OSS - TRIPS REPORTS/REPORTS FROM OSS DESCRIBING THEIR WORK EXPERIENCES ABROAD/APPOINTMENTS AND TRAVEL ORDERS/REPORT ON FIELD CONDITIONS/REPORT ON FIELD ACTIVITIES, 1944

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 195
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 27, 1944
• Content Type: MISC

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FE
IWOMMENDATIONSI At the end of the trip I came to the conclusion
that all thea feelings wore not so deep rooted, but rot a rumor
campaign alone would be inadequate and ineffeetive. In order
that we may acoomplish our task, we have to rcwort to some printed
matoriala also, Which doom come under the jurisdlotion to 0.W,.
It is only by such oombination, oan we accomplish our mission.
POLIOYsi Well by the time I returned to Cairo, 1 to that the
MO Branch WA4 not interested to operate in the Middle Scot, but
WO re coneentrating all their effort* to the Balkans, as well as
to Greece and Turkeys They mentioned the Directive of the Chiefs
or Starts, which prohibit us from operating in the Ma. This
policy is atill prevailing at the present time. Even liate
Department orricials objected to our operating in that theatre,
being
it British aphere of influence.
RETURN After staying In Cairo for a while, the MO Branch leanod
me to SI*NB to do aome commercial study in Palestina, which was
requented of them by F.R.A. At the completion of the work, 1
maw Lieut. Col, Weat who suggested my returning to the States,
as there is not much we cAn do there, and to which I acceded*
DIVONATIgN8 Now that I ant back, / herewith tender my resignation
to retv,rn to private lire, but shall always be at the disposal of
to 0.8,8* Organization, for any future consultations. / may be
reached at the following addresat 160 Broadway, New York 7, N. Y.
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. 41On my arrival to Cairo, I reported to Lieut. Col. West, and
later to Mr. Ben Amos, who had just taken charge of the MO Branch.
They decided that I take a trip around the Middle Past, and so I
travelled under cover of making a Post-War trade study in the
Middle East for the U.S. Chamber Of Commerce, .and my credentials
were drawn aocordingly.
FINDINGS: The attitade of the majority of the people were anti-
British and consiquently pro-German. They believe a British
Victory will shatter all their future hopes for complete indepen-s
dome, particularly in the case of Palestine. As regards the
Atlantic Charter, they heard it often said by responsible British
officials, that this charter would not apply at of Suez.
So they are afraid that they shall not be better off after the war,
Othaa they were before it, However, there is one sign of oncourage-
msnt as far as we Americans are concerned, and that most of the
Arabs look to us as champions of freedom and democracy, especially
after the role we played in the Independence of Lebanon. Yet at
times they get pessimistic and say that America is being controlled
and run by the Jews, and tharefore no matter how willing or
sympathetic the people are to their cause, the Government would
not dare do anything which is contrary to Jewish aspirations er
interests. They claim that President Rooseve/t is pro-Jewish,
and they stress the fact that he is surrounded by a number of
Jewish advisers. The Arabs also believe that the British can at
any time out-smart the Americans in the field of International,
Polities, and will eventually have their own way in the Middle
,45,4-ropi
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REPORT ON amP. TO THE MIDDLE lAM240k1
TO: Mr. R. J. Perohall, MO Branch
FROM: Mr. Edward 8, Sununu
TRAVEL: Lett by steamer on Ootober 14, 1943, and sixteen days
later landed at Oran. Prom there we went to Algiers, and
finally seoured a plane priority, Arriving at Cairo on
November 21, 1943.
iNURETJ/N_ROUTE: May I at the outset register an incident whieh
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1 believe is off groat importanoe and which should be watehed
oarefully in the future. At the time of embarkation, there were
five YUgoalav civilians with us who belonged to the SO Branch,
carrying revolvers and radio receivers with them. At the docks
the customs Orricers inspeoted the luggage and ineisted on
displayina those articles right there, in front or everybody.
They interrogated them in front of all sorts of people, without
paying any attention to anything as seourity, especially when
they were travelling under cover9 This was resented by those
YUgoalav men who were willing and ready to sacrifioe their lives
for the defeat or the enemy, but not to lose it so waltingly
due to the atupicuvy of coup) of ottioera. Therefore special
attention should be ?maintained in the future to avoid any auoh
inoidents, whioh will endanger the lives ot those men and doteat
their missions, before they over get a ohanoe to acoomplish
anything. Security us preached so repeatedly in the trainina
centers, should also be observed by all Government Agencies and
At all times. There in no exouse or such blunder*, especially
when human lives are at stake.
"*EORET
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OFFICE OF STIIATIMIC SERVICES
C,
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144 JUL, 28 PM 3 34
Reporta Officer
R* ha Li )
Report by Edwtsrd 8* Sununu
Inolosed herewith is a report submitted by Mr,
Edward S. Sununu upon his return to this oountry*
This report has been reviewed by Oolonol Es Ds Mann,
Mr. David Williamson, and Mrs J* R* Pershall of MO Branehs
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NOTSS OF A GEZNIZI:
Jf All of the parachutes we use, including those used by our agents,
are BritiThy this lack of American chutes. Thesumily chutes
have to bt repacked itken obtained tram the British, but if obtained
from Amerimi sources they could be shipped, stamped and ready tor
use, thereb2r. eliminating repacking: vhich wastes a lct of time when
you constder thousands of thew being repacked. Sometimes ther send
white chutes which show up like a flare when used on Voomlit nights,
but we have to use them nevertheless.
No one his setuall;r had an encounter with a night fighter in the 343
sorties (205 successful) flown. We have lost ftre planes thus far.
An example of what happens is illustrated by the story of Lt Ambrows
crew. They delivered their goods and were on their way back when thery
hit a mountain. (This was reported by-the underground). The rear
gunner vas seriously injured; two men are making their "ay back via
the undergrouad and one other member of the crew is making his own way
back without the help of the underground. The papers such 43 b011biqg
charts, etc. were returned to Sngland within three days after the crash.
Lt Reardon thinks the underground would have been smarter net to risk
this and feels it would have been safer to barn this evtdence. It is,
job.
an example of speed by the underground and thty did a splendid
job.
The first lto crash was the one piloted by Lt McDonald (over Belgiva)
which occurred on larch 3rd. Lt McDonald's co-pilot i3 MCW back in
England, havinc escaped through Fraace with the help of the underground.'
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IfSX1,
territory over which they were to fly - when the contact
I
was made, the mon on the ground could guide the plane by
sight, or sound if dark and cloudy, to an approximate drop-
ping spot, and we might also be able to pick up first-
hand intelligence information. As it stands now, the British
probably get better results only because of their attaching
? native-speaking man to operate this simple plane-ground
tslephone.
A. SI.V.AL21:
(a) Pick-up - Rescue work.
Nothing being done.
1=41.2QP.1k2E1
(a) Lt Reardon talked to Major Brooks (now replaced by *jar
Gable ) about his (Reardon' s) talk with a British Group
Captain, who was an old friend of his when he was with the
RAF, by the name of rieldon, who is C. 0. of the RAF station
at Tempsford (the British section of Harrington). Captain
IFisldon, in collaboration with W/Cdr. Verrity (who has done
!35 pick-ups for the British) arranged for 0$8 to get 6
;1,and eglasiorsytlieolf= ::11".'sfltititit: 11:40711". pick
enthusiastic about this and so were the men he had lined up
, for the job, but the scheme was side-tracked somewhere along the
lino. He feels that OS$ should do something along this line,
use the lysandors (which after all are a great deal better
than nothing - the reasoz1 they are not accepted as perfect
being that they can only pick up 6 agents at once, while the C-.47
can pick up 20) and do the best we can with them. Picking vp
these agents would be most valuable for getting recognition
from the Partisan groups, who do not care if supplies came
from us or the British (in fact do not from which) as long
as they get them, but the men who are picked mp knew which
oountry has done it and are asoordingly appreciative. Lt
Reardon admits that we could surpass the British if we would
use our initiative and not wait around for the perfect type
of plane but use whet is there and the British were also
willing to give us the facilities for training our pilot( and
Ow * on the loreender planes.
(b)I He also feels we oould out produce the British in anything we
I set out to do and as an example ot this points out the fact
that even though the British haws been in the war owes years
longer than we, in four months' time our Harrington as against
their Harrington can be judged by the folloeingt In the last-
AprilAky moon period we delivered twice as maw agents as
they did, 50% more packages and about .200 mere cestaimpre -
so this gives an idea of American production ability ,if given
a chalice. Lt Reardon feels that **means should begin working _
on this angle.
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Reardon has experimented with these containers against the
type used by the British and found them satisfactory for
at least smell arm nd food. As thee. are at present our
normal container load, we could use them for theme without ,
any worry abo4t anything being broken or spoiled,. The actual
reasons for not using them ar,11 that (l) The balance of the
containcrs is not perfect and (2) They have never been uerek:
before. Another reason for using them is that the enlistek,
men at the packing etetion are shays *head of themeelves in'
reference to what we're physically able to drop, and fill in,
the time drilling; but if thee. plestic containers were filled,
1 the materials welt spoil, and when D'-Day comes they will '
probably be glad to drop anything and everything in whatever
1 containers they have, and then these would be ready in case
the demand comes in.
srUATONs
Most of our drops are in the Moon period, and the Partisan
groups would like non-moon drops, such as the lritish do,
using rureka-Rebecca radio sets.
(b) S-Phone communication between plane and Partisan groups while
delivering supplies, is the reason why we do not realise the
results which the British do.
POSUB4E $01411/021
Tho British Eureka-Rebecca radio sots have, a range of 89 miles
to our ID, which makes our sets more or lest useless because if
a pilot can stay on his course up to thirty miles of the drop
ta-..gst, he does not have much worry. The radio set acts as a
beincn for the pilot and with the poorer pet, if be should Ries
him course because of bad weather conditions, 'to., he is likely
to go over a "Flak" town, each would not occur with the better
set, and would also make flying in non-moon periods a groat deal
easier. Lt Reardon suggests that either 0.53 try to get ion oil
these sets from the Ei itish or make one ourselves that is better
than the one in use, which must be remembered has a maximum' rense
of 30 miles and then only under perfect conditions,
(b) S-Phone communication between aircraft and ground Reception
Committees. The British have interpreters in the plane for
the country over which they are flying and into which they
intend dropping supplies. We have no interpreters and the.
do not get the full value from the S-rhone sets. *s ha
actually happened we might be over a French arm and allief,s
sudden our radio Mn picks up the French mite of the partisan
groups. *tile this is helpful to us to the extent that lOpem
though our men don't understand what the Trenchman is $itimg?
it helps guide the plane to some extent end one can suppose be
Iis at the correct spot because of the contact, yet if ISeisest
along on these missidis men who understood the Langlaget of the
? L.
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TO
FltOM
SURPICTi
ce illemotandurn ? UNITED STATES GOVEILI4
Oeneral Donovan
pm, 101 July 1'
We have discussed the attached report contcaninz thq
ob
servutiona of Lt. Reardon with Colonel Joseph Haskell who A4
of the opinion that it does not give un accurate picture oir'the
situation. The speeifle point;.1 marked in red pencil have 1,Men.
met by Colour' Haskell us follows:
iltj,i4,4114.11
1.14..4.1.11:?AXIIY1I1Aa. Colorml
Haskell states that the London office ia cohducting such tours
constantly) and that we now have sufficiiint planes and crews to
meet our requ rments.
2. Pr222A1!..1, o estublish ermanent Air School.
grossed tisfuctority
sa and that more than enough have been trained
to meet our
3 rveds.
Air
12.;2.Lial. lastic
Th
being .used. Colonel Haskell poInts out tkl
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them were. :A;)r-it to Algiers for use there.
40)Fuilure to 1.1.4e British t
------------,------------------
According to Colonel Hoskell all our planes
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Coloncl Haskell buileves that trainint; of air crews has prom
163S
ese containers are
t s;-veral thous4nd of
buve
e Eureka
the Americ;.n type which Lt. Reardon sta'W flOW
tes are bein8
5. 2.1222s1 to use interpreters for S-Phoue communica-
tion.katzavvaircraft and
ZOUflct leco.t1on Committees
ereas
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Tir. 'Reardon statos that the British ute such interpreters
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the 'Americans do not, Colonel liasItell statee that coalti th*
opposite Ls the ease. It was our idea to train mnd ute thete.
interpreters and they are being used at the prement'timei
6. 12x9cur me .t 0s Atr,L,Dx...910 -Luls?a,11.119?x.Xj. Colone
liasIcell advises that we now hmre four C-471s engaged in pict-
up worli:, ana that aleoe planes are more satisfactory thanithe
LYsanders.
7.
blaa C0101101 aa %tell states that everyone is
agreed on this.
. a Es...x.1213919,Ls. As a matter of
fact a large number of NMOri.CRTI parachutos have been available
but since the British obute has a larger canopy and does not
tear al$ easily as the Amerierin chutes, many of our American
parachutes have been traded for British chutes.
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TO: Major Carl O. Hoffman, Chet, SO
FROM: Lt Ralph N. Elam?, Mape and Reports Officer* WESO
SUBJECT: Report from Officer returning from Field.
T
17 June 1944
1. Thit memorandum is submitted in compliance with General Donovan's
instructions that all officers of 0S8 ahell file a comprehensive report on
field conditions on their return to Washington from the field,
2. Major Bruce B. Cheever, USMC, (former head of OSS parachute
school England) returned to Washington around the 16th of May. His report
deals with the OSS Parachute School located at Ringway Cheshire - 15 miles
out of Manchester.
3. Major Cheever wan relieved from duty with 085 the 13th of April.
He was ordered back to the Marine Corps, having been on TD with OSS, and
in now attending the War College.
4. Hie report am follows:
"The SU staff at the school, at the time of my leaving, consisted of Lt
Arthur Hughes, (I/Sgt. R. E. LaSalle, USMC, and Sgt. F. J. Brunner, USW.
The SOE representation consisted of the following: 1 Major C. 0., 2 Captains
iADM., and the Trataing Section consisting of 2 Captains, 2 Lts., 2 igts.,
and 1 Cpl. Thia underataff of SO against SOE personnel is not serious
because It is felt that most of the parachute training is over with.
The output of trained "Parachute Personnel" never went over the 111444.M40 of
125 per week. WhiN1 I left the school we were traininp about 50 a week,
however, the future need of the school, considering the fact that most of
the known candidates to be trained had already completed their course* looked
very dull. Up to the time of my departure we had trained and qualified around
350.
The course, kailess otherwise requested, lasts one week and oonsists of 3-day
jumps and 1 night. The course, however, is made to order, therefore, any-
thing which is taught one group (in addition to routine parachute instruction)
would not necessarily be taught another.
The men jump from Ahitley Bombers (British) and all jumps are static line
(Semi-fixed). The men use the British standard combat chute with a 28-foot
canopy and which in made from either Nylon or Rayoix. The mon leave the
plane through a hole in its bottom. The first man to leave the plane clears
its' tall by 18 inches the remainder of the man clear the tail by 3 feet.
The men jump, as all British personnel do, with no reserve chute. No deaths
to date and a very low average in minor injuries is a feat the school is
proud of.
The housing of the mon is done in 2 country homes. The ideal sot-up if to
house 50 men at one cnd 30 at the other, however, these figures are mmde
For comfort. W. can house more men if necessary.
Whom. va.payeetA.AW?''a%
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The school in established with the intentiOn of helping all pereonnels
whether young or old, tn get through. There are no jump towers and
Wawa physical conditioning. Either the personnel are in condition
when they report Xor trainine or else they jump "out or condition."
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16 June 1944
TO: Major Carl O. Hoffman, Chief, SO
FROM: Lt Ralph N. Elamo, Maps and Reports Officer, WESO
SUBJECT: Report from Officer returning from Field.
1. This memorandum is submitted in compliance with General Donovan's
instructions that all officers of OSS shall file a comprehensive report
on field conditions on their return to Washington from the field.
2. Lt Reardon (formerly with the RAF - now with the AAF) returned
to Washington the latter part of May. His report deals primarily with
the prevailing conditions and possible solutions governing our Airops at
Harrington. Lt Reardon flew many missions for us, therefore, speaks from
experience rather than observation.
