is disproportionatQ to the area and the vital
points are th.; coastal cities of Auklan, Wellington,
By invasion and occupc.tion of Australia and New
Japan could gain tn::: following advantages:
The elimination of those countries froL. the
(bl Their elimination as . bridgohad for counter
fls against th.zi barrier.
(s) Protection of the Japanese loft flank in future
na for the control of thk. Indian Ocean.
(la) Tho sst1sfaction of territorial ambitions through
*Iltion of torritory attractive to emigrants.
) Acqui,wition of natural rtsources, especially iron
nvarslork Ant occupation of Australla and Now
woula irocur the following disadvantagt-s:
(14 Tho- Ottonsio of their flank and lints of eonxnuii
A41110, 'tlao rrant ois t11. principal (=my, to tJnitod
tbm dio-ploxymmt of major forctu away from their
-1,a64
Zoo,* Vo4u,tisd tow uocur o occupation would
to the advantagoll saincd.
L.
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(e) It would be a time-consuming oporation, absorbing
forces which W.ght be employed morc. profitably elsewhere.
(d) The resistance of a White people in their home-
land would be more determined than any yet encountered.
They could expect no assistance from a fifth column.
(e) The operation would invite the United States
and
Russia to attack their flank and rear.
8. It is premature to estimate Japanese scales of attack
on Australia and New Zealand (paragraph 6 of the enclosure). The
Japtnesos have not yet fulfilled the agreed conditions prerequisite
to such an attack. Until the have done so, neither the effect of
available nor the effect of Allied counter
aaa on th3 forces required can be estimated with precision.
An tttemptad landing In the populated sector of Australia or in
Witm Usland will assume the proportions of a major operation and
will ?squire control of the adjaeont sea aroas together with,local
Th s Committee concludes that, although a major inva-
lid: or Australia or Now Usland is unlikely, enemy operations
d*O1 the 130410, oi Torras $tralt and to isolat., thw two countries
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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
POSSIBLE JAPANESE ACTION AGAINST AUSTRALIA
At the request of the representatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff, the attached appreciation
of possible Japanese action against Australia and
Dievr Zealand, which has been prepared by the Joint
Intelliconce Committee in London, is circulated ft
consideration of the Committee.
(Signed) V. DYKES.
L. R., MeDOWELL.
Tigellngtan, DO CO
31st Xanuary, 1042.
�
roma
PAidsT 1)7 Gruisor and Armed Merchant Cruiser
otitibi* st amp:time against one or morc principal
porta m Goast of Australia 4nd Vow Zcaland, nnd might
followinc formssm
Vombardment,
Apt took' by irorar
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�zw-
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(d) Attacks by midget submarines and Coastal
Motor Boats launched from these ships.
Surprise attack by carrier-borne aircraft on
concentration of shipping at Port Darwin, or ports
farther South, possible.
2. gil.J.0-11E20_1.211.
'Japanese plans at this stage not thought to
embrace major attack on Lustralia and New Zealand as
distinct from raids as set out above. Only e:ceoption
is attempt to occupy Darwin.
3. copinpu
Before making major attack against Australia
and New Zealand, Japanese Naval Staff would probably
require following conditions fulfilled: (a) Singapore
in Japanese hands or beleaguered and Java, Sumatra
and Philippine Islands in Japanese hands.
(b) Japanese
control extended in South China Sea by occupying key
points in Islands of East Indian Archipelago as far
as Timor inclusive, and Islands of Now Guinea, New
Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa group.
(c) No hosti-
lities with. Russia or situation on that front not
sach as to require material for strengthening of
Upanese force in that area.
(d) (?To)
retain power to transport large bodies of troops over
long' line of sem communications, without risk of
serioas loss from killed action.
4# VASIIPMELPAZ.1.19-P.ran
Japanese strategy at present scorns to be aiming
pocialay at (a) and (b) above as rapidly as possible.
saccossrul Japan vill be established in powerful
advanced Naval and air positions with safo lines of
cannunicatians to liorae bases, will also threaten
tations between Amoria and New Zealand and thus
bo strongly placed to secure major gains and procoed
with turthar aims as followss- (a) Full scale opora-
tioaa galnst, Burma (for which proliminary movos
alfodOinprogress) and thence possibly towards India.
(b) Pull scale opera-
liatt against. iiustraiia and/Or Nov Zealand.