3. His report as follows.
"For clarification, 3 will break down the contents under two headings:
SITUATION and POSSIBLE POLUTION.
I. A. SITUATION
(a) In February we boriowed 100 containers from the British (Lt
Reardon arranged the loan). These were dropped during the
next two moon periods.
- I -
In March we borrowed 500 containers (only delivered 540 in,
March moon period).
In April we dropped 1300 containers and BOO packages (of these,
Lt Reardon states that at least 1100 containers and 350 packages
were American packed).
At Area "H" we pack only small arms and food ("A" rations and
British COY.P0 rations). We do not possess the technical radio
equipment, etc., which is necessary, therefore, they are obtained
from the British.
Up until May 16th we dropped around 15G0 containers (for this
wly.en period).
7500 plastic containers (ours Obtained frcm the Nary) are located
at Area "H" - in orates, four to a crate, piled five crates high,
around "H" Area.
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B. POSSIBLE SOLUTTaa: To I., A., a, b, c, d, and *.
Sometimes we are forced to substitute "K" rations and small arms
for various items which we did not have, the substitution being
merely to fill containers. We are still dependent on the British
for such items as contalners, French francs, Belgian money,
technical radio equipment, etc. If the aforementioned difficulties
could be ironed out, we would be self-sufficient.
II. A. SITUATION:
(a)
We have recently obtained 25 new crews, now undergoing train-
ing for this particular tyre of operations, but have not as
yet received the additional planes we were promised. WHY?
Lt Reardon feels it is because of lack of coordination due
to lack of authoritative recognition.
B. FOSSIBLE SOLUTIONS:
(a)
Sometime in March General Doolittle visited Area "H" and was
given a Cook's Tour. The General was both Famed and amazed
and then and there promised OSS anything they wanted. Lt
Reardon feels that the General is in back of us, but that he
may pass down an O.K. for something for OSS to his Chiefs of
Staff, who, not knowing of the activities of OSS, may basket
any such request. At any event, our requests are not followed
ithrough. Lt Reardon feels that the so-celled "Big Boys"
should be given Cook's Tours (at least invited to come) when-
ever possible, which would give them a picture and under-
standing of exactly what OS ? is doing, and our possibill tea
if given the necessary support.
(b) Lt Beardon also feels that a permanent "Air School" for train-
'
ing crews for this type of Air Operation should be ostablished,
such as the one through which the 25 new crews are now going.
Ha feels that the men in command, *hen they see on paper that
so many crews are now in operation and 25 more assigned (at present
without the planes), will be satisfied that the personnel situa-
tion is well in hand. This, however, is far from the case as
the pilots and crews complete their 30 missions fast in this
work; also we do lose planes and personnel occasionally and the
pilots have to get rest from coMbat fatigue. We must keep up
reserves, as two nights Is the maximum the same crow can do in
succession, as they are then exhausted, and are off for one
night, when the planes also must be overhauled. Lt Reardon
does not know definitely that there is no advanced planning
along this line, but from his past experience thinks it unlikely.
jcE TO PAGE - POSSIBLE SOLUTION...aJL)_L"Uk f
The reason for not using the plastic containers is because
they aro not exactly what we would like, a reason to which
Lt Reardon agrees. However, we do have them and they can be
used. (SI) uses them and drops two with every agent. Lt
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CONFIDENTIAL rq( tt. i r
ROUTING AND MORD MIXT .)( S 1)AV ill - 43
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Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
!ricer Designations should be used in To coltunit.
`.-efach Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before furtner routing.
Action desirod or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
Fitly Officer Designations see separate sheet.
(20640) CONFIDENTIAL
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UTANDAH1) FORM NO. 4.1
F
STATES
TO ;General Donovan
PROM Aoting Chief, X-2 Branoh
SUDJECT: Field trip report - China - 30 Maro't 1943 to 22 June 1944.
GOVERNMENT
DAM 26 July 1944
As of possible interest to you, I om trwmnitting herewith a report
oovi5ring exporien000 in China and India by Hr. Robert K. Smith.
This !wort reflects a rathor comprehensive survey and comment upon
oxilpting condition in China which may bo met by personnel of our
organization.
er A. Pf
or, Inf.
Enclosure
70 ac. vi (.,
CONFIDENTIAL
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FROM:
SUBJECT:
3/09/25 1 CIA-RDP13X00001R0
For Release 201
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
4
L.3NFIDENTIAL
11411EROFF1C3E MEMO
Major Roger A, Pfaff, Acting Chief 1-2 DATE: 5 July 1944
Robert K. Smith
Field trip report - China - 30 March 1943 to June 22, 1944
With Mr. C. J. Smith and Mr. G. E. Adams I left the United States
on March 30, 1943 on the U.S.S. Hermitage. We arrived at Bombay on May 11, 1943
and, after traveling across India to Calcutta by train, we were able to obtain
immediate transportation on a China National Aviation Corporation plane to
Chungking, wh-l.ch place we reached on May 17.
Mr. Adams was presumably representing the American Foreign Insurance
Association, whereas Mr. Smith and I represented the American International Un-
derwriters Corporation. To those who wsre curious about our reasons for coming
out to China, we explained that our companies had sent us out on a joint survey
of the China market; that we were not sure whether we would do any immediate ?
business but that we wanted to check on future possibilities and at the same
- time take care of any service that our old customers might ask for. Mr. Smith
and I also were able to state that we were prepared to service United States
Life and Asia Life insuranae policies which in one way was the most logical
reason for our remaining in China inasmuch as hun&reds of individual life insur-
ance policyholders had migrated from the coastal cities back into the interior.
It soon became obvious that it would be most dangerous to accept any new fire
and marine insurance in Free China. The currency was unsound, and, although the
loss ratio was exceedingly mall due to the elimination of any moral hazard, it
was quite obvious to one and all that as soon as any overland communications
opened up into Free China there would be a catastrophic amount of losses from
people who found themselves stuck with inventories bought at high prices. We
were offered many possibilities of securing reinsurance from Chinese companies
and a survey was made of this company market. A report was sent back to our
respective New York offices, but we had little hope that they would see their
way clear to authorizing us to accept any of this reinsurance business. At the
same time r. adams and I were rather conspicuous in civilian clotl,es as we
were obviously of draft age and the few foreign civilians in Chunking were for
the most part ever forty years of age.
?
Feeling that it would be unwise to remain in Chungking and attract
attention, particularly when we were not doing any active business, it was de-
cided that we should move out to some smaller city, preferable down-country,
where we might be able to pick up some worthwhile data on both the enemy and
internal Chinese con0;tions, 4.n opportuni to do this presented itself when
Mr. J. Arthur Duff, who had already obtained conneCtions with the United China
Relief, procured a job for us with the Kwanutung International Relief Committee
U.C.R. committee for that prevince). It was explained to both the relief
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Memo to:
Major Roger A. Pfeff
5 July 1944 2,
authorities in Chungking and in Kwangtung that we had come out to China for our
insurance employers hut that it would take some time for them to obtain and study
the insurance reporte we had sent back to them. Consequently, in the interim,
both of our employers were willing to offer our services to the U.C.R. on a
voluntary basis and that our employers would take care of our salaries and ex-
penses.
Accordingly, we left Chungking in the middle of June ? by good for-
tune were able to obtain military plane transportation to Kweilin From Kweilin
we traveled to Kukong, the provincial capital of Kwangtung Province and the head-
quarters of the relief committee there. We arrived in Kukong on July 12 1943.
For the next two months Mr. Adams and I, along with Mr, Duff, worked
on tee relief situation in Kukong with both the Chinese relief people and Mr.
Edwari Lockwood, an American Y.M.C,A. man who was the head of the local commit-
tee. It was agreed that Mr. Adams would remain in Kukong and take Mr. Lockwood's
place while the latter went on a two months' vacation and that I would travel
dowr to the famine area in Toishan - some ninety miles below Canton - with Mr.
Duff. Durin?; these first two months in Kukong we orientated ourselves to the
local situation and obtained information from refugees coming up from Canton and
Hongkong. This information was passed back to a connection of Mr. Duff, a Major
Otte, in Kweilin, who was head of a special branch of the 14th Airforce Intelli-
gence whict dealt primarily with economic conditions in Free China and occupied
areas and eot with operational information. During all of this time Mr. Smith
in Chungking, as well as the three of us in Kukong, were waiting for some contact
or rord free the OSS in China or Washington; but during this whole period no
word from them had boon received. The one exception was the day before Adams
and I left Chungking when a naval officer who had come out on the same ship with
us from the States dropped around to our hotel, presumably on a social call.
He said that he had heard thet we were going down to Kwangtung for the relief
people and he had brought a friend around, a Commander Reighley (?)2 who asked
us to give him a report on local conditions in that area when we returned to
Chungking. He explained that he was with the OSS and that we could contact him
through the American Army headquarters when we returned. He was one of Commo-
dore Miles' men and frcm all indications knew nothing about us. In this regard
we had heard about Commodo:7e 'les upo- eur arriNal in Chungking and understood
that he was heading the OSS in but ee made no effort to communicate with
him nor did he with us.
Around the end of August, 1943 Mr. cuff and 1 left Kukong for Toishan
and after a two weeks' trip by sanpan and by foot we arrived at our destination.
Mr. Duff spent only one week in this aeea as he received a cable to report back
to the United States. He departed for Kweilin and points west with a Reverend
Mills, a Canadian missionary of about thirty-five yee-s of age, who headed up
the relief situation in the entire Toishan area. I renamed and traveled around
this southeAlKwangtung region for approximately six week r and in this time I was
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410 Memo to:
Major Roger A. Pfaff
fv1Iviti ,
5 July 1944
able to get down to the count and get a load picture of the pop:Abilities of set-
ting up radio and obeervalion statione with which Japanese Mapping movements
could be detected. 1 wee also in an excellent position to obeerve local domestio
conditions in the entire Sz Yap region, of whinh Toishan is one of the four dis-
tricts. One boat trip aceose a bay along tho China coat wai made, another was
made down to the City of Yeungkong from which wolfram was being shipped out to
the Japanese and finally I traveled over to the Ngaimon River which is the border-
line between 000upied and unoccupied Chtna. From my potation on one side of the
river I was able to observe the varioue Japanese fortification(?) on this boundary
line. Around the middle of October I went back to Kwellin, where I turned over
my operationdintelligenoo information to Lt. Col. Wilfred Smith of A-2. Re was
primarily interested in the Japaneee fortifications I saw, along with the pod-
eibilitiee of setting up observation etations on the coast.
From Kweilin 3 went back to Kukong and spent a week with Adams in that
city. lie had worked out an arrangement with Major Otte whereby he had contacted
all of the mieeionariee in Kwangtung Province who were doing relief work, and
Adams sent them regular queetionnaires primarily dealing with internal conditions
in their local areae. The misoionaries were toli that Adams was doing this as a
favor for the 14th Airforce) and that they could be of real eervioe by helping in
thin-3 regerd. Inaemuoh as all of them were interested in having increased eums
tient to them for relief work and furthermore, inaamunh as Adams as temporary
head of the provincial committee was in a poeition to affirm or disapprove such
actione, the miseionariee went out of their way to give him detailed answers to
these various eueptione. In turn Adams sent thin information on to Major Otte
in Kwellin and he wan able to uend copiee to Mr. Smith in Chungking through the
British Intelligence office in Yekong. They relayed all his reports to their
Chungking office via cafe hand and Mr. Smith in Chungking showed them these re-
porta an a return favor fer their cooperation in getting this information to
him. Unforttuiately the miseionaries had to ueo the open mail in sending replies
to Adams but Adam wee able to forward the information on to Major Otte by safe
hand throu& en arrangement worked out with the local American Army Service of
Supply station In Kukong.
(1 left October 20, 1943)
From Kukondl traveled back to Chungking and found the 14th Airfortes
people very cooperative in supplying a traneportation, whereas originally on
our trip to Kukong we had just managed to get on a plane to Kweilin. For one
thing I believe thAr now-found hospitality was due to the information both
Adams and I were oblo to give them, and in addition they sounded re out on
whether Adams and i would be interested in obtaining eommissione in the Airforo.
Intelligences In fact Lt. Col. Smith intimated that we would be given oaptaIn.
oleo if we would reeign from our present outfit and go to Washington on trans-
portation they would obtain for us. How Lt, Oa. Smith discovered we were with
the ?SS I do not know, as, at that time, both Adams and 1 were very definitely
sticking to our story of being insurance man lent out to the United China Re.
lief and being only too anxioue to do any odd jobs we could for the local U.S.,
Declassified and A
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Memo to:
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Major Roor A. Pfaff
Footnotes continued:
(3)
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5 July 1944 12.
At the time or our departuro from the States, in March of 1943, our Insur-
&DC? Unit wan or course under El. As a connegnenoo, the indoctrination we
r000lved waa of an El nature, Due to lack of communications with Washing-
ton, Adams and I did not know that X-2 had become a 'operate branch until
April of 1944 when we met Colonel Rubenstein in Cacutta. Naturally, C. J.
Smith wan not aware of tho change for the same reason.
With reference to the temporary ranks or the British intelligence in China,
man that thily are only given this rank when they are in China, and if
thr:f are transferred back to their regiments in India, they go back one or
two ranks to one which correeponds to a rank of any officer in the Army who
Ip not of the permanent Army. In other words, many Britishers who were
oiviltans in the Far East and got out of China, Hongkong, etc. before Pearl
Harbor wont to India and received direct war-time commissions such as a
captaincy. When they were assigned to the British intelligence set-up
in China, they wore given a "temporary" milk of Major. In other words,
General Chonault will prosuirtably not allow anyone to renove his Captain's
bars when ho goes down country and put on a Major's leaf while traveling
in thmse down ootntry areas.
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Memo to
Major Roger Pfaff
Footnotes contine,,la
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5 July 1944 11.
Chine!, huoinese men travel in Free China by whatever tram,-
porteg' el is available, but they hardly over are given trance-
porirl on (n an elewican military plane unloes they are work-
ing for the ,I.S.Alrforce. Whereas an American soldier can fly
from Chungkin, to Kweiiin via Kunming in seven hours, a Chinese
civilian traveling by truck and train will reach Kveilin in two
or three weeks' timt. There As a regular traffic between Free
and Occupied Chine, which is usually slow but is aocomplie-ed
with a minimum of effort, and if the Chinese civilian is trans-
porting goods, it unuelly only requires bribing the Chinese
military and custor: officials in order to get their stuff
into or out of Occui.3td areas. Their means of transportation
is usually by foot over the immediate adjoining regions to the
boundary line, and in el! 'r placan by sampan or bus.
(2) It is my opinion that foreign civili are closely observed even in
Chungking upon their arrival in China. t have heard a Chinese state the
cases of two foreigners in Chungking who he states made derogatory remarks
about the Chinese government; yet ac far 1 know these foreigners never
have said anything in public. 3 do not bel'eve that in the large cities
foreigners are necessarily shadowed, but 1 4[1nk a close watch is kept on
them at the verious so-callud foreign hotels te ere their remarks can be
easily overheard what with the flimsiness of tle' walls. Any foreigner
tr./welling down country has to go through a lot ke: red tepe in order to
get out of Chunking, and even then, when permiseion is given, I believe
hie itinerary is cabled on to the officials in the .e-lous places he has
stated ho will visit. I do not necessarily think le 't shadowed at all
times, but I believe a very close check is kept on hie movements. In Mr.
Adams' and my own cese 1 do not think we were aotuelly ehadowed a+ all timem
until the last few months, and then Adams was in Kukong moot all the time
and could bo easily observed; end for my part, in Chebiant Province, I did
not detect anyone following me on my tr!,pc between various places. It was
only after i reached and stayed in a certain place for several clays that
1 was beinL clocely observed. As regards the American military, I do not
think they are shadowed, but 1 think a cloee scrutiny is kept on their
movements when they are in out.of-the-way places and are apt to be in a
position to see the bad internal conditiors of Free China. I also believe
that Tai Lee hue young, attractive Chinerie ,irls in his organization Who
make it a point in such place:: as Chungking to associate yelth certain
American military officers who are in more or less of an intelligence
position. 1 lutow of two girls w'o attended ell tee foreign social fune-
tiono in CLungking and who were very friendly with the 4%ssistant American
tilitetry Attache .nd Naval Attache respectively.
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5 July 1944 10.
illuurtmoti 0-riodm In ()iuneskinc, Thurd la one rdamon tor keeping thim office open
I. no rivt, or mnrinli Noiflognit Lhnt to, that WO C011ont 11r0 inirt
murtinnt, pvemidmo on uld poltoiem at iltio addremo. f4a 1,8 ham mome cover and it
miLht, ho that Oho other ()velour oot, there nould almo oarr;, on under ouch ft cover.
Uowever? I do dot, t.11 Ii that more than one uodln get uwuy It, nor do 7 think
tht. I. 1 Llitir h !WHO or I oodid ?et by moldly h fi itiourt.1108 tnan?
Footnotems
Exuept for the run from Chungking to Kunming, there ie no commeroial air
tranaportation in China. The Army TranoportatIon dorpo hea planea running
on regular flie,him from Kunming to all 136Q Lions of Free China where there
are air hamem.
(n) Amerloan military permonnel are given priority for air
trunopor, which im ueually baesd upon rank - exceptione being
made for Important mimoiono, health, eto.
(b) filoraign oiviliano are infrequently given permiesion to ride on
military planet!, and even then are given the wormt priority -
one that aorreopoitdo with that given an enlipted man in the
army. Thera have been intervalm when direotivem were immued
barring military plane traneportation to any' and all civillane,
but thaea have usually been modified, particularly in Lsettlno
mlmaionariee baok to Kunming from forward aream, however, no
?nary, or any civilian, unlobe he ia openly oonneetted INith
the U.:3.6overnment, ie given military plane tranaportation 4n
China and on the rare occuoions when ouch transportation is
obtained, one uoually is not very certain until the plane Webb
off from the field that it wont ba repoinded.
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Memo to:
Major Rogor A. Pfaff
5 July 1944
s,
9.
would like very much to get out of China and hie orgamiwttiont One man told me
that Commodore Milea had received varioun bite of information from Chinese in-
telligenoe oirolee which he knew were abeolutely false, yet he pafteod them on
to Weehington without any comment or indication that he believed them to be un-
true. I alai) knot,/ that Commodore Miler; lute not cooperated to any extent with
the other American intelligence agenoiee in China and one .110A man told me that
in their of fort to get eet up in China they were reoeiving 000peration from
every intelligenoe unit except Commodore Miles'. I do know that Milee definitely
reeenta the COS peroonnel in China, and it in intereeting to note.that those of
hie men who highly regard him in hie efforts have made uncomplimentary remarks
about the OBS In my presence. Of oourae they did not know my true identity.
I alp? underetand that Colonel Jens() William), the head of A-4, hAn
not definitely given hie full approval to the new AOFRT aituation; but the fact
that hie aeslotaat, Colonel Wth, io being lent to them would indicate that
A-2 would actively work into this new pet...up, Being in euoh A unique poeitiont
whereby I actually worked for every Amertean Intelligence agency on my last
trip to Chekiang except for Commodore Mile& outfit, I have been in A poeition
to oheerve the conflict among thee? organimtione almo the peraonal jealounies
that eximt between the heade of theee unite. Therefore, in my opinion, the
beet intellioenoe job and the only real way a unified effort can be made le
- under this now ACFRT errangement. It ehould not only eliminate personal eon.
Mote but &Mould do away with doing overlapping work.
At the preeent time the AFIA and the A111 have a very nice office In
Chungking which ia run by a Mr. Richard ftim. He ie an Hawaiion.born Chineaes
who wae manager of the Asia Life in Hongkong and, in my opinion, iv very re-
liable individual. He le a rare exception in the Ohinene in that ho admits
they have weakneeeep and at c.ho mama time hie viewpoint le very Amerioan. L'hi*
haat had no intelligence experience but be wee able to procure throe Chins for
our orgenivailon. One of these men did not turn out satiefactorily but the
other two made tripe to hongkong and Stow and were in a poeition to obtain
eome excellent informat.on. When Adame oontacted Colonel Coughlin, he told
Coughlin about these two men and Coughlin consequently contacted Shim in Chung-
king and worked out an arrangement, the detail e of which I am not fully *WOW* of.
However, thee? two men, Harry and Ed, have been given radio sets and are pre.m
aumably now in 000upied territory or very close to occupied territory. They soma
all reports book to Captain Lynn in Kukong, who ie oenneoted with A.20 but I be-
lieve will be in the new AOFRT net-up. Harry and Ed have also been given various
other equipment which can be exceedingly useful in their operatdons, And I be-
lieve they are also aupplied with funds whi.ah they can give to any agents they
obtain. I furthermore believe that Shim will get reports of their work through
Colonel Coughlin ;)r direct from Captain Lynn in Kukona. I have not seen Shim
since last December and as a result I do not know what other work he io doing.
However, I understand that Colonel Cooghlin haa worked out some arrangement with
him and it might be that Shim is in a position to lend active assietanolo to the
CCS oefice in Chungking. I do believe that Shim could be worthwhile in both
operational and X-2 work under the net-up he now has, i.e., manager of our
CL,Nt IDENTIAL
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Major Roger A. Pfaff
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5 July 1944
8,
personnel in that area. I do think that some X-2 work could also be done at the
same time; and certainly if I was to be kept in X-2 worktI could do a better
job in China than LI India where I know people, have traveled extensively and
have contacts in most of the areas in Free China and where I also know of
several ouspicious people or cabarez run by girls whom I have heard maw stories
of as regards their possible connections and what their true aims are at this
time. I am referring In this connection primarily to two cabarets in Xmilin
named the "Lido" and the "Sky Hawk". They are both run by Chinese girls who
used to live in Hongkong and whose pasta are certainly questionable.
As far as operating in China, I believe it would be preferable at
this time to operate iu the open as I think any cover insofar as Adams or I are
concerned would be extremely difficult to maintain. I think too that any pretense
of cover would only arouse the suspicions of the Chinese that much more$mhereas
if we operate in the open, either in a civilian or military capacity, and they
are assured that we are not investigating internal conditions in Free China but
are working solely against the enemy, they will neither view us with suspicion
nor make any effort to obstruct oul work. I do think that having a definite
military rank is preferable to going back as a civilian inasmuch as that carries
more prestige when deoling with the local Chinese military or eivil officials.
It also would not attract as much attention or questioning on the part of every-
one. However, unless suitable rank is obtainable, 7 believe that these advan-
tages are erased and that it is preferable to go back as a civilian definitely
connected with the OSS, with some such anonymous title as "Technical Representa-
tive". The British have no rank :In their intelligence set-up less than Major in
China, which of course is only a temporary rank, but which enables them to deal
with the Chinese with more "face" inasmuch as all Chinese are at least Colonels
with whom an Allied intelligence man comes into contact. I, furthermore, under- .
stand that General Chenault will not allow anyone to have temporary rank even
when he is going down past the most forward American base. Speaking for myself,
I do not believe that 1 will have any difficulty in carrying out my duties in
China as long as I operate in the open end presumably work for the 14th Airforce -
who are recognized by the Chinese as the "big heros".
Frankly I do not want to go Fan!: to Chinn under the same system as
oefore with no definite chLnnels of sendirr, information back or of getting trans-
portation or other facilities reeded to o a really worthwhile job. I appreciate
that the trouble caused on our last trip whereby we were never able to get any-
thing back to the OSS was due to various reKsons; none of which is connected
with any in&vidual unless we take Commodore Miles into the picture. In this
connection I understand that Commodore Miles knew of our identity When we first
arrived in China and that he openly disparaged anything we could do and more
or less dismissed us as business men and referred to anything we might do as an
amateurish effort. Every indication would point to tie fact that he notified
Tai Lee of our true connections. I do know that Commodore Miles told his own
personnel to stay away frem us. But, or the other hand, some of his personnel
)have told me several t!-ings about Ooimmdore Yelles and his set-up in China. Ham'
of his people are exceedingl:,' dissetisfied with the work they are doing and
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410002-7
Memo to:
Major Roger A. Pfaff
'
5 July 1944 7.
weeks I was told to report to Colonel Rubenstein in CalcuttEW Colonel Rubenstein
also thought it best for me to return to the States, and wired Washington to that,
effect. He received a reply, telling both Adams and me to await Mr. Irvine's
arrival in Calcutta, which Rubenstein thought would occur very shortly. However,
when we finally heard that Irvine had not even left the States, I sent a radio
message back through Captain Brown, Colonel Rubenstein's assistant, asking to be
relieved of any duty in India or any enforced wait for Irvine's arrival. Receiv-
ing no answer to this message I sent a commercial telegram to Mr. C. V. Starr
stating that I was unwilling to remain in India any longer; and, as a result of
this telegram, I received a message saying that transportation was being arranged.
I left Calcutta on June 19, 1944 and arrived at LaGuardia on June 22, 1944.
My reasons for being unwilling to remain in India longer were due
to the fact that I was doing practically nothing of a constructive nature in
Calcutta and that I knew that Colonel Coughlin and the other intelligence people
in China all wanted me to come back there and work in the newly formed joint
intelligence unit, AGFRT. Colonel Rubenstein had asked Adams and me t-th to fre-
quent the various night clu:do in Cr,lcutta and attempt to get into various circles
including the airforce pilots and the China National Aviation Corporation pilots.
He wanted us to attemrt to detect any activities of Japans's? agents. Inasmuch
N..) as both Adams and I were unacquainted with Calcutta and the people there, it
took us some time to work ourselves into these circles, and even when we did we
were unable to note any possible enemy agents, although we did discover and con-
sequently have discharged one girl who held a responsible position as a secretary
to a high American officer. We discovered that she was talking too much, but
that was obviously through carelessness and stupidity on her part rather than
because of being an enemy employee. Both Adams and I felt thEt our year in China
had given us some experiener; in operational intelligence and that we were best
fitted to serve in that capacity; whereas we had had absolutely no training in
counterintelligence work ; nnd that we were hardly "worth our salt" in Calcutta.
And at that time it was obvious that Colonel Fubenstein had no organized set-up
in Calcutta and everything seemed to be rather at loose ends, which made our
posit:on that much more worthless.
In my opinion I can best serve in the Far East in the new associated
intelligence agency of AGFRT. This unit will be headed up by Lt. Col. Wilfred
Smith, who will be lent to theo by A-2. The personnel will be made up of A-2,
G-2, ON', OSS and even people who are normally under Commodore Miles. Colonel
Coughlin is working very closely with this organization and he and Colonel Smith
seem to get along very well. As a consequence, I think for the first time that
the USS will be able to work in China and actually obtain the full cooperation
and approval of the various military intelligence agencies. Both Colonel
Cougiain and Colonel Smith seem to think that I would be most valuable down on
the Chekiang coast where I would have to my advantage the contacts I originally
established there along with the active knowledge and cooperation of the British
Declassi
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Memo to:
Major Roger A. Pfaff
5 July 1944 6.
being constantly shadowed and every movement I made was being closely observed.
I ff)lt quite sure these people were Tai Lee men and not Japaneqe,agents, and I
believe that subsequent events have proved this to be the cas02)
Upon returning to Pihu, the British told me that they had word that
my cover had been exposed and that everyone in the local provincial circlesimew
of my identity although I doubt whether they knew that 1 was connected with the
OSS. They probably thought me a plain-clothes military man. When I returned
to Kukong, Adams told me that several things had shown him that the Tai Lee was
definitely aware of our true connections. As one example, he recited the case of
Mr. Mills, the head of the Toishan relief, who had been asked by Mr. Duff to
zcther information for us in the Toishan area, had entertained a Chungking
banker who was visiting that region. This banker asked Mills, after a dinner
party one night, whether he knew of three foreigners named Duff, Smith and
Adams who were presumably doing relief work. When Mills replied in the affirma-
tive , the banker said that we were not really relief men but were enemies of
the Chinese people s.nd were spies looking into local internal conditions. He
ascribed the fact that we were enemies of the Chinese people to the fact that we
resented anti-foreign insurance laws that were apt to be put into effect in the
near future. Mins, being of a rather emotional nature, immediately wrote the
U.C.R., demanding that we be dismissed from their service; but the relief offi-
-/ cials in Chungking never did ask Adams and me to dissociate ourselves from their
organization. This might be due to the fact that we left China before they could
take any such action, although I am not at all sure this is the case. I might
add that Mills was never told that we were with the OSS, but when he had journeyed
up to Chungking with Mr. Duff last autumn, Duff and Mr. C. J. Smith asked Mills
whether he would be interested in helping the local war effort by gathering any
information on his return to Toishan and forwarding it up to either Mr. Adams in
Kukong or Mr. Smith in Chungking whichever way he could most safely transmit the
information. Mr. C. J. Smith gave him 10,000 Chinese dollars to cover any
ex-
penses incurred in doing this work.
March 12, 1944,
After seeing Adams in Kukong, I went over to Kunming,/ where I con-
tacted Colonel Coughlin, who I had heard was the new head of the OSS in China.
Adams had contacted Coughlin several months before and had seen him when
Coughlin came down to Kukong on a trip. The Colonel, upon hearing the situation
as it stood at that time, decided that the best thing possible was for me to re-
turn to Washington, get a commission and return to China to carry on intelligence
work in the open. He senL a radio message to Washington and I was packed and
ready to leave upon a moment's notice. This all took place around March 20,
1944. Although the Colonel sent two radio messages and a letter to Washington,
no reply was received for six weeks, during which time I remained in Kunming,
as it was thought that it would be inadvisable for me to travel around China
any longer under the circumstances that existed then. It vas even felt that
I should stay out of Chungking, so I did not go back to that city. After six
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41, Memo to:
Major Roger A. Pfaff
?
5 July 1944 5.
Pihu for several days and then proceeded down the Wu aiver to Wenchaw. Here I
stayed with two Britishers who were in the British intelligence service and
who offered me every possible cooperation. In fact they opened all their files
to me and although they understood everything was being passed on by their main
office in Calcutta to the 14th Airforce that was of an operational nature, I
nevertheless made copies of practically every report they issued, with the re-
sult that when, leeks later, I returned to Kunming, the 14th Airforce found out
that the British Calcutta office had not turned over to them much of the in-
formation I had been given in Wenchow. Aside from the information the British
gave me; I obtained various bits of news regarding Shanghai and shipping move-
ments along the coast from reliable Chinese sources I was able to establish.
I also obtained some charts and papers taken from Jap ships that had been sunk
by our planes. But for the most part this material had been already procured
by the British, who sent it via safe hand direct to Calcutta, with the result
that the 14th Airforce obtained very little of the loot taken off these ships
sunk by their planes.
I also made a trip out to Yuhman Island, some eight miles off the
Chekiang coast. From a hill on this island I was able to detect Jap ships mov.,
ing southward an also could see the funnel and upper structure of a ship sunk
by our planes some two miles off this island. The people on the islrInd also
\..0)sold me things they bad obtained from this ship that had washed ashore and that
they had salvaged. Because of the fact that the Japs would undoubtedly be told
of my presence on the island by local fishermen who were in their pay, I vas
able to spend only two days and a night there. On returning to Wenchow I found
that a message awaited me from Adams in Kukong stating that our cover had been
blown. The British in Pihu also sent word down that they had informatior which
would make it advisable for me to get back to their place immediately.
On this entire trip I had posed as a relief official, but, inasmuch
as the economic conditions in this province were particularly good, I had to
change my position somewhat and say that I was up there looking into the plague
epidemic that happened to be raging at that time. The local government officials
had been exceedingly hospitable to me, which was partially d'ie to my being the
first American in their section, and probably due also to the fact that they
thought I had large amounts of relief money to dispose of. However, I found my-
self being so tied down with their showing me around to hospitals and medical
stations, along valth very extensive entertaining, that it was very hard to find
time to look into matters that I was primarily interested in. Therefore, I
finally told them that General Chenault had asked me, inasmch as I was going
to be up in that area, to look into several things for him, and that as a con-
sequence 1 would like to visit the coastal areas. The local officials did not
dare to take the responsibility of approving my request so they tired back to
Chungking for approval. Realizing that they would undoubtedly get a negative
reply, I left Wenchow secretly on my trip to the Island, although upon my ar-
rival there I found the head man expecting me. During this whole time I was
,
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Memo to:
Major Roger A. Pfaff
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5 July 1944 4.
military. I imagine Smith identified us through Colonel Jesse the head
of the Airforce Intelligence, who was an ex-Texas Oil Compaly executive in Shang-
hai. He ev:Idently knew of our connection when we first arrived in China.