(e) Attac against
1400,114,tichvie consider improbable. It is too
44ottral to say, at this stage, which of tho two
fttartiaz courses Japanese would adopt, but they would
.44144.1Y to adopt more than one at the same
itt '0 against Burma, with limited objective as
� 00T,00$4.TIgooTt, teed not await outcome of opera-
tth,lalarn fachigelago and vauld not preclude
.oits oporAtioa* against Lustralla and Nov:
Itt
.Uforo attamptint any major operation
tand Xou Zealand, 3apanose likely to
104a :Darwin, donying to us only possible
0114 Australia. Duo to its isolated
attr4ctivo target for capturo
�trurgtben tnd whilo our military
comparativel:r wedk.
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(b) If and when Japanese decide to develop
major operations against Australia and New Zealand
operations likely to take form of simultaneous
landings at, or in vicinity of, important norts, with
a view to gaining stranglehold on key points and
communications. Any attempt at occupation of Aus-
tralia or New Zealand would probably be mainly
confined to Coastal area.
(a) NAVAL: Close escort, to protect convoys
and subsequently cover each landing, might consist
of:- 6 Cruisers, 2 Aircraft Carriers and possibly
2 Seaplane Carriers, 20 Destroyers.
Main Japanese Fleet would be disposed so as
to intercept any large scale interference by Allies.
(b) MILITARY. Some 12 Japanese Divisions
could be made available and transport for operations
against Australia and New Zealand, and following
might be scales of attack in each phase:-
(i) Darwin. Attack on Darwin likely to
be made by one to two divisions transported in
landing craft and small craft. Initial landings
carried out by Brigade groups.
(ii) Australia. 6 or 7 divisions likely
to make attack on continent of Australia,
landing up to 2 divisions at 2 or more key
points simultaneously. Initial landings would
be carried out by Brigade groups in landing
craft transported to assembly positions in
landinc craft carriers.
(iii) New Zealand. From 4 to 5 divisions
would make attack simffEr to (ii)
If attacks on Australia and Now Zealand
not simultaneous, scale of attack against
either could be increased accordingly. Avail-
ability of special landingcraft would not be
'bating factor for any or above operations.
Lane numbt)rs of small craft such as Pearling
Lugger, small Trading schooners available in
Caro1in6 'elands which could be used for this
purpose..
,
, ,,,,
�
,, ...,,, (e) A. Following scales of attack based
,,
on stostricption that no developments had occurred on.
* 41214qan rtonts which would ju3tify Japanese reducing
AO, Porto rotainod to meet potential throats in
t,),*t=r ttoater a War.,
� ,,,,_ � _ , ,(1-) T,* color landing 'and obtain aero-
,1- olt from which to develop operations on
1J --.... ... ,...,tiii': 411,01triese might support landings with soma
-t%"'
:'/Otteettet Carriers., and similar number of
4. 004- AO oarrivrs, capable or carrying Sorle 250
,, Alt-tOrtj comprlains say 100 risliters and 150
- '.cii,. nt l'orpo o botibort and up to 100 soaplanes.
-..CH,-*--(10:, Aft *von As port captured, Japanese ,
404:14 tir#40 'In gaps and posaibly overland from
'1**in;--atettt It intermediate landing ground's had
WAblisTiod, additional land based aircraft.
U!iflr Opetoations in Ualaya and MIlippines _
,$017 aotolude4t :they might make available
,
-iktOtaireraft. And possibly in addition,
%
. :, - -itittie..t14 ing 1)004:
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���6 6 v.
7. Above scales of attack represent maximum
considered possible in conditions most favourable to
Japanese. Conditions in paragraph 3 must first be
fulfilled, and operations involved represent for-
ridable task. In these operations, combat losses and
waste of aircraft would be heavy.
OPERATIOUS IN BLIRMA.
Necessity of retaining forces on north.ernmost
front against possible aussian attacIL in spring and
garrisoning of China and other territory captured,
all representing haavy drain on Japanese resources,
particularly in air.
9. In these circumstances Jananese 4:10ht
hesitate before attempting occupation of continents
such as Austr,ilia or even the s-allor territory of
:Iwo Zealand, particularly in view of their experience
in China.
10. Such further dissipation of their forces might
seriausl, je3pardi.;e Japailese power to .old territory
gained, in view of increasinc strength of Americans.
1/. CONCLUSION.
It seems likely that Japan will at this stage
aontent vlith endeavourins to isolate Australia and
Now Zealand withovt ombarkinc on major onerations to
southwards except for capture of Darrin. ,ttack on
Dovvin likely In any event.
;
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