Upon my arrival in Chungking, on November 15, 1943, I discovered that
Mr. C. J. Smith had had no word from the WS as yet but that General Donovan was
due to arrive in Chungking in a week's time. This information was given us by
Colonel Brown, the Naval Attache in the Embassy, who had been approached by the
Messrs. Smith and Duff a month or two before and who promised, upon being told
of their connections, that he would get back any reports given him to General
Donovan in Washington. An agreement was made whereby Colonel Brown would be able
to see these reports and would then get them back to the General. Mr. Smith and
I sat quiet when the General arrived in Chungking and some tan days later we
learned that he had already departed and that once again we had not been ap-
proached by any OSS personnel. Mr. Smith then received a cable from Mr. C. V.
Starr to return to New York for a conference, and I decided to go into a terri-
tory where, as far as I knew, no American military personnel had been - that was
on the Chekiang coast some two hur4red miles below Shanghai. I might add at this
time that any information that was sent to Mr. Smith by Adams or me was being
shown to two agencies, namely, the British Intelligence office in Chungking and
.the American Naval Attache. Information given to A-2 was done so by Adams and
--/me direct.
? ?
I traveled down to Kunming, on Decewber 22, 1943, by CNAC plane inas-
much as the military authorities suddenly tightened up on Army air transportation
and were unwilling to cooperate in getting me down cvuntry. This might have been
caused by my not acting their offer to take commission in the Airforce. At
Kunming I was told that no civilians could travel on Army planes any longer so
it was necessary for me to disclose my identity in order that the Airforce could
mire back to Delhi to find out whether civilian OSS personnel were entitled to
Army air transportation. Unfortunately, in doiag this, several people in G-2
also learned of this situation, and Colonel Dicky, on General Stilwell's staff,
was apprised of Adams" and my true identity. Word was finally received from
Delhi that it was all right for us to use Army air transportation, and we were
consequnntly given the worst priority for air travel issued in China, with the
result that we usually had to wait a long time for plane transportation. From
Kunming I flew to Kweilin and then proceeded on to Kukong by train. After a few
days' stay in Kukong l traveled, via Pritish military mission truck, up to their
camp at Pihu in Chekiang.
Fortunately, General Grimsdale, the head of the British military set-
up in China had given me a letter of introduction and with this letter I vas
able to obtain the full cooperation of the British in such matters as transporta-
tion, lodging, etc. The British military mission was interested only in guer-
rilla training and had an arrangement with the 3rd War Zone in Chekiang similar
to Commodore Miles' set-up in Arrehei Province. I rel....tined at their camp in
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SUPREME COMMAND
OFFICIAL INFORMATION
Thank you very much for the kind remarki sent to this office
in appreciation of our work up to the present time.
thing possible will always be done to develop and maintain more ?
WI-
. ,
oient collaboration between our office and the corresponding Allied or-
ganizations.
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In the hope of seeing you soon, please accept my best regards.
?
Col C. C. Carter,
Commanding Officer,
Offioe of Strategic Services,
Allied Armies in Italy - U.S. Army
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
APO 777, U.S. ARMY
17 April 1944
My Dear Colonel Pompeo Agrifoglios
On behalf of General W. J. Donovan and Colonel E. J. Glavin,
Commanding, Office of Strategic Services in North Africa, I wish to
express sincere thanks for your most gracious cooperation in essist'...ng
us to further the War effort.
'Lou may rest assured that we appreciate your most kind gift
of your two personal Beretta pistols.
I am looking forward to th4.1king you personally, sometime in
the near future.
Sincerely,
Pnr Release 2013/09/25
CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410002-7
I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410002-7
OFFIOU OF OTNAVAIO 8ERVIOES
ALLI4D ARMIS5 IN ITALY
APO 777. U.S. ARMY
My rdiar Lt. 1.-40,..11 Mnrio Rovotrlal
On hohalf of Oonoral W. J. Oonovan and Oolonel N, J. Glavin,
Commanding, Ofrioo of OtrAtogio norvloos In North Atrlog. I'doh to
oxprono vinooro thanko for your moot graoious cooperation in aoaimting
uo to turthor tho War offort.
You may ropt ka.oroo thgt wo Appraolato your moot kind gift
of tho Dorotta pioioloc
1 Am looking rorward Lo thanking you porsonelly0 itometise in
tho near Nturo.
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Dear Carter.
SECRET.
HQ SOM,
CMF.
REF: SO/158
16th May 1944,
Reference your letter of 4th May regarding parachute training for
personnel of our respective organizatione.
The situation in that, at prevent, there are two or three parachute
echoole in Italy catering for the needs of both regular troops And our-
selves. The personnel of the R.A.F. parachute school, formerly at
HAW DAVID, are going spare and in order to utilise the service* of the
skilled personnel of thie aoh0011 MUF have decided to act up oro central
parachute school to cater for the needs of ell organisations in Italy.
I wan aoked whether I would subscribe to thie idoe. So far as we were
\g?encerned I agreed to do eobeeause it seemed logical and soonomical to
cut out auky eameneepary overheads which *operate establishment* in.
volve. Further I .tlad experience of the training given by the RAW DAVID
school. I stipulated, 1.TAwt-ver, that our special needs should be safe-
guarded and laid down whiO, our special requirements au regards security,
special training, etc., are. MAAF have agreed to provide All the reoili-
tiee now available at No. 1 400141 Force School,
1 have agreed that No. 1 Speolal Foroe should keep their school in
being until we ave satisfied that the facilities provided by the new
Central School do, in fact, meet our needs.
I am very grateful to you for the kind remarts of appreciation you
were good enough to make regarding the cooperation and training provided
by No. 1 Special Pomo paraohuto mohool,
apologize for not answering your letter ).*fore this but I had
hoped to see you yesterday and explain the whole situation to you in
detail verbally.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Cowl. HOLDSWORTH.
Yours sincerely
/*/ W. Steven
Col C.C. CARTER,
C.A.C.,
Office of Strategic Services,
Allied Armies in Italy,
Apo 777, U.S. Army.
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C. C. CARTER
Colonel, C.A.C.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410002-7
HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATZGIC SERVUM ITALY
APO 777, U.S. ARMY
: Commanding Officer, 2677th Headquarters Company, OSS,
(Prov.), APO 512, U. S. Army.
On Tuesday, 9 May, I gave an official dinner
Ambassador Alexander
Mr. Horn
Mr. Livengood
Mr. Jones
Mr. Goshi
Mr. Reinhardt
Mr. Reber
General Lemnitser
Col. Smith
Major McBee
General Infante
General Roei
Col. Agriroglio
Col. Revotria
Col. As Frarcesco
Col. Goodfellow
Col. Huntington
Col. Garter
Col, Nee
Maj. Waffle
Maj. Berding
Maj. Angleton
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CONFIDENTIALT
BLAUQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATZGIC SLRVICES . ITALY
APO 777 U. S. ARMY
12 May 1944.
SUBJECT: Badoglio Viotti
TO $ Commanding Officer, 2677th fig Co OBS (Print), APO 512, U. S.
Army.
1. On Wedneeday, a party oonsisting of Colonel Goodfellow, Colonel
Huntington, Colonel Carter, Major Angleton and Colonel Revetria (nation
Army), visited Marshal Badoglio at Salerno.
2. The party spent an hour with the Marshal with Vr. fran40 Montineri
acting as interpreter. Tho subject of the conversation wee Italy's status
at the present time and future poomibilitiee under the plen he has tor the
new government. This plan was briefed to you by Mr. Scamporino and I do
not think I should put it in writing at this time due to security. I was
also briefed by Mr. Scamporino and he did a very good job or it. In root,
he even used the Marshal's exact words and phrases at times. Nothing new
was brought out at the conference and the Marshal repeated hie desire to
have Italy help the Allies in every way possible. The visit was very
interesting and the Marshel has an extraordinary personality.
3. After the visit with the Marshal, we hod lunch with Marshal
Meese, Commanding the Lend, Sea and Air Foroes of Italy. He explained that
ltaly was anxious to help and told us that there were 14,000 troops reedy
to go into action at any time. He desires help from our Air Fore'. The
rest of the conversation 1140 purely persoft41, renewing old friendship*.
4. No commitments' or exprossion of opinion woo wide by any weber
of the Amerloan party.
CONFIDENN
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C. C. CUM
Colonel, O. A. C.
Commanding.
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General, Special Operation., Mediterranean Theater, Bari; OSS ACC; and
such additional army and other hoadquartern which will permit exercise
of responsibility and authority for OSS activities.
7. Communications activities will be coordinated by OSS Algiers
in compliance with ourrent orders from AGHQ Chief Signal Officer as
transmitted through Communications Officer or his representative.
8. An officer in charge of OSS activities for the Naples area will
be appointed by you not later than April 15th to represent your head-
quarters.
9. Al]. personnel now on duty with OSS Bari will be transferred
from the Cairo T/O to the Algiers TAD for re-assignment with your
headquarters.
10. Special attention is invited to current procedure for the
preparation of weekly reports to this headquarters which will be
continued on schedule.
Declassified and Approved For Rel
EDWARD J. F. GLAVIN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding
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HEADQUARTMS
2677th HEAD(UARTERS COMPANY OSS (PROVISIONAL)
APO 512 U.S. ARMY
TO: Colonel C. C. Carter
SUBJECT: Orders ?
11 April 1944
1. In compliance with verbal orders from the Director of OSS, con-
firmed by the Joint Chiefs of staff, information copies forwarded to the
Theater Commander and Deputy Theater Commander, you are hereby designate
as Commanding Officer of OSS Italy. You will assume command of all OSS
activities in Italy to include the following:
a. WS activities with the 5th and 8th Armies which, for these purpos-a,
will operate under OSS-AAI.
b. OSS Bari which, for these purposes, is released from all control of
OBS Cairo.
OSS activities from Corsica which are directed into or from Italy.
d. All OSS-SI, MO, R & A, X-2, and other lotivities, Mr. Vincent
Scamporino is hereby designated officer in charge of all Italian
SI. All Italian MO shall be controlled by an officer of your
selection working in conjunction with Mr. Eugene Warner, Chief 140,
for the Mediterranean Theater.
2. These instructions will be coordinated with the Commanding General*
AAI, and with Major General Staiell, Commandiag General, Special Op.,
Mediterranean Theater, headquarters, Bari, Italy.
3. You will initiate the following transfers of personnel to Al-
giers on or about April 20th: Lt. Callan**, Lt. Barnes, and Lt. Buserak*
4. The following personnel are designated as members or your staff:
Ao Lt. Colonel Nee, Executive Officer
b. Major Toriolli, Intelligence Officer
o. ;skjor Koch, Operations Officer
4. Lt. Hubbell, or Lt. Brown, Communications Officer
el. Captain Echols, Services Officer
5. The final date of the above assignments are dependent upon
independent releases which will be the subject of further vtbled instruc-
tions.
6. You are hereby directed to complete current arrangements in re,-
peat to liaison with the advanced echelon of Special Ops Sub-Section, G-1*
AFHQ, Caserta; Special Operations Section AAI; Headquarters Commanding
1
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personal contact with General Deverm, General Lemnitzer, Ambassador
Kirk, and Marshall Bagdolio, then Acting Chief of the Provisional
Government.
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01/ Headquarters of 088 in Rome. On 11 June Colonel Glavin inspected
Villa Torlonia and accepted it tor 088.
8. On my arrival in Rome 1 reported by messenger my presence
in Rome to General Lemnitzer? AAL On 12 June I poreonally visited
Oeneral Lemnitzer and received from him the .4,nformation that Headquarters
AAI Mein would physically* move into Rome about June 20. During the
period 8 Juno to 18 June there VA,..0 numerouo administrative difficul?
ties. I personally had to tweet and supervise the requisitioning
of all propertiee. I personally had to maks arrangements for rationing
of my personnel, in addition to carrying out the usual duties of a
Commanding Officer in regard to intelligence and operations. The commun?
ications facillties wore practically nil. I bad one radio set, with
two very poor operators. I made arrangements to use the Amy teletype
and telegraph, which was part of the Rome Area Command. This resulted
in a normal delay of 6 to 8 hours to get mimeos Ar- Rome to SAn
Leuoio to be retransmitted. I had to use motor (mu Ar in ardor to
oontact AAI Advanced.
9. On 26 June General Donovan and party arrived in Rome
at 1145. At 1420 General Donovan loft Rome to visit General Clark.
On 27 June General Donovan had an audience with the Pope at 0930.
(Note* This audienoe wan secured by my staff within 48 hours, which in
an all time Vatican record. The Pope usually requires 2 weeks to 2
months to make arrangements for an audience.) At 1113 General Donovan
left for Bari.
10, On 3 July Colonel Glavin arrived in R4M41 and ordered
me verbally to proceed to Algiers and then to Washington. The original
ordem of 29 June from General Donovan to Colonel Carter Ives finally
received by me in Algiers on 8 July. I proceeded to Mhshington and
arrived on 13 July.
11. During the period April 11 to 6 July I reoeived no
clerical help for 085 Italy. I had one Services officer for 038 Italy,
and this officer was not assigned to me until six weeks after I took
command. Luring the entire period we were badly handicapped by lkok
of communioations and transportation. The above facts were brought
to the attention of the Commanding Officer, 08S, Mediterreneen, on
every semi-mmonthly report and, in addition, in special requests which
averaged about once a week.
12. Reports of 08&-Italy were extracted in Algiers and
forwarded to Washington, but the oompleto reports were not forwarded
to 08$ Washington. This inoludes letters of commendation which were
received by 088?Ita2.y on numerous occasions.
13. Wher I left Italy relations between 088.Ita4 and the
American and British ov4rnment agencies had improved to such an
extent that we were receiving letters of commendation and had been
given a status praotiotilly equal to ACC, AUG, and other agencies in
the theatre. Our dealings were on the very highest 1evol6 with
SECRET
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4. About Mv 1 all agent aotivity yes stopped by the British
due to their having pioked up Prinoefts lAgnatelli. Several oontermoes
wore held on thin matter, and After a period of nearly a month we war*
allowed to gond agente through the lines with the +agreement that X04
would ?hook All *onto and state to the British that the agents had
been thoroughly ?hooked. About the 20th of April I ordered AA invesmr
tigation of all aotivities of all agent ohnina Itely. The investi-
gating board wan ?wood of Colonel C. C. Carter, It Col Neo, Major
Torrielli, Major Kochi It Cellanen, recorder without vote. It Callanan
WA* placed on this board becaune Nowell the only person Aunignod or
attached to OBS-Italy who oould take ohorthAnd. These investigations
wore prooeeding and we had lust gotten to the inventigation of Italian
SI when Colonel Goodfellowto board arrived. In talking wlth Colonel
Goodfellow I found that WO would be duplioating our efforts it I
oonduoted a similAr inveotigetion, se it was agroed that Major James 1100
Angleton of my staff would be Appointed and would sit as a mamba of
the board during the tnvestigation of personnel of SI-Italy. Major
Angleton reported to me on eAoh case And ritoolved my approval tor the
aotinn recommended. The complete prooeedings of this board have boon
tranamitted to the Direotor, 08.541
5. During the month of May I spent most of my time making
oontaotn with various government ?Mauls in Italy, both British and
American, in order to have OSS-Italy given its proper Alma in the
general orgAnixiation. I pereonally had the best of relations with the
American And Britiph staffs, and AO a result OBS-Italy was completay
reoognized by all email's.
6. On May 22, as a reault of the investigations that / was
trying to conduct on Italian SI, I had a mooting called in Algiers
which resulted in a boare being appointed by Colonel Glavin to
inveotigate Italian SI. This board oonaisted or Colonel GlAvin,
ex officio, Colonel Carter, Colonel Early, Major Torrielli, Major
Chapin, And W. Soamporino, And was to meet at a later date At Sen
Imuoio. On MAy 28 Colonel Glavir and Major Chapin Arrived at San
Leuolo And opent until June 4 going over records and making notes.
On Juno 3 a meeting WAR held on Italian aI And orders wore issued
reference chain of oommand and ohannele of communioatton. On June 4
Colonel Glavin let for Bari.
7, On Jane 6 Igot A report that OSS was running wild in
Rome. I immediately tried to get permieeion to go to Rome and annum,
commend of the Forward Echelon. I was untelooeusful until the night
of June 7, when I reoeived permission pernonaly fon General Lemnitsor
to proceed to Rome. General Lemnitaer had boon absent freft HOndqearter**
AAI on the 6th and 7th. ?)arly the morning of 8 Juno I pr0000ded to
Rome and assumed command of the Forward Icholon of 085-Italy. I
immediately issued orders an to the proper method of requisitioning
offioe space, living quarters, and transportation. I was doterminod
that there would be no repetition of what had happened when 0$8 moved
into the Naples area some months previously. I immediately called on
Major General He Br Johneon? Commending Comma of the Rome Area
Command, and established our relattonehip with his. On the 7th of
INTI, Villa Torlonia was inspected and deemed eatable for the
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11V.P.Arkilt
HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONAL GROJP5
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON? D. C.
SUBJECT: Overseaa Report
TO: Director, OSS
THRU: Deputy Director, 830
A111.
,
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SF::_OFX;17
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31 July 19 -4.---7-71/CAM
1. On April 11, 1944 I received orders from Colonel Glavin
to prooeed to Italy and assume command of OSS?Italy (copy of orders
attached). On arrival at Caserta I immediately assumed command of
OSS Allied Armies in Italy. On April 12 I activated and organized
which consisted of OSS?AAI, OSS?Bari, Italian SI, and activi?
ties from Corsica into or from Italy. On April 14 I was notified by
telephone that there was a riot of our SI and SO agents in Brindisi.
I telephoned Commander Green to proceed to Brindisi, make an investiga?
tion, and assume command until my arrival. On April 15 I proceeded to
Bari and explained to Lt (dr Green the new organization of OS.,?Italy?
inspected the Headquarters, paid my respects to General Twining and
General Born, 15th Air Force, held a conference with JICA reference
suitable targets for San Marco Battalion.
2. On April 16 I proceeded to Brindisi and investigated
the conditions there and the cause of the riot. In Brindisi I found
conditions very bad. There was no security, and there were 14 agents
lodged in two roomo in the middle of town. These agents had been
there as much as three weeks, and most of them had completely blown
their cover. I found that Lt Cordell, the CO in Brindisi, was extremely
and ordered his hospitalization. Lt Cordell, with the aid of one
Cpl and with a jeep that he had borrowed from a friend of his in the
12th Air Force, had been trying to handle all operational activities
in the Brindisi area. Lt Cordell had done a superior job under a
difficult situation, having no directives and no chain of command to
turn to for help. Through his own personal efforts and friends he
conducted to the best of his ability all operations out of Brindisi.
I immodiately ordered 5 officers into Brindisi area to handle opera?
tional activities.
3. Luring the period April 17 to 28 I was paying official
calls on General Sir Maitland Wilson, General Lemnitzer? and the staff
members of AAI. I also contacted Ambassador Kirk, General McFtrlane,
of ACC, General Immell Commanding Naples Area, and visited Forward
Echelons of the 5th and 8th Armies. During this period I had numerous
administrative difficulties, so I requested a conference with Colonel
Glavin and staff in Algiers. This conference was held on the 28th,
29th, and 30th of April, at which time Commander Green was present.
It appeared at that time that all parties concerned understood the
new organization of OSS?Italy.
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Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Ogi ?
TO
PROM
StilijiteTi
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Vxeoutive Offioor, II
WiUi 1.1. firewater, Captain
Report on Pisld Conditions .? ..
OATR1Z imiust 1044
Personnel to go into Northern Itely to establish contact with
Italian and German railroad workers was reoruited and trained, but
the mission was never dispatched as the operations ?Moot would not
give it sufficient priority for transportation.
During this period, Labor personnel for use in Germany, Austria
and Frame were trained and qualified in paraohut$,ng and three ex.
oellent radio operators were developed.
Two men were introduced into German PON stookedes and lived
with the prisoners as prisoners for two weeks, thereby gaining oxo
?silent training and valuable information.
o During this period the partiouler condition that Gould knee
been !Improved was a lank of surf personnels *waver, I believe this
situation hoe now been remedied, and when I left it was my feeling
that matters wore progressing extremely well. Central Muropean
personnel is now in Bari, some should be in the field shortly. ?reach
personnel remain in Algiers under the direction of John 01a0k who seem.
*d to me to be extremely oapable of handling the situation them
d There are no specific diffioultieo in the field, but I have a
feeli4 that to much development was being done on top and too little
on the bottom. To my mind the important point to be strengthened is
the desk head. Coordination, liaison and oontaot work are of no use
unless at the production level intelligence is being brought in. In
the Algiers office it would you to me that it was unneeessary te
have both en, 81 Officer and staff, and an Intelligeaoe ?Moor and
staff. I can understand from a Commending Officer's point of view
that hs would wish to have a man who was responsible for the in.
telligence work instead of having all the various brambles owing
directly to him. However, it seemed to no that *ash desk should he
directly under the intelligence officer as their problems and modes
of operation are quite independent, and netters that nre not Worm&
ent I believe can be dilat with satisfaoterily on the basis of ii0110011
between the desks rather than control over them. This of sours. is
merely a personal opinion applying only to the ?Moe Whore I hove
been as no doubt conditions are different in other *Mese.
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SURINCT: Report OA Field Col4itions
I.11,44r;
4.9
'TED STATES GOVERNMENT *
DATA,I August 1044
a I have just returned from six months duty with the Labor Desk
In Alilers, where X was originally seat to do administrative ?Mee
ftrk. Due to the tot that 04Ort4A4 staff pereonnel was sent inte the
tield, oertain were recalled to ASshington, one ?Meer transferred
out to Communioatione, and furthermore, that the head of the deek wee
absent from Algioris tor at leest three quarters ot the time, it *Nome
neeessery tn attend to ell the verious espeots of runnieg the desk swoh
401 moss144, billeting, obtC4ning rations, housing, training* as well
as the administrative and polioy funotiens neoessary at the headquarters.
Besides the regular Labor Desk fUnotions, this desk through
some historical promos., had booms responeible for ell Central luropean
work that wam done at the Yeadquarters, ncot only in SI lines but else
R 6 A and OD with minor aid from tims to time to the Reporting board
and M04,
b The rosoaroh pop's:moot produced weekly a bulletin oovering
develsolments in Germany obtained from ourreat German newspapers and
known as the Woohenberloht, This function, together with the personnel
oonneoted with it, has reoently been turned over to
A large oolleotion of German documents was oolleoted and clessm
Ailed and this tunotion has reciently boon turned ovei, to OD breath to.
other with one man roormitod by this desk*
Documents end stamps ?elicited by this section were used by IWO
In the beginning of their activities, and recently one 444 reoruited
by this desk has been transferred to NO for their uses
The Sparrow mission wee dispatohed in Mar* but unfortunately
the enmity moved into the territory involved the dv after this party
was dropped and the mission has been unsueoesefUl.
The Quail mission 1V44 reoruited and trained to set up chains
to penetrate Central Auropean ocuntries through labor oontaote, Rook.
ever, at 4 oritio1l moment in the preparetion of this projeet, it
beoame neocesary to recall the Naval officer who had been handling the
personnel, and the resultent disruption of morale made it aeoessary
to trensfer this projeot to the London ?Moos
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PROM Mortimer B. 170,1,f
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TED -STATES GOVERNMENT
SUBJECT: Commentn on Attached Report by Captain Brewster
.1.1? -11:7?:?:11r ? t11 '
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DATEt 9 Augunt 1944
At the requeet of Lieutenant Beale, the following comments
are made connerning the attached report by Captain Brewster based
upon his nix-monhAls' tour of duty with the Labor Desk, Algiers. ,
1. The prolonged absence of the head of the desk from,Algiers,
noted by Captain Brewster, has now been remPalied Lieutenant, Devoe
has been sent to Cairo as desk head there and it is nolOnger,necea-
sary for Mr. Koliender to divide his time between Algiers and Cairo.
There will be continued occasion, of course, for trips to Bari by
Mr. Kollender. However, since the principal activities of,theLa*
Desk have now been transferred from Algiers to Bari, these trips
,v
-should not be regarded as absenoes from the principal office.'
2. The shortage of administrative personnel, noted by CaptOp
Brewster, has now been remedied. The administrative staff in the
setup consists of Mr. ol1eder, Mr. Mask, Lieutenant ,
Perry, and Mr. Clark. This staff i thou at to be adequate for ad-
ministrative purposes.
3. During the time Captain Brewster was in NATO4 the following
projects of the Labor Doak were in WI active status* Fa A, A, Fern,
Ferro, Heine, Lemon, Quail, Redbird,,Rook, sparrow, Stork, Tunic,
Weapons. Captain Broweter's report does not, of course, attempt to
go into the details GonlernJng each of these projects, but merely
mentions those factrs which are regarded by him as the principal '
developments during his tour or duty.
MBNVOS
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therefore by Navy jeep. The "Hump" situation was such that
for many months no jeeps could be brought over.
These seemingly =tall items - a few gallons of gasoline
and a jeep or two - seriously curtailed our activities and
are mentioned to show how completely cur people are depen-
dent upon others.
Mr. Christian had only recently arrived in Chungking and
Colonel Hall spoke most enthusiactically of him. We were
unable to contact him, however, since he was not due to
met again with Colonel Hall until a few days after I left
and because no transportationwas available to get to him
in the martime.
Colonel Hall had arranged for the rental of EL separate
OSS house in town. This has beenteported on fully by
Colonel Hall, but essentially it was a means of providing
OSS with a house for MA and for Mr. Christian's activities
outside of the Valley. It was taken in the name of
Lt. Colonel Smith of AGFRTS for reasons of cover.
IV. SACO
The subject of SACO can properly be put under a heading
separate from that of Chungking and comments can b e based
almost entirely on my talks with Colonel Hall, Major
Wilkinson and several of the other officers.
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situation which had been so bad dB to raise serious probloms,
has been considerably improved. Our men took great delight
in the fact that for the men in the Valley assigned to
Commodore Miles an invitation to dinner at the OSS house is
something to look forward to. Several physical difficulties
existed in the Valley however, quite apart from the nature
of an outra/g ious climate which/iffected the strength and
health of men stationed there too long. /bile I was there
and for three weeks prior the generator which supplies
electricity for our establishment, as well as that of 2avy,
had broken down. This meant that during this period our
people were without lights. One of the officers had brought
with him a small Army Coleman lamp with five gallons of
white gasoline. When I left only a few hours supply was on
hand and none was available locally or in Kunming. Inability
to get even a few gallons of gasoline to remedy this situa-
tion with dispatch, despite the repeated cables, meant that
work after dark was largely shut down.
The only transportation from the Valley was an old, worn
out LaSalle, contributed to OSS by General Tai Li, which
spent most of its time in the shop. The only dependable
transportation to and from the Valley for our people was
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Major MacCarthy was doing an excellent job under the most
difficIllt circumstances.
I mention the circumstances because there may be, or
already have been, some complaints on the partial breakdown
that inevitably resulted.
The only transportationw as one jeep which Major
MacCarthy had borrowed back in February from the 14th Air
Force "for a few weeks", and which the 14th had since
demanded back by August 1. The *Hump" situation was such
that while I understand one or two jeeps finally got over,
it was only after many months of waiting and cabling.
,) III.Chungking
While at Chungking I stayed at the OSS house in the
Valley. Commodore Miles was not in Chungking at the time
and I met the MIting Commanding Officer, Commander Wight,
in town. Navy courtesy would have required my calling on
Commodore Miles but under the circumstances a call was
unnecessary.
I met Major Wilkinson, the Commanding Officer at
Chtip.gking, in Kunming and It ter in Kweilin. My talks with
him are summarized later in the report ander SACO. I spent
several days in Chungking and talked at length with Colonel
Hall and with several of our other officers. The mess
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Declassified and A
II. China
Colonel Coughlin has established his headquarters for CBI
at Kunming. In his absence (Colonel Coughlin was in the
United States during my visit to China) Major MacCarthy was
Acting Commanding Cffieer at Kunming, while Colonel Peers was
Acting Strategic Services Officer for CBI. Major MacCarthy
was extremely and embarrassingly shorthanded. His only other
off leer, Ensign Wkland, spent six weeks in the hospital and
several more weeks at a rest camp with a serious case of
jaundice. It meant that Major MacCarthy was the Commanding
Officer, the Services officer who arranged transportation
north, south and west of Kunming, who read ^nd approved all
cables and answered most of them, who met people at the air
field and who managed the OSS house in town and the warehouse
on the other side of the air strip, who served as mess
officer, house committee, reception committee and entertain-
ment committee for everyone involved and who did these
things alone. The natural result was a partial breakdown in
the functioning of the headquarters. Just before I returned
to India from China two officers and a few enlisted men from
Detachment 101 were sent up by Colonel Peers and conditions
were considerably alleviated. It was my impression that
proved
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The mvnsoon heat and mud and the malaria essualed
epidamio proportions, reaching 1014 in one (whichcamp which had
to be condamned) was taking its toll, particularly ew
of the steppeg up operatio in vi
undul th matte nu. Without effecting morale
y, e r of replacement and leave was ever present
in the minds of most. Replacoment of Aft 11110 h
some time is being, and will larg ave been there
ely be,
normal recruitme
personnel nt 'of more SO, taken care of by
Communications and Services
. A particularly knotty problem Is presented,
however, in the case of the Field Photographic me
en there
n, m
whom have be
ost of
ists nd who
000 Navy slots
over a year, who are particular special-
a11,Ay .
The integration
been of some of the Branches, who have lot
represented at Detachment 101 in the past, into the
organization, which was
extent exists today o origina14 established
Army rather thanand to SQMO
n an basis,
a Branch
has not been difficult. This can be ascribed almost
calibre
entirely to the bre of the Coman
mann mding Officer and the
men sent out. Reasonable men approaching the problem in an
has represented er fi
intelligent nd no difficulty. Lt. Cox for example
R&A fora
doi comparatively short time and is
ng an excellent job and has been d escribed by Colonel
%
Peers as an extremely valuable and likable addition to the
Detachment and his work is of great help to
ever5 _Jae concerned.
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Typical of the spirit displayed by our men was that of
Captain Parker. .hen I arrived early in the morning the mud
was well over my knees. During the day the temperature rose
to what I was told was 1300 and by midday, dust rose In
clouds. Captain Parker, who had been there well over a
month, had a bad case of malaria with recurrent attacks of
high fever, but stayed on the job. After I left ryitkyina
I mentioned to Colonel Peers that Captain Parker was in 1)47.4
physical shape and probably ought to be moved. Colonel
Peers told me that he was aware of it and that he had tried
to get Captain Parker out but that the only way this could
be done was to order him out on threat of court martial; that
he had been there in the early stages of the attack and lfts
going to be there when the town fell if it killed him. It
was a matter of days or even hours, and Captain Parker was
allowed to stay.
Most of the men who went out with the original Detach-
ment 101 group have returned or are about to return o leave.
Colonel Peers hopes to be able to return for a short :Alva
this fall. Conditions at that time will determine whether
he is able to do so. horalelis high and an e sprit de corps
exists even among the newer men that I found no where else.
' 47.
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S.
liaritiee of SEAC are such that, unlike CBI, half a lob cannot be
done with half the men and half the equipaent; that unless lore
conclude it is worth going all the way and accoraingly furniih
all the men and materials they need, any partial furnishing
would. be completely wasted.
?
I. p3efli?l
The story of Detaohment 101 has already been describea
in detail front many angles and heeds no ambellishaent at
this point. During my visit I made it a point to look not
only at headquarters but at the various camps and establiih-
ments in the area - at Dibrugarh and Din5an. On Colonel
Peers instructionsI visited Myitkyina before the city fell
and watched our people at work there. A unit of the nola
Photographic Branchw as waiting the actual fall of the town
so they might make a pictorial record. Captain Poker tnd.
Lt. Brophy conducted the interrogation of all prisoners iho
were brought in in the first instance. The Japanese prison-
ers were being turned over to G-2, while natives *ere hanalea
by our own people. In all cases, however, our people retainea
any items, such as maps, passes and other docents, Which
might be of value to the Ra Branch.
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they likewise are afraid that the existence of the doubts
may mean that they will got less preferential treatment and,
will be neglected by way of supplies and personnel so that
there will not be enough to satisfy all needs. This, of
course, is not expressed by them but is an impression dis-
tinctly my own. I mention it because I think it is impor-
tant in servicing this Theater from Washington and in under-
standing come of the cormnunicat5ons received here from time
to time.
2. The CBI Theater, both Detachment 101 and China, are
doing a job in exact proportion, plus a little more, to the
help and servicing we give them. The choice is ours, in a
sense, to determine the extent of the job that CBI will do.
Some supplies and men have always been available in this
Theater and by the proper liaison and approach by our
excellent Commanding Officers many of the needs have been
filled from local sources, both American and otherwise. In
the case of SEAC, however, the amount of personnel aud equip-
ment obtainable locally is extremely small. I believe that
the decision that Washington must make with respect to this
Theater is to go ahead with full support in every way or to
abandon the matter and withdraw our people, if this is
politically possible. It is my firm belief that the pecu-
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driver, and the vehicle may never be soon again. Road con-
ditions are bad and maintenance becomes a serious problem.
With the increase in the flow of supplies and personnel of
the other Branches the Services problem is rapidly approach-
ing the critical stage. If it were not for the fact that
local labor is available for some purposes, Services functions
would have broken down completely by this time. To add to its
problems SEAC has had to assign men from its limited Tb O to
the Calcutta area to assist in the handling of supplies which
arrive there for both Theaters.
No other Branches were yet represented on the island.
Bofore concluding with SEAC, I should like to make two
observations:
1. Both before I left Washington and on my return,
there seemed to be considerable question as to whether OSS
-
SEAC would ever be able to contribute materially to the war
effort. This was partly from a feeling that SEAC itself,
under Lord kountbatten, would be given no important function
to perform and partly from the feeling that OSS, based on
Ceylon, was too far from the enemy geographically to do much
good. Our people in Ceylon are well aware of the existence
of these doubts. It has not effected their morale, nor has
it slowed down their organization and planning for operations.
They, of course, feel they have a large part to play; but
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were on the way. Lt. Commander Kenneth Pier, USNR, Was
nominally the head of Field Photographic for both SEAC and
CBI. There was some discussion as to whether he would leave
the Branch entirely and assume the position of Chief of
Maritime-SEAC.
This Branch finds itself under a tremendous handicap
by reason of shortage of personnel. It has a lot of diversi-
fied work to do and a large area to cover. In addition to
the regular station complement required at headquarters and
at the various camps, personnel is required for warehousing
in various areas and in Colombo; for servioing the transient
personnel at Colombo; transportation ot supplies and equip-
ment from one establishment to another; clerical help; of
the adjutant type; guard duty; maintenance; and a good deal
of construction, both physioal and supervisory. *Ale a
considerable amount of the physical work is done by native
labor, the native 1Lbor needs supervision. Native cooks
and kitchen helpers are available and are used but must be
supervised by American military personnel or the food will
be contaminated or stolen. Vehicles climb* driven lo:ally
by natives but American military peesonnel is requlred on
the long hauls from camp to camp or the supplies, the
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trained, he has taken care of thr medical needs In Kind, in
the ?tinter of the Island; at Trincomalee, 120 miles by jeep
to the Northeast; and at Col.ombo, 60 miles by train to the
Southwest; and at Gallo, 60 miles by jeep from Colombo. I
understand, however, that shortly after I left some help
arrived and that more is on its way.
Medical conditions on the island are fairly good.
Malaria has not been extensive, nor have any of the tropical
diseases, with one exception, effected our personnel. The
one exception relates to dengue fever, which most, if not all,
the women contracted at one time or another during the first
few months. Commander Murphy has been making every effort
to avoid a recurrence.
13. Field Photo ra hic
This Branch is represented in the Theater by
Lt. Norton, USNR, recently arrived. While at the time it
was not clear whether Lt. Norton was Branch Chief, he appearea
to be making excellent progress in the establishment of the
necessary relationship with the British and the Dutch and
had made plans with them for the filming of a Japanese
escape film. In addition, he was well underway in the pre-
paration of a building with facilities for the development
of photographic work. Badly needed personnel and supplies
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This Branch, headed by Miser Julia McWilliams, has
the necessary additional help on the way and is doing an
able job.
10. IlallaLtEtItAtation
This Branch,-Z;lby Mr, Paul Child, is doing a
considerable amount of work for SEAC as well as for our ovn
Branches. The so-called "war room" with various maps and
other visual devices was under preparation and the work of
the Branch was proceeding in a satisfactory manner. One
difficulty has been that this wa:_ formerly a Branch of
Services. Now that it has been made a separate Branch it has
no T/0 of its own on which to work and it has an extreme need
for a small number of well equipped specialists.
11. Schools & Traini
Colonel Beppner has been badly handicapped in the
work of this Branch because of the failure of Dr. Enders to
work out. The only Schools and Training personnel were those
borrowed from the other Branches.
12, Medical Services
It. Commander Murp4y, the only medical officer on
the island, has been doing a good job under terrific condi-
tions. With a few technicians and a few natives, whom he
:444!;44,6
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to keep the efforts of his Branch directed towards the enemy;
and to avoid any repetition of mistakes that might possibly
have been made in the past.
Miss Cora du Bois hus been doing an excellent job
with very limited facilities and personnel. For the time
being she has been concentrating on work for our own Branches
in Detachment 404, with special requests for SEAC being
handled from time to time. However, these outside requests
are becoming more numerous and because of the personnel
shortage she is able to take on only the most essential ones.
Until more personnel irrive, R&A will be unable to service
Washington properly (seven l individaals of the R&A Branch
have just arrived with a few others apparenqy on the way).
By and large she has been getting able assistance from
Registry and from some of the other girls, which permitted
her to do considerably more work than she otherwise could
have dome.
8.
Lt.
Lt. GiImartin had been there a short time and
several assistants had just arrived or were on their way. He
had commenced the establishment of the standard security
processes and was studying the local situation for particular
problems peculiar to the Theater.
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to keep the efforts of his Branch directed towards the enemy,
and to avoid any repetition of mistakes that might possibly
have been made in the past.
7. RA
Miss Cori du Bois has been doing an excellent job
with very limited facilities and personnel. For the time
being she has been concentrating on work for our own Branches
in Detachment 404, with special requests for SEAC being
handled from time to time. However, these outside requests
are becoming more numerous and because of the personnel
shortage she is able to take on only the most essential ones.
Until more personnel arrive, MA will be unable to service
Washington properly (seven l individuals of the MA Branch
have just arrived with a few others apparently on the way).
By and large she has been getting able assistance from
Registry and from some of the other girls, Which permitted
her to do considerably more work than she otherwise could
have dune.
8. Security
Lt. Gilmartin had been there a short time and
several assistants had just arrived or were on their way. He
had commenced the esteblishment of the standard security
processes and was studying the local situation for particular
problems peculiar to the Theater.
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6. SI
SI needs personnel. Mr. Dillon Ripley, Chief of SI,
made certain specific recammeudations on the type of person-
nel required for his Branoh, which has already been reported
on directly and which I have taken up with the Branch itself.
Generally it is that men with language and//or area background
are required only on a policy level, while those on a lower
level need only be young, smart, energetic officers. Lan-
guage and area background are desirable but not required.
6. X-2
At the time of my visit X-2 had no representative
in Ceylon. I had several talks with Major McDonough, both
at Detachment 101 and in Calcutta, who advised that the X-2
representative for Ceylon was on his way. In this connection,
it is Important to note that it has been necessary to up
X-2 on a basis slightly different from the established OSS
Theaters. All of India, Ceylon and Assam, including Detach-
mnt 101, are under Major Maonough who makes his headquar-
ters in New Delhi. These men are all assigned to SEAC,
although those in Assam are on detached service from Detach-
ment 101. I was impressed with Major McDonough's sincere
desire to keep his Branch functioning under the over-all
supervision of the respective Strategic Services officers;
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on the over-all reproduction needs and the proper location
and division of reproduction facilities.
8 The needs of MO in the way of personnel have been
outlined in the regular reports. At this time the problem
is one of finding the necessary individuals as well as of
finding tile necessary "slots". On a priority basis those
needed immediately are the desk heads, while the others can
come along in due time. At the present time, Mr. Betsson is
the only mature person on hand. (Lt. Bonamy, USBR, with the
approval of kr. Scofield has been in charge of the estab-
lishment of the Chittagong base. It is anticipated that
his transfer from MO will be made a permanent one.)
4. MU
For obvious reasons a good deal of SEAC's opera-
tional activities will depend on the functioning of a good
Maritime Unit and the availability of boats and other Mari-
time equipment. At the present moment, because of the ill-
ness of Lt. Fisher Howe, a new Chief of Maritime is needs&
Fuller details concerning the needs of the Unit can best be
given by Major Lichtman of the Maritime Branch in Washington,
who has just returned from a visit to Ceylon, and by Lt.
Howe himself who has just been returned to this ovuntry for
reasons of ill health.
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rigorous and everyone seems to be working with enthusiasm.
2. SO
This Branch is headed by Captain Walter Mansfield,
USMCR, a recent transfer from METO. )2 in the case of Major
Peddicord, Captain Mansfield is old enough to have had the
necessary experienc, and background for his job and young
enough to have retained his enthusiasm, energy and durability.
Most of his personnel had not Axed but his plans were to
work closely with Major Peddicord.
8. MO
I talked several times with Mr. Scofield who had
been MO Chief and only recently had been made Chief Planning
Officer. The greacest need at the present time for MO-SEAC
is, therefore, a new Chief. In the meantime Mr. Scofield is
very enthusiastic about the chances of MO and regarded
qualified personnel as MO's greatest need. Worthy of comment
at this point was what appeared from the field to be a ten-
dency from Washington to make plans Al reproduction needs for
MO and other Branches without consulting those in the field
on their needs. I believe this was largely a matter of mis-
understanding since shortly before my departure Lt. Caldwell
of the Reproduction Division had arrived to survey and report
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Alb
II. Branches
Colonel Heppner is making every effort to organise
and carry on OSS activities within the Branch argsation and
is generally meeting with success in this respect. in Opera-
tions Committee, comisting of the Chiefs of SO, MO, OG,
and SI had been established. Full details have been covered
in regular monthly field reports and will not be repeated
here. This arrangement seems to be working satisfactorily.
In essence, it provides that any operation entered into by
OSS-SEAC is presented first to this Committee for thrashing
out and approval and for proper coordination of the respec-
tive Branches that might be concerned before it is submitted
for approval to the "P" Division of SEAC.
As to individual Branches the followin comments aro
worthy of note:
1. OG
Major Peddicord, on detached service with OBS from
SEAC, is =experienced, able and enthusiastic officer 'be
has handpicked a group of men for OG operations. I met sane
of these men before leaving the States and a few others while
in Ceylon. From my own observations of them and from c'.
merits made by others, they are some of the finest men of
their type available today. Their training course is
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sECHET
both by air and by sea. It is the terminus of air lines from
India and the trip to headquarters at Kandy is by train.
Similarly it is the port of debarkation for supplies coming
in either from Calcutta or directly from the Unite States.
The main store roams and warehouses are located here, with
substations at our other establishments on the island.
The climate on the island is exceptionally good, particu-
larly considering the fact that it is located so near the
equator. The other natural disadvantages however - mosquitos,
leeches, etc. - are present in profusion.
5. 122SLPIIER
This camp, not yet established at the time of
my visits, is intended largely as a holding area for new
native agent recruits.
G. Elifisala
This is a forward area Which has probably been
completed by this time and is intended for a base for SRO
operations into central and lower Burma and on the mainland
generally. Contact had been established with the British
forcAs operating along the coast as far as Akyab and liaison
with the British authorities in the area was apparently good.
Radio towers had been built and the camp was "ready for
business".
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planned. On my second visit to Ceylon on 10 August 19440 on
the way back to Washington, the organization had been pretty
well set up and construction largely completed. Some of the
neeessary personnel to 1311 in the framework hila arrived, with
others on the way or promised. They had largely passed out
of the construction phase and entered into the operations.
This camp is established about ten miles from
the British Naval Base at Trincomalee, at the shore's edge in
the jungle. It is intended that this camp, 'which offers
complete isolation, will be used for the training of native
It is intended that the Galle camp, which is
located a few miles from the town itself on a hill top several
hundred feet above the shore, and offering excellent oppor-
tunities for training and conditioning, will be used for
training American or non-native personnel. Trincomalee and
Gallo have alternate monsoon conditions so that both rough
and smooth surf are available at all times at one of the
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. General
...........................
K. Ph sical Establishments
1. x5:121k
Readquarters SEC is locate& en a former coco-
nut plantation a few miles outside of Kandy itself and from
Kdmiral Mouytbatten's headquarters for SC in the Botanical
Gardens. Kt our headquarters are residences or all our per-
sonnel except civilian women (Who are billeted at the Queens
Rotel in tam). Rare too rre the offices for Lt. Colonel
Reppner and his immediate staff and for most of the Bran6h
Chiefs and their immediate assistants. Colonel lippner
occupies the "bungalow", the only structure of a permanent
nature, which was the residence of the former manager of the
plantation. The rest of the buildings are temporary, baiha
type, and as such are most inexpensive as well as easily
constructed. They are quite adequate and additional buildings
can easily be erected as needed.
I first visited CeyloTs on 26 June 1944, at which
time OSS had been on the island for less than two months. kt
that point physical construction and organization occuplea
most of the attention of our people, althouth one operetion
(Sugarloaf II) had already taken place and others were being
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7
4
I.
?
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s
time the extent of our activities in China are limPed in
almost exact proportion to the amount of tonnage that can be
moved out of Calcutta and the various depots in Assam over
the "Hump". The natural corollary to this Is that the question
of "Hump" transportation mist be a prime consideration in any
plenning for OSS activities in China.
In my discussions with Lt. Colonel Heppner, Lt. Colonel
Peers, Colonel Hall, Lt. Colonel Smith and Major Illkinson and
the various Branch Chiefs in the field, 6 Amber of problems
were raised and requests made of comparatively minor importance,
which I have covered by memorandum to and discussion with
local representatives and Branches in Washington and need not
be set forth in a report of this kind.
For the purpose of my over-all report, which follows, I
believe it most expedient to proceed from the basis of indi-
vidual Theaters and the establishments within them.
Major Frederick Mills, USMCR, Executive Officer to
Colonel Lowman, Communications Branch Washington, accompanied
by Major Falknor, Chief of Communications Far Enat,was in
the field covering the same areas as myself. Accordingly
I have omlttdd from this report discussion of the Communi-
cations Branch, its activities and problems.
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4.
t.
are acting as good soldiers under conditions, both climatic
and political, which range from fair at best to what can
only be described as frightful.
3. On the basis of pure efficiency, apart from any
sentiment, our program of replacement of individuals in the
Far East should be more liberal than might normally be the
case. An individual who spends a year in the Far East, par-
ticularly Burma and China, and goes through a full monsoon
season of heat and rain, may have his efficiency so badly
affected that he should be replaced.
4. Every establishment in the Far East needs more
supplies. The nature of the supplies and the degree of need,
of course, vary from place to place, so that when we consider
places like Chungking and Kweilin supplies of all kinds are
practically non-existent. I would say that the bottleneck
on supplies for the Far East is moving from Washington to
the field, particularly Calcutta and the "Hump".
5. Transportation within the field is still a problem
of vast importance. Within particular establishments the
problem is simply one of local transportation, jeeps, trucks,
etc., and personnel to man them. That is in process of being
solved. In its most serious form the transportation problem
is one of getting supplies over the "Hump". At the present
a.
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Attached, as AppendITfl
ix , la a detailed schedule of my
itinerary. By way of suramary the following were visited:
In SEAC: Kand,y, Colombo, Trincomalee, Galle and
Chittagong.
In CBI: New Delhi, Calcutta, Detachment 101
(including Dinjan and Dibrugarh), kiltkyina
(Burma), Chungking, Kunming and Kwellin.
I departed from Washington 2 June 1944, and from Miami,
Florida, 6 June 1944,
1944 and returned to Nshington, 22 August
.
Before discussing particular Theaters and
should like to make some caa Detachments,
ment common to our Far East
establishments.
1. Both Theaters Detach
an ent
d all m place I went, to-
s are short-handd
e.
Almost identical comments were made every
help.wit: They are working hard, too hard in some ca
2. The ses, and no
morale over-
there some all is axtremely good. Occasiona14
is resentment and disillusionment with
hshington, but the great majority of respect to
are
attaapting and in most cases personnel
succeeding i our t doing a job. They
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IC\
Nt. ?
1,0
8 September 1944
? /
To: Brig. General W. J. Donovan
From: Lt. (jg) George C. Demas, USNR
Subject: Report of Trip to SE AC and CBI
NIIIRE,2LggsioN
In May of 1944, Colonel Atherton Richards, OSSTO,
ordered that I proceed to both Theatera in the Par East to
meet with the Strategic Services Officers and Branch Chiefs
and in general familiarize myself with the makeup and
activities of OSS in SEAC and CBI. It WAS thought that such
a trip would enable me to perform my duties *II Mushington as
Far East Theater Officer with a better understanding of the
problems as they arose and to assist the Branches at this
end in their servicik; of the tiela.
Colonel Buxton, immediately prior to my departure, mat
it cleft? that my mission was pu.ov internal; that /was not
to represent Washington to the field (axcept as Far East
Theater Officer), nor OSS to &Ay uutaide agency or authority.
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INDE.1221.111
10. Visual Presentation
11. Schools & Training
12. Medical SOVVI063
13. Field Photographic
14. Services
PAGE NO.
13
13
13
14
15
CBI
I. Detachment 101-
II. China
III .Chungking
IV. SACO
V. AGFRTS
VI. Calcutta
VII.New Delhi
General Comments
Appendix "A"
22
24
27
31
33
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19. Wy inspootion trip *lolly satisfied no that ttto initial
setup as established by Colonel Lowman in. the Thr last, with Colonel
Falknor as ovorall Communications Ohio! for C111 and SW, is an
eminently sound and functioning one. I de not Wiwi a eommmaioations
chief for sac& alma out there without an ovorall Coimuniestiess Chief
encompassing all of the areas oould possibly de as good a servieing
job, nor could it coordinato Commumioations policios and activities as
effoctively.
20. I wish to commend most highly tha work whish Colonel Filknor
is doing in that theator. He is using good, sound judgment, a high
order of diplomacy whom it is n000ssary and lets of moral guts when
that is required. Hi is taking it well in his stride and is not dammed
or disturbed by inconsequential matters. HO owned very well liked kf
everyone and, of course, is complotely competent in his Umbilical
knowlidge and background. He was thoroughly deserving of the promotion
he received and which will, I believe, help him in his operations.
21. Transportation is a crying and &spoliate need in all OSS
operations in China. The lack or it is ? sovere handioapping, matter at
the moment.
%44f
Frederic A. Willis
Major, mini.
Executive Offieer, Commmmleations
Drama.
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taking many weeks and in ems eases months to oroomplish eves throe.
the higher **helms. Information ebtaimed Is freqwemtly imadequabe
or downright inoerrect. There is a Sensilerable feeling of suspieimn
permeating the air and General Tal Ll's agents oeem to be everywheres
on every plane and in every oity.
18. Tho preseAt Japanese campaign, if it takes Kmellin, sax well
throw the Amerioan support of China back five *r six hundred miles
Kunming. One's impression is that there is mething to atop them
(outside of the 14th Air Force and the Composite ling) but parasols mg
fans. lhen I was in Kunming I saw an extensive withdrawal frau the
forward areas of the "Z" Foroes.
17. AOFRT8 is a great, if not the greatest. hop* of 088 ia Gams.
Badly needed are more men and equipment but equipment is mow there and
considerably more men will be there by October 1st.
RISVITs JET
18. The Oommunications Branch immosibirmg up and installing ons of
the but Communications operating stations and establishments in bias
both
both in voice and cods. &never1 the present Japanese advance has made
it impossible for Colonel Smith to knew where to establish the Commodeatioas
training sohool or to give us instruotions as to where he wants the vole*
and code transmitters(800 watts) plaood. The whole pioturolailim a &tattiest
state of flux at the time I WSW there which was five days
attoottlitt.
preparatory evacuation There is a groat deal of harassi
after tlie initial
nz of the air
strip in Zweilin and almost daily air raids. rim's. take up mempower. time.
break circuits and schedules and fatigue the personnel.
4.:4?
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the Japsnese for three reasons. Pinot, they are bolding their etreagth
and power in reserve for the peetear battle for the domination mod
oontrel of Chines' life and Weirs. &mond, they are 111.equippod,
inadequately fed and armed and hay, poor and little transportation.
Thirdly, they are pretty warwmoary and I believe there is a roluctanes
to battle to the death against the Japanese as long as they feel the
Americans msy do it and as long as they *an oontimus to get Lemialease
aid from Amerioa.
Ay hearsay and moral impress.ons from mores of soureee,
it is my impression that the Communist arniem and inflow, in China
WIN. most potent and distinctly the most virile tere's there to be
(conjured with in the postwar period. ?afters. also. they ars the best
equipped and best trained aside from wey postwar help that **yew mei,*
from RUIPUR and the undoubted influenoe that Dania will have inland
affairs and consequently on Chinese affairs 13 the posaar period.
14. The Chinese battle eommuniques, I found, eoulin't be ignoited
or relied upon at all. In the owspaiga waving mouth on Nogyang amd mem
Lingling the Chinese armies bemuse very mud' die/organised. rho istiltretios
of Japanese plainclothes can was rampant. Several villages were takes ,
by them ilea,. Needless to say Japanese espionage was also rampant.
Many bank. in Nes China shortwave daily to their branehes sad Oilmor
cosswor*Ial Muses in Japanese **espied Clank uktok epees the doer vial
viksvas
to direct espionage ami emmemioationso
15. Obtalaing authorisation free the Chinese to de thing., getting
their emoperation on the simplest natters, is almost a berenleen job
...
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9. There are some major operations brewing out of 811A.0 *hi*
undoubtedly have been reported to you. They will be major moos and
sttiw
not small raids. SRAC is ,very*stirs in small elamdestine operatiote
of an intelligence, reocnnaissanoe nature.
10. The potentialities of 088 operations in Durso, is China, and
in SIAC depend proportionately an what role the high emmaends of strategy
assign to those theaters. They oan be great or miser depending on this
fact alone.
11. OSS's opportunitiec to be prepared and ready in these theaters
aro perhaps greater thom they ever were at emy time In any other theater.
12. Communioations equipment is flowing in ateedar ?it thin
Our development work on the now and more appropriate type of equipment
for those areas is not moving anything like as rapidly as we had hoped.
(This is owing to the constant labor troubles and begging down by the
manufacturers. This is being followed up diligently by the Communisations
Branch, their officers being sent oonstantly and some permanently to the
various corporations involved until the material is put out property mad
in quantity.)
13. The situation in China was to we, perhaps the most interesting.
This in owing to the highly involved pelitieal situation existing. Mr
impression was that the Central Government is getting, largely, lip eerviee
from the diverse groups of Chinese national life today. These eonsist
of Communists, the Governor ottoman provisos, and the guerrilla groups.
It is my impression that magy of China's armed fore.. aro net battling
EC ri
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dollen women ooders are being recruited ter Calosito but it will be a
eouple of months before they can be recruited, trained and gotten
into the field. Colonel Coughlin's 50 Commanications mem should all
be in the theater by October 1st.
4. Constant alertness on the part of Washington must be maintained
?oncoming the health of the men in CBI and SMAC owing to the shortages
frequently soused by illness. In this respect these theaters must be
viewed somewhat differently from other theaters.
5. I VIM not at all impressed with the medical supervisioa in these
theaters. This applies as to the caliber of medioal ?Moor, the quantity
of them, their attention to details such as moss, native help, comp sanitation,
malarla ocntrol, the health and morale of the men, etc.
8. Much more care Should be exercised by Ns in recruiting men for
these Par nagt theaters. Young men are highly preferred. Inergy, willing-
nese to be assigned to almost any type of Job, eheorftluess, sooperation
and leadership are perhaps more important in this theater than in amy
other. Men's charaoter weaknesses will show up very quickly there.
7. Detachment 101 Ls distinctly outstanding in its eommand,
management, morale of personnel, activity of operations and results.
8. In both theaters and all areas I 1110,4 impressed by the gulf or
drop been the top commanders of a detachment and the eleoond in eemaand.
Those, in my opinion, should be materially strengthened. Our top officers
weer senveaw How 2 No..
are tops. (The exoeption to this,4in my opinion, is Colonel perm imbe
an I stated before, is an exceptionally capable officer.)
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O. The mess is good though Wimple and plain.
D. lhe Gall* *amp is new equipped to adequately boodle $5 to 00
trainees.
I. They only have a mmall 83T2.1 (t.rommaitter and reeeivor) at
Gall. which is being eurrently used for intreppisland adainistrictire
This
traffic. There is not nor de me ever conaider that Mom will be aa
expanded oommunications bast' on the island.
=NEM IMPRESSIONS
le For the most part, Communisations is well staffed as to quality
of officers and men. (Ther* are only two offieers who are exeeptions to
this statement and who hove sertain definite abilities that are morel
in the Far Stott but who are not rtght in their present assignments. Ome
of then night have to be removed.)
2. Communications is functioning well in all theaters in the Par
East through oortain sections need oonsiderelly mere equipmenti
piles are being planned and *All have to be set up at Sutra. Zooming
and in Ceylon. This is necessary so that immediate operations eon be
staffed and equipped without long delays being required while us sod
materials are gotten there.
5. Very considerably mere personnel for Comesunieatione Inuit be
sent to both CBI and SM. Ceders are badly seeded. (These things are
being taken care of now. Some 15 additional personnel. *Moore,
William instructors, and enlisted men operators hzve been offered by
cable to Falknor with request for air transportation it' October.) Ji
sLic
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Its living conditions, like all bases in that seek of the geode. will
be adequate but crude consisting principally if bashers and hew pretty
well right eut of the jungle.
1. Both of these stations are situated about three miles from
the 08$ main Communisations headquarters and emp at Trinamalee.
C. The mess at Trinoosalee is good. Living conditions, under
the circumstances, are really quite eatertable and habitable* The
morale is ',drably hit*.
D. Here again, I believe the medical situation needs bolstering
up* Mile there is a nedicel offioer, I was mot too well impressed
with his real oompetenoe, activity and sinoerity in, his job.)
B. Transportation at Trincomalee is again, only fair. If
operations increase much, which there is every reason to believe they
definitely will and quickly, Ceylon as a whole should be supplied with
more adequate transportation as the distances are fairly great.
GALLIC
A. Galls is an exoollent imp, beautifully situated and being
very efficiently and actively run by Major Pioddicord.
B. The training schedule of the 088 tactical and oombat grape
at Gallo is very impressive. Beginning at about 700 in the morning.
it sometimes doesn't end until 10230 at night* The terrain is suffleieut4
diverse and rugged for adequate trainieg of all types; so are. the beahas
with their variety of surf and shoreline iharacteristiso. I spat awhile
day training with one of their groups, dem the paths. over the cliffs.
and into the sea and my personal viewpoint about their training seems
well supported by other 08$ officers at Kandy and elsewhere ea the island.
SECRET
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should get espies didmq always get them, (4041 of theft
veriti importanto) This, h000lfor, has boo
m elearod mp with Colson
loppner and was nothing but an oversight, pne not Intentional.
B. Colonel
whom Sopr is apparently well liked lir all of tho higher
echelon with he deals. le treats his staff with Ploit frissatbess
under cheerful. pleasent oonditIons.
and kindness and In oonsequenos
gots a great deal of work cot of' them
a. ?he mess Is very good and living oonditions
D. More is a
out, e
constant daily stream of traffle sooting la or going
offloors and nlisted mon from Grille.
14 lombo frineenaleo. Co and the
United States. aro well handled and moll resolved. One too ?ransportetion is net very adequate end they oould do with INOTO?
or new jesps arrived the dey 1 IOU loaviag.
P. ?boy had attaohed to theft at the tine on as one of the meet
thoroughly oompotent. *614 rersetile. non that I not im the par kit.
namely. 0os/eft4er itigr kier of Pleid Photegraphio. So Is universally
respected and admired throughout tali Ihr Sun by OSS Poe"10 aud rsaLtr
has it on the ball. leatever more ***ler assignment he is ever gives. I
am oconfident he condu
will ct with the utmost effieleney. ,
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ll
being sompleted. Is
extrenely *i looatod and most offielently laid onto the reentring
station. situated more than a mile from the transmitter station. ins ta
proposal of boiac oomploto4 ky a detachment of Madras englaeore at Mho
till. I was thoro That also
. Is *ell loo ated and mill be very well installed.
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001000
A. OSS has a Tory **plot, in koodqoarters there bet WilmaI left
was in prowess of moving to a sow siltation right ea the *hors. They
have by new oemplotod their walmhpsuse of approximately 216000 ocean
feet which is %etymon tbe abiJOISO sir strip mod iho city itself. This
has plenty of aoreago for oxpansio* it mwooskiarys Whim I visited there
the Dotaehment was undo,' the sommaad of Captain met a seat 1410 met
with 'boa I was highly improssod. It is now wmder the oommaad of soother
officer who, in my opinion, minuet be oompared to Captain Clark. It for
any reason SZAC doors net want laptain Clark in, his ~root position.
Communications will be delightod to have his at any time. This viempolat
is also endorsed by Colonol Yalkoor.
11. 14 only halm a Tory small trumsnittor and reooiver at Colombo
used wholly for administrativo traffic with Kandy and oeoosionally with
Gallo.
'vitt
C. Tho morale of our two waisted men is good. They do a imilbs
busioess-liko daily Jobe
KANDY
A. ?he whole OBS sot up in Kandy is beautifully sitmotodo oxtremely
well constructod, well managed and run with the least mount of tvourntroa.
There is a small but good *wags (muter in one of tho bashemelong the
main line of administrative bathers. Again, the soestity is fair gommoih
oonsidoring general security in the Far .at. Th. transmitter tower is
located right next to Colonel Roppnor's bungalow up on *if top of the hill.
Our mon are good. I found a certain amount of neglect ia th. distzibetiom
of information copies of cables in that all pooplo in Communioaticas eat
SLCAET
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D. It was my distinct impression that OSS een win or lees its
MY To
reputation in China 11. the extols* It whisk it beeks or tails to lea
AWRTS. This group is on its tom as a tactieal operetta. term. It
is doing great &nage to the Japaneso,and the 14th Air Perm ead the
American Chinese Composite Wing under amoral Vineent are almost the
only mitten*. of really hard hitting, hard fighting tootles that I ems
opposing the Japanese in China.
I. Lt. Drren, our ?immunisations men, as well as other Commuaisations
personnel, 043 bighly thought of by Colonel Smith who *emends them in
their presenoe ropeatedly, encourages them often. They have a good set-
up there 14 an extremely well arranged ompound at the end of the air
strip. The building was well designed and inside has been very well
constructed for one of its type; but the outside like most Par Nesters
construction has a tendency to fall off. (This bemuse of the type of
mud plaster they use .- but this Should not be given very serious
consideration as it is widespread everywhere.)
F. Colonel Smith is recommending two of our Communisations ma fir
decorations for tho work that they did in being largely responsible ter
the slaughter of so many Japanese cavalry on the road and so may Japanese
orossing the river in doubledook troop oarriers.
G. (More on the China situation under General Improesime later
in this report.)
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Hall, liked him aid considered him sincere, knowledgeable and +capable
of doing a good job for OBS in the right party.
XWBILIN
A. I arrived at Kweilin anticipating all sorts of trouble and
fairly well poisonod against Colonel Mmith of AGMS.
B. I found precisely the opposito. I found htm a most likeablo
man, hard working (personally ambitious) sinoore in his efforts to make
of AGFRTB a real show. Es was doing muoh of the work himsolt without
any fancy staff of adjutants and legwork offioers and men to do it for
hie. He couldn't have been mono helpful in giving as information of
every type. At the momont he was slightly bittor againot OBS (whisk I
soon found involved personality conflicts with two of our offieero and
whioh I doubt if them is any real remody for as I found when I get bask
from iwoilin that the feeling is mutual). 6110 HAY Now EWEN liemernol)
C. I found Colonel Smith's critioiema, whisk Imre sincere and
dispassionately directed, almost all well grounded and justified.
Colonel Falknor and I took immediate steps to correct all throe of the.
They were:
(1. Tho removal of one officer who is a troublemaker.
2. Th. removal of another officer with our DP crowd who was tee
young and afraid of tho responsibilities being plowed on him, and
tho bolstering up of our Dr staff in twisilin.
3. T)t. delay in transmission of informatiou to Oblosel
and General (honnault of the 14th Air 'Oro. in Chungking, swing
to the lack of a direct tolotrpe lino from the Message ?enter to
the 14th Air %rico which I mentionod Wore and which I believe has
alroady been morroctod.)
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N. The transmitter is well leeated, guarded by Chimes, soldiers,
but as security is known here, it sem ealy be oemsidered seam in the
Chinese sense as natives are inevitably wamderiag around, eenstmmtly
passing the transmitter via paddy fields and paths.
OWOOKISO
A. In spite of spending about one tour with Ommodore Mos *WI
I arrived in Chungking and going up to Nappy Vella, talking to their
?Meer. and Communioations men and going into the Whole setup. / profited
very little either in information or impressions trem mr trip there. In
feet I drew a cipher.
D. I did not get the feeling that morale is very high. There
was no running later at the time I ems there. Wiser' and men had teem
looked in the Nappy Valley with no opportunity to get into Chengking
proper for the past five days.
C. Transportation was the worst I found in China as the Nappy
Valley had net one ear or jeep of its own.
D. I got the distinet impression that Niles dominates and infleemees
the entire picture. Re is tied up with amoral Tod Li whisk seems to give
his suoh complete espionage (not military or Naval intelligent:40 ss to
make his able to oontrol things very much to his owe liking.
1. I was. frankly net well impressed nor do I feel 1Wil is the
big outfit in China for 0118 to back and give its efforts to. 'I express
MAY NIMI
this it* due hesitancy imam* as the failure to get moromite likely
!SEW
ma my own eomplete failure. I was, however, well impressed with Calomel
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O. Communioations is shorthanded there amd a geed deal or illnees
can be expected in that valley. I presume, however, that nrw that
Myitkyina has falleniNotter housiag ocsditioas will be tumid within
the city itself with greater *comfort and proteetion fres the olssomts.
TWA SMALL MUMMA VILLAOMS
A. These are weal' rugged outposts where a great deal at illness
will neoessarily be encountered and the replenishment of Cr- hatless
equipment by dropping or porta" :oh as new sets, batteries, battery
chargers, etc. will have to be ocustantli undertakwa.
KUNMING
A. The Communications transaitter is located about three miles
from the OBS house in the city of Kunming. I felt ve were someWhat
weak on manpower here, both as to quantity and in some instanees, as
to quality. (Corrections aro now being made in this.)
B. A direct teletype line frma our transmitter to the Mk Air
Force was non-existent at the time Ives out there but Major McCarthy
assured as that it would be installed within three weeks. It undoubtedly
is in operation now.
C. The transportation to Xunming is extremely bad consisting et
one jeep and one borrowed Navy one, which is net always available to us,
for the whole of OSS operations.
D. In spite of the fine climate, sickness has eo depleted the
staff that Major McCarthy MA having to attend to practieally every
single detail and it.. of operation for OSS (with the =sorties of
actual Communications work.)
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SHADUZUP
A. This is combat headquarters for Stillwell's forms'. The
OSS basher is but one removed from General Stillwell in a most exeelbmt
situation. The Communications transmitting and receiving station is
about 200 yards up and em top of the hill. It is out out of virgin
jungle; extremely rugged, having a hard, muddy, root/ and slippery
climb uphill after every ness.
11. Here again the morale sof the men is exoelloont, and their
health Pair. The equipment and its efficiency only just eatisfaetiery;
at the moment requiring replenishment. 11.661 it mama Dime.
MYITIYINA
A. The situation here has probably *hanged since I was there
which was during the Japanese occupation of the city. At the time
was there it oonsisted of nothing but an air strip, oontrol tower, and
tents surrounding the air strip pegged down in eneessive mud and *ea
the sun was out, excessive heat. The men have to dig about four feet
down in the mud to put their cots in order to get sway as far as pessible
frma the heat of the canvas tents. Our operator 'working on his set at
the time I came in VAS down in a hole about six feet deep with the equip-
ment, beneath the tent. The other operator, a native, was on his cot,
down with malaria.
B. The Japanese were occasionally *belling the field Baden were
shelling Witkyina nearly every five minutes and bombing it as fast as
the pursuit pianos could take off with new bombs under their wings.
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0. The Message Closter and Cesrmunieations headgsertore are Li
the main bungalow well established and will mansed (with the exleeptces
of a great deal of illness wkioh depletes their Agrees.)
D. The transmitter station. out out et extmeely rugged sad
tangled oountry, eould well be a model for any seek station in the whole
of the Fir Nast. The men have apparently shown the utmost ingmmultir
in making themselves osmfortable, *lean and sanitary with very littIe?
Their mess is one of the finoot I struok In the whole of the Fir Usti,
There is an orderlineme and knew-how to their operations whisk was
distinsey impressive and I gather they have so impressed ethers. I
wish to commend Lt. Riohter most highly for his intelligent leadership.
his diplomaoy and his innate good sense as to hew to run a statism and
do a job.
2, 04mmander Luce struck me am a eompetent medloal offieer but
with that exoeptionI think the medioal attention in Assam as well as
in Burma demand' the ittmost thought and attention on the part of 01X
in Wishington ana : consider it imperative that Teich younger and moseh
more oapable men should be sent to Detaohment 101 If their implement
of manpower is to be maintained at anything like neoessary 'treat*.
There was a great deal of malaria and Colonel Peers was insisting cm
every preoautionary measure against
WWI
A. rhis is just a landing strip for planes te Mhadusup. Myltkyinia.
and other plow's. Communications had no installations theme
r4.
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B. Our now base station is in the preeess of eonstreetien.
The rhombic antennas were already up and the building by new undoubtedly
has been oompleted. It is exoellently built and has been dims*,
planned for oonnunioations operations. 2t is situated as a high hill
overlooking Communioations warehouses and Chops. OSS trainimg *amp and
the air field to 'his* it is in oleo, proximity. It is about 18 miles
from our main 088 house in Chittagong.
C. Transportation is rather weak in Chittagong oonsistiag ef no
jeep and a weapons carrier.
D. Illness has not taken any great toll in this area. Our
Sergeant in charge and Lt. Bartholowy are both doing an outatandiaey
fine job in establishing the station.
'AURA
A. Here I found the morale of the men as high if not higher than
at any place in CHI or S*AC. They seem to have a keeaness and awaremese
of the importance of their jobs. The 023 headquarters there is as
strongly and well commanded as any place we have in the Far Bast, if
not better. There is good collaboration and the results speak for
themselves.
B. Colonel Rays Peers is most cooperative in every way but is
iw opinion he needs a good strong eapable ezeoutive offieer as there
is quite a large gulf between his own oapabilities and the next nearest
in oommand.
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newspapers in the shipments of egaipseut laid' have gems eut theft
amd I isn't enplaia the high morale effect on the mem uhidi this had
upon their arrival. Ome has te be there sad is. at it mesas to them.
This Branch is oontinuing this practise in its shipments
2. During my stay there we had two doctors ozonise ever7mee of the
visa time employees, giving thee a thorough pkysioal ezamimatima. Approximate/7
fifty per cent of the natives refused to be is examined .ad were dieeharged
that same day and replaced by others. I know of me bettor ample ef
safeguarding the men's health than this in all o: the Far at.
P. Them was an average amount of illness for the climate. Aloest
everyone of th.lat Communications men and offieers in the Theater had either
boon hospital/see or just come o.t of the hospital du*Ing my stay there.
414-
Ione of these illnesses are serious,lithey are more or less oonstaat and
ever present threats. They definitely deplete our manpower supply amd
endanger operations accordingly.
G. Our relations with Colonel McGehee in Caleutta both in my
personal talks alone with him and in conversations with oar ema Communi-
cations men, are most cordial and running smoothly.
/4H. Fraa the Communicatioms angle, transportation is good. From
"the other Branohos' angle it is extremely poor but had improved somewhat
by the time 1 left.
CHITTAMIG,
A. I. are somewhat shorthanded in personnel in Chittagong tut are
sending another officer there and perhaps an enlisted maa to increase our
complenent.
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oonoentrating on the business at hand and it is Interesting to note
that at no time either going or sowing book through Now Delhi did I
Markin make one unfavorable remark WM regard to amy man la the field
in any theater, nor did he boot about Washington and the way lhor are
handling things. This I found impreseivs and refreshing.
D. ?moral Reeder bas taken over Signal Cemmunieatlana fres
General King; our relations with bin are Wamellent both i Wow Dsibi
and Calcutta. I consider from my brie opportunity for ampressions
that 088 relationships in Now Delhi ar 4
oe4porfeet.
CALCUTTA
A. The Communications building in Caleutta while being buis.6184
it must originally have seemed an improvident establishes's%) is now. in
my opivion more than fully justified. It has been renovated, window
screened, modern *Indian* plumbing put in and the mess is now well
managed and the men well housed.
B. At this time it is very well stocked with equipmant and smpplies
and greatly impressed General Reeder, Colonel Neal and tho British MB
and Signal officers Who inspected it while I yes there.
0. The transmitter and receiving: station as well as the eede resin
are now undoubtedly moved into thi Osontsdeations motor from Telligaungs
D. The morale of all the men is extremely ktgho good tasilities
have been s000rded that by furniihing a roomettes roma sad piano 'hi*
makes that desire to stay there in the evenings instead et going into
town. Major Perry has 'Airily paeked all sorts of neganinss amit Ihmkr
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4. lhile I 111114 in China I talked to 'uric* at Shang-Jae but I
11110 unable to visit him as it would have taken about ton do's to got
there, part of the trip by sampan. and I didn't know that sutfielent
time would be authorised ne to make the trip though I strongly feel
that torsional. and other reasons, that nil of the most outlying and
even the mealiest outposts should be visited to let the nen know that
the people book home *owe that far to see then and are interested is
their welfare and work.
A. Our dowourications setup here consists wholly of code it
and direct contacts and operations with the Army Signal Center.
B. I found the morale of the men good but they were extrema,'
shorthanded during the current illness of two of the mon.
C. I was extremely favorably impressed with Colonel Barry Berne,
both as to the manner in which he was conducting his natter* work with
all of the important people that OSS and Communioations should keep
contacts with, as well Ls the apparent friendship which they *videos's
towards him. I interviewed a great 'many of these people throgh
Colonel Berno's kindness and was also present when he was asked by
Colonel Rios to accompany him and general Stratemeyer in general
Stratemeyer's plane on a throe day visit to tashair. Colonel Berne
impressed me as being a thoroughly oapable executive type aims
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,
r?40Memorandum?? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO : General Donovan
FROM : Major Willis
SUBJECT: Report MA Recent Trip to CBI and /MAC
DATE: September 111# 1944
I, The purpose of ny trip was to inspeot the Comunisations
installations in CBI and (RAC. I Timed this responsibility as
enoompassing sore than merely a natter of teshaleal eirmits, equipment
supplies and the ealiber of officers and nes. With this in *Ind I
oconoerned igscolth equally with Moo living comditions of the men, their
fiNmd and sanitation, their health, norale and vbether er at they were
in the right notch and assivonent, else their relationships to the
ecommand to which they were attacked.
2, _I virited and inspected all of the Ommmaieatione headquarters
and installations in CBI and =AC and ? few of the mere forward pests,
as follows:
INDIA CERA WM
Noirraki iuiaq igialp
Calcutta Chungking Tankaw
Chittagong , Usti in Iwites Tillage
Tanya Village
Nitadawag Village
CEYLON ASSAM
Co ariU---
Landy
Trincomalee
Galls
3. At ?silos and Ilawdawng me we molls to land ming to *co
bad condition of the air strip and fields whisk were under wabse.but
ECI:pFIET
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VAN PELT, HOMRE H.
15,173
SCHOLTL, MAJOR H.F.
15,194
ANTUNOVIC? T/5 IVO
15,195
CHUN'...MING, MAJOR ARCHIE
15,223
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A8SIGJNNT1
BY
LEONARD S. WILSON, LT., USNR
20 OCTOBER 1944
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SUTJARY BY CAPT^IN KANTACK OF FOLLOWING REi-ORTS
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riglIMAI"grstnXIALU-,,,yriiirf*I4 ggi.,V5rarisM;a?*?4 AA- iv 130p-^ KIntirp itsta`-`"1".'7"alA oNfEek:;.No.,14,04talgtat-Vglitro''''''' :"7"w7k,r.tr)P
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oTAiximo room no. $4
To General. Donoviin
FROM Seeretdriat
WINTcTs Report:, .f Officers Heturning from MA/Lonaon
Attached hereto are reports of inrec offic'er3 Jtaff
member on duty with MA/London hetv,een 14 Jamiar. 1.9..4 and 30
November 19i#Li..
I. MA.14_111-21211
A. A detailed dnu documented .nirtlysis of tne Map Division
ontitied "Assignment in britait.,11 by Leonard Wilson, Lt., U.S.N.R.
Deputy Uhler. Incluueo tn tnts report. r tt l iowixi items
vilica may be 01 iiiterust:
faileu to tell h&A/I,ondon that a
11,q, blvt:Aon wa: c3tab1isheu or tn.,t. :%flyi re
I.Rec.1 oLdhtempl. tea. The relait wag tnat
Servi.es Brnnch founo ttselr co-plett.ty unawilre of Lae
1'rob1.e.,1 of iroell.n, our !zal'ilie_;.from thL, British. It
is, ulert..forL, t:lat e.A-Aolish!ltnt of any
outpost be 11.1Lidity then cart: of by..',t,...rvices/Wdshington
and the division et- teemed (4penuix III.)
/. Parat.,ounL uwi upplies isackint, in shipments froqi
Washini,ton iirL air Imushes, Mint- e,ibinetz.,, microfilm
cameras, fil. ln, otordct cabinets (a. )3.)
3. The-e are to com..lendatiolis of outst,.nding interest,
one fro Pri,e Cdurch111 (14. .2) 41K. another
fro' l k,,ueen WiLdelina kfir. 19.)
41111.
Alb
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Ito la>y.! iszln by traced to
11)ilo3ophy in
They are
allowe,:! for expo/1810n
in Lndcn
ti'jcohtinent, anti coordination
lAra. i.urpoz;us twtweeh iackLondon und FAA/
11-..vur accompli:iheU.
utssipated :it projects without
lc
of cioar-out orgwii4cItion within
confu:310zi in contInenthi operational
genertd working progriAL but
ith ;;Iarvivo.. Dno
ra!,c:,
PronioLioLo wtru lotl for :1&A
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kotting aeaker
A. Rol)urt J. VosklIL,
of 9 Octuour 1944.
III. Thu rvport VI
L014(1011, Uw.;eviliv::
WI th
rvciArrilw ppouLvill:
ynolu:31 ottAff
t.tt; ?cco:up113hmeht of a staff
The foliowlhi: ilifficaltIvs presented a
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